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The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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American Unity and the National Interest

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

Senator Sparkman [John J. Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee], Senator Allen [James B. Allen], Mayor Seibels [George G. Seibels, Jr., Mayor of Birmingham], ladies and gentlemen: Let me thank you, first of all, for the warmth of this reception, which has been made possible by the persistence of your two Senators, which is as great as their abilities. I am pleased to be in a part of the country that has always stood for a strong America, an America that defends itself, its principles, and its friends.

Alabama's representatives in Washington —Senator Sparkman, Senator Allen, and Birmingham's own Congressman [John H.] Buchanan—have been supporters of a dynamic American foreign policy. They have been champions of that close relationship between the Congress and the executive which a purposeful foreign policy requires. They and the people of Alabama have understood that in this modern age America's safety and well-being are, to an unprecedented degree, bound up with our interests and responsibilities in the world.

I want to discuss with you today the basic elements of our foreign policy and why Americans can be proud of their nation's role in the world and confident of its future.

Since the first settlers sought refuge on this untamed continent, America has represented to all the world man's capacity to shape his own destiny. And for the past 30 years global peace and prosperity have depended to an extraordinary degree on our efforts. When World War II ended, this country took the lead in helping Europe and Japan recover from devastation. We created institutions that have expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. We forged peacetime alliances with the major industrial democracies. We have maintained the balance of power; we have mediated conflict. We have fed the hungry, contributed to economic development, educated young men and women from other lands, and welcomed refugees from oppression to our shores.

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make such a contribution now. And today the age-old issues of war and peace, of maintaining stability and advancing human hopes, of preserving the peace and promoting progress, continue to summon a vigilant and purposeful America.

But Americans have a right to ask: The world may need us, but do we need the world? Do our policies abroad serve American interests and American ideals?

A look at our contemporary agenda leaves no doubt that peace for us is inseparable from global tranquillity and that our well-being is intimately bound up with the prosperity of the rest of the world.

—Never before in history have the weapons of war been so gigantic, so dangerous, and so unsuitable for the pursuit of political objectives. We have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance—for we otherwise risk our survival. We

[1] Made before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference at Birmingham, Ala., on Aug. 14 (text of the two introductory paragraphs from press release 411A; balance of address from press release 411).

have no more urgent obligation than to check the nuclear arms race—for we otherwise risk global holocaust.

—While in military terms the world is still bipolar, there are now many centers of economic power and political initiative. Clearly, political, military, and economic power are no longer synonymous. Of the democratic nations, only the United States is strong in every field. Thus our responsibilities are inescapable. Whether this country acts or fails to act has profound consequences.

—While the world has been free of war on a global scale for more than a generation, regional and local conflicts still abound. Unless they are resolved through diplomacy they pose grave risks to the general peace. We have seen all too clearly that conflict in the Middle East threatens confrontation between the superpowers and economic dislocation for all nations.

—The ever-present danger of local conflict takes on a more ominous dimension as we face the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we do not halt their spread, nuclear war will become ever more possible and the risks of theft, accident, and blackmail will multiply. Should the United States withdraw from its security commitments, this process would accelerate, for nations which now rely on us may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons.

—Events have proved that industrial and developing nations are part of a single international economic system on which the prosperity of all depends. The supply and price of energy, the availability of food and other vital raw materials, the strength of currencies, and the flow of trade are all vital for a healthy and productive American economy.

Much depends upon this generation of Americans. Because of our size, our strength, our traditions, America is a leader among nations whether we like it or not. We cannot always assure our preferred solutions, but few solutions are possible without our cooperation. If we do not care about global stability, if we do not help resist aggression if we do not work for a more equitable and productive world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will take our place—at least no nation that believes in our values. Force and the threat of force would become the rule of the day, and mankind's material and spiritual fortunes would be dealt grave blows. Ultimately we would pay the price ourselves.

Other nations must do more, but this nation must continue to do its share. We still have a unique and irreplaceable contribution to make to a world of peace and prosperity and justice. Our leadership remains needed to mobilize friends and allies to organize a wider international cooperation.

We have the advantage of the boundless assets with which this country is blessed our industrial strength and agricultural productivity, the sinews of military power, and the talent of a free people.

But these will serve us little without unity and common purpose. We must know what we want for America, and we must be willing to defend and to promote it. We must avoid extremes of bellicosity followed by extremes of abdication. We need a steady course that our people can understand, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries. In this period of global change—when the simple categories of the immediate postwar period no longer match the complex realities of the modern world—dialogue, public support, and confidence are needed more than ever before.

The citizens of this country have met this challenge. Your sense of responsibility has sustained an enlightened American participation in the world. You knew that America could not thrive in isolation; you understood that our values deserved to be defended and promoted; you realized that the basic decency and generosity of the American people made our leadership not a matter of arrogant pride but a contribution to the well-being of mankind.

Today the issues that rent our unity in the

past decade are behind us. The resilience of our national spirit is being demonstrated anew. We can move forward together with confidence to face the great challenges of our time.

Let me now discuss the challenges we face and how we plan to meet them.

First, we have maintained and improved our national defense. Peace requires an equilibrium of power, and this government will maintain it. No great nation leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a defense that cannot be challenged.

Friends and Allies

The second pillar of our foreign policy is steadfast support of allies. Our alliances with the major industrial democracies have prospered for 30 years because they reflect common interests in a new era as well as a shared heritage of principles and values. They are an essential element of global stability. These bonds were forged a generation ago to protect weaker allies against a military threat. Today we work together as equals on issues far beyond security. We have strengthened our European defenses, but we have also coordinated our respective approaches to easing tensions with the East; and we have cooperated closely in our economic and energy policies.

As a result, our ties with Europe and Japan have never been stronger. This was reaffirmed in the President's visit to the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May, in his meeting with key allied leaders in Helsinki, and in his recent consultations in Washington with Prime Minister Miki of Japan. Beyond the technical problems of the daily agenda lies the deeper necessity for the great democracies to demonstrate that in an age of turmoil they can shape their own destinies.

Our smaller allies and friends around the world are important factors in global stability. We have learned the lesson of Viet-Nam: American military involvement cannot substitute for a nation's efforts to mobilize its people to defend itself. Nor will we permit allies to blackmail us by pretending that their security means more to us than to them. But the fact remains that military assistance to allies is an essential national interest of the United States. It contributes to local or regional balances of power; it helps deter local conflict; it cements important political relations. And it makes much less likely the need for direct American involvement. When we cut off supplies to an ally, for whatever reason, we inflict a setback on ourselves—as has been demonstrated by the severe damage to our national security caused by the embargo of military supplies to Turkey. Nothing would undermine local or global stability more than if America were to prove unwilling to continue to provide material support to those small and brave friendly nations who want and need our help. If our adversaries maintain their support for their allies, by what reasoning—and at what price—can we do less?

Relations With the Soviet Union

On the basis of our strength and allied unity, this Administration has sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. There must be no misunderstanding of what we are doing.

We are trying to manage a fundamental conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. We are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential values and ideals.

In a crisis situation, such as the *Mayaguez* incident, or the October 1973 Middle East alert, or the Jordanian crisis of 1970, or the Soviet attempt to build a naval base in Cuba in 1970, we have reacted firmly and decisive-

ly—and in the face of an outcry from some who now accuse us of being insufficiently vigilant. It is the firm policy of this Administration to resist encroachment and attempts to gain unilateral advantage.

At the same time, the hope for lasting peace depends on building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers. The United States has stated these principles on many occasions and embodied them in formal documents in our summit meetings with Soviet leaders. Similar principles of international conduct were stated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed by 35 heads of government in Helsinki two weeks ago. They are not a guarantee of peace but a definition of peace, a standard of behavior to which we must insure adherence by our own determination and vigilance. They are a framework for our own efforts, not a substitute for them.

We also successfully engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations to resolve concrete political problems. This effort has brought some success. A Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 ended two decades of constant crisis. And our relationship with the Soviet Union has helped so far to restrain big-power conflict in the Middle East.

Central to our agenda has been the limitation of strategic nuclear armaments. In 1972 we reached an agreement which froze the Soviet numerical buildup for five years and restricted no American programs. Therefore we consider the 1972 SALT agreement to be unquestionably in America's interest. It prevented an existing missile gap from widening; and it permitted us to maintain and even to increase our lead in multiple warheads, bombers, and other areas of military technology.

Last November in Vladivostok President Ford reached agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev on the principles of a new accord which is also unmistakably in our interest. If achieved, this agreement will bring about strict numerical equality of strategic systems. It will limit the strategic arms competition for a 10-year period. Thus for the first time defense planning will not be driven by fear of unknown military expansion by the other side. And once this common ceiling is implemented we can move immediately to negotiate mutual reductions.

We have negotiated other arms control agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent accidental war and to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the deep seabed or in outer space.

The negotiations in Vienna on force reductions in central Europe will be the next test for the process of relaxing tensions. If progress toward peace in Europe is to prove durable, it is time to reduce on a secure and mutual basis the large standing armed forces now facing each other in the center of the continent.

The United States pursues the process of easing tensions from a position of self-confidence and strength. It is not we who were on the defensive at Helsinki; it is not we who were being challenged by all the delegations to live up to the principles being signed. At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation. The conference put forward *our* standards of humane conduct, which have been—and still are—a beacon of hope to millions.

The winds of change are blowing from the West; the ideals of liberty and the challenges of technical innovation come from the West. The efforts of Communist countries to participate in the rest of the world, after decades of autarchy, are a sign of the vigor and attraction of our economic system. These are assets of our diplomacy, which we should be prepared to use.

In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with responsibility for the lives of Americans. The American people have no desire for a policy of confrontation for its own sake. When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind, it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.

But the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of European security.

Events in Portugal have their origin in the dynamics of Portuguese history. But 80 percent of the Portuguese people have declared unmistakably their desire for a democratic system and democratic parties. The attempt by an antidemocratic and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is meeting inevitable and growing popular resistance.

The United States welcomed the Portuguese revolution. We and our allies have supported its aims diplomatically and materially. We sympathize with those moderate elements who seek to build Portugal by democratic means. We will oppose and speak out against the efforts of a minority that appears to be subverting the revolution for its own purposes. The Portuguese people should know that we and all the democratic countries of the West are deeply concerned about their future and stand ready to help a democratic Portugal.

And at some point we and our European allies must ask ourselves whether major Communist influence in a government is compatible with membership in an alliance dedicated to resisting Communist aggression.

This Administration shall never forget the moral difference between freedom and tyranny. Nor shall we forget that peace, too, is a moral imperative. We have been firm in the face of challenge even as we have sought to ease tensions and move the world closer to peace. We will not let the American people be lulled into a false sense of security. We shall continue on our course.

The combination of strength and conciliation requires self-restraint in our public debate. Let us put an end to the swings between confrontation and false hopes, between belligerence and exhilaration, which have marked earlier periods. Let us not take for granted the stability and relative tranquillity that we have achieved. Let us stop acting as if we had anything to fear from progress toward peace.

