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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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October 7, 1974

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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A Framework of International Cooperation

*Address by President Ford*¹

In 1946 President Harry Truman welcomed representatives of 55 nations to the first General Assembly of the United Nations. Since then, every American President has had the great honor of addressing this Assembly. Today, with pleasure and humility, I take my turn in welcoming you, the distinguished representatives of 138 nations.

When I took office, I told the American people that my remarks would be "just a little straight talk among friends." Straight talk is what I propose here today in the first of my addresses to the representatives of the world.

Next week Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will present in specifics the overall principles which I will outline in my remarks today. It should be emphatically understood that the Secretary of State has my full support and the unquestioned backing of the American people.

As a party leader in the Congress of the United States, as Vice President, and now as President of the United States of America, I have had the closest working relationship with Secretary of State Kissinger. I have supported and will continue to endorse his many efforts as Secretary of State and in our National Security Council system to build a world of peace.

Since the United Nations was founded, the world has experienced conflicts and threats to peace. But we have avoided the greatest danger: another world war. Today we have

the opportunity to make the remainder of this century an era of peace and cooperation and economic well-being.

The harsh hostilities which once held great powers in their rigid grasp have now begun to moderate. Many of the crises which dominated past General Assemblies are fortunately behind us. Technological progress holds out the hope that one day all men can achieve a decent life.

Nations too often have had no choice but to be either hammer or anvil—to strike or to be struck. Now we have a new opportunity—to forge, in concert with others, a framework of international cooperation. That is the course the United States has chosen for itself.

On behalf of the American people, I renew these basic pledges to you today:

—We are committed to a pursuit of a more peaceful, stable, and cooperative world. While we are determined never to be bested in a test of strength, we will devote our strength to what is best. And in the nuclear era, there is no rational alternative to accords of mutual restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union, two nations which have the power to destroy mankind.

—We will bolster our partnerships with traditional friends in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to meet new challenges in a rapidly changing world. The maintenance of such relationships underpins rather than undercuts the search for peace.

—We will seek out, we will expand our relations with old adversaries. For example, our new rapport with the People's Republic

¹ Made before the 29th United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 18 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 23).

of China best serves the purposes of each nation and the interests of the entire world.

—We will strive to heal old wounds reopened in recent conflicts in Cyprus, the Middle East, and in Indochina. Peace cannot be imposed from without, but we will do whatever is within our capacity to help achieve it.

—We rededicate ourselves to the search for justice, equality, and freedom. Recent developments in Africa signal the welcome end of colonialism. Behavior appropriate to an era of dependence must give way to the new responsibilities of an era of interdependence.

No single nation, no single group of nations, no single organization, can meet all of the challenges before the community of nations. We must act in concert. Progress toward a better world must come through cooperative efforts across the whole range of bilateral and multilateral relations.

America's revolutionary birth and centuries of experience in adjusting democratic government to changing conditions have made Americans practical as well as idealistic. As idealists, we are proud of our role in the founding of the United Nations and in supporting its many accomplishments. As practical people, we are sometimes impatient at what we see as shortcomings.

In my 25 years as a member of the Congress of the United States, I learned two basic practical lessons:

—First, men of differing political persuasions can find common ground for cooperation. We need not agree on all issues in order to agree on most. Differences of principle, of purpose, of perspective, will not disappear. But neither will our mutual problems disappear unless we are determined to find mutually helpful solutions.

—Second, a majority must take into account the proper interest of a minority if the decisions of the majority are to be accepted. We who believe in and live by majority rule must always be alert to the danger of the "tyranny of the majority." Majority rule thrives on the habits of accommodation, moderation, and consideration of the interests of others.

A very stark reality has tempered America's actions for decades—and must now temper the actions of all nations. Prevention of full-scale warfare in the nuclear age has become everybody's responsibility. Today's regional conflict must not become tomorrow's world disaster. We must assure by every means at our disposal that local crises are quickly contained and resolved.

The challenge before the United States [Nations] is very clear. This organization can place the weight of the world community on the side of world peace. And this organization can provide impartial forces to maintain the peace.

And at this point, I wish to pay tribute on behalf of the American people to the 37 members of the U.N. peacekeeping forces who have given their lives in the Middle East and in Cyprus in the past 10 months, and I convey our deepest sympathies to their loved ones.

Let the quality of our response measure up to the magnitude of the challenge that we face. I pledge to you that America will continue to be constructive, innovative, and responsive to the work of this great body.

The nations in this hall are united by a deep concern for peace. We are united as well by our desire to insure a better life for all people.

Today the economy of the world is under unprecedented stress. We need new approaches to international cooperation to respond effectively to the problems that we face. Developing and developed countries, market and nonmarket countries—we are all a part of one interdependent economic system.

The food and oil crises demonstrate the extent of our interdependence. Many developing nations need the food surplus of a few developed nations. And many industrialized nations need the oil production of a few developing nations.

Energy is required to produce food, and food to produce energy—and both to provide a decent life for everyone. The problems of food and energy can be resolved on the basis of cooperation—or can, I should say, [be]

made unmanageable on the basis of confrontation. Runaway inflation, propelled by food and oil price increases, is an early warning signal to all of us.

Let us not delude ourselves. Failure to cooperate on oil and food and inflation could spell disaster for every nation represented in this room. The United Nations must not and need not allow this to occur. A global strategy for food and energy is urgently required.

The United States believes four principles should guide a global approach:

—First, all nations must substantially increase production. Just to maintain the present standards of living the world must almost double its output of food and energy to match the expected increase in the world's population by the end of this century. To meet aspirations for a better life, production will have to expand at a significantly faster rate than population growth.

—Second, all nations must seek to achieve a level of prices which not only provides an incentive to producers but which consumers can afford. It should now be clear that the developed nations are not the only countries which demand and receive an adequate return for their goods. But it should also be clear that by confronting consumers with production restrictions, artificial pricing, and the prospect of ultimate bankruptcy, producers will eventually become the victims of their own actions.

—Third, all nations must avoid the abuse of man's fundamental needs for the sake of narrow national or bloc advantage. The attempt by any nation to use one commodity for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to use their commodities for their own purposes.

—Fourth, the nations of the world must assure that the poorest among us are not overwhelmed by rising prices of the imports necessary for their survival. The traditional aid donors and the increasingly wealthy oil producers must join in this effort.

The United States recognizes the special responsibility we bear as the world's largest producer of food. That is why Secretary of

State Kissinger proposed from this very podium last year a World Food Conference to define a global food policy. And that is one reason why we have removed domestic restrictions on food productions in the United States. It has not been our policy to use food as a political weapon, despite the oil embargo and recent oil price and production decisions.

It would be tempting for the United States—beset by inflation and soaring energy prices—to turn a deaf ear to external appeals for food assistance or to respond with internal appeals for export controls. But however difficult our own economic situation, we recognize that the plight of others is worse.

Americans have always responded to human emergencies in the past. And we respond again here today.

In response to Secretary General [of the United Nations Kurt] Waldheim's appeal and to help meet the long-term challenge in food, I reiterate:

—To help developing nations realize their aspirations to grow more of their own food, the United States will substantially increase its assistance to agricultural production programs in other countries.

—Next, to insure that the survival of millions of our fellow men does not depend upon the vagaries of weather, the United States is prepared to join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of food reserves. This system will work best if each nation is made responsible for managing the reserves that it will have available.

—Finally, to make certain that the more immediate needs for food are met this year, the United States will not only maintain the amount it spends for food shipments to nations in need, but it will increase this amount this year.

Thus, the United States is striving to help define and help contribute to a cooperative global policy to meet man's immediate and long-term need for food. We will set forth our comprehensive proposals at the World Food Conference in November.

Now is the time for oil producers to define

their conception of a global policy on energy to meet the growing need—and to do this without imposing unacceptable burdens on the international monetary and trade system.

A world of economic confrontation cannot be a world of political cooperation. If we fail to satisfy man's fundamental needs for energy and food, we face a threat not just to our aspirations for a better life for all our peoples but to our hopes for a more stable and a more peaceful world. By working together to overcome our common problems, mankind can turn from fear toward hope.

From the time of the founding of the United Nations, America volunteered to help nations in need, frequently as the main benefactor. We were able to do it. We were glad to do it. But as new economic forces alter and reshape today's complex world, no nation can be expected to feed all the world's hungry peoples. Fortunately, however, many nations are increasingly able to help. And I call on them to join with us as truly united nations in the struggle to provide more food at lower prices for the hungry and, in general, a better life for the needy of this world.

America will continue to do more than its share. But there are realistic limits to our capacities. There is no limit, however, to our determination to act in concert with other nations to fulfill the vision of the United Nations Charter: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to promote social progress and better standards, better standards of life in a larger freedom.

