



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Business Week Magazine

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger on December 23 by Business Week Editor in Chief Lewis H. Young, Washington Bureau Chief Robert E. Farrell, and Boyd France, State Department correspondent for the magazine, which was published in the January 13 issue of Business Week.

Press release 2 dated January 2

Q. Until recently it was the U.S. position that the energy crisis could be solved only by an immediate and substantial reduction in the price of imported oil. Why has that policy changed?

Secretary Kissinger: I would disagree with the word "immediate." It has been the U.S. position that the energy crisis cannot be fundamentally changed without a substantial reduction in the price of oil. This remains our view. It is also our view that the prospects for an immediate reduction in oil prices are poor. I have always had the most serious doubts that an immediate reduction in oil prices could be achieved, because I did not see the incentives for the oil producers to do this in the absence of consumer solidarity. A reduction in energy prices is important. It must be achieved, and we must organize ourselves to bring it about as rapidly as possible.

Q. Why was it impossible to reduce the price of oil immediately?

Secretary Kissinger: Because in the absence of consumer solidarity, pressures required to bring oil prices down would create a political crisis of the first magnitude. And this would tempt other consuming countries simply stepping into the vacuum created by the United States and would therefore not be effective.

Q. Can you describe the kind of political problems that would develop without consumer solidarity?

Secretary Kissinger: The only chance to bring oil prices down immediately would be massive political warfare against countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them risk their political stability and maybe their security if they did not cooperate. That is too high a price to pay even for an immediate reduction in oil prices.

If you bring about an overthrow of the existing system in Saudi Arabia and a Qadhafi takes over, or if you break Iran's image of being capable of resisting outside pressures, you're going to open up political trends which could defeat your economic objectives. Economic pressures or incentives, on the other hand, take time to organize and cannot be effective without consumer solidarity. Moreover, if we had created the political crisis that I described, we would almost certainly have had to do it against the opposition of Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

Q. In your University of Chicago speech [Nov. 14, 1974], you said, "The price of oil will come down only when objective conditions for a reduction are created, and not before." What are these objective conditions, and when do you think they will be achieved?

Secretary Kissinger: The objective conditions depend upon a number of factors: One, a degree of consumer solidarity that makes the consumers less vulnerable to the threat of embargo and to the dangers of financial collapse. Secondly, a systematic effort at energy conservation of sufficient magnitude to impose difficult choices on the producing countries. Thirdly, institutions of financial soli-

clarity so that individual countries are not so obsessed by their sense of impotence that they are prepared to negotiate on the producers' terms. Fourth, and most important, to bring in alternative sources of energy as rapidly as possible so that that combination of new discoveries of oil, new oil-producing countries, and new sources of energy creates a supply situation in which it will be increasingly difficult for the cartel to operate. We think the beginning of this will occur within two to three years.

Q. Over the past year the oil producers have been able to cut back production as demand has declined. Doesn't that indicate that conservation alone will not break the oil cartel?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there's a limit beyond which that cannot go. Many producers are dependent on their revenues for economic development. Countries which can cut production most painlessly are those that are simply piling up balances. Countries that need oil revenues for their economic development, like Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela, do not have an unlimited capacity to cut their production. If the production of these countries is cut by any significant percentage, their whole economic development plan will be in severe jeopardy. Therefore the problem of distributing the cuts is going to become more and more severe. I understand that Libya has already had to take a disproportionate amount of the reductions, which it can do because it has really no means of spending all its income. In the absence of an Arab-Israeli explosion, Saudi Arabia's incentive to cut production indefinitely is limited for political reasons. Other countries will have less and less of an economic incentive to cut production. As the number of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries increases and as alternative sources come in, I think these cuts will grow increasingly difficult to distribute.

Q. Are the conservation goals to cut something like 3 million barrels a day in 1975 enough?

Secretary Kissinger: I think 3 million bar-

rels a day will be enough, plus alternative sources, plus an increase in later years. We have to continue this conservation over the years.

Q. Are the Europeans accepting your proposal for a 1-million-barrel-a-day cut by the United States and a 2-million-barrel-a-day cut by the other consumers? Or are they pressing for a more equal distribution?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to announce our conservation plans more concretely before we will have an effective negotiating position with the Europeans. I believe that the major objective of our strategy can be implemented, and the desire of some European countries for a consumer-producer conference can be used to accelerate consumer cooperation. We will not go to a consumer-producer conference without prior agreement on consumer cooperation.

Q. Are there any political pressures the United States can bring to bear on the oil cartel?

Secretary Kissinger: A country of the magnitude of the United States is never without political recourse. Certainly countries will have to think twice about raising their prices, because it would certainly involve some political cost. But I don't want to go into this very deeply.

Q. Businessmen ask why we haven't been able to exploit King Faisal's fear of communism to help lower prices.

Secretary Kissinger: We have a delicate problem there. It is to maintain the relationship of friendship that they have felt for us, yet make clear the consequences of these prices on the structure of the West and of the non-Communist world.

I think we will find that Saudi Arabia will not be the leader in the reduction of prices but that it will not be an impediment to a reduction if enough momentum can be created in the Arab world—indeed, it will be discreetly encouraging.

The Saudi Government has performed the enormously skillful act of surviving in a leadership position in an increasingly radical

Arab world. It is doing that by carefully balancing itself among the various factions and acting as a resultant of a relation of forces and never getting too far out ahead. Therefore I never for a moment believed, nor do I believe today, that the lead in cutting prices will be taken by Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the Saudis will happily support a cut in prices proposed by others. The Saudis have no interest in keeping up prices. They don't know what to do with their income today.

Q. But all along it has seemed that the Saudis have taken the lead in saying they want to get the price of oil down and that has never happened. In fact the joke is we can't take another cut in oil prices from the Saudis because we can't afford it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that's true. I have always assessed the Saudi statements in the context of their positioning themselves in a general constellation of forces. In my opinion, they will not take the lead. But they will not oppose it.

Q. Who is likely to take the lead, or what producer nations?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my opinion that a reduction in prices cannot come from Iran alone, though its voice is important, given the powerful personality of the Shah.

Among the Arab countries Algeria is important; Kuwait could be important; Syria, even though it's not an OPEC country, has a moral influence for political reasons. But it will not come, in my view, from Saudi Arabia.

Q. Do you think there is something that could happen in the Arab-Israeli situation that could result in a reduction in oil prices?

Secretary Kissinger: Not really. I think that if the situation deteriorates there could be a reduction in supply. I don't believe it is wise for us to try to sell the Israeli concessions for a reduction in oil prices, because this would create the basis for pressures in the opposite direction during a stalemate. Every time the OPEC countries want something from us politically, they could threaten to raise the prices again.

Q. So there's nothing tied to the Jerusalem problem or the refugee problem that would have anything to do with the price of oil?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has never been raised.

Q. Many bankers claim that all the schemes for recycling oil money—including the one you suggested in the University of Chicago speech—are only band-aids because each scheme piles bad debt on top of good. Most of the countries have no way to ever repay the loans. Do you see how the \$25 billion fund you proposed would be repaid?

Secretary Kissinger: We have two problems. We have an economic problem, and we have a political problem. The political problem is that the whole Western world, with the exception perhaps of the United States, is suffering from political malaise, from inner uncertainty and a lack of direction. This also affects economic conditions because it means that you have no settled expectations for the future and therefore a lowered willingness to take risks.

One of the principal objectives of our energy policy is to restore among the industrialized countries some sense that they can master their own fate. And even if this would involve some questionable debts, these are debts that have to be met somehow. It would be enormously important for the general cohesion of the industrialized world, and for its capacity to deal with the future, that they are dealt with systematically and not as the outgrowth of some crisis. Moreover, one way of disciplining some of the industrial countries is by the conditions that are attached to the funds that might be available.

Q. Where would this \$25 billion come from?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, small sums from other countries.

Q. But the United States and West Germany would bear the brunt?

Secretary Kissinger: That's probably true.

But you have to look at it as a guarantee rather than as a debt.

Q. Will this require congressional approval?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm told that we could actually do it by borrowing and not require congressional approval. However, we have decided that in undertaking even potential obligations of this magnitude we'd better seek some congressional concurrence.

Q. How long will it take this program to really get rolling?

Secretary Kissinger: We will not go to a producer-consumer conference without having this program well established. If we don't have consumer solidarity, we're better off conducting bilateral negotiations with the producers. However, I think that within the next three months—by the end of March certainly—the major elements of our program will be in place.

Q. Who will have the job of getting these elements in place?

Secretary Kissinger: Our new Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. [Charles W.] Robinson; Tom Enders [Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Thomas O. Enders]. Of course, the Treasury Department has a vital role. Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon has been intimately associated with the entire program. We have a committee dealing with the international implications of the oil crisis. It is composed of myself, Simon, Bennett [Jack F. Bennett, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs], Robinson, Ingersoll [Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll], Burns [Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System]. Another committee, under Secretary [of the Interior Rogers C. B.] Morton, links domestic and international policy.

Q. Have you had any discussion with the Soviets about what their position would be if there were a confrontation between the

oil cartel and the Western consumer governments?

Secretary Kissinger: No, and I think it would be a very foolish question to ask them.

Q. Do you know if the Arabs are using their petrodollars to force a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think they've done it up to now. If we don't have consumer solidarity that may happen eventually.

Q. There was some concern last month about the British pound.

Secretary Kissinger: I've seen these reports. They were denied. It is certainly an option they have. And that is one reason why we are so determined to create institutions of financial solidarity; because if you have these institutions, then that sort of pressure will not be possible. The producers could not take on one currency then.

Q. Is it possible that we may have to engage in an emergency financial bailout of Italy or Britain before the financial facility is in place?

Secretary Kissinger: Very possibly, in this sense, the proposed facility merely institutionalizes what will have to happen anyway, because if present trends continue, there will have to be a bailout sooner or later. But it makes a lot of difference whether you bail somebody out in an emergency and therefore enhance the sense of vulnerability and create conditions for a new emergency. Or whether, having perceived the emergency, you can convey to the public that there is a structure that makes it possible to master your fate and to deal with difficulties institutionally.

Q. How do you rate the chances for another Arab-Israeli war in the spring?

Secretary Kissinger: In the absence of a political settlement there is always the danger of another Arab-Israeli war. On the other hand, war is talked about much too loosely. Both sides lost grievously in the

last war. Neither side really won. I think the readiness of either side to go to war is often exaggerated. I also believe that there is some possibility of political progress before the spring.

Q. Then you don't anticipate the possibility of another oil embargo soon?

Secretary Kissinger: Not unless there is a war.

Q. Well, what about after the spring?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't anticipate an oil embargo in the absence of war. I am not even sure of an oil embargo in the event of a war. It would now be a much more serious decision than it was the last time. We're now engaged in rather delicate negotiations and these still show promise, so why speculate about their failure while they're still in train?

Q. The Shah of Iran has indicated that in the next war he'd be on the side of the Arabs. Does this represent to you a shifting of forces over there?

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to analyze exactly what he said. In the past the Shah maintained a rather neutral position. What he means by being on the side of the Arabs I would have to understand a little better. But obviously the trends in the Moslem world are in the direction of greater solidarity.

Q. Have the Israelis indicated to you a willingness to give back the oil lands in the Sinai they captured in the 1967 war?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go into the details of any specific ideas the Israelis may have suggested, but the Israelis have indicated their willingness to make some further territorial withdrawals.

Q. One of the things we also hear from businessmen is that in the long run the only answer to the oil cartel is some sort of military action. Have you considered military action on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: Military action on oil prices?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: A very dangerous course. We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price; it's another where there is some actual strangulation of the industrialized world.