Let those who offer us tough rhetoric define what precisely they propose to do. What is their exact alternative? What borders do they plan to change and by what means? What level of expanded defense expenditures are they willing to sustain over what period of time and for what purpose? Are they not urging a policy of deliberate confrontation? Can we gain support from any of our major allies for such a radical alternative?

Above all let us face the fact that many of our difficulties abroad are of our own making. If we are to be vigilant against Communist encroachment, we must stop dismantling or demoralizing our intelligence services. If we are to maintain the world balance of power, we cannot assault our defense budget or impose arms embargoes against key allies. If we are to advance our interests in our diplomacy, we cannot deny ourselves flexibility by legislating blanket restrictions on economic relations with other countries. In short, America cannot be strong abroad unless it is strong at home.

The New Dimension of Economic Challenge

Partly because of our success in maintaining the world balance of power and fostering the growth of other nations, a new dimension of economic issues is coming to the fore in international relations: energy, food, other commodities, and trade.

In this realm of diplomacy, the strength of the American economy is among our greatest assets. All of America's objectives—our military security, our economic well-being, our relations with allies and adversaries and developed and developing nations—hinge on the vitality of the American economy. As President Ford said, "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore

the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do." [2]

The world now needs that confidence. The industrialized nations have been undergoing the most serious economic crisis since the thirties. As then, they are learning that economic stagnation breeds political instability, that it undermines the public support which enables governments to act with assurance and democratic societies to thrive. And as then, we are learning how much the solution depends above all on an intangible quality of confidence and belief in a better future.

The industrial democracies are now being tested. They must surmount social and economic strains and reinvigorate their free institutions. President Ford's talks at Helsinki with allied leaders and his meeting in Washington with the Prime Minister of Japan focused on the crucial importance of a thriving American economy to world economic recovery; they produced a determination to deal with the global economic challenge cooperatively. The United States is prepared to intensify its consultations and to seek a coordinated approach. We are aware of our global responsibility and we shall meet it in the months to come.

The success of these efforts will be of vital importance to the rest of the world. The industrial nations account for 65 percent of the world's output and 70 percent of its trade. Thus, the economic well-being of the developing nations, too, depends on broad cooperation with the industrialized world. Unfortunately, too many nations seek to exact by ideological confrontation what can only be achieved through reasoned cooperative dialogue. The United States is prepared for a serious and constructive cooperative dialogue. We are ready to develop equitable economic relations with all nations. But we will never accept bloc pressure or blackmail.

Early next month, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly will convene in New York to deal with the issues of economic interdependence. It will be a fateful occasion because it can determine the nature of the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. On the President's behalf I will present a series of American proposals looking toward a new approach to the relationship between the industrialized countries and those needing their help. We do so because we are convinced that our own economic health will be served by a world economy which is both expanding and perceived as fair. And our own security will be enhanced if we live in a world where frustration and despair give way to cooperation and a sense of our interdependence.

We enter this dialogue with confidence and good will. Our technological innovation, the productivity of our farms and industries, our educated and industrious people, and the blessing of our physical resources have given us the strength and responsibility for leadership.

In no area is this more striking than in the field of food. Our agricultural productivity is admired and desired all over the world. America's farmers and those who process and sell our food can be proud of their contribution to American strength in what is becoming an increasingly important dimension of our foreign policy and world leadership.

America has generously provided food aid to scores of foreign nations. But the gap between consumption and production is growing constantly. While we are prepared to continue food aid, this cannot provide a long-term answer to feeding the world's hungry. Therefore, a World Food Conference was convened in Rome last November at U.S. initiative. Acting on many American proposals, the conference organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources—including the new wealth of the oil producers—to improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

We intend as a matter of principle to make our food policy a model for cooperative relations between producers and consumers of vital and scarce commodities and between developed and developing countries. In this

[2] For excerpts from President Ford's state of the Union address on Jan. 15, see BULLETIN of Feb. 3, 1975, p. 133.

way we serve our own as well as a general interest. America's farmers will benefit from a steady global demand for their product; as world production is expanded, the burden of shortages and higher prices will be lifted from our consumers; our political relations with scores of developing nations will be enhanced, and conditions of order worldwide will be improved.

The American Responsibility

Thirty years ago the United States was the world's only great power. Since then our allies and our adversaries have naturally grown in strength, recovering from the devastation of World War II. The cold war world of two rigid blocs now belongs to history: the Communist world is fragmented; our allies and friends and the new nations have asserted their own identities. The diversity even among the developing countries, among producers and consumers of vital materials such as oil, is increasingly apparent. We live in a world of some 150 independent nations, a world of diffused power, subject to the domination of no nation.

Such a world is an exciting challenge for America. For it is the kind of environment most consistent with *our* values. It is not we who have to fear from the relaxation of tensions or the spread of initiative and opportunity. We can only benefit from diversity, change, economic competition, the free flow of ideas, and the sharing of responsibilities. We have the capacity to shape from this complexity a new pattern of order and new hope for human progress.

But what this nation can do in the world depends upon how we conduct ourselves at home. For our national strength in every respect rests on our unity as a people.

There is a fundamental difference between the requirements of foreign policy and of domestic policy. In our own society, only some issues are matters of governmental concern; we can address these issues selectively, accommodate the different groups concerned, and legislate a solution that, hopefully, disposes of the problem.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is the sum total of our nation's action abroad. Our involvement with the world outside is continual. Our action cannot be fragmented into a series of individual compromises except at grave risk. Every decision sets in motion a sequence of events and is in turn perceived by other nations as symbolic of our intentions and capabilities. Though we are a system of separated powers in Washington, to the world we are *one* government and *one* nation.

Our democratic system, and the broad participation of all of our people and private and public institutions, present a constant challenge to fashion unity out of diversity. We have done so in moments of crisis in the past; we must do so today in a moment of historic opportunity.

And here the recent controversies between the two branches of our government give cause for serious concern. The Administration is held responsible for virtually all difficulties around the world—whether or not they resulted from its policies—and then is hamstrung in its capacity to act flexibly and purposefully.

—In energy, the lack of determined action on conservation and alternative sources seriously jeopardizes our efforts with other oil-consuming nations to reduce our vulnerability and to improve our bargaining position toward the producers.

—In Latin America, attempts to give impetus to a new dialogue are impaired by trade restrictions and automatic legislative sanctions that reduce our negotiating flexibility.

—In East-West relations, the leverage required to protect our national interest has been reduced by blanket legislative restrictions which have failed as well to achieve the humanitarian objectives they were meant to serve.

—In the eastern Mediterranean the stalemate over our military relations with Turkey threatens to unhinge the eastern flank of NATO. The President has proposed a compromise to break this congressional deadlock; the Senate, nearly half the House, and the leaders of both parties in both Houses, have

supported it. When the Congress reconvenes in September we hope for a rapid, cooperative solution before irreparable damage is done to our national security.

The country cannot afford the dominance of *either* branch over the other. This is not a constitutional or legal dispute. The issue is how to conduct a single, purposeful foreign policy in our democratic system. Our Constitution gives the Congress wide authority in key areas of our foreign and defense policy. But the President represents the nation abroad; he must have the possibility of shaping and carrying out a coherent policy. Accommodating special or parochial interests through a series of compromises does not necessarily produce coherence; contention between the executive and Congress risks falling between two stools on too many grave issues.

The two branches of our government have shown their ability in recent years to work cooperatively. On many issues honest differences of opinion were reconciled and a common position achieved—the Romanian trade agreement, the basic direction of our Middle East policy, the preparation for the special session of the General Assembly, and many issues in arms control and policy.

Let us build on this. The President is a man of Congress; he regards its members as his colleagues, and he has pledged to cooperate with them. The Administration will make every effort to consult, inform, and work with the Congress in making foreign policy. And let me say that the close cooperation between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Administration has given strength and impetus to our foreign policy. When we are divided, when partisanship produces bitter debates, we can do damage that outlasts our present emotions; we harm not only the country's fortunes today but the hopes of future generations. But when we are united together there is no force stronger than the power of free men acting in unity.

Ladies and gentlemen, our nation has gone through a searing decade. Assassination, war, and internal turmoil have all left their mark upon us. We began the 1960's secure in our belief in the goodness of our purpose, confident of our power to shape our future, and proud of our youthful vitality. Yet 15 years later, tested by extraordinary events, many came to believe that we were powerless to affect the world and that our boldness had given way to the weariness and timidity of old age.

Already we can begin to see that the pessimists, as so often, spoke too soon. Despite a constitutional crisis unmatched since the 1860's, our government remains strong and our freedoms stand undiminished. People the world over have been reminded by our adversity that their only real hope for a better life lies in America's continued commitment to a free and peaceful world. The Administration has responded by making clear that we will not retreat from our obligations abroad and that we will not be shaken by divided purpose at home.

Once again, a troubled world needs a strong and confident America. It offers us no simple choices but rather what Americans have always welcomed: a challenge to our courage, an opportunity to fresh accomplishment, a summons to greatness.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Birmingham Address

Press release 411B dated August 15

Chairman J. D. "Jimmie" Hayes, president, Alabama Farm Bureau Federation: . . . Now, Dr. Kissinger being a wise man, I do not question his decisions, but he has invited a question-and-answer session, which I think perhaps should be limited to 15 minutes.

The first question: Are unions going to dictate foreign policy regarding loading and shipping of grain to Russia and other countries? [*Applause.*]

Secretary Kissinger: This is my first experience in having a question applauded. [Laughter.]

The Administration has favored the sale of grain to the Soviet Union and to other countries. As I pointed out, we consider our agricultural productivity one of our most

important national assets, including the field of foreign policy.

We regret attempts that may be made by individual groups to influence the overall policy by such measures. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Labor and other senior officials are now talking to the unions concerned; and we are trying to meet those concerns that reflect their working conditions, freight rates, or similar matters. We hope that we can work out a cooperative solution very rapidly, because we think it is very important. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: Do you have comments on the reports coming out of Washington that Israel and Egypt are close to signing a peace agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: What is being discussed between Israel and Egypt at this moment is not a final peace agreement, but an interim step which, however, if it is achieved, would mark considerable progress on the road to peace, perhaps the biggest single one that has yet been taken.

The two parties are at this moment still in the process of negotiation, and there are still important issues that still remain to be resolved. However, progress has been made in recent weeks. The two sides, with American mediation, are negotiating with each other in good faith and seriously; and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. We should know within the next couple of weeks whether these hopes will be realized, but certainly over recent weeks progress has been made. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: Perhaps this would be the appropriate place for the next question. You, Dr. Kissinger, have been quoted in the press recently as saying that we have a commitment to Israel—and continuing as an incomplete quotation—but this is not to be construed as a status quo. Would you comment on this?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has no legal, formal commitment to Israel in the sense of an agreement ratified by the Congress. On the other hand, we have a close historical relationship. And successive administrations since the creation of the State of Israel—of both of our major political parties—have affirmed that the survival and security of Israel represent a major American concern.

