



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIII • No. 1883 • July 28, 1975

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975

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1975

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1883

July 28, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Military Assistance and Sales to Turkey

Following are texts of a letter dated July 9 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and a statement by Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, made before the House Committee on International Relations on July 10.¹

TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE ²

JULY 9, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I wish to share with you my concern about a complex foreign policy problem that relates to the deteriorating situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the threat to our North Atlantic Alliance relationships, the plight of the people of Cyprus and the role of the United States. Both the Congress and the Executive Branch share a responsibility to reexamine this critical situation with care. This is not a partisan matter or one where the rights and wrongs of a decades-old dispute can easily be judged—particularly by outsiders. Our overriding objective must be to help in the peaceful settlement of a problem that involves two valued Allies and a people whose history as an independent nation has been riven by strife.

The strategic situation must also be weighed. At a time of uncertainty in the Middle East, we should consider carefully any action which could add to the tensions that already exist. Our facilities in Turkey and our mutual defense arrangements have

played and continue to play a vital role in the security of the area and, more directly, in the security of our own forces. Mutual defense links that have stood us well for thirty years should not be lightly cast aside.

I have spent much time studying these issues and have talked in Brussels with the leaders of Turkey and Greece. I am convinced that U.S. and Western security interests require the urgent passage by the House of legislation enabling the resumption of our long-standing security relationship with Turkey. The Senate has already acted favorably on a bill to accomplish this purpose.

Existing legislation passed by Congress last December 18, with an effective date of February 5, 1975, has been in force for nearly five months. This action has: (1) called into question the ability of an Ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities, thus undermining NATO's strength in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) jeopardized vital common defense installations which Turkey and the U.S. jointly maintain; (3) contributed to tensions which are not helpful to Greece; and (4) reduced American influence to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion acceptable to all parties.

The legislation voted against Turkey last December is sweeping in its effect. It is more extensive than similar legislation enacted in October, 1974, with which the Administration was in full compliance. The December legislation provides for not only a total embargo on grant military assistance, and cash and credit sales of defense items by the U.S. Government, but prohibits as well the issuance of licenses to permit the export of military equipment purchased from American firms. Practically all nations of the world can purchase in this country at least some

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, July 9, p. H 6473.

items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now impossible for Turkey to procure most items produced in third countries under U.S. license; nor can Turkey even take possession of merchandise in the U.S. which it paid for prior to February 5 and which is now ready for shipment. The result is that a relationship of trust and confidence with this important NATO Ally, built up over many years, has been seriously eroded. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration, jeopardizing our security interests throughout the Eastern Mediterranean area.

For all these reasons, it is my strong view that the Administration and the Congress must join in legislative action that will remedy the present situation. The form that legislation should take to achieve this end is for Congress itself to decide, but it is clear that only legislation can produce the actions which are necessary in this case.

I know that in the minds of many in the Congress there remains the issue of how American-supplied arms were used last summer. The Cyprus problem is one where neither moral nor legal judgments, on the arms issue or any other, can be easily or lightly made. Yet, the effect of the embargo is to ascribe blame totally to one of the parties in a dispute that has its roots in centuries of animosity and for which both sides must share some responsibility.

Where we can all agree, and where I believe we must all act together, is in our sense of anxiety and concern over the Cyprus problem and in a consensus that the only way to achieve what we all seek—a just and broadly acceptable settlement—is through negotiations in which we maintain maximum flexibility with all the parties. Unless some progress is made in the negotiations, the humanitarian plight facing the people of Cyprus, including particularly the refugee problem, cannot be solved.

The United States will continue to work, as it has done continuously since last July, as hard and as determinedly as possible to move the parties of the Cyprus conflict toward a negotiated settlement. Recent U.S. diplomatic activity in Ankara, Athens and Brussels has contributed to the start of a Greek-

Turkish dialogue which has defused the tense situation and hopefully laid the groundwork for Greek-Turkish cooperation.

As we pursue our efforts, we want the continued friendship of both Greece and Turkey, and our sympathy and concern extend to all the people of Cyprus. We want an end to human suffering and misery, and the rebuilding of an island where all can live in freedom and security.

At present, our ability to urge this view persuasively is compromised by the erosion of our influence. I ask the Congress' cooperation and assistance, therefore, in enacting legislation which will assure that America's influence is not further weakened and U.S. interests further threatened at this time of critical concern in Cyprus and throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY SISCO

Press release 361 dated July 10

Mr. Chairman [Representative Thomas E. Morgan] and members of the committee: I come before you today to enlist your support in preserving our vital security relationship with our NATO ally Turkey and in strengthening our close ties with an equally important NATO ally, Greece. You have already seen the message from the President in which he explained his concern about the deteriorating situation in the eastern Mediterranean, the threat to our military facilities in Turkey, and the plight of the peoples of Cyprus.

As the President emphasized in his message, prohibiting military assistance and sales to Turkey has had damaging effects in four areas: (1) It has weakened the ability of our Turkish ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities, thereby further debilitating the southern flank of NATO; (2) it has jeopardized common defense installations which Turkey and the United States jointly maintain and which serve vital interests of the United States and NATO; (3) it has contributed to ten-

sions which are not helpful to any of the parties, including Greece; and (4) it has severely reduced American influence to move the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful settlement acceptable to all parties.

Throughout the world, we face changing relationships with a number of our friends and allies. The reasons for these changes are complex, and in some cases where they adversely affect our interests, there is little we ourselves can do to reverse them. In the case of Turkey, however, something can be done. And in our judgment, it must be done quickly.

We maintain alliances and provide military supplies—both sales and assistance—to a variety of friends around the world not as a favor to a particular country or as a unilateral gesture of good will but because we believe such relationships are in the mutual interests of both the United States and our partners. That has been the case for almost 30 years, through successive American Administrations, in our alliance relationship with Turkey.

We are deeply interested—and I want to put particular stress on this—in improving our relations with Greece. Greece is a country whose security and prosperity are of particular and longstanding importance to the United States. We can look back with pride and a sense of achievement at what the Greek people have accomplished with our help since World War II. When we began our economic and military aid to the Greeks in 1947, Greece was in the grip of a cruel and ruinous civil war. We worked with the Greeks to restore that country's economy and to shore up its security. We are as devoted as ever to the well-being of the Greek people. We are gratified that the Greek people have a democratic government.

As you know, we are already providing cash and credit military sales to Greece in response to specific requests from the Greek Government. We are also examining sympathetically requests for economic assistance as well. Moreover, we plan to continue to work closely with the Greek Government with a view to helping in every meaningful way we can in the reconciliation of outstand-

ing differences between Greece and Turkey not only regarding Cyprus but also with respect to issues in dispute between them in the Aegean. It is for all these reasons that we welcome the expressions of continued support for Greece contained in H.R. 8454, which was introduced yesterday by Chairman Morgan and other members of the committee.

Lifting of Ban on Arms Shipments to Turkey

The Administration is committed to working together with the Congress on this vital issue. Our relationship to our Greek and Turkish allies is not a partisan matter. It is one which requires common understanding and cooperation between us.

As you know, the Administration has requested and the Senate has adopted the Scott-Mansfield bill which would restore grant assistance as well as cash and credit sales to Turkey. This remains the legislative action preferred by the Administration. However, as the President said yesterday, and reflecting the dialogue and cooperation we seek with the Congress on this issue, we are prepared to accept the compromise legislation (H.R. 8454) now before you.

Let me now deal directly with the main arguments against a restoration of sales and assistance to Turkey we have heard from some members of Congress and from concerned Americans.

First there is the assertion that Turkey, during the crisis of last year, violated the agreement required under our law by using U.S.-provided equipment in ways not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act. We understand and respect this point of view. At the same time I have also heard the view expressed that the Congress should not now remove the ban it has enacted against arms shipments to Turkey because otherwise it will appear to approve, or at least condone, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

This is not the case. The prohibition against arms shipments to Turkey has now been in effect for more than five months. It has demonstrated to Turkey the strong feelings of many in this country over the mili-

tary action taken by Turkey last year. This period of time has also afforded both the executive branch and the Congress an opportunity to assess the probable consequences of continuation of the present prohibition on arms shipments. A lifting of the prohibition at this time based upon considerations of what is in the best interests of the United States cannot be construed as an endorsement of Turkey's military action last summer. Congress has made this point absolutely clear by adopting the embargo legislation.

Action by Congress to rectify the situation, rather than condone the Turkish action, would remove the impairment to our ability to promote an early negotiated settlement on Cyprus, to maintain good bilateral relations with both Greece and Turkey, to restore the solidarity of NATO, and to preserve important U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. I can assure the Congress that the executive branch will not represent action rectifying the present situation as condoning Turkish military action.

U.S. Efforts Toward Cyprus Settlement

Moreover, with regard to Cyprus, the situation is not one where there is a monopoly of right or wrong on either side. There is a long history of deep divisions between the ethnic communities on Cyprus and of resulting international tensions. Efforts have been made to devise ways to protect the interests of the two population groups under a system of government that would allow Cyprus to function as an independent nation. However, the 1960 Constitution and treaty of guarantee failed to resolve the mistrust and animosity existing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Twice before the crisis of last summer, Turkey had been on the brink of military intervention because of repressive acts against the Turkish minority. When the Greek junta suddenly intervened last year and overthrew the government of Archbishop Makarios, replacing it with one led by Nicos Sampson, a foremost exponent of terror tactics and *enosis* with Greece, Tur-

key became alarmed and fearful of the consequences for the Turkish Cypriots. This act started the unfortunate chain of events we have seen this past year in the eastern Mediterranean.

There are also some who say we have not worked hard enough or imaginatively enough since last summer in trying to bring about a Cyprus settlement. I think a brief look at the record will demonstrate that this allegation is false.

In the first instance, vigorous efforts were made by the United States to find a way to avoid military intervention in Cyprus. Once it became clear that the guarantor powers could not agree on restoring the *status quo ante*, there was unfortunately no way that armed intervention by Turkey could have been prevented short of active military intervention by the United States—a course which would not have been approved by the American people.

Since those tragic events, the Administration has been continuously and intensely involved in encouraging and assisting the parties to find a solution to the Cyprus problem which would restore both peace on the island and harmony in relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Our task has obviously not been easy. In the weeks and early months after the hostilities, the suspicions and passions were so deep that it was impossible at times even to bring the parties to the negotiating table—not to speak of producing progress toward a solution of the problem.

There have been other factors, extraneous to Cyprus, particularly political uncertainty in Turkey, which have impeded progress. We had reason to expect last fall that the Egevit government would undertake important gestures relating to Turkish troop reductions, troop pullbacks, and Greek Cypriot refugees which would have improved the negotiating atmosphere and the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. But the Turkish Government fell at that time, thereby ending our hopes for early progress. Turkey then entered a long period of political stalemate under a caretaker government, and it was only recently that a political government

under Prime Minister Demirel was established, with only a narrow majority in the Turkish National Assembly.

Nevertheless, throughout this period we continued our efforts with Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot leaders to create the groundwork for the negotiation of a Cyprus settlement. As a consequence of Secretary Kissinger's meetings in Brussels in December with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, intercommunal talks were resumed in January. The strategy throughout was, and is, to encourage and support the negotiating process. We have repeatedly made clear to all the parties that the ultimate solution should include agreement on constitutional arrangements along federal lines, territorial concessions, and an easing of the refugee situation. We have also expressed our view that Cyprus must remain a sovereign and independent state.

This spring, Secretary Kissinger made two special trips to Ankara to reinforce our efforts to find a solution and also to express our concern over the deteriorating situation in the Aegean area. These talks were later followed by meetings in Brussels between President Ford and Prime Ministers Caramanlis [of Greece] and Demirel.

It was partly as a result of our diplomatic efforts that a direct Greek-Turkish dialogue has been established. This dialogue can help to defuse the tense situation in the Aegean and should help to maintain a positive climate within which Turkey and Greece can continue efforts to help achieve a Cyprus settlement. Meanwhile, we have continued actively to support the intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots which began under the auspices of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim in May and which will be reconvened in Vienna later this month.

In our judgment, however, our role in promoting either these talks or the Greek-Turkish dialogue is seriously circumscribed as long as we maintain a policy of total denial of U.S. military equipment to Turkey. We can understand the reasons which led the Congress to impose this ban and the view that Turkey had violated agreements with

the United States when it used U.S. military equipment without our permission to conduct its military operations in Cyprus last summer. We believe, however, that it is clearly not in the U.S. national interest to maintain an embargo that weakens our influence, jeopardizes our NATO defenses by depriving our Turkish ally of the military equipment it needs to discharge its alliance responsibilities, and impedes progress in the Cyprus negotiations.

Other Questions of Concern

I have dealt at length with these matters because I believe they are central to your concerns. But there are other questions which have been raised which deserve direct answers.

There are those who argue that lifting the Turkish embargo could be construed as an anti-Greek move. It seems to me that this is an argument based on a false premise. The maintenance of an alliance relationship with Turkey, now more than a generation old, is certainly not directed against Greece. Greece has a vital stake in having Turkey a part of the Western alliance system, and in the last analysis, stability in the eastern Mediterranean is largely dependent upon the cooperation of our two close allies Greece and Turkey.

Some have also asked why the Turks could not do something—make concessions, pledge secretly to make concessions at some later date, or make some gesture in the humanitarian field before the Congress itself undertakes new legislative action. Simple answers to these questions do not exist. The Turkish Government has made clear that it cannot and will not make advance concessions, which would be considered by the Turkish people to be capitulation to outside pressure. It is our judgment that pressure for prior concessions relating to the embargo will only further harden the Turkish stance, both on Cyprus and with respect to facilities in Turkey.

