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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI

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Latin America and the United States

Statement by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I am happy to be able to report to this committee about my recent trip to Latin America. I am prepared to answer questions on other subjects as well—some, perhaps, in executive session—but I have concentrated my prepared remarks on our hemispheric relations.

The Western Hemisphere is, for us, a region of special ties and special interests. We have always felt a bond of intimacy and of collaboration in this hemisphere. We share a common origin in the struggle against foreign tyranny, a common tradition in the heritage of Western civilization, and common purposes in our mutual security and in our cooperative efforts to improve the lot of the people of this part of the world.

Latin America is changing. The nations of Latin America are experiencing, each in its own particular way, the stress of transition —internally from the rigid to the dynamic, internationally from dependence to interdependence.

The quality of their ties to our country is changing in the process. The United States is experiencing a more open relationship with the nations of Latin America, a relationship which now turns not on the memories of an earlier age of tutelage, on pretensions by us to hegemony, or on national inequality, but on mutual respect, common interests, and cooperative problem solving.

Yet, though our ties with them may be changing, the nations of Latin America have a new meaning and importance for us, for they are emerging in their own right on the global scene. This is so because:

—They are increasingly important factors in world commodity, mineral, and energy markets.

—They hold the potential to become a region for increased agricultural output, to feed the world's hungry.

—And perhaps most noteworthy, they are playing a more significant role in the political councils of the world, not merely because of their enhanced economic strength but also because of their growing solidarity with the other developing countries of Africa and Asia and their juridical traditions of personal respect, national dignity, and international collaboration which count for so much in the arenas of world politics.

Our policy in the Americas in the years ahead must recognize these new realities—of change in Latin America and of the fundamental importance of Latin America to the world interests of the United States. We cannot take the nations of this hemisphere for granted. We should put aside earlier temptations to crusade. We must create a new, healthier relationship. We can accept and indeed welcome the emergence of the nations of Latin America into global importance. And we must preserve our special hemispheric ties, without slogans, so that

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[1] Made before the House Committee on International Relations on Mar. 4 (text from press release 111). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

our cooperation as equals in this hemisphere can be a model for cooperation in the world arena.

The inter-American experience of the recent past has helped illuminate these imperatives of our future relationships with Latin America.

In the 1960's, the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies and enthusiasms of people throughout the Americas. By 1969, its promises had begun to fade, and the nations of Latin America gathered together at Viña del Mar to stake out a new agenda of issues between us. In 1973, shortly after I became Secretary of State, I called for a new dialogue between the United States and Latin America. At the meetings in Mexico City and Washington, the Foreign Ministers of the Americas met to discuss the Viña del Mar issues. Those meetings, however, were interrupted almost exactly a year ago, by the enactment of the Trade Act and the exclusion of Venezuela and Ecuador from the generalized system of preferences (GSP).

Yet, if the new dialogue did not yield final results, it did teach some lessons about our future efforts to perfect the undeniable community which exists in this part of the world. For it demonstrated:

—On the one hand, the difficulties which await both the United States and Latin America when the two sides attempt to reduce the complexity of their relationships to a series of demands for quick and categorical responses; and

—On the other, that the regular, recurring nonrhetorical examination of our common problems together is a constructive mode of dealing with them.

My trip to Latin America was an effort to do just that. It had been unfortunately delayed by other problems which were urgent as well as important, but circumstances combined, in the end, to make the timing rather more propitious than might otherwise have been the case.

—In Venezuela, I saw a country not content to husband its own affluence but determined to promote the common destiny of Latin America. I made clear that we welcomed this and that we were confident that as long as they served higher purposes than confrontation we were prepared to cooperate with regional organizations and institutions which expressed the increased sense of solidarity and common purpose within Latin America.

—Brazil is an emerging world power with broadened international interests and responsibilities, not by virtue of our granting them that rank, but by the reality of what Brazil has accomplished. The memorandum of understanding which I signed with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, establishing procedures for consultation between our two governments on issues of common substantive concern, was a recognition of that plain fact. The bilateral relationship between the United States and Brazil is becoming more important and more complex all the time; at the same time Brazil's voice and influence in world councils is also growing.

It was in recognition of Brazil's new world role that we institutionalized the increased consultations which will be required, just as we have with the nations of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. The Brazilian consultative agreement is bilateral. It touches only our relations with Brazil. While it reflects the reality of Brazil's international status, it does not affect our relations with any other country or represent an attempt to manage Latin America by proxy.

I explained to the Presidents of the other countries which I visited that we are prepared to enter into similar arrangements with other nations in the Western Hemisphere if they so desire. In enhancing bilateral relationships in this way with specific nations of the Americas, we will not diminish the sense of solidarity within Latin America or our willingness to work with Latin American institutions.

—Peru's unique experiment of internal development and social change demonstrates the creative worth of the diversity in the hemisphere. We accept the sovereignty of each Latin American state. Our policy, I said, is to support the aspirations and objectives of their program of social change, to co

ciliate differences before they become conflicts, and to cooperate with the authentic development efforts of each of the nations of the hemisphere.

—In Colombia, I saw at first hand another of the hemisphere's practicing democracies, a nation with whom we have the warmest of relations and with whom we can discuss world political and security issues without complexes and with considerable profit. The single serious matter on our mutual agenda is trade, for improved access to our markets and to those of the other developed countries is vital to the success of that democracy. The Colombian Foreign Minister has put forward an imaginative suggestion for expanding commerce within the hemisphere, and we are considering it with care. I might also add that we discussed Colombia's cooperation in the effort to control the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs.

—In Costa Rica, I saw another example of Latin American democracy at work. Addressing the Foreign Ministers of all the Central American states, I said that basic human rights within the Americas must be preserved, cherished, and defended if peace and prosperity are to be more than hollow achievements. I also observed that the problems we confront require more than ever the full and free dedication of the talent, energy, creative thought, and action of men and women free from fear and repression.

—Though I had not taken the initiative on the matter, I had found in each of my previous stops concern over what the dispatch of the Cuban force to Angola might signify for the nations of this hemisphere. Accordingly, in Costa Rica I also emphasized that no nation can hope to advance if it is not secure. And I restated our own firm commitment to the Rio Treaty and to the principle of collective security in the hemisphere.

—Finally, in Guatemala, I had the opportunity to see at first hand the tragic effects of the earthquakes of February 4–6: a few of the 80,000 Guatemalans who were maimed and injured; some of the 1 million now without homes, who are living in tents and makeshift shelters; and something of the heroic efforts of our own countrymen to help that stricken land. I pledged to Guatemala our support, not only in the moment of tragedy but for the long term as well, and I cited the $25 million emergency package now before the Congress as an expression of this intent of the American people.

Throughout my trip, I emphasized that the United States regards our hemispheric ties and responsibilities with a special seriousness and special hope. In a spirit of solidarity, I pledged that we should:

—Respond to the development needs of the more industrialized nations of the hemisphere, and to the region as a whole, in the areas of trade and international finance;

—Assist on concessional terms the efforts of the neediest nations to advance themselves;

—Support and work with Latin American regional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration;

—Negotiate our differences with any nation or nations on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality;

—Maintain our firm commitment to mutual security against any who would undermine our common effort, threaten independence, or export violence and terror; and

—Modernize and strengthen the inter-American system by working with the other member states to develop new structures and processes in the OAS itself and with other organizations to meet the new realities of our hemisphere.

These six points met with a positive response throughout my visit.

It was apparent to me:

—That there is a strong regard and special respect for the United States in the countries I visited, upon which we can build;

—That while the United States has assumed security responsibilities and the nations of Latin America are determined for their part to concentrate on meeting the imperatives of rapid growth, our interests and views intersect over a wide range of issues;

—That our common heritage and our shared aspirations and values of human respect and dignity make it possible for us to cooperate for the common good;

—That, for this purpose, the essential political requirement for progress in these areas of common concern is the readiness of nations to consult and cooperate with each other on the basis of sovereign equality; and

—That, with consultation and cooperation, mankind's hope of meeting the challenges of economic and social progress and of remaking relations between developed and developing countries is brightest and most promising here in this hemisphere.

The executive branch is directing itself in a serious way to these goals. We have already held a series of interagency meetings, involving Treasury, STR [Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations], Defense, and Commerce, at the State Department. We have compiled an inventory of each of the issues discussed in all my talks, and we are tasking specific offices, bureaus, and departments with the responsibility for the concrete steps necessary to respond with action programs.

Within the week, the Brazil-U.S. trade subgroup established by the new consultative mechanism will hold a two-day meeting here in Washington and will focus on the question of export subsidies and countervailing duties. Beyond that, the Foreign Ministers of all the member states will have an opportunity to discuss these issues collegially at the General Assembly of the OAS in June. We intend to take full advantage of that occasion to insure that the U.S. position on the hemisphere's problems be defined well before that meeting in order that its deliberations shall be as productive and specific as possible.

