

**The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “November-December 1975 – People’s Republic of China - TOSCO (4)” of National Security Adviser's Trip Cables of Brent Scowcroft at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3

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IMMEDIATE  
PRECEDENCE

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CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 77 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

INFO:

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 69

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PAGES 9

CITE \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: 04 22 14Z

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO

77

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

1975 DEC 4 22 40

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032851

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram  
  
TITLE . . . . . TOSCO 77  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 9 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000006  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (4)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG



Immediate  
PRECEDENCE

~~Secret~~ Sensitive Eyes only  
CLASSIFICATION

20  
FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 79 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

INFO:

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PAGES 1

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM



26  
SECRET - SENSITIVE

4 December 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

VP: ~~WHICH WOULD BE HELD~~

FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

1. With reference to your 4 December message, for the decision-making process to be sound as well as defensible, I believe a VP meeting should be held in Washington prior to the NSC meeting which the President would want to schedule before HAK's 18 December visit to Moscow. Having a VP meeting in Washington would permit all the principals to attend and to be in consultation with their staffs in preparation for the meeting and for follow-up action as a result of the VP deliberations. I hope HAK will adjust his travel schedule so as to attend both the VP and NSC meetings in Washington before a Moscow trip. An NSC meeting with Henry not in attendance, because he was already en route to Moscow, understandably would be seen as pro forma. Moreover, the press of FY 77 budget deliberations in DoD and with the WH makes it difficult for me to spend an additional day in Brussels, so, for this additional reason, I prefer that the VP meeting be held in Washington.

2. Please let me have your thoughts.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DoD Directive 5200.30

BY 142 NARA DATE 2/1/11

SECRET - SENSITIVE





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~~SECRET~~

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OP IMMED  
DE WTE #7135 3390106  
O 050043Z DEC 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 80//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
SECRETARY KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH52486

TOSCO 80

DECEMBER 4, 1974

TO SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM BILL HYLAND FOR STATE

1. IN YOUR MEETING FRIDAY WITH MULCAHY, YOU SUGGESTED WE CONTACT THE ELYSEE ON SEVERAL ANGOLAN QUESTIONS. STATE HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT MESSAGES TO BROISOLLETTE WHICH HAS BEEN CAST AS A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO BROISOLLETTE. IF YOU APPROVE THE MESSAGE, I WILL SEE THAT IT IS TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY TO BROISOLLETTE ON THE CABINET LINE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: IN VIEW OF THE RAPIDLY CHANGING EVENTS IN ANGOLA, WE ARE INTERESTED IN LEARNING HOW THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CURRENTLY VIEWS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION THERE.

A. SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT ON SIDE OF UNITA/FNLA IS A MIXED BLESSING. IT HAS HELPED CREATE MOMENTARY BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY FORCES, THUS PROVIDING PRECIOUS TIME FOR AFRICAN CONSIDERATION OF WHAT TO DO NEXT, BUT POLITICAL IMPACT IN AFRICA, VISIBLE IN DECISION OF NIGERIA AND DAHOMEY TO RECOGNIZE MPLA, MAY DO MUCH HARM TO FNLA/UNITA. WE ARE ASKING CERTAIN OF OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS TO HELP TO COUNTER ANY MOVE BY NIGERIA AND OTHER MPLA SUPPORTERS TO STAMPEDE AFRICA INTO RECOGNIZING MPLA. WOULD THE GOF BE PREPARED TO MAKE SIMILAR DEMARCHES TO ITS AFRICAN FRIENDS?

\*\*\*\*\* \*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SECFL

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PAGE 01

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~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 10450 (repealed) *EO 13526 9/16/03*  
NSC Memo, 080703, State Dept. Guidelines  
*HR* *NSA, DMS* *2/4/10*



B. WE ARE CURRENTLY EXAMINING MOBUTU'S RECENT  
REQUEST TO ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULCAHY FOR US  
NAVAL PRESENCE OFF THE ZAIRE COAST. WE UNDERSTAND A  
PARALLEL REQUEST HAS BEEN PUT TO GOF. ARE YOU CONSIDERING  
INTRODUCING SUCH A PRESENCE EITHER OFF ZAIRE OR  
FARTHER SOUTH? END TEXT. *SLM 1-15-83*  
0290

RECALLED

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:339/01:00Z

DTG:050043Z DEC 75

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM/8L //

TO: GENERAL SECRETARIAT  
JAKARTA

INFO:

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

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PAGES 1

CITE \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: 050115Z

RELEASED BY: Rg

TOR: 050120Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO

81

(DELIVER upon arrival)

1975 DEC 5 01 15



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~  
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

December 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

Information Item

Background on South Moluccans: Two groups of South Moluccans have hijacked a train and taken over an Indonesian consulate in the Netherlands. They have already murdered several of the passengers from the train. These events seem to be timed to coincide with your trip to Indonesia.