At the same time, we believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is essential. We have supported an evolution in the relations between the Arab states and Israel by which they would negotiate a peace settlement and in which, in return for the relinquishing by Israel of Arab territories, the Arab countries would make commitments toward peace. [Applause.]

The United States has been the only country that has been able to move this negotiating process forward, and we remain committed to moving the process forward. Our basic commitment in the Middle East, therefore, is both to the survival and security of Israel but also to the achievement of a permanent peace. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: The next question refers to your previous remarks, presumably about Portugal. The question is: Do you have any firm evidence that the Soviet Union is aiding the Communist Party's efforts to subvert the revolution in Portugal for its own purposes?

Secretary Kissinger: Undoubtedly there exists a school of thought right now in Washington that I have already said too much about Portugal. [Laughter.]

But there is some evidence along the lines that the question suggests. But above all, the purpose of my remarks is to make clear the fundamental American attitude toward any future action that might be contemplated.

We have to remember that events in Portugal have their own dynamics that rest on Portuguese conditions. We also have to remember that the influence of the Western democracies in the country furthest from the Soviet borders in Western Europe depends as much on the determination of the Western countries as it may on the influence of the Soviet Union. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: Dr. Kissinger, you have been quoted as saying that we are living in a new world and in a new era and facing a new world and facing a new era. Would you like to expand on those comments?

Secretary Kissinger: That's another 45 minutes. [Laughter.] I am sure you will all be very patient.

What I meant with this remark was that, in the immediate postwar period, the world was essentially divided into two big blocs: the Communist bloc on the one side with the Soviet Union in the lead, the Western world on the other with the United States in the lead.

In the 30 years since the end of World War II, conditions have changed quite fundamentally. Western Europe and Japan have grown in strength and self-confidence and in their ability to play a political role. The Communist countries are characterized by the division between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and by other fragmented trends.

In addition, the growth of nuclear weapons has given a new significance to the nature of military power so that where, in the immediate postwar period, it was possible to conduct a relatively simple foreign policy, now we live in a much more fluid world requiring much more complicated decisions and a world in which the question of peace and war takes on added urgency.

What we have attempted to do is to create a structure in which all these divergent forces can find a place in which we can defend our values and our interests, but at the same time reduce the dangers of nuclear war. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: We are going to have to limit it to about two more questions because of our time. This one says: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think of the world fund from which food can be purchased from any country where supply is available, instead of a world food bank?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not developing now a world food bank. We are in the process of developing for the special session of the General Assembly a number of proposals which include proposals in the field of food, in which our purpose is to use our productivity as a model and as a means to show how scarce resources can be used for the benefit of mankind, while at the same time giving incentives to those who produce these commodities.

We have not yet finally decided on what these proposals should be.

We have advocated in the past the development of an agreement for nationally held grain reserves which would help our farmers during periods when there is a shortage of demand and which can be used in case there are major catastrophes in the world. We are in the process of negotiating this now.

Another purpose of this scheme would be to avoid putting ourselves in the position of being the sole country that holds reserves and, by establishing requirements for other countries holding reserves, to create a constant market for our agricultural products. [Applause.]

Chairman Hayes: We are approaching our deadline. This is the last question. The question is: The present Administration has promoted the philosophy of full agricultural production and the free market system. Do you think the government has a fair policy when it arbitrarily restricts the exporting of farm commodities?

Secretary Kissinger: I sometimes have the impression that the audience likes the questions better than the answers. [Laughter.]

We are committed to full agricultural production and the free market system, and we are not conscious that we have arbitrarily restricted the exporting of farm commodities.

In the present situation it is clear that the United States is the only country that has the reserves that other countries must purchase. Therefore, we are trying to bring about, in as orderly a manner as possible, the disposal of these reserves—precisely to avoid the pressures against the free market system that will inevitably develop if there are precipitous actions.

All the decisions that are being taken now are within the framework of the free market system, and they are designed to vindicate toward the farmers our request to them for full production and therefore our obligation to help them move that production. [Applause.]

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Birmingham August 14

Press release 412 dated August 14

Mr. Al Fox of Birmingham News: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the newspaper media of Alabama we welcome you and Mrs. Kissinger to our state. And we appreciate that you have taken the time to grant us this news conference.

Last month it was announced that negotiations, which had been initiated by Senator Sparkman apparently, had resulted in the return of some $2 million to Southern Airways from a plane hijacked from Birmingham. Just how big a step is that toward renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we consider it a positive step and a sign of good will. We have indicated on our side that we are prepared to begin discussions with Cuba to see whether the outstanding issues can be settled. As these discussions proceed, we will be able to make a decision on when the time has come to resume diplomatic relations. That is premature now.

Of course, there is one other point that I made before, which is that I do not know whether we will count concessions that are made to Senators when the negotiations start with our government. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the Soviet Union has resorted to the Helsinki agreement to protest the delayed decisions of the Common Market on economic or financial assistance to Portugal and has designs to interfere with that country's internal affairs. Does this concept of the Helsinki agreement agree with yours? And is there any other Communist action to which we might apply the same standard and use the same appeal?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not agree with this interpretation of the Helsinki document, and we support the attitude of the Common Market, which was that they would be prepared to give economic assistance to a democratic Portugal. That is what I expressed this morning in my speech. So we do not agree with this interpretation, and our policy was stated this morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the question, since the question of Portugal has been raised, it has been my understanding that you consider the problems in Portugal arising from their history and that—to use one of your phrases—the wounds have been self-inflicted, from our point of view. Now you seem to be warning the Soviet Union to stay out. But haven't you raised a strawman? What has the Soviet Union done to interfere in Portuguese domestic affairs?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said in answer to a question earlier, what I said this morning—what I have said in my prepared remarks—was addressed primarily to what might be done in the future and to some authoritative press comments that have been made in the Soviet Union in the last few days. Basically the trends in Portugal result from internal Portuguese developments, but the situation is reaching a point where temptation for outside intervention seems to be arising.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we received a report that a Colonel-General Michael Goleniewski, who was a Polish Army intelligence officer in World War II, had identified a list of KGB and GRU agents and officers which have since been arrested, tried, and convicted. The general, according to our source, also identified you, Mr. Kissinger, as having worked for a Soviet intelligence network—code name ODRA, headquartered in West Germany during World War II—at the same time you were a U.S. Army counterintelligence interrogator and instructor in a military intelligence school in West Germany. Now, is this

true? And if not, how do you explain your name being on General Goleniewski's list?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know who Colonel Goleniewski is, but I think he should be given the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States working to encourage a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not judged that this was the most fruitful area for our diplomatic activity, nor has there been any demand for our services. So we wish the parties well in efforts to settle it, but we have not been ourselves directly engaged.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your speech that the United States will oppose the efforts of the minority that appears to be subverting revolution for its own purposes in Portugal. What precisely do you mean?

Secretary Kissinger: We have indicated that we will support a democratic Portugal, and we have made clear our preferences. Beyond that there is not an enormous amount we can do.

I have also pointed out there is also the question which we have put to the other NATO allies; namely, for how long a government, should it become dominated by Communists, can remain in the NATO alliance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow that up, please? In your speech you also spoke about the Soviet Union having an option to influence, either directly or indirectly, the course of events there. What do you have in mind by influencing the course of events directly or indirectly—their sending in military advisers or what?

Secretary Kissinger: Direct activities by its citizens or by people under its direct control.

Q. Can you tell us in a practical way what benefit does the average American get from détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the benefit to the average American from détente is: first of all, a condition of absence of tension and reduced risk of war; secondly, the settlement of a number of outstanding political issues such as, for example, the issue of Berlin; third, restraint in other areas such as the Middle East; fourth, an easing of the arms race. And in return, we have given up no American interests.

So the question of relaxation of tension is—we should not delude ourselves—an issue that will be faced by any administration at any period. The objectives that I have described are the interests of all Americans as well as all other people, and that is what we get out of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have a meeting this afternoon with president of the International Longshoremen's Local 1410 of the Port of Mobile. What is the purpose of this meeting, specifically in relation to the ILA's national position on loading grain?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have a separate meeting with—

Q. He's involved in a meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever I make these visits around the country, I ask the local sponsors to organize meetings of local leaders. I do not select these leaders; I leave that to the sponsors, except that I ask them to be widely representative. It gives me an opportunity to find out what is on the minds of these leadership groups around the country—this plus the question periods at the end of my speeches. The purpose of these meetings is as much to inform me as to give me an opportunity to express our views. So I do not expect to have a separate conversation with this gentleman or to get into the question of grain loading or any such—this is being handled in Washington.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, except for the Super K cartoons, you have not been in political cartoons until recently; and you have been depicted as giving away the store in Helsinki. How do you feel personally about cartoons?

Secretary Kissinger: I like the first set of cartoons better. The second set of cartoons—I wish each newspaper would bring this to the attention of their cartoonists. [Laughter.] As I keep pointing out around the country,

my father, who clips the newspaper articles, does not clip the second type.

Now, with respect to giving away the store in Helsinki, I think it is important to get Helsinki in perspective. These negotiations have been going on for over three years. For at least a year and a half, it has been known that in all probability that meeting would end with a summit. The conclusions were perfectly well known. The United States was not in the lead of this negotiation, but it went along with its West European allies and the other 34 countries present there.

So suddenly there has started a debate on what? The recognition of frontiers? You ask yourself "what frontiers?" The frontiers in the Balkans were established by the peace treaties of 1946 and 1947, in which we participated. The eastern frontiers of Poland were established in Yalta, in which we participated. The western frontiers of Poland were established provisionally in Potsdam, in which we participated. They were finally settled between the Federal Republic and Poland in 1971.

There are no unrecognized frontiers in Europe today. We did not recognize anything that has not long since been recognized by other countries or by previous American Administrations. I think we are punishing ourselves needlessly here over an issue that was not the principal issue at Helsinki.

The new things that were added to existing international agreements at Helsinki were all things that were in our favor. They were the human contacts; they were the peaceful changes of frontiers. Therefore I believe that these cartoons and other commentaries are totally wrong.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the reports of an American presence in the Middle East, two questions: Can you tell us whether, in fact, there will be an American presence in the passes in the Sinai? And number two, if the agreement should call for such a presence, is it your intention to consult with Congress? Or, going beyond that, is it your intention not to allow an American presence in the Middle East unless you have congressional endorsement for such an action?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to your first question, obviously there is no agreement as of now. There is not even an agreement as to the particular concept of an American presence. Therefore we have not had an opportunity, except in a general way, to sound out certain congressional leaders about the concept, and we have not been able to put before them any concrete propositions.

Secondly, if there is to be an American presence, it will under no circumstances be a military presence. The only presence that could possibly be considered is a presence of American civilian unarmed volunteers at the request of both parties to perform very limited technical functions, and in very small numbers.

Thirdly, if this happens, the United States would not proceed with it without congressional endorsement. We are not talking about consultation. We would ask the Congress to vote on this.

