# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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**THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY**

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***The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.***

***The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.***

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# Secretary Kissinger Meets With NATO Parliamentarians

*Following are informal remarks by Secretary Kissinger and the transcript of his question-and-answer session with members of the North Atlantic Assembly at their 22d annual session held at Williamsburg, Va., on November 16.*[1]

Press release 560 dated November 16

Now, distinguished delegates, when I accepted this invitation it was at the advice of our Policy Planning Staff, which felt that it was safe to use this occasion to articulate the policies of the new Ford Administration. [Laughter.] But you have to remember that not even our Policy Planning Staff can be right 100 percent of the time. So I think there are one or two Congressmen here who, even if I attempted to bluff, would be eager to tell you that I cannot fully speak for the policies of the forthcoming Carter Administration.

Nevertheless, the policy of the United States toward NATO, the basic foreign policy objectives of the United States, have always been treated as nonpartisan issues in the United States. When a Republican Administration was in office, the main lines of our foreign policy have been supported by leading Democrats. And now that a Democratic Administration is about to assume office, the main lines of our policy, you can be certain, will be supported by leading Republicans. We will not treat foreign policy as an issue between the parties in any event. The relationship between the United States and its allies in the Western alliance goes back over the whole postwar period. It has been pushed forward by every President, of both of our parties; and it reflects enduring realities.

The United States will always stand for peace. It will always uphold the security of its friends and of free people, and it will always strive for bringing about a world that is better than the one in which we may find ourselves at any moment.

It is fashionable in discussions of the NATO alliance to emphasize the difficulties, and sometimes the shortcomings, of the alliance. But we should keep in mind that one can think of few alliances in history that have lasted such a long time while gaining in strength and cohesiveness. What started out as an attempt to deal with a military danger has expanded in significance to encompass economic and political cooperation, which is turning our alliance more and more into a cooperative, creative partnership.

I thought that the most useful thing I could do today is to make a few observations about the basic problems that any American Administration faces in the conduct of foreign policy and then to answer your questions.

Inevitably, the NATO alliance faces the need to adjust itself to new realities. Weapons technology has changed enormously since the early days of NATO. At that time the United States had a nuclear monopoly. Today, as a result of unavoidable industrial and technological changes, there exists an effective parity.

We can discuss forever which side has a marginal advantage in what category of strategic weapons. The basic fact remains that the predominance of strategic weap-

[1] Congressman Jack Brooks' introduction of Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

ons which characterized the 1950's and the greater part of the 1960's is no longer the case and cannot be recaptured at any level of American effort. Therefore NATO inevitably faces the necessity of adjusting its defense to these new conditions.

That challenge is being met now. Major efforts have been made in recent years to improve the defensive capability of NATO; and this challenge must continue to be met, and I am confident will continue to be met, in the years ahead.

The second problem we face is the political and economic cooperation between the nations of the North Atlantic. Whether this is done within the framework of the NATO organization or through ad hoc arrangements adopted to specific circumstances is less important than for us to remember that military defense without a political and economic consensus will, over a period of time, prove empty. The nations of the North Atlantic have to have some common vision of the future and a parallel approach to some of the crucial issues of our period.

I believe that in recent years the degree of consultation among the allies has expanded enormously in all fields and that very great progress has been made in developing this consensus in the field of economic cooperation.

I remember when in 1973 I pointed out the need for the nations of the North Atlantic to cooperate in the field of economics, there were some who pointed out that this was not necessarily part of the NATO charter. And that was true. But the events of subsequent years have left no doubt that our nations are interdependent, that we are the engines of the world economy, that none of us can achieve economic prosperity in isolation, and that none of us can master the problems either of East-West economic relations or North-South economic relations by separate policies.

And finally, there is the problem of relations with the Communist world, the problem that brought us together in the first place. We face adversaries that are gaining in military strength, and we therefore have the necessity of building up our own military strength. But we also must remember that we have an obligation to the future and an obligation to our peoples to demonstrate that military power is a means and not an end, that we must spare no effort to bring about a more peaceful world and one less fraught with risks.

We must avoid, on the one hand, the danger of illusionism and of wishful thinking that substitutes the desire for peace for the reality. But we also have to avoid the danger of excessive truculence and of thinking that tough rhetoric is the same as substantive policy.

But we face these problems, I believe, in an atmosphere of increasing confidence between the allies. In the two political campaigns in NATO countries that took place this year, the debate between the parties was as to who would do a better job in strengthening the alliance. And while the incumbents, of course, always believed that the criticism that was made of them was unjust, unfair, and a few other words I would not wish to use here, nevertheless the fact of the criticism is healthy for the alliance because it shows that in this country there is no dispute about the importance of NATO. There is no dispute about the central role the Atlantic relationship plays in our foreign policy. There is only a dispute as to who can most effectively realize the objectives all Americans share.

And now, in any event, that the campaign is over, all Americans will without doubt support the strengthening of NATO, the fostering of the partnership between Western Europe and the United States, and the common achievement of peace, of progress, and of security.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

*Rear Adm. Morgan Morgan-Giles, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, in your very interesting remarks, you spoke*

*about the broadening of the original NATO alliance into political and economic fields. But I am, as an old military man, concerned with the processes within the alliance for taking military decisions for military crisis management below the threshold of any shooting war. And could you say whether during your time as Secretary of State you have been satisfied with the arrangements and the procedures and, in particular, the communications for taking military decisions within our alliance in conditions below a shooting war?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, during my term of office we did not have a major European crisis, and therefore the military arrangements of NATO were never tested as far as I was concerned in a crisis situation.

I have the feeling, based on no very hard evidence, that an improvement in the communications would be helpful. I have had more experience with political consultation, but again not under crisis conditions. There the relationship between the NATO Council and consultations in capitals does not always work as smoothly as one would expect. And in very acute crises, the tendency has been to consult more immediately in the capitals than in the NATO Council.

### Greek-Turkish Disputes

*Constantin Koniotakis, Greek Parliament: I am a retired Air Force general who has served with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] for three years under Gen. [Lauris] Norstad as military representative of Greece.*

*I am, sir, very much concerned, as I am sure all of us here are, about the weakness in the effectiveness of the southern flank of the alliance, which, as all of us know, is due to the existing state of tension in our relations with Turkey.*

*But Greece is asking nothing that belongs to any of her allies. The Turks, after 20 years of smooth cooperation in the alliance, are claiming today rights that belong to us according to existing international treaties.*

*So I ask on which side lies the bulk of responsibility for creating such problems which produce generally this tension. I know, sir, that is a very delicate question to answer, but I am certain that as long as NATO's attitude toward such problems in the alliance is to be, or seems to be, influenced not so much by objectiveness but by other considerations, I am afraid that the cohesion of the alliance will continue to suffer.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am reckless, but I am not suicidal. [Laughter.]

In my limited but intense exposure to the Greek-Turkish problem, it has become apparent to me that in the history in which Greece and Turkey have impacted on each other over the centuries, there has developed a legacy of distrust in which an outsider would better not attempt to apportion the responsibility.

The major problem we face today is that the disputes between Greece and Turkey, and the attempt to settle these disputes by military means, are a disaster for both countries and a disaster for the alliance. These issues have, moreover, become enmeshed in our own domestic affairs, and I think that the most useful role that the United States can play is to seek to bring about a resolution of these conflicts by acting as an honest broker between the parties, using its influence, because there can be no victory for either side between Greece and Turkey. Everybody will lose.

I think the major role in this will have to be played by the new Administration. But again, all concerned Americans will support any serious effort to bring an end to these disputes.

