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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXV • No. 1946 • October 11, 1976

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The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and of officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.

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U.S. Business and Government in a World of Change

Address by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson¹

Secretary Kissinger regretted very much that he could not be here today. He had counted on this occasion for two important reasons. First, he has taken a great interest in the role of business in the international arena. He fully recognizes its critical importance in relations among the industrial democracies, between them and the developing world, and in East-West relations as well. Second, the Secretary is well aware of the significance of the Conference Board, which represents the highest echelons of America's private sector—and which constantly has demonstrated the will and the capacity to contribute ideas and new approaches to the most pressing problems of our society.

My remarks today will, of course, reflect the Secretary's views. They will reflect not only the official view, but also my own particular dual perspective, developed from my recent experience in government following my earlier career as a businessman. This experience has strengthened my long-held conviction that government and business executives have many interests in common.

—First, we both are confronted by a series of short-term crises which must be managed decisively without benefit of all the relevant information. If we wait until all the facts are marshaled, we are generally too late. This calls for judgment and a large quotient of courage. Furthermore,

although anyone who is making no mistakes very likely is making no contribution, we must be right most of the time. You in business face an annual audit, with performance measured in profit and other financial terms. We in government also have to face an audit—every morning when the editorial pages go to press, in addition to the quadrennial variety, the national elections.

—Second, although we both deal with day-to-day crises, our ultimate success or failure will depend on the extent to which we are sensitive to the dynamics of our respective worlds and move intelligently in anticipation of future conditions. The Bible says: "Where there is no vision the people perish." However, both business and government face a world in which change is taking place at such speed that long-range vision is blurred. Yet, we know that basing our long-range policies on nothing more than current conditions will doom our ventures to failure at the outset.

—Third, our increasing interdependence, coupled with increasing domestic demands on government, is forcing a growing government involvement in international economic affairs. Today, even in the case of the United States, where the private sector plays the lead role in international economic activities, the government is forced to take a close look at international trade and investment, assurance of supply of critical materials, and the global implications of domestic economic policies. This poses for government and business com-

¹ Made before the Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 16 (text as delivered).

munity alike the challenge of creating a new cooperative relationship.

We are pleased that this conference is addressing this critical challenge, and we will be greatly interested in your conclusions. Thus we share interests—and we both must look at history to insure sound decisions.

Historical Trends

The foundations of the political situation we are facing were laid during the three decades following World War II. To understand the forces now at work on our global society we must first focus on the basic changes during this period, which are now emerging with increasing clarity.

The United States is no longer able to dominate world events as in the 1950's and 1960's. We can and must continue to play the lead role in resolving global problems, but this requires a more subtle and an increasingly multilateral approach. For example, there is no way the United States could solve the energy crisis alone, without cooperating with the other industrialized oil importers and the principal exporters. Yet at the same time no solution to this problem could possibly come about without the active leadership and participation of the United States.

—We have moved from a bipolar to a multipolar world, at least in economic matters, with shifting international groupings related to specific issues. Institutions tailored to old requirements must be adjusted to the new ones. Because the United States cannot go it alone, we need new structures of multilateral relations. Older economic institutions, established by and substantially for the developed nations—the World Bank, IMF [International Monetary Fund], GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and others—must find ways of serving global interests involving responsible participation by the newly rich oil exporters, the less developed countries, and ultimately the Communist countries.

—Attitudes on foreign assistance have

changed. In the past we tended to justify aid in anti-Communist terms. The decline of bipolarity in the world has contributed to a decline in real terms in U.S. foreign aid. We must develop a new national consensus on foreign assistance which reflects both our moral obligation and our self-interest in the improvement of economic opportunity and buying power throughout the world. It is in both our short- and long-run interests to assure accelerated development in the less developed countries. Otherwise we will pay the higher costs of instability, confrontation, and dangerous political upheaval.

—During the 30 years since the founding of the United Nations, its membership has nearly tripled, from 51 to 144. Many of these new nations are on the margins of economic viability; yet they are deeply nationalistic. Meanwhile, the continued expansion of world industrialization and trade, and the need for foreign investment and assistance for the less developed nations, have created a stubborn reality of international economic interdependence which runs counter to the spirit of absolute political and economic independence. Opening the doors to full participation by the developing world in a new international economic order will be a task ahead for the industrialized democracies over the next decade.

Challenges to Government and Business

As a result of these developments, both American business and government face important challenges. Developing the dialogue with the previously neglected sector of the world's economic community can be accomplished through closer government-business partnership and also through business and government acting singly, but in mutually supportive roles.

In the time available to me, I will not attempt an exhaustive listing of challenges and responses, but will highlight a few. I like to stress the word "challenge" or "opportunity," a positive approach which

derives from my own experience in business.

I would like to cite five important areas of challenge in the global economy which will have a critical bearing on future business and governmental behavior and policies.

—Economic cooperation among the industrial countries, for this is a key to global economic welfare and prosperity.

—North-South economic relations, for here the politics of numbers, the growth of material interdependence, and the demands of fair play will press for changes in the global economy.

—East-West economic policy, for it is time to take a fresh look at this entire area which fuses business, politics, and security.

—Energy, for this is not only a critical long-term economic challenge rooted in our past patterns of behavior, but its connection to the nuclear proliferation issue makes it a pivotal problem for world peace.

—Managing the wealth of the oceans, which tests the world community's ability to agree on rules and procedures for tapping the vast resources which are a common global heritage.

Collaboration Among Industrialized Countries

First, let me discuss the common challenge which the industrial democracies face in managing our economies. An unprecedented expansion of trade and investment, pressure on resources, the 20th-century revolution in technology, transportation, and communication, and the imperative of improving the environment and the quality of life, together have created conditions in which no one country can satisfy its domestic requirements in isolation. There is no alternative to closer cooperation among the industrial democracies—to control inflation, to maintain smoothly functioning economic arrangements among the countries in which the overwhelming amount of global activity

takes place, and to develop further the ties that bind us to the countries of the world that share our most fundamental moral values.

In fact, during the past few years collaboration with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan has become the bedrock of our foreign economic policy. Our relationship has become one of greater equality and sharing of initiative and responsibility. We have worked closely together on the management of national economic policies, including the process of recovery, as illustrated by the Rambouillet and Puerto Rico summits as well as by the reinvigoration of other coordinating mechanisms like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. We have collaborated to avert protectionist tendencies in trade and consulted closely on the issues of energy and raw materials. We have also worked to strengthen the trade and monetary systems and to develop balanced guidelines for private international investment, in order to devise an effective framework for the operation of private enterprise. And we have made considerable progress in developing a long-range strategy for the West to meet the challenge of the energy crisis.

The leaders of the Western nations—President Ford and his counterparts—demonstrated determination and wisdom in preserving an open world market and avoiding panic reactions in dealing with global recession. They led us through the worst recession of the post-World War II era with a minimum of recrimination and with a maximum of cooperation. Today economic cooperation among the industrialized democracies probably is the closest in at least a decade.

For the future we face two key challenges with regard to economic relations with Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. First, we must continue, expand, and improve the policy collaboration which has begun. And second, we must cooperate to extend the benefits and vitality of our economies to other parts of the world. For the

arrangements which are fashioned among the industrial democracies must be seen as only a first step in a more extensive structure of global cooperation which includes the developing countries and must also take account of the centrally planned economies of the East.

North-South Relations

A second major challenge we face is our relations with the developing countries. After our industrial partners, it is the Third World where our economic interests are most at stake. It is this region from which we will be importing a substantial and increasing portion of our raw materials in the future and which holds the potential for future growth in export markets. Efforts to improve the functioning of the global economic system cannot be successful without responsible cooperation from key developing countries. Nor can a stable, prosperous international community be constructed and sustained unless all its principal participants feel that they have a stake in cooperating and believe that their views are heeded.

Be it resource development, technology transfer, the activities of multilateral corporations, or commodity trade, the need now and in the future will be for the development of policies which are responsive to the economic imperatives of interdependence but which also recognize the diversity among countries and allow governments sufficient flexibility to exercise their legitimate national prerogatives.

Political leaders in the developing world are calling for a new economic order. They want greater benefits from the international economic system and a greater voice in the management of the global economy. We believe that it is imperative that the United States and other industrial democracies respond with measures that contribute to development and to the evolution of a more orderly and progressive world economy. We are therefore proposing pragmatic solutions to concrete problems in trade,

finance, resource, and technology issues. A good example is Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal for an International Resources Bank to restore the flow of private capital and technology to Third World resource projects. This pragmatic initiative is responsive to the deteriorating climate for private investment in resource development in the Third World and designed to benefit both industrial and developing nations. We need more ideas like this one. And in their creation and their execution we need your advice and your participation.