Q. You would?

Secretary Kissinger: We would ask the Congress to vote before we would proceed.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, this is fundamentally a farm meeting. How do you visualize the role of the American farmer in feeding the so-called hungry world?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States has the greatest agricultural productivity in the world. The United States is the only country that consistently produces reserves in the sense of surpluses. Therefore, American farm productivity is one of our great assets, if we can put it into the service of the overall objectives of our foreign policy —as we have been able to, thanks to the productivity of our farmers and their willingness to produce at full capacity.

So the primary contribution that our farmers can make is to continue to produce at full capacity. We would like to have an opportunity to talk to farm leaders about how the product can be moved in a way that causes the least disruption of our own domestic markets. But these are matters that

are being handled by the Department of Agriculture at the moment, and I think it is working reasonably well.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how serious is the threat to our security with the Turkish ouster of our forces, and do you foresee a return of these bases to our control very soon?

Secretary Kissinger: Turkey has not yet ousted our forces. Turkey has prohibited our bases from operating. The Administration has repeatedly stated that the decision to embargo aid to Turkey and the consequent closing of our bases have a very serious effect on our national security—first, because these bases are the source of irreplaceable intelligence; secondly, because Turkey is one of the key countries in NATO; and thirdly, because the decision does not help the countries it is designed to help.

We have opposed this decision. We have appealed to the Congress to reverse it. We do so not to win an argument with the House of Representatives, the Senate having voted on the basis of our recommendations; but we think this is a matter of overwhelming national interest; and we hope that the House will reverse itself when it returns.

Q. I would like to ask you a question concerning Turkey. There are about 3,000 Greeks in the Birmingham area, and recently they became very enraged about what happened and they wrote Congressmen and Senators. They are similar to other ethnic groups around the United States with a lot of influence. Regarding Turkey, what do you think of the influence or pressure put by such ethnic minorities?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have been at the receiving end of this from various groups, so I have had direct exposure to it.

I think it is inevitable that various ethnic groups will feel passionately about the interests of their ancestral countries. At the same time, it is also clear that the overwhelming majority of the representatives of these ethnic groups think of the interests of the United States. Even if we differ occasionally with their conception of these interests, their motivation without any question is the same as those of any other group that is concerned with American foreign policy.

On certain issues, it can happen that ethnic groups feel passionately beyond what would be our assessment of even the best interests of the country or group that they represent. This has been our view of some of the pressures from the Greek constituents. We believe that the best means of producing a settlement on Cyprus and of helping Greece as well as Cyprus would be to follow our recommendations with respect to the embargo, because it would enhance our influence in Turkey. They have another judgment. But I think, in the nature of our system of a country composed of so many different ethnic groups, that it is inevitable that these pressures exist; and I would not criticize them.

Q. Just to follow up, if I may, to your answer to Mr. Kalb's [Bernard Kalb, CBS News] question. If you do go to the Middle East and the issue of American presence in the Sinai is raised, are you suggesting now that you wouldn't be able to reach an interim agreement without coming back and getting congressional approval first?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are not party to the agreement. But the parties would have to understand that it would require congressional approval. And since there would be some period of time before such an agreement could be implemented anyway, we believe the Congress would act—we would certainly ask the Congress to act expeditiously, but we will ask for congressional approval before we actually encourage Americans to go there—encourage, because we will not send anybody; it would have to be volunteers.

Q. Is it possible then that Congress could effectively veto an interim agreement in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: On the basis of the consultations that we have had, we do not expect that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Food for Peace pro-

gram has not been labeled a magnificent success. How is it that agricultural sales to other nations are going to help our foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I would not agree that the Food for Peace program has not been a success. I think it has on the whole been a very substantial success. Agricultural sales to other countries, in a world in which the disposition of commodities becomes one of the principal international issues, can set an example for the manner in which other international commodities should be handled; and secondly, if conducted on a long-term basis, can lead to a set of arrangements that would be of mutual benefit to the United States as well as to other countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to the technicians again. Just a month ago in Milwaukee you were considering either military or civilian technicians. What has happened to make you rule out military?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not remember that I—I think you must have misunderstood what I said then. But whatever I may have said then, our policy is clearly the one that I have stated now. We are talking about civilians—volunteers—approved by Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the security and survival of the State of Israel. Is there any geographical configuration which you envision within which Israel's security and survival is in doubt?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not thought it wise for the United States to put forward a proposal on a final settlement, which we believe should be negotiated between the parties concerned and which must have elements of final frontiers matched by complete peace commitments on the other side. But I do not think the United States should draw these lines.

Q. Mr. Secretary, 30 years after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there is still criticism. Do you think it was necessary that we explode the nuclear bombs in populated areas to bring a quicker end to the war?

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned in my time in Washington that, in making complex decisions, it is very easy in retrospect to draw certain conclusions when one does not know all the pressures that operated on the people concerned and when the facts are clearer now than they were then. Therefore I would be very hesitant to second-guess a group of serious and concerned people with 30 years' hindsight.

Senator Sparkman: Mr. Secretary, may I say just a word on that?

The Secretary was not there when that happened. That was 1946. I was there. I was in the House of Representatives. I was on the Military Affairs Committee. General Marshall, who was then Chief of Staff, as I recall, testified before the House Military Affairs Committee that dropping that bomb on Hiroshima, as much as it may have shocked us, saved probably a million American lives that it would have cost us had we invaded Japan. It prevented the invasion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, in your speech you spoke of those who use tough rhetoric and urge policies of deliberate confrontation. Since we are in Alabama in a political year now, would you include Governor Wallace in that group of folks?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not read any of his recent speeches, but I would include anybody who uses tough rhetoric. I leave it to you to determine who that might be. But I think that anybody who attacks the basic policy should not only attack it but should spell out an alternative and indicate the precise implications of his alternative. I am not talking about individuals; I am talking about policy directions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the question of the Cuban return of ransom for a moment. It is apparent from the reports we have received down here that the State Department had only a marginal part in Senator Sparkman's negotiations. I was wondering if a possible explanation for this could be that there are recurring reports

that the State Department, unless a matter has your personal attention, doesn't know what to do.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, this matter has my personal attention, so it is not a good example. Secondly, I am delighted by the result of this negotiation and by Senator Sparkman's role in it. Thirdly, with respect to the State Department, there are certain myths that are going to be repeated no matter what I may say or do. It will be repeated that I am secretive even though I am sure I have given more public speeches, held more press conferences, and met with more congressional committees than any Secretary of State before me.

It will be said that the State Department has no authority, even though I think most observers will have to agree that we have now the best group of Assistant Secretaries that has been assembled in decades, that they are known for their strong personalities, and that the best way to work with me in the State Department is to have strong views of your own. So I think it is absolutely incorrect. The thing that I hope will last longest of the organizational changes that have been made at the State Department is the quality, in a policy sense, of the people that are now in key positions.

Though the matter of Cuba happens to have my personal attention on top of it, I can operate as I do only because the Assistant Secretaries and the Under Secretaries are men of initiative and imagination.

Mr. John W. Bloomer, managing editor, Birmingham News: Mr. Secretary, I think it is time for me to speak. And I wish to express on behalf of the Alabama press our appreciation for your being with us, and particularly for your candid answers to our questions. I would also like to express appreciation to Senator Sparkman for being with us.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [*Applause.*]

U.S. Takes Steps To Conform With OAS Action on Cuba

Department Statement [1]

The Organ of Consultation of the OAS, acting under the Rio Treaty, adopted a resolution on July 29 which allows each member state to determine for itself the nature of its economic and diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba. That action grew out of an earlier decision by the members of the OAS, on July 25, to adopt a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty which, once ratified, will lift sanctions by a simple majority vote.

In keeping with this action by the OAS, the United States is modifying the aspects of our Cuban denial policy which affect other countries. Effective today, August 21, 1975, it will be U.S. policy to grant licenses permitting transactions between U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when those subsidiaries are operating in countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba. Specific licenses will continue to be required in each case, and they will remain subject to regulations concerning U.S.-origin parts, components, strategic goods, and technology.

In order to conform further with the OAS action, we are taking appropriate steps so that effective immediately countries which allow their ships or aircraft to carry goods to and from Cuba are not penalized by loss of U.S. bilateral assistance. We are initiating steps to modify regulations which deny bunkering in the United States to third-country ships engaged in the Cuba trade. We will also seek legislation to eliminate similar restrictions on title I, P.L. 480, food sales to third countries.

[1] Read to news correspondents on Aug. 21 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Vail, Colo., August 17

Press release 413 dated August 17

Mr. Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: Let me read you two statements, and then Henry will be here to brief.

Secretary of State Kissinger will travel to the Middle East next week, leaving Washington on August 20. The discussions the United States has been conducting with the parties concerned, looking toward an interim agreement, have progressed to the point where the parties and the President believe it would be useful for the Secretary of State to travel to the area in an effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. The Secretary's visit to the Middle East will include several Arab countries and Israel.

The President has asked me to read you a statement.

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by President Ford, the text of which follows.]

"I have worked many hours with the Secretary of State analyzing and assessing the situation in the Middle East, and I have now directed him to return to that region in an effort to bring the discussions to a successful conclusion.

"I am hopeful that the parties will successfully conclude an interim agreement, which not only would be in the best interest of the parties involved but also in the best interest of the entire Middle East region and indeed of the whole world.

"I am sure all Americans join me in wishing the Secretary of State success on this critically important mission."

Secretary Kissinger: We will go straight to the questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us some of the issues that remain outstanding that you are going to be working on?

Secretary Kissinger: We have made good progress on many of the issues. We have agreement in principle on some of the lines, but some details remain to be negotiated.

We still have to work out the protocols and the details of the various disposition of forces after another interim agreement has been made.

There will be complicated issues of civilian administration, and there are one or two issues of principle there remaining outstanding. However, it is the President's judgment, the judgment of the parties, and my own that in the light of the good will that has been shown by both parties in recent weeks, in light of the progress that has been made, the remaining differences are surmountable; and this is the attitude with which I am going there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that peace is at hand in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't used that line for four years. [Laughter.]

Q. Where are you going, exactly?

Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. You don't think I am finished with a 30-second answer. I haven't even placed my verb yet. [Laughter.]

This, of course, is not a peace agreement. This is an interim step toward peace between Egypt and Israel, if it should succeed. The issues between Israel and the other countries remain to be resolved, and the United States remains committed to a just and lasting peace, as called for by the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Both the United States and Israel and all the other parties that we are in touch with agree that this will not be the end of the process, but a stage in the process. Nevertheless, if it succeeds, it will be, and it can be, a very big step. It would be the first agree-

ment that has been made between an Arab state and Israel not under the immediate impact of military hostilities, the first one that will require some complicated arrangement of cooperation.

Therefore we hope that it will be a step toward that just and lasting peace which we are committed to try to bring about.

I think, Fran [Frances L. Lewine, Associated Press], you had a question.

Q. What countries are you going to, exactly?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going first to Israel. From there I will go to Alexandria, where President Sadat will be. Then we will have a shuttle, which we do not think should be as extended as the recent shuttles have been, because many issues of principle have already been settled; but while I am in the Middle East, I expect to visit Damascus, Amman, and Saudi Arabia to discuss with the other Arab countries our conception of progress toward peace in the Middle East.