The South Moluccans are descendents of East Indian and African slaves whom the Dutch took to work on the Molucca Islands in western Indonesia, when that country was a Dutch colony. They do not get along well with ethnic Indonesians who took over their islands in 1950. After an unsuccessful bloody uprising that year, 12,000 of them were forcibly moved to the Netherlands to avoid further bloodshed. About 35,000 of them are now in the Netherlands but they have not been assimilated into Dutch society.

The South Moluccans are divided into two groups in the Netherlands, both of which have uniformed paramilitary units. The larger Free South Molucca Republic group (named after the government established in the 1950 rebellion) has condemned the killing on the train. The smaller more radical group has also denounced violence in the past. Those conducting these violent acts are apparently an offshoot of these groups. South Moluccans have carried out violent acts before including: a 1970 attack on the Indonesian embassy; a 1974 gas bomb attack on the World Court; and a 1975 plot to kidnap Queen Juliana and demand Moluccan independence in exchange for her release.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY EXCISE CODE WORD-46-4-1-6  
BY W NSA/State guidelines  
NARA DATE 5/3/10 9/21/05

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~  
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~





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DE WFE #7137 3390211  
O 050200Z DEC 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM //TOSCO 82//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH52407

TOSCO 82

FROM HYLAND

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT SUBPOENA

CONGRESSMAN MC CLORY CONVENED A MEETING IN HIS OFFICE AT 1700 THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS A "COMPROMISE" ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT SUBPOENA. ATTENDING WERE ASPIN AND MORGAN MURPHY, EAGLEBURGER, SCALEA FROM JUSTICE, JACK MARSH, CHARLIE LEPPERT AND HYLAND.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MC CLORY'S PROPOSAL:

BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION

1) THE COMMITTEE WILL AGREE TO FORMALLY WITHDRAW THE RESOLUTION DIRECTED AGAINST DR. KISSINGER FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SO-CALLED STATE DEPT. SUBPOENA; AND

2) THE EXECUTIVE WILL AGREE

A) TO ALLOW COMMITTEE ACCESS TO 40 COMMITTEE MINUTES COVERING THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATE DEPT INITIATED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COVERT ACTION, WHETHER APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED ULTIMATELY, FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 20, 1961 TO 1965 -- UNDER THE SAME GUIDELINES WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO WITH RESPECT TO OTHER 40 COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS.

B) TO ALLOW COMMITTEE ACCESS TO 40 COMMITTEE MINUTES COVERING THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH STATE DEPT. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COVERT ACTION WERE DISAPPROVED BY THE 40 COMMITTEE DURING

\*\*\*\*\* \*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SEC FLE

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PAGE 01

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NO. 1000-1000, 1000-1000, 1000-1000

HR 1000-1000 2/4/11



THE PERIOD OF 1965 TO THE PRESENT == UNDER THE SAME  
GUIDELINES WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO WITH RESPECT TO OTHER  
48 COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS.

-----  
IN THIS WAY, THE COMMITTEE CAN OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE ESSENTIAL  
INFORMATION WHICH IT NEEDS TO CONDUCT ITS INVESTIGATION == AND  
THE EXECUTIVE CAN PROVIDE THIS ACCESS WITHOUT, IN ANY WAY,  
AFFECTING ITS ASSERTION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE FOR THE ACTUAL  
STATE DEPT. DOCUMENTS.

END TEXT

AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THE TEXT, THIS RAISES SOME SERIOUS  
ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY FROM POLICY AND LEGAL  
STANDPOINTS. JACK MARSH WILL HOLD A MEETING TOMORROW MORNING TO  
EXAMINE ALL THE ASPECTS. WE NEED NO DECISIONS FOR NOW,  
BUT WANTED YOU TO BE AWARE OF STATE OF PLAY.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ASPIN, WITH MURPHY'S SUPPORT, ASSERTS  
THAT ON BASIS OF COMPROMISE HE CAN SWING 8 VOTES TO SET ASIDE  
SUPEDNA. MARSH WANTS TO TAKE SOME MORE SOUNDINGS ON THE HILL,  
AND WE ARE ASKING FOR LEGAL OPINION FROM JUSTICE, BEFORE SENDING  
ANY RECOMMENDATIONS.

