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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Newsweek Magazine

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger on December 18 by Newsweek Executive Editor Kenneth Auchincloss, Foreign Editor Edward Klein, and diplomatic correspondent Bruce van Voorst, which was published in the December 30 issue of Newsweek.

Q. Looking back over the conduct of American foreign policy in 1974, what have been your greatest satisfactions and greatest disappointments?

Press release 2 dated January 3

Secretary Kissinger: Strangely enough, the greatest satisfaction was that we managed the Presidential transition without a disaster. This was a rather heartbreaking period. I was extremely worried that while the central authority was in severe jeopardy, the transition might create basic weaknesses in the structure of our foreign policy. I considered our ability to continue an effective foreign policy the most satisfying thing. Of course, individual events were important, too: I got great satisfaction from the Syrian disengagement.

Q. In that transition period, was there a hiatus in which you could not function very well?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say from July to October was a period in which we could not act with decisiveness. Every negotiation was getting more and more difficult because it involved the question of whether we could, in fact, carry out what we were negotiating. Secondly, we were not in a position to press matters that might involve serious domestic disputes. And I think this affected to some extent the summit in Moscow in July. But it affected many other things in more intangible ways.

Q. How do you rank the SALT agreement in Vladivostok in the list of achievements for this past year?

Secretary Kissinger: Very high, and of more permanent significance than perhaps anything else that was achieved. The various disengagement agreements in the Middle East were dramatic and important because they reversed a trend toward another outbreak of a war and may have set the stage for making some important progress. But I think in terms of permanent achievements, I would rank the outline for a second SALT agreement at or near the top. And I think it will be so viewed by history.

Q. How do you account for all the criticism of SALT Two?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have a difficult domestic situation right now. Many people remember, or think they remember, that foreign policy had certain domestic effects in '71 or '72. I don't agree with this. But I think it is in the back of some people's minds.

Secondly, there is a general atmosphere of disillusionment with government.

Thirdly, the liberal intellectual community, which used to lead American foreign policy, was alienated for a variety of reasons from the Johnson administration and then from the Nixon administration, and therefore from this administration as well, at least at first.

Now, what in fact is the significance of this agreement? The nightmare of the nuclear age is the fear of strategic arms based on the expectation of what the other side is doing. One has to get one's priorities right. The first objective must be to get that cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies interrupted.

That has now been substantially achieved. Once that is built into the planning of both sides, I think the negotiations on reductions will be easier.

Q. Do you see those negotiations for reductions taking place before the 10-year period covered by the agreement is over?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In fact, we have covered that in the aide memoire. A number of people gained the impression that the reductions were to start only after 1985. The Vladivostok announcement, in fact, said that negotiations should start no later than 1980 for reductions to take place after 1985. That has now been eliminated from the aide memoire because it was never intended to preclude an agreement on reductions to take place well before 1985. So it is clear that negotiations can start as soon as possible and take effect as soon as there is an agreement.

Q. Some people argue that the agreement sanctions MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] levels that will lead to a first-strike capability by both sides and actually encourage a new arms race.

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement has to be compared with what would have happened in the absence of an agreement—not with a theoretical model. All our intelligence estimates indicate that in the absence of an agreement, Soviet MIRV levels would have been substantially higher than they will be under the agreement, as well as Soviet total levels, which in turn would have triggered another series of moves by us. The so-called new construction programs are the minimum planned construction programs; they would certainly have been accelerated and expanded if the Soviet Union had in fact produced at the level that our intelligence estimates thought they could. And not only could, but would. I am talking now about the middle intelligence estimate. Generally three estimates are made—low, middle, and high. Both of the ceilings agreed in Vladivostok are below the low intelligence estimate, and substantially below the medium intelligence estimate.

A myth is beginning to develop that in July we made a proposal of more severe limitations on MIRV's and that this, for some curious reason, was abandoned between July and December. This simply is not true. The July proposal, first of all, called for a five-year agreement. If you double the number that we proposed for the five-year agreement, you would have a higher number than the one we settled on for 10 years.

Q. The Soviets have issued a statement that they are not going to make any guarantees about Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Does this statement and its possible impact on the trade bill concern you?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it concerns me. Certainly there is no one in Washington who has not heard me warn about this for years. Without saying anything, without making any claims for it, we managed to increase Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000 before any of this debate started. We had managed to intercede quietly in behalf of a list of hardship cases, of which more than half were dealt with successfully. We never claimed a success; we never took credit for it. We never said this was a result of détente. We just encouraged it to happen. We have warned constantly not to make this an issue of state-to-state relations, because we were afraid it would lead to a formal confrontation and defeat the objective of promoting emigration. Despite our deep misgivings, we acquiesced when statements were made by some which implied that the Soviet Union had yielded to pressure, because we thought it was the result that was important, and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate that might have jeopardized the trade bill.

The issue of Jewish emigration is, above all, a human problem. There is no legal agreement we can make with the Soviet Union that we can enforce. Whether the Soviet Union permits emigration depends on the importance they attach to their relationship with the United States and therefore on the whole context of the East-West relationship.

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment to détente, and if we can make clear that this

is related to the emigration question, existing understandings will have a chance. But what we have had is, first, excessive claims. And now the Export-Import Bank bill has been encumbered with amendments that, to all practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of any substantial size to the Soviet Union.

Loans are more important to the Soviet Union than most-favored-nation status, and in this respect the Soviets are worse off now, after three years of détente and even after increased Jewish emigration, than they were to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying that the Soviets must pay something for détente, and then not provide anything from our side to give them an interest in its continuance.

Q. Do you see any signs that détente has led Moscow to play a more positive role in the Mideast?

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East is a very complicated issue for them and for us. I do not believe evidence supports the proposition that the Soviet Union produced the 1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not been prepared to risk its relationship to some of the Arab states for the sake of Middle East tranquillity. What this proves is that détente does not mean that the Soviet Union and we have become collaborators, but that we are partly rivals, partly ideologically incompatible, and partly edging toward cooperation. The Middle East has been an area where cooperation has been far from satisfactory.

Q. Will détente help in the next round in the Mideast?

Secretary Kissinger: Generally, yes, if all parties proceed with circumspection. Some of the participants in the Middle East conflict did not want an extremely active Soviet role. This was one inhibiting feature. The second is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union depends on the actual positions the Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes positions which are identical with one of the parties, then we are better off dealing with those parties directly.

Q. What would be the necessary condition before the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel could sit down together and talk?

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible for the United States to recommend negotiation with the PLO until the PLO accepts the existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one form or another, the destruction of Israel, we don't see much hope for negotiation with the PLO.

Q. Do you share the concern of many people now who feel that both sides are hardening their positions?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been through several Mideast negotiations, and they run a fever cycle. There is a great deal of excessive talk on both sides to prove that they have been tough, unyielding, and didn't make any concessions. We are now in the relatively early phases of these exchanges. I am not pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe another step is quite possible. Obviously, because of the Rabat meeting, and the increasing complexity of the domestic situation of almost all of the participants, negotiations are more difficult now than they were a year ago. The stakes are also higher. But I believe that progress is possible. We have to do it now by somewhat different methods than we did last year. If I compare where we are now with where we were at various stages during the Syrian negotiations, I think it looks far more encouraging than it did then. I am in fact quite hopeful.

Q. Are you going to deemphasize "shuttle diplomacy"?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a time for shuttle diplomacy, and there is a time for quiet diplomacy. I cannot accept the principle that whenever there is something to be settled, the Secretary of State must go to the area and stake his personal prestige on the conduct of the negotiations. I don't think that is a healthy situation. And therefore, while I don't exclude that in a concluding phase, or in a critical phase, I might go to

the Middle East for three or four days, I will not do so unless conditions are right and the stakes are important enough.

Q. Do you think there can be any further progress before Leonid Brezhnev goes to Egypt in January?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a grave mistake for the United States to gear its own policies to the travels of the General Secretary of the Soviet Party. We will negotiate as rapidly as we can, but we don't want to get into the business of imposing settlements or of getting ahead of the parties. The art of negotiations is to make sure that all of the parties feel that their essential interests are safeguarded and that their dignity is respected. Our pace will be set not by Brezhnev but by how rapidly the parties move toward each other.

Q. The military resupply of Israel, both during and after the 1973 war, seems to have stripped the American military establishment of some of its materiel. Does this suggest that the United States will have a difficult time resupplying Israel in any war of extended duration?

Secretary Kissinger: I understand from Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger that these stories about stripping the American military establishment are incorrect. And I understand that production in many of the essential categories is being stepped up. I don't think there is any physical incapacity to do what is necessary.

Q. Some people say that it would be to Israel's advantage to find an excuse to launch a preemptive strike.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on my talks with Israeli leaders, I do not believe that any responsible Israeli leader operates on this assumption. They know that if a war starts it may start events of incalculable consequences.

I think the responsible people in Israel realize that improved American relations with Arab countries are also in the interests of Israel, because they enable us to be a moderating influence. The Israeli leaders

with whom I am dealing are genuinely interested in moving toward peace. It is a very complicated problem because their margin of survival is so much narrower than ours that it is hard for Americans to understand some Israeli concerns. But I do not believe that any Israeli leader would deliberately engage in such a reckless course.

Q. Given the Arab oil weapon and how it affects Western support of Israel, can Israel expect to survive?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the survival of Israel is essential. The United States—and finally, in the last analysis, Europe—will not negotiate over the survival of Israel. This would be an act of such extraordinary cynicism that the world would be morally mortgaged if it ever happened. But it won't happen.

Q. In your list of pluses and minuses for the year, we have not touched on energy yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I think next to SALT, I would consider the most lasting achievement to be the energy policy that we developed. I think the Washington Energy Conference, the International Energy Agency, the emergency sharing program, and the measures which we are currently pursuing may be the beginning of a restructuring of relationships among the advanced industrial countries and eventually serve as a bridge to the producing countries.

Q. What sorts of structure are you referring to?

Secretary Kissinger: The structure that emerged in the immediate postwar period was essentially geared to military defense. Some of the difficulties that emerged in the sixties and early seventies, as a result of the growth of European unity and the emergence of Japan, were that the military organization and the political and economic organization had grown out of phase with each other. It has proved difficult to bring them back into phase by purely military arrangements. This is what I attempted to say in my "Year of Europe" speech, which was a little premature, but many of whose basic

principles are now being accepted. Now the problem of how the advanced industrialized nations can give effect to the realities of interdependence is one of the most serious problems of our time—in the fields of energy, of food, and of the whole nature of economic policies.

Q. Is it American policy to organize the oil-consuming nations so that they can negotiate a reduction of oil prices with the producers?

Secretary Kissinger: We would like to create the maximum incentives for a reduction of prices and, failing that, the maximum capacity to withstand the high prices. The two things are related. If we have effective conservation measures, if we develop alternative sources of energy, and if new sources of oil continue to be discovered, the balance between supply and demand must inevitably change. I have heard statements that the producers can always keep up with us by cutting production, but they will, I think, find this increasingly difficult to implement. If the industrialized nations implement measures of financial solidarity, we can reduce the effect of the balance of payment deficits. And when the emergency sharing program is in effect in a few months, the capacity of these countries to use embargoes for political effect will be reduced.

Q. But while many of President Ford's advisers have been urging him to take stringent conservation measures, he has resisted so far.

Secretary Kissinger: I am convinced that the President will soon announce a program that will give effect to the principle I have outlined. I am confident that it will be a good program and that it will be adequate to our international responsibilities.

Q. Are French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt going to be more cooperative in these international structures? Are they really frightened of what is going on in Europe and the world?

Secretary Kissinger: Both countries are

convinced that without a greater interaction of economic policies, an economic disaster for everybody is probable. And everybody realizes that they cannot deal with the economic policies on a purely national basis.

Secondly, there is a growing realization that the political demoralization of the industrialized countries must be arrested. This presupposes that governments can be seen to be coping with the problems that confront them. And that again will drive some more in the direction of interdependence. Right now it is really irrelevant to discuss what formula of consultation would be adequate, because the necessities that are imposed on us by the energy crisis would produce their own formula.