Q. Do you worry about what the Soviets would do in the Middle East if there were any military action against the cartel?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this is a good thing to speculate about. Any President who would resort to military action in the Middle East without worrying what the Soviets would do would have to be reckless. The question is to what extent he would let himself be deterred by it. But you cannot say you would not consider what the Soviets would do. I want to make clear, however, that the use of force would be considered only in the gravest emergency.

Q. What do you expect is going to be achieved in the first meeting between the consumers and the producers?

Secretary Kissinger: The industrialized nations suffer in general from the illusion that talk is a substitute for substance. And what *might* happen is used as an excuse for not doing what *can* happen. What can happen at a consumer-producer meeting depends entirely upon whether the consumers manage to bring about concrete cooperation and whether they can concert common positions *before* the conference. In the absence of these two conditions, the consumer-producer conference will not take place with our participation. If it did take place, it would only repeat in a multilateral forum the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

There is too much talk to the effect that there is no consumer-producer dialogue now. There's plenty of dialogue. We talk to *all*

of the producers. We have excellent relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Europeans are talking to the producers; the Japanese are talking to the producers.

We do not suffer from the absence of dialogue, but from the absence of a systematic approach, the lack of a clear direction in which to go. If you don't have a systematic coordinated approach, then a consumer-producer conference can only repeat in a multilateral forum under worse circumstances what is already going on bilaterally. So you ought to ask me the question again in about two months, when we're further down the road.

But I want to make absolutely clear that the United States is willing to have this conference. It is in fact eager to have a consumer-producer dialogue. In our original proposals to the Washington Energy Conference in February, we argued that consumer cooperation must lead as soon as possible to a consumer-producer dialogue. At that time we envisaged it for the fall of 1974. But we also want the dialogue to be serious and concrete.

It must deal with the problem of recycling. It must deal with the problem of the less developed countries. It must deal with the problem of price over a period of time. In terms of the producers, we can consider some assurance of long-term development for them. But all this requires some very careful preparation.

Q. Does President Giscard d'Estaing now share our views as to how the consumer-producer conference should go forward?

Secretary Kissinger: It's my impression that he shares it. Of course he has to speak for himself. But he can be under no misapprehension of our view of the matter.

Q. Many people have felt that the U.N. meeting on population in Bucharest last summer and the meeting on food in Rome were unsuccessful because there were too many countries represented at them. Will this problem plague the oil meetings, too?

Secretary Kissinger: None of the organizing countries have yet decided how many

countries to invite and in what manner to conduct the negotiations. Personally, I would favor a rather small negotiating group, but we will not make an issue of it. A lot of countries will favor this in theory until they come to the problem of whom to invite and whom to exclude, so the tendency will be toward expanding the membership. In general I would say the larger the membership the more unwieldy the procedures are likely to be and the more difficult it will be to achieve a consensus.

We worked hard to make the World Food Conference a success. I think that the proposals we made in Rome will probably be the basis of food policy for some time to come. Our basic point was that there already exists a large global food deficit which is certain to grow. The gap cannot be closed by the United States alone or even primarily. Whether our food aid is 4 million tons or 3 million tons is important for moral and humanitarian reasons; it is not decisive in dealing with the world food deficit, which is already approaching 25 million tons and which can grow to 80 million tons in 10 years.

What we need is a systematic effort to increase world food production, especially in the less developed countries, to have the exporting countries organize themselves so that they know where to put their efforts, and to improve world food distribution and financing. That was the major thrust of our ideas.

In addition, we're willing to give the maximum food aid that our economy can stand. But food aid by the United States cannot be decisive. It's a pity that it turned out to be the principal issue in the public debate. What happened after the conference in terms of setting up food reserves, exporters groups, and so forth actually indicates that progress is being made. The conference was quite successful, but the focus of some of the domestic debate was off center.

Q. What policy do you think the world has to adopt for making sure countries have access to raw materials?

Secretary Kissinger: Last year at the special session of the General Assembly, I

pointed out that we are facing a substantial change in world economic patterns. In the past, even the very recent past, almost all producing countries were afraid of surpluses. We're now in a period in which the idea of surpluses will seem a relic of a golden era. The pressures of population, industrialization, and increasing interdependence of the world economy impose on us some form of rational planning and interaction.

I proposed a systematic study of world resources, of raw materials, to obtain a systematic estimate of what we will be up against, even with good will, over a period of the next decade or so. I believe that we need the sort of coherent approach which is now being attempted in the field of energy; it will either be imposed on us or we will have to take the lead in developing it in other fields, including food. One of our efforts at the Rome food conference was to show how a constructive approach might work in contrast to a restrictive cartel approach of the energy producers.

Q. Do you think there will be any legislation in the United States because the food situation, in which we have the position of the OPEC countries, is an explosive political question domestically?

Secretary Kissinger: We're going to face a problem. We have to come to an understanding with the Congress about the proper relationship between the executive and the legislative functions—what Congress should legislate and what should be left to executive discretion. The attempt to prescribe every detail of policy by congressional action can, over a period of time, so stultify flexibility that you have no negotiating room left at all. We recognize that the Congress must exercise ultimate policy control. But what is meant by that, how much detail, is what we intend to discuss very seriously with the congressional leadership when it reassembles. I would hope that the Congress would keep in mind that we need some flexibility.

Now back to your question of how we can allocate food for use abroad and yet not drive food prices too high in this country. That's a tough problem. We have to make

decisions on that periodically in the light of crop reports, in the light of sustainable prices. Suppose we put on export controls that drove the prices down domestically, then we would also have a problem. We have to be prepared to pay some domestic price for our international position.

If Japan were suddenly cut off from major imports of American agricultural goods, you would almost certainly have a dramatic re-orientation of Japanese political life. That would have profound economic consequences for us also over a period of time. They may not be measurable today, they certainly are not fully demonstrable, but the consequences are certain.

On the other hand, if you undermine your domestic position totally in the sense that the American public thinks the high food prices are largely due to foreign sales, then you have another unmanageable problem. On the whole, the United States is a healthy society, so that the national leadership, if it explains its position properly, has a good chance of carrying the day.

Q. How long do you think the economies of Italy, the United Kingdom, and France can go without serious trouble because of the strains imposed by the oil deficits?

Secretary Kissinger: All West European economies, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, are going to be in more or less serious trouble within the next 18 months. Which is another reason for striving for a much closer coordination of economic policies.

Q. Can this economic trouble lead to political trouble?

Secretary Kissinger: Without any question. Every government is judged not only by its performance but whether it is believed to be trying to master the real problems before it. F. D. Roosevelt could go along for several years without a great improvement in the economic conditions because the public *believed* he was dealing with the problems. The danger of purely national policies is that they are patently inadequate for dealing with economic problems—especially in Europe—

and as the sense of impotence magnifies, the whole political base will erode.

As it is, the Communist vote in Italy, and to some extent in France, has remained constant regardless of economic conditions. A substantial proportion of the population has felt sufficiently disaffected with the system, even when the system was performing well, that they voted Communist in order to keep pressure on. As the Communist vote grows, the flexibility of the political system diminishes. Economic decline in Europe would therefore have serious political consequences.

Q. There appears to be a rise in enthusiasm for the far right, too, a feeling that what is needed is an authoritative man that can cope with these labor problems, these inflation problems, et cetera.

Secretary Kissinger: If you have a major economic crisis, the emergence of authoritarian governments of the left or the right is a distinct possibility.

Q. In Europe, the charge is made that you have sold out Western civilization for 18 months of peace in the Middle East. Why do Europeans feel this hostility toward the United States and toward you?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course I'd like to know who these Europeans are—for my own education. What would they have had us do?

Q. They're talking about military action.

Secretary Kissinger: The fact of the matter is that the governments they represent systematically opposed every move we made in the Middle East; every strong action that was taken in the Middle East was taken by the United States. Had we taken military action in the Middle East, we would have faced violent opposition from their own governments.

Our difficulty in the Middle East is caused in part by our inability to organize cooperation even for nonmilitary action. The efforts the administration made diplomatically to lift the oil embargo reduced, at least for a time, the dangers in the Middle East. It gave everyone a breathing space. We gave up nothing.

Except the possibility of military action, which was a chimerical idea.

When we went on a military alert for one day, we were accused of having done it for political reasons. Was it conceivable that in the middle of Watergate the United States take military action? And for what purpose?

Why are the Europeans so hostile to the United States? I think they suffer from an enormous feeling of insecurity. They recognize that their safety depends on the United States, their economic well-being depends on the United States, and they know that we're essentially right in what we're doing. So the sense of impotence, the inability to do domestically what they know to be right, produces a certain peevishness which always stops just short of policy actions. No foreign minister ever says this.

Q. Even though the trade bill has been passed, do you think the economic difficulties here in the United States and abroad will make it possible to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is essential that we go into these trade negotiations with the attitude of creating a new international trading system. It is the only hope we have of avoiding the political consequences we talked about earlier. If we begin to draw into ourselves, we will cause a loss of confidence. We must act as if these problems can be overcome. Maybe they can't be, but they will never be licked if we do not build a new international economic environment with some conviction.

Q. Will Congress' restrictions on Export-Import Bank credits have any impact on trade with the Soviet Union or détente?

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional restrictions have deprived the United States of important and maybe fundamental leverage. The Soviet Union was much more interested in credits than it was in trade, because for the next four or five years it will have very little to give in reciprocal trade.

And this is one of those examples I had in mind before. If the Congress cannot trust

the executive enough to use its credit authority with discretion, then Congress will not be able to deal with the problem by the sort of restrictions it put on—aimed at depriving the credit authority granted by Congress of any effective meaning.

Three hundred million dollars over a period of four years is simply not enough to use as a bargaining chip with a major country. It has no significant impact on its economy, and therefore it is the surest guarantee it will be wasted.

For two years, against the opposition of most newspapers, we refused to extend credit to the Soviet Union until there was an amelioration of its foreign policy conduct. You remember various congressional amendments were introduced urging us to liberalize trade. The corollary of this was if there was more moderate Soviet conduct, trade and credits could open up. I believe that the recent Soviet statements on Jewish emigration have been caused, in part, by Soviet disappointment with the credit restrictions.

But beyond that, a President who has only \$300 million of credit flexibility over four years is forced in a crisis more and more to rely on diplomatic or military pressures. He has no other cards. The economic card has been effectively removed from his hand.

Q. We were intrigued by the timing of the Soviet statement; it came when the trade bill was still in conference.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Soviets wanted to make clear ahead of time what their attitude was so later they could not be accused of having doublecrossed us.

Q. Do you think that Soviet disappointment over credits will cause a hardening of their position on emigration of Jews?

Secretary Kissinger: If these trends continue in the United States, you can expect a general hardening of the Soviet position across the board over a period of time. They will not go back to the cold war in one day. But there are many things the Soviet Union could do that would make our position much more complicated. What could happen in Europe, in the Middle East, in Southeast

Asia, if the Soviet Union pursued a policy of maximizing our difficulties? Most of the criticism leveled at the Soviet Union these days is that they are not solving our difficulties, not that they are exacerbating them. I think the restrictions on Exim credits will have an unfortunate effect on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q. Do you see any way that the countries of the world can better coordinate their economic and financial policies?

Secretary Kissinger: One interesting feature of our recent discussions with both the Europeans and Japanese has been this emphasis on the need for economic coordination. In April 1973, in my "Year of Europe" speech, I proposed the coordination of economic policies and of energy policies. At that time, the proposal was generally resisted on the grounds that we were trying to produce a linkage where the obligations had never run to economic matters. In all the recent meetings of the President with heads of government, and all the meetings I have had with Foreign Ministers, our allies and friends have absolutely insisted that we coordinate economic policies. So you have had a 180-degree turn in one year.