Another area where your active participation is essential is in the formulation of our responses to the demand of the developing countries for greater and more liberal access to Western industrial technology. We are calling an initial meeting on November 11 of business executives and representatives of other nongovernmental groups to discuss the issues we face in a series of forthcoming U.N. conferences on science, technology, and development. Your advice at this early stage will contribute to more constructive and practical U.S. positions.

Our objective is to create conditions for global growth from which all countries benefit. We are firmly convinced that forms of private investment and technology transfer which are adapted to the changing international environment are the most efficient mechanism for achieving this.

East-West Economic Relationship

We must also devote renewed attention to our relations with the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, where we face special difficulties. Yet this element in the global economy cannot be ignored. The past effect of Soviet purchases on the world grain market is a good illustration; but other examples, such as energy development, rising Eastern debt to Western commercial banks, and the growing role of state-controlled shipping, demonstrate the increasing economic relationship between East and West.

The future course of this relationship will require the attention of both the public and private sectors. We must consider how economic relations can be organized so as to provide appropriate benefits to all parties; how East-West cooperation can be applied to the pressing international economic issues of our time, such as food security and adequate resource development; and how relations with the centrally planned economies can make a positive contribution to the stable political environment we all seek.

The Energy Problem

The details of the energy crisis need no elaboration. The oil embargo, escalating oil prices, and the growing percentage of U.S. energy consumption which is imported are well known to everyone here. To respond to these challenges we are moving in four areas:

—We are pursuing domestic measures to reduce our vulnerability to international pricing and supply decisions by gradually lifting price controls, directing more research into alternative energy sources, and building a national oil stockpile.

—We are cooperating with other industrialized oil-consuming nations to reduce our collective vulnerability to manipulation of oil supplies and prices.

—We are cooperating with the non-oil developing countries. We have proposed the establishment of an International Energy Institute, to provide assistance and cooperation in technology and research to help these countries develop appropriate alternative energy sources.

—And we are trying to cooperate with the oil-exporting nations to encourage responsible international action on supply and prices. We are doing this in various multilateral forums and bilaterally, including cooperation with the business community in the context of joint commissions.

But the magnitude of the challenge demands that we all do more in all of these

areas. Largely because of congressional inaction or opposition, our domestic energy policy is not yet adequate to our need to reduce our vulnerability to foreign oil supply pressures. Moreover, we must devote increasing attention to the longer term picture and our transition to the post-oil age. The complexities of this transition are already apparent, for the imperative of providing for future energy needs has stimulated a drive by developing nations to acquire nuclear power plants with all its implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Law of the Sea

The law of the sea negotiations are among the most complex and difficult of our age. The delegations now meeting in New York are seeking to establish a viable legal regime for 70 percent of the earth's surface. The interests involved cut across the traditional North-South and East-West rivalries, and no country has a greater interest in their successful conclusion than the United States.

Technology has enabled us to drill for oil farther and farther out from the coasts in ever deeper waters, to exploit the living resources of the oceans ever more efficiently, to carry crude oil by sea in huge supertankers controlled by computers, and in the near future, to mine the deep seabed for industrial minerals.

The proposed law of the sea convention sets forth broad obligations and responsibilities on the part of both maritime and coastal states to preserve the oceans' integrity and to cooperate with other states in protecting the oceans from pollution. The convention also will insure the freedom of navigation through and over straits and in the economic zone so that maritime trade can be carried out effectively.

Recently the Secretary of State presented a package proposal to resolve the outstanding issues dealing with mining for mineral nodules on the ocean floor. Individual nations and their companies would

have assured access to mining sites, along with an international Enterprise which would be an arm of the proposed Seabed Authority. We and other countries are willing to assist this international Enterprise in a broadly shared financing and staffing of its intended operations with the understanding that all nations would also have assured access to the seabed.

Above all, the law of the sea negotiations are aimed at establishing an order for the oceans that will prevent or resolve peacefully conflict over the uses of the oceans among more than 150 states. Success in this effort could give hope to all that the community of nations can cooperate to solve the complex global challenges ahead.

Importance of Sharing Views

These challenges confront both business and government with the opportunity to work together to forge new patterns of cooperation. I am not suggesting that American business support American foreign policy regardless of its profit consequences. Businessmen do have both the right and the obligation to make their foreign policy views known to the Administration and, of course, to the Congress. That approach may not be as much fun as sitting back and complaining when, in your judgment, the government makes a mistake. But in the long run, it is essential if the private sector's interests are to be preserved.

By the same token, the government cannot afford to regard the actions of American business abroad as natural phenomena which cannot be influenced when national interests are at stake. For example, the U.S. Government is quite rightly concerned about the consequences of questionable payments by American firms to foreign government officials. Even though such

payments may be the mother's milk of domestic politics in certain foreign countries, our government cannot stand idly by and watch as foreign governments friendly to us are shaken to the roots because of revelations of questionable or illegal payments.

The Conference Board was among the first to recognize the need for positive action by the business community to improve its corporate citizenship in overseas operations and to avoid the taint of corruption. Your international corporate social responsibility program has, over the past five years, stimulated practical measures by scores of U.S. companies and by other business associations to improve both the actual behavior and the image of U.S. business.

We stand at a point in history when values and realities are often in a state of tension. It is a time of tension between the value of freedom and the need for order; between the intensity of nationalism and the reality of interdependence; between the dynamism of free enterprise and the demands for economic equality. The genius of America lies in reconciling positions which to others often seem hopelessly contradictory—and in doing so without detracting from the great principles that are our special heritage. Nowhere is the possibility of such achievement more obvious or more needed than in the interface of the private and public sectors of this country.

We have begun to perceive the challenges we face and to delineate the forms of our future cooperative progress. No other nation has our advantages; no other nation can provide the leadership needed if the world of tomorrow is to preserve the values we care about while dealing effectively with changing realities. The problems are vast indeed, but never in history have our problems more truly offered us such opportunities for progress.

Department Testifies on Proposed Military Sales to Foreign Governments

*Statement by Philip C. Habib
Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹*

I am particularly happy to have this opportunity to discuss with the members of the International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee the important role of arms transfers in our foreign relations with friendly and allied governments.

The occasion for this meeting is of course your consideration of the notifications before the Congress of our intention, in response to requests from 14 foreign governments, to provide a variety of military equipment and defense services. The total value of these proposed sales is over \$6 billion, a figure that has naturally attracted considerable notice and comment. The figure is an impressive one, but I believe we can place it in better perspective through an examination of its component parts.

Before turning to the specific cases before you, however, I would like to make one general comment that applies to all of them. That is, as we know from hard experience, it simply costs a vast amount more today to erect an adequate defense than it did 20 or even 5 years ago.

Not only does sophistication add substantially to the price, but there is a con-

stant rise in costs owing to inflation. In the early 1950's, when our security assistance program almost wholly consisted of *grants*, we provided allies with equipment worth about \$5 billion a year; in today's prices that would be well over \$10 billion a year—higher than today's sales figures. So from the inflationary point of view alone, the dollar values of today's arms transfers are not out of line with those of earlier periods.

More significantly, the actual number of weapons systems transferred is smaller in many cases because of the high unit cost of sophisticated weapons. As an example, the most modern jet fighter available in the 1950's would have cost about \$700,000 in fiscal year 1975 dollars; today's most modern jets cost 10 or 15 times that figure. The cost of even far less exotic hardware, such as tanks, has more than doubled owing to increasing sophistication.

In short, because of both inflation and sophistication a billion dollars buys far less arms than in earlier years.

The Middle East

Now I would like to comment on the specific proposals for sales included among the notifications before you.

Let me first speak of Iran. There are eight letters of offer for Iran, which total \$4.4 billion. Over \$3.8 billion, or over half

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

of the total amount of all 43 notifications, is attributable to Iran's request to purchase 160 F-16's with follow-on support.

Iran wishes to have the F-16 aircraft as its aircraft of the 1980's and 1990's. Deliveries will not begin until the early 1980's and will take several years to complete. The delivery schedule has been planned in order not to overburden Iranian facilities or available trained manpower and not to interfere with our own or NATO acquisition of the plane. Although, if this transaction is approved, some payments will be made by Iran next year, the schedule of payments and deliveries will stretch well into the 1980's.

This purchase is characteristic of the Iranian Government's desire to project its development requirements into the future and to act now rather than to delay a decision which might be adversely affected by inflation or other external factors.