The question has been asked whether once the House passes legislation the Turks will in fact then be ready to be more conciliatory

at the negotiating table. Frankly, I cannot give you categorical assurances. Flexibility, of course, will be required on both sides.

Both the President and the Secretary of State are determined to use U.S. influence in bringing about constructive results, because our interests, those of the parties, and of NATO require no less than a maximum effort. Failure on the part of Turkey to adopt a flexible and constructive position in the aftermath of the lifting of the embargo would go to the heart of the American-Turkish relationship.

Finally, let me also say a word about the opium issue, which is a matter of deep concern to all Americans. In July of last year the Turks did, indeed, lift their total ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy. But the government also announced its intention of meeting its obligation to the world community to prevent the poppy harvest in Turkey from being diverted into illicit channels.

Since then Turkey has outlawed completely the hard-to-control "bleeding" of the poppies by the farmers in the field. It has put into effect measures to enforce this ban. Farmers, under the law, have to sell their poppy straw to the government at a fixed price, which is backed by a U.N. standby compensation fund. The objective, through the combination of a government price high enough to make sales to the government attractive and a strengthened control mechanism, is to try to keep the product of the opium poppy in government hands and out of the illegal market.

The first harvest under this new procedure is now underway. Preliminary reports on the harvesting and control process are good. Both U.S. and U.N. personnel are watching this matter very closely. We believe the Turkish Government is heavily committed to making the system work.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, before taking the committee's questions, I would like to repeat that the Administration solicits the bipartisan understanding, support, and cooperation of the Congress in helping to ameliorate a serious foreign policy problem of many dimensions and great complexity.

We seek to preserve our friendship and

vital alliance relationships with both Greece and Turkey. At the same time, we earnestly seek a negotiated and durable Cyprus solution which would restore tranquillity to that troubled island and, by enabling Greece and Turkey to put the Cyprus problem behind them, resolve other outstanding issues and restore stability to their region.

We hope the Congress will act speedily on the compromise bill submitted yesterday.

President Ford Outlines U.S. Goals in the United Nations

Following is an excerpt from remarks made by President Ford on June 30 at the swearing-in ceremony for Daniel P. Moynihan as U.S. Representative to the United Nations.¹

The United States was the chief architect of the United Nations. We joined with others during the dreadful suffering of World War II to conceive an organization for peace and to serve all mankind.

We have been determined supporters of the United Nations, and we will continue to be so in the future. There is no other course, as I see it, consistent with our advocacy of peace and justice for all humanity.

As the need for worldwide cooperation developed, so did the inherent difficulty in finding practical solutions which must advance the enlightened self-interest of the United States as well as the interests of others.

We face not only the fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security but also entirely new problems for world economic interdependence.

We must deal with new political problems as developing nations press forward vigorously to correct what they see as injustices. In this developing situation, we will concentrate on practical and mutually beneficial

¹ For the complete text of President Ford's remarks and Ambassador Moynihan's reply, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 7, p. 693.

projects and we will strive for universal cooperation.

We will engage at the United Nations in a dialogue of candor and directness and of understanding and respect for the concerns of all member nations. We will seek concrete achievement. We will work with firmness and with patience in a determined effort to foster mutually beneficial relations with the developing world.

At the same time, we will firmly resist efforts by any group of countries to exploit the machinery of the United Nations for narrow political interests or for parliamentary manipulation.

Ambassador Moynihhan takes on this very serious responsibility at a time when a vast and vital agenda is before the world—the realization of agreed goals in the area of food and population, the resolution of international conflicts, the strengthening of peacekeeping forces, and a new law of the sea treaty, and, of course, economic prosperity for all.

President Suharto of Indonesia Meets With President Ford

General Suharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia, met with President Ford and other government officials at Camp David, Md., on July 5. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and President Suharto at a luncheon at Camp David that day.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 14

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. President: I am greatly honored to have the opportunity of welcoming you on your visit to the United States as a part of your world tour.

You visited the United States last, as I understand it, in 1970, and we all recognize, of course, that through the years you have been a very wise and valued friend of the United States.

I recognize, as all of us do here from the United States, that you have achieved a great deal for your country in the period during your Presidency. The Indonesian people, we recognize, have developed a solid foundation to deal with your nation's very complex challenges and the very difficult road, but in the process of development great progress has been made.

Admiring you, President Suharto, and your country as I do, I have wanted to meet with you and discuss with you the many issues that concern both of our nations. And I have found today in our discussions that your observations concerning Southeast Asia and the Pacific have been extremely meaningful and very constructive. I hope that this exchange of views will be mutually beneficial to both countries as we face our problems in the years ahead.

We do attach, in the United States, a great deal of importance to our relations with you. You have been a source of strength in Southeast Asia and in Asia as a whole, and we respect you for this part that you have played in the area as well as the leadership that you have given to your own country in the process of development in the last five to ten years.

We look forward to the opportunity of working with you in the future. The fact that we had a recent tragedy in Indochina actually should redouble, and does, our interest in the stability of Southeast Asia. Your assessment there, as I indicated, is most helpful to us as we plan and look to the future.

Let me say that the American people have great respect for your people, as we do for you and those in your government. I was delighted this morning to reaffirm our nation's solid support for Indonesia's development efforts, and we look forward to working with you in economic matters and the strengthening of your country in its major role in Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, in the months and years ahead, it seems to me that your country can provide continuing leadership in that part of the world, working with other nations that have a like philosophical—ideological—

view. Let me assure you that we will be most anxious to work with you and those other nations.

Today has been most enjoyable, most pleasant, and I think most constructive. I hope that you will return to the United States very soon and for a much longer and more extended visit to the United States.

It is a pleasure for me to ask all of you to raise your glasses to the good health and sustained success of the leader of Indonesia—His Excellency President Suharto.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO ¹

Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished guests: May I first of all convey our highest appreciation and heartfelt thanks on behalf of my wife as well as my delegation for the opportunity given me to accept the kind invitation of you, Mr. President, to be here in the United States, and may I also, on behalf of—the Indonesian people and Government convey their profound gratitude for this opportunity provided us.

As part of the nature of this very short visit—I'd say only for several hours—but I would like very much to take this valuable opportunity, an opportunity which is very valuable for us, to enable us to be able to conduct exchanges of views in our common efforts and in the discharge of my duty to further strengthen these relations and friendly cooperation between the United States and Indonesia and also to have the opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. President, and conduct exchanges, open and frank exchanges of views, relating not only to bilateral relations and problems concerning our two countries but also on the international situations as well.

I believe entirely—and I am also fully confident—of the sincerity of the U.S. Government, Mr. President, for the pledge and the assistance that the U.S. Government will

provide not only to Indonesia but also to other Southeast Asian countries, but particularly to Indonesia, an Indonesia which is presently busily engaged in carrying out economic development efforts to create or to establish a just and prosperous society, a just and prosperous society which calls for its development, of course, for a lending helping hand from other able countries who are really able to assist and help us in our development efforts.

In view of the fast-changing developments which have happened recently in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Indochinese Peninsula, Mr. President, we are now striving very hard to consolidate what we call the national resilience and also to strengthen our national ideology, a national ideology which is based on our own principles, national ideology which should be strengthened in the effort of the development efforts—we would like very much to accelerate that effort—the national ideology which should be strengthened in a way that the confidence of the people in this ideology will be such that this will not corrode and the confidence will bolster the unity of the nation, national ideology which becomes the most important aspect of our national resilience to enable us to face any eventualities which could endanger our independence and territorial integrity in the future.

May I also, on this occasion, once again reiterate our heartfelt thanks and gratitude for the pledge and the assistance and support that the United States has so far provided and will continue to support in this respect and gain our heartfelt appreciation.

In our common efforts of furthering or enhancing the friendly cooperation between the two countries, I see the great importance of having this reciprocal visit, a mutual visit by the heads of government.

And in this spirit, Mr. President, I would kindly invite Your Excellency to visit Indonesia and see for yourself, be the witness of what is going on in Indonesia and what are really the efforts of the Indonesian people

¹ President Suharto spoke in Indonesian.

and Government at the present state of our economic development.

May I, in conclusion, Mr. President, invite kindly Your Excellencies and distinguished guests to raise your glasses and join me in a toast to the health and happiness of His Excellency the President of the United States.

AID Makes \$114 Million Loans To Assist Egyptian Economy

AID press release 64 dated July 1

Two loans to Egypt totaling \$114,275,000 are being made by the Agency for International Development to assist that country to expand existing industrial enterprises and to increase agricultural production as well as to modernize port facilities for grain handling.

A loan of \$70 million to finance imports from the United States of agricultural and industrial machinery, equipment, and spare parts and other essential commodities will assist Egypt to more fully utilize existing industrial capacity and to insure availability of agricultural inputs essential to increase agricultural production.

A loan of \$44,275,000 will finance the foreign exchange costs of goods and services required in the design and construction of two grain silo facilities at Alexandria and Cairo and ship-unloading equipment at Alexandria.

These loans will bring the total of U.S. official assistance to Egypt during the fiscal year 1975 to \$250 million.

The \$70 million commodity imports loan will be the second such loan Egypt received in FY75. In February 1975 the United States and Egypt executed a \$80 million commodity imports loan agreement for the financing of goods from the United States.

AID anticipates these loans will enable U.S. suppliers and exporters to reestablish old trade relationships and to create new ones for industrial raw materials and ma-

chinery and commodities essential for increased agricultural production. Egypt will repay these loans in dollars in 40 years after the first disbursement, including a 10-year grace period. Interest during the grace period will be 2 percent and thereafter 3 percent annually.

The grain silo loan of \$44,275,000 will help finance a \$84,075,000 modernization program the Egyptian Government is undertaking to speed handling of grain imports and provide greater and more efficient storage facilities to replace those now used. Egypt currently imports approximately 75 percent of its food grain needs, with grain imports expected to reach 4.5 million tons by 1980 compared to 3.5 million tons in 1974.

The modernization project consists of the construction of a 100,000-ton silo at Alexandria port together with new 1,000-ton-per-hour pneumatic ship-unloading equipment which transports bulk grain directly to the silo for short-term storage, also a 100,000-ton silo facility at Cairo for storage and redistribution. The ultimate benefits are expected to be reduced costs of bread and other grain products.

This loan will be repaid in dollars over 40 years, also including a grace period of 10 years. The interest rate during the grace period will be 2 percent and 3 percent thereafter.

AID assistance programs to Egypt during FY75 were:

| | |
|--|---------------|
| Suez Canal clearance | \$ 14 million |
| Technology transfer & manpower development | 1 million |
| Feasibility studies | 1 million |
| Electric distribution system (Suez).... | 30 million |
| Heavy equipment | 10 million |
| Grain storage | 44 million |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 100 million |
| Basic import & production loan (I) | 80 million |
| Basic import & production loan (II) | 70 million |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 150 million |
| Total FY75 Assistance | \$250 million |

Department Urges Congressional Approval of Trade Agreement With Romania

*Statement by Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to testify on behalf of the trade agreement that we have negotiated with Romania.²

This agreement is a major step forward in our relations with Romania. It places our bilateral trade on a basis beneficial to the economic interests of both countries. Further, it brings our commercial relations into accord with our very satisfactory political ties.

Improvement of U.S.-Romanian relations serves the foreign policy interests of both countries. The dominant theme of Romania's foreign policy is the desire to maintain a high degree of independence. More than any other Eastern European country, Romania has pursued friendly relations with countries of differing political and economic systems—with the United States, the People's Republic of China, the developing world, and with Israel as well as Arab countries. Romania participates actively in a number of international organizations. It is the only COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic Assistance] country which is a member of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank. Romania has acceded to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. It leads the COMECON countries in the proportion of its trade with the West.

We wish to encourage Romania's independent policy orientation through the expansion and improvement of bilateral relations. We believe this approach also furthers our policy of détente as we seek to develop a pattern of interacting interests and political restraint in our relations with the Communist world. Accordingly, in recent years there have been visits by the heads of state of the two countries, and various steps have been taken to develop cultural, scientific, and economic ties.

Measures to improve economic relations include extension of credits and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank for our exports and making guarantees of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation available to American private investment there. These facilities were withdrawn as required under section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974; but they will be fully restored, as permitted under the President's Executive order of April 24, when congressional approval of the trade agreement is assured. In December 1973, Presidents Nixon and Ceaușescu issued a Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation, which set out a framework for bilateral economic relations. It established the American-Romanian Economic Commission, which provides a Cabinet-level forum for annual review of our economic relations. At the same time the U.S.-Romanian Economic Council was established by the U.S. and Romanian Chambers of Commerce to facilitate increased contact between American companies and Romanian

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on July 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of May 19, 1975, p. 655.

enterprises and economic organizations. A very recent development is the negotiation of a final settlement between the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and Romania on defaulted bonds. This agreement was signed on June 24.

Recent trade trends reflect the development of closer bilateral economic relations. Two-way commerce has grown from \$22 million in 1968 to over \$400 million last year. Our exports to Romania have been exceeding imports by over 2 to 1. This favorable ratio indicates the strong Romanian demand over the years for U.S. agricultural goods and capital equipment, despite the fact that Romania has not enjoyed MFN [most-favored-nation] treatment. Our principal import is petroleum products, which Romania continued to supply during the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] embargo. If we now do not remove discriminatory treatment of Romanian goods we could not expect this favorable trade situation to continue. But with nondiscriminatory tariff treatment we are confident that the target in the agreement of at least a threefold increase in trade during the period of the agreement in comparison with the period 1972-74 will be met and that a favorable trade balance will continue.