How you in fact coordinate policies is yet an unsolved problem, but it must be solved. Otherwise we will have a succession of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and countries trying to take a free ride on the actions of their partners.

Q. Do you believe we have to go beyond what is done at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know if we need new structures, but I think we need new approaches to existing structures. I haven't thought through whether we need new structures.

In the next 10 years you will have coordinated fiscal policy, including ours. I am not saying they have to be identical, but they have to be coordinated.

We have greater latitude than the others because we can do much on our own. The others can't. But it is an important aspect

of leadership to exercise our freedom of action with restraint and to let others participate in decisions affecting their future.

Q. Is there any chance of coordinating better U.S. international economic policy, particularly since the Council on International Economic Policy seems to be losing its power?

Secretary Kissinger: You can't look at policies of a government in terms of organizational mechanisms. The Council on International Economic Policy was created at a time when the National Security Council was essentially divorced from economic policies. Then it became clear that every economic policy had profound foreign policy implications and really required political inspiration and leadership to make it effective. You could never implement the energy policy as a purely economic matter; it has been a foreign policy matter from the beginning.

When that happens, the issue tends to be pulled back into the orbit of the National Security Council. What you have had is a greater foreign policy involvement in economic policy decisions.

On the other hand, I think the relations between the State Department and Treasury have never been better, despite the occasional disagreements that surface in the newspapers. You expect disagreements. The issue is not whether there are disagreements, but how they are settled. And they are always settled in a constructive, positive way.

On energy we have a group, which I described before, of Arthur Burns, Simon, myself, Robinson, and a few others who meet regularly to set the basic strategy in the international field. Whether we meet as the Council on International Economic Policy or as the National Security Council, the group has essentially the same membership.

Q. Should there be additional legislation to protect U.S. industry from ownership by Arab oil money? If so, what shape should the legislation take?

Secretary Kissinger: We are now study-

ing the ways that oil producers' money could be invested in the United States and what we should protect against. We haven't come to any conclusions because if you get a manageable minority interest, that would be in our interest. If you get actual control over strategic industries, then you have to determine how that control would be exercised before you know how to avoid it. There are some industrial segments we would not want to be dominated by potentially hostile investors. Since we haven't completed the study, I can't give you a conclusive answer. By the middle of January we will have concluded the study.

Q. Do you think a request for legislation will be the result of that study?

Secretary Kissinger: It may be a request for some sort of a board to monitor foreign investment, and the board would formulate some proposal. I am not sure about the shape of the proposal, but we need a systematic monitoring.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 Signed into Law

*Statement by President Ford*¹

I have signed S. 3394, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, with some reservations but with appreciation for the spirit of constructive compromise which motivated the Congress.

I sought a bill which would serve the interests of the United States in an increasingly interdependent world in which the strength and vitality of our own policies and society require purposeful and responsible participation in the international community. Foreign assistance is indispensable in exercising the role of leadership in the cooperative and peaceful resolution of conflicts, in pursuing political stability and economic

¹ Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 30 (text from White House press release); as enacted, the bill is Public Law 93-559, approved Dec. 30, 1974.

progress, and in expressing the American spirit of helping those less fortunate than we are.

In most respects, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 will serve those ends. It includes, however, several restrictions that may pose severe problems to our interests. I must bring them to the attention of the Congress as matters which will be of continuing concern and which may require our joint efforts to remedy if circumstances require.

First are the numerous and detailed limitations on assistance to Indochina. The economic and military assistance levels for Cambodia, particularly, are clearly inadequate to meet minimum basic needs. Our support is vital to help effect an early end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement. This is also the objective of the U.N. General Assembly, which approved a resolution calling for a negotiated settlement. I intend to discuss this critical issue with the congressional leadership at the earliest possible time.

In South Viet-Nam, we have consistently sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own futures free from enemy interference. It would be tragic indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the progress we have achieved by failing to provide the relatively modest but crucial aid which is so badly needed there. Our objective is to help South Viet-Nam to develop a viable, self-sufficient economy and the climate of security which will make that development possible. To this end, the economic aid requested represented the amount needed to support crucial capital development and agricultural productivity efforts. The lower amount finally approved makes less likely the achievement of our objectives and will significantly prolong the period needed for essential development.

I appreciate the spirit of compromise which motivated the Congress to extend to February 5, 1975, the period during which military

assistance to Turkey may continue under specified circumstances. I regret, however, that the restriction was imposed at all. Turkey remains a key element of U.S. security and political interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The threat of cutoff of aid, even if unfulfilled, cannot fail to have a damaging effect on our relations with one of our staunch NATO allies whose geographic position is of great strategic importance. This, in turn, could have a detrimental effect on our efforts to help achieve a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

I regret the action of the Congress in cutting off the modest program of military assistance to Chile. Although I share the concern of the Congress for the protection of human rights and look forward to continuing consultation with the Chilean Government on this matter, I do not regard this measure as an effective means for promoting that interest.

Finally, the Congress has directed that during the current fiscal year no more than 30 percent of concessional food aid should be allocated to countries which are not among those most seriously affected by food shortages—unless the President demonstrates that such food is required solely for humanitarian purposes. I understand and share the spirit of humanitarianism that prompted a statement of congressional policy on this subject. But that policy could unduly bind the flexibility of the United States in an arbitrary way in meeting the needs of friendly countries and in pursuing our various interests abroad.

As with other differences which the Congress and the executive branch worked out in consideration of this bill, I look forward to working with the 94th Congress in meeting and solving the problems that are still before us. We share the common goal of best serving the interests of the people of the United States. Working together, we shall continue to serve them responsibly.

International Narcotics Control: A High-Priority Program

*Address by Sheldon B. Vance*¹

Alcohol and drug problems are genuine concerns of anyone with management responsibilities, and in this sense my personal involvement is not new. However, my interest has been more immediate and full time since early this year when Secretary Kissinger named me his Senior Adviser on Narcotics Matters.

The Federal international narcotics control program is a combined effort of several U.S. agencies, operating within the framework of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which is chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger. I also serve as the Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee and therefore direct or coordinate, under the President's and Secretary's control, what our Federal Government is attempting to do abroad in this field, whether in the enforcement, treatment, or prevention areas.

My remarks today will not address alcohol abuse, not because we believe alcohol a lesser or insignificant problem—we definitely do not—but because our international narcotics control program does not extend to alcohol. The Cabinet Committee was, in fact, formed largely in response to the tragic victimization of American youth by heroin traffickers in the late 1960's and early 1970's. As you know, the same period also saw a sharp rise in the abuse of other drugs over which we seek tighter controls, including marihuana, hashish, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates,

tranquilizers, and LSD and other hallucinogens. Poly-drug abuse, the mixing or alternating consumption of different drugs, also emerged as a problem requiring special attention.

The American drug scene is not confined to our borders. It extends to our military forces and other Americans residing abroad, as well as to tourists. As of September 30 of this year, 1,289 U.S. citizens were languishing in foreign prisons on narcotics charges, principally in Mexico, Germany, Spain, and Canada. The 1,289 compares with the figure of 242 in September of 1969.

However hard we fight the problem of drug abuse at home, we cannot move significantly to solve it unless we succeed in winning and maintaining comprehensive and effective cooperation of foreign governments. Some of the key drugs of abuse originate in foreign countries. There is a legitimate need for opium as a source for codeine and other medicinal compounds, but illicit opium—from which heroin can be processed—has been produced in such countries as Turkey (prior to its ban), Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and neighboring Mexico. Opium is also being produced legally in India and Turkey for export and in Iran and a number of other countries for domestic medical and research utilization.

Some idea of the dimensions of our problem can be gained when we consider that the world's annual legal production of opium is close to 1,500 tons and illegal production is estimated at 1,200 tons. Similarly, the cocaine used in the United States is of foreign origin, produced as the coca plant princi-

¹ Made before the North American Congress on Alcohol and Drug Problems at San Francisco, Calif., on Dec. 17. Ambassador Vance is Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters.

pally in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Colombia transforms more coca paste into cocaine than other countries. Cannabis, from which we get marihuana and hashish, is both imported and grown in the United States; the biggest supplier of the U.S. market is Mexico, followed by Jamaica.

We have had our problems with U.S.-manufactured amphetamines, barbiturates, and other mind-bending drugs. We are attempting to deal with the U.S. sources through domestic measures, but for the foreign substances we must look to other governments for cooperation. Frequently, it has been a case of persuading them that the problem is not just ours but is also theirs.

We have been increasingly successful in these efforts since mid-1971, when stopping the flow of narcotics to the United States—with emphasis on heroin and cocaine—became one of our principal foreign policy objectives. At that time, the Department of State was assigned the primary responsibility for developing an intensified international narcotics control effort and for managing the expenditures under the program.

To encourage cooperation from other governments and to assist them and international organizations to strengthen their antidrug capabilities, we have provided an annual average of \$22 million in grant assistance over the past three years. Our request for international control funds for the current fiscal year is \$42.5 million. Our bilateral programs emphasize cooperative law enforcement and exchange of intelligence. The major categories of grant assistance are training programs and equipment for foreign enforcement personnel and financial assistance for crop substitution and related agricultural projects. We are also exploring useful cooperative ventures in the fields of drug abuse education, treatment, and prevention.

During the past two months, I visited many of the countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Asia to examine our programs and look for ways to strengthen them. I can report that all of these governments expressed a sincere willingness to help stamp out illicit production and trafficking. But

these governments also face serious internal problems. The opium poppy, for example, usually flourishes in the more isolated areas where central government control is weak or nonexistent. In many areas it is the only cash crop of unbelievably poor tribesmen, and it also provides their only medication and relief from serious disease and hardship.

On my trip I saw something of the poppy-growing areas in Afghanistan in Badakshan and Nangarhar Provinces and of the Buner and Swabi poppy-producing areas of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province when I drove from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Peshawar, Pakistan, through the Kabul Gorge and Khyber Pass and then went on to Islamabad by Pakistani Government helicopter. I also helicoptered over the northern mountains of Thailand, where the Meo hill tribes grow opium like the tribesmen in the neighboring mountains of Burma and Laos in what is called the Golden Triangle.

The experience vividly demonstrated to me the conditions which make it very difficult for these governments—despite a genuine desire to stamp out illegal opium—to control production effectively any time soon. We and producing countries cannot expect to see a high degree of success in our cooperative enforcement efforts until significant adjustments are made in the social attitudes and economic conditions in the opium-growing areas.

Western Hemisphere Control Programs

Mexico—Today, the number-one priority country in our international narcotics control efforts is Mexico. The Mexican opium crop and heroin laboratories are the current source of more than half of the heroin on our streets. The so-called Mexican brown heroin has not only moved into our largest cities but is also spreading to some of the smaller cities throughout our country. When President Ford met with President Echeverría in October, narcotics control was very high on their agenda and they agreed that an even more intensified joint effort is needed.

The Mexican Government under President

Echeverría has assigned high priority to its antidrug campaign and has directed Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada to coordinate its eradication and control efforts.

We are helping them by providing aircraft, mainly helicopters, to assist in the eradication of opium poppy cultivation in the western mountains. This cultivation is illegal in Mexico, and there is no question of the Mexican Government offering income substitution to the farmer. There is also a crash program to strengthen antismuggling controls on both sides of the border. Our crooks smuggle guns and appliances into Mexico, in coordination with their crooks who supply ours with heroin and marihuana. U.S.-Mexican cooperative measures are paying off, but much remains to be done before illicit trafficking can be reduced in a major way.