### Angola and Portugal

*Amaro da Costa, Portuguese Assembly of the Republic: Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to put to you two questions concerning Angolan affairs and one question concerning Portuguese affairs.*

*As you know, and all of us know, two former liberation movements in Angola are now conducting or leading or initiating a new guerrilla war aiming, according to their own declarations and statements, to put an end to the presence and domination of Cuban and Soviet military forces in Angola. I would like to have your reaction on that issue, on those new events, and on the possible consequences of this new state of affairs in the interests of the alliance.*

*A second question, sir, it will be concerning the recent reports indicating that the Cuban military forces in Angola are responsible for genocide in the south of the country, and I would like to have your comments on such reports.*

*The third question, sir, concerns Portugal. The United States and other countries have been giving a positive response to the financial and monetary needs of their own country, and I would like to know if you think that the present level of cooperation is enough to overcome the present economic difficulties of my country.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, we are aware that a guerrilla war is going on in some parts of Angola. We are not supporting it. And to the extent that it occurs, it seems to reflect the inability of the authorities in Luanda to establish their control, even with the presence of 12,000–13,000 Cuban troops.

We have strongly opposed the presence of these Cuban troops. We think that their introduction was incompatible with the spirit of détente or with the practice of détente. And we believe that any future efforts like this would raise very serious questions about Soviet long-range intentions.

But we are not ourselves participating directly or indirectly in any of these actions.

With respect to genocide in the southern part of Angola, we have seen no confirmed reports, and our information is probably no different from yours. It comes from stories from various surrounding countries. But we have had no independent confirmation.

With respect to the economic problems of Portugal, the United States has strongly supported the democratic government that is now in office in Portugal and the democratic system that has been established. We have under consideration now a program for substantially increased economic aid, and I think that within the next week a decision on this will be communicated to the Portuguese Government and, I think, in a constructive sense.

### Rhodesia Negotiations

*Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, British House of Commons: Like the last question, mine goes far beyond NATO, but it concerns Africa. May I ask the Secretary of State to say something about the Administration's policy on Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has supported the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia with respect for minority rights and was instrumental in bringing about the acceptance by Mr. [Ian D.] Smith of the principle of majority rule within two years and of the establishment immediately of a transitional government before full majority rule comes into being.

There is now in Geneva a negotiation under British chairmanship that is enormously complex because it brings together four nationalist groups of different persuasions, the Rhodesian authorities, various African observers—and therefore the negotiations have a very complex character.

Nevertheless I think both the British Government and we are cautiously optimistic that the negotiations are going forward. Each of the parties, of course, has the necessity of making public statements for its own constituents, but we hope that progress—well, we believe that some progress has already been made, and we believe that the negotiations to establish a transitional government can be pushed forward.

### European Unification; NATO Standardization

*Arne Christiansen, Danish Folketing: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among other things the economic interdependence. One of your former Ambassadors to the European Community recently published a book called "The Unhinged Alliance." I think it was Ambassador [J. Robert] Schaetzel. In this book he indicates some reluctance from the Americans in recognizing the efforts and endeavors of the Europe of the Nine.*

*As a European, I would like to hear your comment on that point of view and, in the same connection, also your opinion with a view to the standardization and rationalization within NATO, your view on the European program group.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, you have to remember I am leaving public office as an illiterate. I don't read any nonclassified document [laughter], and I don't know whether I am still capable of reading a sentence that doesn't have five dependent clauses [laughter].

So I have not read the book of Mr. Schaetzel, but I assume, from a general acquaintance with his views, that he is not in complete agreement with the policies of this Administration.

Now, I don't know what is meant by recognizing the efforts of the Nine. Our view has been that in the fifties—and maybe in the early sixties—it may have been appropriate for the United States to be the chief engine of European unification. But at some point in that process, the process of European unification had to develop its own momentum. We have believed that Europe could not be unified by the United States and that frantic efforts by the United States to bring about what has to be an organic evolution would not advance the prospects.

We welcome European unification. We believe it is in the interests of the West, in the interests of the Atlantic alliance. We will cooperate with European unification. But I think that the chief impetus for European unification must come from the Europeans, and the United States cannot adopt a patronizing attitude in which we tell the Nine how they should organize their own internal affairs.

Now, in that sense, we may not have been as active as our predecessors. But it is also an imperative, if Europe is ever to be an independent force, that at some point it take over responsibility for its own evolution. We welcome that evolution. We will support it. We are willing and eager to deal with it.

On the issue of standardization, in principle we support it. It is, in fact, highly desirable. In practice, when the issue arises there are very often conflicting pressures in which theory and practice do not always mesh. But certainly the standardization of weapons in NATO is a highly important and desirable objective.

### Normalization of Relations With P.R.C.

*Roderick MacFarquhar, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary, after an initial breakthrough, the Administration of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford did not succeed in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. I wonder if you could explain why that was and whether you would recommend, if asked, that the new Administration should and could proceed rapidly in that direction.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have done my utmost to curb my propensity of telling others how to conduct their affairs, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give advice to an Administration that hasn't even taken office yet and especially somebody who was not short of advice while I was in office. I will try to be somewhat more sparing than was the case when I was here.

But, basically, I would point out that our relationship with China has at least two components—the component of normalization and the component where two great nations have parallel objectives even in the absence of normalization of relations.

The parallel interest has been expressed

repeatedly in public statements by both sides in our concern with preventing world hegemony by any country. And we believe that we can cooperate, and have in fact on occasion developed parallel views, whether or not normalization has in fact been completed.

The United States has committed itself to work toward normalization. I would assume that the new Administration will continue this process; but I don't want to make cooperation on one of these categories dependent on full completion of the other, nor do I want to tell the new Administration with what speed it should proceed.

### Peaceful Alternative in Southern Africa

*Claude Roux, French National Assembly [in French]: Mr. Secretary, our colleague Chairman [Michel] Boscher very clearly expressed the views of the French delegation regarding your action at the service of peace.*

*We especially appreciate your successful efforts for the safeguarding of peace in the Near East and for the strengthening of alliances. Perhaps this has not been brought out sufficiently, but I would like to tell you that public opinion and the opinion of our colleagues as well is that, as regards Africa, we have the feeling that there is a certain passiveness on the part of the American Government.*

*Our Portuguese colleague raised a question a moment ago regarding the development of guerrilla warfare in Angola. There are Cuban troops who cross the Atlantic, and we would like to have some clarifications on the attitude of the U.S. Government at this point and regarding the future developments of the situation in the whole of southern Africa.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course now we will have to see whether my French is adequate to my self-confidence. But since my answers are usually sufficiently opaque, you may not know. [Laughter.] You may never know whether I understood your question.

With respect to southern Africa, first of all, we believe that the decision that was taken by our Congress last year with respect to Angola had extremely unfortunate consequences and set in motion a series of events which we are now attempting to master. But I think this has to be understood as a background to the current situation.

Our attempt in Africa is to demonstrate that there is a peaceful alternative—to strengthen the moderate elements, to prevent further incursions of military forces from outside of Africa, and at the same time, to encourage an evolution in the direction that is compatible with the aspirations of the African peoples.

Now, under the circumstances which we have faced, this is a very difficult and complicated operation. And the fact is that the Soviet Union had at first actively opposed it and it is now certainly not cooperating with it. Still, I believe it is an attainable objective.

The alternative is the radicalization of all of Africa, with impact on Europe that this group knows better than I do, and perhaps even on the Middle East. And therefore the stakes in a peaceful evolution and a strengthening of moderate forces in Africa cannot be underestimated.