In negotiating this agreement we have attempted, I think successfully, to establish a framework that will encourage continued growth of trade along lines consistent with our economic interests. We considered it essential that this framework take account of Romania's centrally planned economy in two general respects:

—First, we wished to obtain arrangements that would provide a measure of equivalence to the free access to our domestic market that we assure through extension of nondiscriminatory tariff treatment.

—Second, we wished to obtain arrangements that would insure Romanian cooperation in dealing with any threat of injury to our industries caused by disruptive imports, while maintaining the right to take unilaterally what steps might be called for to deal with such a situation.

Negotiation of the trade agreement was undertaken in the latter half of January in Bucharest by an interagency team under the leadership of Ambassador Harry Barnes [U.S. Ambassador to Romania]. Ambassador Dent [Frederick B. Dent, Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations] and Under Secretary Tabor [John K. Tabor, Under Secretary of Commerce] have reviewed for you many of the provisions of the agreement from the perspective of their responsibilities. You have, in addition, a statement provided by Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury]. I would like myself to make the following general points:

—Following the mandate of section 405 of the Trade Act, concerning provision of rights and assurances for American businessmen carrying out commercial activities in the other country, we have set out basic ground rules here that will facilitate the activities of American businessmen, supported as appropriate by our Embassy.

—Also without precedent is the inclusion of commitments by both countries to maintain a balance of concessions over the lifetime of the agreement. Further, the two countries agree to reciprocate each other's concessions in the multilateral trade negotiations, taking into account their different levels of development. These are conditions set out in the Trade Act for renewal of bilateral agreements. A reference was included to the special commitment offered by Romania as a state-trading country when it joined the GATT, in order to make clear that we do not consider that mutual tariff reductions would suffice to assure a balance of benefits.

—Safeguards against market disruption have been included which rigorously follow and in some respects exceed the requirements of the Trade Act. We doubt that disruption by imports from Romania is a serious potential problem. The preponderance of our imports from Romania consists of petroleum products, which strengthen rather than compete with American industry. Also, in one sensitive area, textiles, we have recently negotiated a new bilateral agreement that

will protect our interests. Nonetheless, we believe that with a state-trading country there are special reasons for concern regarding possible injury from imports, as well as special opportunities for dealing with such situations on a basis of mutual cooperation. Accordingly, we have included safeguard arrangements calling for close consultation on the governmental level. They also require action by Romania to insure that its exports conform to restrictions deemed by us to be necessary, and they reserve our right to take appropriate steps unilaterally. These safeguards give the fullest protection to American firms against injury from imports.

These and the other provisions designed to protect our interests, together with the responsiveness to many of our requirements that the Romanian Government demonstrated during the negotiations, give us every reason to believe that the agreement will give further impetus to our trade with Romania and that this trade will be conducted on terms favorable to our commercial interests.

Turning to the emigration aspect of this agreement, we are very mindful of the interest of the Congress as a whole in this important matter and of the concern of individual Members of Congress in specific emigration cases. Let me say that we welcome this interest and will continue to consult closely with you on how to deal with these cases and with the emigration problem in general. While the Administration has reservations about linking trade with emigration by legislation, we recognize and accept the necessity to meet the requirements of the Trade Act. From the beginning of our discussions in Bucharest we emphasized that we needed more than just agreement on a commercial document alone, and we also made plain that our concerns went beyond the few hundred Romanians wishing to move permanently to the United States. Also, we drew upon the numerous strong expressions by Members of the Congress to underscore with the Romanians the importance of this question.

These requirements obviously posed serious problems for the Romanians, especially following refusal by the U.S.S.R. and other

Eastern European countries to accept them as a basis for negotiations. We discussed the matter in considerable detail and on numerous occasions, and we believe we and the Romanians understood each other entirely on the practical meaning and implementation of the language appearing in the President's waiver report and in other documents required by the act. As far as that language itself is concerned, it fully satisfies, in our judgment, both the letter and spirit of the act and will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of section 402. At the same time it takes account of legitimate Romanian concerns.

We fully understand the wish of some Members for more details on our discussions of this subject with the Romanians. I would only emphasize their sensitivity and the consequences to both countries' interests if they should become subject to public debate. Meanwhile I would urge the Congress to judge Romanian emigration practices by future deeds in addition to the words of the President's report waiving section 402 of the Trade Act. It will be on this basis that the President himself will decide whether to seek further extension of the waiver next year.

I would be less than candid if I were to try to gloss over the relatively poor performance of the Romanians during the early months of this year. I refer to emigration to both the United States and to Israel. We do not know what factors lay behind this disappointing situation, but I would urge the Congress to view it in context of several important considerations. One is the relatively small scale of the emigration problem in Romania; there are only a few hundred cases of divided-family members and dual nationals who have indicated a desire to come permanently to the United States. Secondly, the Romanian Government has applied a liberal policy on Jewish emigration over recent years. Under this policy well over 300,000 Jews have been permitted to move to Israel and other countries.

Since this trade agreement was sent to the Congress we have seen encouraging signs that the Romanians are seeking earnestly to solve the family reunification problems that concern us. They have approved the passport

applications of a substantial portion of the several hundred people I referred to earlier who want to join their families in the United States. There has been a similar improvement in approvals of divided-family members wishing to go to Israel. Although there are both personal and official arrangements to be made to translate these approvals into actual departures, we believe this will occur and that the Romanian Government will do its part to speed up the process. We therefore recommend that the Congress approve this trade agreement, understanding that both the executive and the legislative branches will reexamine carefully the question of a further extension less than 12 months from now.

Both we and the Romanians have an important political as well as economic stake in the continued improvement of our bilateral relations. For Romania to continue its policy of independence in foreign affairs is clearly something we should encourage, and we see this trade agreement as fostering that objective. Beyond that, if the Congress approves this agreement, we can confidently expect a sizable increase in U.S. exports to Romania. At the same time, we will make a significant stride toward the free movement of peoples which both the legislative and executive branches of this government greatly desire. Rejection of this agreement, on the other hand, could forfeit all these worthwhile objectives, to the detriment of both the U.S. and Romanian peoples.

U.S. and Finland Agree on Draft of New Extradition Treaty

Press release 353 dated July 1

Representatives of the United States and Finland reached agreement on July 1 on the text of a new draft treaty on extradition. The new treaty, expected to be signed in the near future, will significantly modernize extradition relations between the two countries. It will include provisions to assist in obtaining extradition of narcotics offenders as well as airline hijackers.

Department Discusses Issue of Syrian Jewish Community

Following is a statement by Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 25 during a hearing on H. Con. Res. 312, a concurrent resolution disapproving the obligation of Middle East special requirements funds for certain projects in Syria.¹

The executive branch of the government shares the concern of this committee over the well-being of the Syrian Jewish community. We neither condone nor support repressive measures taken by other governments against their citizens or against others. The U.S. Government is deeply concerned about human rights generally, reflecting our own traditions as well as an appreciation that human rights and respect for such rights are valid foreign policy objectives in themselves.

This situation must be seen in the context of the wider pattern of relationships in the Middle East, and that is the context in which we have considered how the U.S. Government can best address this question.

There are two ways in which Americans can approach an issue of this kind:

—One is to seek to alleviate the problem by the means we judge most effective, which in this case involves the use of quiet diplomacy to help create conditions within which the policies in question can change.

—The other is to create a confrontation between our two governments on the issue.

We have chosen the former course because we judge that a confrontation would produce results that are the opposite of those desired. Experience has shown this, and our discussions with those most intimately concerned with the situation seem to us to in-

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

dicating that they share the view that a public airing and confrontation can only harm those who have most at stake.

The long-range approach to the future of Syrian Jews is through a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As you know, we are bending every effort to bring this about through a process of negotiation. We all recognize that unless this process continues—unless progress is made toward a settlement—not only will we fail in our goal of achieving a settlement but we will probably at some point see the outbreak of further hostilities, with all the dangers and uncertainties this will bring to all the people involved.

Syria is one of the key states in this negotiation. Under the leadership of President Asad and, in part, in response to efforts of the United States, Syria has taken an increasingly positive stance toward the search for peace. The Syrian-Israeli disengagement of May 1974 was of course the key step in this direction. Most recently the Syrian Government has taken another such step in renewing for six months the mandate of the U.N. Force stationed along the disengagement lines.

The Syrian Government naturally determines its own policies and actions in this respect. The role that the United States is playing in the search for peace, however, gives a particular and continuing importance to the relationship between the United States and Syria. It is fair to say that trust and confidence in this relationship will materially enhance the capacity of the United States to play a positive part in the negotiating effort.

The Syrians are putting increasing emphasis on their economic development and are interested in having U.S. technical cooperation and capital participation. The

proposed aid to Syria will demonstrate to the Syrians that the United States is serious about sustaining and strengthening our cooperation in all areas of mutual concern.

While a peace settlement is the most complete answer to the problem we are considering today, there are things we can do and are doing short of that, which we believe can also be beneficial. These lie in the realm of quiet diplomacy, and hence they too depend heavily on the creation and maintenance of a broad relationship of confidence between ourselves and the Syrians.

The situation of the Syrian Jewish community has, we believe, improved in the recent past. This has been confirmed by information from a variety of sources, but it would not be appropriate to discuss the details in public session. Much as we might like to see a definitive solution to the question, it would neither be reasonable in itself nor fair to the Syrian Jews to ignore the value of such relative improvements in the conditions under which the community lives.

We thus have two trends, both of which offer some hope. To take the action being considered by this committee could only harm the relationship between the United States and Syria and jeopardize these hopeful trends. It would be an exaggeration to say that cutting off aid to Syria would be fatal to our hopes, but to take this step when developments appear to be moving in the right direction, however slowly, would surely be a step from which we could expect only negative results.

Particularly so long as our present approach appears to be bearing fruit in the more general setting as well as in the particular issue, we should do all we can to develop it, not hampering it with actions that offer no hope in themselves for achieving what we are trying to achieve.

Department Discusses Status of Human Rights in the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines

*Statement by Philip C. Habib
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*¹

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to testify on U.S. policy toward Korea and the Philippines in the context of developments affecting human rights in those countries.

In his testimony before you on July 30, 1974, the then Acting Assistant Secretary, Mr. Arthur Hummel, gave a clear statement on our general policy of human rights matters as well as an accurate, forthright summary of the situation in South Korea at that time.² Therefore I need not take up the time of this committee by restating what is already on the record. However, I do believe that before I get into the current situation a few introductory remarks are in order.

The U.S. Government is genuinely and deeply concerned about human rights matters. This concern reflects both our own traditions as well as a realization that human rights, and respect for them, are valid foreign policy objectives in their own right. Moreover, we recognize the importance of human rights in the conduct of our foreign policy as well as the clear intent of the Congress that human rights questions be addressed in the formulation of our policies.

We neither condone nor support repressive

measures taken by other governments against their citizens or against others. Indeed, many of our basic policies are designed to create an international environment in which political and economic development can proceed in an atmosphere of security and personal freedom. Within the U.N. framework, we have taken the lead in supporting initiatives on such matters as elimination of religious intolerance, racial discrimination, and other infringements of human rights. We continue to press for broader international support on these fundamental issues.

We are, as you know, in continuing contact at every level of the Department of State with American groups interested in human rights matters. Even where there is serious disagreement with our policies, we have, and certainly plan to continue, this dialogue. Also, as further evidence of our concern for human rights we have, as you know, institutionalized this concern as part of the foreign policy process. We have designated Mr. James Wilson as Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in the office of the Deputy Secretary. We have also appointed Human Rights Officers in each of the regional bureaus and an Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights Affairs.

Further, in those cases where we can be effective, we do quietly express to other governments our views on human rights matters and assure that they clearly understand the strongly held views, not only in the Congress

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 24. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 305.

but certainly among the American people, on human rights matters. We have done this both in Korea and the Philippines.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that we are dealing with sovereign countries with different political systems. We can neither determine the course of internal change nor be certain as to what the outcome will be in situations where there are internal tensions. Further, our policies toward individual countries represent a mix of interests, objectives, and relationships differing in almost every case. We know that neglect of human rights may well adversely affect the achievement of other important objectives. We also know that internal popular support is essential to long-term political stability. As the Secretary of State said in his address to the Japan Society on June 18:

... there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinnings of resistance to subversion and external challenge.

Situation in the Philippines

With these introductory remarks, I will now turn to the Republic of the Philippines. Mr. Chairman, I am submitting separately to your committee more detailed replies to some of the questions you raised on human rights in the Philippines in your letter of June 10 to the Department. I would like to take a few moments here to comment on the human rights situation in the Philippines as we see it and to explain the rationale for our military assistance to the Philippines.

The Department of State recognizes that the consequences of martial law in the Philippines have included the suspension of certain democratic processes and human rights. Specifically, as pointed out by Ambassador Mutuc [Amelito R. Mutuc, former Philippine Ambassador to the United States] in testimony before this committee, there have been wide-ranging arrests since the commencement of martial law, and a number of these people have been held for over two years without trial. In addition, freedom of the press has been curtailed, and under martial law, freedom of assembly and the entire spectrum of democratic processes have

been strictly regulated. Several referenda have taken place, but were held under conditions of martial law.

In regard to the question of mistreatment or torture of prisoners, we have heard charges that this has occurred. We do not, however, have any evidence that mistreatment of prisoners or torture is either a policy of the Government of the Philippines or a general practice. The Philippine Government has acknowledged that some abuses have occurred, particularly in more remote areas, and has taken steps to punish the offenders and to better regulate the system as a whole. We have been advised in this regard that the Government of the Philippines has agreed to accept a mission of the International Commission of Jurists and to afford its fullest cooperation in every aspect of its investigation.