For fiscal year 1975, about \$10 million, or almost one-quarter, of our international narcotics control funds are being allocated to the Mexican program. Our Mexican neighbors are spending much more. My colleague John Bartels, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and I meet three or four times a year with our friend Pedro Ojeda Paullada, either in Mexico City or Washington, in order to coordinate our respective efforts.

Colombia—A country with extensive coastlines and huge land areas, Colombia is the major transit point for illegal shipments of cocaine entering the U.S. market. The Colombian Government has launched a great effort to eliminate the criminal element, to combat drug trafficking, and to crack down on the laboratories processing coca base smuggled in from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. The United States is moving forward with an assistance program tailored to help the new Colombian Government thrust. We are furnishing such enforcement items as jeeps, motorcycles, radios, and laboratory equipment. We are also providing antinarcotics technical training for the Judicial Police, the National Police, and Customs.

Jamaica—This Caribbean island has emerged as a major supplier of marihuana

to the United States, surpassed only by Mexico. Moreover, there is evidence that Jamaica is a transit point for the smuggling of cocaine and heroin to our country from South America. Within the past year, the Jamaican Government has undertaken major steps to curb illicit drug activities. In response to urgent requests for assistance from the Jamaican Government, U.S. technical assistance and equipment was extended to a Jamaican task force set up to intercept boats and aircraft engaged in narcotics smuggling, to disrupt trafficking rings, and to destroy commercial marihuana cultivation. Well over 600,000 pounds of commercially grown marihuana have been destroyed thus far. U.S. support consists of loaning of helicopters and transfers of communications equipment and investigative-enforcement aids together with training and technical assistance.

The Situation in Turkey

Turkey—In 1971, with the realization that a substantial amount of opium legally produced in Turkey was being diverted to illicit narcotics trafficking, the Turkish Government concluded that a total ban on poppy growing would be the most effective way to stop the leakage. However, the Turkish Government which assumed office in January 1974 reconsidered the ban, amid great internal political debate, and on July 1 rescinded it on the grounds that what is grown in Turkey is a sovereign decision of the Turks.

In high-level dialogue between our two governments we have made clear our very deep concern at the possibility of a renewed massive flow of heroin from Turkish opium to the United States. We stressed our hope they would adopt effective controls. A special U.N. team held discussions on this subject in Turkey on the invitation of the Turkish Government, which has stated publicly many times that it will not allow its resumption of poppy cultivation to injure other peoples.

In mid-September, the Turkish Government issued a statement that it would adopt

a method of harvesting the poppies called the poppy straw process, which involves the collection by the Turkish Government of the whole poppy pod rather than opium gum. This was the procedure recommended by the U.N. experts. Traditionally, the opium gum was taken by the farmers through lancing the pod in the field, and it was a portion of this gum that was illegally bought by the traffickers.

Last month I talked with senior Turkish Government officials and with police officials. The word has moved all the way down the chain to the poppy farmer that opium gum production is definitely prohibited, and the enforcement mechanism is moving into place. Turkey and the U.N. narcotics organization are cooperating fully in this effort, and all will be watching closely to endeavor to prevent and to head off diversions into the illicit traffic.

Joint Efforts in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia—The Golden Triangle area, where Burma, Laos, and Thailand come together, is the largest source of illicit opium in the world, with an estimated annual production of 600–700 tons. Most of this production is consumed by opium or heroin smokers in Southeast Asia. Since 1970, when heroin processed from opium in Golden Triangle refineries began to become widely available to U.S. troops in Viet-Nam, we have been concerned that heroin from this source would increasingly reach the United States, especially as the ban on opium production in Turkey and disruption efforts along the way dried up the traditional Middle Eastern-European route to the United States.

For the past three years, therefore, we have made Southeast Asia a major object of our international control efforts. We have devoted a significant share of our suppression efforts and resources to our cooperative programs in Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. The biggest concentration has been in Thailand, which serves as the major transit area for Burmese-origin opium. A recent series of agreements for

U.S. assistance to Thailand include helicopters, communications equipment, vehicles, and training programs. Important steps were also taken on the income-substitution side, including the approval of an aerial survey of northern Thailand, where opium is grown by the hill tribes. In Burma, the government has stepped up its antinarcotics efforts. For fiscal year 1975, Southeast Asia will account for over \$10 million of our international narcotics control funds.

While our joint suppression efforts are making some headway in Southeast Asia, we should not view the situation there through rose-colored glasses. Antinarcotics efforts in Southeast Asia run up against several unique problems. Burma and Thailand are threatened by insurgent groups which control or harass large areas of the opium-growing regions. The governments have limited resources and few trained personnel available for narcotics control. In addition, the lack of internal security hampers police action and intelligence operations against traffickers. The Government of Burma, for example, does not have effective administrative control over a significant portion of the area where most Asian poppies are grown.

The topography of the Golden Triangle area is mountainous, wild, and uncontrollable. When one smuggling route is uncovered and plugged by police and customs teams, the traffickers can easily detour to alternate routes and modes of transportation. We need only look at the difficulties that our own well-trained and well-equipped law enforcement agencies have in blocking narcotics traffic across our clearly defined peaceful border with Mexico to gain a better appreciation of the difficulties in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, use of opium has been tolerated in the area, and opium has been regarded as a legitimate commodity of commerce for centuries under both colonial and indigenous governments. For the hill tribes, opium is still the principal source of medicinal relief for endemic diseases and is also the most lucrative crop to sell or barter for basic necessities. We are actively seeking alternative crops and other sources of income for these

peoples, in close cooperation with similar efforts by the U.N. narcotics organizations; but progress will be slow, as a way of life of primitive and remote peoples must be modified.

And so the situation in Southeast Asia is complex and long term.

Multilateral Approaches

Concurrently with our bilateral action programs, we have given full support to the multilateral or international efforts in the fight against illicit narcotics production and trafficking.

For example, the United States was a leading proponent of the establishment of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. To date, we have contributed \$10 million of the \$13.5 million made available to the Fund by all countries. In Thailand, the Fund is assisting in a comprehensive program designed to develop alternate economic opportunities for those who grow opium; the Fund has a similar project in Lebanon for the development of alternatives to cannabis production. Within the past year, the Fund has financed a World Health Organization worldwide study of the epidemiology of drug dependence which we hope will contribute toward clarifying the nature of the problem we seek to solve. It is also financing treatment and rehabilitation activities for drug addicts in Thailand, fellowships and consultancies in rehabilitation in various countries, and seminars on community rehabilitation programs in Europe.

The U.S. Government has also taken a leading role in formulating two major pieces of international narcotics legislation. The first relates to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. I am happy to report that the U.S.-sponsored amending protocol, which would considerably strengthen controls over illicit production and trafficking, has been ratified by 32 of the 40 countries necessary for its coming into force. The United States was one of the first countries to ratify the protocol, on November 1, 1972.

The second major area of international legislation pertains to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which would provide international control over LSD and other hallucinogens, the amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers. The administration submitted the convention to the Senate in mid-1971 with a request for its ratification. We are now waiting for congressional approval of the proposed enabling domestic legislation that would pave the way for ratification of this essential international treaty. U.S. approval of the Psychotropic Convention would strengthen our hand in obtaining cooperation from other governments in controlling the classic narcotic substances.

The approach to a successful antidrug program cannot, of course, relate to supply alone. Nor is an attack on the demand side alone the answer. Only through a combined effort can the job be done. Thus the initial objective of our international program has been to reduce availabilities of illicit supplies so that addicts will be driven into treatment and others will be deterred from experimentation. We are also examining ways to foster international cooperation in the fields of treatment and prevention to augment awareness that drug abuse is not exclusively an American problem but one that seriously affects developing countries just as it plagues the affluent. We also hope to demonstrate our progress in treatment and prevention and to learn from other countries the methods that they have found effective.

As many of you know, we have several cooperative treatment and research projects with a number of concerned governments throughout the world. For example, with the Government of Mexico through Dr. Guido Belsasso's organization, the Mexican Center for Drug Dependency Research, we have provided some assistance to the Mexican epidemiological study and we are jointly studying heroin use along our common border.

I think we can point with pride to our role over the past three years toward a tightening of international controls. Worldwide seizures and arrests of traffickers have become more

and more significant as other countries have joined in the battle. And there has been a move in the direction of more effective controls through treaty obligations. However, the job is far from done. It should be apparent to us all that abundant supplies of narcotics—both in storage and under cultivation—quickly respond to illicit high profits. Our task, then, is to further strengthen the international control mechanism to reduce illicit trafficking.

On October 18, John Bartels, the Administrator of DEA, Dr. Robert DuPont, Director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, and I met with President Ford to review the U.S. drug abuse programs. The President stated that he had personally seen examples of the human devastation caused by drug abuse and said he wanted every appropriate step taken to further the U.S. Government's drug abuse program both at home and abroad. On the international front, the President specifically directed that all American Ambassadors be made aware of the prime importance he attaches to our efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the United States and requested that each Ambassador review the activities of his mission in support of the drug program.

Thus, drug control continues to be a high-priority foreign policy issue. In cooperation with our missions abroad and the governments to which they are accredited, we shall carry on with our efforts against the scourge of drug abuse.

Department Welcomes TWA-Swissair Agreement on Airline Capacity

*Department Announcement*¹

The Department of State welcomes the announcement by Trans World Airlines (TWA) that it has reached an agreement with Swissair for the reduction of airline capacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market for the summer 1975 season. The agreement, which is subject to the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board, will reduce the overall capacity in the U.S.-Switzerland market by over 25 percent compared with the 1973 base year. The Swissair reduction will be even larger because the agreement calls for an expansion of TWA services in order to improve its position in the U.S.-Switzerland market.

The United States had earlier requested consultations with Switzerland concerning the problem of excess capacity. The U.S. Government is now considering whether the proposed agreement between the two airlines will make intergovernmental talks unnecessary insofar as the upcoming summer season is concerned.

The reduction of excess capacity in the transatlantic market is part of the President's seven-point action program to assist the U.S. international airline industry.

¹ Issued on Dec. 23 (text from press release 543); the announcement by TWA was included in the Department's press release.

U.S. Warns That Present Voting Trends May Overshadow Positive Achievements of the United Nations

Following are statements made in the U.N. General Assembly on December 6 and 12 by U.S. Representative John Scali, together with the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on December 12.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

Statement of December 6

USUN press release 191 dated December 6

Last year the U.S. delegation sought to call attention to a trend which we believed threatened the U.N.'s potential as an instrument for international cooperation. We were deeply concerned then over the growing tendency of this organization to adopt one-sided, unrealistic resolutions that cannot be implemented.

Today, more than a year later, my delegation feels that we must return to this subject because this trend has not only continued but accelerated. Added to this, there is now a new threat—an arbitrary disregard of U.N. rules, even of its charter. What my delegation spoke of 12 months ago as a potential threat to this organization, unhappily, has become today a clear and present danger.

The U.S. Government has already made clear from this rostrum its concern over a number of Assembly decisions taken during the sixth special session last spring and during the current session. These decisions have dealt with some of the most important, the most controversial, and the most vexing issues of our day: the global economic crisis,

the turmoil in the Middle East, and the injustice in southern Africa. I will not today discuss again our main concerns with each of these decisions. Rather, I wish to take this opportunity to discuss the more general question of how self-centered actions endanger the future of this organization.

The United Nations, and this Assembly in particular, can walk one of two paths. The Assembly can seek to represent the views of the numerical majority of the day, or it can try to act as a spokesman of a more general global opinion. To do the first is easy. To do the second is infinitely more difficult. But, if we look ahead, it is infinitely more useful.

There is certainly nothing wrong with like-minded groups of nations giving voice to the views they hold in common. However, organizations other than the United Nations exist for that purpose. Thus, there are organizations of African states, of Asian states, of Arab states, of European states, and of American states. There are groups of industrialized nations, of developing nations, of Western and Eastern nations, and of nonaligned nations. Each of these organizations exists to promote the views of its membership.