0427



**TOP SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

10 WTE  
DE WTE 1132 3382155  
050201Z DEC 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 83//  
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
SEM

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONTAINS CODEWORD WH52404~~

TOSCO 83

DECEMBER 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

SOVIET 1976 DEFENSE BUDGET: ON DECEMBER 2 THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FINANCE ANNOUNCED THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1976 IS THE SAME AS THE ONE FOR THIS YEAR - 17.4 BILLION RUBLES. DIA BELIEVES THE ANNOUNCEMENT MAY BE DESIGNED TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF SUPPORTING DETENTE. BY COMPARISON, MOSCOW REPORTED NO CHANGE IN DEFENSE SPENDING BETWEEN 1970 AND 1973 AND ONLY SLIGHT REDUCTIONS IN 1974 AND 1975. THE ANNOUNCED FIGURE IS ONLY A PORTION OF ACTUAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS, WHICH ARE BELIEVED TO BE INCREASING STEADILY. AN INCREASE IN ACTUAL EXPENDITURES IS QUITE LIKELY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS ARE DEPLOYING NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN ADDITION, THEIR PERSONNEL COSTS ARE RISING AND MILITARY R&D EXPENSES ARE PROBABLY DOING THE SAME. THE ANNOUNCED DEFENSE BUDGET OMITTS MAJOR CATEGORIES SUCH AS R&D WHICH IS BELIEVED TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE SCIENCE BUDGET. SOVIETS REPORTED UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN DEBT REPAYMENT: EGYPTIAN ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW DEBT REPAYMENT SCHEDULE WITH THE USSR HAVE APPARENTLY FAILED.

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted

AUTHORITY EAC NLF, GDE WORD-46-4-2-5

BY 11/15/04 NARA DATE 5/3/04



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DIA review(s) completed

Presidential Library Review

ACCORDING TO DIA, ITS  
TELD DEFENSEMENT IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS WILL ENHANCE LOW-

END OF PAGE 01

Approved For Release 2004/09/08 : NLF-CODEWORD-46-4-2-5



**TOP SECRET**

REIL ANTI-AIRCRAFT COVERAGE AND PROVIDE MOBILE AIR DEFENSE FOR FORWARD ARMY ELEMENTS. THE NUMBER OF THESE WEAPONS IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT KNOWN, BUT THE INCLUSION OF THIS RELATIVELY ADVANCED SOVIET WEAPON IN THE SOMALI INVENTORY REFLECTS A CONTINUATION OF PRESIDENT SIAD'S PROGRAM TO UPGRADE THE ARMY.

TERRORISTS ATTACK INDONESIAN CONSULATE IN AMSTERDAM: OUR EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE REPORTS THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE HIJACKED TRAIN IN THE NETHERLANDS, A GROUP OF ARMED TERRORISTS, PRESUMABLY ALSO SOUTH MOLUCCANS, STORMED INTO THE INDONESIAN CONSULATE IN AMSTERDAM TODAY. IT APPEARS THAT SOME OF THE PERSONNEL IN THE CONSULATE WERE WOUNDED. THE TERRORISTS WERE BARRICADED INSIDE THE CONSULATE AND, ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS, THE PREMISES WERE SURROUNDED BY SOME 200 DUTCH POLICEMEN.

EGYPTIAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY BEING REVIVED: AN UPSURGE OF CONSTRUCTION AT EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE-PRODUCTION FACILITIES INDICATES THAT THESE DORMANT INDUSTRIES ARE ABOUT TO BE REVIVED. FINANCED BY A \$1 BILLION FUND TO CREATE A PAN-ARAB ARMS INDUSTRY IN EGYPT, A MILITARY INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, HEADQUARTERED AT CAIRO, IS OVERSEEING THE PROJECT. CAIRO HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCY ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE BY INCREASING ITS INDIGENOUS MILITARY PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND PROCURING MORE ARMS AND TECHNOLOGY FROM WESTERN NATIONS.