To put in perspective the sums involved in the F-16 sales package, we should not ignore the fact that our nonmilitary trade with Iran will, it is estimated, total \$22-\$23 billion during the period 1975-80, with a \$6-\$7 billion surplus in our favor in civilian goods alone.

More basically, our military sales to Iran add to the strength of a valued ally and to that nation's ability to continue to carry out a policy on which we and the Iranians agree. They also provide the essential assurances that the United States has not changed its mind about Iran, that we remain committed to a close relationship in all fields, and that close coordination with the United States on the part of the Iranians is still justified. For we are not only talking about past and present policies, including relevant military sales, but also about our future relations.

The next group of requests for military equipment is from Israel. Seven letters of offer, totaling \$266 million, cover largely helicopters and munitions for systems already in Israel's inventory. These sales are a part of our continuing supply of military equipment to Israel. Since the October

1973 war, the United States has provided over \$5 billion in funds for the purchase of military items to support our ongoing assistance to Israel. Several major letters of offer, totaling approximately \$1 billion, were submitted several months ago. These letters of offer are in addition to those major requests and are fully supportive of efforts to assure Israel's security.

The next country I wish to discuss is Saudi Arabia. Ten letters of offer have been submitted at a value of \$664 million, of which \$555 million is attributable to construction, inflationary increases, or support equipment. Thus, less than one-sixth of the Saudi package represents money for new weapons.

Saudi Arabia is a good example of where a large percentage of sales is not for arms. Even the dollar amounts listed do not necessarily reflect money that will flow to the United States. We should bear in mind that the actual construction work, which will be managed by the Corps of Engineers in the cases under consideration, will be open to international tender and not reserved for U.S. firms.

The two items on the Saudi list that have given most concern have been letters of offer for 850 Sidewinder missiles and 650 Maverick missiles. Both of these requests would supply the armaments needed for the 110 F-5 aircraft that we have already sold the Saudis. The missiles will be specially fitted on the F-5's and cannot be readily shifted to other aircraft. Both letters of offer have been considerably reduced from the original Saudi request and in response to congressional concerns, from the level we believe justifiable. These proposed sales are, I believe, minimal in terms of what is required to arm the Saudi aircraft.

Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a strong force for moderation in the Middle East. Its support for the moderate Arab governments that are committed to a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israel dispute is of great importance to our own interest in seeing a lasting Middle Eastern settlement.

achieved. Saudi Arabia is also the force for restraint on oil price increases within OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries].

With few other Arab countries has the United States enjoyed such a steady long-term relationship of cooperation. Saudi Arabia looks to the United States not only as the power most likely to preserve peace in the world but as the most reliable supplier of its own requirements for civilian and military development. Expenditures under the current Saudi five-year development plan are estimated to total \$142 billion. If we are to enjoy a close and productive relationship with Saudi Arabia in those policy areas that are important to us, we should expect to meet reasonable requests in other areas of mutual importance.

It is a key component of our well-founded relationship with Saudi Arabia that we respond positively to reasonable requests for the arms the Saudis need for self-defense. This large country has vast resources and a small and scattered population. It has no significant geographical barriers and, with radical Arab regimes to the north and the south, believes that it must equip itself with weapons that make up for its deficiencies and vulnerabilities.

The armaments requested in the notifications before you are reasonable in terms of Saudi requirements for national defense. They are justifiable in terms of the parallel course that U.S. and Saudi policies have followed and may be expected to follow across a broad spectrum of our interests.

Pakistan and East Asia

Five letters of offer, totaling \$84 million, provide munitions and support equipment for the Pakistani Armed Forces. Granting Pakistan's request for these armaments is a modest response indeed in terms of the condition of the country's military forces. We do not believe that the supply of these armaments will contribute to an escalation of arms purchases in South Asia.

A relatively small portion (less than \$355 million) of the total is proposed for four countries of the East Asian region. It includes OV-10 aircraft, M-48A1 tanks, and Sidewinder missiles for Korea, F-5E aircraft and 105mm howitzers for the Philippines, aircraft for Australia, and F-5E aircraft and Sidewinder missiles for Singapore.

We believe that these transfers will serve U.S. interests by assisting allied and friendly governments of this area to improve their defense capabilities and thereby contribute to continuing peace and stability in East Asia.

The tanks for Korea have been well used by the U.S. Army. Before they are placed in service the Republic of Korea Army will give them a major overhaul and modification. These tanks will replace the existing seriously overage M-47 tank force. As you know, North Korea maintains a preponderantly larger tank force. The F-5E's and the Sidewinder missiles are part of our longstanding efforts to modernize the Korean Air Force.

The balance of the letters of offer before you are destined for European countries. I do not believe there are any items for concern among them, but we would be happy to answer any questions on those letters of offer.

Decisionmaking Process on Arms Sales

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some general remarks about the background of these proposed sales.

I can assure you that we are very much aware of the criticism that has been directed at our decisionmaking on arms sales. I would like to stress that the proposed sales that are before you have been subjected to a thorough review process and decided on their own individual merits. We have not relaxed our standards in deciding whether or not to sell military equipment abroad. Indeed, both the Department of State and the Department of De-

fense view their primary responsibility as regulating and managing sales programs, not promoting them.

The review process begins generally in the field where our military missions and our Embassies first receive an indication of foreign interest in a U.S. defense article or service. Our people are not salesmen and do not push the sales of weapons abroad; rather they work with their foreign counterparts when possible to assure that estimates of national defense requirements are accurate and reasonable. Thus frequently a foreign nation's desire for a particular system is either reduced in number or delayed in time following the advice of our personnel. On many occasions, we have been successful in persuading foreign counterparts that a particular glamorous system is not appropriate to their requirements.

Our arms industry—like our agriculture and our other advanced technology industries—happens to be the best in the world. We not only manufacture the best planes, ships, and other systems; we provide better training and more reliable logistical support. We do not seek to force arms sales on others. Our products are sought by modernizing states. Further, this preference for dealing with the United States indicates a confidence in the United States as a responsible world power whose policies are directed toward the goals of peace and stability, rather than disruption, subversion, or the stimulation of conflicts.

When a request is relayed by our military missions or Embassies to Washington, it is carefully studied in the Departments of State, Defense, ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency], and other agencies. A large number of factors are evaluated, but a crucial factor is the role the country plays, its relationship to U.S. interests in its area, and how our response will affect the furtherance of our specific policy goals and our own national interests.

Let me emphasize that we do not sell arms unless there is a very substantial area

of policy congruence—particularly security policy—between ourselves and the recipient. All of the nations which we are discussing today can meet that standard.

Among the other factors in our predecision review, we examine whether the introduction of a new military system would affect the regional security balance or perhaps stimulate other requests from neighboring countries that would lead to imbalances. We also have to examine realistically the alternative sources of supply that the country may have and whether a refusal on our part to sell a particular system would simply result in another supplier—e.g., the Soviet Union—making the sale.

The desire for modern arms by our friends and allies is understandable when they see potential adversaries well supplied with modern hardware by the Soviet Union and its friends. The continuing efforts by the Soviets to provide weapons to its friends have added to the sense of insecurity of many friendly governments. Iraq, for example, which has less than a third of Iran's population, has a rough equivalency in number of Soviet-supplied modern tanks and aircraft. As we have seen in widely scattered areas, the Soviet Union is not constrained in the supply of weapons to its friends.

In our review process, we are not governed by U.S. balance-of-payments considerations. The sale and its relation to our broad national interests are dominant. But economic and social factors are taken into account. A proposed sale is vetted in terms of the country's development goals and its ability to finance the particular system.

We have to make a clear judgment that the supply of a system to a foreign country would not weaken the readiness of our own forces. In addition, we weigh the threat to be countered or deterred and the burden that a new system would place on the foreign nation's ability to absorb new equipment. The value of our defense cooperation with the proposed recipient

country is of importance. We have to calculate how a positive or negative decision on a proposed sale might affect any special interests, such as access to facilities or airspace rights, that we may enjoy with the recipient country.

Finally, except in special circumstances, we do not sell or otherwise transfer certain sensitive items which would tend to weaken our technological lead or which we feel it otherwise inappropriate to sell to foreign nations. There have been a number of cases in which we have refused to sell arms to our friends, although for obvious reasons these do not normally make the headlines nor do we seek to publicize them to the detriment of our relations.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the need to consider such a large number of cases at one time imposes a heavy burden on the Congress. We would have avoided this, had it been feasible to do so. We were faced, however, with the fact that all of these cases were ready for submission to the Congress by the end of the summer or the early fall. This meant that to prevent disruptions in planned production and delivery schedules, to meet the desires of nations anxious to avoid delays in the receipt of equipment and services, and to prevent inflation from raising the cost of the items involved, these cases should be submitted as soon as possible. We were also aware, however, of your strong desire to have 30 days while the Congress is in session to review such cases and of the intention of Congress to recess in early October.