### Middle East Issues in the United Nations

*Philip Goodhart, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, I wonder if you could say a few words about the significance of America's last vote at the United Nations on the Middle East [in the Security Council on November 11], particularly in view of the widespread, if cynical, belief that that vote might have been different if it had come before rather than after the last elections.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that belief is totally incorrect. We have confronted in the United Nations a series of resolutions, of which we have vetoed seven in this year alone. We have before us this month the renewal of UNDOF [United Nations Dis-

engagement Observer Force]. We have before us a general debate on the Palestinian question in the General Assembly. And we also have the necessity that if we are going to contribute to peace in the Middle East we must be prepared to take into account the views of all of the parties.

In this case, we faced a resolution drawn from statements the United States had made over a period of four years.

In May we had abstained from a similar resolution because it contained two offending clauses. Both of these clauses were eliminated from the resolution that was put before the Security Council. Therefore the resolution that went through the Security Council was specifically adapted to meet American concerns and would have been infinitely stronger but for this.

Secondly, it was passed as a consensus statement by the chairman, which, as you know, has in itself no legal force; it simply reflects a view.

And, thirdly, it was based on statements which the United States itself had made over the period of a decade.

Given our overall responsibilities, given the fact that peace in the Middle East is of profound concern to all of the parties, we felt that we had an obligation to go along with the consensus, and especially if we have to keep in mind the positions we may have to take in the months ahead. It did not reflect a change of American policy. It reflected our convictions that had been expressed over many months, over many years, and I would like to think that had that same resolution come up earlier, we would have voted for it, though one can never know that now.

But the fact is that in May we had indicated we would vote for this resolution if it eliminated two offending sentences. At that time the Arabs refused to delete the sentences. This time they did delete them; and therefore we felt, particularly at this period of great uncertainty in the Middle East, that it was in the national interest, it was in the interest of peace in the Middle East, that we voted as we did.

**Middle East Peace Process**

*Erik Blumenfeld, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Chairman, allow me to put a question to the Secretary of State in his capacity as the main architect of peace in the Middle East so far.*

*I should like to know whether his experience goes in the direction we could say that future development will best be served if in the near future the Geneva Conference could be reconvened as the Egyptian President seems to have suggested—or whether, prior to that, between Israel, Egypt, the Syrian Government, the Jordan Government, prenegotiations should take place under the guidance of the United States.*

*Second question: Does the Secretary of State see a more important role for the European partners in our alliance, with a view to a future peace solution in the Middle East? If so, in which direction does he see that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, we have indicated our willingness to reassemble the Geneva Conference. We also on other occasions pointed out that a preparatory conference might be a good way to insure the success of the Geneva Conference.

Our approach to this issue has been pragmatic; that is, to encourage those negotiations that have the greatest hope for success.

We believe that the objective conditions for progress toward peace in the Middle East are better now than they have been perhaps at any time since the creation of the State of Israel. We believe that the countries of the Middle East, through the experiences of the last few years, have learned that nobody can impose its program on the other and that the easing of the tensions between Syria and Egypt may create conditions in which progress can again be started toward peace negotiations.

Since these are tactical questions of great complexity, I don't want to prescribe how to do this except to say that we should be

flexible about whichever approach seems to offer the greatest prospects.

Now, with respect to European participation in this process, it depends on the degree to which European actions can be coordinated with those of the United States.

I think if Europe and the United States began to diverge in significant respects as to a peace settlement in the Middle East, then I think it would have a very unfortunate and unsettling effect.

If our policies can be coordinated, then there are several European countries, or the European Community, that could play a useful role. So, my answer to your question would depend on whether we can achieve a coordinated position.

*Mme. Antoinette Spaak-Danis, Belgian Chamber of Representatives: Mr. Secretary, I asked the same question this morning of Mr. Sonnenfeldt* [*Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State*]. *I think it must be feminine curiosity on my part, but I would like to hear you answer this question now in the same direction as the question raised by my Danish colleague a moment ago. The integration of Europe is the subject.*

*I would like to ask you—and you said very forcefully that you thought that the Europeans should draw up this policy themselves, without the intervention of the United States, and I certainly agree with you on that. We are very zealous and jealous of our own independence, and you are quite right. But I think, under certain circumstances, the United States could show their encouragement perhaps to the more European of the Europeans, showing by verbal encouragement their appreciation of this policy, or these policies, and I am thinking especially of the Puerto Rico conference* [*June 27–28*], *where you didn't invite the European Commission as such to participate.*

*I think that this would have been very important for us as Europeans, and I would like to say, as the more European of us, it would have been important for us to have support which was other than just oral or verbal. It would have been a great step forward for us.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I hope that my friend and colleague Sonnenfeldt did not announce any doctrines while he was here this week. [Laughter.]

On the question of the participation at the Puerto Rico conference, the question of membership was developed by consensus, and it was one of those cases where the United States did not believe that it could be more European than the Europeans. But it is a rather delicate issue.

*Senator Pierre Giraud, French Senate: Mr. Secretary of State, a French automobile builder said that he wanted to make them in any color provided they were black.*

*We have the impression that when the United States talks about cooperation in the area of arms and military materiel manufacture, you want any kind of equipment provided it is American equipment. And I think that this is your view of affairs, is it not?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, you will have a representative of the Defense Department here who can give you the technical explanations for our undoubtedly correct views. [Laughter.]

As I understand it though, we have made efforts to find means of standardizing on tanks and other equipment, but I would prefer to let experts answer this question.

### Cooperation on Energy

*Patrick Wall, British House of Commons: The Arab oil boycott struck a considerable blow against many of the nations represented in this room. The threat is dormant, but it is still there. Could the Secretary of State say something about the future of energy supplies to the West?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have always believed that the West should use this period —or the industrial democracies should use

this period—to put themselves into the strongest possible position to resist the sort of pressures that we faced in 1973.

In some categories, considerable progress has been made. The formation of the International Energy Agency led to a stockpiling program in which I think all of the participating countries now have reserves of between three and six months. There is a program for emergency sharing in case of another embargo. And those are useful and important steps.

However, the fundamental step—that is, the conservation of energy and the development of alternative sources of energy—has not been pursued with equal intensity, and I have to say that our country is as much to blame in this as anybody.

I think the measures to deal with a possible embargo should be looked at from the point of view of emergency measures. The fundamental program has to be in the field of conservation and of the development of alternative sources of energy. And I hope that in the near future this will be a program that all the industrial democracies will jointly pursue.

*Dimmede Psilos, Greek Parliament: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question, very short, very straightforward, concerning your past, recent past. Since the United Nations General Assembly consists of representatives of governments, why did your delegation vote in favor of reconsidering the existing ruling according to which the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community should address a committee only?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This vote concerned a procedural position that the United States has consistently taken in which various liberation movements of several countries have addressed either the committees or the Security Council. It implied no recognition. In fact, we have always taken the position that interested parties, even if they were not governments, could address committees and the Security Council. And we have simply applied in that case votes we took in connection with many so-called liberation movements that have addressed various committees of the General Assembly. It was in no sense a new decision by the United States.

*Alan Lee Williams, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, I understand that this weekend you are going to Plains, Georgia. I am not quite sure where that is, but I am just wondering whether you could say something about the discussions that you might be having with Mr. Carter.* [*Laughter.*]

*Secretary Kissinger:* Would you repeat the last part of the question? I was so overwhelmed by the first part of it. [Laughter.]

Well, I have spent so much of my time finding Plains on the map [laughter] that I have not yet had time to address what I might discuss, but the discussion depends primarily on the President-elect, and I am going there to answer fully his questions and to cooperate to the fullest extent in bringing about a smooth transition and to enable the President-elect to take over under the best possible circumstances.

### Communist Parties in NATO Governments

*Aristide Gunella, Italian Chamber of Deputies: Mr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, as a historian, in your view what would be the implications of the participation of the Communist Party in a government of a great NATO country in Europe, the effect of this on Europe and on NATO? Here I am talking about Italy or even France.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I hope that the record shows that I was provoked [laughter]—that I did not, in the closing days of my incumbency, volunteer comments on so controversial a topic.