THE WASHINGTON STAR

PRESIDENT FORD IS PICTURED WITH A LITTLE CHINESE GIRL WITH A TENNIS RACKET AS HE TOURS THE FAMED SUMMER PALACE IN PEKING TODAY. (A-1)

HENRY BRADSHAW REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT SUMMING UP HIS VISIT TO CHINA PRESIDENT FORD SAID TODAY THAT HE HAD HELD "FRIENDLY, CANDID, SUBSTANTIAL, AND CONSTRUCTIVE" TALKS WITH CHINESE LEADERS WHICH LEFT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM BUT CONFIRMED COMMON PERCEPTIONS OF WORLD AFFAIRS. (A-1)

VERNON GUIDRY REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS MORE LIKELY TO UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE WITH THE U.S. THAN THE MORE ATTENTION-GETTING AREA OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER SAYS. SCHLESINGER APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY, AND QUESTIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PROMPTED HIM TO SUGGEST THAT A DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD BE MORE RELEVANT. (A-3)

RICHARD SCOTT MOWRER REPORTS FROM MADRID THAT UNDER GENERALISIMO FRANCO, SPAIN HAD ABSOLUTISM WITHOUT A MONARCH. UNDER KING JUAN CARLOS, THE NATION HAS A MONARCH BUT NO ABSOLUTISM. FOR ALTHOUGH HE SUCCEEDED FRANCO AS HEAD OF STATE, JUAN CARLOS DOES NOT HAVE THE CONCENTRATION OF POWERS HIS PREDECESSOR HAD.

(A-4)

HARRY WILLS WRITES Approved For Release 2004/09/08 : NLF-CODEWORD-46-4-2-5  
HAY HELP. SENATOR CHURCH SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE CHURCH OF



~~TOP SECRET~~

PARTISAN LIKE GEORGE BUSH TO HEAD THE CIA WILL UNDERMINE THE PROFESSIONAL SPIRIT OF THAT AGENCY. ODD, ISN'T IT? CHURCH HAS BEEN PRETENDING TO FIGHT THAT SPIRIT IN HIS INTELLIGENCE EARINGS, AND NOW HE WANTS TO RESTORE IT. THAT TENDS TO CONFIRM THE GENERAL OPINION IN WASHINGTON THAT, BETWEEN THE TWO INTELLIGENCE HEARINGS GOING ON, SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMITTEE HAS THE STAFF AND NOT THE WILL AND REPRESENTATIVE PIKE'S COMMITTEE HAS THE WILL BUT NOT THE STAFF. REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON TOLD WILLS WHEN THEY DISCUSSED THE CHURCH AND PIKE COMMITTEES: "THEY CANNOT BRING DOWN THE CIA. THOSE GUYS WILL HAVE TO BRING THEMSELVES DOWN." PERHAPS PRESIDENT FORD, WITHOUT KNOWING IT, HAS BEGUN THAT PROCESS WITH HIS NOMINATION OF BUSH. (A-23)

CROSBY NOYES WRITES THAT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT GERALD FORD'S FOREIGN POLICY, AT THE ONSET OF THE ELECTORAL SEASON, HAS MOVED TO THE RIGHT. DETENTE AND SECRETARY KISSINGER MAY WELL BECOME THE MOST PROMINENT CASUALTIES OF THE SHIFT. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE MOVING BACK INTO THE DEEP FREEZE. INSTEAD OF DWELLING ON THE PROSPECTS OF SALT II, MR. FORD AND HIS SECRETARY OF STATE NOW ARE BUSY DEFENDING THEMSELVES AGAINST CHARGES THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CHEAT ON THE PROVISIONS OF SALT II. HOW SUCCESSFUL THE PRESENT SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY MAY BE AS AN ELECTORAL TACTIC DEPENDS ON THE OPPOSITION THAT MR. FORD IS UP AGAINST. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NONPOLITICIANS IN THE ADMINISTRATION LIKE HENRY KISSINGER ARE DISTINCTLY UNPLEASANT. MR. FORD CAN ADJUST TO THE OPPOSITION IN WAYS THAT AN INTELLECTUAL LIKE MR. KISSINGER WOULD FIND DIFFICULT. IT IS ABOUT AN EVEN BET HERE IN WASHINGTON THAT WE WILL HAVE A NEW SECRETARY OF STATE BY CONVENTION TIME NEXT SUMMER. (9A-23)

1151  
#7132

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SENSITIVE

Immediate  
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 84 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

INFO: DICK CHENEY

RELEASED BY: RE

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 013

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PAGES 1

TTY \_\_\_\_\_

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DTG: 050246Z

TOR: 050305Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO 84



1975 DEC 5 02 38

SENSITIVE



76  
SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

December 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH 

We have had an inquiry from the League of Families as to any information reported to have developed on MIA situation through conversations the President and Henry may have had with Chinese officials on this subject.

I would appreciate any information or guidance you could give me on this matter.

cc: DChency



SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

NSA review completed

NGA Review completed.