Q. Can you tell us who suggested a U.S. monitoring team in the Middle East, and isn't this fraught with danger, and I would like to know if it is tied to any money agreements of aid to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: The idea of possible monitoring team has as yet not been finally decided. It is an issue that was first raised and which we have made clear we would agree to do only if both of the parties join in.

We have also made clear that the American participation would be of an entirely technical nature; that is to say, we would man certain kinds of warning equipment whose results would be given to both sides and the United Nations.

In other words, it would be an extension of the U–2 flights we are now undertaking at the request of both parties. Any Americans that are going to the Middle East would go only if approved by the Congress. It would be volunteers. They would have no military mission of any kind; and their primary function, their exclusive function, would be to give warning information to both sides and to the United Nations; and their numbers would be very small.

Q. Who suggested it, and is it tied to any aid?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of warning stations depends on the issue of the aid. The issue of the aid in turn to Israel has been discussed with Israel for many months, as we have, for that matter, discussed aid programs with Arab countries for many months.

We will submit in September, I would expect, an aid package for the entire Middle East, including Israel and those Arab countries that have been the recipients of aid last year; and this has been entrained as part of the reassessment in any event.

Q. How much money does it entail?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has not yet made the final decision about the amount that we will request from the Congress, but this grows out of technical studies that we are undertaking jointly as to the needs of the parties and particularly the needs of Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, alongside whatever agreements may be reached between Egypt and Israel, will there also be third-party agreements between the United States and both of these parties, and what will their nature be?

Secretary Kissinger: We still do not have any actual documents that have been agreed to between the parties. All we have are certain agreements in principle about the outlines of a possible agreement.

In the disengagement agreements, there was a formal agreement, then there was a protocol that was attached to that agreement, then there was separate understanding between the parties in which the United States acted as an intermediary and transmitted assurances from one party to the other.

Everything in which the United States is involved will be submitted to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, and to the House International Relations Committee. There will be no secret understandings that are not submitted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you set yourself a time limit for this particular trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to be back on September 1 or 2 to speak at the special session of the General Assembly. That I have to do in any event no matter what the state of the negotiations is.

Now, it is theoretically possible I might go back to the Middle East from there, but I hope that we can make sufficient progress in 10 days. But I don't want to operate against a deadline. These issues—even when there is agreement in principle, the issues are enormously complex and there are so many different aspects of civilian as well as military arrangements that have to be made that I would hate to tie myself too closely.

Mr. Beckman [Aldo B. Beckman, Chicago Tribune Press Service].

Q. I have two questions. One, can you tell us if the American volunteers will be armed, and secondly, when your earlier shuttle failed, I seem to recall your saying you wouldn't go back unless there was a 90 percent chance of success. Is there a 90 percent chance of success?

Secretary Kissinger: You have to remember even if you say there is a 90 percent chance of success, if it fails, it fails 100 percent. We think there is a good chance of success—whether you express it at 80 percent or 90 percent, that is just guessing at it—we think there is now a good chance of success, or the President would not have authorized my return.

What was the other question?

Q. Will the American volunteers be armed?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet worked out this arrangement. If they are armed, it would be only for self-defense. It would not be for military operations. It would only be personal arms for really very immediate self-defense. They will not be authorized, under any circumstances, to conduct military operations or to defend themselves against military forces. If they have arms, it would be against marauders, but they are not there for a military function, and we are talking about very small numbers of about 100 or so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will this force be a unilateral American force or will it be part of a U.N. force?

Secretary Kissinger: It is very difficult for me to talk about something that has not yet been agreed to and finally worked out. In any event, there will be a U.N. force standing between Israel and Egypt in a zone of a greater depth than has ever existed between the hostile forces in the Middle East.

So these would not be in direct contact with either of the hostile parties. They would work more closely with the United Nations.

Q. Has the United States agreed in principle to compensate Israel for the loss of the Sinai oilfields?

Secretary Kissinger: We are discussing with Israel not so much compensation for the Sinai oil, but arrangements for alternative supplies of Sinai oil if Israel has difficulty arranging them for itself. We will take into account, in arriving at the economic aid figure, the additional foreign exchange requirement for Israel in the purchase of oil.

Q. So we are going to pay for the replacements? That is what it amounts to?

Secretary Kissinger: It isn't going to be done exactly on that basis, but it will be taken into account.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may change the subject, could you explain to us the situation surrounding the transfer of Ambassador Carter [W. Beverly Carter, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania] out of the State Department?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge—and I am not always told everything in the State Department—Ambassador Carter has not been transferred out of the State Department. We have avoided any comment on a situation which, quite frankly, has not always been reported with full accuracy.

The problem that arises in the case of terrorist attacks on Americans has to be seen not only in relation to the individual case but in relation to the thousands of Americans who are in jeopardy all over the world. In every individual case, the overwhelming

temptation is to go along with what is being asked.

On the other hand, if terrorist groups get the impression that they can force a negotiation with the United States and an acquiescence in their demands, then we may save lives in one place at the risk of hundreds of lives everywhere else.

Therefore it is our policy—in order to save lives and in order to avoid undue pressure on Ambassadors all over the world, it is our policy that American Ambassadors and American officials not participate in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists and that terrorists know that the United States will not participate in the payment of ransom and in the negotiation for it.

In any individual case, this requires heartbreaking decisions. It is our view that it saves more lives and more jeopardy and that it will help Ambassadors, who can then hide behind firm rules rather than leave it to the individual decision.

I think Ambassador Carter is a distinguished Foreign Service—he is not a Foreign Service officer—he is a distinguished Ambassador, and he has served well in Tanzania. I do not want to engage in a debate in which his concerns are very easily understandable and which we are trying to handle in as compassionate a manner as we can and without penalizing any individual concerned. But there are important issues of principle involved here.

Q. What is going to happen to Ambassador Carter? He has the impression he has been transferred out of the State Department.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that Ambassador Carter would be better advised to deal with the responsible officials of the State Department than to engage in an independent publicity campaign of his own.

We are reluctant to put forward our view of the situation, because we do not believe it would help anybody. We are trying to maintain a principle that terrorists cannot negotiate with American officials, and we are doing this in order to protect the thousands of Americans that could become victims all over the world if we once started that process, and not only the American tourists and students but also American officials.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one more question on this. I understand that President Ford wrote a letter to President Nyerere of Tanzania thanking him for his cooperation in this problem.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. And that that cooperation included releasing two of the terrorists of the organization that kidnaped the four young students. Now, isn't that cooperating with terrorists?

Secretary Kissinger: After the event, President Ford did indeed write this letter, and in each individual case it is a matter of judgment of how rigidly that line is drawn and at what point one believes that the line has been breached. In any event, Ambassador Carter has not been transferred out of the State Department.

Q. But out of his post?

Secretary Kissinger: I really am trying to avoid a detailed discussion of the issue, I think in the interest of all parties concerned.

Q. Can we get a kind of outline of what the accords have been in terms of what has been printed? Is that the passes and the oilfields?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I can go into something in which there are so many items that have only been agreed in principle and so many items that are not yet agreed to at all. Some of the things that have been printed are roughly accurate. Some of the things that have been printed are not accurate. I would not go firmly with any one of them.

Q. I was going to ask the same question. Are the reports of the agreement in principle for a pullback from the passes and the oilfields in exchange for a guarantee of nonbelligerence accurate? Is that the general scope of the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think the issue of a formal issue of nonbelligerence is now before us, and I think it would be better

not to go into the precise details of the geographic separation until we are a little further ahead in the negotiations.

But it is known, of course, that the negotiations have involved the passes and the oilfields, and as I have already pointed out in answer to another question, that some of the economic discussions with Israel involved the problem of how to deal with Israel's foreign exchange problems in the absence of the oilfields; so that is a speculation that would be proper.

Q. Are you going to see Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] on this trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't expect to see him, no, not on this trip. I expect to see Mr. Gromyko next when he comes to the General Assembly in the middle of September.

Q. Between now and then, will there be any special arrangements or efforts to keep the Russians posted?

Secretary Kissinger: We will stay in touch with the Soviet Union and keep them generally informed.

Q. As you pointed out, if there is an interim agreement, can you give us a more specific idea of the territories Israel may have to give up?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out on other occasions, in a lasting peace, a lasting peace will have to settle the frontier of Israel not just with Egypt but with all of its neighbors. It will have to take into account the Palestinian problem. It will have to spell out in great detail the reciprocal obligations for peace on the part of the Arab countries. And it will have to include guarantees—international, multilateral, bilateral, whatever may be devised for the final arrangements.

This interim agreement which we are now talking about is a step, we hope a significant step, toward this, but it will still be only a partial—we will only have traveled a part of the road.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in answering Jim Haughton's question, you said the formal issue of nonbelligerency, which is not a question here, but what is Israel going to need in the way of some guidance, and what is Israel going to get? You have talked about the oilfields and the passes.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think I ought to be into the provisions of an agreement which has so far been negotiated in a rather cumbersome process through Washington in which there are no documents yet agreed to by both sides, but only some concepts and general lines, and that will all be apparent when the agreement is negotiated, hopefully in the not too distant future.

Q. On the question of compensation or whatever it may be called for the loss of the oilfields, are you talking about American compensation, American aid? Are you talking about Arab aid or some other form?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression, but I have to confirm that when I get out there, that the Arabs are not yet ready to compensate Israel for any loss of oil revenues. We are talking about the fact that in setting the aid level for Israel, we will take into account the foreign exchange losses that Israel will suffer if, as a result of the agreements, it gives up the oilfields.

I think I will take one more question.

Q. Can you give us any idea of whether you heard from the Israeli Cabinet this morning?

Secretary Kissinger: This announcement is based on the decision of the Israeli Cabinet to invite me to come to Israel.

Q. Is there any question about it? This morning there was a question about it.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, there was in the sense that the Israeli Cabinet had to approve what the negotiating team and we worked out during the course of last week, and until the Israeli Cabinet had formally approved the results of last week's negotiations, we could not announce that a shuttle could, in fact, take place.

Q. When are you leaving here?

Secretary Kissinger: I am leaving here tomorrow afternoon, and I am leaving Washington Wednesday around midnight.

America's Strength and Progress Toward Freedom and Peace

Address by President Ford [1]

I am very, very happy to have this opportunity to talk with my fellow Legionnaires about two things which the American Legion has always held dear: freedom and peace—for our country and for the world.

Freedom always comes first. Let there be no doubt about that. Patrick Henry answered that question for all of us some 200 years ago. The marines, the seamen, and the airmen who rescued the *Mayaguez* gave the same clear answer which was heard 'round the world. All Americans are terribly proud of their success.

But in today's world of technological terror, with weapons of awesome sophistication and destructiveness, it is difficult to see how freedom as we know it could survive another all-out war. It is even questionable whether a free society such as ours could survive an all-out, unrestricted arms race.

We are therefore confronted with this dilemma that has faced the American people and their government since the postwar Administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. The question is this: How do we preserve, protect, and defend our freedom and that of our allies? How do we advance the cause of freedom worldwide? And how do we, at the same time, preserve the general peace and create conditions that reduce the chances of war? How do we control the tremendous cost of maintaining the capabilities required for a potential major war?