I have stated our view repeatedly that the participation of Communist parties in the government of a NATO ally would raise serious questions about the kind of

military cooperation that would be possible, the kind of policies that such a government could pursue, the degree of consultation within the alliance that might be feasible, and indeed the ultimate impact even on the European Community.

So, we have held the view, and we continue to hold the view, that participation would have serious consequences for the alliance—and this independent of whether this party takes its orders from Moscow or is a relatively autonomous party, which you cannot judge in any event from their declarations. I would be more convinced about the autonomy if the votes by which it is established in the central committees were not so totally unanimous.

### Control of Strategic and Nonstrategic Weapons

*Kurt Mattick, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, since 1968, when we had in Europe student demonstrations and popular movements against the war in Vietnam, and demonstrations have also taken place against armaments—since then there have not been any serious objections against this development in the public opinion of Europe, even I would say a dreamlike acceptance of everything.*

*I would ask you now: How do you estimate the possibilities of disarmament? How do you see the role of the Soviet Union? And, if I may ask, does the U.S. Administration have certain reservations as far as SALT Two is concerned?*

*The third question, if there are opportunities for success in disarmament. would there not be time for all European governments to talk with the population of the countries concerned, why there has not been any progress, and should we not also underline that this is perhaps the fault of the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments? Otherwise, we might expect demonstrations against future armament.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have believed that the control of arms is an imperative of our period.

With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, we do not believe that either side can gain a decisive advantage unless the other totally fails to meet its obligations over an extended period of time. And since one can expect that both sides will make the necessary efforts, it only insures a continuously rising level of expenditures and of arms that in the final analysis will not be relevant to most of the crises that occur.

Secondly, I believe that our governments have an obligation to their peoples not to accept a constant accumulation of nuclear weapons without having made a serious effort to limit them.

We will of course accept no unequal agreement. Of course an agreement must be balanced and reciprocal. We believe that such an agreement is achievable at levels somewhat lower than those that now exist and could lead from there to more substantial reductions.

That is the field of strategic weapons. In the field of nonstrategic weapons, the issue is more complicated because there the West is not in a position of parity as we are in the field of strategic weapons; in certain areas, our opponents have a numerical superiority.

So therefore negotiations such as those in Vienna [on mutual and balanced force reductions] are more complex, because in order to establish parity the Eastern bloc would have to make disproportionately larger cuts than NATO.

But I believe that if parity is the proper course in strategic weapons, it must also be the proper course in nonstrategic weapons.

I agree with your comment that our governments must demonstrate to their public that they are making every effort to control arms. But the art of leadership now is to demonstrate this in such a way as not to undermine the readiness to maintain adequate defenses in the absence of an agreement.

So, we have to do both things: to maintain adequate defenses and to maintain our readiness to negotiate seriously about limitation of arms.

### Sino-Soviet Relationship

*U.S. Senator Robert Morgan, of North Carolina: Mr. Secretary, would you comment on what you think the effect might be on NATO in the event of a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that it is in the interest of the West to give the impression that we are panicked about a possible rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China quarrel for their own reasons, and they are going to make their rapprochement for their own reasons. They will certainly not be prevented from any rapprochement by any concern that might be expressed by either Europeans or Americans.

Whatever concerns the People's Republic of China has, however justified they might be, about its neighbor—those concerns will continue to exist. And therefore I would judge that there is a limit beyond which rapprochement is unlikely to go.

But I think our best course in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is to let those two Communist powers handle their own relationship and not give the impression that we can manipulate it for our own ends.

### Impact of Increase in Oil Prices

*Lothar Krall, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, in your speech to us, you pointed out the need for economic cooperation in the alliance, and rightly so; and the energy policy, I think, is part of it. You have already commented on this.*

*During these days, the representatives of the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] meet in Vienna in order to discuss the increase in oil prices. Now, do you know whether the industrialized states or partners in our alliance intend consulting with each other in order to develop a joint attitude in that case where such an increase were agreed?*

*And a second question, what will be the implications for the North-South dialogue of such increases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the United States has made its view very clear. We believe that an increase in prices will slow down economic recovery in the industrial states, will compound inflationary pressures, and will in fact not solve the problems of the OPEC nations that led to the demand for a price increase to begin with.

We have called our views to the attention of the OPEC nations. We are discussing this problem also with industrial democracies. We are also approaching some of the less developed countries, whose deficits will rise if the prices increase and whose deficits ultimately will then come back to us. So, we are paying for the increase not only out of our gross national product but eventually in some form in the less developed countries.

So, what the impact of all these consultations will be it is too early to foretell, but it is certainly a matter we take very seriously and in which the actions of the countries concerned cannot be ignored or taken lightly by the United States.

### Helsinki Conference on European Security

*Victor Goodhew, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, since the U.S. Government and other Western governments recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples of the continent of Africa, why did they all go to Helsinki to decide upon the permanent denial of that same right of self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all. there are a number of myths that have developed about Helsinki. It is clear that the United States was not exactly pushing its European allies on the issue of the European Security Conference. In fact, as I look back over the last eight years, the opposite might be said.

But leaving aside the question of who took the major role, what is it in the docu-

ment on European security that denies people in Eastern Europe the right to self-determination? The document says that frontiers should not be changed by force but that they could be changed by peaceful means, according to international law.

I do not know any NATO country that has had the principle that frontiers in Europe should be changed by force. There is nothing in the document that legitimizes Soviet domination of any outside country. And it is precisely those countries that are most concerned in Eastern Europe about getting greater freedom of maneuver that were the most active proponents of the European Security Conference.

So, I have failed to understand why it is that it is in the West that the most extreme and the most pro-Soviet interpretation of the Helsinki document should be taking hold and why we in the West should be making arguments on behalf of the Soviet Union that they don't make for themselves.

*Mme. Annemarie Griesinger, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, in Western Europe—not only in Western Europe, in fact, but also in South America and Africa—we find again and again that the strategy of Communists is directed toward ideological struggle.*

*This takes two sides. First of all, the feeling of dissatisfaction of the population vis-a-vis environmental pollution, et cetera, is encouraged. We have some examples in the south of Germany recently. A number of nuclear power stations were to be built, and we had to make use of the full power of the police to make sure that these nuclear power stations could be built. And we know fully well that agitators here are not only German Communists but that there are other strategies at play.*

*Secondly, we see that Communists are active where people are dissatisfied with military governments and with racial governments in southern Africa and in South America.*

*I have had a very interesting discussion with the Secretary General of the Economical Assembly (sic), and there we saw it very clearly that everyone only bases his own judgment on his own experience.*

*And I am very worried about this in the United Nations. We can see that those who have lived under military governments are not able to judge that Communist governments in fact offer less freedom and liberty.*

*This is an important problem. This is why I would like to go into the details of this. I would like to have an answer from the Secretary of State what America can do here, what more America can do. Because what is tragic is that even the Christian churches at the moment are very much of the opinion that suppression comes from the West only and exclusively and not from the East.*

*The Secretary of State gave us such a marvelous speech, but recently—where was this, New York it was—during the 50th anniversary of the Council of Synagogues of America, and there he speaks about these problems and these values, et cetera. And this is why I would ask for a very short answer to this very long question.*

*I am fully convinced that the Secretary of State will be able to do this, brilliantly he will be able to do this. But I did not want to miss the occasion in order to ask this question.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Among my many abilities, giving a short answer isn't one of them. In fact, my country of origin puts me into the position that it usually takes me 10 minutes before I can place a verb. But I think you have called attention to an important problem. [Laughter and applause.]