While we support the Philippine Government's avowed intention to promote improvement in the social, economic, and administrative areas and think that there has been measurable progress in some of these, we do not believe that the ends justify or require the curtailment of human rights.

Having said this, I believe it is important to mention the fact that the Philippines has had a long association with the United States: first as a colony, then as the Philippine Commonwealth, and since 1946 as a close and valued ally.

The democratic form of government that was in effect in the Philippines until the introduction of martial law in September 1972 was patterned after our own, and we, of course, would have preferred to see that form of government continue. However, we feel strongly that the future of the Philippines and that of its form of government are for the Philippine people to determine, not us. Regarding the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms, we can only express our concerns, as we have, and hope that governments will realize that free people inevitably come down on the side of that which is good for the country as a whole.

I might note that the United States had no advance notification nor did we expect the actual declaration of martial law in

September 1972, despite some earlier rumors that it was being considered. However, as some of your witnesses have pointed out, most of the Philippine people appeared to accept martial law at the time it was declared and, indeed, some aspects of martial law were clearly welcomed (for example, the marked improvement in law and order and in government administration). Since the establishment of martial law in September 1972, we have continued to maintain friendly relations with the Philippine Government while avoiding any comment either in condemnation or support of the declaration or continuation of martial law.

Military Assistance to the Philippines

In security matters the Philippines has traditionally been one of our closest and most important treaty allies in East Asia. The defense commitments and mutual security interests of both countries are formally embodied in longstanding agreements. We have military bases in the Philippines, the existence of which is important both for Philippine defense and for broader security interests of the United States. We have long considered it important that the Philippine Armed Forces be well prepared, and it is to these ends that our military assistance has been directed since 1946.

Since the late 1940's, the United States has supplied a wide variety of military equipment to the Philippine Armed Forces. At least one of the purposes of this assistance has been to help the Philippine Army develop a capability for maintaining internal security. Our military assistance is a long-established component of our security relationship with the Philippines; it long predates the Moslem and Communist insurgencies. We are aware that U.S. military equipment is being used to counter Moslem insurgency in the southern Philippines as well as the smaller threat posed by Communist guerrillas in the north and central Philippines. We keep our military units strictly out of the Moslem areas, and we screen our assistance program in terms of equipment provided. It has been U.S. policy

and practice to stay out of Philippine efforts to suppress both of these domestic insurgencies.

Our small U.S. Military Advisory Group is not involved in combat operations of any kind. JUSMAG [Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group] Philippines is assigned a military assistance role only at the national level. U.S. Army personnel do not perform direct advisory functions below the level of the Department of Defense, the Armed Forces of the Philippines General Headquarters, or service headquarters, all of which are located in the Manila area. These advisory efforts do not directly support operations of the Philippine Armed Forces but are limited to military procurement, distribution, utilization, maintenance, and the like.

Human Rights in Korea

When we turn to the Republic of Korea, the issue of human rights is a matter of continuing concern. Since last year's hearing, there have been a series of further domestic events impacting on the human rights situation. In this connection, I have prepared the attached statement on certain specific questions you have raised in dealing with political prisoners, due process procedures, and other questions.

Since the hearings last year, the original four emergency measures have been lifted. A total of 203 persons were tried under these emergency measures. Subsequently all but 35 were released, although the prominent poet Kim Chi Ha has since been arrested on other charges. Further, of the 35 persons whose sentences were not suspended, eight reported members of the People's Revolutionary Party were executed on April 9 after the Supreme Court confirmed their original sentence.

On May 13 a new Emergency Measure No. 9 was instituted by President Park and continues in force. The provisions of this measure are broad in their terms and significantly inhibit political expression, including advocating constitutional revision; they further prohibit political activities on the part of students and form the basis for

severely restricting press coverage of certain major domestic political issues. The measure provides for minimum sentences of one year although, unlike the earlier measures, trial is in the civil court, not by court martial. In addition, any Korean criticizing the government or constitution to foreigners in Korea or abroad could be subject to the antislander law passed in March of this year.

The Korean Government has justified its latest emergency measure by the threat from the North, which it believes is accentuated in the post-Viet-Nam situation. Such North Korean activities as the tunnels under the DMZ [demilitarized zone] have had a significant effect on the Republic of Korea. The government acknowledges that the emergency measure inhibits political rights, although activities within the National Assembly itself are excluded from the emergency measure. The Korean Government believes that South Korea is still freer than North Korea. The initial reaction to the latest emergency measure in the Republic of Korea has been muted. Although the measure is recognized by the government's critics as infringing on political rights, the political opposition has continued to cooperate with the government parties in the National Assembly, in part recognizing, in the post-Viet-Nam situation, the need for focusing national efforts on the country's external security threat.

In describing the Korean situation, I wish to make it clear that the U.S. Government is neither involved nor associated with the Korean Government's internal actions. My remarks are a description, not a justification, of the Korean Government's domestic policies. In the case of the execution of the eight reported members of the People's Revolutionary Party, we publicly expressed our regret at this action. We continue to assure that the Korean Government is aware of the public impact within the United States of certain of its actions. While I believe this may have some limited effect, the Korean Government views its domestic policies as internal matters not subject to consultation with other governments.

U.S.-Korea Security Relationship

At the same time, we do have close relationships with the Republic of Korea extending over the 27 years of its life. These close ties encompass a continuing concern in the development of functioning representative institutions within a framework of respect for human rights. Beyond that, we also have a direct and vital interest in the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. We have a Mutual Defense Treaty obligation, and our military presence and military assistance have been essential elements in maintaining the military balance on the peninsula. This is in our own interest as well as that of the Republic of Korea and of its people. Very obviously our security relationship contributes importantly to the peace and security of Northeast Asia and is so recognized by our allies, including Japan.

I would further point out that, whatever their criticisms of the Korean Government, President Park's domestic opponents and critics view the security relationship with the United States as being essential. Within Korea our military presence and programs, particularly in this post-Viet-Nam period, are not the focus of criticism and debate. Rather, as you know, the Korean Government's political opponents have joined it in emphasizing the importance of our security commitments and wish them to continue.

We should not misjudge the determination of the people of South Korea to resist North Korean aggression nor the internal cohesion of the nation on this issue. What is most important to the Koreans, whatever their view of their own government, is the preservation of their military security and integrity. The continuation of our bilateral relations is essential to that objective.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would stress again the importance with which we view human rights matters and assure you that we recognize the clear interest of Congress in this issue. We neither associate ourselves with, nor justify, internal repressive actions and will continue to make clear our concern and that of the American people over the protection and preservation of human rights. At the same time, we will

continue our security policies which serve the interest of Korea, the region as a whole, and the United States. The preservation of peace on the peninsula remains the essential prerequisite for political development and the exercise of human rights in Korea.

I am sure you will agree that we must often strike a balance between our interests and objectives in a particular nation. At the present time in East Asia, the area about which you are most concerned, there are very clear valid concerns about security and about the future direction of the United States policy in the aftermath of the Indochina tragedy. In this part of the world, particularly the Republic of Korea, there is a broad public recognition that the issues of war and peace and the nation's security in the face of external threat are of overriding importance and must weigh heavily in the balance.

Jordan Receives \$10 Million Loan for Highway Construction Project

AID press release 67 dated July 3

The Agency for International Development has made a \$10 million loan to Jordan to help finance the construction of 44 miles of new road to remove a bottleneck in the highway from Amman, the capital, to Aqaba, the country's only port.

Jordan is investing \$4.2 million. The project involves realignment of the highway between the townships of Ma'an and Quweria. The Aqaba-Amman road is a vital communications link for transporting goods and people from the population centers in the north to the port in the south. Jordan is landlocked except at its southern extremity, where about 16 miles of shoreline of the Gulf of Aqaba gives access to the Red Sea. Jordan has a population of about 2.6 million.

The loan agreement was signed in Amman June 28. The loan is to be repaid in dollars in 40 years, with an initial grace period of 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent annually during the grace period and 3 percent thereafter.

Funds for the loan come from a special requirements fund of \$100 million for assistance to the Middle East appropriated by Congress in December 1974.

Syria Receives Development Loans of \$58 Million From United States

AID press release 64 dated June 30

The Agency for International Development is providing two loans to Syria totaling \$58 million to help that country improve its economic development.

A loan of \$48 million will assist Syria in its three-part \$150 million program to expand and modernize the entire water supply system in Damascus. The AID loan will finance the foreign exchange costs of construction and installation of about 222 miles of new pipes and related construction services in the newer areas of Damascus. Other international resources will finance similar work in the old part of the city. The water distribution project is expected to benefit about 1 million people. Aim of the expansion program is to avert a serious water shortage and reduce water-related illness.

Another loan of \$10 million will help Syria increase its agricultural production and accelerate general economic development. Syria is increasing the acreage of land being placed under irrigation so as to achieve greater production of such crops as rice and cereals.

Syria also plans a livestock project to produce meat and dairy animals supported by the development of 250,000 acres of reclaimed Euphrates Valley land which will be planted to fodder crops, primarily oats and hay.

The funds will be used to buy materials needed for agricultural development, such as plows, harrows, harvesters, irrigation equipment, earthmoving machinery, and insecticides. Both loans will be used to buy American machinery, equipment, and services.

The loans are to be repaid in dollars in 40 years, with an initial grace period of 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent annually during the grace period and 3 percent

thereafter. The loan agreements were signed June 30 in Damascus by U.S. Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Syria's Deputy Minister of State for Planning Affairs Mohammed Issam Hilou.

Last February AID made a grant of \$4 million to Syria for technical services and feasibility studies in agricultural production, irrigation, processing of agricultural products, mechanization of agriculture, and other fields. AID also made available a \$1 million grant to train Syrian graduate students in the United States in such fields as agriculture, engineering, medicine, geology, and irrigation management.

Funds for the loan and grants come from a special requirements fund of \$100 million for assistance to the Middle East appropriated by Congress in December 1974.

United States and Israel Plan Joint Desalting Project

AID press release 59 dated June 27

The Governments of the United States and Israel have signed a joint agreement to construct a desalting plant that will daily produce 10 million gallons of potable water from seawater. For this project, the United States will provide a grant of \$20 million and Israel will invest about \$35 million. The plant will be constructed near the city of Ashdod located on the Mediterranean coast about 25 miles south of Tel Aviv.

The proposed desalting plant is considered to be a prototype because of the nature of the evaporation process developed by the Israel Desalination Engineering, Ltd., which is known as the horizontal multiple-effect, aluminum tube, spray film evaporator.

The project agreement calls for the design, construction, supporting research, testing,

and operation and maintenance of a 10-million-gallon-a-day (MMGD) dual-purpose power-generating/desalting plant. Construction of the plant is expected to take four and a half years.

The U.S. and Israeli funds will help finance the cost of machinery, equipment, materials, services, operation, and maintenance. U.S. funds will be used for purchases in the United States and Israel.

The U.S. and Israel will share in the technology derived from the construction and operation of the 10 MMGD plant, which will also be made available to other interested nations, particularly to water-short arid and semiarid lands. Patents and know-how developed from this project will be made available to private U.S. companies on a non-exclusive, nondiscriminatory, reasonable royalty basis for use anywhere in the world.

AID will enter into a participating agency services agreement with the Office of Water Research and Technology, Department of Interior, to provide two experts in desalting processes and engineering who will serve on the staff of the Israeli project manager.

Israel's demand for water is growing steadily, and conventional water resources are nearing their limits. Exploitation of the natural water sources in Israel has now reached 85 percent of the potential and is forecast to approach full potential by the late 1970's. Israeli scientists say the establishment of large-scale seawater desalting plants is the only practical means to meet the country's need for water.

The grant agreement was signed at the U.S. Department of State by Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, for the United States, and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, representing the State of Israel.

Department Outlines Comprehensive Approach to Commodity Policy

Statement by Julius L. Katz

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*¹

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss international commodity policy. This subject has attracted wide attention recently, and it will be high on the agenda of a number of international conferences in the coming months and throughout the next year. These hearings thus come at an opportune moment when we are in the process of developing the U.S. approach to commodity policy.

Interest in the functioning of international commodity markets is not a new phenomenon. In each of the last several decades, interest and concern has been aroused by some aspect of commodity supply, most often the question of price. It is in the nature of commodity trade that prices are often regarded as being too low or too high, and with some commodities, prices can reach both exaggerated low and high points in a relatively short space of time. In the past three years, we have seen exceptionally great price volatility, with prices of many commodities increasing by 100 percent or more and then falling sharply to levels at or near the original point of ascendancy.

But concern over extreme price volatility is only one of the causes for the current interest in commodity policy. The recent example of action by a number of governments to restrict exports, whether for eco-

nomie or political reasons, and the specter of possible resource limitations has raised serious concern about the question of security of supply. Moreover, the example of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and evidences of producer associations for several other commodities have suggested the possibility of a widespread tendency toward producer cartels. Finally, the demands of the so-called Third World for a redistribution of the world's wealth through commodity pricing has served to focus attention on the question of commodity policy, although not on the most useful or constructive aspects of this question.

Against this background, I would like to outline briefly our views on commodity policy, to indicate what concerns us and what doesn't concern us, to describe what we propose to do and what we propose not to do.

First, we are not concerned in any practical sense about the physical limitation of resources. Unquestionably, the search for mineral resources must increasingly rely upon lower grade ores or resources in more remote areas of the world. But the real limiting factor is capital investment rather than the depletion of physical resources. And here I have in mind not only the raising of capital but the process of organizing exploration, development, and marketing of resources, including the provision of technological and managerial skills.