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference Confirmed

The Senate on September 16 confirmed the nomination of Dixy Lee Ray to be the Representative of the United States to the 18th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The nominations of John A. Erlewine, Abraham S. Friedman, Dwight J. Porter, and Gerald F. Tape to be Alternate Representatives were also confirmed that day.

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington September 10–13. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on September 10, together with their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on September 12.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 16

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: It is a very real pleasure for me to have the opportunity of welcoming both of you to the United States.

You are returning as the leader of a great country. You are returning to meet many of your friends over the years that you knew so well during your service here as Ambassador to the United States.

I trust that you and Mrs. Rabin will thoroughly enjoy this visit back to the United States.

The United States, Mr. Prime Minister, has been proud of its association with the State of Israel. We shall continue to stand with Israel. We are committed to Israel's survival and security.

The United States for a quarter of a century has had an excellent relationship with the State of Israel. We have cooperated in many, many fields—in your security, in the well-being of the Middle East, and in leading what we all hope is a lasting peace throughout the world.

Many of our people have a close personal relationship and association with your citizens, your fellow citizens in Israel, and we hope and trust that this relationship will grow and expand.

Over the last few months, there has been movement in the Middle East for a lasting and durable peace. Israel has cooperated;

Israel has been helpful. And we hope and trust that in the months ahead the foundation which has been laid will be built upon.

We want, you want, and others throughout the world want a lasting and durable peace in the Middle East.

The first steps have been taken; others will follow. And I am certain and positive that, as we meet here during the next several days, we can contribute to the building of a better and finer peace in the Middle East.

I hope that you and Mrs. Rabin have a delightful and warm welcome, which you so richly deserve, in the United States.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: I am grateful to you for your kind invitation to come to Washington and for your warm words of welcome.

As you know, Mr. President, I am not a complete stranger in this country nor, indeed, in this city. But this is the first time that I come here in my capacity of Prime Minister of Israel.

You, Mr. President, have very recently undertaken new and awesome responsibilities, and I feel certain, therefore, that you can appreciate the weighty load that rests on my shoulders.

I represent a country which is faced—which is facing manifold problems, great challenges, but also great and new opportunities for internal progress and for peace with her neighbors.

In the performance of my new duties I am encouraged, as all my predecessors have been, by their binding friendship and by the ever-deepening ties which bind the people of Israel with the people of this, the greatest democracy, and with its leaders.

Ever since the renewal of Jewish independence in the land of our forefathers after long generations of suffering and martyrdom, Israel has enjoyed generous aid and support on the part of the United States. Our gratitude for this sustenance will be recorded forever in the annals of our people.

During all these times since 1948, Israel has seen periods of trials and hardships. Yet

she never swerved, even for a moment, from her supreme national goal, which is the quest for peace with her Arab neighbors.

So far, to our nation's deep sorrow, this goal has eluded us. Despite the recent test of arms, Israel is prepared to continue to seek progress toward peace.

We have in recent months demonstrated that we have taken risks for peace to see whether new efforts may possibly bring us nearer to its achievement.

I know, in this quest for peace in our region, we have in you, Mr. President, and in your colleagues in the Government of the United States, a strong and determined partner.

Indeed, you, Mr. President, pronounced the commitment of the United States to the quest of world peace as the central theme in your inaugural address only a few weeks ago.

The people of Israel stand united in the conviction that war is futile, that it cannot solve problems, that only human suffering is brought in its wake. As far as our part of the world is concerned, we are convinced that there is no issue, however complicated it may now appear, that it cannot be resolved by patient negotiations.

What is needed is an equal measure of desire and determination on all sides to achieve peace.

Much depends at this stage on what other governments in the area are prepared to do. At any rate, we in Israel are ready for the peacemaking effort.

I must, however, with a full sense of responsibility, add this: As you, Mr. President, assumed high office you conveyed to your people and to the world the message that a strong America is a paramount guarantee for peace in the world. This is true in the same measure as far as Israel and her own region are concerned. Only a strong Israel which has the capacity to deter aggression and to defend herself successfully by her own strengths has a chance of winning peace.

I cannot underline strongly enough our conviction that the constant maintenance of Israel's strength is an absolute prerequisite for the attainment of solutions to the problems of our troubled region.

On these and other matters of common interest and concern, I shall be exchanging views with you, Mr. President, and your colleagues, within the next few days. I look forward to doing so in the spirit of confidence and of the cultivation of a good future which has linked our governments and our people for so many years.

I am confident that I shall return to Jerusalem assured of the United States determination to support the well-being of Israel within a Middle East that we hope that will finally be advancing on the road toward a just and durable peace which assures security and progress for all its people.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 16

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, and honored guests: It is a great privilege and honor for Mrs. Ford and myself to be host to the two of you on this occasion and to warmly welcome you back to the United States in this capacity as the Prime Minister of your great country.

But I would also like to extend our warm welcome for all of your friends who are here and the many, many friends throughout the whole United States who are also good and firm friends of the two of you and to extend to you, representing your country, the depth and the warmth of the feeling that we in the United States have for Israel.

As I was sitting here chatting with you and talking to Mrs. Rabin, I couldn't help but note that 1948 was a somewhat significant year as far as your country is concerned, and it just happened that it was quite a year as far as the Fords were concerned. It was the year that we were married—

Mrs. Rabin: And the Rabins.

President Ford: Oh! [Laughter.] —and the year that I got elected to Congress but, more importantly certainly, the year that Israel gained its independence.

And I am pleased to note that our country

was the first of all countries in the world at that time to recognize Israel. And we were proud to do it then, and we are proud that it was done by America at that time.

It is especially nice to have the opportunity of meeting with you yesterday and today and tonight, tomorrow—a person who is a soldier, a diplomat, and a political leader—and to know that you represent your country so effectively and so well.

The American people have a great deal of understanding and sympathy and dedication to the same kind of ideals that are representative of Israel. And therefore I think we in America have a certain rapport and understanding with the people of Israel.

We, as two nations who believe in peace, have sought by joint action in conjunction with others a durable and stable peace in the Middle East which I think all of us agree is in the best interest of your country and the Middle East—the world as a whole.

We as a country are proud to be associated with Israel in this mutual effort to move and to continue to move in the direction of an even better, more stable, and more equitable peace in the Middle East.

I can't tell you how pleased that we are to have the opportunity of expressing our gratitude for all of the things that our countries have done together and all of the things that I hope that our two countries can continue to do in the future.

We have mutual aims and objectives. We have a friendship that is durable and growing. We have the kind of relationship that I think, if expanded worldwide, would be beneficial to all mankind.

And so if I may, Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to ask all of our guests here tonight to stand and to offer a toast to your President and to you and Mrs. Rabin: To the President.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: In the name of my wife and myself, I would like to thank you very much for inviting us and taking care of us during our visit here.

I remember, Mr. President, meeting you while you were the minority leader in the House. I had many talks then with you; I learned very much to admire you. And I know that by assuming the responsibilities of the President of the United States you have taken upon yourself tremendous—tremendous role not only for this country. But I believe that the President of the United States is the leader of the free world and has to bear in mind, if you would allow me to say so, not only the well-being of this country but the well-being of all countries that strive for freedom, for democracy, because in the world that we live today, it is not always possible to a small country to do it against odds.

The relations between the United States and Israel started many years ago. When our country was reborn we faced many problems. The first one was the absorption of many newcomers—immigrants—the remnants of the holocaust of Europe, the Second World War, the refugees that came from the Arab countries. I believe that we were a country that half of its population were refugees.

And then the United States offered Israel economic aid, technical aid, that made it possible to us to absorb these people, our brothers, in a way that the transformation from refugees to be part of our creative society was very much facilitated by your help.

During the years other problems appeared. The threat from outside became more apparent, and the United States added also military aid in terms of supplying us arms to be able to defend ourselves by ourselves.

I think that 26 years from 1948 have proved that your support to us was used in the best way for the well-being of our people and for preservation of a democracy and the free country in that part of the world.

And I would like to thank you and to thank everybody in this country that has made it possible till today.

I don't know, Mr. President, if you have seen it. I have given a small present to you. It is a sculpture, a sculpture that describes the struggle between David and Goliath. I

believe it is not only a story from the Bible; it is a story that started then and continues on till the present days.

And if there is something that symbolizes Israel today, it is the spirit of David facing Goliath. And the meaning of the spirit is, on the one hand, to seek peace, to believe in peace. We are a Jewish state, and we believe that part of being a Jew means to seek peace, to search peace; but on the other hand, to realize that peace is attainable only for those who are ready to take risks to dare to withstand Goliaths.

I believe that this is what is significant to Israel today, the spirit of David seeking peace and, at the same time, being ready and capable to meet some Goliaths.