We will be consulting the Congress in the weeks ahead, as these plans take concrete shape. Some of the outlines of what should be done are already clear, as are the important role and responsibility of the Congress for the success of our Latin American pol cies in the years ahead:

—The legislative threat of political r taliation by cutting off the U.S. market stopping multilateral aid projects, directe to states which do not follow our principl in nationalizing property within their bo ders, is still a matter of concern in Lat America. I have suggested that if Lat America and the United States could devel a multinational code regulating both nation and corporate behavior in investments a investment disputes, this would enhance t confidence in the Congress that compens tion issues, at least, could be settled witho the need for automatic statutory retaliatio

—As to trade policy, the system of ge eralized preferences in the Trade Act was important advance in our relationship wi Latin America, for their development aspi tions depend on improved access to wo markets, including our own. The exclusion Venezuela and Ecuador from GSP did se ous damage to the United States in the ey of Latin America. We hope that Congre can give early and sympathetic considerati to repealing this legislation.

—I found considerable fear that our tra policies are becoming generally more prot tionist, as reflected by new countervaili duty actions, escape clause cases, and oth restrictive measures taken with regard imports from Latin America in the p year under the Trade Act. I also found n evidence of a willingness to conciliate a compromise some of the outstanding tra disputes if the United States is in a posit to respond reciprocally in a spirit of mut accommodation. We will be examining th Latin American concerns and ideas and c sulting with the Congress about the gene policy issues and about specific legislat remedies if we determine that furth legislation is essential.

—Latin America is still intensely int ested in solving the problem of fluctuati commodity export earnings. The fact t the Administration will be requesting t

he Congress approve U.S. participation in he new International Coffee Agreement and he International Tin Agreement has been videly applauded in the hemisphere. I am onfident that congressional consent will be orthcoming; for these agreements are of ital importance to Colombia, Brazil, and Central America, in the case of the coffee greement, and to Bolivia, in the case of the in accord, and will be seen throughout the emisphere as an earnest of our sincere de- ire to cooperate in their development efforts. Beyond that, I pointed out that the United States is prepared to work with other coun- ries on a case-by-case approach to other ommodities and that in selecting commodi- ies for such consideration, we would pay articular attention to those items of inter- st to the nations of Latin America.

—Exports take time. Meanwhile, the na- ions of Latin America continue to need con- iderable development assistance, on non- oncessional terms in the case of most, to nance essential imports and capital invest- ents. This session, Congress has before it he legislation to authorize and appropriate unds for our development assistance efforts hrough the Inter-American Development ank, the World Bank complex, and the gency for International Development. The egislation providing for replenishment of he ordinary capital and the Fund for Spe- ial Operations of the Inter-American De- elopment Bank is of particular importance o our Latin American policy, for that Bank s now the single most important source of fficial development capital for the nations of he hemisphere.

—And as I mentioned earlier, there is also efore you the President's special request or legislation to provide $25 million for the elief of the suffering and homeless in uatemala. I cannot stress the urgency of his legislation too much, for the wet season n the highlands is fast approaching, and nless the 1 million homeless get roofs over heir heads, the rains will add new human isery and suffering in that stricken land. Later today a subcommittee of your committee will be hearing testimony on behalf of the proposal. I urge your full support for this first effort to bring timely assistance to the victims of this disaster. We will report to you at a later date about the need for U.S. assistance in the subsequent rehabilitation and reconstruction phases of the disaster.

—Beyond these issues are a series of important hemispheric political considerations. Not the least of these is the extent to which Cuba's action in Angola may constitute an ominous precedent for intervention in this hemisphere and thus invoke our solemn treaty responsibilities.

On this and on other matters, we propose to meet regularly with the Congress.

No policy, in this region of the world or elsewhere, can succeed without the understanding, support, and cooperation of this body. Legislation, whether for good or ill, is a vital—indeed, often a decisive—instrument of the foreign policy of the United States. We know that nurturing the understanding and support of the House and the Senate falls in major part to us in the executive. We consider it a basic responsibility to continue to work with you on hemispheric issues.

For there is much the United States can do of tangible benefit for the people of Latin America and for the common global good without massive sacrifice to ourselves.

In this hemisphere, there is a promise, an emergent power, and a moral force. The United States and Latin America share precious common bonds of history and outlook. Our task is not an onerous task, for it is one which serves the mutual interests of this country and Latin America. Our task is to forge those common bonds into a sense of shared purpose and endeavor so that this hemisphere can truly be a model for and a contribution to the general order, harmony, and prosperity to which the peoples of all the world aspire.

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

Following is the text of President Ford's message to the Senate of February 18, together with the text of the report of the Department of State submitted to President Ford on February 6.

PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 24, 1976, together with seven Supplementary Agreements and eight related exchanges of notes. For the information of the Senate, I transmit also the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

I believe this Treaty will promote United States interests and objectives relating to Spain and western security. With the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty would serve to provide a firm basis for a new stage in United States-Spanish relations, reflecting United States support for and encouragement of the important evolution which has begun in Spain and to which the Spanish Government renewed its commitment in connection with the signing of the Treaty. The Treaty reflects the mutual conviction of Spain and the United States that the proper course of this evolution should include, as major objectives, the integration of Spain into the institutions of Europe and the North Atlantic defense system and should include a broadly based cooperative relationship with the United States in all areas of mutual interest. The Treaty should contribute positively to the achievement of these goals.

In the area of western security, the agreement provides for a continuation of the important contribution made by Spain through facilities and related military rights accorded United States forces on Spanish territory. The agreement reflects a careful balancing of Spanish concerns with the changing requirements of United States military deployment. As a new development of the United States-Spanish defense relationship, the Treaty establishes mechanisms and guidelines, such as those reflected in the provisions dealing with military planning and coordination, to help develop an active Spanish contribution to western security, a contribution which complements and is coordinated with existing arrangements. The Treaty does not expand the existing United States defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area nor does it create an additional bilateral one. Finally, the Treaty pledges military assistance to the Spanish armed forces in their program of upgrading and modernization. The major portion of that assistance is in the form of loan repayment guarantees. The actual cost to the United States taxpayer is expected to be far lower than the figure listed in the agreement.

I recommend that the Senate give prompt consideration to the Treaty and consent to its ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 18, 1976.*

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1976.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain signed at Madrid on January 24, 1976, together with its seven Supplementary Agreements and its eight related exchanges of notes. This agreement would supersede the 1970 Agreement between the United States and Spain on Friendship and Cooperation which expired on September 26, 1975, at which time a one-year transitional period began.

The new agreement is in the form of a Treaty

[1] Transmitted on Feb. 18 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. E, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty, seven Supplementary Agreements, eight related exchanges of notes, and the report of the Department of State.

This solemn form was deemed appropriate not only because of the wide scope and importance of the subject matter covered but also because both Spanish and United States authorities wanted to assure the soundest political basis for the new stage in United States-Spanish relations symbolized by the agreement.

The Treaty covers a broad spectrum of areas of mutual concern in United States-Spanish relations, with specific articles and supplementary agreements creating cooperation in the areas of economic affairs, education and culture, science and technology, and defense matters. It also provides an institutional framework to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation in all these areas. The principal new elements of substance are in this institutional area, and include the creation of a high-level United States-Spanish Council, to oversee the implementation of the entire agreement, and a set of subordinate bodies, including joint committees for the various areas of cooperation and a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff. The agreement specifies the military and nonmilitary assistance to be given Spain over the five-year initial term of the agreement, and grants to the United States essentially the same rights to use military facilities in Spain which it enjoyed under the 1970 arrangements. The principal changes in military facilities are a reduction and relocation of United States tanker aircraft within Spain and establishment of a date for withdrawal of the nuclear submarine squadron from the Rota Naval Base.

Article I of the Treaty, together with Supplementary Agreement Number One, and a related exchange of notes, establishes the United States-Spanish Council, under the joint chairmanship of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Spain. The Council, which is to meet at least semi-annually, will have headquarters in Madrid, a permanent secretariat, and permanent representatives serving as deputies to the Chairmen to assure its ability to function in their absence. An important aspect of the new arrangement is the integration of the military cooperation into the Council structure.

Article II, together with Supplementary Agreement Number Two, calls for the development of closer economic ties between the United States and Spain, placing emphasis on cooperation in those fields which facilitate development. In this connection, the agreement takes into account the current readiness of the Export-Import Bank to commit credits and guarantees of approximately $450 million to Spanish companies. The agreement also specifies general principles to guide United States-Spanish relations in the economic field.

Article III, together with Supplementary Agreement Number Three and a related exchange of notes, provides for a broad program of scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes with principal emphasis on areas having significance to the social and economic welfare of the peoples of Spain and the United States as well as to developmental progress. A total of $23 million would be provided by the United States in the form of grant to support this five-year program. One of the first matters of concern in scientific and technological cooperation will be studies relating to a solar energy institute which Spain wishes to establish, with some seed money for the studies being drawn from the U.S. grant.

Article IV of the Treaty, together with Supplementary Agreement Number Four and a related exchange of notes, provides for a continuation and expansion of educational and cultural cooperation. The agreement contemplates a grant from the United States in the amount of $12 million to support this five-year program, which is considered to be of particular importance in strengthening the relationship between the United States and Spain.

Articles V and VI of the Treaty, together with Supplementary Agreements Five, Six and Seven, and related exchanges of notes, deal with cooperation in the area of defense. The defense relationship which these provisions represent is one woven firmly into the fabric of existing United States philosophy and planning for the defense of the North Atlantic area. It represents a decision to assist Spain in developing a role which will contribute actively to that defense, and provides transitional institutions to prepare the way for an appropriate Spanish role in NATO. These provisions do not constitute a security guarantee or commitment to defend Spain. They do, however, constitute a recognition of Spain's importance as a part of the Western World.

