
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



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M dal MARA DATE 2/17/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTIC IPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 19, 1974 8:00 a.m. [Breakfast]

PLACE: The White House

<u>Kissinger</u>: This European thing will work out okay. They are pissing in their pants.

Schlesinger: I want to travel along the Central Front.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Don't go until after the middle of April. We don't want things to move too fast. We need to stay tough.

<u>Schlesinger:</u> I want to put pressure on the Europeans to make changes on the Central Front.

Why move Strausz-Hupe?

Kissinger: Politics.

The Germans have promised to have consultation with us before they take decisions. The British have gone even further.

<u>Schlesinger:</u> We should write down the list of NATO military needs and make the Europeans shape up. Jones says the British are really obstructionists in NATO -- subtlely. We need new command arrangements.

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<u>Kissinger</u>: I agree. We have troops there to either give us a more flexible response or to prevent European neutralism. If we can't get it, we should organize our defense rationally for us.

I wouldn't reassure the Europeans about keeping our troops in Europe.

<u>Schlesinger</u>: I am not. I have told them that we must have a military reason to keep our troops there.

Diego Garcia.

<u>Kissinger</u>: I defended you to Stennis. I only didn't know why it had to be by supplemental.

<u>Schlesinger</u>: I need to tell Congress that the British don't have a veto on its use.

Kissinger: You can't tell them there is a codicil.

Schlesinger: Can I tell Hebert we have high confidence?

Kissinger: Yes.

Schlesinger: For Suez, we need a Presidential letter.

Kissinger: Okay.

Schlesinger: I don't know if we can pay for it.

<u>Kissinger</u>: If possible, I think the Navy should pay for it. We need to be forthcoming to the Egyptians.

Schlesinger: How about Zumwalt for SACEUR?

Kissinger: Not bad, except he is Navy. Haig would be a good SACEUR.

Schlesinger: I gather the Soviets are not pushing on SALT.

<u>Kissinger</u>: It is hard to say. Gromyko told me only Brezhnev could make a decision on it.

Schlesinger: Why should they push?

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<u>Kissinger</u>: What have the Soviets gotten from detente. The psychic satisfaction of reducing the chance of war and gaining equality with the U.S.

Nothing else. We have defused the peace movement here. The Middle East must be painful to the Soviets.

Schlesinger: Part was their fault.

<u>Kissinger:</u> No nation admits that. And we stalled, obfuscated, etc. on the Middle East last year and they had nothing to give to the Arabs. So they passed arms because they couldn't give the Arabs anything else. Everyone miscalculated. The Soviets probably think I screwed them at the end of October by not proceeding jointly. They have been humiliated.

So I think they will make an effort on SALT.

Schlesinger: I think we could be more forthcoming on MBFR than on SALT.

<u>Kissinger</u>: JCS are starting to go the same way in MBFR as in SALT -toward cynicism.

<u>Schlesinger:</u> The JCS have revised their SALT position. I don't agree completely, but it is thoughtful.

<u>Kissinger</u>[reads JCS paper]: Not bad. It may even be possible. What does Zumwalt want?

Schlesinger: To be tougher.

Kissinger: How?

Schlesinger: We have all Trident and they are restricted to G and H.

<u>Kissinger</u>: The problem is if the Soviets want to break out MIRV from a permanent agreement.

<u>Schlesinger</u>: Zumwalt is on thin ice on air defense. If the Soviets applied it to ASW, we are in trouble.

We got to deal with the FBS.

Kissinger: Maybe we can deal with it in MBFR.

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But even if we did it in SALT, we don't have to disband the forces, just pull them out of range.

The only thing I can tell the Soviets is we can put it into MBFR and look at it benevolently.

One way of restricting MIRV is by missile fields.

Schlesinger: It is interesting.

We need \$50 million more on Canadian needs and PD on it. It is being held up in State.

Kissinger: By whom?

Schlesinger: The security assistance people. You have to start testimony -- early April.

Kissinger: I won't be here much in April. Let's work it out.

<u>Schlesinger:</u> Israeli aid. There are two decisions -- the breakout of the \$1.5 billion and PD to go above \$1.5.

<u>Kissinger:</u> Let's give everything the Arabs don't like in connection with the Syrian disengagement. (Gun-ships -- probably don't give them Cobras, or anybody in the Middle East.)

<u>Schlesinger</u>: Thailand. It is important that we announce 10,000 now -- it doesn't matter over what period. We must negotiate with the Thai military a permanent presence.

<u>Kissinger</u>: On SALT. FBS, we can try to put it into MBFR. If they want to break out a MIRV deal, I will bring it back.

For your thinking, the President might want a MIRV deal and we must not make it look like a sell-out. Even a slowdown in MIRV deployment is in our interest. I will go no further than to elicit Soviet proposals.

Arms for Egypt. They are making a massive move toward us. They have given us a big shopping list. There are two ways we can provide it. I don't want to give them high-visibility items. One way is third countries.



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<u>Schlesinger</u>: There is no problem in doing this, only that it may have to become public.

<u>Kissinger</u>: We must be cold-blooded about it. We maybe can give highvisibility items to the Saudis and let them keep them there for a while.

NSSM 177. We must get going.

Schlesinger: Let's not do it in the DPRC. Let's do it in our SRG.

Kissinger: Okay. Set up a meeting to discuss the issue.

Schlesinger: Hewlett-Packard. You are in favor.

<u>Kissinger:</u> Yes. I want to know before it happens so I can get some political mileage.

<u>Schlesinger</u>: The sub SIOP briefing -- the briefing leaves out the political deficits.



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