Second, given the increasingly unfavorable and unstable political environment facing private investment throughout the world, the question arises whether there are likely to take place the levels of investment necessary to meet growing demands for new produc-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing on July 9. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

tive capacity in the decades ahead. This, in our view, is a matter for genuine concern.

Third, despite superficial evidences to the contrary, stirred to somewhat hysterical proportions by some popular writers, there is little reason to be concerned about the so-called threat of producer cartels. Simple analogies are misleading, and the projection of the OPEC model to other commodities is simplistic and wrongheaded. Nonetheless, when productive capacity is inadequate to meet peak demand and supplies are consequently tight, it is likely that governments will resort to various means of export restriction or of supply allocation. Thus the question of security of supply is a matter of legitimate concern.

Fourth, excessive price fluctuations are costly both to producers and consumers. The effects are harmful to the development efforts of poor countries and, as we have seen, can be destabilizing in developed countries. The exaggerated price swings of the 1972-75 period have been attributed largely to the synchronized boom of the major industrialized countries in 1972-73 followed by the recession of 1974-75. It is an unsettled question whether this phenomenon was unusual or whether the pattern is likely to be repeated in the future. A continuation of synchronized business cycles in the major economies of the world implies greater stress in commodity markets and much greater price volatility, unless adequate productive capacity is developed to deal with peak demand. This, of course, implies idle capacity in slack times. Alternatively, larger reserve stocks accumulated in periods of low demand can substitute for excess productive capacity.

Fifth, we do not support proposals to establish high fixed prices for commodities and to maintain their real value through indexation. Such a policy would seriously distort patterns of investment and result in a misallocation of resources. Even if a workable system of indexation could be developed—an assumption open to serious question—it would redistribute income contrary to the manner intended. It would take from the poorest countries, which tend to be net importers of raw materials, in favor of the

richer developed countries (Canada, Australia, the United States, South Africa, and the U.S.S.R.) which are major net exporters of raw materials.

In sum then, we are not overly concerned about producer cartels or a physical limitation of resources. There is, however, an evident problem arising from the poor prospects for investment in new productive capacity, and we believe that this problem increases the risk of supply limitations in times of shortage. We believe that excessive price volatility is inherently undesirable. At the same time we believe that attempts to fix and index prices at arbitrarily high levels are bad policy, which we reject.

How, then, do we propose to deal with these problems and concerns? Clearly, there is no simple answer to the problems of commodity trade. The circumstances of particular commodities differ, and the solutions to the problems of individual commodities will vary. Secretary Kissinger in his May 28, 1975, speech to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Ministers meeting at Paris laid out a series of proposals that we believe represent a comprehensive approach to the general problem of commodity policy.

First, he proposed that new rules and procedures for access to markets and supplies be negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. What we have in mind here basically is to exchange bindings or assurances on supply access as we have previously exchanged bindings on market access. We would also expect to have elaborated more precise rules governing the resort to export restraints, much along the lines of rules governing use of import restraints. A further issue for resolution in the trade negotiations concerns the objective of providing opportunities to developing countries to market their raw materials in a higher stage of processing. The obstacle to such exports frequently results from "tariff escalation," the practice of levying progressively higher duties on processed goods than on the raw material itself. This situation can be a significant barrier to industrialization, and progress toward tariff

de-escalation can be of genuine benefit to developing countries while improving the efficiency of the world economy.

Second, Secretary Kissinger indicated a readiness to discuss new arrangements for individual commodities on a case-by-case basis. Let me say directly and emphatically that this is not intended to introduce a policy of cartelizing the world's commodity markets. While we are prepared to consider traditional international commodity agreements where such agreements are feasible and appropriate, we believe that the number of such cases is in fact very limited.

What we have in mind is to examine commodity problems in an analytical manner and to consider broadly based solutions not excluding but certainly not limited to price stabilization measures. For a number of commodities the problem in fact is not excessive price volatility, but low returns to producers. Stabilization agreements are not suitable to cope with such problems. Rather the solution might better be found in diversification providing lower cost production techniques, better marketing, or opportunities for marketing more processed forms of the material. The basic point here is that we are prepared to examine individual commodity problems in a serious way to find pragmatic solutions.

Third, as I have indicated earlier, we regard capital investment as the most serious limiting factor in resource availability. If the growing needs of the world for raw materials are to be met, new forms of investment will need to be found to overcome the disincentives to investment which exist at the present time.

Secretary Kissinger proposed that the World Bank increase its financing of resource investments and explore new ways of combining its financing with private management, skills, technology, and capital. We believe that the World Bank, with its associated institutions, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association, is uniquely suited to undertake this role. It has the capacity to analyze investment requirements for particular commodities; it can provide capital; it can mobilize private capital through joint

financing; and it can draw on the unique skills of private enterprise while diminishing the major risks that private capital might face going it alone.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger indicated our readiness to join in the examination of proposals to improve mechanisms for the stabilization of earnings, notably those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to protect the developing countries against excessive fluctuations in export income.

The IMF facilities provide exporters of primary products with additional access to the Fund's resources to meet balance-of-payments difficulties arising from temporary export shortfalls resulting from circumstances beyond the member's control. In mid-June of this year, the United States proposed a substantial liberalization of this facility. We are participating in a study by the IMF Executive Directors to determine exactly what form the liberalization should take.

In addition to the IMF facility, the European Community recently negotiated with its associated developing countries a somewhat different approach to earnings stabilization as part of the Lomé Convention. This convention, signed in January of this year, covers all aspects of economic relations between the Community and the 46 developing countries and establishes a stabilization fund known as STABEX. This fund takes a commodity-by-commodity approach rather than concentrating on fluctuations in overall export earnings as in the IMF scheme.

The advantage earnings stabilization mechanisms have, whatever the approach chosen, is that they meet certain critical financial problems of producing countries arising from commodity price instability without the need to interfere with the operation of commodity markets.

These, then, Mr. Chairman, are the basic directions we propose to move in with respect to commodity policy—supply and market access assurances, investment, case-by-case examination of individual commodity problems, and earnings stabilization. It is a comprehensive approach. It is pragmatic and, we believe, it offers the promise of tangible and realistic results.

U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Shrimp Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil concerning Shrimp. Also enclosed are an Agreed Minute, a related exchange of notes concerning compensation, an exchange of notes concerning interim undertakings, and translations of the Brazilian notes. These documents were signed at Brasilia on March 14, 1975.

The Agreement establishes a basis for regulating the conduct of shrimp fishing in a defined area off the coast of Brazil. Such regulation will help to conserve shrimp resources and will provide an interim solution to problems which have arisen over jurisdiction over those resources.

The measures prescribed in the Agreement will safeguard the economic interests of the shrimp industries of both countries and protect from prejudice their respective legal positions on the extent of coastal state jurisdiction over ocean fisheries under international law. The interim nature of the Agreement reflects the expectation that this underlying question may in the near future be settled by general international agreement on the law of the sea.

A more detailed explanation of the Agreement is contained in the report of the Department of State which also accompanies this message.

This Agreement will contribute to maintaining and strengthening the friendship and cooperation which have long charac-

¹ Transmitted on June 11 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. D, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the agreement and related documents and the report of the Department of State.

terized relations between the United States and Brazil. I recommend that the Senate give it early and favorable consideration.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 11, 1975.

Claims Against the German Democratic Republic

Department Announcement, May 28

Press release 303 dated May 28

The Department of State and the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission wish to advise American citizens who have claims against the Government of the German Democratic Republic for confiscation of property located in East Germany that less than six weeks remain in which to register their claims. The deadline for all such registrations is July 1.

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, the official agency of the U.S. Government which will ultimately adjudicate all such claims, mailed registration forms to over 7,000 individuals and organizations since February 1, 1975, and has received only about 700 claim registrations.

Information obtained from such registrations will form the basis for the negotiation of an equitable settlement of American property losses between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. The Department of State plans to initiate talks aimed at negotiating a settlement of these property losses following their registration and tabulation by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

Potential claimants are urged to promptly file their claim registration forms. Claimants who do not have such forms are invited to contact the Office of the General Counsel, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1111 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20579, or call the Commission on 202-382-7700.

Report of Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees Transmitted to the Congress

On June 23 President Ford transmitted to the Congress a report of the Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees and a Department of Defense-AID report on retrieval of assistance funds to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. Following are texts of a letter dated June 23 from President Ford to six congressional committee chairmen, a letter dated June 18 to President Ford from Julia Vadala Taft, Director of the interagency task force, and the text of the task force report.¹

PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

White House press release dated June 23

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 requires that I transmit within thirty days after its enactment a report to six committees of the Congress describing the status of refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam.

In response to that requirement, I am forwarding a report prepared by the acting director of the interagency task force for Indochina. It sets forth current progress in receiving and resettling the refugees.

Progress to date has been good when con-

¹ Identical letters were sent to James O. Eastland, chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Peter W. Rodino, chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary; John J. Sparkman, chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Thomas E. Morgan, chairman, House Committee on International Relations; John L. McClellan, chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and George H. Mahon, chairman, House Committee on Appropriations. The Department of Defense-AID report and the annexes to the task force report are not printed here.

sidered in the context of the magnitude of the refugee situation—the large numbers and great distances—and the short period of time available to deal with it. The cooperation and sacrifices made by private individuals and organizations, by Members of the Congress, by Federal, State and local officials, and by military personnel have been exemplary. I compliment all of them, and I ask that as many more people as possible contribute their efforts toward complete resettlement.

I am also transmitting a report regarding retrieval of assistance funds to Cambodia and South Vietnam by the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development as required by section 4(b)(3) of the Act.

I anticipate that the subsequent supplementary reports required by the Act will provide the committees additional information on these activities.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

LETTER FROM TASK FORCE DIRECTOR TO PRESIDENT FORD

JUNE 18, 1975.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 requires that you transmit to the Congress a report describing the status of the refugees from Cambodia and South Vietnam not more than thirty days after the enactment of the Act. Attached is a report on the activities of the Interagency Task Force during the past two months for inclusion in your report to the Congress.

I have attempted to make an open and

forthright statement about our activities and have attached a lengthy set of annexes with additional statistical material, detailed descriptions of various aspects of our programs and policy guidelines.

A report of this kind tends to omit the human dimension of the problems we have faced transporting more than 130,000 evacuees halfway around the world, setting up small cities where the refugees can be housed temporarily and processed while they await the opportunity to move to their new homes, and establishing a broad spectrum of programs which will enable these new residents of our country to integrate themselves quickly into our society. In addition, the report does not give full credit to the wide ranging support we have received from the voluntary agencies, state and local governments, citizen's groups and private individuals who have joined in the national resettlement effort.

The Task Force has had tremendous cooperation in this undertaking from all levels of the Executive Branch in setting up and administering this program and from the Congress in providing prompt and effective legislative support. I believe that the Government and the American people have responded to the plight of the Indochina refugees in the best tradition of our country and that we should all be proud of the progress during these past eight weeks. Yet the job is not over. There are still several problems ahead as outlined in the report which we believe can be overcome through the continuing cooperation among all levels of the United States Government and the support of the American people.

Sincerely,

JULIA VADALA TAFT

Director, Interagency Task Force

TEXT OF TASK FORCE REPORT

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON INDOCHINA REFUGEES
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
JUNE 15, 1975

Introduction

On June 16, the Interagency Task Force on Indochina refugees had been in operation for 60 days.

Events have moved quickly during this brief time. In the first days after the Task Force was established on April 18, the world was witness to the collapse of the armed forces of Vietnam, a dramatic air and helicopter evacuation from Saigon, the fleeing of tens of thousands of refugees from their homelands, and the installation of new regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia. The President assigned to the Interagency Task Force, with representatives from almost every cabinet level agency in the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, the responsibility for the coordination of the evacuation effort and the refugee and resettlement problems relating to the Vietnam and Cambodia conflicts.

The activities of the Task Force during the two months of its existence have included:

—the coordination of the evacuation of 86,000 U.S. citizens and South Vietnamese by air and sea in U.S. military or chartered craft;

—the establishment, supply, and staffing of staging centers at Guam and Wake for the care and preliminary processing of the refugees and other reception centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, Eglin Air Force Base, and Fort Indiantown Gap for the final processing of the refugees prior to their resettlement in the United States;

—the reception into these camps of 131,399 evacuees as of June 15;

—the organization and coordination of health, social security, and security check procedures to facilitate the departure of refugees from the centers. As of June 15, 32,321 of the evacuees had left the centers for new places of residence in the United States;

—testimony which led to the passage of "The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975" to fund the refugee program which the President signed into law on May 24, nineteen days after the first of nine appearances by Task Force members before Congressional Committees and Subcommittees;

—the promotion of international resettlement efforts through initiatives to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) and through direct contact with third countries which has resulted in the departure to date from U.S. territory of 3,756 refugees for resettlement elsewhere; in addition, several thousand refugees who fled elsewhere have been accepted for resettlement in third countries. In Western Europe and Canada, over ten thousand Vietnamese and Cambodians stranded by the sudden outcome of the wars have been allowed to stay indefinitely.

—the negotiation of contracts with nine voluntary agencies to support their resettlement programs in the United States;

—negotiations with interested state and local governments for special resettlement programs in their communities;

—organizing special programs with private American business organizations to provide jobs and housing, or commodity support for refugees;

—the establishment of guidelines for the States which explained the nature of Federal Government financial support in the fields of health and medical services, education, and welfare services.