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 FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 85//  
 TO GENERAL SCOWROFT  
 ZEM

TOR: 051113Z

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD WH52409

TOSCO 85

DECEMBER 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
 SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

CUBANS IN ANGOLA: A CUBAN OFFICER CAPTURED BY THE UNITA HAS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON HIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT OF THE MPLA. THE OFFICER SAID THE CUBANS HAD SET UP AND OPERATED TWO CAMPS IN BENGUELA -- NO LONGER IN THE HANDS OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT -- WHERE ANGOLANS WERE GIVEN A 20-DAY COURSE IN BASIC INFANTRY TRAINING. HE CLAIMED HE HAD NOT SEEN ANY SOVIETS IN ANGOLA.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

5/24/06  
 46-4-3-4  
 AUTHORITY: EAC NLF-CODEWORD-46-4-3-4  
 BY: NARA DATE: 5/3/10

(25X1)

CAMBODIA PREPARES AIRCRAFT FOR FLIGHT ACTIVITY: CAMBODIA IS IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING AIRCRAFT FOR FLIGHT ACTIVITY, ACCORDING TO COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. REPORTS DURING THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 28 TO DECEMBER 1 DISCLOSED THAT CHINESE TECHNICIANS WERE GOING TO THE ODDAR MEAN CHEY AIRFIELD TO "PICK UP" AN UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF AIRPLANES. CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS WERE INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE THE PLANES FOR FLIGHT. AS OF DECEMBER 1, THE CHINESE TECHNICIANS HAD NOT YET REACHED THE AIRFIELD BUT INSTEAD WERE NOTED ENROUTE TO THE BATTAMBANG AIRFIELD FROM SIEM REAP. FLIGHT OPERATIONS BY CAMBODIAN AIRCRAFT WERE ALSO REFERRED TO WHEN IT WAS REVEALED THAT A CAMBODIAN HELICOPTER WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GO TO SIEM REAP SINCE IT WAS ENGAGED IN OTHER ACTIVITIES. THIS IS THE SECOND REFERENCE TO THE RESUMPTION OF FLIGHT ACTIVITIES BY CAMBODIA SINCE THE APRIL 17 TAKEOVER.



(25X1)

END OF PAGE 01

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

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## Dangers to Detente

For conspiracy-minded officials in the Kremlin, this has been a trying week. They have found their carefully nurtured detente with the United States under intense attack from two seemingly disparate quarters—the Communist Chinese and conservative Americans. As a further complication, the rightwing politician, Ronald Reagan, has been going about chiding Chinese as well as Russians, even to the point of demanding that the former visit Washington for a change. Was this deliberately misleading, or was Mr. Reagan really adopting the formula that his enemy's enemy was his enemy, too?

Before Americanologists at the Kremlin get too mired in this puzzle, we would remind them that a U. S. presidential year is upon us. Surely they will remember John Kennedy's "missile gap" charge that General-President Eisenhower was undercutting U. S. defenses. If the so-called liberals could lodge such a complaint against a fairly middle-of-the-road Republican administration, then Russians should understand that there is nothing to prevent so-called conservatives from doing the same.

Rather than track election-year squiggles, Kremlin authorities would be better advised to look to the longterm implications of their own current policies. Henry Kissinger, with his personal investment in detente, may be forebearing when the Russians exploit civil war in Ango-

la, encourage Syrian intransigence in the Middle East, move naval forces into the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area, build up their ground forces and engage in strategic arms developments that mock the intent of the SALT I accord. But Mr. Kissinger is not likely to be Secretary of State beyond President Ford's present term. His successor may very well be a hard-liner by nature, or he may be prodded into such a stance if Moscow's provocations cause the American public to sour on detente.

It may be a matter of debate among Americans whether the Soviet Union has literally been in violation of the SALT I accords. Mr. Ford says no, Mr. Reagan says yes. But if the Russians probed deeply they would find there are increasing U. S. suspicions that they are violating the spirit of the treaty by pressing its ambiguities to the limit, and perhaps marginally beyond the limits. If this suspicion evolves into a massive opposition to detente because of aggressive Russian policies worldwide, Kremlin authorities will get little comfort in blaming American politics. The "missile gap" affair suggests the United States would respond by racing ahead in strategic arms and loosening the trade and technological ties the Soviet Union desperately needs to offset its economic failures. This would hardly be the legacy Soviet party chief Brezhnev has wanted to leave his country.