Q. Do you think the American public is prepared for the consequences of such a program?

Secretary Kissinger: All I can say is that it is the absolute duty of leaders to tell the people what they believe is necessary. You can make your life easier by not putting tough choices to the public. But then when the inevitable catastrophe occurs, you have lost not only credibility but legitimacy. So I don't think we really have any choice. I think the administration will have to tell the public what is needed, and I know that the President intends to do this. I think this is basically a healthy society, and I think there will be support.

Q. If all else should fail, would the United States consider military intervention in the Middle East to secure oil at prices that we can afford?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that would be a cause for military action.

Q. You don't think that the financial bankruptcy of the West would be a casus belli?

Secretary Kissinger: The financial bankruptcy of the West is avoidable by other means. We will find other solutions.

Q. That doesn't answer the question, with all due respect.

Secretary Kissinger: What we would do if

there were no other way of avoiding financial bankruptcy and the whole collapse of the Western structure, I cannot now speculate. But I am convinced that we won't reach that point.

Q. What concrete steps might the United States take to induce the Third World countries to pursue a more realistic course in the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Third World countries have to accept the fact that they, too, live in an interdependent world. They cannot both insist on cooperation from the advanced industrial countries and conduct constant warfare—economic or political—against the advanced industrial countries. The spirit of cooperation must be mutual. There will be disagreement, of course. That is unavoidable. But if you have a group of 77 nations that automatically vote as a group, regardless of the merits of the issue, then the United Nations becomes a test of strength and the web of cooperation on which the development of all countries ultimately depends will be severely strained. In future sessions of the United Nations we will look more carefully at the degree of mutuality in the positions of the countries with which we are dealing.

Q. Can you conceive of a situation in which the United States might decide to temporarily suspend itself from the United Nations to protest the tyranny of the majority?

Secretary Kissinger: I can conceive that if an issue is too outrageously decided, that we would suspend our activities in relation to that issue. But it is hard to answer this question in the abstract.

Q. Our détente with China seems to have been stalled.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is the constant position of Newsweek magazine. But it is not our position. I believe that on the level of bilateral relations between the two countries we are essentially on course. I found that essentially confirmed by my last visit to the People's Republic of China. It is

a relationship of practical necessity, in which two countries have made a decision to cooperate for limited objectives with each other. I don't accept the proposition that our policy is stalled.

Q. Do you think within the next year we might move toward a normalization of relations with Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: We were prepared to accept a two-thirds vote of the Organization of American States at its recent meeting in Quito, and we were led to believe that this two-thirds vote had been assured. Suddenly we found ourselves in the position of being asked to produce votes for a resolution which we could not possibly sponsor, given the history of our involvement in the sanctions. There will be another occasion next year in a less structured meeting in Buenos Aires to discuss the Cuban issue, where the necessity of producing votes is less intense, and where one can then chart a course on a hemisphere basis more effectively. I think there will be some evolution during the next year.

Q. How do you evaluate your own situation now at the end of the year?

Secretary Kissinger: During the period of President Nixon's crisis, I may have been overprotected from congressional criticism because many of the Senators and Congressmen instinctively were fearful of doing damage to our foreign policy and believed that they had to preserve one area of our national policy from partisan controversy. So it was inevitable that after that restraint was removed I would rejoin the human race and be exposed to the normal criticisms of Secretaries of State.

I have spent a great deal of time with Congress in the last few weeks, and I have the impression that there is a solid relationship. We worked out the Greek-Turkish aid problem, I think, in a cooperative spirit. I really feel passionately that if we don't maintain our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis, we will be in the deepest trouble. Of course fundamental issues ought to be discussed,

including fundamental foreign policy issues. But there are various areas in which there is or ought to be substantial agreement. And as far as I am concerned, I am going to go the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bipartisan basis.

Q. Do you think the pendulum has swung too far from one direction, from talk of "Super K," to an overwillingness now to criticize you?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no magic and there are no supermen in foreign policy. The difference between a good and a mediocre foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances. It is meticulousness; it is careful preparation. If a Secretary of State or anybody concerned with foreign policy goes out to hit a home run every time he goes up there, he is putting a burden on himself and a strain on the system.

Q. You have been quoted as saying that Americans like the lone cowboy, walking into town with his six-guns blazing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think any society needs individuals that symbolize what it stands for. It is difficult to run countries without great figures.

Q. Have we great figures today?

Secretary Kissinger: One of the problems of the modern age is that great figures are not so easy to come by.

Q. Why?

Secretary Kissinger: It may be that the process of reaching high office is so consuming that it leaves little occasion for reflection about what one does. Moreover, modern man doesn't like to stand alone. This is due largely to the impact of the media, in which everybody wants to check tomorrow morning's editorials.

Q. What role do you think the media plays in your conduct of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: The negative aspect is that there is almost a daily pulling up of

the trees to see whether the roots are still there. There is almost a daily necessity to explain each day's actions. And in the process there is a danger of losing the essence of a substantial foreign policy, which is the relationship of moves to each other and the overall design. In order to conduct a foreign policy you must be prepared to act alone for some period. You cannot get universal approbation at every step of the way. And so the media have a tendency to produce a congenital insecurity on the part of the top people.

On the positive side, the need of public explanation forces an awareness that would not otherwise exist. The more sophisticated of the journalists often have a reservoir of knowledge and continuity that is better than that of many of the top officials. I could name individuals who, on arms control, on Vietnam negotiations, could spot subtleties that many of the officials could not see.

So I think that the interplay is on the whole useful. But as one looks ahead, there are several dangers. There is a danger of a Caesaristic democracy in which the media are manipulated by the government. There is a danger of the media trying to substitute themselves for the government. And you know yourself that there are fads, that sometimes there is excessive praise and then it swings back to excessive criticism.

Q. You are about to begin your seventh year in Washington. Is there a seven-year itch? Are you thinking of turning to something else?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to think that the best time to leave is when you are not under pressure. I have been here long enough now so I don't have to continue being here to prove something to myself.

On the other hand, I am also engaged in a number of things from which it would be either difficult to dissociate or painful to dissociate. I would like to think that I will know when to get out. But very few people have mastered this. And most people are carried out instead of walking out. I have no itch to leave. But I also have no compulsion to stay.

The New Dialogue: Toward a Relationship With Latin America

*Address by William D. Rogers
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

A year ago today, Deputy Secretary Rush addressed this distinguished audience. He took the occasion to set out a few reflections on the evolution of the historical relationship between the United States and Latin America. He pointed to the forces of change which were at work and which had eroded the old patterns of paternalism that had long characterized that relationship. Secretary Rush noted that Secretary Kissinger had, only a few weeks before, launched a new dialogue with Latin America in an effort to work out the basis for a new relationship.

A good deal has occurred in the year since, both within the United States and in the area of U.S.-Latin American policy. We now are working toward a policy. I emphasize the phrase "working toward a policy." Building a new policy toward a group of two dozen very diverse countries in an era of profound change in global relationships is bound to be a long-term process. There can be no pat formulas, no grand designs that will automatically bring about a new era in U.S.-Latin American relations. As Ken Rush said here last year, "The new relationship . . . can only be worked out as specific issues are faced, discussed, and resolved."

The specific issues were defined by the Latin American Foreign Ministers last year at Bogotá. They include the patterns for cooperation for Latin American development, the question whether something by way of principle could be agreed to for the future transfer of technology, the behavior of transnational enterprises, and the restraint of co-

erceive economic measures by one country against another, as well as the Panama Canal issue, the structuring of international trade, and the reform of the Organization of American States.

The composition of the agenda, I believe, is indicative of the deep and abiding Latin American concern with the impact of the United States on the development of their economies and societies. The agenda also illustrates that regional concerns can no longer be separated from global problems.

Areas of U.S. Policy Response

Today I would like to talk about what I conceive of as the two strands of that long-term process. One strand consists of efforts by the United States to adjust its policies to the new realities in the hemisphere. Because our weight in hemispheric affairs is so great, any new relationship between the United States and Latin America will require that the United States adjust more than any single Latin American country. The other strand in building a new relationship is the effort that all the countries in the hemisphere must make together.

The United States has the elements of a policy response in five general areas. These are settling outstanding differences, avoiding new disputes, intensifying consultations, improving cooperation for development, and reshaping the inter-American system.

I. Settling outstanding differences

We have had remarkable success in clearing the board of old, festering investment

¹ Made before the Council of the Americas at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 5.

disputes and other longstanding controversies. The celebrated problems with the Government of Peru have been happily resolved, and our relationship with the Revolutionary Government is very much on the mend. Negotiations with the Government of Panama on a new canal treaty are going forward nicely in the cooperative spirit embodied in the statement of principles signed between our governments on February 7. Finally, I am delighted to say that most outstanding investment disputes in Chile have been resolved. These disputes have been or are being resolved because both parties have been willing to make concessions to the other's point of view.

II. *Avoiding new disputes*

Here, we are not so far along. We have proposed the establishment of a factfinding or conciliation procedure; something along these modest lines would permit us to consider the modification of our legislation regarding expropriation cases. This legislation—the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments—had been a major cause of the charges of economic coercion leveled against the United States. Unfortunately, the U.S. proposal found no response in Latin America.

We also continue to believe that a balanced Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States could reduce the potential for future disputes. Unfortunately, substantial differences still remain between the positions of the developed countries and the developing countries on the draft charter articles.

We are also prepared to accept—indeed, we are a leading advocate of—the formal recognition of the essential interdependence of the nations of the world and the need to recognize that economic security is collective and indivisible. Here again, however, the discussions thus far within the special committee on restructuring the OAS have reflected a difference of view between the Latin American countries who have spoken and ourselves as to how collective economic security can be achieved.

Finally, we have joined with the Latin

American countries in a Working Group on Transnational Enterprises in an effort to agree upon some principles which could serve as guidelines for the interaction between governments and foreign investors in Latin America. This working group has only recently begun its deliberations, and we are hopeful it will produce something useful. It will do so, however, only if it is recognized that the United States will not unilaterally renounce long-held positions on international law.

Clearly, the task of preventing new conflicts is a difficult one. Perhaps, in keeping with its greater power, the United States will have to make somewhat greater adjustments than it has been willing to thus far. But it cannot be expected to make all the concessions on matters of principle.

III. *Increased consultations on matters of concern*

We have made good, and are making good, on the Secretary's promise to consult—beforehand—on matters of U.S. policy of interest to Latin America. The President's Special Trade Representative, Ambassador [William D.] Eberle, completed an extensive consultation mission to Latin America in April. Consultations were held prior to the Law of the Sea Conference, the World Food Conference, the World Population Conference, and the U.N. General Assembly. A team of U.S. foreign policy planning officials has just returned from highly successful visits to four Latin American countries. This is an area where clearly the United States, as a major actor on the world scene, must make the lion's share of the effort.

IV. *Cooperation for development*

Our efforts to be responsive in this crucial area depend importantly upon congressional support, and the returns are not yet in. We will need congressional support to enable us to meet our commitment to maintain assistance to Latin America at least at its current levels. And it is not even certain that we will have a fiscal year 1975 aid bill. Passage of

the Trade Reform Act with its provisions for generalized tariff preferences for the less developed countries intact and unencumbered by restrictive amendments is absolutely essential and will be debated in the Senate next week.

Trade and market access are at the top of the agenda for Latin America today. The Latin Americans are striving to diversify and expand their exports and look to us, who supply them with nearly 40 percent of their imports, as a logical market along with other industrialized countries.

We are committed to assist the Latin Americans in this effort, but I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that our credibility has been damaged somewhat by countervailing-duty proceedings initiated in recent months as the result of industry complaint, backed up by court suits. The Latin Americans have found it difficult to believe that the U.S. Government had no discretion and was performing its statutory duty in compliance with legislation dating from 1897. The proceedings have been seen in Latin America as evidence of a renewed protectionist trade attitude.

Our ability to be responsive in the trade field, of course, will be determined largely by the fate of the Trade Reform Act. We have been closely cooperating with others within the administration to strongly urge that this priority piece of legislation be enacted by the current session of Congress, and I have spoken with many Senators of the importance of this bill to the conduct of our foreign policy with Latin America. We appreciate the help that you and the council staff have made to get the trade bill enacted. I would urge you to redouble your efforts in these few days of December remaining to enact a trade bill.