To delay these submissions until January would, it was clear, have resulted in a delay of at least five months in each case, and perhaps longer, with consequent harmful effects to the programs and to our relations with the recipient nations. It would also have meant that the new Congress would have been faced with a problem of even greater magnitude in the early months of next year if it had to deal with almost a half year's backlog of sales in addition to the continuing flow of new sales requests.

For the countries involved, it would have simply meant further significant delay, increased costs, and possibly disrupted production schedules.

In conclusion, let me again stress that we take very seriously the obligation we have to consult with Congress on our sales of military equipment abroad. To the extent we can, we are ready to provide you with the information you need to further your deliberations. I shall be pleased now to attempt to answer your questions and to receive your comments.

U.S. Calls for Equitable Resolution of Law of the Sea Issues

Following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger issued on September 17 upon the completion of the fourth substantive session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Press release 446 dated September 17

The law of the sea negotiations have just ended their current session in New York on September 17. The work they have undertaken is among the most important, complex, and difficult of any negotiations in this century. The delegations are attempting to establish a legal regime for nearly three-quarters of the surface of the globe. With some 150 nations participating, each seeking to protect its interests, it is not surprising that progress has been slow, given the diversity of views represented. However, significant progress has been made since the first substantive session in 1974.

The present revised single negotiating text represents a consensus on a large number of issues before the conference. This text has been maintained in this session as the basis for negotiations. A broad consensus already exists in certain key areas, including a 12-mile territorial sea, establishing coastal state resource and other rights in a 200-mile economic zone,

protecting navigational rights, and marine pollution. However, the United States believes the present text remains imperfect and requires further changes in a certain number of key areas, such as:

—A regime for mining deep seabed minerals.

—The nature of the economic zone.

—The provisions for marine scientific research in the economic zone.

—The articles dealing with the exploitation of resources in the continental margin beyond 200 miles.

—The rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in the economic zone.

During meetings between myself and certain other delegations September 1-2, the United States put forward important new ideas on a number of key topics still at issue. With respect to deep seabed mining we proposed a package approach which would include assured access in all its aspects to deep seabed mining sites by all nations and their citizens along with a financing arrangement to enable the proposed Enterprise (the independent operating arm of the International Seabed Authority) to get into business. As part of that package we further proposed that there could be a review, in 25 years perhaps, to determine if the provisions of the treaty regarding the system of seabed exploitation were working adequately. This was a significant move which generated considerable interest which we believe can be transformed at the next session into specific treaty language.

A number of delegations, representing all concerned groups, have expressed to us their belief that our package proposal represented a constructive contribution to the negotiations. This reaction is encouraging, and we intend in this same spirit to follow up this initiative both during the period between sessions and at the next session. On the other hand, some delegations chose tactics of confrontation. Such tactics cannot work and will inevitably lead to deadlock and unilateral action.

With respect to the issues in Committee II of the conference dealing with navigation and the nature of the economic zone, the United States continues to believe that a satisfactory solution is within reach. While specific language on the nature of the proposed economic zone has not yet been agreed, several promising ideas have been considered. We believe that a solution can be found which will provide for both the legitimate interests of the coastal states in protecting their resource and other interests and the high seas freedoms of the international community in the economic zone. These provisions are important in maintaining global security and supporting our allies in this dangerous age.

In Committee III the United States is seeking protection of the marine environment and preservation of the right to conduct marine scientific research. The present text already contains important provisions on ocean pollution which we seek to strengthen. With respect to marine scientific research in the economic zone, we have proposed a compromise which will give the coastal states the right to control marine scientific research directly related to resource exploitation but which will insure the right to conduct other forms of marine scientific research which benefit all mankind.

In order for an overall package settlement to be viable, the treaty must contain provisions for comprehensive, obligatory and binding third-party dispute settlement. This session has made considerable progress toward that goal.

We believe that equitable resolution of these and other key issues in these negotiations can be found. Unless this is the case various governments may conclude agreement is not possible, resulting in unilateral action which can lead to conflict over the uses of ocean space.

The United States has a major interest as a global power in preventing such conflict and thus will continue to seek overall solutions acceptable to all groups of countries. In so doing, however, we will continue vigorously to safeguard essential

American interests. We will work cooperatively with other nations, but we expect a reciprocal attitude of good will and reasonableness. There are limits beyond which the United States will not go, and we are close to such limits now.

We must now move toward businesslike negotiations and toward a recognition that the alternative to a treaty would serve no national or international community interest. I continue to believe that a law of the sea convention can be achieved. The United States will seek to build on the progress made to date and will continue its intensive efforts to achieve a treaty. A successful outcome will bring major benefits to this nation and help shape a more peaceful and prosperous international community.

Policy of Refusal To Negotiate With Terrorists Reiterated

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on September 15 by Frederick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.

I would like to state categorically and for the record that the policy which involves a refusal on the part of the U.S. Government to negotiate with terrorists, to comply with monetary or in-kind ransom demands, or to accede to any terrorist demands has not changed and will not change.

The maintenance of this no-negotiations, no-concessions policy is based on our firm belief that future incidents can be deterred only when it is widely understood and recognized that such acts cannot succeed and will not further the cause of the individual terrorist or international terrorist organization.

American Ambassadors are, and for some time have been, authorized to demand the well-being of hostages and request their unconditional release on humanitarian grounds. American Ambassadors are not, and never have been, authorized to make concessions of any kind. Ambassador [to France Kenneth] Rush operated in the full cognizance of this policy [during the September 10-12 hijacking to Paris of a TWA New York-Chicago flight] and in no way violated those standard instructions.

This may be the most difficult of policies to follow and in any individual incident may require difficult decisions. However, as Secretary Kissinger stated in Orlando last September, ". . . our general position has been that we will not negotiate, as a government, with kidnapers of Americans because there are so many Americans in so many parts of the world . . . that it would be impossible to protect them all unless the kidnapers can gain no benefit from such acts."¹

¹ For remarks by Secretary Kissinger and questions and answers before the Southern Governors Conference at Orlando, Fla., on Sept. 16, 1975, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1975, p. 516.

Department Discusses Policies in the Nuclear Field With Respect to the Republic of China

Following is a statement by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 22.¹

It is my honor to appear before this distinguished committee and to testify concerning our policies in the nuclear field with respect to Taiwan.

The Administration is deeply committed to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In recent years, great effort has been devoted to restricting the spread of national uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities. I believe we have made significant progress in these areas; we are determined to do more.

Our nuclear policies with respect to the Republic of China combine cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with determined vigilance against the possibility of potential nuclear proliferation. The main elements of our policy are:

—To cooperate with the Republic of China's plans to meet a growing portion of its electric power needs from nuclear reactors;

—To cooperate in those areas of peaceful nuclear research and training for which

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

the Republic of China has a legitimate need;

—To insure that the Republic of China abides by its policy not to develop nuclear weapons; and

—To insure that the Republic of China does not obtain a national reprocessing or enrichment capability.

In many respects, the issues we confront and the policies we are pursuing in the nuclear field with the Republic of China are similar to those we face in other areas of the world. However, our nuclear relations with Taiwan are unique in other respects.

First, we are, in a practical sense, Taiwan's only source of reactors and enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power program. This reduces the problems of coordination with other suppliers and increases Taiwan's dependence on a cooperative U.S. attitude in order to maintain its nuclear power program.

Second, our nuclear policies in the Republic of China must be determined within the context of our overall China policy. They must be compatible with our commitment to normalize our relations with the People's Republic of China and with our interest in encouraging a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem.

For these reasons, our nuclear policies with respect to Taiwan are formulated with great care and circumspection.

Since the late 1960's, the Republic of China has been planning to meet an increasing portion of its energy requirements from nuclear power. The Republic of China

has industrialized rapidly over the past decade and expects this trend to continue. Its energy needs have grown proportionately. Domestic energy sources, largely hydroelectric, meet only a fraction of Taiwan's needs. As the Republic of China's efforts to develop offshore oil have yet to bear fruit, the Republic expects to remain totally dependent for the foreseeable future on imports for its growing fossil-fuel needs. Consequently, the Republic of China is convinced that diversification into nuclear power is essential to its continued economic growth; the energy crisis in 1973 reinforced their belief in the correctness of this decision.