To this end, a Combined Planning and Coordination Staff, with no command functions, is provided for by Supplementary Agreement Number Five, which sets forth a carefully drawn mandate and geographic area of common concern. All activities of the staff focus on the contingency of a general attack on the West. There is no commitment, express or implied, in the drawing up of the contingency plans.

To further the purposes of the Treaty, Spain grants the United States the right to use and maintain for military purposes those facilities in or connected with Spanish military installations which the United States has heretofore enjoyed, with the exception that the number of KC–135 tankers in Spain will be reduced to a maximum of five and the remaining tankers relocated; and that the nuclear submarines will be withdrawn from Spain by July 1, 1979, a date which corresponds with our changing requirements. In addition, the United States undertakes not to store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil. Details concerning the facilities granted are set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Six, a related exchange of notes which includes U.S. military strength levels authorized in Spain, and an exchange of notes confirming United States military overflight rights and rights to use facilities in Spain for military aircraft transiting to third countries.

The details of the military assistance to be provided Spain are set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Seven and a related exchange of notes. Under these arrangements, the United States would provide to Spain, over the five-year initial term of the Treaty, repayment guarantees under the Foreign Military Sales program for loans of $600 million, $75 million in defense articles on a grant basis, $10 million in military training on a grant basis, and a U.S. Air Force contribution, on a cost-sharing basis, of up to $50 million for the aircraft control and warning network used by the U.S. Air Force in Spain. In addition, provision is made to transfer to Spain five naval vessels and 42 F4E aircraft on terms which benefit that country.

The notes exchanged include United States assurances to Spain on settlement of damage claims which might result from nuclear incidents involving a United States nuclear powered warship reactor. These assurances are based on Public Law 93–513. Finally, there is an exchange of notes relating to the possible transfer of petroleum storage and pipeline facilities presently used by United States forces in Spain.

Associated with the Treaty and its supplementary agreements and exchanges of notes are an Agreement on Implementation and procedural annexes thereto which regulate such matters as the status of United States forces in Spain and the use of the facilities there. These documents are being provided to the Congress for its information.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Department Urges Senate Approval of U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty

Following is a statement by Ambassador at Large Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 3.[1]

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you this morning on the proposed treaty with Spain. I have consulted previously with many of you individually while the negotiations were in progress and after its signing, and with the Subcommittee on Europe. I would hope the end result reflects this process, which I have found of great benefit to me as a negotiator. This is my first opportunity to meet with the full committee on this treaty.

I believe the committee already has Secretary Kissinger's letter to the President and the President's letter transmitting the treaty to the Senate for ratification. I would like to briefly describe the background from which the treaty emerged and identify its principal elements.

This important agreement establishes for the United States a new complex of relationships at a time when Spain is entering a new era in its long history. By this complex of relationships we shall contribute to the security of the United States and to the defense of the West in general. The treaty is also a vehicle for expanded cooperation between the two parties in economic, cultural, technological, and other fields as well as defense.

Our other partner in this treaty, the Spanish Government, clearly believes that our new relationship and our expanded cooperation in diverse fields will also be of positive benefit to it as Spain begins the process of restoring democracy in Spain and returning to the councils of Western Europe. We support both of these objectives as being in the interest of the United States, and we believe this treaty to be strong evidence of this support.

It is significant that the new agreement is in the form of a treaty. In large part this resulted from the sound counsel of members on this committee and your colleagues that the legislative branch should have an opportunity to review the substance and purpose of this agreement and, if it chooses, to endorse them in the most formal way under our Constitution.

The treaty form also is appropriate for the wide scope and importance of the subject matter covered. It satisfies the desire of both Spain and the United States to assure the soundest political basis for the new era i

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S.-Spanish relations symbolized by the agreement, as well as for its specific undertakings.

This new agreement goes beyond what we were negotiating with the previous regime: it is a treaty; it has a more substantial nonmilitary element; and it explicitly looks toward eventual Spanish entry into NATO.

The proposed treaty embodies a broader relationship with Spain than under the past agreements. This is not just a military or bases agreement. It provides an institution and establishes structures to give meaning to our mutual desire for closer cooperation. It explicitly recognizes and endorses Spain's new and growing ties with the Atlantic community, including proposed links with the European Economic Community as well as with NATO. It would provide additional funding for new programs in science, technology, education, and culture, including seed money for a major solar energy research effort from which we could benefit as much as Spain. It specifically notes that the Export-Import Bank is prepared to commit some $450 million worth of loans and guarantees to Spanish companies, and it recognizes the important contribution such loans have made to Spain's development as well as to our own export efforts.

In addition to the enriched nonmilitary relationships, the treaty also establishes a defense relationship—an expansion of the earlier basing arrangement, if you will—which is very important to U.S. security interests, and yet whose cost to the U.S. taxpayer is modest. The largest element in the military assistance to Spain is a guarantee of $600 million in credits at nonconcessional interest rates. The proposed assistance is as follows:

1. *$600 million ($120 million per year)* in U.S. Government guarantees of credits for purchases of military equipment.

2. *$75 million ($15 million per year)* in grants for military equipment.

3. *$10 million ($2 million per year)* in grants for military training.

4. *$50 million* on a cost-sharing basis as the U.S. Air Force share for modernization of the jointly used Spanish air control and warning system. This modernization program keeps the system compatible with the NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment System] system of the NATO countries. Because the U.S. Air Force needs the system for its own use, this item is outside the pure assistance category.

5. *$35 million ($7 million per year)* in grants for programs in education and culture and in science and technology, including research in solar energy.

The treaty also provides that we will help Spain to obtain five naval vessels and to lease 42 F–4E aircraft.

Turning from assistance to the facilities we will use, the treaty would grant to us essentially the same rights in Spain which we have enjoyed under the 1970 agreement. The major changes would be the withdrawal of the tanker wing from Spain, leaving a detachment at Zaragoza, and the withdrawal of the nuclear-missile submarines from Rota by July 1, 1979. These changes, while modifying the U.S. military presence in Spain, will not impair the important military capabilities we have to fulfill our strategic and general purpose requirements in that part of the world.

The defense relationship set out in the treaty reflects and supports our overall approach to the defense of the North Atlantic area. The treaty is intended to help Spain contribute even more effectively to Western defense efforts, moving from a passive to an active role and eventually leading, we hope, to Spain's entry into NATO. To these ends we plan to establish a Combined Coordination and Planning Staff to develop contingency plans for a Spanish role in the event of a general attack on the West. We also will work with the Spanish Government to develop means to coordinate our bilateral activities more closely with those of NATO.

These provisions do not constitute a security guarantee or commitment to defend Spain. The Spanish understand and have publicly confirmed that the United States

has not undertaken here a security commitment to Spain. The Combined Coordination and Planning Staff would have no command functions, and there is no commitment or understanding regarding implementation of any contingency plans. Therefore, the new treaty would not represent any enlargement of the existing U.S. defense commitments in the North Atlantic area, nor would it create any obligations for NATO or the other individual allies regarding Spain. Our NATO allies have been kept informed of our progress in the negotiations, and to my knowledge have not objected to the provisions of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, the Administration is firmly convinced the treaty will benefit U.S. interests in Spain and Europe by giving positive impetus to the transition now underway in Spain. We also believe that transition will facilitate the development of a more constructive and harmonious association between Spain and the other West European countries. That is the broader objective of our policy. Of course, this can hardly be a straight-line development, and it will be very important in the process that the Spanish Government be able to count on understanding and encouragement from its neighbors and from the United States.

In conclusion, I would say that the United States supports Spain's progress toward democracy out of a dedication to human rights and out of the simple understanding that we are all part of a wider Atlantic community whose strength and cohesion demands that high standards in these matters be met and maintained by all members. The treaty is a clear sign of our moral support for Spain at this time. Moreover, the treaty will contribute to a deepening of Spain's role in Western Europe, thereby benefiting Americans, Spaniards, and other Europeans alike. I trust that the committee will agree and that the Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to address a few additional remarks to a question which, I gather, has quite recently become the subject of some concern. I refer to the question of procedures for authorizing and funding the assistance contemplated for Spain which appears to arise from submission of the agreement to the Senate as a treaty. I must say I am somewhat surprised by the concern because we had no intention, through this submission, of imposing on the Congress any particular modality of authorization and funding. While we have submitted a treaty, we see merit in having the House of Representatives participate as well. If the Congress prefers an additional authorizing bill as a vehicle for this participation, perhaps in the form of a joint resolution, we would welcome it and lend our support.

Our principal concern would be to assure that any additional authorization reinforces the action of the Senate in advising and consenting to the entire agreement rather than seeming to reserve judgment about such an essential part of it as the assistance package.

We would hope that this concern would be shared and accommodated in any recommended action. In our view, it argues for any authorization to be for the five-year term of the treaty.

Letters of Credence

Denmark

The newly appointed Ambassador of Den mark, Otto Rose Borch, presented his creden tials to President Ford on February 24.[1]

Japan

The newly appointed Ambassador o Japan, Fumihiko Togo, presented his creden tials to President Ford on February 24.[1]

Switzerland

The newly appointed Ambassador of th Swiss Confederation, Raymond Probst, pre sented his credentials to President Ford o February 24.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and th President's reply, see Department of State press r lease dated Feb. 24.