These are exceedingly difficult questions to answer. At times we have come perilously close to a major military confrontation. We have suffered some serious setbacks. And we are still unable to resolve some dangerous conflicts festering on nearly every continent in the world.

But we have prevented world war III. We have preserved civilization. Few who remember the immediate postwar period after World War II would say that the world is not calmer and better off today than it was.

The free world, as we define it, is essentially intact after 30 years of uneasy peace between the superpowers, instability in former colonial areas, and sporadic outbreaks of local and regional violence. And three decades of imperfect peace have permitted unprecedented gains in productivity and economic progress for much of mankind, including the United States.

Some fundamental lessons were learned in this period. They must not be forgotten.

First, the military might, the material strength, and moral purpose of the United States were absolutely essential to achieve the present level of international stability. They remain absolutely essential. We are still the principal defender of freedom throughout the world.

Second, our enormous defense capability and its economic base have been reinforced by the growing resources of our allies in Europe and in the Pacific and by the increasing interdependence of industrial democracies in both military and economic areas. They must continue.

Third, the policies of five American Presidents before me for strong national defense, for reduction of East-West tension and the

[1] Made before the 57th National Convention of the American Legion at Minneapolis, Minn., on Aug. 19 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 25; introductory paragraphs omitted).

threat of thermonuclear war, and for the bolstering of our essential allies have had the unswerving and nonpartisan support of the Congress and the American people. I will continue to seek that support. But today I ask you, my fellow Legionnaires, to help me achieve that objective, and I know that I can count on your support.

We share a very deep concern over the cracks now appearing in the foundations of essential national unity on defense and foreign policy.

Without a clear consensus among 214 million Americans, the role of the United States as the champion of freedom and peace throughout the world would be crippled—crippled very seriously, if not fatally. The ability of a President to carry out his constitutional duties would be dangerously diminished. The temptation to potential adversaries to take advantage of any apparent weakness, disunity, and indecision could become irresistible. With your support and that of other Americans, my Administration will give them no such temptation.

Insurance Policy for Peace

George Washington, our first President, said the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war. In one way or another, each of President Washington's successors has repeated that truth. Unfortunately, we have historically ignored it. We have abruptly demobilized after every war, and the next generation—the next generation of Americans—paid very dearly for this folly. I see some danger signs of our doing it again, with the stakes infinitely higher than ever before.

That is why I say to you, I am determined to resist unilateral disarmament. I am equally committed to keeping America's defenses second to none.

Now that Americans are no longer fighting on any front, there are many sincere but, in my judgment, shortsighted Americans who believe that the billions for defense could be better spent for social programs to help the poor and disadvantaged.

But I am convinced that adequate spending for national defense is an insurance policy, an insurance policy for peace we cannot afford to be without. It is most valuable if we never need to use it. But without it, we could be wiped out.

Certainly the most important social obligation of government is to guarantee all citizens, including the disadvantaged, sufficient protection of their lives and freedoms against outside attack. Today, that protection is our principal hope of peace. What expense item in our Federal budget is more essential?

This is one place where second best is worth nothing. The proportion of Federal spending for national security and the proportion of our gross national product going for defense requirements have declined in recent years. The dollar figures in the Federal budget go up, but simply because of inflation. But the weapons we can purchase and the personnel we can afford have declined.

During the Viet-Nam war, defense spending concentrated—and properly so—on current combat requirements, shortchanging our long-range research and development efforts. If our technological lead is not rapidly recovered, this could be fatal to our qualitative superiority in the future. Scientific progress in the Pentagon must be an equal partner with the best in personnel and the best in weapons in maintaining peace and deterring war.

Our potential adversaries are certainly not reducing the levels of their military power. The United States, as a result, must be alert and strong, and it will be. The defense budget which I submitted for fiscal year 1976 represents, under these circumstances, the bare minimum required for our national security. I will vigorously resist all major cuts in every way I can, and I hope I have your help.

For the next fiscal year—1977—I honestly and sincerely hope to hold down our spending on nuclear forces. This tentative judgment is conditioned on real progress in SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. But the Congress and the American people must realize that, unless agreement is achieved, I

will have no choice but to recommend to the Congress an additional $2 billion to $3 billion for strategic weapons programs in current and coming fiscal years.

The Process of Detente

In recent weeks, there has been a great deal said about the subject of détente. Today, let me tell you what I personally think about détente.

First of all, the word itself is confusing. Its meaning is not clear to everybody. French is a beautiful language, the classic language of diplomacy, but I wish there were one simple English word to substitute for "détente." Unfortunately, there isn't.

Relations between the world's two strongest nuclear powers can't be summed up in a catch phrase. Détente literally means "easing" or "relaxing," but definitely not—and I emphasize not—the relaxing of diligence or easing of effort. Rather, it means movement away from the constant crisis and dangerous confrontations that have characterized relations with the Soviet Union.

The process of détente—and it is a process—looks toward a saner and safer relationship between us and the Soviet Union. It represents our best efforts to cool the cold war, which on occasion became much too hot for comfort.

To me, détente means a fervent desire for peace, but not peace at any price. It means the preservation of fundamental American principles, not their sacrifice. It means maintaining the strength to command respect from our adversaries and provide leadership to our friends, not letting down our guard or dismantling our defenses or neglecting our allies. It means peaceful rivalry between political and economic systems, not the curbing of our competitive efforts.

Since the American system depends on freedom, we are confident that our philosophy will prevail. Freedom is still the wave of the future. Détente means moderate and restrained behavior between two superpowers, not a license to fish in troubled waters. It means mutual respect and reciprocity, not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.

With this attitude, I shall work with determination for a relaxation of tensions. The United States has nothing to fear from progress toward peace.

Although we have still a long way to go, we have made some progress: a defusing of the Berlin time bomb, the ABM [antiballistic missile] treaty, the first SALT agreements and progress on SALT Two, the start of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and other arms control agreements regarding space, the seabeds, and germ warfare.

We have established the basis for progress toward détente and cooperation in Europe as a result of the summit meeting of some 35 nations in Helsinki. But the principles we adopted there now must be put into practice—principles, I should say, will be put into practice. We cannot raise the hopes of our people and shatter them by unkept promises.

We are now carefully watching some serious situations for indications of the Soviet attitude toward détente and cooperation in European security. The situation in Portugal is one of them. We are deeply concerned about the future of freedom in Portugal, as we have always been concerned about the future of people throughout the world.

The reality of the Portuguese situation is apparent to all. The wishes of a moderate majority have been subverted by forces more determined than representative. We are hopeful that the sheer weight of numbers—the 80 percent of the Portuguese people who support the democratic process—will prevail in this conflict of ideologies. But they must find the solution in an atmosphere that is free from the pressures of outside forces.

So far, my meetings with General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev in Vladivostok and Helsinki have been constructive and helpful. Future success will of course depend on concrete developments.

Peace is the primary objective of the foreign and defense policies of the United States. It is easy to be a cold warrior in

peacetime. But it would be irresponsible for a President to engage in confrontation when consultation would advance the cause of peace.

So, I say to you—as I said to Mr. Brezhnev and the leaders of other European nations and Canada in Helsinki—peace is crucial, but freedom must come first.

Those who proclaimed American independence almost 200 years ago asserted not merely that all Americans should enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but that all men everywhere are endowed by their Creator with such inalienable rights.

I told the leaders of Europe that these principles, though still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of American policy, that the American people are still dedicated to the universal advancement of individual rights and human freedom implicit in the Helsinki declaration.

It gave me great pride, as the spokesman of the United States at Helsinki, to say to both East and West: My country and its principles of freedom have given hope to millions in Europe and on every continent, and still does.

On the other hand, I emphasize that we are tired of having our hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unkept promises.

I reminded all there in Helsinki that détente must be a two-way street because tensions cannot be eased with safety and security by one side alone.

Through détente, I hope that we are on a two-way street with the Soviet Union. But until I am certain of real progress, I must reserve final judgments about the defense budget and particularly our plans for strategic nuclear forces.

We will therefore continue to seek meaningful arms agreements. But this will be possible only with sufficient and credible strength of our own and in concert with our allies. Moreover, any agreements we reach must be verifiable for our security. To put it very practically, that is, we must possess the means of making sure that they are being honored. The time has not yet come when we can entrust our hopes for peace to a piece of paper.

Thus, another essential element of any real arms limitation, whether of strategic systems or conventional forces, is our own intelligence capability. Sweeping attacks, overgeneralization, against our intelligence activities jeopardize vital functions necessary to our national security. Today's sensations must not be the prelude to tomorrow's Pearl Harbor.

I certainly do not condone improper activities or violations of the constitutional rights of Americans by any personnel or any agency of the Federal Government. On the basis of the comprehensive studies of our intelligence agencies by the Rockefeller Commission and by the Murphy Commission on the conduct of foreign policy, I will take administrative action and recommend legislation to the Congress for whatever must be done to prevent future abuses.

Intelligence in today's world is absolutely essential to our national security—even our survival. It may be even more important in peace than in war. Any reckless congressional action to cripple the effectiveness of our intelligence services in legitimate operations would be catastrophic. Our potential adversaries and even some of our best friends operate in all intelligence fields with secrecy, with skill, and with substantial resources. I know, and I know you know, that what we need is an American intelligence capacity second to none.

Restoring Assistance to Turkey

Finally—and this relates both to our vital intelligence installations and to the imperative need to strengthen key alliances such as NATO—let us now consider our relations with our friend and ally of many years, Turkey. How do you explain to a friend and an ally why arms previously ordered and paid for are not being delivered? How do you explain to your other allies the potential damage that this may cause to our NATO alliance? How do you justify to the American people the loss of strategic intelligence data,

with its attendant effect on our national security, that this action has caused?

I don't know, because I am at a loss to explain it myself. As a man of the Congress, and proudly so, for 25 years, the last thing I seek is confrontation with my friends, my former colleagues on Capitol Hill, both Democrats and Republicans.

Obviously I am troubled that the House of Representatives has refused to permit the shipment of arms to Turkey. But I respect the sincerity and the motives of those who support this position. However, I know when the bottom line of any issue is the ultimate security of the United States, which it is in this case, the Congress and the President always found a way to close ranks and to act as one.

This does not mean that one side or the other capitulates blindly. Let us put this issue on the table and once again debate it, not in a climate of fire and fury, but in a reasoned approach based on what is right and what is best for America.

I am convinced from my personal talks last month with the leaders of Greece and Turkey and Cyprus that their differences can be settled peacefully.

We can help—the Congress, the President, and the American people. We can help cool the passions that caused so much heartbreak in the Mediterranean.

The American political system is one of checks and balances. But it works best when the checks do not become roadblocks. As President, I need the cooperation and the full support of the Congress, which I know is as concerned as I am about our nation's security.

Just as important, your representatives in the Congress need to know where you stand. They have to realize that you place America's security above personal and political considerations.