In addition to financial aid and trade, technology is regarded in Latin America as a key element of development cooperation. We have been participating vigorously in a Working Group on Science and the Transfer of Technology in an effort to see what steps the United States and Latin America might

take to improve the flow of technology to the region. The returns on this effort are not in yet. So far, however, there has been a tendency on the part of the Latin American participants to criticize the United States for not being willing to go far enough fast enough. Again we have the problem of the two strands of the relationship, of how much the United States can be expected to do unilaterally and how much Latin America and the United States can do together.

V. Reshaping the inter-American system

As the fifth new policy area, I cite the inter-American system. Both we and the Latin Americans are pretty well agreed that existing inter-American institutions must be reformed and revitalized. There is, however, no consensus as to how—whether, for example, to create a development council to take charge of the array of regional economic development matters which are such significant grist in the OAS mill; whether to take a new look at the political side of the Organization, including the General Assembly and the Permanent Council; whether to move a large share of the OAS, such as its technical assistance program and service functions, or even its headquarters, to Latin America. The problem seems to be that most of the member countries are uncertain as to what they want to use the OAS to accomplish. Here we need as much effort and input from Latin America as from the United States.

Proposal To Lift Sanctions Against Cuba

The United States can no longer, if in reality it ever could, define by itself the purposes of inter-American cooperation. And there will no doubt be a great deal said on the future of the inter-American system at the Buenos Aires meeting of Foreign Ministers, which itself, of course, will be outside the formal OAS.

This anomaly leads me to a word or two about the inter-American system and the Quito meeting. Quito illustrated both the

challenges to and the strengths and promise of the new dialogue.

The issue at Quito, as you are aware, was whether the diplomatic and economic sanctions voted by the OAS against Cuba in 1964 should be lifted. The resolution to remove the sanctions was supported by a majority but failed to receive the two-thirds vote required by the Rio Treaty [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance]. The sanctions therefore remain in effect, despite the fact that five Rio Treaty countries and four other hemispheric nations maintain either diplomatic or commercial ties with Cuba.

What implications do the Quito results carry for U.S.-Latin American relations?

While we are still too close to the event to render definitive judgments, I think there are certain aspects of the outcome that are worth noting.

First, and perhaps most obviously, the Quito results show that no consensus yet exists within the hemisphere regarding Cuba.

Second, the U.S. position at the meeting was one of complete neutrality. We neither lobbied for nor against the resolution, and we abstained when the matter came to a vote. Quito was a Latin American, not a U.S., show. The significance of this point, I am sure, will be apparent to all who have followed U.S.-Latin American relations in recent years. Our neutrality was a major change.

What of the impact of the indecisive result at Quito on the future of the Rio Treaty and the inter-American system? Since a majority—12 countries—voted in favor of removing the sanctions, we must ask if the procedures outlined in the treaty continue to be appropriate. Quito demonstrated that the time has come to give new impetus and political direction to the effort to update the organization. For, in many respects, the Organization of American States, despite its defects, remains the embodiment of our common aspirations in this hemisphere.

Of one thing I am certain, however, Cuba has absorbed far too much of our time and

energies in recent years. The Cuba issue must not be allowed to impede the important task we have undertaken in the dialogue. Both we and the Latin Americans are more aware of this central fact as a result of Quito.

Hemisphere and Global Agenda

Where do we go from here? The goals of "collective economic security" and "integral development" advanced by the nations of Latin America simply cannot be achieved in this hemisphere alone without reference to the larger international system. The problems which have been identified through the dialogue—development cooperation, the structure of trade and the monetary system, transnational enterprises, and the transfer of science and technology—are in fact the priority items on the global agenda.

But progress can be made in this hemisphere. And to the degree we can do something in the hemisphere, we will be shaping the solution of the larger problems as well.

What we are engaged in is a process. It is a process which requires not just unilateral action by the United States, although as the major power in the region we undoubtedly must bear the major responsibility. It is a process that involves not just Secretaries of State, Foreign Ministers, and their respective governments. It is a process which to be successful will require the active support and participation of all elements of our societies. The task before us then is to broaden and deepen the dialogue.

As Secretary Kissinger put it, we must "anchor the Western Hemisphere relationship not only in the consciousness of our government but in the hearts of the people."² With the continued support of organizations such as your own, I am convinced we can succeed.

² For a toast by Secretary Kissinger on Oct. 2, 1974, at a luncheon honoring Latin American Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, see BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1974, p. 583.

Secretary Underlines Importance of Western Hemisphere Policy

Secretary Kissinger met on December 17 with members of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Sol M. Linowitz, chairman of the commission, made to the press after the meeting.

Press release 537 dated December 18

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Ladies and gentlemen: I came down here primarily to introduce Sol Linowitz, an old friend of mine, who has chaired a commission that has studied the Western Hemisphere policy.

We attach the greatest importance to revitalizing the policy in the Western Hemisphere. I think an important beginning was made last year in the Foreign Ministers meetings that took place in Tlatelolco, in Mexico City, and in Washington. And another one is planned for Buenos Aires in Argentina, I think in the second half of March.

We would like to give effect to our conviction of the interdependence which is the chief characteristic of the modern period. In this hemisphere, where we are connected with so many countries with a long tradition of friendship and cooperative action, we are aware that there are many serious difficulties. We realize that the history of the relationship has had many ups and downs and that the United States has not always shown the requisite understanding for conditions in Latin America. But we do want to work together in a spirit that reflects the necessity of our time. It is for this reason that the report of the commission headed by Mr. Linowitz¹ is taken so seriously by us. We believe that it reflects a conceptual approach and a structure which is very compatible with our

¹ The 54-page report entitled "The Americas in a Changing World" is available from the Center for Inter-American Relations, 680 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10021.

own. It contains many recommendations with which we are extremely sympathetic.

I have just met for an hour with a group, some of whose distinguished members are in this room—and indeed we hired away one of its members as Assistant Secretary for Latin American relations. And I am delighted that they have agreed that they would stay in business and continue to meet and to give us the benefit of their advice. I plan to meet with them regularly. And as we get closer to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Buenos Aires, we will certainly check our conclusions with them and hope prior to that to benefit from their views.

So I came down here with Mr. Linowitz to underline the importance we attach to his report, the importance we attach to the Western Hemisphere policy, and the hope that we can bring about a dramatic improvement in Western Hemisphere relationships.

Thank you very much.

MR. LINOWITZ

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. On behalf of the commission, may I just say that we are deeply appreciative of the opportunity to meet with the Secretary today and to have had the chance to exchange ideas with him on a number of the most important problems confronting U.S.-Latin American relations.

I ought to indicate that, as I see it, six members of the commission who were present at the meeting this afternoon are in the room. And I would merely call your attention to the fact that Dr. Harrison Brown, Secretary Elliot Richardson, Mr. [Henry J.] Heinz, Professor [Samuel P.] Huntington, Dr. [Thomas M.] Messer, and Mr. [Nathaniel] Samuels are all here with us. Mr. [Arnold] Nachmanoff, who is the executive director of the commission, is there, as are Mr. [Gregory] Treverton, the rapporteur, and Mr. [Abraham] Lowenthal, who served as our consultant.

In the course of our meeting with the Secretary, we had a chance to talk with him about some of the most critical, contentious problems and, in an informal, wholly free,

give-and-take atmosphere, exchange our ideas and give him the benefit of our own thoughts with respect to these particular issues.

The main point we wanted to make was that in this changed world, where previous assumptions and premises have to be re-examined and reformulated, we must no longer rely on policies which are no longer applicable; that the premises which underlie everything from the Good Neighbor policy through the Alliance for Progress, indeed to some of the more recent pronouncements, are really not truly reflective of the kind of world in which we are living; that we have to recognize that Latin America is no longer our sphere of influence; that we can no longer be patronizing or neglectful toward the countries of the hemisphere; and that we have to enter into a whole new policy in this country which will permit us to work with the countries of Latin America in recognition of our true interdependence at this critical time and in recognition of the fact that indeed, in the deepest sense, we need one another.

It was with this in mind that we formulated our recommendations based around five major principles which we discussed with the Secretary: First, that the United States and Latin America have to work together in a global context; secondly, that American policies have to be sensitive to their impact in this hemisphere; third, that we have to do away with the patronizing and paternalistic and discriminatory legislation and practices which were prevalent in this hemisphere in times in the past; fourth, that we have to cooperate in the strengthening of human rights; and fifth, that we have to evolve a policy for economic cooperation which will be mutually beneficial.

We touched in that context on a number of issues which are referred to and discussed in our report: Cuba, Chile, the whole business of intervention, covert or overt, the problems arising from economic sanctions in the hemisphere, how we can do a better job of strengthening human rights, what we ought to be doing about relationships between governments and between companies and governments in the economic area.

That really was the substance of our conversation. We were tremendously encouraged by the Secretary's deep interest in our report and this recommendation and his commitment to the thrust of our report, his support for the principles that we espoused, and his assertion to us that he believed that the main direction of our report was wholly consistent with his own views.

It was also encouraging to have him ask that we indeed go forward with our proposal to meet from time to time in the months ahead in order to take stock of what had happened to our recommendations and to issue statements as to how we find the developing situation in the hemisphere.

Secretary Kissinger Honors Senator Fulbright

Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger made at a dinner in honor of Senator J. W. Fulbright given by the Board of Foreign Scholarships on December 16 at Washington.

Press release 535 dated December 17

We are here tonight to honor an American statesman, and an old friend. Bill Fulbright has been my colleague and mentor ever since I came to Washington. We have not always agreed, but I have come to value his opposition more than I would some other men's support. For the force of his wisdom and sincerity can leave no man's views untempered.

From the origin of democracy in Greece down to the present, the question has been posed whether a government of the people could muster the vision and resolution which the conduct of foreign policy requires.

It was Pericles, speaking to the Athenians, who first stated our faith that a free people can, through free discussion and free elections, sustain a wiser and more decisive policy than governments that find their unity in discipline rather than common purpose.

Senator Fulbright has fulfilled this promise triumphantly in our own time. A son of the State of Arkansas, he has represented its

people for a generation; and at the same time, he has been a statesman who could look beyond our own country to see, as clearly as any man, the emerging challenges for our policy abroad.

He was an architect, after 1946, of a post-war international system built on the need for Western unity in the face of a monolithic Communist threat. But he also perceived sooner than others that the cold war order must give way to a more pluralist and tolerant system in which neither great power would try to remold the world in its own image. His voice was among the first to define ideas which have become pillars of our policy today—*détente* with the Soviet Union and China, more limited American involvement in Indochina, an evenhanded approach to settlement in the Middle East. Before the word was used, he was a prophet of the interdependence that has become our current condition.

His views were often unpopular when first advanced, but because he voiced them, opinion came to terms more rapidly with the reality he perceived. He has exercised his leadership not to exalt his own position but to bring his country abreast of his own understanding. He has earned a leader's highest praise in a democracy, which is that he has been the educator of a free people.

But in addition to honoring the service and leadership of a masterful American statesman, we also are here to mark an achievement singular in its significance for our time; for as the members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships attest by their presence, we honor this evening a career which has been translated into an institution.

In his book "The Public Philosophy" Walter Lippmann noted that if we are to avoid disaster we must deal with what Lippmann called "the pictures in people's heads"—the manmade environment in which ideas become realities.

In an age when the technologies of communication are improving faster than man's ability to assimilate their consequences, and at a time when the multiplication of differ-

ing perspectives and predispositions complicates the achievement of global consensus, Bill Fulbright conceived a program brilliant in its simplicity and essential for our future. He recognized that the dramatically accelerating pace of interaction among peoples and institutions would not necessarily lead to increased understanding or cooperation. He foresaw that interaction unguided by intelligent and humane direction and concern had the potential to bring increased tension and hostility rather than less.

The Fulbright exchange program was an expansive concept founded upon a global vision. It has grown to meet new realities. A program which once promoted the solidarity of the West now sustains exchanges between the United States and 122 countries around the globe. It expressed, it helps us to master, the growing interdependence of the world.

Personally, it is difficult for me to accept that Senator Fulbright will now be leaving the Senate. He has suffered the ultimate fate of every politician, which is to leave the office he has made his own. But I will continue to rely on his wise counsel as much in the future as I have in the past. Bill Fulbright's wisdom will not be lost to this nation.