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

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WHC028  
OO WTE14  
DE WTE #7157 3391412  
O 051423Z DEC 75.  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 87//  
TO GEN SCOWCROFT  
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TOSCO-86

Top: 051427Z

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE WH52410

TOSCO 87

DECEMBER 5, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: BILL HYLAND  
REF: SCOTO 17

I RELAYED THE REQUEST TO DOBRYNIN TO DELAY THE ANNOUNCE-  
MENT UNTIL THE 12TH. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED A REPLY BUT EX-  
PECT ONE -- PROBABLY TODAY (LOCAL).

WARM REGARDS.  
0094  
#7157

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 (EXEMPTED) CEC 8.3  
100 (EXEMPTED) CEC 8.3 (EXEMPTED) G. 1.1  
by HR DATE 2/4/11



~~SECRET~~  
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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
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PART 1 OF 2

DECEMBER 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
SUBJECT: MORNING NEWS SUMMARY

THE WASHINGTON POST

GEORGE WILSON SAYS THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL TRY TO PUT A LID ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PAY INCREASES AND PUSH 85,000 PEOPLE OFF THE PENTAGON PAYROLL TO BRING THE NATION'S MILITARY BUDGET DOWN TO \$110 BILLION IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. HE ALSO HAS TENTATIVELY DECIDED TO PUT OFF BUYING A NEW AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND TO DELAY OR CANCEL A NUMBER OF WEAPONS PROGRAMS -- INCLUDING FIGHTER PLANES, THE MINUTEMAN III ICBM AND THE LANCE BATTLEFIELD MISSILE. MR. FORD MADE HIS CHOICES IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET IN MEETINGS THAT EXCLUDED DEFENSE OFFICIALS -- INCLUDING NEWLY APPOINTED SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD. (A-1)

SENATOR HUGH SCOTT ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT HE WON'T RUN FOR A FOURTH TERM IN THE 1976 ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, HE IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN THE SENATE AND KEEP HIS LEADERSHIP POST UNTIL HIS TERM EXPIRES. (A-1)

LAURENCE STERN REPORTS ON DETAILS OF A "MASSIVE" CAMPAIGN OF CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD TO BLOCK THE ELECTION AND THEN TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LATE SALVADOR ALLENDE IN CHILE REVEALED YESTERDAY BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. (A-1)

ACCORDING TO MURREY MARDER, SECRETARY KISSINGER PLAN TO GO TO MOSCOW LATER THIS MONTH IN A NEW ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ADD MOSCOW TO KISSINGER'S ITINERARY FOR A TRIP TO BRUSSELS, LONDON, AND PARIS THAT STARTS WEDNESDAY. IT WOULD TAKE VIRTUALLY A

END OF PAGE 01





LAST-MINUTE DECISION TO RULE OUT THE PROJECTED MOSCOW VISIT. MAJOR POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS SURROUND THE NUCLEAR STALEMATE. (A-1)

YUVAL ELIZUR SAYS THAT MONDAY'S ISRAELI AIR STRIKE IN LEBANON EVOKED ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED CRITICISM AMONG ISRAELI EDITORIAL WRITERS AND COMMENTATORS. GOVERNMENT JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE RAID, INCLUDING REPORTS THAT INTELLIGENCE SHOWED NEW GUERRILLA ATTACKS BEING PLANNED, HAVE FAILED TO PERSUADE ALL ISRAELIS. MOST OUTSPOKEN WAS THE INFLUENTIAL DAILY HAARETZ WHICH ACCUSED PRIME MINISTER RABIN OF NOT WEIGHING CAREFULLY ENOUGH THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIR STRIKE. EVEN YEDIOT AHARONOT, WHICH USUALLY SUPPORTS HARDLINE GOVERNMENT POLICIES, QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF THE ACTION, CLAIMING "MUCH IS STILL UNCLEAR ON THE MOTIVES THAT LED TO THE DECISION TO ATTACK." MEANWHILE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED LAST NIGHT TO GRANT THE PLO THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ONE OF ITS MEETINGS. THE GROUP WAS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COUNCIL UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS A UN MEMBER-STATE. THE VOTE WAS NINE TO THREE IN FAVOR WITH THREE ABSTENTIONS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VOTE THE PLO DELEGATE TOOK A SEAT AT THE COUNCIL TABLE UNDER THE NAMEPLATE OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE ISRAELI DELEGATION RECEIVED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO BOYCOTT ANY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS THE PLO ATTENDS AND WERE NOT IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBER. FOR THE PRESENT THE POLITICAL ISSUE WAS NOT THE RAID OR WHAT THE COUNCIL WOULD DO IN RESPONSE, BUT THE PRECEDENT-SETTING MOVE BY EGYPT TO BRING THE PLO INTO THE COUNCIL, MOVING ANOTHER STEP TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMIZATION OF THE PLO. (A-1)