The United Nations, however, exists not to serve one or more of these special-interest groups while remaining insensitive to the others. The challenge of the United Nations is to meld and reflect the views of all of them. The only victories with meaning are those which are victories for us all.

The General Assembly fulfills its true function when it reconciles opposing views

and seeks to bridge the differences among its member states. The most meaningful test of whether the Assembly has succeeded in this task is not whether a majority can be mobilized behind any single draft resolution, but whether those states whose cooperation is vital to implement a decision will support it in fact. A better world can only be constructed on negotiation and compromise, not on confrontation, which inevitably sows the seeds of new conflicts. In the words of our charter, the United Nations is "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

No observer should be misled by the coincidental similarities between the General Assembly and a legislature. A legislature passes laws. The General Assembly passes resolutions, which are in most cases advisory in nature. These resolutions are sometimes adopted by Assembly majorities which represent only a small fraction of the people of the world, its wealth, or its territory. Sometimes they brutally disregard the sensitivity of the minority.

Because the General Assembly is an advisory body on matters of world policy, the pursuit of mathematical majorities can be a particularly sterile form of international activity. Sovereign nations, and the other international organs which the Assembly advises through its resolutions, sometimes accept and sometimes reject that advice. Often they do not ask how many nations voted for a resolution, but who those nations were, what they represented, and what they advocated.

Members of the United Nations are endowed with sovereign equality; that is, they are equally entitled to their independence, to their rights under the charter. They are not equal in size, in population, or in wealth. They have different capabilities and therefore different responsibilities, as the charter makes clear.

Similarly, because the majority can directly affect only the internal administration of this organization, it is the United Nations itself which suffers most when a majority,

in pursuit of an objective it believes overriding, forgets that responsibility must bear a reasonable relationship to capability and to authority.

Each time this Assembly adopts a resolution which it knows will not be implemented, it damages the credibility of the United Nations. Each time that this Assembly makes a decision which a significant minority of members regards as unfair or one-sided, it further erodes vital support for the United Nations among that minority. But the minority which is so offended may in fact be a practical majority in terms of its capacity to support this organization and implement its decisions.

Unenforceable, one-sided resolutions destroy the authority of the United Nations. Far more serious, however, they encourage disrespect for the charter and for the traditions of our organization.

No organization can function without an agreed-upon framework of rules and regulations. The framework for this organization was built in the light of painful lessons learned from the disastrous failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations. Thus, the U.N. Charter was designed to insure that the important decisions of this organization reflected real power relationships and that decisions, once adopted, could be enforced.

One of the principal aims of the United Nations, expressed in the preamble of its charter, is "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors." The promise the American people and the peoples of the other founding nations made to each other—not as a matter of law, but as a matter of solemn moral and political obligation—was to live up to the charter and the duly made rules unless or until they were modified in an orderly, constitutional manner.

The function of all parliaments is to provide expression to the majority will. Yet, when the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it, and the parliament will cease to function. Every majority

must recognize that its authority does not extend beyond the point where the minority becomes so outraged that it is no longer willing to maintain the covenant which binds them.

My countrymen have made a great investment in this world organization over the years—as host country, as the leading financial contributor, and as a conscientious participant in its debates and negotiations and operational programs. Americans have loyally continued these efforts in a spirit of good faith and tolerance, knowing that there would be words spoken which we did not always like and resolutions adopted which we could not always support.

As the 29th General Assembly draws to a close, however, many Americans are questioning their belief in the United Nations. They are deeply disturbed.

During this 29th General Assembly, resolutions have been passed which uncritically endorse the most far-reaching claims of one side in dangerous international disputes. With this has come a sharply increased tendency in this Assembly to disregard its normal procedures to benefit the side which enjoys the favor of the majority and to silence, and even exclude, the representatives of member states whose policies the majority condemns. In the wake of some of the examples of this Assembly, the General Conference of UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] has strayed down the same path, with the predictable consequences of adverse reaction against the United Nations. Innocent bystanders such as UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] already have been affected.

We are all aware that true compromise is difficult and time consuming, while bloc voting is fast and easy. But real progress on contentious issues must be earned. Paper triumphs are, in the end, expensive even for the victors. The cost is borne first of all by the United Nations as an institution and, in the end, by all of us. Our achievements cannot be measured in paper.

A strong and vital United Nations is im-

portant to every member state; and actions which weaken it weaken us all, particularly the smaller and the developing nations. Their security is particularly dependent on a collective response to aggression. Their prosperity particularly depends on access to an open and expanding international economy. Their ability to project their influence in the world is particularly enhanced by membership in international bodies such as the United Nations.

In calling attention to the dangerous trends, I wish also to call attention to the successes of the United Nations during the past year.

U.N. members overcame many differences at the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference. There was also progress at the Law of the Sea Conference. There was agreement on programs encouraging states to maintain a population which they can feed and feed the population which they maintain. As a result of these U.N. conferences the world community has at last begun to grapple with the two fundamental issues which are central to any meaningful attempt to provide a better life for most of mankind.

In the Middle East a unique combination of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy has succeeded in halting last year's war and in separating the combatants. With good will and cooperation, the Security Council has renewed the mandate for the peace forces, allowing time for a step-by-step negotiating process to bear fruit. My government believes that this negotiating process continues to hold the best hope in more than a quarter of a century for a just and lasting peace in that area.

On Cyprus, the Security Council, the Assembly, and our Secretary General have all contributed to progress toward peace and reconciliation. Much remains to be done, but movement toward peace has been encouraged.

Perhaps the U.N.'s most overlooked success of the past year resulted from the mission of the Secretary General's representative, Mr. [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz. This

effort, which was undertaken at the request of the Security Council, succeeded in mediating a particularly dangerous border dispute between Iran and Iraq. This example of how to prevent a small conflict from blowing up into a much bigger war must rank among the U.N.'s finest, if least heralded, achievements.

Thus, despite the disturbing trend toward the sterile pursuit of empty majorities, recent U.N. achievements demonstrate that this organization can still operate in the real world in the interests of all its members. Unfortunately, failure and controversy are threatening to overshadow the record of successes. Its lapses are long remembered and remain a source of lasting grievance for those who feel wronged.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to say a few words, not as the U.S. Representative to this organization but as an American who has believed deeply in the United Nations since 1945 when, as a young reporter just returned from the war, I observed the birth of this organization.

I must tell you that recent decisions of this Assembly and of other U.N. bodies have deeply affected public opinion in my country. The American people are deeply disturbed by decisions to exclude member states and to restrict their participation in discussions of matters of vital concern to them. They are concerned by moves to convert humanitarian and cultural programs into tools of political reprisal. Neither the American public nor the American Congress believes that such actions can be reconciled with the spirit or letter of the U.N. Charter. They do not believe that these decisions are in accord with the purposes for which this organization was founded. They believe the United Nations, in its forums, must show the same understanding, fair play, and responsibility which its resolutions ask of individual members.

My country cannot participate effectively in the United Nations without the support of the American people and of the American Congress. For years they have provided that support generously. But I must tell you

honestly that this support is eroding—in our Congress and among our people. Some of the foremost American champions of this organization are deeply distressed at the trend of recent events.

A majority of our Congress and our people are still committed to a strong United Nations. They are still committed to achieving peaceful solutions to the issues which confront this organization—in the Middle East, in South Africa, and elsewhere. They are still committed to building a more just world economic order. But the trends and decisions of the past few months are causing many to reflect and reassess what our role should be.

I have not come to the General Assembly today to suggest that the American people are going to turn away from the United Nations. I believe that World War II taught Americans the tragic cost of standing aside from an organized international effort to bring international law and justice to bear on world problems. But, like every nation, we must from time to time reassess our priorities, review our commitments, and redirect our energies. In the months ahead, I will do all in my power to persuade my countrymen that the United Nations can return to the path the charter has laid out and that it can continue to serve the interests of *all* of its members.

If the United Nations ceases to work for the benefit of all of its members, it will become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandoning its important role in the real world of negotiation and compromise.

We must join to prevent this. The reasons for which this world organization was founded remain as valid and as compelling today as they were in 1945. If anything, there is added reason: the specters of nuclear holocaust, world depression, mass famine, overpopulation, and a permanently ravaged environment.

If we are to succeed, we must now renew our commitment to the central principles of tolerance and harmony upon which the U.N. Charter was built. We must redouble our

efforts to use this organization as the world's ultimate instrument for compromise and negotiation. I pledge my nation to these efforts.

Statement of December 12

USUN press release 196 dated December 12

My delegation will vote in favor of draft resolution A/L.748. This resolution reflects the views of the U.S. Government on strengthening the role of the United Nations.

My delegation also welcomes the initiative of the Australian delegation contained in its draft resolution A/L.749 on peaceful settlement of international disputes. We are pleased to announce my delegation will vote in favor of this resolution.

I want also to take the occasion to thank my colleagues who have spoken since this discussion began last Friday. I do not agree with everything I have heard, just as others disagree with some of the points I made.

I am encouraged that the debate has turned into a constructive dialogue with much sober reflection. If we can maintain this willingness to listen carefully to one another, we can write a record that peoples everywhere can applaud.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 3282 (XXIX)¹

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between States

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2925 (XXVII) of 27 November 1972 and 3073 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973,

Emphasizing that the active participation of all Member States in efforts aimed at strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its role in contemporary international relations is essential for the success of those efforts,

Aware that strengthening of the role of the United Nations requires continuous improvement in the functioning and effectiveness of its principal organs in the exercise of their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter,

Considering that it is desirable for the General Assembly to keep constantly under review the overall problems connected with the role and the effectiveness of the United Nations and to consider them periodically with a view to evaluating the progress achieved and adopting appropriate measures aimed at strengthening the role of the world Organization in international life,

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of its resolutions 2925 (XXVII) and 3073 (XXVIII) concerning the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in contemporary international relations;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General,² prepared pursuant to resolution 3073 (XXVIII), containing the views, suggestions and proposals of Member States regarding the strengthening of the role of the United Nations;

3. *Transmits* to its thirtieth session for consideration, the views, suggestions and proposals of Member States contained in the above-mentioned report and in any communications that may be submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 below with regard to improving the functioning and effectiveness of the General Assembly in the exercise of its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter;

4. *Draws the attention* of the other principal organs of the United Nations to the views, suggestions and proposals of Member States contained in the relevant sections of the report of the Secretary-General so that they may be taken into consideration in the process of effectively improving the activities and functioning of those organs and invites them to keep the General Assembly informed on this subject in such manner as they may consider appropriate;

5. *Requests* Member States to give further study to ways and means of strengthening the role of the United Nations and enhancing its effectiveness and to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 30 June 1975, their views, suggestions and proposals in that regard with a view to supplementing the report prepared on the basis of resolution 3073 (XXVIII);

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of interna-

¹ Draft resolution A/L.748; adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 12 by consensus (text from U.N. press release GA/5194).

² U.N. doc. A/9695. [Footnote in original.]

tional peace and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between States”.