A Common Heritage, A Common Challenge: The Atlantic Link

Address by Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt
Counselor of the Department [1]

Today we are gathered here, in the heart of Europe, to celebrate 200 years of American independence—independence from Europe, let us recall. Yet we also meet at a time when the ties between Europe and America are more numerous and in many ways closer than they ever have been. I speak not only of our cultural and ethnic ties, which have never been broken, but also of our unparalleled economic exchange, political consultation, and military cooperation, much of which is of more recent origin. This interdependence is the hallmark of our age, and the relationship between the United States and Europe is perhaps its highest and most constructive form. Let us examine, therefore, how this new Atlantic relationship has evolved and where it is leading.

Two hundred years ago America was moving toward the final break in its principal political bond with Europe—its allegiance to the British Crown and its subordination to the British Parliament. On July 4, 1776, America proclaimed its independence from the mother country and struck out on a new path. Half a decade of fighting still lay before it and yet another war with Britain in 1812. But once America had conclusively won the independence that it had proclaimed on that brave day, it was left, free of serious external threats, to grow and prosper for more than a century. Shielded by vast oceans and on occasion by the British Navy, favored by the balance of power in Europe, and confident of its own destiny, America stood distant and aloof.

Then, in the opening decades of the 20th century, the European balance of power collapsed, just as modern technology shattered forever the barriers of time and space behind which America had for so long been sheltered. America found itself for the first time in its history unable to either accept or ignore events in Europe. We began to pay the price necessary to influence them. That price—in blood and treasure—was not by European standards very high, but it was more than Americans could then permanently accept.

Once the immediate threat was past, the perhaps inevitable reaction came. Unwilling to pay the long-term price necessary to help maintain a stable balance of power in Europe, America first proposed to substitute an international system which largely ignored the realities of power as a determinant of international conduct. Failing in this, tiring of the effort, and unable to count upon the old natural barriers to insulate it from Europe, America sought to erect artificial new barriers by a legislatively decreed neutrality.

The folly of America's flight from reality was brought home to our people with overwhelming force, and at tragic cost, by the holocaust of World War II. Indeed, even before that war, the shocks of our Great Depression had graphically shown that America could not insulate itself from events beyond its shores. Once again America found itself unable to either ignore or accept or,

[1] Made before the Bicentennial Conference on German-American Relations at Eichholz, Federal Republic of Germany, on Feb. 20 (text from press release 90 dated Feb. 21).

even less, control developments in the world around it. Once again it was forced to pay the price necessary to help restore a peace which it had failed to help maintain.

Lessons twice taught are well learned. Those who remember the terrible costs of that war realize how incomparably lighter are the burdens of maintaining the peace. Europeans and Americans alike have shouldered these burdens willingly now for more than three decades.

Thirty Years of Atlantic Achievement

It is during these last 30 years that U.S.-European relations have achieved the scope and intensity which we now consider normal. It is during these 30 years that the great ocean which once divided us has bound us together into that community of nations which today bears its name.

The Atlantic community is not a single institution or a rigid structure, but a web of relationships among diverse nations which yet share common values and interests. These relationships are carried forward in NATO, within the European Community, between the European Community and other European and American states, and in numerous other bilateral and multilateral forums. Let us now examine what this extraordinary association of peoples and nations has achieved and what it is destined to achieve. Is our unity of purpose and action permanent or transitory? These are some of the questions I will try to answer today.

The political order which grew out of the ashes of World War II has been in most respects amazingly successful. Within it, there have been virtually undisturbed peace, continuous economic development, and the expansion of personal liberty. These are accomplishments almost without parallel in history. They are the direct consequence of the perhaps unique forms of cooperation that all of us brought to the challenges of the postwar period.

It is tempting to believe that our future will be much like our recent past: progress at home, equilibrium abroad. Certainly this must be the goal. But its attainment is not automatic. We must recognize that the international environment in which we live has in many ways changed and is still changing. There has been a geometrical expansion in the number of participants—from a few dozen sovereign nations to over 150. The international structure must now accommodate the diverse and often conflicting aspirations, interests, and values of these nations. Three decades have also brought major changes to Europe, America, and the Soviet Union. If the Atlantic community is to cope with the challenges of the next quarter century as successfully as it has with those of the last, we must understand and adjust to these changes.

It is in Europe that this transformation is most evident. From economic collapse, political vacuum, and moral confusion, Europe has emerged economically strong, politically cohesive, and morally reborn. We welcome this, for it means that Europe is no longer a junior associate but, rather, a vigorous and mature partner in our common quest for security, peace, and well-being.

The Soviet Union, too, has not ceased to grow and develop. It recovered from its grievous wartime wounds and, with enormous determination and energy, set out on a path of building the sinews of power and industrial might. And while its ideology and system have hardly exerted the attractions and appeals that its rulers expected, the Soviet Union has steadily evolved from being a major power on the Eurasian landmas to the status of a superpower on a globa scale.

Yet while the power that it has amasse and will undoubtedly continue to amass i formidable, the Soviet system has develope unevenly and is far from being withou shortcomings. It is no longer hermetically sealed off from the outside world, and if i is to evolve into the modern society towar which its people strive, it must place con siderable reliance on various forms of co operation with the outside world. This ha been recognized by the Soviet leadership, an it is precisely here where the opportunitie lie for shaping realistic and pragmatic rela tionships based on our strength and unit

in which our own interests will be safeguarded and peace maintained.

In absolute terms the ability of the United States to play its part in meeting the new Soviet challenge has not diminished over the past 30 years. On the contrary, it has steadily increased. Even in relative terms, and taking account of Soviet growth, the United States alone, and even more so the United States and Europe together, maintain a clear margin of potential power.

Nevertheless the situation is qualitatively different than it was 30 or even 15 years ago. In 1945 the United States had a tremendous surplus of resources which it could and did use to meet its new global responsibilities. Because of the incredible expansion of America's wartime industries, the United States was at that time producing perhaps 50 percent more than its citizens were consuming. This gap allowed us to transfer extensive resources for the reconstruction of Europe while at the same time improving the standard of living of our own citizens at a rapid rate.

Over the years the gap between what America produces and what its citizens consume has steadily narrowed. The American economy has grown continuously, but our standard of living has grown even faster. As consumer expectations rise, the surplus of resources available for commitment abroad narrows. The political choices which leaders must make become harder. New programs are more hotly debated. As late as the 1960's, America thought it could fight a major war in Viet-Nam without new taxes or inflation. Today we realize that our resources, though immense and still growing, are nevertheless limited.

Competing domestic priorities are not going to cause America to reduce its international commitments, including those in Europe. But it is not reasonable to expect in the future the kind of massive new programs with which we sought to solve problems in the past. Indeed, many of the problems which we and other members of the Atlantic community face do not lend themselves to "solution" by massive commitments of resources.

The Atlantic Agenda

Let us turn then to a discussion of these problems, to the agenda before the Atlantic community. Our fundamental goals are clear: to maintain our security and thereby the peace; to promote our prosperity; to build a more just world economic order; and to preserve our democratic systems. In each of these areas, success will depend on our ability to cooperate closely.

To Maintain Our Security and Build the Peace

The continued growth of Soviet power presents the West with its principal security challenge. We are confronted with the continuing necessity to protect our interests and resist the expansionary tendencies of a Soviet Union that has achieved substantial strategic parity with the West and an enhanced ability to project its power at great distance. Given the imperatives of a nuclear age, we have an interest in approaching this task in a manner which minimizes the risks of war and builds a more constructive long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger addressed this, the central challenge of our time, in a major speech given in San Francisco a little over two weeks ago:

> It is our responsibility (he said) to contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation.
>
> This can be done, but it requires a delicate and complex policy. We must strive for an equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to promote the habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and ultimately cooperation. We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world.

The term "détente" has come into common usage to characterize policies adopted in this effort to cope with the emergence of Soviet global power while promoting the habits of restraint. Unfortunately, the term lends itself to oversimplification, since while relaxation of tensions and diminishing of the frequency and intensity of crises are involved, the relationship is in fact much more com-

plex and dynamic. Restraint in the uses of power is not automatic or a matter of good will. It must be based on a cool calculus of interests—of benefits and risks.

If East-West relations are to show lasting improvement, the nations of the West must be willing both to provide benefits for responsible behavior and to impose risks and costs for irresponsible behavior. It is in this respect that present Soviet conduct in Angola is of particular concern. In Angola, the Soviets are using military means to determine the outcome of a civil war in an important African country. Angola may be far away from Europe or America. It is equally far from the Soviet Union. All of us in the West must be clear that this kind of action, if acquiesced in, could establish dangerous precedents which would directly damage our interests. These interests will be respected only if they are seen to be protected. We must insure that the Soviets and others understand that the exploitation of this or that opportunity to gain unilateral advantage undermines all efforts to achieve greater mutual restraint and increases the risk of serious confrontation.

From the late 1940's through the early 1960's, the West met and successfully overcame a series of Soviet expansionary moves. Whether these confrontations occurred in Central Europe over Berlin, or around Cuba over the emplacement of Soviet missiles, Western diplomacy succeeded, among other reasons, because it was backed by both adequate strategic and local forces. Beginning in the late 1960's and taking advantage of the Soviet Union's desire to expand and normalize its contacts with the West, we have sought to engage the Soviet Union in an array of negotiations, relationships, and arrangements, all of which are designed to create a web of further incentives for restraint. These actions have been designed to supplement, not replace, the diplomatic and military efforts by which we have historically met and contained the growth of Soviet power. Our interest has been to lower the level and frequency of confrontations, decrease the danger of war, and gradually build up a more stable structure of peace.