ISRAELI'S AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, DINITZ, SAID YESTERDAY THAT UN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO "WILL ONLY INCREASE THEIR LUST FOR MURDER AND RADICALIZE THEIR STAND." SPEAKING AT THE NPC, DINITZ SAID THAT THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAS STARTED USING UN RESOLUTIONS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS ACTIVITIES. DINITZ JUSTIFIED ISRAEL'S RETALIATORY RAIDS ON GUERRILLA BASES IN LEBANON BY SAYING THAT IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS HIS COUNTRY HAD SUFFERED 25 ACTS OF TERROR AGAINST AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS, POPULATION CENTERS AND CITIES. THERE WERE 68 CASUALTIES, HE SAID, MOSTLY CIVILIAN. (A-15)

LOU CANNON REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT FORD DEPARTED FOR JAKARTA AFTER FOUR DAYS OF TALKS WITH CHINESE LEADERS THAT HE TERMED "FRIENDLY, CANDID, SUBSTANTIAL, AND CONSTRUCTIVE" BUT THAT PRODUCED NO NEW AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND. MR. FORD LEFT WITH ONE SMALL CONCESSION FROM THE CHINESE -- THE NAMES OF SEVEN MISSING NAVAL FLIERS WHO WERE SHOT DOWN OVER CHINA OR IN CHINESE WATERS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND WHO HAD BEEN LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION. THESE NAMES WILL BE RELEASED



IN WASHINGTON AS SOON AS NEXT-OF-KIN ARE NOTIFIED. ON THE BASIC ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE U.S. AND CHINA -- DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE PEKING GOVERNMENT INSTEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN -- NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR KISSINGER MADE ANY CLAIM OF SUCCESS. (A-18)

ACCORDING TO LOU CANNON, "ALL THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS LOOKED BACKWARD UNTIL NIXON," A CHINESE OFFICIAL SAID THE OTHER DAY. "PRESIDENT NIXON LOOKED FORWARD. PRESIDENT FORD IS JUST LOOKING." THIS FRANK APPRAISAL OF MR. FORD AS A RATHER TENTATIVE PRESIDENT WAS MADE TO A EUROPEAN, NOT TO AN AMERICAN. IT REFLECTS THE CHINESE UNDERSTANDING THAT MR. FORD MAY WELL BE EITHER AN INTERIM PRESIDENT OR THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE THE CHINESE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH IN THE TROUBLED YEARS AHEAD. (A-19)

JOSEPH KRAFT SAYS THAT HE HAS BEEN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHINESE ARGUMENT, PUT AGAIN APPARENTLY BY CHAIRMAN MAO, THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ABANDON DETENTE WITH RUSSIA BECAUSE, AS FIRST VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING PUT IT TO PRESIDENT FORD, "THE FACTORS FOR WAR ARE CLEARLY INCREASING" AND "EUROPE IS THE FOCUS OF THIS CONTENTION." MR. CHOU WEI-CHANG SAID: "THE CENTER OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS IS IN THE WEST. BUT WE HAVE TO DEFEND OURSELVES. WE HAD A TRIAL WITH THE RUSSIANS IN 1969 ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, AND THEY WERE DEFEATED. NOW IF THE RUSSIANS TRY TO COME IN AGAIN, THEY WILL HAVE MORE TROUBLE. THEY MAY BE ABLE TO INVAD, BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET OUT." THAT STATEMENT MUST EXPRESS THE INDOCTRINATION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF CHINESE WHO HAVE LABORED HARD, USING SCARCE MATERIALS TO BUILD THOUSANDS OF SHELTERS. SO WHAT THE CHINESE ARE NOW SAYING IS NOT PURE RHETORIC. PEKING CLEARLY DOES EXPECT TROUBLE FROM THE RUSSIANS. MERELY BECAUSE THE CHINESE HAVE AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE, TO BE SURE, DOES NOT QUEER THEIR ARGUMENTS. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP DOES NEED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, VERY SERIOUSLY IN FACT. BUT THE CHINESE ARGUMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE HIGHLY RHETORICAL AND IMPRECISE FORM IT IS USUALLY EXPRESSED, IS FAR FROM BEING THE ULTIMATE GOSPEL ON WORLD AFFAIRS. CERTAINLY, THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM TAKING STEPS TOWARD DETENTE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD SIMPLY BECAUSE IT RUBS CHINA THE WRONG WAY. (A-23)