As Pericles once said to the Athenians, great leaders find:

. . . the grandest of all sepulchers . . . (is) the minds of men, where their glory remains fresh to stir to speech or action as the occasion comes by. For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; and their story is not graven only on stone over their native earth, but lives on far away, without visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other men's lives.

Bill, we are confident you will go on to new achievements. But your deeds are already woven into the fabric of our lives, into our policy, into our way of perceiving the world. And the Fulbright program will live as the visible symbol of your gift to mankind. We will always be grateful. On behalf of the past and present members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, it is now my honor and pleasure to present you with this scroll of appreciation.

Economic and Technical Assistance to Portugal

*Department Announcement*¹

Following the most useful conversations the President of the Republic had with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger in Washington, the Governments of the United States and Portugal agreed that a positive demonstration of U.S. support and confidence in Portugal's future would be timely and helpful.

Within the resources immediately available to it, the U.S. Government has offered to begin at once a program of economic assistance and cooperation which will address itself to the Portuguese Government's high-priority needs in the fields of housing, agriculture, transportation, public administration, education, and health and in the areas of finance and economy.

The program of economic assistance and cooperation is intended as an earnest of U.S. Government support for Portugal in its effort to construct a free and democratic society.

The principal elements of the present phase of economic assistance and cooperation are the following:

—The U.S. Government will guarantee up to \$20 million in private American loans for the construction of housing in Portugal.

—U.S. Government experts in the fields of agriculture, transportation, public administration, education, and health will be made available to Portugal on a short-term basis at no charge when requested by the Portuguese Government.

—Opportunities for Portuguese to study and train in the United States will be increased in accordance with Portugal's present needs.

—The Export-Import Bank will give sympathetic consideration to financing U.S. goods and services needed for Portuguese development projects.

—In addition to direct bilateral assistance, the United States at the request of the Government of Portugal will:

a. Support Portugal in international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;

b. Urge other friendly countries to help Portugal, too, either bilaterally or in conjunction with the United States.

Appropriate Ministries of the two governments are beginning immediately to work out the details of the program so that it can begin at once.

In addition, the administration strongly supports the congressional proposal for aid to Portugal. This proposal, if enacted, would authorize loan funds and grant aid, to be divided equally between Portugal and African territories under Portuguese administration and former territories.

Letters of Credence

German Democratic Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, Rolf Sieber, presented his credentials to President Ford on December 20.¹

Morocco

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco, Abdelhadi Boutaleb, presented his credentials to President Ford on December 20.¹

Yemen Arab Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic, Hasan Makki, presented his credentials to President Ford on December 20.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Dec. 20.

¹ Issued on Dec. 13 (text from press release 527).

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate

Following are statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 21 by Senator Stuart Symington, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, and on October 30 and November 20 and 22 by Joseph Martin, Jr., U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Adviser to the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, together with the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on December 9.

U.S. STATEMENTS

Senator Symington, October 21

USUN press release 140 dated October 21 (prepared text)

As we start our annual disarmament debate, my government believes it appropriate to devote its initial statement on disarmament questions exclusively to one of the most critical matters before the 29th General Assembly—the objective of limiting the growth and spread of nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of the nuclear age, we have been forced to live with the dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy. We have held high expectations concerning the contribution that nuclear energy could make to human welfare; but we have always been painfully aware that tied to these expected benefits is a growing potential for mankind's destruction. The rapidly expanding use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power in recent years has made this dilemma one of the most urgent issues of our time.

An inevitable result of the massive growth of nuclear-generated power will be the tremendous increase in worldwide production

of plutonium. Estimates are that by 1980 close to 1 million pounds of plutonium will have been produced worldwide in electric power reactors, enough to manufacture over 50,000 nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, rising demands for enriched uranium as a nuclear reactor fuel will require a marked expansion of uranium enrichment capacity.

Widespread development of enrichment facilities, perhaps involving new enrichment techniques, could create a capability for producing weapons-grade uranium at many locations throughout the world.

This increasing availability of nuclear fuels and materials, as well as the continuing dissemination of nuclear technology, threatens to place a nuclear explosive capability, and the accompanying capability to produce nuclear weapons, within the reach of an ever-widening group of states. As perilous as the situation was when there were only two states with a nuclear weapons capability—and is now with six—stability would be vastly more precarious in a world of many nuclear powers.

Such a world is not to be feared more by one group of states than another. All nations would stand to lose.

States fortunate enough to be located in regions now free of nuclear weapons would suddenly find themselves faced with nuclear-armed neighbors. This would bring them under strong pressures to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. Even minor conflicts would then involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The probability of the use of nuclear weapons—whether by design, miscalculation, or accident—would increase sharply. Prospects for significant arms control and disarmament measures would deteriorate as all

states felt the need to prepare for a larger and more disparate range of contingencies.

Many have assumed that time was on our side—that every year without the use of nuclear weapons, every year without an additional nuclear power, every step in East-West détente, and every measure to curb the arms race have all been part of a steady progression to where we would no longer fear the possibility of nuclear war. But it is obvious, in light of the worldwide energy crisis and the emergence after a 10-year hiatus of an additional state with a nuclear explosive capability, that we cannot afford to be complacent.

Hopefully, these developments will at least have the positive effect of making us fully alert to the dangers of the further spread of nuclear explosives and of encouraging a determined international effort to avert that possibility.

We are now at an important juncture, perhaps a decisive one. The challenge, as Secretary Kissinger well described it to the General Assembly on September 23, is “to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.”

The United States does not believe that a world of many nuclear powers is inevitable. Nor does it believe that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must necessarily be cut back because of the risk that nuclear technology will be diverted to military purposes. However, we cannot expect to take full advantage of the expanding use of nuclear energy unless we are willing to strengthen the system for assuring one another that there is nothing to fear in the continued diffusion of nuclear materials and technology.

While working toward a more universal and effective system of assurances or safeguards, we must also strengthen the political and economic incentives for resisting the temptation to acquire nuclear explosive capabilities. Those capabilities would inevitably be perceived as a threat to others and therefore trigger a competition in the destructive potential of nuclear devices.

No state or group of states can meet the challenge alone. What is required in the months and years ahead is a sustained and concerted international effort involving nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclear suppliers and importers, parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and states which have not yet seen it in their interest to join the treaty. My government would like to suggest several tasks which members of the world community, individually and collectively, should undertake in meeting this challenge.

First, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be continued. It could be argued that the most appropriate response to the increasing risk of diversion of nuclear technology to hostile purposes would simply be to cut back on international cooperation in the nuclear energy field. The United States does not believe such a course of action would serve nonproliferation objectives, nor would it be responsive to the pressing need throughout the world to receive the benefits of this important new source of energy. The United States recognizes fully that the vast potential benefits of nuclear energy cannot be monopolized by a handful of advanced industrial states. This is especially true at a time when many of the world's developing countries are among the hardest hit by global economic difficulties.

As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, I have been privileged to participate in U.S. efforts to make the peaceful applications of atomic energy widely available. The U.S. Government has facilitated the participation of American industry in atomic power activities abroad. It has sponsored large international conferences to share our technical know-how. It has shipped materials abroad to help others move ahead in nuclear technology. And it has given strong support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to that Agency's programs in the nuclear field. All told, it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to promote peaceful uses worldwide. We intend to continue this effort, both through our bilateral cooperative

arrangements and our support for the work of the IAEA.

Second, we should intensify our search for effective measures to curb the competition in nuclear arms. We are mindful that serious risks are involved in the further accumulation of nuclear weapons by states now possessing them, as well as in the spread of weapons capabilities to additional states. Moreover, we know that we cannot expect non-nuclear-weapon states to show restraint unless nuclear powers also practice restraint.

As one of the principal nuclear powers, the United States recognizes its special responsibility in this area. We are aware of the concerns expressed by a number of countries about the pace of progress in nuclear disarmament. Although proud of achievements already made, we would agree that progress has been disappointingly slow. We understand the impatience of others, and ourselves are anxious to proceed faster. But it must be recognized that these complicated issues, touching upon the vital interests of all states, are rarely susceptible to quick and easy solutions.

U.S. and Soviet negotiators recently reconvened their talks in Geneva on strategic arms limitations. We attach the utmost importance to these negotiations, in which members of this body have also expressed much interest.

The talks are currently aimed at concluding an equitable agreement placing quantitative and qualitative limitations on offensive strategic weapons. We will make every effort to reach such an agreement at the earliest possible date. In addition, the United States remains firmly committed to seek an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, has significance not only for its restraining effect on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms competition but also as a step toward our ultimate goal of a comprehensive ban. Indeed, in the first article of that treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to pursue further negotiations toward that goal.

Third, steps should be taken to insure the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is noteworthy that, while

treaty parties have sometimes urged faster implementation of provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty, there is virtual unanimity among them that the treaty's basic concepts and structure are sound and that the treaty continues to provide a valuable legal framework for dealing with both the peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy. My government continues to regard the NPT as one of the most significant international agreements of the post-World War II era. Recently, President Ford called the treaty "one of the pillars of United States foreign policy."

The Nonproliferation Treaty has been criticized as discriminatory in that it divides the world into two categories of states: those with nuclear explosive devices and those without. But the NPT did not create that distinction, nor is it intended to condone it. The negotiators of the NPT recognized that the only promising and realistic approach was to start with the world the way it was. Accordingly the treaty calls for a halt to the further spread of explosive capabilities and obligates existing nuclear powers to speed limitations and reductions of their own stockpiles.

If there had been no effort, such as the NPT, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons or if the effort had been postponed until nuclear-weapon states had abolished their arsenals, we would have found ourselves in a world of so many nuclear powers that further attempts to stop "vertical proliferation"—that is, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons—would be futile.

The distinguished leader of the Swedish disarmament delegation, Mrs. [Inga] Thorsson, put this matter in the proper perspective at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on July 30 of this year when she said:

The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its purpose is such that it has been supported by the majority, and needs to be supported by the entirety, of the world community. It is in the interest of every single country in the world that this purpose be fulfilled.

As we approach the May 1975 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty,

we should consider ways of making the treaty more attractive to existing and prospective parties. Last summer my government announced that parties to the NPT will be given preferential consideration in the donation by the United States of special nuclear materials—primarily enriched uranium for use in IAEA medical research projects. We have also decided to give preference to NPT parties in allocating training and equipment grants for IAEA technical assistance programs. And we encourage others to adopt similar policies.

We would welcome further suggestions for increasing incentives for NPT membership.

Fourth, thorough international consideration should be given to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's). The dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy is nowhere more evident than in the problem of PNE's. Indeed, because the technologies of PNE's and nuclear weapons are indistinguishable, it is impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon state to develop a capability to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without, in the process, acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. For this reason, the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the development or acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon states.

Article V of the NPT was developed to assure the states that give up the option of developing nuclear explosives that they will receive any benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that eventually might materialize. To date, however, the commercial utility of PNE's has not been proved. Moreover, the use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter politically and legally, which has ramifications for the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the case of excavation projects and which would pose problems in relation to any test ban treaty.

The United States stands ready to honor its article V obligation to make the benefits of PNE's available on a nondiscriminatory basis when and if their feasibility and practicability are established. In the meantime,

we support the steps already taken in the IAEA context to implement article V, including the development of guidelines for PNE observation, the adoption of procedures for responding to requests for PNE services, and the approval of a U.S.-sponsored resolution authorizing the Director General to establish, at an appropriate time, an office in the IAEA Secretariat to deal with PNE requests.

We are willing to consider other suggestions concerning organizational arrangements for an international service.

Fifth, we should work urgently toward strengthening the system of international safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and technology to the manufacture of nuclear explosives. The interests of nuclear exporters and importers alike would be served by a system which provided confidence that nuclear technology was not being misused. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses of nuclear technology should not impede the full exploitation of its peaceful potential. The realization of peaceful benefits should be facilitated by a broad international commitment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities.

We should step up our efforts to improve the effectiveness and achieve the broadest possible acceptance of IAEA safeguards. In this connection, let us note that in his message to the recent IAEA General Conference, President Ford reaffirmed the U.S. offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards to demonstrate our belief that there is no threat to proprietary information and no risk of suffering commercial disadvantage under NPT safeguards.

Nuclear exporters should make special efforts to insure that their transfers of nuclear materials and equipment do not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities. The U.S. will shortly approach the principal supplier countries with specific proposals for making safeguards more effective.