This morning I am deeply honored to have had this great opportunity to meet with you here in the heartland of America and to share some of my deep concerns and some of my personal thoughts on the future of our nation.

But talk is only the starting point, and so I ask each of you, as well as this great organization, to join with me in the commitment that I have made for the reinforcement of lasting peace and the enlargement of human freedom. I ask this not only for ourselves but for our posterity and for all peoples who pray that the torch of liberty will continue to burn bright.

God helping us, freedom and peace will both prevail.

U.S. and Bahamas Fail To Agree on Spiny Lobster Fishing

Press release 443 dated August 27

The Department of State announced on August 27 that the talks between the United States and the Bahamas designed to permit U.S.-based fishermen access to the Bahamian spiny lobster resource had failed.

David H. Wallace, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the talks, said that the United States had made a number of proposals which were, in the U.S. view, reasonable and in the interests of both governments. He indicated that he was authorized to consider any proposals which the Bahamian Government might wish to advance. Regrettably, the Bahamian Government refused to advance any counterproposals, stating it did not believe it proper to advance such proposals to the United States.

Proposals advanced by the United States included joint conservation measures and cooperation in scientific research, limitations on U.S. fishing efforts, measures to insure that there would be no competition for that portion of the resource Bahamian fishermen are able to take, license fees to be paid to the Bahamas, assistance in enforcement, and especially assistance in training Bahamian fishermen, he said. These proposals were not accepted by the Bahamians, who concluded that they could not find a basis for agreement with the United States.

The talks between the U.S. and Bahamas Governments were held in Nassau from

August 13 to 27 and have been suspended for further consideration of the matter by the respective governments.

Mr. Wallace expressed regret over the outcome, noting that it will cause severe hardship for many U.S. spiny lobster fishermen. He pointed out that U.S. fishermen have engaged in fishing for spiny lobster on the Bahamas Banks for many years. He also noted that a joint U.S.-Bahamian group of scientific experts had developed a report which clearly indicated a substantial availability of lobster on the banks which could be taken by American fishermen without prejudice to the stock or the plans of the Bahamas for expansion of their fishery.

On July 9 the Bahamas declared jurisdiction over the spiny lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf. Similar action was taken by the United States in January 1974 when it declared jurisdiction over the American lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf.

Mr. Wallace further indicated that he had made the following statement to the Bahamian delegation upon instructions from Washington:

> Without questioning the validity of the Bahamian claim of jurisdiction over spiny lobster as a living resource of the continental shelf, the U.S. Government believes that the Bahamas have an obligation under international law to take into account the interests of fishermen that previously fished for spiny lobster in the area and to negotiate reasonable arrangements regarding U.S.-flag vessels to that end. We believe such arrangements would strengthen the interests of both countries in the conservation and effective utilization of the stocks and would not in any sense be incompatible with the interests or jurisdiction of the Bahamas.

Pending resolution of this issue, the United States calls on all concerned to avoid any acts or provocations that could result in violence. We call on the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to exercise restraint in this matter. For its part, the United States will enforce its laws to the fullest extent within the United States and with respect to American vessels.

The U.S. Government will continue to do everything possible to insure that transitional arrangements will be made that fairly protect the interests of our fishermen and fishing vessels as well as those of the Bahamas. Accordingly, the U.S. Government immediately intends to pursue discussions between the two governments regarding the accepted methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. In particular, we are suggesting to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas that the issue be submitted immediately to the International Court of Justice.

Department Declassifies Records for 1948 and 1949

Press release 399 dated August 4

Effective August 4, the Department of State has declassified almost all of its foreign policy records for the years 1948 and 1949. This action has been taken by special administrative decision and does not void the Department's standing regulation that provides, on a continuing basis, for the opening of records 30 years old. The present decision is based on a provision of the regulations allowing for the opening of blocks of records less than 30 years old when this is administratively feasible and consistent with the national security. Many of the most important papers in the Department's files for 1948 and 1949 have already been declassified for publication in volumes of its series "Foreign Relations of the United States" that have been released or will be released in the near future.

The bulk of the Department's records for 1948 and 1949 are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service. The central files and most of the "decentralized" files are in the National Archives building in Washington, D.C.; the Foreign Service post files are at the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Md.; and some of the

"decentralized" files are in the Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center in the Department of State.

Documents for 1948 and 1949 in these various locations may now be consulted by all researchers in accordance with the standard procedures of the National Archives. Inquiries about these documents should be addressed to the Chief of the Diplomatic Branch, Civil Archives Division, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. 20408.

President Ford Eases Restrictions on Meat Imports From Canada

A PROCLAMATION[1]

TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON THE IMPORTATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN CATTLE, SWINE AND PORK FROM CANADA

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 4335 of November 16, 1974, limiting imports into the United States of certain cattle, beef, veal, swine and pork from Canada, was issued pursuant to Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) in response to Canada's imposing unjustifiable restrictions on cattle and meat imports from the United States, said Proclamation inserting item numbers 945.01 through 945.04 into subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), and

WHEREAS, Canada has now lifted those unjustifiable restrictions on cattle imports from the United States, and

WHEREAS, Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) authorizes the President to terminate in whole or in part any proclamation made pursuant to Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), and

WHEREAS, I deem it necessary and appropriate to terminate in part the restrictions proclaimed in Proclamation No. 4335, specifically those imposing temporary quantitative limitations on the importation into the United States of certain cattle, swine and pork from Canada, in order to encourage the resolution of trade disputes between the United States and Canada,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, acting under authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, including Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) do hereby proclaim that:

1) So much of Proclamation No. 4335 as proclaimed temporary quantitative limitations on the importation into the United States of certain cattle, swine, and pork from Canada is terminated.

2) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the TSUS is amended as follows:

(a) By deleting from the superior heading immediately preceding item 945.01 the following:

(i) "the cattle, the swine,"
(ii) ", or the pork"
(iii) "cattle, swine,"
(iv) "or pork, respectively,"

(b) By deleting items 945.01, 945.02, and 945.04.

3) This Proclamation is effective with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after 12:01 a.m., EDT, August 7, 1975.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifth day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two-hundredth.

GERALD R. FORD.

[1] No. 4382, 40 *Fed. Reg.* 33425.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Agreement for the Creation of an International Office of Epizootics. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. M. 93–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–4. April 30, 1975. 7 pp.

Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 94–134. May 6, 1975. 2 pp.

International Petroleum Exhibition. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S.J. Res. 59 authorizing the President to invite the states of the Union and foreign nations to participate in the International Petroleum Exposition to be held at Tulsa, Oklahoma, from May 16, 1976, through May 22, 1976. S. Rept. 94–118. May 12, 1975. 5 pp.

Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 1661. S. Rept. 94–119. May 12, 1975. 31 pp.

Draft Convention on Environmental Warfare Tabled in Geneva Disarmament Committee

On August 21 the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Representatives to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva tabled, in parallel, identical draft texts of a Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.[1] *Following is a statement made before the conference that day by U.S. Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., together with the text of the draft convention.*

U.S. delegation press release (Geneva) dated August 21

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN

The United States today is tabling a draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. A parallel draft is being tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union. We are presenting the draft convention as a basis for consideration by all governments and for negotiation in the CCD.

Previous discussions in the U.N. General Assembly, in the series of bilateral meetings between representatives of the Soviet Union and my government, and here in this committee, have indicated clearly the serious concern felt by many states, including my own, over the potential catastrophic dangers to mankind if environmental modification techniques were to be developed as weapons of war. Comments made by the experts at our recent informal meetings on this subject underline the need to develop effective measures to control military or any other hostile use of those techniques having major adverse effects before such techniques can be developed and perfected.

In the past few weeks, various delegations have provided data on the existing state of the art in environmental modification and have hypothesized about the nature of possible future techniques. From these data we can see that, while environmental warfare is not practical on a militarily significant scale at present, understanding and technology in the field are increasing. Significant advances may be possible in the course of time. Some scientists believe, for example, that methods might be developed for intentionally and selectively effecting harmful changes in the composition of the earth's atmosphere or in its climate, or for causing floods or drought. An ambitious, incautious, or desperate state might then resort to the use of such techniques. At present there is an opportunity to prohibit such use. We should seize that opportunity.

The U.S. delegation believes that development of a generally accepted convention along the lines of the draft we are tabling today would best allow us to accomplish the objectives of the General Assembly, the CCD, and of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of July 3, 1974. At the same time it would not discourage the development of peaceful and beneficial environmental modification techniques.

The formulation of a convention imposing

[1] The draft text is the result of bilateral talks held at Moscow Nov. 1–5, 1974, at Washington Feb. 24–Mar. 5, 1975, and at Geneva June 16–20, 1975, pursuant to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of July 3, 1974.

restraints on environmental warfare presented difficult and complex problems of definition. This is the case because the development of environmental modification techniques is still at an early stage and a treaty will necessarily have to deal with future discoveries. This draft seeks to resolve such definitional problems.

The draft convention would prohibit military or any other hostile use, as a means of destruction, damage, or injury, of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The prohibition against "military or any other hostile use" covers two types of environmental warfare. First, it covers the hostile use of environmental modification techniques in armed conflict or to initiate such conflict. Second, it covers the use of such techniques for the specific purpose of causing destruction, damage, or injury, even when no other weapons are used or there is no other military operation taking place. We believe this draft provides a basis for distinguishing between the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons, which is covered by the prohibition, and the environmental impact of other weapons, which is not covered.

The draft deals with environmental modification techniques whose use would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. This is in order to focus on the most important aspects of the problem—potential applications of such techniques as weapons which could cause the gravest harm to man and his environment.

An important consideration in this regard is that in any limitation on the hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, the attainable degree of verification of compliance with treaty constraints obviously is related to the scale of activity. Accordingly, the possibilities for verification decrease as the size, duration, or severity of the activity diminishes.

Included in the proposed convention is an illustrative list of effects of environmental modification techniques subject to prohibition. The list includes earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; or changes in weather patterns, the state of the ozone layer, climate patterns, or ocean currents.

The draft does not include a ban on military research or development. Such a ban would be ineffective in view of the dual applicability to civilian and military ends of much research and development in this field and the difficulties which could be encountered in determining whether all parties were observing the prohibition.

Mr. Chairman, let me now comment on specific portions of the draft convention itself.

The preamble briefly explains the problems the convention is designed to address and provides a framework for the specific obligations which follow. The second paragraph expresses the point that advances of science and technology are giving rise to the possibility that deliberate actions can release significant natural forces or significantly alter the natural state, thus giving man the potential of modifying the environment to his own ends. The third paragraph highlights the essential difference between the great harm which military uses of environmental modification techniques might produce and possible benefits which peaceful uses might bring. The fourth paragraph reflects the commitment to limit the potential danger to mankind from such military activities. The fifth places the agreement in the context of the goals and objectives of the international community.

Articles I and II taken together form the operative substance of the convention. They are closely interdependent. Article I contains the basic obligation not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another state party. It also provides for an obligation not to assist, encourage, or induce any other state, group of states, or international organization to engage in such use.