Thus, through carefully expanded economic relations, preferably undertaken harmoniously among major industrialized countries, we have tried to maximize Soviet awareness of what would be in jeopardy and to create ties between the Soviets and the external world which they would choose to sever only at substantial costs. In increasing our contacts with the Soviet people we have sought to create incentives throughout Soviet society for the maintenance of cooperative relations with the West. Finally, in engaging the Soviets directly on fundamental security issues, we seek to maintain the balance of power at a less precarious level.

Central to this effort are the talks aimed at limiting the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals.

This issue presents an essential test: whether the world's two nuclear superpowers will be able to translate their common interest in self-preservation into arrangements which will lessen the uncertainties of open-ended competition and the threat of nuclear war. A milestone was reached in May 1972 when both countries agreed to forgo territorial defense against offensive missiles. While not removing all the dangers in the U.S.-Soviet strategic military relationship, this treaty did confront both sides with the stark fact that their peoples are to remain utterly vulnerable to missile attack. For the defensive-minded Russian it was not an insignificant psychological step that, in the interest of greater stability, this vulnerability was to be sanctioned by a treaty with its principal competitor. The Soviets also committed themselves at this time to end the numerical growth of their offensive missile programs and agreed to an arrangement which would require them to dismantle older missiles if they acquired the permitted number of sea-based missiles.

Now we are engaged in the second stage of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] process, working out a treaty to put equal ceilings on offensive missiles and, equally significant, on their most potent qualitative aspect—MIRV'ed warheads. Progress continues to be made. If the talks succ

ceed as we hope, then for some 10 years the respective numerical strengths of the strategic force programs will be stabilized, possibly even reduced, and in any case more easily calculated, thus reducing uncertainty in the decision process. In regard to these negotiations, we have kept in close touch with our allies who obviously have a major stake in agreements affecting the security of all of us.

Simultaneously with the regulation of strategic competition, we are negotiating on force reductions in Central Europe. In contrast to SALT, however, MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] is a multilateral negotiation in which our allies directly participate. We have a right to expect that the major proposal recently made by the Western allies in Vienna will lead to active negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, including a move of corresponding importance by the Warsaw Pact. Our objective here, as in SALT, is to strengthen military stability and to enhance security. Any agreement that may be negotiated must advance us toward that objective.

The United States also joined its European allies in negotiations leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Progress in Berlin was made a prerequisite for our going ahead with these talks, and substantial concessions resulted, leading to the quadripartite agreement and considerable improvement in the situation of the city.

In the CSCE Final Act, the West for the first time secured Soviet and Eastern European recognition that human rights issues are a legitimate topic of international discourse. The West also received a number of political commitments from the East to take certain steps on these issues. Implementation, although slow, has started. We now have a benchmark against which to measure Eastern performance in the various areas covered in the CSCE Final Act, and we will continue to press for the maximum attainable implementation. Finally, the West secured specific Soviet recognition of the principle of peaceful change of frontiers in Europe. Indeed, in its broadest sense, CSCE is and must continue to be part of the complex long-term process of change, involving a wide range of contacts, negotiations, and agreements, whereby relations between East and West become increasingly normal and responsive to the needs and aspirations of all the peoples concerned. It is, to repeat, a long-term process, and there will undoubtedly be disappointments and setbacks as well as achievements and advances. It is a process that all of us have an interest in encouraging with patience, realism, and care.

The future of Germany remains as fundamental to the East-West equation in the present era as it was at the height of the cold war. Together with our NATO allies, we have worked to overcome the divisions of Germany and Europe. It is a profoundly humanitarian goal as well as an integral part of the overall endeavor to build restraint into East-West relations. In this context, we have long supported the efforts of successive German governments to achieve normalization and reconciliation through a series of agreements with their neighbors to the East. Carrying the heavy burdens of history they do, this has often been a painful process for all concerned. Yet it is one of the imperatives of our era, and we welcome the progress that has been made by our German allies since the first steps in 1955 in their relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union.

The policies we are pursuing do not offer a finite solution to the problem of the growth of Soviet power, but a means of dealing with it so that our security will be preserved and peace maintained. The construction of a more durable, more stable international order is a process both dynamic and incremental, which will, if it is properly understood, act to unite rather than divide the Atlantic community.

The successful execution of our policies depends, above all, on the maintenance of an equilibrium of power. The Atlantic community must pay continuing attention to the maintenance of credible deterrence and effective defense capability. In an age of awesome nuclear weaponry, when conventional forces have taken on even greater impor-

tance, each alliance partner must carry its weight and be perceived by all the others as doing so. At a time when the Soviet Union has attained substantial strategic parity with the West, the maintenance of adequate local forces takes on decisive importance.

Hopefully, current alliance discussions on standardization and interoperability of weapon systems can lead to a more effective use of our inevitably limited resources. In any case, the NATO connection remains at the very heart of U.S.-European collaboration. Whatever else we are to do in common must proceed on this bedrock of collective defense. In this respect, I wish to salute the contribution of the Federal Republic and the stalwart support which the *Bundeswehr* has received from all the German political parties.

To Promote Our Prosperity

If peace is our first goal, our second must be to promote that prosperity upon which our security, our liberty, and the creation of a more just world order depend. Together the industrial democracies have been the engine of global economic growth, accounting for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade. Our success has been based on adherence to certain fundamental principles which we all share:

—That the individual initiative of our people is our greatest resource;

—That the free market can provide the most effective mechanism for regulating the flow of goods and services; and

—That each of our countries can only attain sustained economic growth in full cooperation with the rest.

We have each adapted these principles to the temperament and needs of our people, the historic patterns of our societies, and the national resources of our countries. Our several economies have developed differently, but at the same time they have all shared in a level of sustained growth never equaled in history.

At Rambouillet the leaders of the world's six largest industrialized democracies agreed that the world's current economic difficulties —increased energy costs, inflation, recession, and unemployment—require more, not less, cooperation for their solution. Already Rambouillet has led to Jamaica, where we achieved agreement on the form of the new international monetary order to replace the Bretton Woods system. We need now to provide an impulse to the still-laggard multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

We do encounter from time to time differences on economic issues among us, growing out of real differences in our resources and needs. But differences should not lead to a destructive rivalry. We must continue to seek to work in harmony even where differences exist, because otherwise we undermine the foundations of our common security and political affinity.

Our common task is to restore public confidence in the resumption of sustained economic growth in Western Europe and the United States. The rapid expansion of the U.S. economy over the past two quarters and substantial evidence of a turnaround in Europe, are cause for encouragement. Even as the recession wanes, however, the specter of protectionism remains a serious concern. The United States is anxious to build on the improved communication and comprehension which has emerged in U.S.-European Community trade relations in the past two to three years. The United States and the Community are committed to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] trade pledge to prevent artificial stimulation of exports or restrictions on imports.

Thus far, our governments have been generally successful in not permitting protectionist pressures on both sides of the Atlantic to be translated into protectionist measures. We must insure that this remains the case, and we must continue to work together in the OECD, the multilateral trade negotiations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and other forums to restore sustained economic growth to our own nations and the world economy in general.

To Build a More Just World Economic Order

Events of the past several years, particularly the 1973 oil crisis, demonstrate that sustained growth among the industrialized countries requires cooperative relations with the developing nations who supply much of our raw materials and purchase much of our manufactured products.

The nations of the Atlantic community have embarked on a major effort to help build a more just world economic order, one which will reduce present disparities and create additional opportunities for all nations of the world. We have accepted this task not because we are responsible for the poverty which plagues so much of mankind—for we are not—but because our help is needed if their plight is to be remedied. Obviously, all those in a position to do so must contribute, particularly the newly rich oil-producing nations. But in the long run only a development strategy which combines local efforts with Western technology, Western investment, and access to Western markets offers the Third World any hope of advancement.

At the seventh special session of the United Nations last fall, Secretary Kissinger offered a detailed program for the future. We have in the succeeding months proceeded in a variety of international organizations to give substance to the many proposals we made during that Assembly session. We have also cooperated in the creation of a new forum for North-South dialogue—the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, whose Commissions on energy, raw materials, development, and related monetary issues have begun to meet in Paris. Our task now is to insure that these various initiatives do not lose headway.

To Preserve Our Democratic Systems

Our final, most fundamental, goal must be the preservation of human freedom. This is a never-ending process. The Atlantic community is an association of democracies—some new, some old, some well established, some less so. All of us can take great pride in the fact of our liberty. None of us can afford to take it for granted.

Whether and how to encourage the growth of democratic values and institutions is a grave and delicate problem. Fundamentally, each nation must find its own path. It is difficult to draw the line between well-meaning advice and foreign interference. Even the most ardent democrat will resent and reject the latter. Thus, efforts to promote freedom in other countries often have counterproductive effects. Yet free men cannot remain indifferent to the fate of democracy elsewhere, even if they are sometimes powerless to affect it.

As democratic nations, we can certainly all take great satisfaction in the restoration of democracy in Greece and in the trend of events in Portugal and Spain. The fervor with which the peoples of these countries seek their freedom is a demonstration of the vigor and continued attraction of the democratic system.