One of the problems to be faced in the

years ahead is the challenge of meeting rapidly increasing demands for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing services without undermining safeguards. An alternative to developing national facilities for these services—one which would be both economical and conducive to effective safeguards—might be the establishment of multinational plants capable of satisfying world demands.

Sixth, steps should be taken to insure the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials. As the civil nuclear industry expands throughout the world, nuclear materials will become an increasing factor in international commerce and the threat of theft or diversion could become acute. While physical security must be the primary responsibility of national governments, we believe the world community can play an important role. Accordingly, Secretary Kissinger stated on September 23 that the United States will urge the IAEA to develop an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material.

Such a convention should outline specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer. The United States, moreover, agrees with Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund's recommendation that the IAEA should prepare itself to be a source of advice and assistance to nations that wish to improve their physical security practices.

Seventh, and finally, we should support and encourage the development of regional arrangements which contribute to nonproliferation objectives. While the NPT has played a central role in efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, the United States believes that complementary tools should also be used to serve that objective. Accordingly, we support the treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, so far the only densely populated region in the world to set up a formal regime to ban nuclear weapons.

We also welcome the interest shown in nuclear-free zones at this General Assembly, in particular in the proposals for creating nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

On several occasions my government has put forward four criteria for the establishment of nuclear-free zones:

1. The initiative should be taken by the states in the region concerned.
2. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important.
3. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements.
4. Provision should be made for adequate verification.

We would take these criteria into account in assessing any specific regional arrangement.

Another factor my government would take into account would be the treatment of PNE's in any nuclear-free-zone proposal. When the United States adhered to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it was with the understanding that the treaty does not permit nonnuclear states party to the treaty to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. We accordingly regard the Latin American nuclear-free zone as consistent with our objective of curbing the spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities.

We have suggested the principal tasks which we think should be undertaken in dealing with the vital issues of nuclear arms control and look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on these suggestions. A broadly based collective effort should be made by all—nuclear and nonnuclear, NPT parties and nonparties, industrially advanced and developing states alike—if we are to save our own and future generations from a world of many nuclear powers and unrestrained nuclear arms competition.

Ambassador Martin, October 30

USUN press release 152 dated October 30

In his statement to this committee October 21, Senator Symington discussed the tasks that we feel should be undertaken in a broad international effort to curb the further spread of nuclear explosive technology. Today I

would like to review the other important arms control issues before the Assembly at the current session.

In spite of some disappointment that we have not progressed further toward our disarmament objectives, my government continues to believe that encouraging progress has been made in the past decade. In recent years states have worked together seriously and cooperatively on arms control and disarmament to a degree which would not have been thought possible 10 years ago. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between my country and the Soviet Union, the discussions on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and the successful negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty are solid evidence of the progress that has been made.

Since our discussion of disarmament issues a year ago, encouraging progress has been made on the problem of chemical weapons. We were impressed by the submission by the delegation of Japan to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft convention on chemical weapons, an important contribution to the deliberations on the question of effective international restraints on chemical weapons. Of equal interest have been the extensive comments and suggestions concerning the Japanese draft offered by other CCD delegations. We are taking careful note of the Japanese draft and these comments in our continuing review of possible actions in the chemical weapons field.

We were also gratified that, at the initiative of Sweden, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this summer held a productive informal meeting on technical chemical weapons questions, in which 22 experts from 13 countries discussed the best ways of defining chemical agents for purposes of international restraints, the scope of possible chemical weapons limitations,

and the possibilities of devising effective means of verification. Such discussions should provide a basis to make informed judgments on the question of chemical weapons restraints.

Furthermore, members of this committee will recall that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed at the 1974 summit to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.

At its current session this committee will also address the problem of the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes. In recent years new scientific and technical advances in the environmental sciences have given hope that man may be able to work purposefully to change the environment to his benefit. At present, although there has been promising progress in efforts in certain localities and under limited conditions to increase snowfall, lessen the severity of hailstorms, affect precipitation, and disperse fog, the limited success of these efforts thus far demonstrates how little we understand the interaction of natural forces and how rudimentary are man's attempts to influence those forces. Techniques may, however, one day be developed to alleviate drought, to mitigate the destructive power of hurricanes and typhoons, prevent floods, and perhaps eventually to change climate to respond to the universal desire for opportunity to increase living standards.

We believe that environment modification techniques, which are yet little understood and remain largely hypothetical, could have considerable potential for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the techniques to accomplish these goals might also be used for hostile purposes that could have widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare. Scientists have expressed concern about the future possibilities of triggering earthquakes, generating tidal waves and long-term climatic changes.

The United States has declared that it would not use climate modification techniques for hostile purposes even if such techniques come to be developed in the future. In the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement on environmental warfare at the summit meeting, we expressed our willingness to examine with the Soviet Union what measures could be effective to overcome the dangers of the use of environment modification techniques for military purposes. We are prepared to study this question and to examine the measures that might become the subject of international agreement. If it is the general view that this question should be referred by the Assembly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we could support referral if it were accomplished without prejudgments of the Committee's consideration of the question.

In regard to international consideration of the question of napalm, other incendiaries, and certain other conventional weapons, the constructive and useful first step was taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross when it recently convened a meeting on this subject of government experts at Lucerne, Switzerland [Sept. 24-Oct. 18]. U.S. experts participated fully in this meeting; some useful data were compiled, and the report of the experts' group merits careful review.

We believe that no position on possible restrictions on these weapons can be developed until government experts have more extensively examined the technical, legal, military, medical, and humanitarian problems involved. We are gratified that this process is underway. We would consider it unrealistic, however, to try to impose a deadline on the work of the experts in this complex field.

The question of a world disarmament conference is again on our agenda. In three separate solicitations of views by the United Nations, a wide diversity of views on such a conference has been revealed. Some governments have suggested beginning preparations for such a conference soon; some others have stated their view that certain preconditions must be met; many have

stated that the conference could prove useful only if all nuclear powers were prepared to participate.

The views of the United States on this subject are unchanged. We recognize that a world disarmament conference could serve a useful function at an appropriate time, but we do not believe that such a conference now or in the near future would produce useful results. It is not the lack of a suitable forum, but the lack of political agreement, which prevents us from taking more far-reaching steps toward disarmament. A world conference could not in the foreseeable future solve this problem and thus would merely disappoint the hopes of its proponents.

Members of this committee have received a report on the question of the possible reduction of military budgets, prepared by a group of expert consultants to the Secretary General.¹ Although my delegation abstained on the resolution requesting this report,² for reasons which we explained at the time, we welcomed the suggestion of such a study because we recognized that the most promising path to genuine progress on this question of military expenditures is through a careful and thorough study of the issues. We are gratified that the experts' report examines the whole range of technical questions related to the feasibility of agreed reductions of military budgets. It analyzes the economic benefits that could result from allocating to social and economic development funds that might be saved by budget reductions. It also points out that reducing military budgets without diminishing the security of states would require careful and thorough preparation. Specifically, the preconditions for military budget reductions would include both agreement on what is and what is not to be included in military budgets and also the provision by all parties concerned of detailed data on military expenditures for the purpose of comparative measurement. The study brings out the necessity of guarding against destabilizing shifts in spending and the necessity for

¹ U.N. doc. A/9770.

² A/RES/3093 (XXVIII), adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 7, 1973.

adequate verification of compliance with any agreed reductions.

Finally, the experts' study implicitly recognizes the need for greater openness in defense expenditures. My government regards openness as a particularly important point. We welcomed the suggestion made by Sweden last spring that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should consider the possibilities of ascertaining the willingness of states to account for their defense expenditures in comparable terms and to explain how their defense expenditures are allocated. We agree that greater knowledge about the defense expenditures of others could allay concerns that arise out of suspicion and misunderstandings, and thus promote confidence among states. The technical sections of the experts' report provide valuable guidelines which could be the basis of greater openness in defense expenditures.

We were gratified that a consensus was reached at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year to invite five nations—the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru, and Zaïre—to join the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. On behalf of my government I warmly welcome these nations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Their inclusion will make the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a more representative body and will enhance its expertise without, however, enlarging it to a point that would impair its effectiveness as a negotiating body. We think that with these additions the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will continue to be a valuable disarmament forum, contributing significantly to the work of the United Nations and to the furtherance of our disarmament objectives.

Ambassador Martin, November 20

The United States has strongly supported the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 as a constructive step toward our common nonproliferation objective. Indeed, the efforts of the Japanese, Netherlands, and

Canadian delegations, as well as of others, in developing this draft resolution must be greatly appreciated, certainly by all the members of this committee who voted for it.

The United States wishes to explain its vote in one respect; namely, with regard to the statement in the sixth preambular paragraph, which reads:

... that it has not yet proven possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

For countries in the early stage of developing a nuclear explosive capability, we cannot see how it would be possible to develop such a capability for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. In the case of advanced nuclear-weapon states, however, it may be possible, under certain conditions, to develop criteria that would be adequate to insure that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not used to further nuclear-weapon development. But, I should add, if such criteria could be developed they would not be applicable to the problem posed by the development of a nuclear explosive capability by a non-nuclear-weapon state.

Ambassador Martin, November 22

The United States supports the concept of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and believes that it could make a considerable contribution to stability and nonproliferation in the area. We have therefore voted in favor of this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.700, as amended].

At the same time, we are dubious of the approach taken in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which urges states in the region to undertake immediate commitments with regard to the zone, in advance of actual negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement. Frankly, we do not believe this is an approach that will advance the purposes of the draft resolution.

Notwithstanding that reservation, we are prepared to lend our full cooperation to

efforts to realize the aims of the draft resolution. We assume that in the further formulation of the zone it will be made clear that the prohibitions of the zone apply to the development of nuclear explosive capability for any purpose.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 3261D (XXIX)³

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions on the urgent need for prevention of nuclear proliferation,

Recalling also its resolution 2829 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,

Recognizing that the acceleration of the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons endangers the security of all States,

Convinced that recent international developments have underlined the urgent necessity for all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to take effective measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Further convinced that the achievement of these goals would be advanced by an effective comprehensive test ban,

Bearing in mind that it has not yet proven possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes,

Noting with concern that, in the course of this year, six States have engaged in nuclear testing,

Recognizing that even those States which renounce the possession of nuclear weapons may wish to be able to enjoy any benefits which may materialize from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

Noting with great concern that, as a result of the wider dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear materials, the possible diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military uses would present a serious danger for world peace and security,

Considering therefore that the planning and conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions should be carried out under agreed and non-discriminatory international arrangements, such as those envisaged in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which are designed to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and the intensification of the nuclear arms race,

Recalling the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee, held on 31 May 1968, by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America concerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which relate to the conclusion of a special international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

Noting that the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva in May 1975,

Noting further that, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization dated 30 August 1974, the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out the possible danger of peaceful nuclear explosions leading to nuclear weapons proliferation and suggested that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in all its aspects should now be a subject for international consideration,

1. *Appeals* to all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects, and to report on these questions to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

3. *Calls upon* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in submitting its report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the views of the International Atomic Energy Agency as requested in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Expresses the hope* that the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, will also give consideration to the role of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in that Treaty and will inform the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of the results of its deliberations;

5. *Invites*, in this connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to provide the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with information concerning such steps as they have taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or intend to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which is envisaged in article V of the Treaty;

³ A/C.1/L.690, as amended; adopted by Committee I on Nov. 20 by a vote of 91 (U.S.) to 3, with 11 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a vote of 115 (U.S.) to 3, with 12 abstentions (text from U.N. press release GA/5194).

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General, should he deem it appropriate, to submit further comments on this matter, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

Resolution 3263 (XXIX)⁴

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by bolstering and expanding the existing regional and global structures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Realizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safeguards could accelerate the process towards nuclear disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second session, held in Cairo from 1 to 4 September 1974, on this subject,

Recalling the message sent by His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on 16 September 1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,⁵

Considering that the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery,

Mindful of political conditions particular to the region of the Middle East and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the

countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

Recalling the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964,

Noting that establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would contribute effectively to the realization of aims enunciated in the above-mentioned Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa,

Recalling the notable achievement of the countries of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone,

Also recalling resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, convened at Geneva on 29 August 1968, in which the Conference recommended that non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the Latin American nuclear-free zone should study the possibility and desirability of establishing military denuclearization of their respective zones,

Recalling the aims pursued by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, the goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Commends* the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Considers* that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. *Expresses the hope* that all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, will lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the present resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

⁴ A/C.1/L.700, as amended; adopted by Committee I on Nov. 22 by a vote of 103 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a vote of 128 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions (text from U.N. press release GA/5194). By Resolution 3261F, adopted on Dec. 9, the General Assembly also requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make "a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects" and to submit the study in its report to the General Assembly at its 30th session.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/9693/Add. 3. [Footnote in original.]