There are presently four nuclear generating units under construction on Taiwan; two others are in the planning stage. The first nuclear generating unit is scheduled to begin operation next year. These four generating units will provide approximately a third of total projected electric generating capacity when they become operational. When all six are completed in the mid-1980's, nuclear power will provide 45 percent of the island's electric generating capacity. The Republic of China is aware that this program is crucial to its continued economic vitality. Moreover, it will be investing several billion dollars in this program, a sizable stake in terms of Taiwan's economy. The nuclear power plants and the low enriched uranium to fuel them are all being supplied by American companies.

In addition to its nuclear power program, the Republic of China has been conducting a modest program in nuclear research since the late 1950's. This program began at Tsinghua University, which has a small research reactor supplied by the United States. In the mid-1960's the government intensified its research program and established a government agency, the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER), for this purpose. INER has developed plans for research into all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. INER has an operational fuel-fabri-

cation plant and a Canadian-supplied 40-megawatt research reactor. The Institute has been constructing a small reprocessing laboratory since 1969, but this laboratory is not yet operational.

U.S. involvement in Taiwan's nuclear power and research programs is governed by the terms of the U.S.-Republic of China Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. This agreement restricts our nuclear cooperation to peaceful purposes, provides for the application of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards and gives the United States a veto over the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel. All U.S.-supplied facilities and materials are under IAEA safeguards and have been periodically inspected by the IAEA, most recently in July of this year.

Over the years the Administration has restricted U.S. cooperation to those areas where we believe that Taiwan has legitimate research and training requirements and which do not endanger our nonproliferation objectives. Despite the interest of Republic of China scientists in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, we have not extended such cooperation to reprocessing and, in fact, have made clear our determined opposition to such activities. We do not believe that Taiwan's nuclear power program provides an economic justification for a national enrichment or reprocessing program. We have made clear that any attempt by the Republic of China to develop such programs will seriously jeopardize our cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Republic of China has enunciated a consistent policy with respect to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. The main elements of its policy are that:

—The Republic of China has been a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty since its inception and will abide by its treaty obligations.

—The Republic of China has no intention to develop nuclear weapons.

—All nuclear facilities in the Republic of China are for peaceful purposes.

—All nuclear facilities in the Republic of China are subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA's inspections have not revealed any irregularities.

Premier Chiang Ching-kuo publicly reiterated this policy last week following a meeting of his Cabinet. In doing so the Premier publicly stated for the first time that the Republic of China does not plan to acquire a facility for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. We welcome this commitment.

Over the past few years American officials have made clear to the Republic of China this Administration's determined opposition to any activities which would cast doubt on its commitment to nonproliferation. This position was again conveyed to the Republic of China early this month and resulted in assurances to us by the Premier similar to his public ones of last week. These have been subsequently confirmed in a note to us by the Republic of China stating that:

The Government of the Republic of China has no intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons, or a nuclear explosive device, or to engage in any activities related to reprocessing purposes.

We are pleased with this forthcoming position, which should eliminate any ambiguities concerning nuclear activities on Taiwan. This development is continuing evidence of the seriousness which we attach to preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of China is fully aware:

—That the United States is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

—That the United States is opposed to the spread of national reprocessing facilities; and

—That actions by the Republic of China contrary to these policies would fundamentally jeopardize continued U.S. cooperation

with the Republic in the peaceful use of atomic energy as well as other important relationships.

I can also assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of China is fully cognizant of section 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which denies economic and military assistance to countries which import unsafeguarded national reprocessing facilities.

Our approaches to the Republic of China on nonproliferation have been supplemented by bilateral consultations which we have undertaken this year and previously with the governments of countries which are potential suppliers of nuclear equipment to Taiwan. These consultations have been designed to insure that the policies of various suppliers are compatible. The responses from other governments have been favorable.

The Republic of China, in common with an increasing number of other nonnuclear states, has the economic and scientific base from which to develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive device, should they choose to do so and if they were in a position to procure or produce the necessary quantities of weapons-grade fissionable materials. Their declared national policy is not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices nor to develop the technology which would enable them to produce materials required to accomplish this. I cannot overestimate the seriousness with which the U.S. Government would view any deviation from this declared policy by the Republic of China.

I can assure you that we follow every aspect of Taiwan's nuclear program with the utmost diligence. Our contacts with Taiwan in the nuclear field have evolved over a period of years, and they will continue to do so in the future. Our cooperation in peaceful uses has been mutually beneficial. Our nonproliferation objectives have been maintained, and their continued maintenance will be an essential aspect of our relationship with the Republic of China.

Department Testifies on Question of Human Rights in North Korea

Following is a statement by Oscar V. Armstrong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on September 9.¹

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to testify on the question of human rights in North Korea.

Let me begin by saying that North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the world. The press and other media are totally controlled by the party. Only a few carefully selected officials are permitted to leave the country, and then only on official business. Foreign visitors or diplomats in North Korea, including even those from other Communist countries, are prevented from having contacts with ordinary citizens, and their movements are carefully controlled.

Virtually nothing is heard from this tightly closed society except what the totalitarian regime permits. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to obtain detailed information on civil practices or on the extent to which dissatisfaction or underground dissent exists within North Korea. Nevertheless, the silence which emanates to the outside world from other than official sources is in itself an indication of the absence of basic human rights in North Korea.

The situation can be briefly summarized. Although P'yongyang has promulgated formal guarantees for individual rights, North Korean theory and practice deny these same rights in the name of the collective good, and the regime has established an extensive network of sanctions to enforce that denial.

North Korea's Constitution, adopted in

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

December 1972, includes the following guarantees:

—"The right to elect and be elected" regardless of party affiliation and political views.

—"Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration."

—Religious liberty.

—"The inviolability of person and residence and privacy of correspondence."

—"Equal rights" in political, economic, and cultural life.

At the same time, the Constitution also lists fundamental "duties" which provide a theoretical basis for denying individual rights. Thus, all citizens must:

—"Strictly observe the laws of the state and the socialist norm of life and the socialist rules of conduct."

—"Display a high degree of collectivist spirit."

—"Voluntarily and honestly participate in work."

—"Heighten their revolutionary vigilance against the maneuvers of the imperialists and all hostile elements."

Moreover, the regime clearly places more importance on respect for the authority of Kim Il-song, who is both head of government and head of the Korean Workers Party (the Korean Communist Party), than on respect for civil liberties. The September 1974 issue of the authoritative party monthly *Kulloja*, for example, maintained:

Adherence to the absolute principle of the execution of the Leader's instructions means accepting the Leader's instructions as law and supreme command, and carrying them through to the end, with total devotion and self sacrifice, without complaints on grounds of trivial reasons, excuses or unfavorable conditions, and with such strong will, that even death does not relieve one of his duties to carry through the Leader's instructions to the end.

I would like to mention some specific aspects of what we would consider to be essential human rights. One is the electoral process. Elections are held for national and local assemblies, but the regime does not permit the election of candidates whose

views differ from those of the leadership. Thus in national elections in 1967 and 1972, the government announced 100 percent voter participation and 100 percent approval of the officially sanctioned slates.

The regime has permitted a few members of two minor parties—the Korean Democratic Party and the Chondokyo (or Young Friends) Party—to be elected to the Supreme People's Assembly, which is the national legislature. But these parties exist in little more than name only. The Korean Workers Party has total control of the state and its operations. All key officials and the vast majority of the members of the Supreme People's Assembly belong to it.

Despite the constitutional facade, freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration, and religion simply do not exist. There is virtually no opportunity for open expression of views contradicting the official line. The regime controls and censors all information media, whose officials come from the top ranks of trusted party cadre.

In more private milieus, such as the factory, school, or neighborhood, the expression of dissenting views is discouraged by a pervasive police presence, the outlawing of unauthorized gatherings, preemption by the party of much of the citizen's free time, and the organization of residential areas into small citizens' units that spy upon their own members. Regimentation of the society is further implemented by required participation in mass organizations.

Religious groups have been severely restricted, and public worship may have been banned entirely. After 1945 the state confiscated most of the land belonging to Christian and Buddhist organizations. P'yongyang's main theological seminary became Kim Il-song University. Christians were discriminated against in jobs and the education of their children.

Like free speech, privacy has political significance and is therefore restricted. Information obtained in earlier years showed that the political police, called the Political

Defense Bureau, had used wiretaps, mail intercepts, and searches without court authorization to uncover opposition. In addition there were paid informants in every village and factory. Surveillance was used both to gather evidence and to intimidate. There is no evidence that these practices have changed.