*John Arentoft, Danish Folketing: Mr. Secretary, I fully agree if you do not answer my question [laughter], but I am sure that if you do, your answer will interest very many.*

*What are your plans to serve your country and the world after the 20th of January, 1977?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not have any plans. But I wish the new Administration well. And as I pointed out, I consider foreign policy a nonpartisan effort, and I will continue to support the principles for which I have stood outside the government on a nonpartisan basis. And if that helps us to have a more effective foreign policy, I would be delighted.

## Letters of Credence

*Bahrain*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Bahrain, Abdulaziz Abdulrahman Buali, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.[1]

*Fiji*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Fiji, Berenado Vunibobo, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.[1]

*Niger*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Niger, Andre J. Wright, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.[1]

*Rwanda*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda, Bonaventure Ubalijoro, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.[1]

*Sudan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Omer Salih Eisa, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 18.

## Meeting of U.S.-Egypt Working Group on Education and Culture

Press release 562 dated November 18

A series of new cooperative programs to be carried out between the two countries was announced by the Egyptian-American Joint Working Group on Education and Culture upon conclusion of a three-day meeting at the Belmont Conference Center at Elkridge, Maryland, November 16. These range from proposals of assistance to the Egyptian primary and secondary school systems to upgrade teacher skills to the recording and preservation of Egyptian folklife and the strengthening of various Egyptian Information Agency activities.

The Joint Working Group was established 2½ years ago to stimulate and facilitate the development of mutually beneficial educational and cultural relations between Egypt and the United States. Dr. Hassan Ismail, president emeritus of Cairo University, headed the Egyptian delegation, and William K. Hitchcock, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, headed the American delegation. The recently appointed Egyptian Minister of Health, Dr. Ibrahim Badran, who represented Egypt at the opening of the Treasures of Tutankhamun exhibition at the National Gallery on November 15, was in the 10-member Egyptian delegation.

At this meeting, the group reviewed progress achieved since its last meeting in January. This included arrangements to assure the availability of American textbooks and periodicals in Egypt, efforts to resolve the issue of U.S. and Egyptian academic degree equivalencies, university-to-university exchanges between the two countries, the establishment of a Center for the Training of Teachers of English in Cairo, and broader exchange-of-persons programs.

The group will hold its next annual meeting in Egypt.

# The United Nations: Can It Serve the Common Interest?

*Address by Samuel W. Lewis*
*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs* [1]

I am grateful for this opportunity to explore with you a basic question of American foreign policy: Can the United Nations serve the interests of both the United States and the Third World?

I can give you a clear response—and my answer is yes. The United Nations can serve the interests of both the United States and the Third World. It clearly has the potential to do so. The tougher question is: Will it? Or that more difficult question can be stated this way: In the decades ahead, is the United Nations likely to be more successful than not in fulfilling its basic purposes? The answer, of course, depends upon all the imponderables of future events, the play of forces in world affairs, and the behavior of governments and individuals. And these are things about which no one can speak with certainty.

But both of these questions—about the U.N.'s capacity and about its future—deserve serious analysis. And the answers to both depend, in turn, upon other related questions. For example:

—Can the work of the United Nations and its family of institutions be a force for harmonizing the efforts of diverse governments, or will the U.N. system function in ways which promote deepening conflict and harden lines of division?

—Will it be possible increasingly to identify mutual benefits from common action, or will the existing political divisions persist so tenaciously that the work of the United Nations will be perceived only as a scoreboard for posting victories and defeats?

The relevance of these questions is surely clear to Americans. As achievers, as "can-do" people, we know that enterprises move forward and are successful only if all the participants feel they achieve some benefit.

Beyond this pragmatic approach, it may be helpful to look at much more fundamental issues. I would like to try to think through with you today the underlying purposes of the United Nations in the light of our present experience. If we analyze those purposes, and some basic challenges to them, I believe we will acquire a much sounder basis for seeing how the organization can serve the interests of all nations.

## The Challenge of the United Nations

The United Nations presents us, and all other nations, with a fundamental challenge. It is not merely a test of our technical capacity to manage an international institution efficiently. Nor is it related solely to what happens within the U.N.'s walls. It is, rather, a challenge of enormous breadth—concerning the basic nature, the purpose, and the quality of relationships among sovereign states in a world where national sovereignty remains paramount.

This challenge was first posed after the

[1] Made before the American Association of University Women's United Nations Seminar at New York, N.Y. on Nov. 18.

First World War with the creation of the League of Nations. Although its motivating force was the idealism of an American President, the United States was not then ready to take up the challenge. And a few decades later it became clear that the entire world had been equally unready.

Now the challenge of the United Nations still remains before us. It has two dimensions:

—First, to help reconcile individual national interests with the broader interests of the community of nations; and

—Second, to facilitate changes in the international system which reflect the ever-changing power and prosperity of individual nations—and to do so peacefully, without destructive violence.

Whether the United Nations meets these two challenges will determine whether it serves the interests of both the United States and the Third World, indeed the entire community of nations.

*Reconciling National and International Interests*

The problem of reconciling national and international interests underlies nearly all foreign policy disputes. But in a global international organization like the United Nations it is central.

In dealing with the great global issues—the environment, the oceans, energy, food—the interests of all nations are now more clearly entangled. Many governments are beginning to perceive that their own interests are best served by resisting pressures for immediate gains and by joining in a broader consensus in support of long-range goals. If every nation were to pursue courses of action aimed at bringing the largest and most immediate benefits, there could be no consequence other than perpetual chaos and conflict in every international organization.

If the United Nations is to work, nations must forgo pressing for some advantages now to gain lasting benefits in the future.

*Achieving Change Through Peaceful Processes*

The problem of achieving change through peaceful processes will be with us for as long as there are nations. Since Heraclitus, the world has known that "Nothing endures so much as change." And a world of independent and competing sovereignties will continue to generate tensions created by desire for, or resistance to, change.

We must never be content with a world in which satisfaction with the status quo stultifies change and progress. But neither can we permit untrammeled forces of change to destroy progress already made. And we should never accept the idea that change must be brought about by one society's imposing its system upon others. These efforts have come in many guises—colonialism, imperialism, hegemony, ideological militancy. They are all inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. They must all be left behind.

Throughout most of history, important international changes all too often have come by force. The League of Nations, and then the United Nations, were rooted, however, in a new concept: that mankind has the rational capacity to find the means of managing change through peaceful processes of negotiation. The realities of power will remain an inherent ingredient of all international relations. International organizations cannot abolish power—but they can assist in constraining and channeling its use to positive ends; they can be of vital assistance in the unending task of substituting reason and compromise for force and domination.

## Difficulties Confronting the United Nations

It would be difficult enough under any circumstances to realize these two broad purposes of the United Nations: reconciling national and international interests and achieving change through peaceful processes. But there are special circumstances

in contemporary history which add new dimensions to the task: the virtual explosion in the number of independent nations comprising the international community and the emergence of pervasive political and ideological conflict. Indeed, it is the magnitude of precisely these developments which leads us to ask ourselves whether a world body can serve the interests of both the old and the new nations.

*The New Nations and the United Nations*

I said earlier that if international institutions are to achieve their purposes, all of the participants—new nations and old—must be prepared to give up something to achieve something else.

Since the Second World War, our country has been among the strongest supporters of international institutions and the rule of law. This undoubtedly results partly from our idealistic traditions. I hope it will not be taken amiss, however, if I add that our ability to pursue such a course has been enhanced by our enormous wealth. More than most other countries, we can afford to give something up in the present to gain something in the future.

But most nations are not so fortunate. Many are extremely poor. It is understandably more difficult for them to exhibit patience in the pursuit of long-range goals when their immediate needs are so desperately pressing.