United Nations Reaffirms Continuing Responsibility in Korea

Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on December 2, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on December 9 and by the Assembly on December 17.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 183 dated December 2

For more than 20 years the United Nations has played an indispensable role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. In 1953, the commander in chief of U.N. forces in Korea signed the armistice agreement, which halted a war that had raged for three years. Since that time, the U.N. Command has participated in the meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, which was until 1972 the sole channel of communications between the two sides. The armistice agreement remains to this day the sole basis for the current state of peace in Korea. In considering the Korean question once again, this committee confronts two basic questions: how to preserve the peace in Asia and how to promote the peaceful reunification of Korea in a manner acceptable to all its people. In formulating our response to these questions, it is important that we not tamper with the present structure for peace without first having assured that a satisfactory alternative is in its place.

This committee should recall that last year the General Assembly reached an agreed conclusion aimed at promoting practical steps toward peace and accommodation in Korea. In a consensus statement read from the

Chair, it noted with satisfaction the July 1972 joint communique of North and South Korea and urged the two governments to continue their dialogue. In accordance with the Commission's recommendation, it also decided to terminate the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

The United States warmly supported this outcome. We believe that it appropriately highlighted the need for further progress in discussions between the two Koreas.

We were disappointed, therefore, when some member states, evidently at the urging of North Korea, chose to burden this Assembly again this year with a request to inscribe a one-sided partisan item on the agenda of the Assembly. We saw no reason for such a debate. We concluded, however, that if the Assembly were to take up this question, it should do so in a reasonable and balanced manner. For this reason, the United States and many other countries urgently requested inclusion of a Korean item on the agenda and simultaneously introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676 for the Assembly's consideration. The subsequent introduction of the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677 confirmed our fears that its cosponsors looked to an intemperate and contentious debate. The First Committee now faces an important and fundamental choice. On the one hand it can reinforce its unanimous decision of last year by adopting the resolution in A/C.1/L.676, which once again urges the parties to reconcile their differences and arrive jointly at a new arrangement for peace. On the other hand, in resolution A/C.1/L.677 the committee is being asked to reverse last year's consensus and, in the process, to recommend abandon-

ing the arrangement which has preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than 20 years.

Mr. Chairman, let us look for a moment at what lies behind the various words of these draft resolutions. For example, one suggests that peace might be maintained and peaceful reunification might be expedited by the removal of U.S. troops from Korea. History does not support this view, however. This particular solution to the Korean issue has already been tried once. It failed badly. In 1949, soon after World War II, American military forces were completely removed from the territory of South Korea. Within a year, North Korea launched an all-out military attack on South Korea.

I do not wish to dwell on the history of those unhappy events, the memory of which has poisoned international relations in Asia and elsewhere for the last 20 years. I do ask that each delegate weigh this tragic experience most carefully before he accepts the facile assertion that the way to solve all the problems of the Korean Peninsula is to remove foreign forces.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. forces were sent to Korea in 1950 in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions because we and other members of this organization were convinced that international aggression had to be stopped. We were also convinced that prevention of such aggression was, and is, a cardinal purpose of the United Nations. Therefore, I repeat, U.S. forces were dispatched to help South Korea defend itself in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council adopted in June and July of 1950.

After the armistice agreement was signed by the commander in chief of U.N. forces and by military representatives of the other side, two essential tasks remained.

The first was to maintain the armistice agreement and to carry out the obligations and responsibilities of the commander in chief of U.N. forces as a signatory of that agreement. This commander has been joined in the performance of his duties by representatives of many of the countries, originally numbering 16, which so generously lent

their assistance to the Republic of Korea.

The second essential task was to maintain peace and preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula until such time as conditions permitted more normal discourse and more definitive solutions among the countries of that area.

For this purpose, the United States and the Republic of Korea concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, which was duly registered with the United Nations in accordance with article 102 of the charter. Under this treaty, U.S. forces remain in Korea with the full agreement of our two governments.

That these arrangements have provided an important element of stability on the Korean Peninsula is evidenced by the absence of major armed conflict there since 1953. That these arrangements have not prevented the opening of a more normal discourse between the two Koreas is clearly demonstrated by the North-South discussions which have been held since 1971.

It is against this background that the First Committee should carefully consider the two resolutions before it. One of these drafts, contained in L.677, rests on assumptions that are dangerous for the maintenance of international peace and security. This resolution would precipitately dismantle the arrangements which have for so many years preserved peace and security in Korea. It fails even to mention the need to maintain peace. It fails to mention the need to maintain the armistice agreement which has maintained peace in that area. And it fails to reaffirm in its operative portions the need for continuing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the two Koreas, by which peace can best be maintained in the future.

Fortunately, this session of the General Assembly has an alternative before it. There is another draft resolution which provides an opportunity to encourage a positive evolution of the situation in the Korean Peninsula. It would do so by encouraging the North-South dialogue as the most realistic means of promoting a reduction of tensions, of increasing contacts and exchanges, and furthering steps toward an eventual peaceful reuni-

fication. Moreover, the draft resolution in L.676 would not precipitately and dangerously destabilize the arrangements which have preserved peace in the area since 1953.

This resolution, which my government and 27 other member states have cosponsored, reaffirms the consensus reached last year by the General Assembly to urge the two Koreas to continue their dialogue and to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea.

It recognizes the continuing importance of the armistice agreement of 1953 for the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean Peninsula.

It seeks to have the parties directly concerned discuss how peace and security on the peninsula is to be maintained, before the present arrangements are changed.

These are important steps. They insure that the existing equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula, within which the first tentative steps toward reconciliation have already been taken, will not be altered to the disadvantage of one side or the other.

This resolution would also encourage the parties directly concerned to discuss those aspects of the Korean question which fall within the responsibility of the Security Council, the most important of which is the U.N. Command and its relationship to the armistice agreement.

The U.S. Government and the Republic of Korea have both made it clear that they are willing to consider an alternative to these present arrangements, one which would help preserve the present armistice between the two sides and the machinery which supports it. We fully agree that the time has come—and is perhaps overdue—for reconsideration of the role played by the United Nations under the arrangements established by the Security Council in 1950.

But we are also convinced that such reconsideration cannot take place at the expense of the military stability on the Korean Peninsula which these very arrangements brought about and helped maintain. We need to be assured that, in the course of discussions between North and South Korea, North Korea and its associates are pledged to main-

tain and improve the conditions of peace and stability brought about by the armistice agreement, that they will continue to respect the provisions of the armistice agreement, and that they will continue to participate in the machinery established to administer that agreement.

We believe this is a reasonable objective, in light of the history of armed conflict on the peninsula and the continuing intransigent public statements of the North Korean authorities, such as that made by the North Korean Representative to this committee on November 25 or that of the North Korean Foreign Minister on November 8, when he said, speaking of the Government of the Republic of Korea, "we can never make any compromise with the splitters, nor can we join hands with the betrayers."

President Ford during his recent visit to the Republic of Korea reaffirmed that for its part the United States will continue its best efforts to insure the peace and security of the Pacific region. President Ford reiterated the support of the United States for efforts by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dialogue with North Korea designed to reduce tensions and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and to lead eventually to the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Our President further joined President Park Chung Hee in expressing the hope that the current session of the General Assembly would recognize the importance of the security arrangements which have now preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than two decades.

Finally, President Ford reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The United States believes it is time to bring to a close the cold war on the Korean Peninsula. We have made serious efforts in that direction. The Republic of Korea, for its part, has made clear it would welcome good relations with any country regardless of

ideology. The Republic of Korea has also made it clear that as an interim measure pending reunification, it would welcome the entry of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as members of the United Nations. The United States supports these objectives. We look forward to a time of accommodation between North and South Korea, when there can be normal political, economic, and social ties between both sides leading to eventual reunification, the goal of all Koreans.

Progress must be achieved, however, without damage to either side and without threatening the existing balance and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We are convinced that the measures contained in our draft resolution will make a constructive contribution. We are equally convinced that the adoption of the resolution in L.677 would obstruct, not encourage, the movement toward durable arrangements for maintaining peace on the peninsula.

This overall peace on the Korean Peninsula is a precious asset of the people of both North and South Korea and of the wider world community. We should not take actions which could disrupt those arrangements which have been so successful in keeping the peace in this troubled area of the world. These arrangements can, and should, be modernized, but this must be done only with the cooperation of all the parties directly concerned.

My government strongly hopes that the General Assembly will once again urge upon the parties the negotiating process which offers them and the world the only hope of peaceful change in the Korean Peninsula.¹

¹ On Dec. 9 the committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/L/676/Rev. 1, as amended, by a rollcall vote of 61 (U.S.) to 42, with 32 abstentions; draft resolution A/C.1/L.677 was not adopted, the vote being 48 in favor and 48 (U.S.) against, with 38 abstentions.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

Question of Korea

The General Assembly,

Desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the joint communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972 and the declared intention of both the South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,

Aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,

1. *Reaffirms* the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973,³ and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;

2. *Expresses the hope* that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between them.

² A/RES/3333 (XXIX) (text from U.N. doc. A/9973); adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 17 by a rollcall vote of 61 (U.S.) to 43, with 31 abstentions.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1973, p. 775.

OECD Environment Committee Ministerial Meeting Adopts Declaration on Environmental Policy

The Environment Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) met at ministerial level at Paris November 13-14. Following is a statement made in the meeting on November 13 by Christian A. Herter, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental and Population Matters,¹ together with the texts of a press communique and a Declaration on Environmental Policy issued at the conclusion of the meeting on November 14.

STATEMENT BY MR. HERTER

I should stress at the outset, Madam Chairman, that the United States views this meeting as extremely important.

In this regard, I should like to read the following message from President Ford:

The United States has viewed the collaborative efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the environmental area as a good example of the constructive progress nations can achieve in harmonizing national policies to achieve common goals. We therefore regard the meeting of the OECD Environment Committee at ministerial level as most important.

In the aftermath of last winter's energy crisis, and with the need to bring inflation under control, I have noted expressions of concern in the United States and elsewhere that environmental protection might have to be sacrificed to current exigencies. I wish to assure the member states of the OECD that the United States remains firmly committed to its environmental goals. In my view, the achievement of our economic objectives and environmental improvement are not incompatible. Indeed, there are numerous areas such as energy conservation in which sound energy and environmental policies can be mutually reinforcing.

¹ Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), who was to serve as U.S. Representative at the meeting, was unavoidably prevented from attending.

The United States looks forward to continued close collaboration with the other OECD member-countries in the pursuit of environmental quality. Your meeting provides an exceptional opportunity for all members of the OECD to reaffirm their continuing commitment to the protection of the environment. I wish you and your associates every success in your deliberations.

The President's message serves to underscore our belief that this is a particularly appropriate time for a meeting of this character, bearing in mind that the member countries of this body face all sorts of new and difficult environmental challenges. This conference also offers an unusual opportunity for policy-level assessment and guidance regarding OECD's future role in the environmental field during a period when the committee's mandate is being reviewed.

In approaching the future, it is useful for us to first take stock of where we have been in the past.

In the past decade, industrialized societies have come to realize that nature's resources are limited and that they cannot be exploited and expended with impunity in a pursuit of material wealth. They also have witnessed a massive and encouraging public revulsion against environmental degradation, as well as the evolution of a new ethic that recognizes that increased production and consumption are not the only components in an improved quality of life.

Indeed, most governments now have environmental ministries and comprehensive programs to abate and reverse pollution. Environmental considerations now loom large in the planning and execution of major governmental projects; many universities now offer programs in the environmental sciences; and there is a widely felt appreciation that future generations can be the victims

of unwise environmental decisions made today.