Freedom of movement exists neither in principle nor in practice. Travel within the country requires special food rations plus permission from local security authorities and one's employer. Changing jobs requires official permission. Transfers, therefore, are most commonly dictated by the desire of the state rather than the individual's wishes, and undesirable work assignments in remote areas are used as a form of punishment.

North Korean law defines espionage, sabotage, treason, and agitation against the state as political crimes. Other crimes are termed economic and moral. Evidently the more serious crimes are those in the "political" category.

In the past, severe punishment has been meted out for these crimes. In 1952 and 1953 several top officials apparently died as scapegoats for the unsatisfactory outcome of the Korean war. Ho Ka-I, a Vice Premier, "committed suicide" after he was criticized for malfeasance. Former South Korean Labor Party leader Pak Hon-yong, who went to P'yongyang during the Korean war, and 10 of his supporters among the top leaders of the Korean Workers Party were executed for allegedly plotting against the government.

The country's most severe political crackdown occurred in 1958 and 1959. During what was called a "collective guidance campaign," virtually the entire population was screened and subjected to intense interrogation about their political loyalty. South Korean sources claim that several hundred people were killed, about 2,000 imprisoned, 5,000 assigned to labor reform, and 8,000 families resettled.

During this period, some criticism of Kim Il-song occurred. Kim responded by

purging the party of members of factions known to oppose him. Since then, he has taken pains to recruit leaders loyal to him, including a large number of relatives: Kim's uncle is a Vice President; Kim's younger brother is a Vice Premier; his wife is head of the Korean Women's Union; an in-law is Foreign Minister. Kim has also apparently designated his son to succeed him as head of the party and government.

Little is known about the current treatment of persons convicted of political crimes, although North Korean propaganda suggests there is an official preference for "rehabilitating" them through intensive political indoctrination. Indeed, the very effective prevention of open dissent may reduce the need for more severe forms of punishment. Nevertheless, a North Korean defector in 1967 stated that the central authorities but not the local police used physical coercion and that army units were permitted to use electric shock or to beat suspected enemy agents.

I might note that the South Korean people have no illusions about individual freedoms in the North. Today in South Korea, even the most ardent domestic critics maintain that the nation must remain strong to prevent the imposition of communism by the North.

I will close by quoting two North Korean statements spanning 18 years. In 1956, as de-Stalinization started in the Soviet Union, North Korean judicial officials began to discuss the need to end legal discrimination based on class distinctions. These officials incurred the wrath of Kim, who responded in 1958 with a purge of the legal profession. In April that year Kim appeared before a convention of jurists and condemned those who had advocated that "law should be applied equally to everyone" and that "human rights" should be upheld. Kim asserted that on the contrary, law must be used as a weapon to safeguard the Socialist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In 1972 the regime adopted the constitution which included the guarantees I

mentioned earlier. But the North Koreans continue to hold that the function of law is not to protect the individual but to insure his conformity to norms imposed by the party. Thus the government newspaper *Minju Choson* observed in March this year:

"The law of our country serves to uproot outdated thoughts and conventions in the minds of our people, and to indoctrinate and transform them through legal sanctions . . . (It) guarantees the task of dyeing the whole society one color with the revolutionary thought of the great leader by serving as a weapon of dictatorship to destroy all sorts of obstructive machinations by class enemies."

United States Reaffirms Commitment to Integrity and Unity of Lebanon

*Department Statement*¹

The United States is convinced that the occasion of the installation of a new President of Lebanon offers an opportunity which must not be lost to bring an end to the fighting and to begin rebuilding national institutions. It will be essential for all parties in Lebanon to support and strengthen the authority of Lebanon's new President elected by legitimate processes so that all Lebanese may promptly begin their return to productive life.

The violence and destruction in Lebanon have gone on far too long. The costs in human suffering have been far too high. It is clear that no one can gain from continued fighting: countless more men, women, and children will lose lives, property, and hope for the future. It is a time for magnanimity, restraint, and compromise.

The United States believes that a solution can be found that will preserve the country's independence, territorial integ-

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 23 by Frederick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations; also issued as press release 464.

rity, and national unity. Solutions based on the partition of Lebanon are invitations to further strife and instability. The states so created would not be viable and would invite external intervention.

We continue to believe that the principles for a political accommodation among the Lebanese parties enunciated last January and February provide a basis for institutions that will meet the needs of the Lebanese people and nation. We hope that President Sarkis will be able to bring his countrymen to the roundtable talks he has proposed as soon as possible so that the process of reconciliation and rebuilding can begin.

The major objective in negotiating a solution will be to preserve a united country, led by a central government which will assure security and opportunity for all individuals and communities in the country. The principles proposed in January and February were designed to give practical political expression to the concept that there should be a partnership of equals in a reunited Lebanon. In our view, this calls for political, economic, and social adjustments that all Lebanese will perceive as fair and equitable. It presupposes that the government will have at its disposal security forces loyal to it which can restore confidence in the authority and ability of the government to maintain domestic order. And it will require that the Palestinians in Lebanon live in peace with their Lebanese hosts and neighbors without challenging the authority of a central Lebanese administration.

The governments of the area and the Arab League are in a position, each in its own way, to make constructive contributions to a political solution of the conflict. Continuation of the fighting cannot serve their interests. Peace in the Middle East and international stability will be in jeop-

ardy as long as the fighting continues. An end to the fighting in turn would create conditions more conducive to a resumption of the search for a negotiated settlement of the broader Middle East question which would take into account the concerns of the states of the area for their security and territorial integrity, as well as the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

We are prepared to help to bring an end to the fighting in Lebanon and to achieve a political solution. The interests of the United States lie in alleviation of human suffering, in the restoration of unity and stability based on justice in Lebanon, and in the reduction of tension and the establishment of peace among the nations of the Middle East. We will be prepared to support or undertake any diplomatic initiative requested by the parties.

We will continue our humanitarian programs, which already amount to more than \$10 million in hospital and other medical equipment and supplies and foodstuffs distributed as fairly as possible on both sides of the lines. We will do this and more as necessary. We are considering ways of shipping substantial quantities of wheat under Public Law 480.

We will also play our part, after a settlement is achieved, in helping President Sarkis and his government rebuild Lebanese institutions and the Lebanese economy. We have invited him to send a personal envoy to Washington as soon as he considers it appropriate in order to discuss specific ways in which we can be helpful. We have sought from the Congress an appropriation of \$20 million to begin the process.

This is a time of opportunity and hope for a suffering people in an area already too long devastated by war. The United States shares the conviction that this opportunity must not be lost.

The U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), May–June 1976

by Stanley D. Schiff¹

The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) was held at Vancouver May 31–June 11. Habitat was the latest in a series of major U.N. conferences (the environment, population, food, and the role of women) which have directed world attention at significant aspects of the planetary condition.

The idea for this conference originated at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Many of the developing countries there believed that the concern of the industrialized countries with environmental pollution was remote from their own concerns about poverty and the manmade environment. The Stockholm meeting recommended that a Conference on Human Settlements be held. The 27th U.N. General Assembly endorsed the recommendation in December 1972 and accepted the invitation of the Canadian Government to hold the conference in Vancouver, British Columbia.

In its Resolution 3128 (XXVIII), adopted on December 13, 1973, the U.N. General Assembly stated that the purpose of the conference would be:

... to serve as a practical means to exchange information about solutions to problems of human settlements against a broad background of environmental and other concerns which may lead to the formation of policies and actions by Governments and international organizations.

The conference had other purposes. Probably the most important of these was

¹ Report prepared especially for the BULLETIN. Mr. Schiff was Coordinator of U.S. Participation in the Habitat Conference.

to alert governments, private citizens, and the international community to the conspicuous lack of correlation between economic growth and the quality of life in human settlements. This was not an argument against growth; rather, it was an appeal for recognition that growth by itself is no guarantor of better living conditions. If quality and not just quantity was to be the guiding consideration, then priorities would have to be altered and thinking habits would have to be modified. That is a message Habitat aimed at imparting.

Carla A. Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, headed the U.S. delegation, and Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, served as her alternate. In her statement to the conference on June 1, Secretary Hills said:

Habitat is a creative challenge. Since it is certain that our often sterile—and too often rigid—thinking of the past will not serve the awesome needs of the future, this conference demands a radical change in our entire perception of human settlements. Above all, it calls for a long-range comprehensive approach to the problems and opportunities of human settlements rather than dealing separately and short range with each contributing factor.