I hope and I believe, Mr. President, that under your leadership the relations between our two countries will continue, will be strengthened in the unique spirit that was so significant till today—the search of peace and the understanding that strength helps to achieve peace.

Allow me, Mr. President, to raise my glass to the President of the United States.

President Ford: Thank you very much.

President Ford's News Conference of September 16

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the East Room of the White House on September 16.¹

Q. Mr. President, recent congressional testimony has indicated that the CIA, under the direction of a committee headed by Dr. Kissinger, attempted to destabilize the Government of Chile under former President Allende. Is it the policy of your administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other democracies?

President Ford: Let me answer in general. I think this is a very important question.

¹For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 23.

Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.

Now, in this particular case, as I understand it and there is no doubt in my mind—our government had no involvement whatsoever in the Allende coup. To my knowledge, nobody has charged that. The facts are we had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself.

In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press, and to destroy opposition political parties.

The effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties.

I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest.

Now, may I add one further comment. The Forty Committee was established in 1948. It has been in existence under Presidents since that time. That committee reviews every covert operation undertaken by our government, and that information is relayed to the responsible congressional committees where it is reviewed by House and Senate committees.

It seems to me that the Forty Committee should continue in existence, and I am going to meet with the responsible congressional

committees to see whether or not they want any changes in the review process so that the Congress, as well as the President, are fully informed and are fully included in the operations for any such action.

Q. Mr. President, in the face of massive food shortages and the prospects of significant starvation, will the United States be able to significantly increase its food aid to foreign countries, and what is our position going to be at the Rome conference on participation in the world grain reserves?

President Ford: Within the next few days a very major decision in this area will be made. I am not at liberty to tell you what the answer will be, because it has not been decided.

But it is my hope that the United States, for humanitarian purposes, will be able to increase its contribution to those nations that have suffered because of drought or any of the other problems related to human needs.

Q. Back to the CIA. Under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country, and does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to destabilize the Government of Canada, for example, or the United States?

President Ford: I am not going to pass judgment on whether it is permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that, historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries involved.

Economic Interdependence and Common Defense

*Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll*¹

I am delighted to be the first speaker on the agenda. We are hardly strangers. It is a pleasure to return for the day to the associations and the issues that have shaped 35 years of my business life.

We have a joint purpose in our short time together. From my side, it is to put the issues as we see them in the Department in the clearest possible terms—to describe the connection we see between our domestic, foreign, defense, and economic policies. Your purpose, I think, is to challenge our premises and conclusions and to present your own. Out of this exchange we should all learn something useful.

My own subject was chosen quite deliberately. There is presumptive evidence, for example the recent Fortune poll, that the support you have traditionally given to our defense policies is eroding. We have a deep interest in this phenomenon. We need to know why. What is the basis for your disenchantment, if in fact it is as real as the polls suggest?

The last decade has been a difficult one for all Americans—the international, racial, and personal violence of the 1960's, a series of violent international crises—Viet-Nam, the Arab-Israeli war, three Cyprus crises, internal upheavals in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We have an energy crisis, a food crisis, an inflationary crisis, and a series of monetary crises. And in Watergate

we have just had a domestic crisis of immense proportions.

Facing such a catalogue, it is easy to lose heart. But let us also recall our strengths:

—We enjoy a credibility with allies and adversaries alike for strength, for leadership, for reliability, enjoyed by no one else.

—We remain the largest single producer of most of the world's most important things, tools, energy, capital, and technology.

—We are uniquely the most important producer of food.

—Forty-five percent of the world's trade in wheat and almost 60 percent of its trade in feed grain and oilseed are of U.S. origin.

As a result, we have a very special, indeed moral, responsibility toward that two-thirds of the world that is chronically undeveloped and protein-short. It is a responsibility we have discharged well in the last quarter century and that we must continue to discharge in the future. In short, gentlemen, the United States has a great reputation for toughness, stamina, and initiative. The world expects much of us—rightly, I think, for we expect much of ourselves.

Let me put before you and explain two major realities within which our policy must be formulated:

—First, economic interdependence is a fact. We must resolve the paradox of growing mutual dependence and growing national and regional identities.

—Second, common defense is a necessity. We and our allies must be prepared to adjust

¹ Made before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives at the Department of State on Sept. 5.

it to changing conditions and share burdens equally. We need a definition of security that our peoples can support and that our adversaries will respect in a period of lessened tensions.

The Fact of Economic Interdependence

Let me discuss each of these more fully. You in this audience know economic interdependence is a commonplace.

Our exports and imports comprise some 14 percent of our national production of goods. This year our import bill will run close to \$100 billion; one-third of this will be raw materials—fuels, minerals, ores, and metals.

In a dozen critical materials we will be almost totally dependent on foreign sources—among them, bauxite, mercury, nickel, titanium, manganese, cobalt, tin, and chromium. There is a much longer list of critical materials where the margin of independence is critically thin. Oil leads the list, but it is by no means alone. Such basics as lead, zinc, and iron ore already comprise a large fraction of our import requirements. Nor is our dependence limited to raw materials. For years we were virtually the only exporter of services of every description from Peace Corps or elementary English teachers to the most arcane and sophisticated of aerospace technological services. But today, what American hospital could function without foreign interns, resident physicians, and nurses?

Looked at from the other side, the free world is no less dependent on us than we on them. There are 24 OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries. Taken together, they represent the bulk of the world's productive capacity. The United States is formally linked to 17 of them by mutual security treaties. Last year they did almost 60 billion dollars' worth of business with us. They are the recipients of some 60 billion dollars' worth of direct United States investment. With few exceptions, notably Canada and Australia, the OECD group is far more dependent than we

on imports to survive—in fuels, in minerals, and in food. This immense traffic in essential goods and services demands that certain corollary conditions be met:

—There should be a reasonably stable monetary system.

—There should be some mechanism for allowing capital to flow across international boundaries to finance production capacity.

—There should be further liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis of tariff and nontariff restrictions on trade.

—Finally, there should be a regime of law governing the great sea lanes.

The Defense Side of the Equation

This leads me to the defense side of the equation.

Clearly, no military policy we can conceive of today can breach tariff barriers, impose monetary reform, or dictate international investment regulations. Neither, in truth, can it realistically police the thousands of miles of sea lanes of communication. What it can do is help to establish an environment in which reason and good sense can be applied to the problems that face an interdependent international economy.

A world that cannot be intimidated by the threat or the use of force is a world that has some prospect of negotiating its economic and other differences to tolerable solutions. Our security policies and those of our allies are to this extent a critical element in maintaining efficient and uninterrupted economic exchange.

As Secretary Kissinger put it on April 23, 1973:

The political, military, and economic issues . . . are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other.

Let us, then, examine the military realities:

—Defense spending this year is expected to be in the \$82 billion range, or 6 percent of our GNP.

—About \$13 billion covers the costs of paying, training, and supporting U.S. forces

deployed abroad under our mutual security commitments to NATO and our six multi-lateral and bilateral security treaties in Asia. About \$4.5 billion of this sum enters our international balance of payments account. The entire European portion (\$2.1 billion), however, is covered by negotiated offset agreements, and the remainder by U.S. sales of military equipment worldwide.

—Our total military manpower is 2.1 million, of which something over 400,000 are abroad. Three-fourths of them are in Europe.

—Our major allies, in aggregate, spend about \$45 billion on defense, or roughly 4 percent of their aggregate GNP.

—They have $4\frac{3}{4}$ million men under arms, over twice as many as we have.

These figures represent the gross dimensions of our joint security efforts. The questions now before us are:

—Are U.S. defense outlays supporting our alliances inconsistent with our foreign policy and economic interests?

—Is the United States bearing a disproportionate share of those costs?

The answer to both questions, I believe, is "No." On the first question: Ours is not a subsistence economy. Our per capita income is the highest of any developed country in the world. Our personal spending on automobiles and the wherewithal to run them last year exceeded our entire defense budget by a significant margin. What we spend annually as a nation on tobacco and alcohol would easily cover the direct cost of our foreign deployments. I cite these figures not as a criticism of our national sense of priorities but as a reminder that a narrow focus on defense spending masks other large figures in the public and private sectors of our economy that no one thinks to ask about.

This does not answer the question, however, whether \$82 billion is justified. It is inappropriate for the Department of State to attempt to defend any exact figure. It might be feasible to spend somewhat less; it might be prudent to spend somewhat more.

My concern is not so much the money but, rather, the forces.

—Money cuts must be translated into cuts in forces, equipment, and training.

—U.S. forces now in being are the smallest since the Korean war.

—The Communist forces present a formidable potential threat to precisely those countries in which we have the largest and most important trade and financial interests: to Germany, to the European members of NATO, to Japan, and to the smaller countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The ideological, political, and other problems that have divided the free and Communist worlds since the end of World War II have not been resolved, although significant progress has been made. So long as they are unresolved there is always the possibility that our adversaries will resort to threat or force to impose the solutions they want.