European Unity and the Atlantic Relationship

The Atlantic nations confront the ambitious agenda I have just outlined at a time when our own internal relationships continue to evolve. Thus, the European Community has recently grown from six to nine member states. The scope of the Community's activities, and particularly the political coordination among its members, continues to expand. At the same time, relations between the Nine and other European states seeking membership or association are also progressing. Finally, the relationship between Europe and the United States continues to develop in line with these European evolutions.

Speaking from some experience, I believe that transatlantic consultation has developed successfully and in some respects is more extensive and intensive than ever before. This is due, I think, largely to the pragmatic view now taken on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the contents and forms for these consultations, as well as to the underlying appreciation shared by us

all that our destinies are inextricably linked. In view of the complex issues with which we must deal, and the competing domestic demands with which all of us must cope, I believe the present level of transatlantic cooperation represents an achievement of major significance.

As you know, the United States has supported and welcomes movement toward European unity as a contribution both to Western strength and cohesion and to a stable and prosperous global order. The pace and precise nature of community building is for Europeans to decide. For our part, we have a natural interest in both your development and your policies. We believe that the links between us are so strong and our fundamental interests and values so much in common that serious consultation will most often produce common or mutually supportive policies.

In assuring that the Atlantic relationship keeps pace with the continued European evolution, we must take care that our basic ties never become obscured in theoretical, even theological, efforts to define precisely the shape which our present or future relations should take. The United States will continue to work with European institutions and respond to European initiatives as they emerge, our attitude being determined by the contribution which can be made to the promotion of our common interests.

A Community of Free Peoples

Ours are open societies, ever seeking new ways to fulfill the aspirations of our citizens and ever dependent on the popular will. Indeed, we are revolutionary societies, with a great capacity for innovation and renewal. If we are to be true to our heritage of dedication to freedom and justice, we—the democracies of the West—must draw upon the moral and material assets we share and demonstrate we are able to master the challenges of the complex era we have entered.

In this time of accelerating change, when problems can rarely be solved conclusively and the choices are often narrow and ambiguous, all governments within the Atlantic community must devote increased efforts to promoting the public consensus which supports our policies and unites our action. It was Jean Jacques Rousseau who once said that: "As soon as any man says of the affairs of state, 'what does it matter to me?' the state may be given up as lost." It is our task today to demonstrate to our peoples why the Atlantic alliance, and the other multiple relationships which bind the United States and Europe, continue to be of vital importance to them.

We must always remember that the Atlantic community is a free association of free peoples. Our policies are not governed solely by strategic or geopolitical considerations but also by an underlying commitment to shared interests and common values. Thus, the long-term ability of our community to endure depends primarily on a consensus not only within our nations but among them. It requires that each of us perceive that the other is pulling his full weight. It requires that each of us perceive that the other is pursuing the same fundamental goals. The future of the democracies and the survival of the values we represent will depend upon our ability to agree on objectives and work together to achieve them.

Much rests on our ability to maintain this public consensus in support of our efforts. Our collective economic growth, our common defense measures, our political and ideological cohesion, are indispensable to the creation of a more stable, more durable international structure. We in the West hold the only hope for a better life for that great majority of mankind who live on the borders of destitution, starvation, and despair. We remain the sole beacon of hope for those who would be free from the chains of dictatorship and oppression.

For 30 years we have borne these burdens in common. I can offer you no short-term hope of definitive solution to many of the problems confronting us today. I am certain, however, that combined, our unparalleled moral, intellectual, economic, and political energies will assure us progress toward the more peaceful, more just world order that we seek.

Humanitarian Aid to Angola Discussed by Department

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs[1]

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to address the question of U.S. disaster assistance to Angola. I understand this is a followup to hearings you held in November when the then Acting Assistant Secretary, Ed Mulcahy, who is accompanying me today, stated our policy on humanitarian aid for that country.

Since November the effects of the civil war have been much more widespread, touching nearly every city in the country and causing about 250,000 rural Angolans to leave their homes and fields. This is true in the north, where members of the Bakongo tribe have once again fled from their homelands into Zaïre. In the populous central highlands, where over 40 percent of Angola's population resides, many other thousands have fled south toward Namibia or melted into the bush as the Cuban-led MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] advance continues. Some reports speak of a refugee column 75 kilometers long composed of 90,000 people heading south to join an estimated 12,000 already being cared for by the South African Government.

In addition to the problem of displaced persons in the north and south, there are food shortages in Luanda and environs and, as fields are left untended, prospects of similar shortages elsewhere in the interior. Further, the hundreds of thousands of Bakongo who returned to the north of Angola the past year after over a decade of exile Zaïre haven't yet had an opportunity to establish the strong agricultural base they need to retain self-sufficiency in food production. We thus see the provision of food as perhaps the single most pressing need in Angola at this time.

To our knowledge, there has been relatively limited physical damage to the infrastructure of the country. The ports and most airports remain intact; and the extensive road network was little affected by the fighting, although there are reports some highway bridges were destroyed by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] to slow up the Cuban advance. We believe the most serious effect of the fighting on the economy has been on the Benguela Railway, which in normal times transports much of Zaïre's and Zambia's copper and other foreign trade commodities as well as essential imports for the interior of Angola. We understand several rail bridges located in the extreme eastern portion of Angola and a major rail bridge on the Angolan-Zaïrian frontier have been damaged in the recent fighting. However, we have no reports on the extent of destruction nor how long it will take to restore full service.

The overall economy of the nation was brought to a standstill by the war. Oil production ceased, as did most of the coffee harvesting and mining operations of both diamonds and iron ore. A primary cause of this disruption was the exodus of 90 percent of the Portuguese population, which took away technicians, managers, and other trained personnel required to run the economy.

The United States has contributed $675,000 for disaster relief within Angola, exclusive of the $7.5 million expended for the airlift of Portuguese to Lisbon that was completed on November 4. Six hundred thousand dollars of our disaster assistance has been given to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in three installments, in August and November of 1975 and in January 1976. We have been informed by the ICRC that they will require an additional $6.4 million for an expanded relief effort in Angola during the first six months of this year. They contemplate augmenting their present three medical teams with 10 additional mobile teams, each consisting of a doctor and a nurse; supplying 100 tons of drugs and medical supplies; supplementing

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on Feb. 26. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

food supplies; and providing 300 tons of blankets and clothing. In this regard we stand ready, as we have stated several times before, to donate additional funds and food to international efforts to ease the plight of refugees in Angola, and we are presently preparing a response to this latest ICRC appeal.

I wish to point out that this ICRC effort will aid refugees still within Angola, including those now encamped in extreme southern Angola, but is not designed to aid those refugees who have fled into Zaïre. We understand the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has representatives in Zaïre evaluating this problem and will shortly be presenting recommendations for a program to aid these people. We have asked our Embassy in Kinshasa and our mission in Geneva to stay in close contact with the UNHCR representatives on this matter. We, of course, intend to respond favorably to this appeal as well.

Looking to the future, Mr. Chairman, I can assure you this Administration will give prompt and generous consideration to further requests from international organizations and private volunteer groups for humanitarian aid for all areas in Angola. There have never been strings attached to our humanitarian assistance to the ICRC, which has labored valiantly and, I might add, under very dangerous circumstances to assist the homeless and deprived in all areas of Angola. We look to appropriate U.N. agencies to assist in resettlement and rehabilitation, goals we endorse and will support.

Beyond these immediate humanitarian goals, further aid considerations clearly depend on an independent evaluation of the needs in Angola and on the evolution of the political and economic situation in that country and the region.

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice an consent of the Senate to ratification, transmit herewith the Extradition Treat Between the Government of the Unite States of America and the Government of th United Kingdom of Great Britain an Northern Ireland, together with a Protoc of Signature and an exchange of note signed at London on June 8, 1972. I transmi also, for the information of the Senate, th report of the Department of State with r spect to the Treaty.

The Treaty, one of a series of extraditio treaties being negotiated by the Unite States, significantly updates the prese extradition relations between the Unite States and the United Kingdom and adds t the list of extraditable offenses both na cotic offenses, including those involvir psychotropic drugs, and aircraft hijackin

The Treaty will make a significant co tribution to the international effort to co trol narcotics traffic and aircraft hijackin I recommend that the Senate give early a favorable consideration to the Treaty a give its advice and consent to ratificatio

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 3, 1976.*

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[1] Transmitted on Feb. 3 (text from White Hou press release); also printed as S. Ex. A, 94th Con 2d sess., which includes the texts of the trea protocol of signature, and exchange of notes a the report of the Department of State.

Department Discusses U.S.-Saudi Arabia Defense Relationship

Statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you to respond to any questions you may have about the sales of defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia for which letters of offer are now before the Congress. First I would like to explain briefly why the Administration considers these proposals to be in the national interest.

Saudi Arabia carries considerable weight, as you know, both politically in the Middle East and on a world scale in the financial and energy areas. We proceed from the premise that it is in our interest to maintain good—and by that I mean mutually beneficial—relations with Saudi Arabia.

Our ties to the Saudis are broadly based and cover many areas of common interest, including that of national security and self-defense. As should always be the case if our relationships with other countries are to be soundly based, U.S.-Saudi relations are a two-way street, and I think it is important to look at what is valuable in that relationship for Saudi Arabia and what is valuable to the United States.