Statistical Summary

As of June 15, a total of 131,399 evacuees had entered the U.S. system of control, of whom 36,188 were in Western Pacific reception centers, 58,654 in continental U.S. reception centers, 480 en route to centers, 32,321 had been released from the centers for resettlement in the United States and 3,756 for resettlement in other countries. An analysis of refugee status for June 15 by reception center reveals the following [Table 1]:

TABLE 1

| Reception center | Capacity ¹ at center | Number of evacuees released | Number of evacuees released in U.S. | Number of refugees released to third countries |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| Guam, Wake and other Western Pacific Sites | 56,286 | 36,188 | 762 | 2,178 |
| Travis ² | 0 | | 5,750 | |
| Pendleton | 18,500 | 17,077 | 15,737 | 899 |
| Chaffee | 25,000 | 22,525 | 7,054 | 577 |
| Eglin | 5,000 | 4,251 | 2,691 | 102 |
| Indiantown Gap | 17,000 | 14,801 | 327 | 0 |
| | | 94,842 | 32,321 | 3,756 |

¹ Capacity figures in the continental U.S. reflect surge capacity for period of June 15 to July 15.

² Initial continental U.S. processing center no longer in use.

A survey of 99,580 refugees who were within the care of the United States Government on June 10 showed 19,619 heads of household, 79,929 family members attached to the households and 32 orphans. A total of 15,134 of the 99,580 refugees have U.S. citizen or permanent resident relatives or sponsors. (As of that date, the Immigration and Naturalization Service listed 1,885 orphans who had entered under "Operation Babylift" and had been placed for adoption.)

Upon their release from the reception centers, the refugees have been located in all parts of the country, although the principal destinations are clustered on the Pacific coast, the highly urbanized centers on the East Coast, Florida, and Texas. As of June 10, the States which led as destinations for refugees were:

| | | | |
|---------------|-------|------------------|-----|
| 1. California | 8,135 | 7. Florida | 939 |
| 2. Virginia | 1,614 | 8. Maryland | 918 |
| 3. New York | 1,604 | 9. Washington | 651 |
| 4. Texas | 1,246 | 10. Pennsylvania | 562 |
| 5. D.C. | 1,202 | 11. Illinois | 514 |
| 6. Hawaii | 1,075 | 12. Ohio | 504 |

Reception Center Processing and Preparation for Initial Resettlement

At the reception centers on Guam and Wake, the refugees receive basic health care and begin processing for entry into the United States, which includes the initiation of the security clearance. Representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM), the International Red Cross (ICRC) and some third countries (Canada and Australia at times) have been present on Guam to assist refugees who wish to go to third countries or return home. The other Western Pacific refugee centers—in the Philippines and Thailand—serve as temporary holding areas for refugees awaiting transportation to Guam and Wake. Of special concern at the Western Pacific sites has been the possibility after May 1 of a typhoon on Guam which is the largest of the reception centers and has a capacity for 50,000 refugees. Tropical typhoons would seriously threaten many of the temporary shelters. The number of refugees on Guam had been decreased from 43,939 on June 1 to 26,447 on June 15. An order was issued on June 13 to reduce the refugee population on Guam to the level capable of being housed in other than tent quarters no later than June 24. By that date all tent quarters should be dismantled.

The major activities at the four reception centers in the continental United States are:

—the provision of food, shelter, clothing and other necessities;

—processing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), including interviewing, fingerprinting, photographing, creating of an alien file, security clearance verification, completion of parole document, authorization of employment, and granting of parole;

—processing by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, including medical screening, assignment of a social security number, initiating action to reunite split families, explaining voluntary agency and sponsorship role to the refugees, and determining resources for travel;

—providing employment counseling through the Department of Labor, including identification of skills, analysis of sponsor-related job offers, and information on skill demand and excesses by location;

—language training and cultural orientation which are presently being provided by volunteer agencies, individual volunteers, and State and Federal personnel;

—recreational activities, generally under the aegis of the YMCA and other volunteer organizations;

—arranging sponsorship through the voluntary resettlement organizations in most cases but also directly through State and local governments in some instances.

During the middle part of May, the principal

delay in resettlement resulted from the requirement to complete clearances for all refugees prior to their departure from reception centers. Normal INS security procedures require clearance for entry into the United States by INS, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of State. At the request of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, the Task Force also instituted clearance with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of Defense. To expedite the new security clearance process, the records of the individual agencies were assembled in Washington and in several instances computerized, the collection point for the cleared statements was centralized at INS headquarters in Washington where it could be cabled to the respective camp, and the initiating request for the security clearance was begun on Guam rather than waiting for the refugees to arrive in the United States. At the present time, many security clearances are completed in a matter of hours.

Sponsorship—placing the refugee with an individual or organization willing and able to assume responsibility for assisting in the refugee's integration into the American economy and society on a self-sufficient basis—will continue to be the key element in the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees. Offers of sponsorship from the public are being solicited by the voluntary resettlement agencies, public and private organizations and by the Task Force itself. Each of the voluntary agencies works in its own way to develop sponsorships: religious groups generally through local churches and non-sectarian organizations through a network of community groups who have supported them in the past. Officials in the State of Washington, the cities of Cincinnati and Honolulu and other communities around the country have expressed interest in developing local programs for the resettlement of refugees. In response to an outpouring of public interest in providing assistance, the Task Force established a toll-free telephone number on May 5 to receive and record such offers. As of June 15, the Task Force had received more than 20,000 calls in addition to hundreds of letters containing other offers of assistance.

The sponsorship offers received by the Task Force as well as the personal data collected about the refugee upon arrival in the United States have been placed in a central computer bank. Printouts of sponsorship offers are being made available to the voluntary agencies. Computer terminals have been installed at each voluntary agency headquarters and at each of the reception centers to provide instant access to the information which has been stored in the computer. This information is available to supplement the voluntary agencies' normal sources of support.

Verifications of the sponsorship offer from other than those groups which the voluntary agency has had regular contacts with is one of the most im-

portant and, at the same time, most difficult elements in the entire resettlement process. Since the Federal Government is not the proper agent to evaluate whether the offering party has the means, good-will and follow-up ability to provide continuing support for the refugee, the voluntary agencies have agreed to attempt verification of the sponsorship offers which have been generated by the toll-free number.

After the assurance of sponsorship has been obtained and the security check has been completed, the refugee is ready for release from the reception center. Transportation to a point near the sponsor's community is arranged by the center. If it is determined that the refugee or sponsor cannot afford all or part of these transportation costs, transportation is provided under the resettlement program.

Resettlement

The resettlement of the refugee in American society is a cooperative effort involving the sponsor and his community, the voluntary agency, and the Federal Government. Sponsorship involves a moral commitment to provide food, shelter, clothing, pocket money, ordinary medical costs and assistance in finding employment to enable the refugee to become self-sufficient. While one family group is usually designated as the sponsor of each refugee family, the voluntary agencies have usually contacted a community group, church or civic organization to provide supplementary assistance in kind and advice to the sponsor and the refugee. Resettlement is a long-term proposition. Family problems may develop, the first job might prove unsatisfactory, or economic conditions may alter the sponsor's ability to be of assistance. Since the resettlement process often involves a difficult cultural adjustment for the refugee family, requiring more assistance than for an American newcomer to the community, the community group designated to support the sponsor plays an essential role in the assimilation process.

If the sponsor and his community fail to provide the adjustment assistance or personal difficulties develop, the responsibility for a second attempt rests with the voluntary agency. The Task Force has been encouraging each of the voluntary agencies to ensure that every refugee under its aegis knows whom to contact if the sponsorship breaks down. The voluntary agency may attempt a second resettlement effort in the same or a nearby community or move the refugee family to a different part of the country. Recently, occasional stories in the press have reported that refugees have gone on welfare shortly after arriving in a community. In most cases, these are refugees who arrived in the United States and left the reception centers before the voluntary agencies were actively involved in resettlement or refugees whose American-resident relatives were unable to provide sufficient assistance.

The responsibilities of the Federal Government are both residual—in cases of total breakdown of sponsorship—and direct—to provide initial support

for the refugees through the sponsorship program and to the communities in which the refugees have settled.

The Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, working through State welfare agencies, is responsible for the provision of financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees, as the need arises, after their resettlement in communities throughout the nation. Federal funds under the SRS refugee assistance program will be utilized to reimburse the States 100% for such assistance and services so that a refugee will not become an extra burden on State or local resources if the resettlement plan breaks down. The following are the principal provisions of the program to provide financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to needy refugees:

—Needy individuals and families will be assisted regardless of family composition.

—State welfare agencies are required to verify with the sponsors of refugees that the resettlement has broken down before assistance can be granted.

—Financial assistance to refugees will be based on the same standards of need and the same payment levels as apply in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.

—Medical assistance will be provided to meet health needs of needy refugees and to help keep sponsorships from breaking down if major medical costs arise.

—Social services will be provided in accordance with a State's approved plan for service programs so that refugees are eligible for the same range of services as other residents of the communities in which they settle.

Other Federal programs are designed to assist the refugee become integrated into American society:

—Negotiations are under way to develop language and orientation materials and provide technical assistance to school districts.

—Plans are being developed to implement a grant program to school districts.

—Refugees have been declared eligible for HEW's direct student aid programs for post-secondary students.

—The Department of Labor, in cooperation with State and local employment agency representatives, is presently identifying occupational skills of refugees and providing counseling about employment and training possibilities in areas where they are resettling.

The Interagency Task Force has promulgated two general guidelines in an effort to influence areas of resettlement: (1) to avoid resettlement in areas of high unemployment; and (2) to avoid high concentrations of refugees in any specific community. The Department of Labor's counseling program at

each of the camps provides assistance to the refugees and to the voluntary agencies in avoiding areas of high unemployment or areas where the refugee's skills are already in excess. As a matter of fact, the voluntary agencies generally have received fewer offers of assistance, especially job-related, from communities with high unemployment rates. The voluntary agencies have also shown general understanding of the importance of avoiding the concentration of large numbers of refugees in any single community. Refugees are presently resettling in all parts of the country. Since any resident of the United States is free to move and to settle in any location, it is nevertheless possible that clusters of Vietnamese may assemble in selected parts of the country at a future date.

Repatriation

On May 8 the Task Force sent the following message to all U.S. diplomatic posts and to U.S. refugee camps:

1. The following provides official USG policy for those refugees who wish to return to Indochina, whether they are in third countries or the United States.

2. The United States will not repeat not interfere with their effort to return to their country of origin. All cases which come to the attention of the USG will be promptly referred to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees who will assume responsibility for screening, care and maintenance if necessary, and onward transportation under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration or through other means if required . . .

Civil coordinators at the camps were then directed to post notices and circulate information in camp newspapers that persons desiring repatriation were free to do so and should indicate their wishes to specified members of camp staffs.

At the same time, discussions were held with the UNHCR, who agreed that assistance to persons wishing repatriation was within his mandate. The UNHCR then spoke with the Vietnamese authorities who agreed to its proposed role in the organization of repatriation. UNHCR representatives at Guam, Chaffee, Camp Pendleton, Eglin Air Force Base, and Indiantown Gap, as well as UNHCR representatives in other countries, have been interviewing applicants for repatriation, using a questionnaire developed jointly between the UNHCR and the Vietnamese authorities. At the request of the UNHCR, the American Red Cross (ARC) is assisting the program in the United States. If refugees outside the camps indicate a desire to go home, the UNHCR and the Red Cross are informed and arrangements are made to interview the applicants.

Completed questionnaires are forwarded by the UNHCR representative to his headquarters in

Geneva and from there to the Vietnamese authorities for their consideration.

Repatriation to Cambodia is not yet as well planned as return to Vietnam. Arrangements similar to those for Vietnamese repatriation are being worked out by the UNHCR to accommodate those Cambodians who wish to be repatriated. (On May 29 and June 1 about 340 Khmer armed forces personnel returned from Thailand to Cambodia under arrangements between the Thai Supreme Command and the Khmer local authorities at the border without reference to the UNHCR.)

The United States Government will pay the costs of movements back to home countries from the money appropriated for resettlement outside the United States.

As of June 15, a total of 1,917 Indochina refugees under U.S. administration had indicated a desire for repatriation.

The speed and form of the repatriation effort now are essentially in the hands of the present authorities in Saigon who will accept or reject the applicants for repatriation.

Third-Country Resettlement

From the beginning, we have made every effort to internationalize Indochina refugee resettlement. On April 10, Department of State officials met with John Thomas, Director of ICEM, who agreed to take up with his Executive Committee the need for the full machinery and expertise of his agency as a matter of urgency. On April 12, before the fall of the Khmer Republic, the State Department instructed its Geneva Mission to request assistance from the UNHCR and ICEM in resettling Khmer refugees throughout the world. A similar instruction pertaining to Vietnamese refugees went out on April 17. Because of our desire to take no action which would precipitate the collapse of the Khmer and Vietnam governments, these approaches were made privately but they focused the attention of the international agencies on the problem and stimulated preparations for worldwide resettlement.

At the ICEM Executive Committee meeting, April 28-29, John Thomas formally advised delegates of the 32 member governments that the United States had requested ICEM to assist in the resettlement of Indochina refugees. In the absence of objections, he proposed to undertake the task.

On May 8 and 9, the UNHCR sent an appeal for resettlement opportunities to some 40 governments and a second appeal went out on May 29. Meanwhile, both ICEM and the UNHCR placed representatives on Guam, strengthened their staffs elsewhere, and began registering refugees for third-country resettlement.

Earlier, on April 27, acting through the State Department, the Task Force had instructed American Ambassadors in most countries around the world to ask the governments to which they were

accredited to share the burden of refugee resettlement. The instruction noted that this bilateral appeal paralleled those which ICEM and the UNHCR would soon be making.