Resolution 3283 (XXIX)³

Peaceful settlement of international disputes

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Charter of the United Nations obliges Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,

Recalling in particular that the Security Council is charged under the terms of Article 24 of the Charter with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that disputes may be brought to the attention of the Council for purposes of pacific settlement under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter,

Recalling also that Article 33 of the Charter directs that parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice,

Recalling further that the International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and, as such, is available to Members for the settlement of legal disputes, that it has recently amended its Rules of Court with a view to simplifying its procedure so as to avoid delays and simplify hearings, and that it may establish chambers to hear and determine cases by summary procedure allowing for the speediest possible settlement of disputes,

Mindful of the existence of other facilities and machinery available for the settlement of disputes by mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, including the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and established regional agencies or arrangements,

Reaffirming that recourse to peaceful settlement of international disputes shall in no way constitute an unfriendly act between States,

Mindful also of the continuing threat to international peace and security posed by serious disputes of various kinds and the need for early action

to resolve such disputes by resort in the first instance to the means recommended in Article 33 of the Charter,

1. *Draws the attention* of States to established machinery under the Charter of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of international disputes;

2. *Urges* Member States not already parties to instruments establishing the various facilities and machinery available for the peaceful settlement of disputes to consider becoming parties to such instruments and, in the case of the International Court of Justice, recognizes the desirability that States study the possibility of accepting, with as few reservations as possible, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute of the Court;

3. *Calls upon* Member States to make full use and seek improved implementation of the means and methods provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and elsewhere for the exclusively peaceful settlement of any dispute or any situation, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, good offices including those of the Secretary-General, or other peaceful means of their own choice;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare an up-to-date report concerning the machinery established under the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, inviting his attention in particular to the following resolutions of the General Assembly:

(a) Resolution 268 D (III) of 28 April 1949, in which the Assembly established the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation;

(b) Resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, section B, in which the Assembly established the Peace Observation Commission;

(c) Resolution 1262 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, in which the Assembly considered the question of establishing arbitral procedure for settling disputes;

(d) Resolution 2329 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, in which the Assembly established a United Nations register of experts for fact-finding;

(e) Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, in which the Assembly approved the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. *Invites* the attention of the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General to the present resolution.

³ Draft resolution A/L.749, as amended; adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 12 by a recorded vote of 68 (U.S.) to 10, with 35 abstentions (text from U.N. press release GA/5194).

U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of the U.N. Charter

*Statement by Robert Rosenstock*¹

As the Sixth Committee considers suggestions regarding the review of the U.N. Charter, my delegation is again impressed with the profound implications of the questions we are discussing and with the diversity of those suggestions which have been made.

The charter, as any fundamental governing document, must have the capacity to allow those who adhere to it to deal efficiently and effectively with the questions they face. Because of the broad spectrum of interests, the full range of political diversity, and the considerable discrepancy in the types of contributions which can be made by the various members of the United Nations, the charter must truly be an extraordinary document in order to provide the basic ground rules within which we all can agree to attempt to solve our common problems.

The charter has generally proven to be such an extraordinary document for the past 29 years. For this we all owe a profound appreciation to those who developed its text during those complex and difficult negotiations in San Francisco. Neither then nor now have sensible persons believed all the charter language was perfect and immutable for all time. We know of no significant governing document with a long life which is or could be perfect or immutable.

This is not to suggest that our organizational problems have been overcome or that the United Nations has always dealt effectively with the challenges before it. It is to

suggest, however, that those problems are solvable by full and proper use of the machinery we have, rather than by creating new machinery. We certainly hope we can engage in self-criticism without opening the entire charter to the whims of the moment. In this we associate ourselves with the views of the late Krishna Menon which were recalled this morning.

We are surprised by the comments of some that the charter has been unchanged since 1945. Quite apart from the several amendments which have been made to the text and to which I shall refer later, the charter has, by the normal process of interpretation and evolution, gone through very significant modifications as times and circumstances have changed, as new members with new views have joined the United Nations, and as we have been able through years of experience to understand better the needs of this central multinational organization.

The fact that the present charter has allowed such flexibility is clear evidence of the fundamental value and wisdom of its text. As general political needs have changed, so in many cases, have our collective interpretations of charter provisions.

These changes have taken place gradually and effectively—a constructive evolution in which all members have participated. Such an evolution is, in our view, an invaluable way in which the charter is maintained as a living, current document, an avenue of change vastly preferable to sudden radical shifts which, by virtue of the extreme diversity among the member states, almost inevitably would result in loss of the funda-

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 5 (text from USUN press release 190). Mr. Rosenstock is Legal Affairs Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

mental consensus which is the foundation of the charter. The loss or weakening of that consensus can only result in diminution of the effectiveness of the organization and thus the meaningfulness of any changes which some might urge.

Evolution has taken place in some of the most important provisions of the charter. For example, if in 1945 or 1950 we had asserted that the charter granted peoples the right to self-determination, most members would have disagreed. If in 1960 we had made the same assertion, many would have pointed out that all that existed as a matter of law was a principle, not a right. Today if anyone questioned the interpretation that there exists a charter right to self-determination, his views would be considered preposterous or, at the least, anachronistic and wrong.

In 1964 some states asserted that there was no charter prohibition on intervention by states in the domestic affairs of other states. If anyone asserted that view today we would think him mad or worse.

Can anyone deny that article 2, paragraph 7, means something different from what it meant before various decisions by the Security Council, before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and before the numerous subsequent resolutions which deal with human rights and various forms of denial of those rights, such as apartheid?

In 1950 certain delegations attacked Resolution 377A (V) as illegal and contrary to the charter. In 1967 the state which led the earlier attack against that resolution relied upon it in moving to convene an emergency session of the Assembly.

The Friendly Relations Declaration with its interpretations of key concepts of the charter, including the prohibition of the threat or use of force, nonintervention, equal rights and self-determination, and peaceful settlement, is merely one of the more obvious examples of the process of evolution. The Friendly Relations Declaration was negotiated and unanimously adopted essentially by today's membership.

If we proceed pellmell into a review exercise without the requisite broad agreement, we shall encourage states to harden positions; we shall widen the difference among us and reduce our own flexibility to compromise. We shall harm the chances for continued evolutionary change. A review exercise may well prove the greatest impediment to change rather than a catalyst for change.

During the past two days we have heard several delegations for diverse reasons call for a variety of modifications to the charter. We have heard delegations state that reluctance to consider or make such modifications in one specific way—namely, through the proposed ad hoc committee—would amount to obstruction of the will of the majority of states and would demonstrate opposition to the basic idea of any change in the charter at all. Because of the importance and the sensitivity of these questions, I would like again to express the position of my government on these issues.

In the first place we have participated, in some cases by leading, in the many evolutionary changes that have taken place since 1945. At no time have we sought to oppose this concept of the charter as a living, breathing document which must be made to respond flexibly to the contemporary needs of the organization.

In the second place we have been in the forefront of those who supported the amendments which have been adopted. Nor can these amendments be lightly passed over. For example, the expansion of the Security Council has breathed new life into the general consensus principle which has and must underlie the functioning of the Security Council. In 1955 no decision could be taken by the Security Council over the objections of the East or the West. In the late fifties and early sixties the membership of the organization underwent a fundamental change. Today a majority of the membership of the Council represents what is frequently called the Third World. Not only may no decision be taken without the active support of these members, but most of the decisions which are taken in the Council these days are at their

request and based upon proposals drafted by one or more of them. The peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, for example, were created largely because the states of India, Kenya, and Yugoslavia took the lead to press the Council to establish them rather than a U.S.-Soviet peacekeeping force.

Finally, in addition to supporting evolutionary change and specific amendments to the charter we have sought to retain an open mind on the concept of charter review. In our reply to the Secretary General's request for the views of states on the question of review,² we expressed a willingness to participate even in a charter reviewing conference if it is the general view of the membership that the outcome of such a conference would be constructive. I think it fair to say that there is not such a feeling that an overall review would solve problems. There is certainly no broad agreement at this time on what specific changes might be desirable. There does seem to be widespread recognition that very great damage could be done to confidence in the basic fabric of the United Nations if considerable care is not exercised to insure very broad support before any type of review of the charter is undertaken.

It is the view of my delegation that such broad support can most realistically be amassed if we approach charter review on a case-by-case basis. We have amended the charter successfully in the past by this approach, enlarging the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council when the requisite measure of consensus has been achieved.

We are dealing, in this field of international cooperation, with an activity based essentially not on the ability of some states to compel action by others but rather, on our ability to find standards of behavior and ground rules for cooperation to which we are all willing to adhere.

We have all freely accepted the charter. We must obviously take great care to develop that consensus, particularly for changes so significant as those to the U.N. Charter, if

we intend to maintain it as a realistic instrument by which all member states will be guided. This may be a cautious approach, but it emphatically is not a negative approach. We have amended the charter in the past; we can, and presumably will, amend the charter in the future.

Although we and others have not and presumably will not always agree with every suggestion made for amendment of the charter, we have recognized and we do recognize the usefulness of giving serious and thorough consideration to any specific proposal when it appears to be a constructive effort to improve our ability to deal with the problems we face and when it will preserve the delicate balance which we have developed to allow so many nations so different from each other to work together. There may well be variations in the formula under which that balance can be maintained. If there is broad and serious support for a specific proposal for change, it should at the least be fully considered.

It would, however, do neither member states nor the organization itself any service to proceed with any specific amendments without being confident at least of basic agreement among the member states on a given amendment, much less to undertake a general review. The risk is too great both of poisoning the cooperative atmosphere which is essential for our work and of polarizing this highly diversified body without constructive gain. We are well aware of the protection afforded us by article 108; our fears are for the very foundations of the United Nations.

In our view the establishment of the proposed ad hoc committee would almost inevitably result in a general, wide-ranging review of the charter. Even among the few replies received from states and among the fewer still which urge change, there is a very broad range of suggestions for modification of the charter, many of them mutually exclusive. For these reasons we strongly oppose the draft resolution contained in A/C.6/L.1002. We are prepared to vote in favor of the draft contained in A/C.6/L.1001 or any

² U.N. doc. A/8746/Add. 1, p. 13.

other text which commands sufficiently broad support and which does not endanger the foundations of our institution.

We, like others, were moved by General Romulo's speech [Carlos Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs]. While we do not believe that there is now sufficient agreement to make it useful to undertake a process of review and revision, the time may well come when a basis for agreement will exist. General Romulo continues his very great service to the international community by reminding us from time to time to examine whether the requisite widespread agreement exists.

In order to strike a balance between our important common interests in insuring that the charter is kept responsive to a changing world and in insuring that there is essentially overwhelming agreement to any changes in our basic ground rules, the United States believes that an appropriate step for this committee to recommend might be to request the Secretary General to undertake a detailed assessment of which of the suggestions for charter amendments so far received have broad support among the U.N. members and which of the goals behind such suggestions might be accomplished without charter revision. Member states which have not yet done so should be invited to submit their views on this subject.

Although it is commonly understood that the percentage of states which reply to requests for their views on particular issues is usually not high, we are not dealing here with an ordinary matter. We are dealing here with the most basic and fundamental rules of international cooperation. It has been suggested that a reason for charter review is that only 51 of the present 138 members of the United Nations were present at San Francisco. Surely it is of even greater significance that only 38 of the present 138 member states have so far submitted their views on suggestions regarding charter review. This is not an ordinary questionnaire;

we owe it to ourselves not to settle for such a small number of responses before undertaking a review exercise.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we have repeatedly stated, the United States is fully prepared to maintain an open mind regarding modifications to the charter which are broadly supported. It is as much in our interest as that of any other state to insure that the charter is a viable, up-to-date, and respected document. We must not be afraid to consider appropriate modifications to that document; yet we must not confuse dissatisfaction with policies of states with inadequacy of the charter. If there is broad desire to consider a particular amendment, let us in an appropriate forum undertake such a consideration as we have in the past.