Moreover, national independence is a relatively new experience for many countries. Our country had been independent for about 140 years when it rejected the concept of the League of Nations. Many U.N. members are barely 15 years old. Yet already they confront the need to submerge some attributes of national sovereignty in the interests of global community. And many are reluctant to do so.

We can sympathize with the dilemma posed for the new nations. But today there are fundamental truths that no nation can escape. In our interdependent world, it will be impossible for most nations to progress toward their goals of development, of providing opportunity and dignity for their citizens, unless there is broad international cooperation founded upon a mutual effort to realize common gains.

*Political Conflict and the United Nations*

Ironically, while it is the very purpose of the United Nations to channel political conflict toward accommodation, to facilitate peaceful change, it is also true that international organizations can readily be misused as theaters for waging political warfare.

And unfortunately, the public diplomatic stage at the United Nations can provide great temptations to indulge in posturing instead of sober recognition of hard truths, to search for scapegoats instead of solutions, and to substitute voting majorities for genuine consensus.

It is a commonplace that our century has witnessed global ideological struggle perhaps unprecedented in history. That struggle, between East and West following the Second World War, dominated the United Nations for many years.

Now we have seen the possibility emerge of a new ideological struggle between North and South, the rich and the poor, with the United Nations again serving as a battlefield. And certain regional conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli dispute, seem at times to hold the potential of tearing the United Nations apart.

Clearly we must bend every effort to avoid these results. For, should they occur, there would in the long run be no winners—only losers.

## Where We Stand

The difficulties facing us may seem enormous. However, if we look back toward the past, not just over the last year or two, but over decades and longer, the picture is less bleak. From such a vantage point we can see some fundamental grounds for encouragement. I would like to describe briefly three areas in which the process of

change has involved a broad advance for all nations: the strengthening of law, world economic cooperation, and human rights. In all of these areas, I believe it should be possible for the international community to continue to build upon underlying common interests.

*The Role of Law*

Despite some fearsome assaults, in our century the role of law in international affairs has gathered some strength. In prior centuries, there was little question that every state arrogated unto itself the right to use force to accomplish almost any goal which its leaders thought worth the cost—even to invade and conquer for the mere sake of glory. But today the principle embodied in the Charter of the United Nations that law and justice, not force, should guide relations among states is applicable universally.

This does not, of course, mean that there are no longer serious tensions which can lead to war or that countries will not disagree on who is at fault when violence erupts or that it is no longer essential to maintain a strong defense to deter aggression. Obviously, all these things are true, and they will remain true so long as nations accept no ultimate direction save that of their own leaders.

But, still, there has been a change. There is today an abhorrence of aggression—beyond rhetoric—that extends across the globe. That is something surely which can be built upon, provided we and others remain steadfast in maintaining our strength.

Today it is more important than ever to marshal all possible efforts for extending the role of law. And this is an interest which indisputably is shared by all nations, new and old, weak and strong.

The point warrants some elaboration because it is sometimes argued that international law is a creation of the older Western countries designed to serve them and to keep the new nations in their place.

But nothing could be further from the truth. In a world without law, every nation would play by its own rules. And in such a world, without question the weak would suffer the most. Yet there would be scant consolation for the strong. In a world without respect for law, a world of the jungle, the strong would find no peace. And overhanging all conflict would be the ever-widening threat that someday, in some dispute, uncontrollable forces would unleash the ultimate nightmare: nuclear holocaust.

Yet the role of law cannot be extended save by negotiation—negotiation in which the interests of all states are reflected ultimately in consensus.

We are right now engaged in some critical diplomatic enterprises to extend the role of law among nations in just this fashion.

The most striking example is the Law of the Sea Conference, an ambitious effort to devise comprehensive rules to govern the entire domain of the oceans. No international negotiation in this generation has been more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe. Unless competitive practices and claims are soon harmonized, the world faces the prospect of mounting conflict. But if we succeed, the sense of community which has been so elusive on land could be realized for some 70 percent of the world's surface. And the United Nations will have met this test—to reconcile the interests of individual nation-states with those of the world community.

*Economic Cooperation*

It was not so long ago that problems of economic cooperation between rich and poor nations simply did not exist on any diplomatic agenda. That may have been a less complex world. But it was not a better world for most of its inhabitants. For centuries the vast majority of the Earth's population lived in mute suffering.

We face today a new and more promising situation, a challenge to frame a more equitable and productive world economic system. In historical terms, we have really only just begun to take up this challenge. Whatever the difficulties, there can be great opportunities ahead.

Today we know that our interdependence inescapably imposes on all nations a need for new forms of cooperation. For this reason, the United States has increasingly taken the lead in drawing world attention to new diplomatic imperatives in this age of interdependence and in proposing concrete solutions to its challenges. Our preoccupation with interdependence has not been a matter of mere rhetoric. It is a matter of grappling with the fundamental elements of our survival, of preserving the capability of independent sovereign nations to advance the welfare of their peoples, including our own.

Some assert that our proposals are really intended to make others more dependent on us. That is utterly false.

There exist today varying degrees of dependence, or vulnerability, in all relationships among states. These differences are politically exploitable by more powerful nations. The very notion of cooperative solutions based on the facts of interdependence is this: New economic arrangements, freely negotiated and satisfactory to all the parties, can insure that differing degrees of vulnerability can less easily be exploited.

Thus, only if the realities of interdependence are honestly faced will nations have the freedom to pursue their independent courses free from the specter of abrupt disruptions in their national development plans. This is the essential meaning of the U.S. proposal to establish a system of global food reserves, a system that could enhance the basic security of many societies—if we can bring it to fruition.

But a global economic system based on equity can evolve only from negotiation, not confrontation. And its creation requires all nations to accept mutual responsibilities. The process of cooperative change cannot be sustained if there are destructive assaults on those successful economies whose dynamism is crucial to any effort to create a more just and productive global economy. Boycotts, arbitrary price hikes, confiscations, and other forms of economic intimidation would only tear apart the fabric of cooperation. Indeed, we have seen recently that when the economies of the industrial nations suffer the poorer nations suffer even more.

The most prosperous nations, the United States and the other great industrial democracies, do have major responsibilities. Our experience, wealth, and technological capacity are indispensable for any lasting solutions to the problems of interdependence. I hope the American people are prepared to support long-range efforts to solve these problems. If we are to elicit the cooperation of the developing nations toward such long-term goals, we must help them now to surmount their current economic woes, which, for them, are of overwhelming proportions. We must be prepared to accompany our advice on development strategy with concrete deeds of assistance.

And we should keep in mind that assistance for development is not charity. Nor is it some form of debt owed to the poorer countries to make up for past exploitation, real or perceived. Instead, assistance from the developed countries is an investment in a future world of growing prosperity, expanding opportunity for everyone—ourselves included.

*Human Rights*

Even in the field of human rights there has been progress, when viewed over a long perspective. Not many decades ago vast numbers of human beings were virtually bereft of all rights. Slavery and slave labor were not even recognized universally as intolerable. The present situation in many parts of the world is, without question, unsatisfactory; and in recent years there has been some serious retrogression. But for the first time in history there are now basic documents, the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which have a global reach and which set enlightened standards for advancing the dignity

of all human beings. And for the first time there is a beginning, weak as it may now be, of worldwide and regional procedures to protect against human rights abuse.

But do the Western democracies and the Third World truly share a common interest in advancing the cause of individual rights? Some have argued that we and the Third World are in fundamental opposition —that the human rights standards of the charter, established before the emergence of many newer member states, basically have little importance for many of them in relation to their overriding goals: economic development and the fullest preservation of their newly won independence.