There have been many positive responses to the U.S. and international approaches. Canada has agreed to take 3,000, plus those who have relatives in Canada and those who had been issued visa letters prior to the fall of Saigon. More than 3,000 refugees have already arrived in that country. Germany has indicated willingness to accept students who are already there and their families. The total could reach several thousand. France, which has for over a century had close ties with Indochina, is accepting those with relatives already in the country, students who are in France and others. Other countries in Western Europe, Latin America and Africa have agreed to take smaller numbers. ICEM is presently selecting refugees with special skills for resettlement in Latin American countries.

By June 15, the number of Indochina refugees released to third countries from U.S. reception centers had reached 3,756. Approximately 4,000 other refugees in U.S. centers have also requested resettlement elsewhere and are now awaiting approval. A number of initial asylum countries have permitted refugees to remain and many thousands more have traveled to resettlement countries from countries of initial asylum. ICEM reports that as of May 31, there were also 2,545 Indochina refugees in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand who were being processed for resettlement in third countries.

Estimated Expenses

The Indochina Evacuation and Resettlement Program has a total budget of \$508 million. As of June 6, 1975, total obligations were \$181 million. The largest portions have been obligated as follows: the Department of Defense for facilities and daily maintenance at the reception centers (\$64.5 million), the Department of Defense for the airlift (\$63.1 million), and contracts with the voluntary agencies (\$34.32 million). An analysis of the source of funds and their obligations follows [Table 2].

Issues for the Future

The Interagency Task Force has been involved in a wide range of issues over the past eight weeks. There are also many problems which must be solved to carry out successfully the resettlement program. The principal issue is that of sponsorship. Given time, the traditional voluntary agency system of settlement should permit the absorption of the Indochinese refugees as it has permitted the resettlement of over 1½ million refugees from Europe and other parts of the world since World War II. Time is of great importance for this resettlement program. While there is little doubt that the legislative program goal of resettling refugees by June

TABLE 2

| Source | Total available | Total obligations as of 6/6/75 | Amount available |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| AID funded by Presidential Determination | \$ 5,000,000 | \$ 2,678,892 | \$ 2,321,108 |
| AID funded by Indochina Post-war Reconstruction Program | 98,000,000 | 98,000,000 | 000 |
| State portion of Refugee Act of 1975 (includes DOD & INS portions) ¹ | 305,000,000 | 79,733,000 | 225,267,000 |
| HEW portion of Refugee Act of 1975 ¹ | 100,000,000 | 669,884 | 99,330,116 |
| Total | \$508,000,000 | \$181,081,776 | \$326,918,224 |

¹ Represents amount appropriated in P.L. 94-24. This appropriation does not include the additional \$50 million which was authorized by Congress in P.L. 94-23.

30, 1976, can be met, the Task Force hopes to be able to move more rapidly to prevent unacceptably high human and financial costs. The traditional resettlement systems are not able to adapt easily to processing the desired numbers within the time frame we are imposing.

A second and related issue is the breakdown of the sponsorships. Many of the first refugees to arrive in this country moved directly to the communities of their relatives and friends without the benefit of sponsorship verification through the voluntary resettlement agencies. Inadequate housing and unemployment have forced some of these refugees on welfare. The voluntary agencies have in the past been effective in resettling refugees in a way that few become long-term charges on the welfare system or become impossible to assimilate into American life. The Task Force will be evaluating breakdown cases to determine what steps might be taken to assist those refugees who have already sought government support to become self-sufficient and to prevent future breakdowns. At the same time, when considering any broadened system of sponsorship, the valuable role which the resettlement agencies play in preventing breakdown must not be overlooked.

The Task Force is further concerned that all refugees who are cleared for entry into this country find homes in America. Obviously, some refugees and their families—possibly the less educated and unskilled—will take longer to be assimilated into American society than others. Early identification of such refugees is currently in progress and intensive language training and orientation will be provided beginning in early July. The resettlement organizations are committed to the resettlement of all of these refugees.

In addition, the United States Government will have to find homes outside this country for those refugees at Western Pacific locations who might be determined as ineligible for entry here. The number is expected to be small. A plan for this group will be formulated as the dimension of the problem becomes more apparent.

The Task Force has undertaken to expand the traditional sponsorship system by seeking the involvement of a broader range of labor, business, civic and social service organizations. In addition, the Task Force is also expanding initiatives with State and local governments in identifying sponsors and assisting in resettlement.

One of the key problems related to sponsorship has been the effective use of offers which have come forward. The Task Force is developing an identification service which will be contacting individuals who called on the toll-free number to verify their continuing interest in sponsorship and to ensure appropriate consideration of each offer by a voluntary agency. In addition the identification service will be used to search the computer system for information about the location of Vietnamese who have entered the United States. While attempting to make available all information which will aid resettlement, the Task Force is mindful of the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the personal history data which might be acquired about the refugees. The Red Cross agreed to establish an international family locator service for Indochina refugees, using the facilities of the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.

The Task Force has been looking ahead to the time when all of the staging areas in the Western Pacific area and the reception centers in the United States can be closed, but definite dates have not yet been established. Some original estimates indicated that all of the centers might be closed in three months. Eglin Air Force Base in Florida will have the shortest use, possibly being phased out by the end of July. With the continual refinement of the processing procedures at the centers, which should speed up the outflow, the Task Force hopes that all but one or two of the centers will be closed in September.

Resettlement of the refugees from Indochina will take time, not only to move the refugees from the reception centers into communities around the country, but also to assist them in the difficult process of adjustment to a new way of life. Many dramatic events have occurred during the past eight weeks. The future will be less dramatic, but much work lies ahead to achieve the successful assimilation of the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees into American society.

U.N. Outer Space Committee Meets at New York

The U.N. Outer Space Committee met at New York June 9-20. Following are statements made in the committee by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 11 and by U.S. Alternate Representative Ronald F. Stowe on June 17.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 65 dated June 11

The past year has been an active one both in space exploration and in the work of this committee and its subcommittees. The brevity of our agenda conceals a myriad of complex and significant questions which will require a great deal of hard work to resolve. Happily, the reports of the Legal Subcommittee and of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee¹ reflect that efforts of those two bodies during the past year have been fruitful in a number of areas.

Also on a positive note, we in the United States have had a most successful year in our national program for the continued exploration and use of outer space. Two examples in particular are worthy of note here: Pioneer 10, which last December swept past Jupiter and headed for a rendezvous with Saturn in 1979, and Landsat 2, an earth resources technology satellite, which was launched into orbit in January. The American efforts have focused both on the scientific and technical challenges of the exploration of the farthest reaches of the solar system and on concerns that significantly affect the quality of everyday lives.

One of the useful functions of the Outer Space Committee's annual review of space

activities is to identify and encourage international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

With regard to the U.S. international cooperative programs, I would briefly note the following events which have taken place since this committee's last session.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has launched four cooperative satellites, one each with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In these projects, in which we have a strong program interest, we furnish the booster and launch services, while our cooperating partners take responsibility for the spacecraft.

NASA has launched three satellites on a reimbursable basis: one for Canada, one for the Federal Republic of Germany, and one—the Symphonie communications satellite—for France and West Germany. Early last month NASA agreed to launch an Indonesian domestic communications satellite.

Both NASA and the new European Space Agency are actively engaged in coordinated planning for the use of Spacelab, the manned orbital laboratory which Europe is building as an integral part of the NASA Space Shuttle. The prime development contract was awarded just one year ago, and the project has proceeded on schedule in Europe. This integrated contribution to the future exploration and use of space represents a new dimension in international cooperation. Spacelab will provide, for the first time, opportunities for U.S. and foreign scientists and engineers to accompany their experiments into space. It will facilitate many joint-use programs.

The members of this committee are already

¹ U.N. docs. A/AC.105/147 and A/AC.105/150.

well aware of the ATS-6 [Advanced Technology Satellite] television broadcasting experiments we have undertaken. The importance of the potential of such community broadcasting is emphasized by our own national experiments in this area.

Even though the United States has a highly developed domestic communications system, we have many areas remote from metropolitan centers that lack many of the services and facilities which these centers provide for their populations. We are experimenting with space applications to provide improved medical, education, and communication services to these areas; and ATS-6 has been used here to conduct the Health/Education/Telecommunications experiment in Alaska, the Rocky Mountains, and the Appalachian area since its launch in May 1974. This experiment is designed to determine whether satellite systems offer an effective way of providing high-quality educational programs and health services to people in remote areas.

These experiments could open new opportunities for the benefit and advancement of students and doctors and their patients in the United States and, we hope, perhaps be even more valuable to countries without an already extensive ground communications system.

The ATS-6 has recently been moved from its position over the Galapagos Islands eastward to a station over Lake Victoria in central Africa. From this location it will be made available to the Government of India for four to six hours a day for about a year to conduct the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment. India will use the satellite to relay Indian instructional broadcasts to augmented receivers in more than 2,000 remote Indian villages and to some 3,000 additional villages via conventional ground relay systems.

The Indian Space Research Organization is responsible for television programming and for designing, manufacturing, and maintaining services, associated ground equipment, and antennas. Its programming will be directed toward improved agricultural techniques and family planning, hygiene, and school instruc-

tions. The results of this practical applications experiment should give us all a better understanding of the potential of broadcast satellites as a tool for development. Brazil is already using ATS-6 in an educational television experiment.

Landsat 2, like the first earth resources technology satellite, is serving as a focus for international cooperation. Investigators from 45 countries and five international organizations have been selected to conduct studies with data it obtains. More than one-third of the member states on this committee are working with us in expanding the practical uses of remote sensing by satellite.

Some countries have established their own data acquisition, processing, and dissemination facilities. Stations in Canada and Brazil are now operating, and stations in Italy, Iran, and Zaïre are expected to become operational during the coming year. These stations help assure the reception of global data in event of tape-recorder failures, and as the report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee makes clear, they can facilitate the emergence of regional arrangements.

Finally, I wish to mention the progress of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. This project marks the crossing of a major threshold in international space cooperation on both the political and technical levels. On May 22, senior officials of NASA and the Soviet Academy conducted a joint flight-readiness review and concluded that the mission was ready for on-schedule launchings July 15. We look forward to the Apollo-Soyuz mission and to reporting on its operations at the next session of the committee.

Although we may comment in more detail later during our session on the contents of the reports of our two subcommittees, I would like to make a few general remarks on the course of their work this year.

The Legal Subcommittee, in our view, took positive and constructive steps in continuing to try to clarify the legal implications of both direct television broadcasting and remote sensing from satellites. We support the thorough and responsible approach which has thus far characterized the Legal Subcom-

mittee's examination of these two extremely complicated areas.

The drafting exercise to develop principles relating to direct television broadcasting by satellite has been useful in identifying those areas of general agreement and in helping clarify the views of countries on the issues on which there are substantially different opinions. Although the latter are of considerable significance—and I must admit that my delegation does not immediately see how they are to be reconciled—we recognize that the Legal Subcommittee has faced difficult issues frequently in its work, and we have confidence that with determination, patience, and good will on all sides we will again in good time find appropriate and acceptable solutions to the problems we are addressing.

The Legal Subcommittee also began a serious thorough examination of the legal implications of remote sensing of the earth from satellites for the first time since this item has been on its agenda. An increased number of delegations have expressed their views on the legal implications of remote sensing, and we look forward to hearing from the remaining members of the subcommittee when it meets again next year.

The U.S. delegation introduced a working paper at the last session of the Legal Subcommittee with the intention of spelling out our views regarding the direction which any further development of legal principles in this area should take.² From the starting point of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space reflected in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, we strongly believe that the international community should encourage the broadest possible cooperation and exchange of information so that all countries, not just the space powers, can share in the benefits which we believe can be derived from programs such as the Landsat experiments.

There obviously are different points of view regarding where the greatest interests of the members of the international community lie. Those differences have been reflected to some extent in the several drafts

which have been put forward and in the comments which a number of delegations have made during our debates so far.

More than anything else, the discussions about remote sensing in the Legal Subcommittee have begun to point out how extremely complex the legal implications of such activities are. The one week which the Legal Subcommittee devoted to remote sensing proved useful in beginning to identify the issues which must be addressed but also demonstrated that we have considerable work to do even to reach agreement on the very complex and difficult questions to be asked.

For example, the U.S. delegation felt rather strongly that an early issue to be faced is the definition of the activities the legal implications of which we are trying to assess. Although it is only one of numerous issues which must be further examined, attempts to rush into drafting precise language even before agreement on the scope of the remote sensing activities we are talking about seem ill advised.

Another important example of an issue which needs considerably more attention is the likelihood that application of a restrictive dissemination policy would result in the loss of remote sensing data for many countries which do not have their own programs, including the space segments. Although the United States is not concerned about its ability to conduct such programs for its own benefit, we would consider it most unfortunate if nations, except for the small handful of space powers, were to cut themselves out, perhaps inadvertently, from sharing in these exciting programs and directly obtaining their own national benefits. This consequence cannot simply be dismissed. For those countries who depend on others for data, it should be very, very carefully studied before attempts are made to reach agreement on precise language for guidelines on this matter.

I also wish to note that a considerable amount of time and effort was devoted by many delegations to attempting to reconcile the remaining issues in the draft moon treaty. Obviously the key remaining obstacle

² For text of the working paper, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1975, p. 423.

to completion of this treaty centers on the question of natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies.

In spite of the extensive efforts made, it seems that we are prevented from completing this treaty because of factors not directly related to the exploration and use of outer space. There are a number of elements valuable to all countries in the already agreed provisions of this draft treaty, such as the proposed measures to protect the environment of the moon and other celestial bodies, the publication of greater amounts of information derived from exploration of celestial bodies, and the endorsement of enhanced cooperation among the countries undertaking such exploration.