Article II provides a definition of environmental modification techniques. This term refers to techniques designed to manipulate deliberately the natural processes of the earth, its oceans and atmosphere, or of outer space. The article is, therefore, comprehensive in its coverage of the natural environment. Article II also provides an illustrative list of effects which serves to define the type of phenomena to which the prohibition applies.

Article III makes it clear that the treaty does not apply to the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and that it does not stand in the way of international cooperation in this regard.

Article IV provides for the legal implementation of the convention within individual states party, wherever needed for domestic reasons.

Article V deals with problems that might arise in applying the convention's provisions. The article sets forth the basic undertaking for consultation and cooperation among the parties and a procedure for submitting complaints to the U.N. Security Council in the event a party believes that there has been a breach of obligation.

Articles VI through IX set out provisions covering such matters as amendments, duration, and entry into force. The draft contains blanks in articles VI, VIII, and IX where the convention's depositary or depositaries remain to be identified. In addition, paragraph 2 of article VI leaves open the number of instruments of acceptance of an amendment required for its entry into force for those governments that have accepted it, while paragraph 3 of article VIII leaves open the number of ratifications required to bring the convention into force. Article VII provides that the convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Mr. Chairman, in tabling this draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the United States believes that it can serve as the basis for the CCD's further consideration of the subject. We look forward to hearing views of other delegations on the proposal and hope that our deliberations will lead to early agreement.

TEXT OF DRAFT CONVENTION

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES

The States Party to this Convention,

Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of limiting the arms race, and of bringing about disarmament, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare;

Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities with respect to modification of the environment;

Realizing that military use of environmental modification techniques could have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects harmful to human welfare, but that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations;

Desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from means of warfare involving the use of environmental modification techniques;

Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of trust among nations and to the further improvement of the international situation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provision of paragraph 1 of this article.

ARTICLE II

As used in Article I, the term "environmental modification techniques" refers to any technique for

changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space, so as to cause such effects as earthquakes and tsunamis, an upset in the ecological balance of a region, or changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms), in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, in climate patterns, or in ocean currents.

ARTICLE III

The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes by States Party, or international economic and scientific cooperation in the utilization, preservation and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE V

1. The States Party to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of this Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

2. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Party to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

ARTICLE VI

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to ———— which shall circulate it to all States Party.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Party which have accepted it, upon the deposit with ———— of instruments of acceptance by ————. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instruments of acceptance.

ARTICLE VII

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with ————.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by ———— in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The ———— shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by ———— in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IX

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with ———— who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done in ———— on ————.

U.S. Vetoes U.N. Admission of North and South Viet-Nam

The U.N. Security Council had before it on August 6 a provisional agenda which included applications for U.N. membership from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Republic of Korea; the Council voted to include the Vietnamese applications on the agenda but rejected the application of the Republic of Korea. As a result, on August 11 the United States voted against the Vietnamese applications for membership. Following are statements made in the Council on August 6 and August 11 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan.[1]

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

Statement of August 6

USUN press release 82 dated August 6

We are at the end of another day in a dubious time in the history of the United Nations. The Security Council has had before it the simplest of matters. We have been asked to carry forward our duty under the charter to consider the admission of new members. The applications of these nations were before us. The United States was of course prepared to vote for the consideration of each of these three nations. The essential thrust of the charter toward universality required nothing less of us. Verily, it is a duty of a Security Council member to insure that the application of any entity bearing any resemblance to statehood—the application for admission to the United Nations—be referred to the Admissions Committee. It is the role of the Admissions Committee to consider whether the applicant in fact meets the requirements of the charter for membership.

Today we have had before us three applicants. The United States had been prepared to see each considered by the Admissions Committee, and as the United States has made clear, we have been prepared to vote for the admission of each and all of these applicants. We were prepared to see each of them admitted if all were admitted. Clearly, the Security Council action forecloses this opportunity for the 30th General Assembly, and we can only regret it.

Statement of August 11

USUN press release 83 dated August 11

The United States today has, for the first time, vetoed the admission of a new member to the United Nations. The veto was repeated a second time. This is an action my country hoped it would never take. As far back as 1948, in a resolution sponsored by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who had served as a U.S. delegate to the first General Assembly, the U.S. Senate specially called on our executive to forswear our use of the veto in all questions involving the admission of new members. In 1949 the executive branch undertook to do just that. And so it is no small matter for us that we have felt forced to break with our practice of 30 years. The American people, and possibly peoples and governments elsewhere, will desire an explanation.

This is not difficult to provide. If our specific actions today are at variance with 30 years' practice, we nonetheless continue to act in support of the same principle, that of universal membership in the United Nations. What has changed is our judgment that if the United States acts in an open and accepting manner as applications for membership come before us, other members of the Security Council might do so as well. I be-

[1] The Council on August 6 approved the inclusion on the agenda of the Vietnamese applications by votes of 14 to 0, with the United States abstaining; the vote on the inclusion of the South Korean application was 7 (U.S.) in favor, 6 against, with 2 abstentions. On August 11 the Council voted on the draft resolutions to admit South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam; the votes were 13 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica).

lieve it is fair to say that we did not change this judgment precipitously. In truth, an impartial observer might wonder that our practice persisted through a quarter century of vetoes by others.

What in the end changed our mind was the decisions of the Council taken at its 1834th meeting on August 6, 1975. It became absolutely clear on that occasion that the Security Council, far from being prepared to support the principle of universal membership, was denying to one applicant even the right to have its case considered. Never before has the Council gone so far as to refuse even to consider the application of an entity so widely regarded as a state as to have been accepted as a member of numerous specialized agencies, and also, on four separate occasions in the past, to have been proposed for membership by a clear majority of this same Security Council.

It may be recalled what I said, speaking for my government, on August 6. I said that the United States had made clear that we were prepared to vote for the admission of each and all of the three applicants then before us, which is to say the United States would have voted for the admission of the Republic of South Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam. And I would like to take this occasion to welcome the representatives of those countries to this Council chamber.

Earlier that day a State Department spokesman had indicated that the United States would be equally willing to vote for the admission of North Korea as well. We would have done so in plain pursuit of the principle of universality. But the State Department spokesman said then, and I repeat now, that we would have and we will have nothing to do with selective universality, a principle which in practice admits only new members acceptable to the totalitarian states. I said on August 6 that the action of the Security Council that day foreclosed the admission of these new applicants for the coming General Assembly.

We clearly stated that we were prepared to act in favor of the admission of all three states were the Council prepared to adhere to the principle of universality. The Council was not so prepared; indeed, the principle of universality seems gravely imperiled by what took place here on August 6.

The United Nations should be as near as possible to universal in membership. As new nations are formed, they should be seen as having a presumed right to membership, given their fealty to the charter. It is just that principle that has brought us from an original membership of 51 to the present membership of 138. It is just that principle which will take us still higher, for there are more than half a dozen new nations waiting in the wings. But we must not apply partisan political tests to membership. The United Nations cannot work if we do. It is because the United States desires that it should work that we have today made the hard decision to break with our practice of 30 years and block the membership of two nations whose sponsors have refused to act equitably toward the application of another nation.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, August 18, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.[1]
Notifications of consent to be bound: Denmark, June 19, 1975; Ireland, July 28, 1975; Luxembourg, April 24, 1975.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as amended.

[1] Not in force.

Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Grenada, August 27, 1975.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Grenada, August 27, 1975.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.
Accession deposited: Tonga, August 14, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.
Notification of succession: The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague on January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at Geneva on February 11, 1925 and February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bangkok on November 27, 1931 and at Geneva on June 26, 1936. Done at Lake Success, New York December 11, 1946. TIAS 1671, 1859.
Notification of succession: The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.
Notification of succession: The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Notification of succession: The Bahamas, August 13, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, August 28, 1975.
Enters into force: September 27, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.[1]
Ratification deposited: Algeria, June 2, 1975.

[1] Not in force.

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
Extended to: Papua New Guinea, August 4, 1975.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes and statement. Signed at Washington July 3, 1975. Enters into force when the United States notifies Chile in writing that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling have been complied with.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Agreement amending the grant agreement of February 20, March 16 and 17, 1975, as amended (TIAS 8032), concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva April 18 and 24, 1975. Entered into force April 24, 1975.

Portugal

Agreement terminating the agreement of November 17, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles and providing for consultations on problems of market disruption from exports of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products from Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 20, 1975. Entered into force August 20, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Near East, South Asia, and Africa

Press release 403 dated August 6 (for release August 13)

The Department of State released on August 13 "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948, volume V, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," part 1. This volume is the latest in the "Foreign Relations" series, which has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. Seven other volumes for 1948 and five for 1949 have already been released.

Part 1 of the present volume contains 532 pages and presents previously unpublished documentation

on U.S. participation in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East; the aftermath of the "Pentagon Talks of 1947" between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean; and U.S. relations with and assistance to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Part 1 also includes documentation on U.S. participation in efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and Hyderabad and on relations with India, Afghanistan, and the Union of South Africa.

Part 2 of this volume is now in preparation and will be published subsequently. It will contain documentation on the interest of the United States in the Arab-Zionist controversy over the future status of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel.

The part of the volume now released was prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume V, part 1, for 1948 (listed as Department of State publication 8802; GPO cat. no. S1.1:948/v. V, pt. 1.) may be obtained for $8.25 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Fiji	Cat. No.	S1.123:F47
	Pub. 8486	4 pp.
Guatemala	Cat. No.	S1.123:G93
	Pub. 7798	5 pp.
Hungary	Cat. No.	S1.123:H89
	Pub. 7915	7 pp.

International Wheat Agreement, 1971—Modification and Extension of Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention. Protocols with other governments. TIAS 7988. 62 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7988).

Double Taxation—Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 8002. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8002).

Cultural Relations. Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8006. 10 pp. 30¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8006).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Nicaragua terminating the agreement of September 5, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8007. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8007).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Khmer Republic. TIAS 8008. 32 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8008).

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. Agreement with Singapore amending the agreement of October 30, 1973 and January 20, 1974. TIAS 8009. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8009).

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 25–31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*434	8/25	Study Group 2 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Sept. 25.
†435	8/25	Kissinger: comments to the press, Jerusalem, Aug. 24.
†436	8/25	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
†437	8/25	Kissinger, Sadat: news conference, Alexandria.
†438	8/25	Kissinger, Allon: comments to the press, Jerusalem.
†439	8/25	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
*440	8/26	U.S. Advisory Committee of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Sept. 18.
†441	8/26	Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 1974, released.
†442	8/26	Kissinger, Allon: comments to the press, Jerusalem.
443	8/27	U.S.-Bahamas spiny lobster talks.
†444	8/28	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem, Aug. 27.
†445	8/28	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem, Aug. 27.
†446	8/29	Kissinger: remarks to the press, Jerusalem, Aug. 28.
†447	8/29	Kissinger, Sadat: remarks to the press, Alexandria, Aug. 28.
†448	8/29	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem.
†449	8/29	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†451	8/30	Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jerusalem.
*452	8/29	731 Fulbright-Hays scholarship winners named.
†453	8/31	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.
†454	8/31	Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index