I do not believe this is true. I believe that there is a fundamental community of interest between us and the Third World in advancing the protection of individual rights.

My convictions stem from the inherent nature of human rights issues. When we speak about the protection of personal rights, we allude to many things; but at the core, we have in mind the protection of the individual from arbitrary control by the state—which too often finds its ultimate expression in such abhorrent practices as incarceration without legal process and brutal torture, whether officially sanctioned or tacitly condoned.

The need to protect the individual from such abuses cannot be a discretionary matter dependent upon debate and intellectual argumentation. It is inherent in the human condition. There are no human beings in any society, new or old, who want to see members of their families tortured or imprisoned for daring to disagree with the current political orthodoxy.

This drive for individual human freedom is simply not extinguishable. Many of the leaders of the newer nation-states were responding to it when they fought and sacrificed to achieve their independence. Many of the new nations, drawing on Western European and American traditions, created institutions intended to protect basic human freedoms. In some cases, these institutions remain in place. In others, they have been cast aside, at least for now.

But it is important that we not confuse ups and downs in an endless struggle with long-range and fundamental considerations. If we are to be true to our own beliefs as Americans, we will know, and we must not be timid in asserting, that there are courageous men and women in every nation who yearn for freedom and fulfillment of the human personality, even when conditions of tyranny keep them silent. Governments will come and go—while the longing for humane relations between people and government is permanent and universal.

What can our government do to respond? I think a valid approach for us can include three elements:

—First, we and the other Western democracies must speak up vigorously in international forums in behalf of the ideals of the U.N. Charter—which we know to be right. The United Nations is a particularly appropriate forum for holding up before all nations the standards which are fundamental for decent human existence.

—Second, at the same time we should show more understanding for the problems faced by many of the newer nations, and we should keep our priorities straight. It has not been easy even for some older nations to preserve parliamentary democracy or the civil, political, and human rights of their citizens. The history of this century abounds in examples of tyranny imposed at least temporarily on nations already well advanced in the arts of self-government. But for many newer nations, the problems are compounded when there is no network of modern communications, no established and assertive free press, when there is a very low level of education and literacy. When some new nations fail in trying to sustain democratic political systems along Western lines, we naturally lament this as

a setback to the cause of representative government. But that is not necessarily the same thing as the imposition of a brutal tyranny. Without ever condoning any deprivation of personal freedoms, we must concentrate on the first priority: to promote observance of those standards of human rights which are accepted universally and which touch all human beings, like the elimination of officially sanctioned torture.

—Finally, it is in our interest and the interest of all countries to work as hard as we can to make the international procedures of the United Nations, now in embryo form, as fair and effective as possible. I must say that there has been serious misuse of these procedures. They have too often been platforms for concentrating on the shortcomings of a few while denying the massive transgressions of others. But for us the fight to improve international procedures remains of central importance. Obviously no nation, no matter how strongly it believes in the human rights cause, can take on the task of cajoling, or coercing, all others. We can, however, have more hope of achieving gradual improvement if the application of accepted human rights standards can be entrusted to genuinely fair and capable international bodies.

### Patient and Persistent Efforts Required

At the outset, I said that the United Nations does have the potential to serve the interests of both the old nations and the new. In short, I believe that we and the new nations do share fundamental interests: in strengthening the role of law, in building a system of global economic cooperation, and in advancing the cause of human rights. And of course we share the overarching purpose for which the United Nations was created: the preservation of peace. I believe, despite the controversies which sometimes rage when we come to grips with specific issues, that our work within the United Nations can promote the realization of these large common interests.

But it is equally clear to me that no one can safely predict whether, over time, the U.N.'s basic purposes will actually be realized. This will require, first, that we improve our ability to reconcile individual national interests with the broader interests of the international community; and second, that we gradually master the techniques for managing change through peaceful processes. Both of these are supremely difficult tasks, requiring qualities of statesmanship not often demonstrated throughout history.

Let me stress here that it is not the United Nations, as a corporate entity, which will make the decisions that spell progress or regression. Instead, the crucial decisions will be taken by governments, and that means responsibility will rest with individual national leaders supported by, or driven by, their publics.

So, in the last analysis, whether we and other governments enable the United Nations to achieve its purposes will depend upon qualities of courage, determination, and vision that we exhibit. These will all be needed to resist ever-present temptations to seek immediate advantage and to disregard the constraints of law.

And above all, we Americans will need vision and tenacity. Creative, persistent leadership from the United States is indispensable if the United Nations is to achieve the purposes for which we helped found it. We need to keep our sights firmly fixed on our long-range goals, for there are bound to be many periods of discouragement along our way. The problems which preoccupy us at the United Nations will not be susceptible to quick solutions but at best will only gradually succumb to patient and persistent efforts of accommodation.

In closing, let me recall the words of Dag Hammarskjold, who understood well the need for vision and who left us these words of advice: "Never look down to test the ground before taking your next step: only he who keeps his eye fixed on the far horizon will find his right road."

## United States Urges Resumption of Cyprus Talks

*Following is a statement by Senator George McGovern, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in plenary on November 11.*

USUN press release 145 dated November 11

The question of Cyprus is again before the General Assembly. Despite the concern of the international community and the efforts of the Secretary General, there has been no real progress toward a lasting settlement during the past year. The goal of peace and justice for Cyprus—a goal which my government shares with the people of Cyprus and with all members of the United Nations—is yet to be achieved.

My government has repeatedly expressed its deep concern over the continuing lack of progress toward a Cyprus settlement. As Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in his speech before this Assembly this September, the passage of time has served only to diminish possibilities for constructive conciliation. There has been ample help available, most notably through the good offices of the Secretary General, but for such assistance to be effective, an essential condition is the willingness of both sides to commit themselves to sustained negotiations. Such a commitment is not yet evident.

Since the tragic events of 1974, the United Nations has provided an important forum for encouraging progress toward a settlement. Through their resolutions the General Assembly and the Security Council have expressed the continuing concern which all members of the international community share over the situation in Cyprus. The Secretary General has worked tirelessly, under the "good offices" mandate provided for by these resolutions, to encourage negotiations between the Cyprus communities. My government again wishes to express its appreciation for the patience and skill with which Secretary General Waldheim has pursued this mission. He and his associates have worked diligently—but thus far to little avail.

The United States has sought and will continue to seek to assist the Secretary General in every way possible. We have consulted closely with him and with other member states intimately involved with the Cyprus question. In September, Secretary Kissinger put forward several ideas aimed at serving as a point of departure for the parties' discussion of their most serious problems.

In recent weeks we have consulted intensively with members of the European Community in an effort to refine and improve this framework. We are still engaged in this endeavor. Our hope is that shortly after the General Assembly concludes its consideration of Cyprus, the two parties will come together again under the auspices of the Secretary General and consider this set of ideas which many of Cyprus' friends believe can provide a path through the procedural barriers which have impeded progress.

In sum, my government believes that a rapid and equitable solution is essential and that enhancing the prospects for a negotiated settlement should be the foremost consideration in the General Assembly's current debate. We believe the cause of peace on Cyprus is less well served by continued public dispute than by serious, quiet discussion of the real issues.

This year's session of the General Assembly, through calm and reasoned consideration of the issues, can make a meaningful contribution to the search for peace on Cyprus. What is needed is a moderate and balanced resolution which encourages both sides to embark once again on a productive negotiating course.[1]

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[1] The Assembly on Nov. 12 adopted by a vote of 94 to 1 (Turkey), with 27 abstentions (U.S.), Resolution A/RES/31/12 concerning the question of Cyprus.