Because the unmanned exploration of the planets is in fact continuing even now, whereas the possibilities for commercial exploitation of resources still seem in the distant future, my delegation would consider it unnecessary to delay completion of the moon treaty just because of provisions which would not realistically have significance for some time to come. We would hope that delegations may find it possible to reconcile their views in the near future.

We look forward to continuing our constructive discussions of the legal implications of these and other issues related to remote sensing at the next session of the Legal Subcommittee.

With regard to the report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, we are pleased by the progress which was made, particularly in the examination of organizational aspects of remote sensing. Our delegation has been among those which have attempted to insure that the political and legal assessments of remote sensing did not outrun the assessment of what was actually practicable and desirable. The parallel approach adopted in the past year has in our view been beneficial to both subcommittees and has kept the deliberations on the legal implications from becoming irrelevant to actual progress in the field.

We note with much favor the focus of

attention on the desirability of using extant or planned ground stations as the nuclei of regional centers for receiving and processing remote sensing data of different areas of the world. The studies which have been requested can be most useful in the subcommittee's future deliberations on what particular type of international facilities and functions in the remote sensing area we wish to develop. We look forward to their completion.

The United States is also supportive of the growing number of seminars and symposia which are being held to acquaint scientists and potential users with the characteristics of current remote sensing experiments. In fact, at this very time, the week of June 8 through 13, NASA is sponsoring a major Earth Resources Symposium at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. More than 1,500 persons from a wide variety of fields are focusing on the practical applications of earth resources survey data gathered by satellites and aircraft. The results of Landsat experiments and of Skylab earth resources programs and the need for new data systems are being discussed.

This has been another important year in the exploration and use of outer space and in our deliberations on the wide variety of questions which those activities generate. The United Nations, through its specialized bodies such as this committee and through its Secretariat experts and staff, has again done much constructive and valuable work. The United States continues to view the Outer Space Committee and its subcommittees as examples of some of the best aspects and best hopes for multilateral diplomacy. We are looking at highly complex questions with practical applications both now and in the distant future. We are working in a field of exploration into hitherto unknown areas and are developing new and sophisticated disciplines. Most of all, we are working to apply the benefits of these activities to improve the lives of all peoples. It is therefore with considerable pleasure that my delegation looks forward to our continued work and future progress.

STATEMENT BY MR. STOWE

Although it was not originally the intention of my delegation to address the substance of the remote sensing debates which have taken place in our subcommittees, we have heard recently, and in particular this morning, a number of assertions which we feel must be responded to.

First, we believe that there has been an effective and constructive effort underway to deal with the extremely complex issues involved in remote sensing. We disagree with those who claim that no progress has been made. Substantial work is now in progress, and it should be recognized.

A very important aspect of current remote sensing activities is that they involve and are being pursued under programs and projects of international cooperation. We have heard apparent distress from at least one delegation about what was called the unilateral nature of present activities. This is somewhat remarkable. Under the Landsat program—and I refer to that program because it is the only one which is making data available—data collected by satellite are received by earth stations in four separate countries, and others are now building substations. Scientific and research projects are in process or are completed using these data in 55 countries, and we know of at least five major international organizations which are using the available data in scientific studies. This does not appear to be a classic definition of a unilateral program. Major progress is being made in the use and application of remotely sensed data, and much of it is of substantial benefit to many countries.

If, on the other hand, this concern is that data are available from only one source, then I suggest that complaints such as we heard this morning about reliance on the good will of the data provider are quite ill considered. If it had not been for the good will of this space power for the last 15 years, there would be remarkably little data at all publicly available. The international community has not received data from anyone else.

Furthermore, we are not the ones who wish to restrict data availability. On the one hand we hear concern about the reliability of data availability; on the other hand, we hear from the same parties proposals which in fact could go quite far toward reducing the benefits which all but space powers could derive.

We are mindful of the concerns expressed by many states about how data are to be controlled, distributed, or used. It is clear, of course, to the representatives here that raw sensed data coming from a satellite have relatively little intrinsic value. To be of use they must be processed, interpreted, and combined with other data of a corroborative nature.

Maximum use of the remotely sensed data requires an environment of cooperation. It assumes availability of trained scientists and specialists, and it produces information that can help finance and sustain the professionals necessary to use the data. Restriction of the collection and dissemination of data would be strongly in favor of the countries with a satellite operational capability and strongly adverse to the interests of developing countries.

Several countries today possess the capability to build and launch remote sensing satellites. We believe that by 1980 the number could be doubled or trebled. Few countries who may develop the capability to conduct such sensing could reasonably be expected to become party to a treaty which would deny this right, a right which is guaranteed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

Therefore, to insure that data collected are not to be held or unilaterally employed by a sensing state to its exclusive advantage, it is our view that this committee and the international community should endorse recommendations that data collected must be made available on nondiscriminatory terms to anyone wishing to use them. Any alternative structure that we have seen proposed would result in unilateral control of data by sensing states, putting all others potentially

at a disadvantage. We believe that any other approach invites exclusion, discrimination, and reduced timeliness of data, and in some cases, perhaps eventual denial of access completely.

If one or a selected number of earth stations are built in a system wherein data are controlled, each earth station operator would be in a highly privileged role. On the other hand, if each country must establish its own station, costs multiply enormously. Administrative problems arise, and restrictions generate hostility and friction, which in our view constitute greater dangers than those posed by access to the data.

We strenuously urge those delegations which are promoting restrictive systems of dissemination based on prior consent to reexamine the long-range practical consequences of such an approach. As I said, it appears to us that no nation with the capability is likely to voluntarily forgo its right to conduct peaceful uses and scientific research using remotely sensed data from satellites. We believe that such uses are clearly within the scope of the legal principles of the 1967 treaty.

Suggestions have been made here that there is a juridical vacuum in place of any legal norms for the conduct of remote sensing. These suggestions overlook the provisions of several existing international agreements, most notably the Outer Space Treaty itself. The very first article of that treaty states that "There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space," and provides that ". . . States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigations." Remote sensing is surely within the scope of such investigation, with the evidence accumulating day by day of its scientific contribution, and it is as surely a peaceful use of outer space.

My delegation views the proposals to impose new, restrictive rules as retrogressive and counter to our aims of securing the benefits of the peaceful activities in which 55 states are now participating.

It is because of these significant differ-

ences of view that my delegation has urged that the Legal Subcommittee concentrate on detailed, precise analysis of the implications of remote sensing before beginning a drafting exercise. We would consider it irresponsible to do otherwise. This does not preclude us from attempting to draft provisions on areas which have been clarified, and we would have no interest in opposing such efforts.

Our position is not one of wishing to preclude drafting; it is one of attempting to avoid reversing a logical chain of events. First we should understand generally what we wish to do, and then we should attempt to codify those goals. I do believe, on the basis of informal consultations, that a compromise can be worked out with regard to the mandate for next year's session of the Legal Subcommittee.

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 13, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 66 dated June 13

We have today unmistakably affirmed the conviction of this Council that those concerned must commit themselves to rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement on Cyprus. Our responsibilities under the U.N. Charter, together with the prolonged suffering of all the Cypriot people, make this an urgent requirement.

The United States welcomes the recent agreement of the parties concerned to resume the Vienna discussions on July 24. We thank the Secretary General for the great skill and patience he has shown in helping to advance these talks and in preserving

their momentum. His objective, thoughtful report emphasizes not only the hopeful start which has been made but also the patient efforts, good faith, and mutual understanding which are still required to achieve a settlement. The continued skillful assistance of the Secretary General will be essential to the success of this process.

The U.N. Force in Cyprus, whose mandate we have just extended, has continued to make an outstanding contribution to the safety and welfare of all the people of Cyprus. In so doing, it has also significantly assisted the negotiating process. The Secretary General's Representative on Cyprus, the Commander of the U.N. Force, and his staff and men have continued to demonstrate the professional ability and sensitive understanding the world has come to expect of them. We earnestly hope that all parties will make every effort to assist, and to safeguard, the men of the Force as they carry out their demanding tasks.

My government fully supports the action which the Council has just taken. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State have in recent days directly urged the parties to recognize the paramount importance of reaching a settlement through free negotiations among themselves and to make effective use of the assistance to them which the Council has provided in the personal auspices of the Secretary General. We join this Council and the world community in emphasizing that progress must be made toward permanent peace on Cyprus—and it must be made now.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹

The Security Council,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1975 (S/11717) that in existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform

the tasks it is currently undertaking if the ceasefire is to be maintained in the island and the search for a peaceful settlement facilitated,

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

Noting further that, in paragraphs 67 and 68 of his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view, in connexion with the talks in Vienna between the representatives of the two communities held pursuant to resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, that the negotiating process should be maintained and, if possible, accelerated and that its success would require from all parties determination, understanding and a willingness to make reciprocal gestures,

Noting also the statement by the Secretary-General contained in paragraph 69 of his report that the parties concerned had signified their concurrence in his recommendation that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1975,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of UNFICYP and on other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;

2. *Reaffirms once again* its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975);

3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;

4. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1975 in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;

5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in its continuing performance of its duties;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made, and to submit an interim report by 15 September 1975 and a definitive report not later than 15 December 1975.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/370 (1975); adopted by the Council on June 13 by a vote of 14 to 0, with the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Airline Services

The Department of State announced on July 8 (press release 359) that diplomatic notes had been exchanged on July 7 at Lima bringing into effect an understanding between the United States and Peru which will govern airline services between the two countries for a three-year period. Ambassador Robert W. Dean signed the U.S. notes and Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de la Flor signed for Peru. (For texts of the understanding and the exchanges of notes, see press release 359).

The understanding allows Braniff Airways, the designated U.S. airline serving Peru, to operate 15 roundtrip flights per week between U.S. points and Lima via intermediate points. Ten of these flights may operate beyond Lima to Santiago, La Paz, Asunción, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The Peruvian designated airline, AeroPeru, will be allowed to operate air services between Lima and Los Angeles, Miami, and New York via intermediate points at certain specified frequency levels.

The two governments also agreed in a separate exchange of notes on steps each country would take to allow the airlines to implement the rights accorded in the understanding. Services previously operated by the airlines may be restored immediately up to the levels specified in the understanding, and each government will use its best efforts to issue new or amended operating permits to the airlines by mid-September.

This new agreement, which supplements the U.S.-Peru Air Transport Agreement of 1946, resolves through negotiation the civil aviation issues which arose between the governments earlier this year.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.¹
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, July 2, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹

Signature: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 30, 1975.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 30, 1975; Denmark, Sweden, July 1, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7988.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, June 12, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Peru, July 9, 1975.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²

Accession deposited: Peru, July 1, 1975.

BILATERAL

Israel

Joint statement of the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade relating to expansion of economic cooperation. Signed at Washington May 13, 1975. Entered into force May 13, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreements of February 21, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7573, 7572, 7571, 7981, 8020), relating to certain fisheries problems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, fishing operations in the northeastern Pacific Ocean, and fishing for king and tanner crab. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Western Europe Released

Press release 314 dated June 4 (for release June 10)

The Department of State released on June 10 "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949," volume IV, "Western Europe." This volume is the latest in a series which has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. The volume now released is the third of a projected nine volumes documenting American foreign policy during the year 1949. Previously two volumes were published—one concerned with policy toward Austria and Germany and the other, with China.

This volume of 854 pages presents documentation—hitherto unpublished and of the highest classification—on such major issues as the participation by the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the interest of the United States in the economic recovery of Western Europe, the future of the Free Territory of Trieste, and the disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa. A selective but comprehensive outline of the relations of the United States with the countries of Western Europe (exclusive of Austria and Germany) is documented with particularly significant bodies of papers on relations with France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Prominent personages who figure importantly in the pages of this volume include President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Under Secretary of State Webb, British Foreign Secretary Bevin, French Foreign Minister Schuman, W. Averell Harriman, and Paul Hoffman.

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Volume IV (listed as Department of State publica-

tion 8791; GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. IV) may be purchased for \$11.15 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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1974 Report of the Visa Office. This report by the Department of State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs shows in graphs and charts the nature and volume of visa activity for fiscal year 1974. Pub. 8810. Department and Foreign Service Series 150. 84 pp. \$1.70. (Cat. No. S1.69:8810).

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International Labor Organization—Amendment of the Constitution. Instrument of amendment adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization, at the fifty-seventh session, Geneva, June 22, 1972. 8 pp. 30¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7987).

Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan. Arrangement with Japan relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 7989. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7989).

Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the July 7 issue:

p. 43, col. 1: The second sentence of the second full paragraph should read: "Coupled with positive action, such clarity is called for to insure a peaceful and realistic settlement of the territory's future."

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| *356 | 7/7 | Kissinger Scholarship Fund awards. |
| *357 | 7/8 | U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, July 23. |
| *358 | 7/8 | Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements established. |
| 359 | 7/8 | U.S.-Peru air transport understanding (rewrite). |
| †360 | 7/9 | Kissinger: departure, Andrews AFB. |
| 361 | 7/10 | Sisco: House International Relations Committee. |
| *362 | 7/10 | Kissinger: arrival, Paris, July 9. |
| †363 | 7/10 | Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: remarks, Paris. |
| *364 | 7/11 | Twenty-one foreign energy research leaders to visit major U.S. facilities. |
| *365 | 7/11 | Heroism award presented posthumously to Ronald A. Webb. |
| †366 | 7/11 | Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: remarks, Paris, July 10. |
| †367 | 7/11 | Kissinger: arrival, Geneva, July 10. |
| †368 | 7/11 | Kissinger, Gromyko: remarks, Geneva, July 10. |
| †369 | 7/11 | U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique. |

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.