The Saudis see a number of advantages in their relations with us, probably most significantly on the political level. Profoundly anti-Communist and vigorously opposed to the expansion of destabilizing influences in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia looks to the United States as a nation of world stature with which it shares common principles in that regard.

Saudi Arabia has supported our peace efforts in the Middle East, recognizing as we do that failure to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict carries with it a high risk that there will be a new war and that that in turn will greatly enhance opportunities for Soviet and radical influence in the region.

The United States has long been a significant factor in the development of Saudi economic strength, through the activities of U.S. companies in both the oil sector and elsewhere. Thus the Saudis look to us for a major input to their ambitious development plans. They are accustomed to and prefer American technology, American products, and American management. They like what they see, and by and large they hope we will assume a major role in their $142 billion five-year development plan announced last year.

I would emphasize that this aspect of our relations is more than simply economic or commercial; it is based on mutual respect and confidence built up over many years. That kind of respect and confidence can be a more precious commodity than the most persuasive economic factors.

Similarly, in the financial field, a long history of mutual confidence has led the Saudis to look to us for both advice and adequate and profitable capital markets for their surplus oil revenues.

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[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on Feb. 23. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

What, then, are the advantages for the United States in our relationship with Saudi Arabia?

As I indicated above, there are similarities in our view of the world strategic equation. We, too, seek to limit the expansion of Soviet and radical influence in the Middle East, because it presents a threat to the stability and security of that region, where vital U.S. interests are at stake.

Like the Saudis, we see the trend toward moderation on the part of a number of Arab governments, over the past two years in particular, as a most significant factor in the progress we have made thus far toward peace. Saudi Arabia has been a strong supporter of that trend, both politically and economically. Like us, they do not want to see a regression to the polarization and disunity among the Arabs which existed in the past and which create an atmosphere in which militancy flourishes and progress toward peace is frustrated.

In all of these important respects we see Saudi policy as paralleling our own. Indeed, in both the political and the economic fields the Saudis have been able to make a contribution to moderation—and thus to progress toward peace—which has been supportive of our policies. In dealing with those issues on which differences exist between Saudi Arabia and the United States—and we do deal with them frankly and constructively—it is important that we both keep in mind the importance of preserving the larger framework of interests and objectives we share.

Saudi oil policy has been basically advantageous to the United States, despite the oil price increases which Saudi Arabia has gone along with and which we continue to feel are unjustified. Saudi Arabia has acted as a strong moderating force within OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] against even greater increases and has maintained production levels which are well beyond its economic needs. With oil availabilities declining in the Western Hemisphere, Saudi Arabia can be expected to become an increasingly important source for our own oil imports.

In the economic and financial fields, the advantages for us of close U.S.-Saudi relations are self-evident: multibillion-dollar trade and business opportunities for American companies, both here and in Saudi Arabia, and very large amounts of capital for growing U.S. needs.

Beyond these mutually beneficial political and economic ties, an integral part of U.S.-Saudi relations has been a military supply and training relationship which goes back over a quarter of a century. It began shortly after the Second World War, which had highlighted in dramatic fashion Saudi Arabia's strategic and economic importance to the United States, to Western Europe, and to Japan.

Although our ties to Saudi Arabia had begun in the thirties, we began after the war to develop a more broadly based relationship. That relationship included a military aspect almost from the beginning, because our strategic interests led us to request and receive base facilities at Dhahran, while Saudi interests led them to request and receive advisory and training assistance from us for their military forces. It is important to remember that this security relationship thus predated the advent of the Arab-Israeli conflict and was founded on reasons totally unrelated to that conflict.

Saudi Arabia's military forces at that time were composed largely of traditional desert warriors employing age-old cavalry and ground tactics—forces which were very effective in certain situations but which were little suited to any sort of modern defense needs. That situation persisted through the fifties and even into the sixties; to some extent, it is still true today.

Thus, for many years our military supply and training programs in Saudi Arabia were relatively low level and concentrated on improving the effectiveness of the traditional small-scale Saudi military units. Virtually no modern weapons were involved.

In 1965, primarily as a result of hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the civil war in Yemen, the Saudis turned to us for modern air defense equipment, and we

provided a limited amount of such weaponry. In more recent years, the Saudis began an ambitious program to modernize other existing arms of their military structure and have used European as well as American equipment for such modernization. Finally, in 1974, at their request, the U.S. Department of Defense carried out a survey of Saudi defense needs over the next 10 years.

That survey, among other things, was intended to bring some order and priority into their military planning, and it has succeeded in so doing. But I would emphasize that we are still talking about relatively small and limited forces, forces which are not nearly the size of those of other states in the area: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, and Israel.

Among the letters of offer now before the Congress, those for military equipment and related services are fully in line with the recommendations of that 1974 survey. Saudi Arabia has a small number of conventional infantry brigades, of 5,000 men each. The letters of offer for tanks, APC's [armored personnel carriers], Dragon missiles, and Vulcan guns are in response to a Saudi request that we assist them to mechanize two of those brigades along the lines on which U.S. units are organized and with similar equipment. At the time that recommendation was made in the 1974 survey, we considered a reasonable step in the direction of modernization for a force which was, as I have said, quite small and without modern equipment.

Thus, when the Saudis requested this materiel and training in mid-1975, we agreed in principle. If these sales are carried through, the Saudis will have, in the late seventies, two brigades with a small integral tank force each, with APC-type vehicles for mobility, and with integral antitank and antiaircraft capability. Deliveries for the bulk of major equipment will begin in 1977 for APC's and 1978 for tanks.

The Maverick missiles proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia are to be used on the F–5 aircraft which we have sold them. The Maverick is consistent with our survey recommendations; while it is a very modern weapon, its principal advantage is its accuracy, rather than the firepower which it represents.

Finally, the two Corps of Engineers cases are similar to those which the corps has managed in Saudi Arabia for some years now. The great bulk of the money forecast to be spent for those cases is not for work to be performed by the corps itself, but for disbursement to contractors and subcontractors. Under a bilateral agreement concluded in 1965, the corps manages construction projects, sets specifications, supervises design work, reviews contractor bids, supervises contract performance, and disburses moneys to contractors on satisfactory completion of work. Corps personnel are not involved in the actual construction, and of course all costs are paid by the Saudi Government. Finally, it is important to note that these projects do not involve the purchase or transfer of any weaponry.

One corps case is for the construction of two cargo-handling facilities. Port congestion in Saudi Arabia is a major bottleneck to Saudi development. At Saudi request, the corps proposes to construct two facilities—one on the Red Sea near Jidda and one on the Persian Gulf—to facilitate the import of construction materials. Eventually, these ports are likely to revert to civilian uses, for which they are also suited, and they will thus contribute to the overall economic development of the country.

The second corps case is for naval facilities. As some members of the committee know, we undertook in 1972 a program to build a small modern coastal force for the Saudi Navy. At present, that navy is almost nonexistent, with a few patrol boats stationed at Dhahran. This program calls for the construction of a naval headquarters at Riyadh and naval facilities at Jidda, on the Red Sea, and at Jubail, on the Persian Gulf. These onshore and offshore facilities—ship docking and repair facilities; breakwaters; housing, training, maintenance, and administrative buildings; desalinization plants; schools; messhalls; and so on—will be comparatively expensive, especially at

Jubail, which is presently little more than an area of desert coastline. This amendment to the previously approved FMS [foreign military sales] case for construction will cover onshore facilities, primarily at Jidda and Jubail.

Mr. Chairman, we have previously outlined before this subcommittee the general criteria which we apply to arms sale decisions for the gulf area. Certain criteria were particularly pertinent to our decision to go ahead with the letters of offer now before the committee, and I would like to touch briefly on them:

The Balance of Forces: We have looked carefully at the relative balance of forces in Saudi Arabia and its neighbors and conclude that these sales would not significantly affect that balance. In fact, to the extent that strengthening Saudi ground forces in a limited way enhances the Saudi security role with respect to its smaller neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula, the impact would be positive. As far as other neighboring states are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that we are talking here about mechanizing Saudi *brigades*. Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan each measure their ground forces in corps or armies or, at least, divisions.

Legitimacy of Defense Requirements: The basic Saudi motivation in wishing to modernize its limited defense forces is simple: with territory approximately as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, with resources valued at about $1.5 trillion at current prices, and with limited military capability, Saudi leaders clearly realize that they have much to protect and little to protect it with. They are strongly opposed to and deeply concerned about possible future intrusion of radical influences, already present to the north and south of them in the gulf and the peninsula. They see that they have an important security role to play, along with Iran, in preventing such further intrusion. And I believe they realize that they cannot play a significant regional security role without some credible military force behind their policy. In these terms, we see their present requests as reasonable and rational, albeit limited and relatively small, and well within their capability to absorb and employ effectively.

Transferability: We are aware of concerns held by some on this account. There is of course no ultimate guarantee that military equipment we sell to one state will not be transferred to another. But there are serious constraints. First, there are the legal and political restraints inherent in our FMS procedures. There is nothing in our experience thus far to suggest that the Saudis intend to do anything other than respect our FMS agreements on this score. On the contrary, they have in fact chosen non-U.S. suppliers for military equipment which they have purchased for other Arab countries. Beyond this, however, there are serious technical limitations to effective transfer. I say "effective," because we must distinguish between transfer of hardware as such and transfer of capability. To transfer hardware, one needs only move it from one place to another. But the transfer of capability—the only meaningful kind of transfer—implies the ability to transfer the hardware *and* the necessary supporting services, training or trained manpower, sources of supply for spares and ammunition, and so forth. In these vital areas the equipment we are proposing to sell would need U.S. support for some time to come; it would be extremely difficult to transfer it in ways not authorized by us and to have it effectively employed.