In a nuclear-armed world, this is unacceptable. There is only one alternative: To foreclose that option by making clear to those who would try it that the costs and risks would be unbearably high. By this means, together with positive incentives we can offer, particularly in the economic field, we hope to induce the resolution of differences through negotiation.

I do not want to leave the impression from the foregoing of a never-ending spiral of defense spending.

We have tested and continue to test the negotiating route in SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], in MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the threshold test ban. Progress is slow, but this is to be expected, as you can appreciate. The subject matter is enormously complex, and we are dealing in an area that touches the most vital interests of the Soviets, ourselves, and our allies—national security. But you will also appreciate, I think, that we have no rational alternative to negotiations, no matter how difficult and sensitive.

Negotiation is a never-ending process, not

a state of equilibrium. It is a process that requires tenacity, clear sight, and endless patience. It entails an investment in time and money and, above all, ceaseless attention to maintaining a sturdy defense, a well-functioning economy, and a cohesive, cooperative set of relationships with those who have joined their strength and future with ours in the search for peace.

Burden Sharing and Deterrence

On the second question, of fair shares:

—The statistics suggest that, in aggregate, our allies are doing a creditable job.

—They have increased their defense spending over the last four years. NATO spending, for example, has increased by about 28 percent; ours by less than 5 percent.

—Total defense expenditure by NATO allies, as I noted earlier, is about \$45 billion per year, the bulk of it devoted to general purpose forces. This is approximately the sum we spend annually to maintain our general purpose forces deployed worldwide and the forces we maintain at home, as a strategic reserve for reinforcement and for dealing with less than general war contingencies.

—Individually, some could undoubtedly do more. It is central to U.S. policy to see that they do.

—In the aggregate, our allies worldwide can field 10 soldiers for each one we have deployed abroad. The basic Nixon doctrine (1969) that “We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense” is thus fulfilled.

A limit to burden sharing is imposed by two things:

1. No ally alone or in combination can meet the formidable nuclear threat posed by the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China, nor is it in our national interest to encourage them to try through proliferation of national nuclear forces.

2. In the event an ally cannot find the necessary resources to defend himself, it is in the present self-interest of the United States to help.

Deterrence, not burden sharing, is the priority objective of U.S. defense policy.

Let me now restate my conclusions in brief form.

Our economic dependence on the world and its on us is already large. That dependence is irreversible and growing. In the next quarter century, our demand for such basic commodities as iron ore, oil, aluminum, copper, and sulfur will increase enormously, as indeed will world demand.

Self-sufficiency in the face of this expected growth is an illusion. This represents a threefold increase over world consumption of these commodities today. To produce, sell, and transport these basic commodities and the finished goods that result will require a degree of order, stability, and sophisticated economic planning unimaginable by today’s standards.

The free world’s military strength will continue to play an important role in the maintenance of a peaceful world—a sine qua non if the planet’s minimum economic, political, and social aspirations are to be met.

By virtue of our enormous economic capacity and our military strength, we have no alternative open to us but leadership of the most challenging kind. As President Ford put it:²

“Successful foreign policy is an extension of the hopes of the whole American people for a world of peace and orderly reform and orderly freedom.

“So long as the peoples of the world have confidence in our purposes and faith in our word, the age-old vision of peace on earth will grow brighter.”

² For an excerpt from President Ford’s address before a joint session of Congress on Aug. 12, see BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1974, p. 333.

Action Program for World Investment

Address by Thomas O. Enders

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*¹

In responding to Secretary Kissinger's invitation, a large majority of you indicated a desire to discuss foreign investment.

It is also one of our major preoccupations, made urgent by two compelling facts. One is the worldwide supply crisis; the other is the need to make the recycling of oil dollars work for as long as the current extraordinarily high oil prices require.

Let me take the supply problem first. The starting point here is that the world economy cannot solve the double problem of high inflation and stagnation in output without a quantum increase in and restructuring of investment.

It is noteworthy that investment as a percentage of total output has been relatively static or declining in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] as a whole over a long period. Moreover, its structure has been suboptimal, as shows up in the persistence of major shortages in individual industries despite an overall stagnation of demand: basic chemicals, food, fertilizer, capital goods, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and a number of key non-ferrous metals.

Note also that cartel action in oil could not have been attempted had a strong rising demand for petroleum not been outrunning investment and supply. And we are currently seeing an attempt by some Caribbean bauxite producers to take advantage of the conjuncture of high demand and the close of an in-

vestment cycle in the aluminum industry to raise prices in the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] manner.

Taken together, sectors in which there have been major shortages this past 24 months and the oil sector account for a large share of recent price increases. Petroleum products, chemicals, and metals account for 40 percent of the rise in wholesale prices from July 1973 to July 1974.

For the shortage and cartelized sectors, the basic problem is thus how to create conditions in which the massive investment required in new capacity and in alternative sources of supply will occur.

Effective recycling of oil dollars is no less important. The economies of the industrialized world will not be able to grow and prosper over the medium term unless it works; rather, they will start to break apart in reciprocal beggar-your-neighbor actions.

For the first year of the oil crisis the great bulk of oil dollars were recycled to the Euromarket and done so efficiently.

However, one cannot expect the Euro-market again to handle in the next 12 months a comparable volume of funds unless there are massive new infusions of capital into the banking operations engaged in intermediating the short-to-medium-term deposits of oil-producing countries and the medium-to-long-term borrowing of consuming countries and enterprises. So far there has been no clear evidence that increase in capital of the kind required will be forthcoming. Thus it is commonly predicted that the great bulk of future recycling will flow through national

¹ Made before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives at the Department of State on Sept. 5.

capital markets; through such state-to-state loans as Germany and Italy have just concluded; through direct lending by producing to consuming countries, as in the case of the large Iranian loans to Britain and France; or through the use of multilateral recycling facilities such as the Witteveen fund [the International Monetary Fund oil facility].

However, the mere fact that the recycling operation has worked relatively well up to the present and that these alternative mechanisms are available does not permit us to be confident that the operation will proceed effectively in the future; for we do not yet know what the impact will be of the accumulation of massive debts by the consuming countries and thus what further institutions may be needed to underpin the system.

Climate for International Investment

If the need for the free flow of international investment has never been greater, the climate in which it can occur has deteriorated both at home and abroad.

At home the acceleration of foreign investment both in industry and in real estate over the past 24 months has given rise to concern at the influence and power foreign investors may acquire over our economy.

The actual volumes of direct incoming investment are relatively small, although growing—in 1973 incoming was \$3.5 billion, versus \$14 billion outgoing—and much of the reaction stems from their concentration in a few states. But it would be wrong to dismiss these fears which, if not addressed fully and directly, could develop into a serious political problem. Equally, it would be very wrong to take ill-considered or hasty action on the basis of these fears.

Americans are just beginning now to experience what many other countries, notably in Europe and in Latin America, have experienced when foreign enterprise enters the economy on a substantial scale. In Europe and Latin America, ways have been found for mutual adjustment between the foreign enterprise and the host country. Similar adjustments are and will be found in the United States.

Overseas, changing attitudes toward the great transnational enterprises, and the rising number of investment disputes, are posing new uncertainties to potential investors.

Since the Second World War, American enterprise overseas has been the most dynamic single agent of economic change in the world, consistently outperforming every national economy, including Japan's. But the very success of the transnational enterprises has called forth reaction to them of two sorts:

—The first is political, doctrinal, emphasizing conflict between the separate jurisdictions of the host country and the country of incorporation, opposition between the political power of the host country and the economic power of the enterprise, and the dangers of "business culture." A few real abuses are cited, notably the grave ITT-Chile problem, but most arguments are in terms of potential abuses. Characteristically, proponents of this view regard transnational enterprises as very profitable and driven by a strong desire to invest. They see the problem as how to protect the smaller and developing countries from the intended or unintended power of these enterprises, how to right the balance of bargaining between individual host countries and transnational enterprises with flexibility to locate in many countries. In a word, they see the problem as how to regulate transnational enterprises for the common good. This view, which is set forth fully and in moderate terms in the report of the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons on Multinational Corporations, is widely held in developing countries and is common also in industrialized countries. In both it corresponds to deeply held political concerns. It would be a misreading to expect that the urge to regulate transnational enterprises will level off and wane; on the contrary, it will probably grow.

—The second reaction is the growth in the volume of investment disputes. The increase has not been as rapid or as great as many feared. But nonetheless the volume is significant. From June 30, 1971, through July 31, 1973, American firms with an aggregate

book value in excess of \$1.5 billion became involved in 87 new investment disputes. The statistic is somewhat artificial since the gravity of the dispute varies widely from case to case. Nor is it possible to give a good comparison from statistics of earlier years. But the total is clearly up from what it has been.