Let us first, however, take care first to determine that support. At the least, an assessment by the Secretary General of the states' views he has received and a concentrated effort to obtain the comments of the vast majority of member states should precede any such specific deliberations, much less the establishment of an ad hoc committee. We shall vote in favor of L.1001; we shall vote against L.1002 if it is put to a vote. The resolution contained in L.1001 also commends itself to my delegation—not because it perfectly expresses our view but because we would hope it is a middle ground toward which the overwhelming majority could move.³

Let us, above all, do nothing to erode the foundations of the only international institution concerned with peace and security which through its flexible adaptability to the contemporary needs of the world community has stood the test of over a quarter of a century.

³ Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1002, establishing an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Charter of the United Nations, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 9 by a rollcall vote of 77 to 20 (U.S.), with 32 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a recorded vote of 82 to 15 (U.S.), with 36 abstentions (A/RES/3349 (XXIX)). Draft resolutions A/C.2/L.1001 and A/C.2/L.1011 were not put to the vote.

U.S. Reaffirms Support for Goals of World Population Plan of Action

Following are texts of a statement made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on December 2 by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, and a statement made in plenary session of the Assembly on December 17 by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on December 5 and by the Assembly on December 17.

U.S. STATEMENTS

Senator Percy, Committee II, December 2

USUN press release 185 dated December 2

I am pleased to have the opportunity to express the views of the U.S. delegation on the report of the World Population Conference.¹

The conference was convened in an attempt to focus the attention of the international community on one of the most complex problems of our time: spiraling global population growth. The difficulty in dealing with population problems lies in the fact that population questions are entirely interrelated with virtually every other problem that currently confronts people and nations. They cannot be dealt with in isolation. They must be considered within the context of other social and economic issues—health care, education, racial and sexual equality, housing, agriculture, nutrition, old age security, religious and moral values, economic development, and others.

The United States believes that the World Population Conference achieved real success and that its success is a direct result of the

consideration of population in its social and economic context. The World Population Conference attained a most significant goal: It brought to the attention of all nations the concept that population is an integral aspect of the quality of life of all people.

Certainly the consensus of participating nations on the World Population Plan of Action was the major triumph of the conference, and the United States is extremely hopeful that the plan will be accepted by this committee and subsequently by the General Assembly because of what we believe are the plan's many very positive and helpful recommendations and resolutions. The United States believes that the plan of action contains provisions which will have immeasurably beneficial consequences for people everywhere for generations to come.

Although the United States does not intend to comment on each of the provisions of the plan of action, we do wish to highlight a few items which we feel are of special significance.

The pronouncement within the plan of action which the United States views as the foundation for all the others is the affirmation of the basic human right of individuals "to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so." The United States strives to assure this basic right in our own country, and we welcome its acceptance by the world community.

Although the plan of action does not make outright recommendations of target dates for specific population goals, the concept of quantitative goals is included. The United States believes that the mention of quantitative goals to reduce mortality, increase life expectancy, and reduce fertility and rates of population growth will give those countries choosing to do so helpful targets at which to aim. The United States particularly wel-

¹ U.N. doc. 5585; for U.S. statements at the World Population Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19-30 and an unofficial text of the World Population Plan of Action, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429.

comes the concurrence of nations of all levels of development and all points of view on the inclusion of these possible goals in the World Population Plan of Action.

While in Bucharest I stated my hope that the conference would take a clear and strong stand on the future role of women in developed as well as developing nations. Perhaps the most unexpected positive development of the World Population Conference and one that the United States considers to be an outstanding accomplishment was the relatively easily reached agreement among nations that additional emphasis on the role of women in population policies and in economic and social development should be included in the plan of action. Thus one of the plan's objectives became:

To promote the status of women and expansion of their roles, the full participation of women in the formulation and implementation of socio-economic policy including population policies, and the creation of awareness among all women of their current and potential roles in national life.

A number of specific recommendations in the areas of education, planning and development, legislation, and family life are made that would allow countries to achieve this objective. The United States strongly supports those recommendations.

These provisions in the World Population Plan of Action are based on the recognition by all governments that an improved status for women will yield progress not only for individual women but for their societies as well. Development and implementation of population policies can most particularly benefit from expanded participation by women. The United States is making strong efforts to improve the status of women in our own country and welcomes this goal as part of the plan of action.

The report of the World Population Conference and the plan of action reflect that the nations of the world are in agreement on a very important point: Population policies and goals cannot be achieved without accompanying economic and social development.

One of the major contributions of the debate at Bucharest was to focus attention on the reciprocal relationship—the interface be-

tween population factors and development.

The United States believes that the underlying reasons for countries requesting assistance for their population or family planning programs is that such programs form a part—and only a part, but an essential part—of overall economic and social development efforts. The guidance of Bucharest is that any country wishing to succeed in either will be wise to press both. Many countries have found that despite their development efforts, population growth has caused their per capita standard of living to stand still or even recede. They have in effect been running hard to stand still or have even lost ground. The balance of attention to each program will of course vary according to the situation of the individual country and according to its own sovereign determination.

One of the major innovations of the World Population Plan of Action was its recommendation (Par. 31) that countries wishing to affect levels of fertility should give priority to those factors of development that have a greater impact on fertility than others. This recommendation was based on much recent evidence and thinking that some factors of development do have this effect. They are listed in paragraph 32. We agree with this concept and with the call of paragraph 31 for priority in international cooperation for carrying out such strategies.

The United States is sensitive to the continuing large gap between the developed and developing nations with regard to levels of economic development. Because the United States recognizes the relationship between population growth rates and economic development, we affirm the inclusion in the World Population Plan of Action of emphasis on efficient use of resources. The plan states:

It is imperative that all countries, and within them all social sectors, should adapt themselves to more rational utilization of natural resources, without excess, so that some are not deprived of what others waste.

We further affirm that the United States will continue to seek to reduce wasteful consumption of resources in our own country and will encourage other nations to do the same.

At Bucharest we regretted the lack of attention given to the role of population growth on present availability of food for the peoples of the developing countries—although the Deputy Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization in his address there warned in the most somber terms:

First, that action must be initiated *now* to reduce the rate of population growth if we are to have any chance at all of meeting the world's food needs 25 years from now.

Second, while family planning and population policy are matters for individuals and governments, there is at the same time a clear need for international action.

The documents prepared by FAO authorities for the Rome Conference [World Food Conference, November 5–16] recognize clearly that the main reason for the growing imbalance between the food supply and demand is the rate of population growth, which in the developing countries is twice as fast as in the developed world. They call on all countries to recognize urgently the gravity of the challenge to feed growing populations and to formulate and implement policies for population growth control.

It was with these thoughts in mind that the Rome Conference adopted a special resolution calling on governments and people everywhere to support sound population policies relevant to national needs within a strategy of development which would assure the right of all couples to decide the spacing and size of their own families.

The conclusion is inescapable that the efforts already being made by many countries to reduce population growth rates must succeed—and more rapidly than at present. At the same time, it is both fair and essential that developed countries reduce their population growth and their consumption of foods produced by wasteful means in order that more can be available for those in grave need.

Mr. Chairman, the word “population” derives from the Latin word “*populus*” for “people.” The United States reaffirms the report of the World Population Conference and supports the provisions of the World Population Plan of Action, for we believe

that they truly seek to improve the quality of life of the earth's people. We will continue to support and cooperate in those efforts of the international community that approach that same goal. In this spirit, my delegation is pleased to be a cosponsor of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.1.²

Ambassador Ferguson, Plenary, December 17

My delegation, with deep regret, abstained on draft resolution VI,³ this despite the fact that, as is well known, my delegation and my government have been committed to the study of world population questions for some time.

We regret it very much, but the presence of a single paragraph, paragraph 5, in the draft resolution, which reads:

Stresses that the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action should take full account of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, and thus contribute to its implementation;

is the sole reason my delegation abstained. We object to the substance of the paragraph, and I must state on behalf of my delegation that we also very much regret the manner in which, procedurally, that paragraph was negotiated.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ⁴

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2211 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 on population growth and economic development following the World Population Conference in 1965 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1484 (XLVIII) of 3 April 1970 calling for a World Population Conference which would be the first held at the intergovernmental level,

Recalling further that the Economic and Social Council in resolution 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974,

² Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amended, was adopted by the committee on Dec. 5 by a vote of 108 to 0, with 2 abstentions (U.S., Niger).

³ Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1388/Rev.2, as amended, was recommended to the Assembly as draft resolution VI in part II of the Committee II report (U.N. doc. A/9886/Add.1) on agenda item 12, “Report of the Economic and Social Council.”

⁴ A/RES/3344 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a vote of 131 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.) (text from U.N. press release GA/5194).

considered that the results of the Conference would constitute an important contribution to the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to development and international economic co-operation,

Recalling further the decision adopted by the Economic and Social Council, at its resumed fifty-seventh session on 19 November 1974, on the report of the World Population Conference,

Recalling further its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 containing the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,

Greatly concerned with the gap between developed and developing countries and with the inequities and injustices still existing in international economic relations,

Stressing that the formulation and implementation of population policies are the sovereign right of each nation, and that such a right is to be exercised in accordance with national objectives and needs and without external interference, taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world,

Recognizing that population and development are interrelated and that, consequently, the basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation and development,

Further recognizing that the consideration of population problems cannot be reduced to the analysis of population trends exclusively,

Believing that, in the formulation of population policies, consideration must be given, together with other economic and social factors, to the supplies and characteristics of natural resources, the quality of the environment, and particularly, to all aspects of food supply, and that attention must be given to the just distribution of resources and minimization of wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world,

Having considered the report, resolutions, recommendations and the World Population Plan of Action adopted by the World Population Conference, held at Bucharest from 19 to 30 August 1974,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the World Population Conference, including the resolutions and recommendations of the Conference and the World Population Plan of Action;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Government of Romania for its co-operation and gracious hospitality;

3. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the World Population Conference for the successful organization of the Conference;

4. *Affirms* that the World Population Plan of Action is an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress;

5. *Stresses* that the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action should take full account of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, and thus contribute to its implementation;

6. *Invites* Governments to consider the recommendations for action at the national level and to implement population policies and programmes which they determine are appropriate;

7. *Calls upon* the Population Commission and the governing bodies of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the regional economic commissions, the specialized agencies and all other United Nations bodies which report to the Economic and Social Council to determine how each can best assist in the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action and on adjustments which may be necessary in their work programmes and to report thereon to the Economic and Social Council;

8. *Requests the Economic and Social Council*, within the in-depth consideration of the report of the World Population Conference at its fifty-eighth session, to pay particular attention to the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, including the functions of the monitoring and review and appraisal of the Plan also at the regional level;

9. *Invites* the Economic and Social Council to continue to provide over-all policy guidance within the United Nations system on population-related matters and to this end to consider these issues on a regular basis, in a manner to be determined by it;

10. *Requests* the Population Commission at its eighteenth session, within its competence, to report to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth session on the implications of the World Population Conference, including the implications for the Population Commission itself;

11. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth session to forward its views and recommendations through the Preparatory Committee to the seventh special session and the thirtieth regular session of the General Assembly;

12. *Invites* the Secretary-General to report to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-eighth session on ways and means of strengthening the over-all capacity of the relevant units of the Secretariat, within the existing framework to meet the need for a broad approach in the population field, consonant with the principles and the objectives of the World Population Plan of Action;

13. *Urges* that assistance to developing countries should be increased in accordance with the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade and that international assistance in the population field should be expanded, particularly to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, for the proper implementation of the World Population Plan of Action.

United States Calls for Renewal of World Commitment to UNRWA

Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on December 5 by U.S. Representative William E. Schaufele, Jr.

USUN press release 188 dated December 5

The United States has expressed each year in this forum its admiration and appreciation for the dedicated and skillful work of the Commissioner General of UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] and his associates in the face of difficult circumstances. More than any time in UNRWA's history, the last 12 months have presented even greater challenges and have demanded even higher qualities of leadership and dedication. War and its aftermath, the uncertainties of the ensuing search for peace, the internationalization of inflation, and shortages of key commodities—all of these have presented the Commissioner General and his colleagues with increasingly complicated and interrelated financial and administrative problems.