Mr. Chairman, to the extent that there may be an inclination to see proposals of this kind under consideration today purely in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I suggest that this would be an incomplete perspective. To understand Saudi Arabia's interest in modernizing its armed forces and our interest in assisting it to do so, I believe three broader points must be stressed:

—First, Saudi Arabia's vast terrain, its resources, and the fact that its armed forces today are small and are not equipped as a modern force.

—Second, the fact that Saudi Arabia looks to its military relationship with the

United States as an integral part of a broader relationship, which has important benefits for the United States with respect to our peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, energy, finance, and trade.

—Third, the fact that refusal on our part to provide the Saudis with these reasonable amounts of advice and equipment would be seen as a conscious and witting step away from our present close relationship, and such a refusal would, moreover, be essentially irrelevant to the question of whether or not they acquire equipment of this kind. With rare exceptions, everything we sell Saudi Arabia in the military field is available from other suppliers, and of course they have the money to pay for it. Thus, the question is not "Should Saudi Arabia have this equipment and these services?" but "Saudi Arabia is in a position to acquire these types of equipment and services; should they come from the United States or from another nation?"

Mr. Chairman, to summarize, the proposed sales we are discussing today are part and parcel of our overall relationship with Saudi Arabia. We believe that they are reasonable in the Saudi context and that they will not significantly affect the balance of forces in the region. They will, moreover, contribute to the larger purposes which are served by our good relations with the Saudis.

Department Describes Guidelines for Nuclear Exports

Following is a statement by George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 24.[1]

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss nuclear export matters.

Members of the committee are already well aware, from my own previous testimony as well as from a number of official and unofficial sources, that we have been engaged in an effort with other nuclear-exporting countries to devise a common set of standards concerning safeguards and other related controls associated with peaceful nuclear exports. I am glad to be able to report to the committee that we have made substantial progress.

I think it is important to recognize that what is involved here is not a single self-contained activity seeking a permanent solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation, but part of an evolutionary process. The nature of the problem, the technology which creates it, and the policies and mechanisms which will be effective in dealing with it, are all subject to change. It is therefore highly important that we continue this process and that we do nothing which might jeopardize the willingness of other countries to continue the process.

For reasons which I am confident the committee will understand, I cannot discuss in open session the policies and positions of other governments or the substance of the discussions we have had with them. The consultations are regarded as sensitive by a number of the participants, and we have undertaken to protect their confidentiality and privacy.

At the same time, we recognize that Congress has a vital interest in what we are doing. I would like, therefore, to describe in some detail certain minimum principles which the United States has decided to apply to its future nuclear exports as a result of our consultations with other suppliers. These principles include the following:

—The requirement that recipients must apply IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards on nuclear exports from the United States. This includes facilities and certain equipment as well as special nuclear material.

—The requirement that recipients give

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

assurances that they will not use our exports to make nuclear explosives for any purpose.

—The requirement that recipients have adequate physical security for imported nuclear facilities and materials to prevent theft and sabotage.

—The requirement that recipients give assurances that they will also require the above conditions on any retransfer of our exports or transfers of material or equipment derived from our exports.

In addition, with regard to sensitive exports (which include fuel enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, and heavy water production):

—We intend to exercise restraint in supply of these exports, particularly when we believe such exports would add significantly to the risk of proliferation.

—Through our supply conditions and other initiatives, we will encourage the concept of multilateral regional facilities for reprocessing and enrichment so as to limit the number of such facilities and to site such facilities in order to insure effective application of safeguards and physical security.

—In those cases where we export sensitive facilities, equipment, and/or technology, we will require assurances from recipients that any sensitive facilities built using transferred technology will be safeguarded.

—Finally, we will require recipients to obtain our consent for retransfer of any sensitive nuclear materials or sensitive equipment or technology to a third country.

The foregoing are minimum standards which the United States will apply to its nuclear exports. Most of these are consistent with current U.S. practice. In addition, we are prepared to adopt more stringent constraints when appropriate.

Again, I would emphasize that we view our overall nonproliferation efforts, our discussions with other concerned countries, and the results that flow from these as an evolutionary process. We have no pat answers to the proliferation problem—only a conviction that if we are to successfully cope with the problem, the United States must continue to work with other concerned countries to develop a fabric of political commitments, safeguards, and controls on nuclear exports.

Laos To Be Removed From List for Generalized Tariff Preferences

Following is the text of identical letters sent by President Ford on February 26 to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

White House press release dated February 26

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) In accordance with the requirements of section 502(a)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974, I herewith notify the House of Representatives (Senate) of my intention to withdraw the designation of Laos as a beneficiary developing country for purposes of the Generalized System of Preferences by amending Executive Order No. 11888 of November 24 1975.

The considerations which entered into my decision were based upon the provisions o section 504(b) and 502(b)(1) of the Trad Act. Section 504(b) of that Act states:

> The President shall, after complying with the re quirements of section 502(a)(2), withdraw or sus pend the designation of any country as a beneficiar developing country if, after such designation, h determines that as the result of changed circum stances such country would be barred from designa tion as a beneficiary developing country under sec tion 502(b). . . .

Section 502(b)(1) states that:

> . . . the President shall not designate any countr a beneficiary developing country under this section- if such country is a Communist country, unless (A the products of such country receive nondiscrimina tory treatment, (B) such country is a contractin party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trad and a member of the International Monetary Fun and (C) such country is not dominated or controlle by international communism. . . .

As a result of changed circumstances, Laos would be barred from designation as a beneficiary developing country under section 502(b)(1), quoted above.

A diplomatic note is being prepared for delivery to the Government of Laos on or about the same date as that of the delivery of this letter, notifying that Government of my intention to terminate the country's beneficiary status, together with the considerations entering into my decision, as required by section 502(a)(2) of the Trade Act.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Department To Study Role of Science and Technology in Foreign Affairs

Press release 83 dated February 19

The Department of State has initiated a study under the direction of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Charles W. Robinson, to examine the role of science and technology in foreign affairs. The study will make recommendations defining the appropriate functions and concerns of the Department, and especially of its Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), in this area. Under a recent organizational realignment, the OES Bureau now reports to the Under Secretary.

Both substantive and organizational relationships will be investigated to insure the most effective utilization of science and technology in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Questions to be considered include the proper guidance to other agencies, the most efficient division of operational responsibilities, the promotion of national interests through international technological interchange, the impact of technology on foreign policy, the utilization of technological initiatives for foreign policy objectives, and the optimal internal staffing and organizational structure.

The study will be conducted by Dr. T. Keith Glennan, former Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, and U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, who will call upon various experts for assistance as appropriate.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Approved by the International Coffee Council December 3, 1975. Open for signature at U.N. Headquarters January 31 through July 31, 1976.[1]
Signature: United States, February 27, 1976.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.[1]
Accession deposited: Netherlands, February 4, 1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, March 1, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs of Bangladesh, March 1, 1976.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris

[1] Not in force.

November 16, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: March 1, 1976.

BILATERAL

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Seoul February 18, 1976. Entered into force February 18, 1976.

Kuwait

Technical security arrangement. Signed at Kuwait January 18, 1976. Entered into force January 18, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the provision of two helicopters by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México October 24 and 29, 1975. Entered into force October 29, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of aircraft by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México January 29, 1976. Entered into force January 29, 1976.

Agreement relating to the provision of supplies, equipment, and services by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México February 4, 1975. Entered into force February 4, 1976.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973. Entered into force February 26, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: February 25, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on certain fishery problems on the high seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with annex and related letters. Signed at Washington March 1, 1976. Entered into force March 1, 1976, except that articles II, VI, VII, and X shall enter into force April 1, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Cameroon	Cat. No.	S1.123:C14/2
	Pub. 8010	6 pp.
Ghana	Cat. No.	S1.123:G34
	Pub. 8089	7 pp.

Establishment of a Joint Commercial Commission. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8116. 9 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8116).

Onchocerciasis Fund. Agreement with Other Governments. TIAS 8117. 95 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No. S9.10:8117).

Amendment of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Protocol with Other Governments. TIAS 8118. 137 pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:8118).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Syria TIAS 8119. 30 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8119).

Narcotic Drugs—Equipment and Training to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8125 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8125).

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: March 1–7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*106	3/1	J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Surinam (biographic data).
*107	3/1	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), April 29.
*108	3/1	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on subdivision and stability, Mar. 31.
*109	3/1	SCC, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, May 14.
110	3/1	U.S.-U.S.S.R. Atlantic fisheries agreement.
111	3/4	Kissinger: House International Relations Committee.
*112	3/4	John A. Shaw sworn in as Inspector General of Foreign Assistance (biographic data).
†113	3/4	Sisco: Senate Budget Committee.
†114	3/5	Ingersoll: Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee.
*115	3/5	Rozanne L. Ridgway sworn in as Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs (biographic data).
†116	3/6	Kissinger: interview, Sigma Delta Chi, Atlanta.
†117	3/7	Kissinger: interview, U.S. News and World Report.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.