Narrowing Areas of Potential Conflict

It is inefficient, indeed probably impossible, to deal with these investment issues in terms of principles.

No lawyer is going to devise a formula which will reconcile the principle of the Argentinian Carlos Calvo, according to which a foreign investor should renounce the protection of his home country, and the law of many countries under which their governments are required to extend assistance to their citizens overseas. Nor is there any way of determining at a high level of generality, as the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons would like to, what right package of services, equity, and technology transnational enterprises should offer developing countries. Nor can we expect, at any early point, agreement on what are good and what are bad takeovers, which seems by all odds to be the most sensitive issue.

Rather, progress will be best made by concentrating on individual practical issues.

Some of the most significant economic issues can be handled through tax treaties providing for national-treatment protection as well as negotiations between the national tax authorities on a case-by-case basis in disputes such as transfer pricing.

By limiting its ambitions, the current OECD exercise on capital movements can create a strong, clear area of agreement on the national treatment of already existing enterprises.

Additionally, the Working Group on Transnational Enterprises set up at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Washington in April can lead to a new, more powerful procedure for factfinding in investment disputes.²

Each of these actions will tend to narrow the area of potential conflict. Such partial

and limited agreements will tend in turn to create the basis on which further limited agreements can be made. A sequence can thus be engaged by which the most intractable problems, which may in the end turn out to be largely theoretical in any case, are gradually circumscribed and limited.

For these are areas in which progress is all important.

The great outpouring of discourse about transnational enterprises in the last 15 years has shed astonishingly little new light on their economics and operations. But it has sensitized the enterprises themselves to many of the problems they face in entering or operating in foreign countries and enabled them to develop new and often quite imaginative ways of structuring or executing their business. Innovative capital structures, service contracts, participation arrangements, phaseout and access agreements have, as a result, been tried and in certain circumstances have proved to be feasible. At the same time many governments have become more sophisticated about foreign investment and about its basic principle—that without adequate expectations of return, there is no way to achieve the desired level of investment.

Progress is also important in dealing with the resolution of individual disputes. The most efficient means of doing so is to establish an agreed means of conciliation and, if necessary, arbitration. Sixty-five nations have chosen to do so by ratifying the treaty establishing the International Center for the Settlement of International Investment Disputes. ICSID now faces its first great test in the case of the Jamaican aluminum contracts.

For other countries, which do not accept the concept of international arbitration, alternative, if less efficient, procedures can be established. The most useful such devices are arrangements for factfinding and for encouraging and sustaining negotiations.

² For text of a communique issued at Washington on Apr. 18 at the conclusion of a meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers, see BULLETIN of May 13, 1974, p. 517.

Finally, national governments can play a great role in the solution of investment disputes. The U.S. Government cannot be impartial in a dispute in which it appears that the rights of American citizens or enterprises under international law are being infringed. But that is not the only and not necessarily the main role it plays in such disputes. Often our primary concern is to help structure and carry through a process of negotiation that will lead toward resolution.

The Insurance Function

But even with major progress in the areas of tax agreements, capital movement codes, conciliation and arbitration, and dispute resolution, major uncertainties will inevitably remain in the area of foreign investment. These uncertainties can be made manageable and acceptable by insurance; this is the role of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

Over the past year, with the renewal of OPIC's authorization, there has been much soul-searching about its proper role. Some have questioned whether it made sense to encourage, through insurance, private investment in developing countries given the greater incidence of investment disputes. Others have felt strongly that the insurance function could as well be performed by private insurers and have pressed for privatization of OPIC.

While these concerns are significant and privatization must be given a proper trial, they should not be allowed to determine the size of the OPIC program at a time when there is such an urgent need for new investment, particularly in basic commodities, but also in a range of key industrial operations. Thus the OPIC management must expand its insurance operations vigorously. The administration should be ready to seek new authority for OPIC should it reach insurable limits.

Increasing availabilities of products in short supply is first of all an investment problem worldwide—not just one for U.S.

investment, domestic or foreign. In this respect, the Export-Import Bank can play an important role in financing sound projects—sponsored by foreign as well as U.S. investors—which increase production of short-supply items.

Strengthening the Worldwide Investment Market

I have spoken here of the need for a higher rate of investment, and of the climate in which it can occur, in worldwide terms.

It used to be that one could argue about foreign versus domestic investment as if there were a real option between them. The arguments go on, but the reality has shifted behind them. We still have the option of controls on outward capital flows, but our experience in the 1960's showed that if you could temporarily dam up outward investments you cannot really change their overall thrust. One can refuse entry to transnational enterprises, but with a significant percentage of the non-Communist world's GNP generated by them—and the most dynamic part of it—there is a significant penalty to doing so. One has the option of refusing oil producers' funds, but all our economies need a greater flow of savings. And you can't have it both ways, with one investment policy for incoming, and another for outgoing, capital.

In a very real sense, there is a single worldwide investment market. It needs strengthening and perfecting. This, as we see it, is the action agenda:

—First, we must sustain free access to the American capital market both for borrowers and for investors. The decision in January to end the decade-old controls and taxes on capital outflow constituted a major contribution to making the recycling of oil dollars work. There must be no return to controls on capital outflows or to taxes on them. Equally, we must continue to remain open to foreign investment. It is useful to go ahead with detailed studies like the Tariff Commission's on multinational corporations and the Culver-Inouye [Represent-

ative John C. Culver; Senator Daniel K. Inouye] proposal for a detailed survey of foreign investment in the United States. These studies will help sensitize foreign investors to problem areas and to practices that can usefully be avoided. They may also result in recommendations for addition of specific sectors to those that have traditionally been reserved for American investors only. We will certainly need a better reporting system.

—Second, we must be certain that the international banking system is able to continue to play its part in the oil recycling operation. For that we will need to make sure that each banking operation can have recourse to a “lender of last resort” in cases of illiquidity; at present there are a range of Euromarket banking operations, most of them subsidiaries of large banks, that are not so covered. And we may have to consider a system of multilateral guarantees by governments to cover oil deficits to make sure countries can borrow what they need in international capital markets.

—Third, we should continue to seek full national treatment for U.S. investment abroad, and we must insist on prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the few cases of nationalization. Where needed and appropriate, we will bring to bear available political and economic influence to get a satisfactory resolution, recognizing that the basic sanction is the damage the host country does to its future investment prospects.

—Fourth, at the same time, we must take every opportunity to enlarge the area of non-legally-binding codes, guidelines, and understandings in which both host country and enterprise can have stable expectations about each other's behavior. Generalized discourse on these issues can go on at the United Nations; but our strategy will press for progress at the regional level, where real interest and real problems in investment are more easily identified. The OECD investment exercise and the Working Group on Transnational Enterprises are particularly

promising in this regard. We will press ahead very actively in these two forums.

—Fifth, it is important for the companies to continue to develop their sensitivity to host country concerns and problems. The great American enterprises that operate internationally have shown themselves to be highly adaptive. As host country problems are gradually identified, I am confident that new modes of investment will be invented to respond to them.

—Sixth, a yet greater effort can be deployed in the investment dispute area. Our policy cannot, of course, be designed essentially to avoid investment disputes; clearly there are other and more important equities in almost every case. But the American Ambassador abroad and the State Department at home will take the lead in seeking to identify possible procedures leading to a resolution and to encourage the parties to the dispute to make use of them.

—Seventh, we need to expand more rapidly the area of transactions governed by tax treaties. At present we have treaties with 22 countries and about 10 more are at various stages of negotiation. We shall actively press to expand that number. At the same time, the traditional scope of tax treaties should be broadened so as to include provisions for intergovernmental negotiations on transfer pricing and better protection against domestic taxation that has a confiscatory or discriminatory effect against foreign enterprise.

—Finally, we must actively support investment overseas through OPIC's program of insurance, expanding the program as necessary to cover the volume of investment that will be needed to overcome the major shortages in the world economy.

Let me end where I began. The world economy needs much more investment. These are the things we think we should be doing about it. But you are the experts in the field. We would very much like to know what you think ought to be done.

Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute to Former Secretary Acheson

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on September 17 at a ceremony marking the presentation of a portrait of the late Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the National Portrait Gallery at Washington.

Press release 365 dated September 18

We come here this evening to do honor to one of the greatest of my predecessors. We do so for many reasons—out of affection, for reasons of friendship, and because of our admiration for his genius.

As a historian I have long respected the heritage left by Dean Acheson the public servant. He brought unity from the chaos that was the legacy of war; he built a mighty alliance that gave hope and security to millions; he fashioned an international structure that lasted far past his own departure from the public scene. The magnitude of his accomplishments has assured that ever afterward he will serve as the standard against which his successors will inevitably be judged.