These problems are not abstract issues in management and financing. They are problems of people—because the money which must be found and effectively disbursed is the indispensable means to continue education programs, to provide or to improve housing, and to assure necessary health services; in short, to preserve for the promising if uncertain future even the limited material security and the cautious hope which UNRWA in the past has been able to bring to those it serves.

In the year ahead, UNRWA faces a financial crisis of unprecedented seriousness. Other speakers here have called for recognition of this crisis and for action to avert it. We share their apprehension. We intend to do our part, and we strongly urge others to do the same.¹ This is not an easy time for most nations to increase financial commitments of any kind. Many of us have difficulty

enough simply to maintain the present level of financial outlays in both our national and international activities. Nevertheless, in view of drastic redistributions of the world's wealth in recent months, other governments with vastly increased resources can appropriately do more than they felt able to do in the past. I strongly urge them to do so.

Our basic humanitarian standards, and the principles of international life to which we are committed by the U.N. Charter, demand that we respond fully to this human requirement to which the work of UNRWA is directed. Just as those standards and those principles were initially proclaimed and accepted voluntarily by each nation member of the United Nations, so it is right and proper that the response to them represented by UNRWA's program should be a voluntary one.

It is in this spirit that we introduce this resolution today. It acknowledges the continuing importance and justice of the humanitarian demands which UNRWA and the condition of the Palestinian refugees make on all, on every member of the international community. Finally, it renews UNRWA's tenure for another three years, a period in which we hope that its task will at last be fully accomplished.

Taking all these elements into account this resolution represents a firm call for the renewal and reaffirmation of the commitment of each nation represented here to insure that UNRWA will in fact be able to carry out its work. The commitment is clear. It obligates each of us, individually and collectively, to act to fulfill it.²

¹ On Dec. 3 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Ambassador Schaufele announced the U.S. pledge of \$24,940,000 to UNRWA for calendar year 1975. For his statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press release 186 dated Dec. 3.

² The U.S. draft resolution (A/SPC/L.317) was adopted by the committee on Dec. 6 by a vote of 106 to 0, with 2 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a vote of 122 to 0, with 3 abstentions (A/RES/3331A (XXIX)).

U.S. and Japan Initial Agreements on Pacific Fisheries

Press release 538 dated December 18

Representatives of the United States and Japan reached agreement on December 13 on two fishery agreements dealing primarily with fishing in the northeastern Pacific and the Bering Sea following discussions held in Tokyo November 15–December 13. Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, initialed for the United States, and Hiromu Fukada, Deputy Director General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initialed for Japan.

The new agreements do not change the stipulation in previous agreements, first signed in 1967, that Japan will refrain from fishing within the nine-mile contiguous fishery zone of the United States, except in certain selected areas, primarily in the Aleutian Islands.

In order to preserve the fish resources of the northern Pacific, the first new agreement establishes new and better balances between fishing and the condition and size of fishery resources in the northeastern Pacific and eastern Bering Sea. The principal features of this new agreement include:

1. In order to protect declining pollock resources, the Japanese pollock catch in the eastern Bering Sea will be reduced to 1.1 million metric tons from the over 1.5 million metric tons of pollock Japan caught in 1973.

2. For conservation purposes, controls will also be placed on the harvest of other fin-fishes, such as Pacific Ocean perch, in both the Bering Sea and the northeastern Pacific Ocean in areas of special concern to the U.S. fisheries. These controls are being imple-

mented by means of catch limitations and area and time closures.

3. The agreement stipulates that Japan may fish within the contiguous zone of the United States and conduct loading and transfer operations in certain specified areas. In return, Japan has agreed to refrain from fishing in certain areas of the high seas during prescribed periods in order to avoid conflicts with American fishermen arising out of differences in types of fishing gear.

4. Japan has also agreed to adopt procedures and measures to reduce and control incidental catches of king and tanner crabs in their trawl fisheries. As one means of achieving this objective, Japanese fishermen will equip their trawl gear with bobbins during months when crabs are concentrated to reduce incidental crab catches.

The second agreement involves fishing for king and tanner crabs in the eastern Bering Sea. These fisheries are important to both the United States and Japan. Under the new agreement, Japan's king crab quota is reduced by nearly 60 percent, from 700,000 to 300,000 crabs (953 metric tons). Japan's tanner crab quota (14 million in 1974) is reduced by a smaller percentage, but that portion of their total quota which can be taken in the traditional grounds, which are also fished by U.S. fishermen, was reduced by a substantial amount (about 70–80 percent).

As a result of the new arrangements, the United States will become the principal harvester of crab resources in the traditional grounds in the southeastern Bering Sea. It should be noted that the United States claims that both the king and tanner crabs are "creatures of the U.S. continental shelf" and that we have complete jurisdiction over these resources.

The two countries also emphasized the need to take all possible measures to refrain from polluting the seas and to avoid dumping undesirable products in the water. Both governments also agreed to inform each other of lost fishing gear which may create danger to navigation.

The new arrangements provide for enforcement measures more stringent than ever implemented before, with both governments agreeing to cooperate fully in their enforcement efforts. In this connection, U.S. observers will be provided the opportunity to observe the conduct of enforcement and to work closely with their counterparts from Japan.

The U.S. delegation also included Robert Schoning, Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, and fishing industry representatives from Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, as well as experts from the concerned Federal and state government agencies.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, December 31, 1974.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Ratification deposited: The Gambia, December 27, 1974.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, November 25, 1974.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.

Acceptance deposited: Grenada, December 4, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, with protocol of signature, as amended by the protocol

signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.²

Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.²

Notification of approval: Jamaica, October 4, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Proclaimed by the President: December 31, 1974.

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Proclaimed by the President: December 31, 1974.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended (TIAS 7603, 7770, 7862), concerning shrimp. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia December 30 and 31, 1974. Entered into force December 31, 1974.

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of May 18 and June 28 and 29, 1965, as amended and extended (TIAS 5826, 6646, 7102), relating to a seismic research program known as VELA UNIFORM. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 14 and December 19, 1974. Entered into force December 19, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March 4, 1972. Entered into force September 19, 1974.

Proclaimed by the President: December 31, 1974.

Agreement relating to salmon fishing in waters contiguous to the United States territorial sea, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 20, 1972. Entered into force December 20, 1972. TIAS 7528.

Terminated: December 24, 1974.

Agreement concerning salmon fishing in waters contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. Entered into force December 24, 1974.

Agreement regarding the king and tanner crab fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix, agreed minutes, and Japanese note. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 20, 1972. Entered into force December 20, 1972. TIAS 7527.

Terminated: January 1, 1975.

Agreement concerning king and tanner crab fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea, with appendix, agreed minutes, and related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. Entered into force December 24, 1974; effective January 1, 1975.

Agreement concerning certain fisheries off the coast of the United States, with related note and agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 24, 1974. Entered into force December 24, 1974; effective January 1, 1975.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul December 7, 1974. Entered into force December 7, 1974.

Malaysia

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of September 8, 1970, as amended, relating to trade in wool and man-made fiber textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into force December 27, 1974.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of September 8, 1970, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur December 23 and 27, 1974. Entered into force December 27, 1974.

Mexico

Agreement relating to a training program for Mexican helicopter pilots and mechanics as part of U.S.-Mexican cooperative efforts to reduce traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México September 30, 1974. Entered into force September 30, 1974.

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance to Mexico in narcotics enforcement training activities. Effected by exchange of letters at México

December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4, 1974.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 24, 1974 (TIAS 7907) providing additional helicopters and related assistance to Mexico in support of its efforts to curb production and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México December 4, 1974. Entered into force December 4, 1974.

Agreement relating to cooperative arrangements to support Mexican efforts to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México December 11, 1974. Entered into force December 11, 1974.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the following: agreement of June 21, 1973, on certain fishery problems on the high seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic Ocean (TIAS 7664); and agreements of February 21, 1973, (1) on certain fisheries problems in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States of America (TIAS 7573), (2) relating to fishing operations in the northeastern Pacific Ocean (TIAS 7572), and (3) relating to fishing for king and tanner crab (TIAS 7571). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 31, 1974. Entered into force December 31, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Far East and Australasia Released

Press release 541 dated December 23

The Department of State released on December 30 volume VI in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the year 1948. This volume is entitled "The Far East and Australasia."

Two volumes on China for the year 1948 (volumes VII and VIII) were released in August and December 1973, so that the publication of volume VI completes the issuance in the series of material on the Far East for 1948.

This volume of 1,379 pages contains previously unpublished documentation showing U.S. policy on many important topics including nationalist opposition to restoration of French rule in Indochina and Netherlands rule in the East Indies (Indonesia), as well as lengthy sections on occupation and control of Japan and events leading to the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office,

Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VI (Department of State publication 8681; GPO cat. no. S 1.1:948/v. VI) may be obtained for \$14.40 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Austria	Cat. No. S1.123:AU 7 Pub. 7955 6 pp.
Bolivia	Cat. No. S1.123:B 63 Pub. 8032 7 pp.
China, People's Republic of	Cat. No. S1.123:C 44 Pub. 7751 11 pp.
Cuba	Cat. No. S1.123:C 89 Pub. 8347 8 pp.
Ireland	Cat. No. S1.123:IR 2 Pub. 7974 5 pp.
Malta	Cat. No. S1.123:M 29/6 Pub. 8220 4 pp.
Mauritius	Cat. No. S1.123:M 44 Pub. 8023 5 pp.
Qatar	Cat. No. S1.123:Q 1 Pub. 7906 4 pp.
South Viet-Nam	Cat. No. S1.123:V 67 Pub. 7933 11 pp.
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of	Cat. No. S1.123:508Y/ Pub. 8170 5 pp.

An Action Program for World Investment. Remarks by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, at the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives held at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., September 5 and 6, 1974. Pub. 8780. General Foreign Policy Series 289. 14 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:289).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-Spain Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with Spain and the International Atomic Energy Agency amending the agreement of December 9, 1966. TIAS 7856. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7856).

Safeguarding of Classified Information. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 7857. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7857).

Defense—Relinquishment of Certain Land at Camp Wallace. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7858. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7858).

Suez Canal—Salvage or Removal of Navigational Hazards. Arrangement with Egypt. TIAS 7859. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7859).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea amending the agreement of May 8, 1974, as amended. TIAS 7860. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7860).

Pollution—Contingency Plans for Spills of Oil and Other Noxious Substances. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7861. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7861).

Fisheries—Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended. TIAS 7862. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7862).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on December 13 confirmed the following nominations:

Richard B. Parker to be Ambassador to the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Dixy Lee Ray to be an Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Leonard F. Walentynowicz to be Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

The Senate on December 19 confirmed the following nominations:

Monroe Leigh to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

Michael A. Samuels to be Ambassador to Sierra Leone.

William Saxbe to be Ambassador to India.

Thomas J. Scotes to be Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic.

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 6-12**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to January 6 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 538 of December 18, 541 and 543 of December 23, and 2 of January 2.

No.	Date	Subject
*5	1/6	Study Group 1 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, Feb. 13.
*6	1/7	Study Group 8 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Feb. 13.
*7	1/7	Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Feb. 6.
*8	1/8	Laise appointed Director General of the Foreign Service.
*9	1/8	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee of the CCITT, Feb. 6.
*10	1/10	Soviet journalists visit U.S., Jan. 10-24.
†11	1/10	Kissinger, Sultan of Oman: exchange of toasts, Jan. 9.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.