Recommendations for National Action

A 56-nation preparatory committee had agreed that the conference would concentrate its attention on three documents: a Declaration of Principles; Recommendations for National Action; and a Program of International Cooperation. Of the three, national action would be the centerpiece in-

asmuch as settlement problems are primarily national responsibilities. The role of the international community would be essentially supportive of national efforts.

The framework for the national action recommendations comprised six major topics:

- Settlement Policies and Strategies
- Settlement Planning
- Institutions and Management
- Shelter, Infrastructure and Services
- Land
- Public Participation

The 64 recommendations for national action, under these six headings, are cast in the form of general guidelines; they do not form a rigid blueprint for universal application. While the document as a whole emphasizes the Third World's problems, much of the thinking incorporated in it is relevant to the industrialized countries.

Together the recommendations constitute a powerful argument for changes in thinking which respect and do not deny complexity. That is almost revolutionary doctrine, since most governments are accustomed to dealing with such problems as industry location, housing, transportation, and water supply in isolation from each other. What the conference urges is a new approach which attempts to comprehend all of these elements—and more—in dealing with settlements. It also suggests that governments will have to alter priorities if improvements in the quality of life are to be more equitably distributed among regions within a country and among socioeconomic groups.

The basic thought underlying the national action recommendations is summarized in the preamble to the section of the document relating to settlement policies and strategies:

Human settlements of today embody the outcome of generations of ideas, decisions and physical investment; it is not possible, therefore, to achieve radical modifications overnight. But population growth and rapid changes in the location of human activities proceed at such a pace that, by the end of the century we shall have to build "another world on top of the present one". If properly directed, this formidable

task could mobilize untapped resources and be turned into a unique opportunity for changing our man-made environment: this is the challenge of human settlement strategies.

Habitat added another dimension to the development process—the dimension of the use of space and of land, a dimension not well appreciated by economic policymakers and decisionmakers. Where industry and other economic activity are located has a significant influence on which settlements grow and which stagnate or decline. What Habitat suggests to governments is that they seek consciously to consider the spatial consequences of their investment decisions.

But the document is as much concerned with social, economic, and environmental factors as it is with the physical. Its recommendations are laced with repeated references to measures designed to safeguard against further environmental degradation. Woven into the recommendations is recognition of the need to include women in the planning and decisionmaking that affect the quality of their lives. Compassion for the poorest elements in society and for children, the elderly, and the handicapped is writ large in the documents.

There are two other ideas incorporated in the recommendations that are notable. The first is the acceptance of the important role which regional and local governments have to play in the formulation and execution of human settlements policy. It is an admission that the problems are too complex to be dealt with effectively by a central government acting alone. Secondly, the conference put a rather surprising degree of emphasis on the necessity for governments to consult their publics actively in the formulation and implementation of human settlements actions so that policy would be more responsive to their needs.

International Cooperation

The conference had a twofold task in the area of international cooperation: to devise an institutional arrangement within

the United Nations for dealing with human settlements activities and to recommend specific programs of activity.

Within the U.N. system, virtually every organ and agency carries on activities which might come under the heading of human settlements. However, two organizations have responsibilities which are most clearly associated with the major subject-area interests identified by the preparatory committee. They are the Center for Housing, Building and Planning, which comes under the U.N.'s Department of Economic and Social Affairs and is located in New York, and the U.N. Foundation for Habitat and Human Settlements, which is attached to the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) and is located in Nairobi.

Within the preparatory committee a strong consensus had developed on two basic points: that no new and separate organization to deal with human settlements should be created and that the Center and the Foundation should be consolidated to form the secretariat of a human settlements unit. Where views divided was on the question of whether the consolidated unit should be responsible to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs or to UNEP and whether it should be located in New York, Nairobi, or possibly elsewhere.

The conference reached a consensus on an organizational arrangement with the following main features:

—At the global level, a consolidated secretariat comprised primarily of the staffs of the Center for Housing, Building and Planning and the U.N. Foundation for Habitat and Human Settlements and an inter-governmental body of no more than 58 members which would provide policy guidance to that secretariat.

—At the regional level, a small human settlements secretariat unit in each of the regional economic commissions and an inter-governmental committee.

The organization would serve as a focal point within the United Nations for human settlements activities. The framework for

its future programs is based on the six topics which formed the framework for the national action recommendations. The motive in using an identical framework was to forge a direct link between national action and international cooperation. Using those six topics as a framework, the organization will identify selective priorities in its future activities based on the needs and problems of the regions and countries within the regions.

The document also reflects a concern that was broadly shared; namely, the need for better coordination within the U.N. system as a whole and the maintenance of close links with the World Bank and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). In addition, the conference recommended that at both global and regional levels cooperation should be sought with universities, research and scientific institutes, and non-governmental organizations and voluntary organizations.

Left in optional form in the document for General Assembly decision were the questions about organizational link and location. The basic options were those described above. They were the ones which received the greatest attention in Vancouver; and among those delegations which expressed a preference, a very clear majority favored integrating the human settlements unit with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and locating it in New York.

This was the position expressed by the U.S. delegation. Among the reasons cited by the United States in support of this view were:

—The need for closer integration of human settlements policy with economic and social policy at the national level has its parallel at the international level.

—The kinds of international programs that will be needed will have an essentially developmental and not environmental character.

—Most of the funds that will be required for activities in these areas are going to have to come from the UNDP and interna-

tional financial institutions. That will require close working relations with the UNDP and the World Bank.

—If the Human Settlements Foundation is to perform the kind of financial function that was foreseen for it, it should be close to a major capital market.

However, the majority of delegations did not indicate any preference at all, and it was this which made it impossible to envisage getting a final recommendation in Vancouver, whether by consensus or vote. Thus, the resolution of these questions was left up to the General Assembly.

The Declaration of Principles

Intended as the inspirational message from the conference, the Declaration of Principles was also the most political of the documents in Vancouver.

The process of shaping the draft declaration during the preparatory phase had been largely free of contentious political issues. The preparatory committee membership, dominated by urban managers, planners, and environmentalists, had developed an esprit de corps which took it beyond cooperativeness to cordiality. This was reflected in the suggestion made by one delegate, to which no one took exception, that it might be better to postpone the conference and just allow the committee to continue its existence indefinitely.

Psychologically, the conference was totally unprepared for the political assault which occurred in Vancouver. Long-unresolved political issues, many relating to the Palestinian problem, were cast into human settlements terms and injected into the discussion not only of the Declaration of Principles but of the Recommendations for National Action as well. The repugnant Zionism-racism resolution adopted by a deeply divided U.N. General Assembly in November 1975 was resurrected. References to the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties in the declaration multiplied and were proposed in forms which would have required

countries which opposed these resolutions when they were debated in the U.N. General Assembly to modify their positions substantially.

At a quite early stage in the consideration of the declaration, the Group of 77 produced a revision of the draft prepared by the Secretariat which was so substantial that it represented an almost new draft. A working group identified 13 paragraphs in that document as controversial. Negotiations were to concentrate on those issues. The negotiations never materialized, because the Group of 77 made acceptance of the Zionism-racism resolution a precondition to their willingness to negotiate on the other 12 disputed provisions. This offer was rejected. Consequently, it was decided to forgo committee discussion of the document and instead refer it directly to the plenary.

In plenary, a U.S. procedural proposal that the document be voted on as a whole (rather than paragraph by paragraph) was accepted.

The final vote on the declaration was 89-15, with 10 abstentions. The United States was among those countries which voted against adoption. In a statement following the vote, the U.S. delegation said:

... we are sorely disappointed that so much time and effort has been expended in discussions of problems of a political nature, essentially extraneous to the substantive work of this conference. There is good reason to believe that public esteem for the United Nations will be seriously impaired by this record. Continuation of this type of tactic does not bode well for my country's support and participation in future U.N. conferences concerned with global problems demanding international attention. Now, Mr. President, does it contribute to cooperation and progress at conferences such as these to have the rules of procedure deliberately subverted to the political objectives of a numerical majority?

The references in the U.S. statement to the subversion of rules of procedure related to parliamentary maneuvering which occurred during plenary consideration of the committee report and particularly to a Cuban amendment which "condemned settlement planning and implementation for the purpose of prolonging and consolidating occupation and subjugation in territo-

ries and lands acquired through coercion and intimidation" as violations of U.N. principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Pakistan delegation proposed that the conference rules of procedure be changed so that amendments on substantive matters could be approved by a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote. The conference President stated that the Pakistani proposal was itself a substantive one and therefore required a two-thirds majority. When he asked the conference to support his view, he was overruled by a vote of 59-30 (U.S.), with 6 abstentions. Following that, the plenary went on to approve the Cuban amendment by a vote of 77-8 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions.