But for me this ceremony tonight is far more than mere history.

It is, first of all, an opportunity to give thanks for the gallantry he displayed toward me when I first came to Washington almost six years ago. I shall be forever grateful for his wise counsel during those difficult times, and I shall never forget his concern—free of partisanship—for the proper governance of this nation.

But most important, this ceremony provides an opportunity to remind ourselves that what Dean Acheson was, what he stood for as a man, remains vital and alive today and that he set a standard against which all of us—in government or out—must judge ourselves.

He was a man of dignity—in his person and in his view of the public process. He revered the greatness and majesty of the nation he served, and never demeaned it. He

felt deeply the duty his country demanded, and never shirked it.

He was, as well, a man of wit and humor; life was fun and it was fun to be around him. I shall, for example, never forget his description to me of a then senior statesman: "He reminds me of an amateur boomerang thrower practicing his art in a crowded room." On another occasion, though as a Harvard man I personally could not find it particularly amusing, he described President Truman as "a Yale man in the finest sense of the word." Finally—and much closer to home, given my former profession—he said in one of his remarkably articulate speeches:

While public men cannot escape historians, they would do well to forget them while they get on with their job. One cannot even be sure of fixing the jury by employing its members—though it may help temporarily—or by becoming a member and writing its verdict. . . .

So much, then, for historians. And so much for any thoughts I may have had about future employment once I depart my current position.

The Acheson legacy is nowhere more pervasive—nowhere more deeply felt—than in the institution I now head. He will not pass from the hearts and minds of those who worked with and for him, for he gave them an understanding of the great adventure they were embarked upon. And he inspired hundreds who knew him only as a legend. He took them beyond themselves, beyond the petty concerns that can stultify and smother a bureaucracy, and showed them the breadth and scope of the business they were really about—the peace, the security, and the well-being of their own nation and of all mankind. In charting his great enterprise, he engendered a sense of pride, of purpose and dedication, that put the Department of State at the center of the policymaking process—not because an organization chart indicated that it should be but because its quality demonstrated that it must be.

It is, perhaps, the ultimate compliment that any man can receive that more than 20

years after his departure from office his way of thought and action remains the test of quality and his example the goal for which those who have followed after him still strive.

As he was an inspiration to his subordinates, so was he devoted to his chief. As he said in describing himself:

Like General Marshall, his successor never forgot who was President, and the President most punctiliously remembered who was Secretary of State. This mutual restraint is basic to a sound working relation between the two.

And a sound relationship they did indeed possess. Nothing so briefly yet so eloquently sums up the depth of that remarkable relationship as does the simple dedication of "Present at the Creation"—"To Harry S. Truman 'The captain with the mighty heart'."

Finally, Dean Acheson was a man of rare honor and integrity—a man who saw the human condition, and the awful influences of power, more clearly than most. In an eloquent statement before a Senate committee in 1950 he said:

In the long days and years which stretch beyond that moment of decision, one must live with one's self; and the consequences of living with a decision which one knows has sprung from timidity and cowardice go to the roots of one's life. It is not merely a question of peace of mind, although that is vital; it is a matter of integrity of character.

The strength, the humanity, and the compassion of Dean Acheson are found in those few words. They are a reaffirmation of his greatness for all who loved or admired him;

they are a challenge to all who treasure his memory.

Justice Holmes once said, in a speech that Secretary Acheson was fond of quoting:

Alas, gentlemen . . . We cannot live our dreams. We are lucky enough if we can give a sample of our best, and if in our hearts we can feel that it has been nobly done.

Dean Acheson more nearly lived his dreams than any man I know of. He gave us his best. And it was, indeed, nobly done.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 29th U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 17 confirmed the nominations of the following to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 29th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

John A. Scali
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Stuart Symington, U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri
Charles H. Percy, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois
Thomas H. Kuchel

Alternate Representatives

Oliver C. Carmichael, Jr.
Joseph M. Segel
William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr.
Barbara M. White

Department Discusses Proposed Nuclear Reactor Agreements With Egypt and Israel

*Statement by Joseph J. Sisco
Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

It is a great pleasure to appear before you today to discuss with you our proposed commercial nuclear agreements with Israel and Egypt. Because you have already heard from my colleagues in the executive branch and because you are already well informed on the basic facts of these agreements, I will keep my opening remarks as brief as possible so we can go directly to your questions.

Let me explain at the outset exactly where discussions on this subject with Egypt and Israel stand. Both countries were given draft agreements in June. Since that time the United States has given both countries modifications to be made in the drafts, and the Egyptians have raised a number of questions as to the interpretation and intent of various of the provisions in the drafts. The most recent discussion with the Egyptian representatives was on August 15 in Washington. The Israelis have not given us their detailed views on these drafts.

Nuclear technology is a two-edged sword. The Middle East is a volatile and dangerous area. No one—least of all someone like my-

¹ Made before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Sept. 16. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

self who has been concerned with Middle Eastern affairs for many years—could lightly take a decision to sell U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel there.

I would like to make four general observations. We believe:

—That an offer to sell commercial power reactors and fuel to Egypt and Israel will help reinforce the momentum toward peace in the area;

—That our offer makes sound economic sense;

—That our offer limits the possibilities of adding to the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation in the area; and

—That our offer will be accompanied by the most effective safeguards possible.

Let me elaborate on these four points.

We began with one key assessment: That if the United States did not cooperate with Egypt and Israel in their desire to obtain nuclear power reactors, others—who are far less concerned with nonproliferation goals—would. Only by taking a positive stance could we help shape the manner in which this technology was brought into a geographic area of vital concern to us.

Nuclear technology will inevitably find its way into Egypt and Israel, given the economic benefits of nuclear power plants for electrical generation. By selling reactors to

both countries at the same time and under comparable conditions, we will help insure that commercial-scale nuclear technology enters the region in a *balanced* and *symmetric* manner—a result which can minimize risks and reduce tensions.

But we also believed a positive response would add to the forces that can help turn the area from war toward peace.

Since the signing of the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria and Egypt, we have been moving to sustain the momentum of the progress toward peace and to strengthen our relations with those countries whose contributions to its realization are indispensable. In August we had important discussions with Arab leaders, and we have just completed significant talks with the Prime Minister of Israel.

These consultations will be carried on later this month in the context of the opening of the U.N. General Assembly session. Our hope is that these will lead to understanding on the course of further negotiations. There must be continuing progress if we are to avoid risking what has already been achieved.

The intangible in this process is confidence. Our willingness to sell reactors and associated fuel to both countries provides evidence to Israel and Egypt of our interest in broad and continuing cooperation with them. On their part, it signifies their confidence in American technology and, more importantly, in the stability of their future relationship with the United States. That the power plants we are discussing would not become operational until the 1980's underlines this point. The mutual interest in friendly relations will be given material expression. But perhaps more importantly, the element of confidence—so indispensable to the peace-making process—will be reinforced.

There was also an economic dimension to our decision. Nuclear power reactors make economic sense in both countries. With the dramatic increase in oil prices, the World Bank, for example, which has been historically conservative about this technology, now

endorses it as economically viable for nations like Egypt and Israel.

So there were foreign policy purposes and an economic rationale for responding favorably to reactor requests. But we also have to be sure that the commercial nuclear equipment and materials provided by the United States could be protected with nuclear safeguards adequate to the very special dangers that pervade the Middle East.

Under our Nonproliferation Treaty obligation, we are obligated to insure that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are placed on material transferred to other states through agreements for cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. We believe that in most areas of the world these IAEA safeguards are adequate to meet prevailing risks. An IAEA-safeguarded reactor has never been used for peaceful nuclear explosions or for diversion of plutonium.

It is clear to us, however, that IAEA safeguards must be supplemented to meet the unique circumstances of the Middle East. For example, the potential for uncertainty about weapons development has to be closed off, particularly the potential for uncertainty on the part of nations in the area. Doubts on one side about what the other side might be doing with his plutonium could have a devastating effect on Middle Eastern peace. It was for this latter reason that we saw the introduction of additional controls as a matter of self-interest in both Egypt and Israel.

Moreover, we were and are resolved to make the special safeguards on our nuclear power agreements not only adequate to risks but, just as importantly, precedent-setting as to their nonproliferation benefits.

As you are aware, the reactors we contemplate supplying are themselves without weapons potential, and the low-enriched uranium fuel cannot be used for nuclear explosives. Rather, the threat arises in three areas; we are determined that each be choked off:

—First, that either government will overt-

ly or covertly divert the plutonium byproduct of the reactors and make it into weapons. Against the risk of diversion, our agreements with Israel and Egypt will supplement inspection by the IAEA by specifying that the reprocessing and storage of the plutonium will be done outside each country.