## U.S. Announces 1977 Contributions to UNDP, U.N. Natural Resources Fund

*Following is a statement made in the 1976 United Nations Pledging Conference on the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Capital Development Fund by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson on November 2.*

USUN press release 137 dated November 2

On the occasion of the annual pledging conference for the United Nations Development Program, I am pleased to announce that the U.S. contribution for the coming year will be $100 million. This represents a further tangible indication of the importance which my government—the executive branch and the Congress—attributes to the Program and to the crucial work that it performs in the cause of economic development and international cooperation. Our contribution underscores both our faith in the Program and our commitment to its future.

The past year has not been an easy one for the United Nations Development Program or for its Administrator, Mr. Bradford Morse, in whom we have great confidence. He has been confronted with administrative and financial problems of immense difficulty and complexity. We all share in the responsibility to render to UNDP the necessary assistance, cooperation, understanding, and advice required to set things aright. A good beginning has been made over the past 10 months. We look forward to further significant progress in the coming year.

The UNDP is now embarking upon its second cycle with an ambitious program designed better to meet the needs of the least well-off nations. We hope for mounting financial support from all sources, including those relatively wealthier nations which have UNDP programs. Naturally, to the extent feasible, UNDP should have freely usable, convertible currencies available. These are the most useful contributions.

My delegation believes that special thanks are due to those countries, developed and developing, which have made extraordinary contributions to UNDP during the current year. We wish also to applaud those nations which, after reviewing their own situations, have announced their intention to forgo part or all of their indicative planning figures for the second cycle. In this spirit of mutual cooperation, the UNDP can face the future determined to carry out its vital role in meeting the problems of insufficient food, disease, unemployment, and poverty in general.

Mr. President, it is also my great pleasure on this occasion to announce the first U.S. contribution to the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources. Developing mineral resources anywhere is a far from simple matter, one involving considerable risk. Many developing countries are not in a position to finance exploration on their own even though their development objectives would be served thereby. The Fund, with its unique replenishment feature, will permit UNDP programs of countries concerned to be supplemented in an area which can provide substantial economic benefits to them. It can also expand the global base for many natural resources. In light of these considerations, the United States wishes to announce a contribution to the Fund of $2.5 million for 1977.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

Nuclear Reduction, Testing, and Non-Proliferation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. Res. 69. March 18, 1976. 57 pp.

United States-Cuba Trade Promotion. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. July 22, 1976. 63 pp.

Admission of Foreign Nationals to the Coast Guard Academy. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce to accompany H.R. 11407. S. Rept. 94–1187. August 27, 1976. 4 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

# Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.
*Notifications of provisional application deposited:* Haiti, Netherlands, September 16, 1976; Costa Rica, September 17, 1976; Panama, September 20, 1976; Portugal, Venezuela, September 21, 1976; Ivory Coast, September 27, 1976; Bolivia, Honduras, September 30, 1976.
*Ratifications deposited:* Canada, September 17, 1976; India, September 20, 1976; Uganda, September 21, 1976; New Zealand, Switzerland, September 27, 1976; Nigeria, November 11, 1976.

#### Judicial Procedure—Documents

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638.
*Signature:* Spain, October 21, 1976.

#### Judicial Procedure—Evidence

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
*Signature:* Spain, October 21, 1976.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
*Acceptance deposited:* Republic of Korea, November 8, 1976.

#### Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973; for the United States October 20, 1976.
*Proclaimed by the President:* November 16, 1976.

#### Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.
*Acceptance deposited:* Romania, November 4, 1976.
Tenth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force January 8, 1976; for the United States January 19, 1976. TIAS 8320.
*Acceptances deposited:* Finland, October 29, 1976; Romania, November 4, 1976.

#### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
*Ratifications deposited:* Egypt, November 23, 1976; Iraq, November 22, 1976.[2]

### BILATERAL

#### Bangladesh

Project agreement relating to the grant of funds for feasibility studies of development projects. with annexes and related letter. Signed at Dacca September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

#### Egypt

Loan agreement relating to the modernization and improvement of the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company facilities, with annex. Signed at Cairo September 4, 1976. Entered into force September 4, 1976.
Agreement amending the grant agreement of May 30, 1976, as amended, relating to technical and feasibility studies. Signed at Cairo September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

#### Guatemala

Loan agreement for municipal earthquake recovery, with annex. Signed at Guatemala September 20, 1976. Entered into force September 20, 1976.

#### Peru

Loan agreement relating to a program for improved water and land use in the Sierra, with annex. Signed at Lima September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.
Loan agreement relating to agricultural cooperative federations development, with annex. Signed at Lima September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

#### Portugal

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 18, 1976 (TIAS

[1] Not in force.
[2] With statement.

8264). Signed at Lisbon October 22, 1976. Entered into force October 22, 1976.

### United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972. Enters into force January 21, 1977. *Proclaimed by the President:* November 17, 1976.

### World Meteorological Organization

Agreement relating to a procedure for United States income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva May 11 and September 24, 1976. Enters into force January 1, 1977.

### Zaire

Project agreement relating to the improvement of small farmer production and income, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Cape Verde . . . . . | Cat. No. S1.123:C17v | |
| | Pub. 8874 | 4 pp. |
| Czechoslovakia . . . . . | Cat. No. S1.123:C99 | |
| | Pub. 7758 | 7 pp. |

The Twelfth Report, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. This annual report summarizes the principal activities of the Commission during the past year and makes specific recommendations on funding of the U.S. Government's international educational and cultural exchange activities, U.S. implementation of the "Final Act" of the Helsinki Conference (CSCE), utilization of exchange to improve understanding between the United States and Latin America and Canada, and the U.S. role in UNESCO and the U.N. University. 82 pp. $1.50. (Stock No. 044-000-01622-2).

Narcotic Drugs—Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8297. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8297).

Narcotic Drugs—Drug Enforcement Administration Representative. Understandings with Indonesia. TIAS 8299. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8299).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Greece. TIAS 8300. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8300).

Air Charter Services. Understanding with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8303. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8303).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Lebanon extending the agreement of September 1, 1972. TIAS 8304. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8304).

Scheduled and Nonscheduled Air Service. Agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amending the agreement of September 27, 1973. TIAS 8305. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8305).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Ireland. TIAS 8306. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8306).

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). Agreement with other governments. TIAS 8307. 68 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8307).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 8308. 22 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8308).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 8309. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8309).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tanzania. TIAS 8310. 15 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8310).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sri Lanka amending the agreement of April 9, 1976. TIAS 8311. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8311).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India. TIAS 8312. 22 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8312).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8313. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8313).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan amending the agreement of October 14, 1975, as amended. TIAS 8314. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8314).

Tracking Station. Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of December 20, 1971 and February 23, 1972, as supplemented. TIAS 8316. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8316).

Food and Agriculture Organization—Amendments to the Constitution. Adopted by the eighteenth session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 8–27, 1975. TIAS 8318. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8318).

*Name Index*



## Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: November 22–28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|---|---|---|
| *565 | 11/22 | U.S. and Spain terminate textile agreement, Sept. 23. |
| †566 | 11/22 | U.S.-Egypt Joint Working Group on Technology, Research, and Development, Nov. 18–19. |
| *567 | 11/23 | Jack B. Olson sworn in as Ambassador to the Bahamas (biographic data). |
| †568 | 11/23 | U.S. and Romania sign long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation, Nov. 21. |
| *569 | 11/24 | Donald R. Norland sworn in as Ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (biographic data). |
| †570 | 11/26 | U.S. and Mexico sign treaty on execution of penal sentences, Nov. 25. |
| *571 | 11/26 | Fine Arts Committee, Dec. 14. |
| †572 | 11/26 | U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign fisheries agreement. |
| †573 | 11/26 | U.S. and Mexico sign fisheries agreement. |

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.