Within my country, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 was a turning point in our concern for environmental values. We have been endeavoring, with gratifying success, to attack some of our more pressing environmental problems: air and water pollution, use of pesticides, ocean dumping, strip mining, urban sprawl, and waste management.

In this respect we also have witnessed much encouraging international cooperation born out of a realization that many of our most pressing problems pay no heed to national boundaries and require collective action for solution.

The United States believes that the OECD has been most helpful in fostering cooperation and harmony among its members in the formulation of their national environmental policies. In a relatively short period, notable strides have been made by the Organization in fashioning common policies, such as the "polluter pays" principle, to help encourage sound environmental practices and avoid trade distortion.

Systematic exchanges and cooperation have been initiated to solve some of the critical problems related to air and water pollution and to identify and control potentially harmful substances, including toxic chemicals. Some of the most challenging problems related to the urban environment are being collectively faced, and the environmental benefits of waste utilization, recycling, and conservation are being assessed.

We are jointly seeking to determine how to more effectively address some of the critical environmental problems posed by prospective energy demands and alternative sources of energy supply. And we are engaged in an important pioneering effort to frame new norms for resolving pollution problems of a transboundary character.

We further believe that the OECD can continue to provide a valuable forum for cooperative actions to safeguard and improve the environment, both nationally and internationally. We therefore are pleased that the

mandate of the Environment Committee has been extended.

OECD members can take pride in this progress, but we recognize that we face some current difficulties. In our own country, for example, important elements are questioning the priority to be given to environmental goals, citing the current inflation and high cost of oil and other raw materials and the pressure to reduce dependency on external sources of supply. Under these circumstances, we are sometimes asked whether the United States now regards the environmental movement as passé, whether we are easing up on our environmental policies and goals. To my mind, President Ford's message to this body gave the answer; namely, a resounding No.

We also are sometimes confronted with another question: Can we "afford" environmental protection in the light of current conditions? The accusation has recently been heard that the cost of antipollution measures has significantly contributed to inflation. Within the United States the studies that I have seen tend to strongly dispute the assertion that environmental controls are contributing significantly to inflationary pressures. Our own organization, the Council on Environmental Quality, for example, recently conducted an analysis of the impact of environmental programs on the U.S. economy. At most, we found that these programs account for roughly one-half of 1 percent of our current 11 percent rate of inflation. Put in perspective, expenditures made during 1973 to satisfy requirements of U.S. Federal water and air pollution control legislation amounted to approximately 1 percent of our gross national product. Projections for the future show similar results.

In a democratic society, of course, the priorities that the public ascribes to environmental values can be highly significant in determining future directions. Here, too, the data we have been able to pull together for our part is encouraging. Several recent surveys of U.S. public opinion indicate that environmental values remain extremely important in the mind of the U.S. public. Moreover, the current concerns about the availability of energy and inflation appear to have

had little effect on this attitude. Quite to the contrary, during the energy crisis in the United States it became clear that the public was tired of watching opposing groups place the blame on one another. It became clear that the people want both adequate energy and environmental quality. They are calling for workable solutions, not contrived issues.

As we look to the future, we face problems and challenges, of course, in the full achievement of our desires and goals for environmental protection.

First, the pressures on the environment of economic growth will continue to increase. In 1950, when the gross world product (GWP) reached its first trillion, there was little concern about pollution. The GWP is now \$3.5 trillion and may reach roughly \$12 trillion by the year 2000. This expected and continued huge expansion of production, especially in the presently developed countries of the world, will mean ever-increasing exploitation, processing, and consumption of resources. Such expansion will create progressively increasing demands for lower quality resources, whose recovery and use will accelerate pollution of the environment unless adequate protective measures keep apace.

What we urgently require is a concept of economic growth that takes into account the quality of life as well as the quantity of goods produced. We were delighted to see that this concept has been incorporated in the draft declaration now before us.

Second, as environmentalists, I believe we shall face some significant new problems in the years ahead in relating to the public, industry, and governments. While public support for environmental programs remains high, I believe we have to recognize that our task in justifying our efforts may become harder, particularly so long as current adverse economic trends continue. In a period of economic retrenchment, we shall have to do a continually effective job in convincing the average worker that we are not simply concerned with the niceties of life but with compelling problems relating to human health and survival. We will have to develop better scientific information to

show that the benefits of environmental actions justify the costs.

Third, and without discounting the difficulties, I believe it is high time to bury the old misconceptions that there are insuperable incompatibilities between economic growth, with its associated technological advances, and the preservation of environmental values. Rather, I am hopeful that we are entering a more sophisticated era where extremism and polarizations will be put aside; and when the environmentalist will no longer be characterized by his detractors as an elitist endeavoring to halt technology. Our objective should be to assure that environmental considerations are fully taken into account in all relevant decisions.

Fourth, the solution of environmental as well as most of the other major problems facing us today is dependent upon solving the population problem. If world population continues to grow at its current rate, there will be at least 6.7 billion men, women, and children on our planet by the year 2000 and 35 billion by 2074. This rate of increase clearly will create insuperable problems in feeding and providing other basic necessities for the populations of many regions of the world. It is clear to me that if we do not take early international cooperative action to effectively limit population growth, nature will take more drastic measures, making our concern about environmental quality in the affected regions largely academic. Therefore the United States strongly endorses the recently adopted World Population Plan of Action, which is aimed at achieving a balance between the number of people on earth and the planet's carrying capacity.

Turning to the future work of the Environment Committee, I would first like to make a few general remarks. While the United States fully appreciates the pressing need for budgetary restraint in this and other international organizations at this time, we hope the resulting impact on the work program of the Environment Committee can be minimized.

Furthermore, the United States would favor the concentration of our program on

a more limited number of high-priority projects than in the past. We would hope the committee could create some sort of overall review mechanism to promote this end.

As to program content, my country recognizes that in the field of toxic chemicals, including carcinogens, we face enormously complex problems. The difficulties we in the United States are encountering in how to deal with vinyl chloride serve as just one example of many. The OECD is making, and can continue to make, useful contributions in this area by encouraging nations systematically to identify potentially toxic chemicals prior to use. It also can continue to encourage the adoption of common techniques to facilitate the comparability of data and harmonization of policies and to follow the movement of key chemicals in international commerce.

The concept of framing general principles to govern significant episodes of transboundary pollution from land-based sources has occupied much of the committee's recent attention. Like others around this table, my government ascribes considerable importance to this activity. In some respects we consider the action proposal on this subject to be one of the most important before this body and a good touchstone of our willingness to cooperate in solving common problems.

We further strongly recommend that the Environment Committee, which has been considering this matter, now address itself to more concrete ways nations can cooperate to redress or adjudicate significant transboundary pollution problems.

There are a number of practical activities to which the committee might usefully direct its attention in addition to those studies of legal questions already underway. An area of interest might be the development of joint contingency plans for response to incidents of pollution affecting more than one country. Further, we might develop compatible procedures for the identification of trans-frontier pollution problems and for correcting them. Such measures as cooperative air and water quality baseline studies might be undertaken. Joint air and water quality ob-

jectives might be developed, and consideration could be given to developing compatible national programs to realize such agreed-upon objectives.

Procedures related to environmental assessment offer another area where the OECD can do useful work. As you may be aware, the United States is required by law to prepare environmental impact statements concerning all major Federal actions likely to significantly affect the human environment. The purpose of this requirement is to help assure that environmental implications are factored into the decisionmaking process. We support the action proposal that would urge us all to assure that meaningful assessments are performed on significant projects and to exchange information on our experiences. For our part, we are attempting to improve our procedures for quantifying the environmental data that go into our assessments. We shall be happy to share these results with others.

Our experience within the United States has impressed us with the fact that there are some real gaps in ecological data and hence in our ability to perform meaningful assessments. We suspect this is true of other nations as well. This, in our view, underscores the absolute necessity for the members of this Organization to vigorously support environmental research in the years ahead and exchange the products of their efforts.

As environmentalists, one of our most serious concerns for the next decade relates to the need to assure that our pattern of energy consumption and use will take place under terms that appropriately safeguard environmental values. As the consuming nations move together in developing new energy sources and policies, they have a companion interest in assuring that the environment is protected. This committee has already been supporting useful and relevant work in this area, in the air and water sector groups; and we commend the action proposal captioned "Energy and the Environment," which urges the Secretariat to inaugurate new and timely exchanges in this field.

We need to move further in assessing the ecological effects on aquatic systems of thermal and chemical discharges; and the change in effects and costs of alternative control techniques.

We need to continue to concert our efforts in developing a consensus and understanding of the magnitude of the sulfate problem, including the contribution of natural and manmade sources, the health implications, the transnational effects, and the contributions being made by powerplants and other sources, as well as the merits of alternate control strategies.

We also should continue to study the international environmental implications of energy resource development, particularly in the sensitive coastal zone and near-offshore areas. The United States has performed a number of studies in this area, the results of which we shall be pleased to make available.

Clearly, conservation of energy should be one of our prime mutual objectives in the decade ahead, and it is noteworthy that the recent Energy Coordinating Group highlighted this as a priority topic. Obviously, if we can reduce our demand or better utilize our energy resources, we will be fostering our environmental goals, adding to our self-sufficiency, and helping to reduce inflation. Projects aimed at studying the environmental implications of husbanding our energy resources, including recycling, waste-heat utilization, and demand restraint, all merit this committee's support.

We foresee a continuously useful role in the years ahead for those OECD activities that relate to problems of the urban environment and transportation. The automobile consumes a high percentage of our energy supplies and is a major contributor to urban air pollution. In considering the relevant action proposal now before us, I should note that a major effort must be made to make our cars more efficient by redesign and maximized use of improved technology. Studies in this field should continue to be undertaken by the relevant OECD member states, recognizing that they produce most of the world's motor vehicles.

One of the major challenges we all face in this decade will relate to the improved use of land. This is an area where a number of European countries have made advances from which we can all benefit. Studies are being conducted in the United States to give us a better idea of the impact of various patterns of urban growth on the quality of life. Within the United States our Council on Environmental Quality just issued a new study entitled "Costs of Sprawl" that concludes that higher density planned urban development, as contrasted to single-family conventional housing units, results in lower economic and environmental costs and natural resource consumption. For example, investment costs would be 44 percent lower, and air pollution 45 percent less. We are prepared to share the results of our studies with the members of this body and hope they will prove useful to local planning officials. A summary of CEQ's first report is available for each delegation.

Finally, a few words about the longer term. Over the next five to ten years, I believe we shall have to seriously devise new mechanisms and devices for assessing some of the longer term developments of an environmental character covering such matters as land use, population growth, and alternate environmental strategies. This is an area where I would hope we would develop intensive dialogues between the interested governmental authorities, private environmental institutions, and industrial groups that have given serious thought to environmental problems.

As we look ahead, I also suspect that our focus increasingly will encompass our responsibilities toward the developing countries. I believe the OECD's Development Center could provide a useful forum for concerting our efforts. I recommend that our Secretariat explore possibilities for assuring greater environmental input into OECD's Development Center, which has already issued interesting studies, for instance, on population. In looking at the developing world, I look to an era, not of confrontation, but one in which the advanced nations can work increasingly with the poorer nations

in solving common problems, whether they involve energy conservation, deforestation, desertification, or assurance of a sound ecological base for meeting the growing demands for food. Indeed, it is because of this global concern encompassing both the developing and the developed world that the United States also puts considerable emphasis on and support of the U.N. Environment Program.

I close with an exhortation to all of us not only to continue the efforts which have so effectively been started but to intensify those programs and actions which will assure for our peoples and those of the entire world a better quality of life, with both a higher material standard of living and a more healthful, wholesome environment in which to live.

TEXTS OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION

Press Communique

1. The Environment Committee of the OECD met at Ministerial Level on 13th and 14th November, 1974, at the Organisation's headquarters. The meeting elected as Chairman, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian Minister of Environment; three Vice-Chairmen were elected; Dr. Cass (Australia), Mr. Gutierrez Cano (Spain) and Mr. Mohri (Japan).

2. Four years after the creation of the OECD Environment Committee, Ministers approved on behalf of their Governments a Declaration on Environmental Policy reaffirming their determination to pursue, under changing socio-economic conditions, their effort to protect and improve the human environment and quality of life. This important statement expresses *inter alia* the determination of OECD Member countries to promote a new approach to economic growth "that will take into account all components of the quality of life and not only the quantity of goods produced".