—Second, that either government will use the material for what would be described as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Our agreement will explicitly preclude peaceful nuclear explosions. And let me say here we do not believe that there is any technical distinction between a peaceful explosion and a weapons explosion.

—Third, that some of the material could be stolen or that the reactors would be subject to terrorist attack. Against the risk of sabotage or attack, our agreements will provide for assurance that stringent physical security procedures are applied by both countries.

I summarize here only because I know how thoroughly you have studied the details of our planned safeguards. Two questions have almost certainly occurred to you, as they have to me. First, how can we be sure that both or either of the countries will not violate the safeguards we are writing into the agreements? And second, why don't we insist on adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a condition for supplying the reactors? Allow me to respond to them.

There can never be an ironclad guarantee that a country will not violate an international agreement, whatever its nature and no matter how tightly written. But we think that the provisions of these agreements and the interests of both Israel and Egypt make violation extremely unlikely. We start from the premise that a violation could not be kept a secret from either the United States or the international community. Thus, in case of a violation:

—The United States would have the option to suspend its supply of fuel for the reactors, and the violating country would have great difficulty finding a new source, particularly

in circumstances where the world was in full knowledge of the violation.

—The violation would alert its adversary to the fact that it was building nuclear weapons.

—A violation would place in great jeopardy the offending country's economic, political, and diplomatic relationships with the United States.

The disincentives to unilateral abrogation are very great.

The United States is committed to seeking the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We hope that both Israel and Egypt will eventually join us and all other nations in subscribing to it. The agreements we propose to sign with them will reflect faithfully their support for the treaty's objectives.

However, it is clear that neither Israel nor Egypt sees its national interests presently served by becoming a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Over the short run virtually nothing is likely to alter these perceptions.

Our efforts must be bent to helping build the conditions in which those perceptions can change. It is our hope that provision of peaceful nuclear facilities under strict controls against military use can create in time a momentum toward a climate consistent with the goal of nonproliferation within the region and between both nations and the United States.

Mr. Chairmen, members of the subcommittee: Historians of a future age will undoubtedly comment on 20th-century man's efforts to match his political will to his technological grasp. That struggle is sharply etched in the issue you are considering today.

The most modern and potentially the most dangerous of technologies is at the threshold of an area where there has been no lasting vision of peace for a generation. Now such a vision is beginning to take shape. Through prudently molded agreements we propose to use technology to hasten progress toward its full development.

I hope that you can support us in this task.

U.S.-Bulgaria Consular Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, with an Agreed Memorandum and a related exchange of letters, signed at Sofia on April 15, 1974. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The signing of this Convention is a significant step in the gradual process of improving and broadening the relationship between the United States and Bulgaria. Consular relations between the two countries have not previously been subject to formal agreement. This Convention will establish firm obligations on such important matters as free communication between a citizen and his consul, notification to consular officers of the arrest and detention of their citizens, and permission for visits by consuls to citizens who are under detention.

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 12 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. H., 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention, the agreed memorandum and related letters, and the report of the Department of State.

I welcome the opportunity through this Consular Convention to strengthen the ties between the United States and Bulgaria. I urge the Senate to give the Convention its prompt and favorable consideration.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 12, 1974.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Report to accompany S. 3190. S. Rept. 93-1019. July 17, 1974. 3 pp.
- Duty-Free Entry of Telescope and Associated Articles for Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope Project. Report to accompany H.R. 11796. H. Rept. 93-1213. July 24, 1974. 13 pp.
- African Development Fund. Report to accompany S. 2354. S. Rept. 93-1029. July 25, 1974. 4 pp.
- Energy Transportation Security Act of 1974. Report, together with minority views, on H.R. 8193, to require that a percentage of U.S. oil imports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels. S. Rept. 93-1031. July 25, 1974. 66 pp.
- Russian Grain Transactions. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations made by its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. S. Rept. 93-1033. July 29, 1974. 67 pp.
- Increased U.S. Participation in the Asian Development Bank. Report to accompany S. 2193. S. Rept. 93-1040. July 30, 1974. 11 pp.
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Conference Report to accompany S. 2957. H. Rept. 93-1233. July 30, 1974. 13 pp.
- Passport Application Fees. Report to accompany H.R. 15172. H. Rept. 93-1242. July 31, 1974. 4 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences ¹

Scheduled October Through December

ECE Group of Experts on Automatic Data Processing	Geneva	Oct. 1-2
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Technology and Housing	Bangkok	Oct. 1-8
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Oct. 2
WIPO Working Group on Scientific Discoveries	Geneva	Oct. 2-4
OECD Export Credits Group	Paris	Oct. 3-4
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 31st Session	London	Oct. 3-4
ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures.	Geneva	Oct. 3-4
ILO Preparatory Meeting on Civil Aviation	Geneva	Oct. 3-10
ICAO Legal Subcommittee: 21st Session	Montreal	Oct. 3-22
ECE Ad Hoc Meeting on a New Chemical Study	Geneva	Oct. 7-8
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Brussels	Oct. 7-9
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Meat: 4th Session	Rome	Oct. 7-10
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Jute, Kenaf, and Allied Fibers: 9th Session.	Rome	Oct. 7-10
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport	Geneva	Oct. 7-11
GATT Committee on Budget and Administration	Geneva	Oct. 7-11
9th FAO Regional Conference for Europe	Lausanne	Oct. 7-12
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 18th Plenary Meeting	Geneva	Oct. 7-18
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Oct. 8
ECAFE Typhoon Committee	Manila	Oct. 8-14
ECE Chemical Industry Committee	Geneva	Oct. 9-11
GATT Working Party on Trade With Poland	Geneva	Oct. 10-11
ECE Preparatory Meeting for Seminar on Construction in Seismic Regions With Difficult Ground Conditions.	Bucharest	Oct. 12
GATT Balance of Payments Committee	Geneva	Oct. 14-16
ECE Group of Experts on Road Traffic Safety	Geneva	Oct. 14-18
CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 85th-86th Sessions	Geneva	Oct. 14-18
ECE Timber Committee	Geneva	Oct. 14-18
PAHO Executive Committee: 73d Meeting	Washington	Oct. 14-19
UNHCR Executive Committee: 25th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-24

¹This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 13, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October-December 1974. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCITT, International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IHO, International Hydrological Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ISVS, International Secretariat for Volunteer Service; ITU, International Telecommunications Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	Oct. 14-25
WMO Commission on Agricultural Meteorology: 6th Session	Washington	Oct. 14-26
FAO Committee on Fisheries	Rome	Oct. 15-22
18th UNESCO General Conference	Paris	Oct. 15-Nov. 20
IMCO Assembly: 5th Extraordinary Session	London	Oct. 16-18
GATT Balance of Payments Committee	Geneva	Oct. 21-22
ISVS Council: 16th Session	Geneva	Oct. 21-23
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions	Rome	Oct. 21-25
ECE Group of Experts on Customs Questions Affecting Transport	Geneva	Oct. 21-25
IMCO International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea	London	Oct. 21-Nov. 1
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society	Brussels	Oct. 22-23
OECD Development Assistance Committee (High Level Group)	Paris	Oct. 22-23
GATT Working Party on Romanian Tariffs	Geneva	Oct. 23-25
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Oct. 23-25
ITU/CCITT Asian Planning Committee	Tokyo	Oct. 23-30
ECE Group of Experts on Long Term Prospects for the Steel Industry.	Geneva	Oct. 28-29
ICAO Panel on Route Facility Cost Accounting: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 28-Nov. 1
ILO Working Party on Structure: 1st Session	Geneva	Oct. 28-Nov. 1
ECE Steel Committee	Geneva	Oct. 30-Nov. 1
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council	Jakarta	Oct. 30-Nov. 8
ECAFE Special Meeting for 2d UNIDO Conference	Bangkok	Oct. 31-Nov. 4
FAO World Food Program Intergovernmental Committee	Rome	October
SEATO Council of Ministers: 19th Meeting	New York	October
U.N. ECOSOC Policy and Program Coordination Committee: Inter- sessional Meeting.	New York	October
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Brussels	October
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee	Brussels	October
GATT Council	Geneva	October
NATO Expert Working Group on the Middle East and Maghreb	Brussels	October
NATO Expert Working Group on Latin America	Brussels	October
NATO Expert Working Group on the Far East	Brussels	October
OAS/PAHC Committee III	Caracas	Nov. 4-7
ECE Gas Committee	Geneva	Nov. 4-8
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises	Washington	Nov. 4-8
UNCTAD Committee on Tungsten: 8th Session	Geneva	Nov. 4-8
ILO Governing Body and Its Committees: 194th Session	Geneva	Nov. 4-15
ICAO Special North Atlantic/Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Montreal	Nov. 4-15
U.N. Pledging Conference for UNIDO and U.N. Capital Develop- ment Fund.	New York	Nov. 5
FAO Ad Hoc Consultations on Tobacco	Rome	Nov. 5-9
ECAFE Committee on Natural Resources Development	Bangkok	Nov. 5-11
CCC Valuation Committee: 65th Session	Brussels	Nov. 5-15
U.N. World Food Conference	Rome	Nov. 5-16
OAS/PAHC Permanent Executive Committee: 15th Regular Ses- sion.	Caracas	Nov. 7-9
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Nov. 8
UNICEF Special Pledging Conference	New York	Nov. 11
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 29th Session (re- sumed).	Geneva	Nov. 11-12
ECE Group of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods	Bern	Nov. 11-15
IMCO Legal Committee: 24th Session	London	Nov. 11-15
UNCTAD Intergovernmental Preparatory Group on a Convention on International Intermodal Transport: 2d Session.	Geneva	Nov. 11-29
OECD Environment Committee: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 13-14
ICEM Executive Committee: 46th Session	Geneva	Nov. 14-16
UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To Save the Monuments of Nubia: 24th Session.	Aswan	Nov. 16
ICEM Council: 37th Session	Paris	Nov. 18-20
ICAO Statistical Panel: 4th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 18-22
IMCO Marine Environment Protection Committee: 2d Session	London	Nov. 18-22

Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

Scheduled October Through December—Continued

GATT Meeting of the Contracting Parties	Geneva	Nov. 18-22
ECE Committee on Electric Power	Geneva	Nov. 18-22
ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Nov. 18-22
CCC Working Party of the Nomenclature Committee	Paris	Nov. 18-23
FAO Council; 64th Session	Rome	Nov. 18-29
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Nov. 19-20
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna	Madrid	Nov. 20-26
UNESCO Executive Board; 96th Session	Paris	Nov. 21-22
ECAFE Committee on Statistics	Jakarta	Nov. 21-27
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Nov. 22
ECE Committee on Development of Trade	Geneva	Nov. 25-29
IMCO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping	London	Nov. 25-29
ILO 2d Tripartite Technical Meeting for Hotels, Restaurants, and Similar Establishments.	Geneva	Nov. 25-Dec. 6
WMO Regional Association III (South America); 6th Session	Buenos Aires	Nov. 25-Dec. 6
CCC Nomenclature Committee; 33d Session	Brussels	Nov. 25-Dec. 7
ICAO Supersonic Transport Panel; 5th Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 25-Dec. 13
Consultative Committee for the Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan).	Singapore	Nov. 26-Dec. 5
ILO Conference of American States; 10th Session	Mexico City	Nov. 26-Dec. 6
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee	Brussels	November
NATO Industrial Planning Committee	Brussels	November
ECE Committee on Development of Trade	Geneva	November
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee	Brussels	November
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport	Brussels	November
U.N. Economic and Social Council; 57th Session (resumed)	New York	November
International Olive Oil Council; 31st Session	Madrid	November
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Brussels	November
NATO Expert Working Group on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.	Brussels	November
CCC Extraordinary Session of Finance Committee	Brussels	Dec. 2-4
OECD Financial Markets Committee	Paris	Dec. 2-5
3d OAS Inter-American Conference on Radio Chemistry	Rio de Janeiro	Dec. 2-6
IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection; 16th Session	London	Dec. 2-6
ECAFE Committee on Trade	Bangkok	Dec. 2-9
U.N. ECOSOC Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Dec. 2-10
UNIDO Permanent Committee; 5th Session, 1st Part	Vienna	Dec. 2-14
UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts To Review the International Standard Classification of Education.	Paris	Dec. 3-11
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises	Washington	Dec. 9-13
ECE Senior Advisers on Science and Technology	Geneva	Dec. 9-13
ECE Working Party on Road Transport	Geneva	Dec. 9-13
IMCO Life Saving Appliance Committee; 8th Session	London	Dec. 9-13
ECAFE Committee on Economic Planning	Bangkok	Dec. 9-14
FAO/WHO Committee of Experts on Nutrition	Rome	Dec. 11-20
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Pneumatic Tires	Geneva	Dec. 16-20
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative Investigations in the Mediterranean; 2d Session.	Monaco	Dec. 16-21
ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee	Bangkok	Dec. 16-23
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Dec. 17-18
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in Europe Regional Planning Group; 10th Meeting.	Paris	December
IHO Commission on Radio Navigation Warnings	Monte Carlo	December
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative Studies of Kuroshio and Adjacent Regions; 10th Session.	Tokyo	December
NATO Defense Planning Committee	Brussels	December
NATO; 54th Council Meeting at Ministerial Level	Brussels	December
UNESCO Bureau of the International Coordinating Council on Man and the Biosphere Program.	Paris	December

U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention Enters Into Force

Press release 367 dated September 19

The Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and Their Environment entered into force on September 19 when Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll and Japanese Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa exchanged instruments of ratification at Washington. The convention, which was signed in Tokyo on March 4, 1972, opens up a new field of cooperation between the United States and Japan.

The convention is the third bilateral agreement regarding migratory birds entered into by the United States. The first was with Canada, signed August 16, 1916; the second with Mexico, signed February 6, 1936. Both conventions remain in force. Like the two earlier conventions, the present convention reflects the expansion of scientific knowledge regarding the extraordinarily long distances that certain species of birds traverse in the course of their migrations and a concern for their conservation.

The convention marks the culmination of international efforts dating back to 1960 when the 12th World Meeting of the International Council for Bird Preservation in Tokyo passed a resolution proposing that countries of the pan-Pacific area conclude a convention for the protection of migratory birds. Subsequently, studies were undertaken by the Department of the Interior, the Smithsonian Institution, and their Japanese counterparts. After a meeting of experts of each country in October 1968, U.S. and Japanese delegations met in Washington in October 1969 and negotiated a draft convention which, with a few changes, provided the text for the present convention.

The convention is designed to provide for the protection of species of birds which are common to both countries or which migrate between them. At present there are 190 such species listed in the annex to the convention. Included are such endangered birds as the peregrine falcon, the short-tailed albatross, the Aleutian Canada goose, and the Japanese crested ibis and sacred crane. Provisions are included in the convention for review and amendment of the annex.

The convention provides that each party shall endeavor to establish sanctuaries and other facilities for the protection or management of migratory birds. Provisions are included for special protection of endangered species of birds indigenous to each country. Along with the instruments of ratification, notes were exchanged listing such birds. Finally, there are provisions for the exchange of research data regarding migratory birds and endangered species of birds and for the preservation and enhancement of their environment.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.

Acceptance deposited: Korea, Democratic People's Republic, September 18, 1974.

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Accession deposited: Chile, August 15, 1974.

Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the United States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.

Accession deposited: Syria, August 1, 1974.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Norway, May 7, 1974.

Maritime Matters

Convention for the unification of certain rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Done at Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force March 1, 1913. 37 Stat. 1658.

Adherence deposited: Syria, August 1, 1974.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: Mauritius, June 8, 1974.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.²

Notification of approval: Norway, June 27, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.²

Notification of approval: Norway, June 27, 1974.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.¹

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, June 24, 1974; Sudan, June 6, 1974.

BILATERAL

Cyprus

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for execution. Signed at Nicosia and Washington May 7 and June 8, 1973.

Entered into force: September 1, 1974.

Haiti

Agreement modifying the agreement of October 19 and November 3, 1971, as amended and modified, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince September 12 and 13, 1974. Entered into force September 13, 1974.

Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment. Signed at Tokyo March 4, 1972.

Ratifications exchanged: September 19, 1974.

Entered into force: September 19, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Agreement amending the annex to the convention of March 4, 1972, for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 19, 1974. Enters into force December 19, 1974.

Jordan

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Jordan. Effected by exchange of letters at Amman May 20 and August 24, 1974. Entered into force August 24, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

Macao

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for execution. Signed at Macao and Washington February 23 and June 8, 1973.

Entered into force: August 1, 1974.

Switzerland

Agreement relating to the application of the rules of country of origin to air charter traffic between the United States and Switzerland. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern June 12 and July 25, 1974. Entered into force July 25, 1974.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*364	9/17	Passport application fee raised from \$2 to \$3.
365	9/18	Kissinger: remarks at National Portrait Gallery.
†366	9/19	Kissinger: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
367	9/19	U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention enters into force.
*368	9/19	U.S. journalists tour U.S.S.R. under exchange visits program.
†369	9/20	U.S.-U.K. aviation agreement.
*370	9/20	Black sworn in as Ambassador to Ghana (biographic data).
*371	9/20	Cooper sworn in as Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (biographic data).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