Achievements of the Conference

At its first meeting in January 1975, the Habitat preparatory committee settled on an assumption which subsequently shaped the structure and content of the conference. That was that human settlements problems are essentially national rather than international and that national (and local) governments bear the primary responsibility for dealing with them.

Those problems are most acute in the developing world, where rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment give them a dimension unknown in the industrialized countries.

Among its larger purposes, Habitat was intended to bring world attention to bear on this complex of problems and to encourage governments to undertake commitments to respond to them. But Habitat also sought to alter the nature of the response. It aimed at persuading governments (and their publics) to develop approaches which would integrate human settlements policy with social and economic policy. It aimed at stimulating governments to consider carefully the interrelationships among important sectors of human settlements activity (housing, transportation, for example) rather than ignoring them. It sought to

stress the need for governments to modify domestic policies and priorities so as to give the poor access to basic shelter and services. In brief, it had a strong conceptual thrust.

The primacy assigned to national action implied that the role of the international community would be a somewhat limited one. Consequently, the international aspects of the conference would be of subordinate importance. It is against this general background that the accomplishments of the conference need to be assessed.

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of Vancouver was the ability of over 130 nations, diverse in so many ways, to produce, in the Recommendations for National Action, a meaningful document centered on domestic political and economic issues and to adopt it by consensus.

This was significant in several respects. First, it indicates quite clearly that, politically, it is possible for a large group of countries to discuss serious substantive problems in a serious way and arrive at a mutually satisfactory result despite the many obvious differences among them.

Secondly, the document—while hardly perfect—is a high-quality one. It embodies the conceptual thrust the conference aimed at.

Since it had to accommodate diversity, it could not be—and is not—a rigid blueprint for all governments to follow. The recommendations represent a set of guidelines which governments can draw on as they deem fit. But they are comprehensive in scope, reflect a concern and compassion for the poor, and are democratic in spirit. And, most importantly, they can be of real value, especially to developing countries.

Habitat produced a large measure of agreement on the details of an institutional arrangement for international action, thus laying the groundwork for a decision by the U.N. General Assembly at its fall 1976 session. Those details establish a broad framework within which specific programs of assistance can be designed. That frame-

work provides for a close link between national action and future international programs.

Habitat brought modern communications technology into major international conferences for the first time. Approximately 235 films were submitted by governments for use at the conference.

One of Habitat's objectives was to make possible a global exchange of experiences. Films were selected as the vehicle for communicating to a global audience the lessons learned from national experience—the successes and the failures in human settlements activities. It was an invitation to candor which some accepted and others—blinded by ideology to failure—did not. Nevertheless, there were some insightful films produced and shown.

Provided the General Assembly approves the recommendations made by the conference, the audiovisual program will be continued. Some of the films will be valuable training material.

Each of the previous major U.N. conferences—environment, population, food, and the role of women—examined the planetary condition from a different perspective. Each was able to build upon the gains achieved in previous conferences and to extend man's recognition and understanding of global interdependence in new directions.

The Habitat national action recommendations reflect a profound concern for the safeguarding of the natural environment. They reiterate the necessity of giving women opportunity to participate fully and actively in the processes which determine the quality of life in human settlements. Although the national action paper does not include the more specific provisions on family planning that the United States and a number of other countries wanted—due to inadvertence and misunderstanding—there is no doubt that the significance of rapid population growth to human settlements problems is fully appreciated by most countries.

Habitat in these areas represented con-

solidation. But it broke new ground of its own—in altering perceptions of domestic problems and their priorities and in gaining acceptance of the fundamental principle that people should be given the opportunity to participate in decisions which affect the quality of their lives.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.¹
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 21, 1976.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.
Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,² Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,² September 6, 1976.
Enters into force: September 6, 1977.³

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Comoros, September 21, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.¹
Acceptance deposited: Israel, September 8, 1976.

Scientific Cooperation

Memorandum of understanding amending the memorandum of understanding of July 21 and 22, 1976, for a transatlantic balloon program. Opened for signature at Washington August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.
Ratification deposited: United States, September 15, 1976.
Entered into force: September 15, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

² With statement.

³ Not for the United States.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* United Kingdom, September 23, 1976.⁴

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* United Kingdom, September 23, 1976.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes of understanding. Signed at Kabul August 8, 1976. Entered into force August 8, 1976.

Australia

Agreement between the United States and Australia on procedures for mutual assistance in administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington September 13, 1976. Entered into force September 13, 1976.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from Costa Rica during calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at San José April 23 and August 6, 1976. Entered into force August 6, 1976.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and 23, 1976 relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 14, 1976. Entered into force September 14, 1976.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta September 8 and 11, 1976. Entered into force September 11, 1976.

⁴ Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies and Tuvalu.

Nepal

Agreement relating to the improvement of production technology for foodgrain crops and cropping systems, with annexes. Signed at Kathmandu June 30, 1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976.

Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supplementary agreements and related notes. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976.

Ratifications exchanged: September 21, 1976.
Entered into force: September 21, 1976.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Iceland	Cat. No. S1.123:IC2	
	Pub. 8227	4 pp.
India	Cat. No. S1.123:IN2/2	
	Pub. 7847	7 pp.
Iraq	Cat. No. S1.123:IR1/2	
	Pub. 7975	4 pp.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Ecuador supplementing the agreement of January 8, 1947, as amended. TIAS 8205. 28 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8205).

International Wheat Agreement, 1971—Modification and Extension of Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention. Protocols with other governments. TIAS 8227. 67 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8227).

Universal Postal Union. Second additional protocol to the constitution, convention, and related documents with other governments. TIAS 8231. 450 pp. \$4.60. (Cat. No. S9.10:8231).

Extradition. Treaty with Australia. TIAS 8234. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8234).

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8235. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8235).

Extradition. Treaty with Canada. TIAS 8237. 39 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8237).

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Protocol with other governments amending article 14(2) of the convention of September 12, 1964. TIAS 8238. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8238).

Relations. Memorandum of understanding with Brazil. TIAS 8240. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8240).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Nigeria. TIAS 8243. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8243).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8244. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8244).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with the Netherlands. TIAS 8245. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8245).

Atomic Energy—Research Participation and Technical Exchange. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8246. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8246).

Remote Sensing From Satellites and Aircraft. Agreement with Canada amending and extending the agreement of May 14, 1971. TIAS 8247. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8247).

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. Memorandum with Mexico. TIAS 8248. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8248).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Austria amending the interim agreement of November 6, 1973. TIAS 8250. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8250).

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: September 20–26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†450	9/20	Kissinger: arrival, Lusaka.
†451	9/21	Kissinger: departure, Lusaka.
†452	9/21	U.S.-Brazil joint groups on scientific and technological cooperation and on energy, Brasilia, Sept. 16-17.
*453	9/22	Nguza, Kissinger: arrival, Kinshasa, Sept. 21.
*454	9/22	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 4-5.
†455	9/22	Kissinger: news conference, Kinshasa.
*456	9/22	Shipping Coordinating Committee. Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radiocommunications, Oct. 21.
*457	9/22	U.S.-Canada discussions on Great Lakes levels.
*458	9/22	Ralph E. Becker sworn in as Ambassador to Honduras (biographic data).
*459	9/22	Osogo, Kissinger: arrival, Nairobi.
*460	9/23	Julius L. Katz sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs (biographic data).
*461	9/23	Study group 5 of the U.S. National Committee of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, Oct. 28.
*462	9/23	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Oct. 14.
*463	9/23	Kissinger: interview by ORTF, Kinshasa, Sept. 22.
464	9/23	Statement on occasion of inauguration of President Elias Sarkis of Lebanon.
*465	9/23	Kissinger: remarks. Nakuru, Kenya.
*466	9/23	Osogo, Kissinger: departure, Nairobi.
*467	9/23	Callaghan, Kissinger: remarks before meeting, London.
*468	9/23	Callaghan, Kissinger: news conference following meeting, London.
*469	9/23	Kissinger: interview by Walter Cronkite via satellite.
*470	9/23	U.S. and Haiti amend textile agreement.
*471	9/24	Donald S. Lowitz and Monroe D. Donsker elected Chairman and Vice Chairman of Board of Foreign Scholarships (biographic data).
†472	9/24	Kissinger, Crosland: news conference, London.
†473	9/24	Kissinger: arrival, Andrews Air Force Base.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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