3. There was a general consensus that environmental policies should be pursued vigorously. It was agreed that environmental problems would continue to be a major challenge to Governments for the foreseeable future, calling for co-ordinated national policies and concerted international actions. Ministers were of the view that the present economic and energy situation should not adversely affect the stringency of environmental policies.

4. Ministers noted the significant results the OECD

has achieved over the last four years in analysing the economic and technical aspects of major environmental questions confronting the Member countries, in formulating generally agreed policy guidelines and in contributing international solutions to problems of common interest.

5. Focussing on environmental policies for the next decade, which was the main theme of the meeting, and mindful of the need to translate further into action the results of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Ministers stressed the great importance they ascribed to:

(i) meeting the challenges of continued population growth bearing in mind the stresses it might place on limited natural resources;

(ii) ensuring that environmental policies are carefully integrated with efforts to increase the world's food production;

(iii) continued efforts to husband, recycle and otherwise achieve a more rational use of natural resources, including energy supplies, bearing in mind that energy and environmental policies can be mutually reinforcing;

(iv) protecting mankind and nature, as much as possible through preventive measures against short-term and long-term hazards created by all forms of pollution;

(v) ensuring that the public is made fully aware of the concrete benefits of policies for environmental improvement with a view to facilitating informed public participation in the relevant decision-making processes;

(vi) ensuring that the environmental consequences of human activities are fully understood, by means of continued research and development in this field and by the application of sound assessment procedures;

(vii) improving the human environment particularly in cities and other urban settlements, through better land use planning and the implementation of other relevant policies.

6. Ministers moreover agreed that a number of problems arising during the next ten years could only be solved by further strengthening international co-operation particularly through the OECD. In this regard, they stressed:

(i) the need for jointly reviewing actions undertaken or proposed in the Member countries in order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives;

(ii) the importance they attached to continued work within the Organisation favouring the harmonization of environmental policies and avoiding restrictive effects or distortions such policies might create in international trade and investment;

(iii) their determination to join in seeking solutions to environmental problems such as transfrontier pollution or the management of shared environmental resources, which are inherently international;

(iv) the need to reinforce co-operation with the developing countries in the resolution of common environmental problems, bearing in mind the growing interdependence between nations.

7. Turning to the more immediate problems calling for international co-operation, Ministers adopted ten Action Proposals which took the form of Recommendations by the Organisation to the Member countries. These texts, which are made public, concern:

- (i) The Assessment of the Potential Environmental Effects of Chemicals;
- (ii) The Analysis of the Environmental Consequences of Significant Public and Private Projects;
- (iii) Noise Prevention and Abatement;
- (iv) Traffic Limitation and Low-Cost Improvement of the Urban Environment;
- (v) Measures Required for Further Air Pollution Control;
- (vi) Control of Eutrophication of Waters;
- (vii) Strategies for Specific Water Pollutants Control;
- (viii) Energy and Environment;
- (ix) Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle;
- (x) Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution.

8. Ministers emphasized the importance of these Recommendations which will, in several major areas, guide or strengthen the policies of Member countries, as well as OECD action, and they pointed to the need for these recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible.

Declaration on Environmental Policy

*The Governments of OECD Member countries:*²

Recognising that increasing population, industrialisation and urbanisation place growing pressures on the limited assimilative capacity of the environment, and on the finite stock of natural resources;

Conscious of the responsibility they share to safeguard and improve the quality of the environment, both nationally and in a global context, and at the same time to promote economic development, and confident that the achievement of these goals is within the reach of their national economies;

Noting the unique contribution the OECD can make in this field;

Recalling the Declaration adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, to which they unanimously subscribed;

² The mention of "Governments" is deemed to apply also to the European Communities. [Footnote in original.]

Declare that:

1. The protection and progressive improvement of the quality of the environment is a major objective of the OECD Member countries.

2. The improvement of the environment should reflect and promote a new approach to economic growth that will take into account all components of the quality of life and not only the quantity of goods produced. Therefore, economic and social development policies must be pursued in close connection with sound environment policies, in order to ensure a balanced contribution to the improvement of human well-being.

3. The enhancement of the human environment will require further action to evaluate and deal with the problems of cities.

4. The development, extraction, transportation, storage, use of energy and related waste disposal from existing and new sources as well as of other scarce resources, should take place under conditions that safeguard environmental values.

5. Their governments will actively seek to protect the environment by encouraging (i) the promotion of non-polluting technologies, (ii) conservation of energy and other scarce resources, (iii) intensified efforts to recycle materials, and (iv) the development of substitutes for scarce or environmentally harmful substances.

6. They will continue to observe and further refine the "Polluter-Pays Principle" and other agreed principles to encourage environmental protection and to avoid international economic distortions, and where desirable encourage the harmonisation of environmental policies.

7. They will cooperate towards solving transfrontier pollution problems in a spirit of solidarity and with the intention of further developing international law in this field.

8. Comprehensive environmental planning, including that pertaining to land use should constitute an important element of government policy.

9. In order to prevent future environmental deterioration, prior assessment of the environmental consequences of significant public and private activities should be an essential element of policies applied at the national, regional and local levels.

10. Particular attention should be given to the ratification and implementation of international conventions for the protection and conservation of the environment and to the development of new conventions.

11. They will undertake, extend and strengthen the foregoing efforts and their co-operation with other international organisations and other countries, conscious of the special circumstances of developing countries, including those which are Members of OECD; in so doing they are prepared to make the benefits of OECD co-operation with respect to environmental improvement readily available to all countries.

Administration Urges Senate Approval of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972

Following is a statement by Fred C. Iklé, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 10.¹

ACDA press release 74-10 dated December 10

I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 [Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare] and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Ratification of these two arms control agreements in the field of chemical and biological warfare has the strong support of the President and the executive branch. We welcome the initiative of the committee in holding this hearing, which we hope will lead to prompt ratification of both agreements.

As you know, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use—in effect, the first use—of chemical and biological agents in war. Except for the United States, all militarily important countries are parties to the protocol.

The extensive hearings on the protocol held by this committee in March 1971 examined the reasons why U.S. ratification of the protocol has been so long delayed. In the interest of brevity, I shall not go back over this record now, although I would of course be happy to respond to any questions regarding the history of the protocol.

During the 1971 hearings, differing views were expressed on the question of including

riot control agents and herbicides within the scope of the protocol. As a result, the committee requested that the executive branch reexamine its interpretation of the protocol's scope.

In response to the committee's request, the executive branch has undertaken a comprehensive review. We have reconsidered our legal interpretation and analyzed possible alternatives for resolving differences of opinion on the scope of the protocol. We have evaluated the military utility of riot control agents and herbicides. And we have of course carefully considered alternative approaches that would accomplish our arms control objectives.

Mr. Chairman, the President considers it important that the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol at the earliest possible date. On the basis of an interagency review he has very recently taken decisions with a view to achieving Senate advice and consent to ratification. The President has authorized me to announce those decisions today.

The President has authorized me to state on his behalf that he is prepared, in reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the protocol, to renounce as a matter of national policy:

1. First use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.

2. First use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

- a. Use of riot control agents in riot control circumstances to include controlling riot-

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ing prisoners of war. This exception would permit use of riot control agents in riot situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control.

b. Use of riot control agents in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. This use would be restricted to situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks.

c. Use of riot control agents in rescue missions. The use of riot control agents would be permissible in the recovery of remotely isolated personnel such as downed aircrews (and passengers).

d. Use of riot control agents in rear-echelon areas outside the combat zone to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.

The President intends to conform U.S. policy to this position, assuming the Senate consents.

Finally, the President, under an earlier directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that you may have several specific questions concerning this policy. I would be happy to respond to such questions at this time before I proceed to the section of my statement dealing with the Biological Weapons Convention.

The second agreement before the committee is the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. As the title suggests, this convention completely prohibits biological and toxin weapons. Since it provides for the elimination of existing weapons, it is a true disarmament measure.

The convention is entirely consistent with U.S. policy concerning biological and toxin weapons, since the U.S. had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the convention was negotiated. In fact, our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed. Our

biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

Since opening the convention for signature in April 1972, 110 nations have become signatories. This includes all members of the Warsaw Pact and all members of NATO except France. In order for this treaty to come into force it must be ratified by the three depositaries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.—and at least 19 other countries. Enough countries have now ratified, some 36, so that only ratification by depositaries is still required. The British have completed all the parliamentary procedures for ratification and the Soviet Union has announced that it intends to ratify before the end of 1974. It is particularly important that U.S. ratification be accomplished in the near future so that we will not be the ones who prevent this treaty from coming into force.

There is one aspect of the convention to which I would like to give particular attention: the question of verification. Verification of compliance with this convention in countries with relatively closed societies is difficult, particularly for the prohibition of the development of these weapons.

Nevertheless, in our judgment, it is in the net interest of the United States to enter into this convention, basically for three reasons:

—First, the military utility of these weapons is dubious at best: the effects are unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable, and there exists no military experience concerning them. Hence the prohibitions of this convention do not deny us a militarily viable option, and verifiability is therefore less important.

—Second, biological weapons are particularly repugnant from a moral point of view.

—Third, widespread adherence to the convention can help discourage some misguided competition in biological weapons.

It is to be feared that without such a prohibition, new developments in the biological sciences might give rise to concern because they could be abused for weapons purposes.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: Canada (with declarations), December 16, 1974.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6633.

Accession deposited: Canada, November 26, 1974.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937. 50 Stat. 1317.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Oman, January 3, 1975.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as amended (TIAS 3532). Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

Such anxieties could foster secretive military competition in a field of science that would otherwise remain open to international cooperation and be used solely for the benefit of mankind.

It is important, however, that the limited verifiability of this convention should not be misconstrued as a precedent for other arms limitation agreements where these special conditions would not obtain.

Mr. Chairman, the administration believes that the Biological Weapons Convention represents a useful arms control measure. We hope the United States will not prevent the treaty from entering into force through its failure to ratify. By failing to ratify, we would deny ourselves the benefit of having other countries legally committed not to produce weapons that we have already given up. And we would deny 109 other countries the benefit of a treaty that they have already signed.

This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any further questions on either the Geneva Protocol or the Biological Weapons Convention.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

International Council for Exploration of the Sea. Report to accompany Ex. V, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-31. August 22, 1974. 3 pp.

Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, as part of an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy. September 1974. 272 pp.

Consular Convention With the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Report to accompany Ex. A, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 93-32. September 16, 1974. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Catalysts of Platinum and Carbon Used in Producing Caprolactam. Report to accompany H.R. 13370. S. Rept. 93-1176. September 25, 1974. 4 pp.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, December 5, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, December 27, 1974; Cuba (with declarations), December 30, 1974.

Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 27, 1974.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.¹

Signature: Czechoslovakia (with a statement), December 30, 1974.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²

Accession deposited: Lesotho (with a reservation), November 4, 1974.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement regarding the holding of "The Exhibition of Archeological Finds of the People's Republic of China" in the United States, with annexes and related notes. Effected by exchange of letters at Peking October 28, 1974. Entered into force October 28, 1974.

Gilbert and Ellice Islands

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Tarawa November 12 and 20, 1974. Entered into force November 20, 1974.

Rwanda

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Rwanda. Effected by exchange of notes at Kigali December 20, 1974. Entered into force December 20, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Telecommunications—Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7837. 32 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7837).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with South Africa amending and extending the agreement of July 8, 1957, as amended and extended. TIAS 7845. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7845).

Patents. Second revision of the implementing procedures for the agreement for safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense. TIAS 7853. 32 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7853).

Narcotic Drugs—Detection of Opium Poppy Cultivation. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7863. 7 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7863).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Australia suspending the agreement of September 26, 1966. TIAS 7865. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7865).

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 30—January 5**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 30 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 527 of December 13, 535 of December 17, 537 of December 18, and 543 of December 23.

No.	Date	Subject
*1	1/2	Parker sworn in as Ambassador to Algeria (biographic data).
†2	1/2	Kissinger: interview with Business Week magazine.
3	1/2	Kissinger: interview with Newsweek magazine.
*4	1/3	Robinson sworn in as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic data).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.