ACCORDING TO GEORGE WILL, ANOTHER TIGER OF EXTREMISM IS LOOSE IN THE UN, THIS TIME WITH THE CONSENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT. IN A LAST MINUTE POLICY SWERVE, THE U.S. DASHED ISRAELI HOPES FOR A VETO -- HOPES THE ISRAELIS FELT WERE FIRMLY BASED ON U.S. ASSURANCES -- AND VOTED FOR A RESOLUTION THAT THE U.S. KNEW WOULD GUARANTEE PARTICIPATION BY THE PLO IN NEXT MONTH'S UN



DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE INVITATION TO THE PLO WAS ATTACHED TO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE UN OBSERVER FORCE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. ON THE EVE OF EXPIRATION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, ISRAEL AGREED TO RENEWAL. BUT SYRIA, AWARE OF THE BRITTLINESS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, OPPOSED RENEWAL UNLESS IT INCLUDED THE INVITATION TO THE PLO. THE U.S. VOTED THE WAY IT DID FOR THE REASON THAT EVERYTHING HAPPENS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: SECRETARY KISSINGER COMMANDED IT. AS LATE AS SATURDAY NIGHT, NOVEMBER 29, THE ISRAELIS WERE ASSURED THAT THE U.S. WOULD VETO THE RESOLUTION. SUNDAY MORNING KISSINGER CALLED THE UN AND ORDERED THE U.S. TO SIDE WITH SYRIA AND ITS CHIEF SPONSOR, THE SOVIET UNION, AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. POLICY OF PREEMPTIVE CONCESSION. KISSINGER REPORTEDLY WAS TOLD BY OTHER DIPLOMATS BEFORE SUNDAY THAT U.S. FIRMNESS COULD GET THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION DELETED FROM THE RESOLUTION. AND IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT IF SYRIA HAD NOT BACKED DOWN, AND THE MANDATE HAD NOT BEEN RENEWED, NOTHING MUCH WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT A FEAST OF REASON, BUT IT IS NOT CRAZY ENOUGH TO CONTEMPLATE A FAIR FIGHT, ALONE, AGAINST ISRAEL. THE U.S. VOTE WAS A GIANT STEP IN A DEPLORABLE DIRECTION: IT CONFERS LEGITIMACY ON A DICTATORIAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE PLO, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LONG-SUFFERING PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. PERHAPS THE PLO'S RUTHLESSNESS, AND THE SUPPORT OF ITS TOTALITARIAN ALLIES HAS MADE INEVITABLE THE ASCENDENCY OF THE PLO. BUT THE U.S. VOTE WAS NEEDLESS COMPLICITY IN THAT ASCENDENCY. (A-23)

PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, THE "RED PRINCE" AND TITULAR HEAD OF THE PROCOMMUNIST PATHET LAO FORCES, WAS NAMED PRESIDENT OF THE NEW LAOTIAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC YESTERDAY. THE LAOTIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ALSO NAMED KAYSONE PHOMVIHARN, A VETERAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIST IN THE PATHET LAO AS PRIME MINISTER. THE APPOINTMENTS FOLLOWED YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE 600-YEAR-OLD MONARCHY AND THE CREATION OF A REPUBLIC IN THE LANDLOCKED NATION OF THREE MILLION PEOPLE. (A-24)

ACCORDING TO JACK ANDERSON AND LES WHITTEN THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WAS UNABLE TO PIN DOWN ANY PROOF THAT PAST PRESIDENTS AUTHORIZED THE CIA TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS. TOP CIA OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE NOW BROKEN THEIR SILENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. THEY HAVE TOLD ANDERSON AND WHITTEN CATEGORICALLY THAT ALL THE ASSASSINATION PLOTS HAD WHITE HOUSE APPROVAL. TO AVOID EMBARRASSING A PRESIDENT, NO WRITTEN RECORD WAS KEPT. THIS PROVIDED THE PRESIDENTS WITH WHAT THE SENATE REPORT CALLS "PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY." BUT THE CIA OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN THEM THIS RUNDOWN:



- EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION -- THE LATE CIA CHIEF ALLEN DULLES PERSONALLY CONSULTED PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ABOUT THE PLOT TO POISON THE CONGO'S PATRICE LUMUMBA.
- KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION -- THE LATE ROBERT F. KENNEDY, ACCORDING TO ANDERSON AND WHITTEN'S SOURCES, TOOK A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE EFFORT TO ELIMINATE CUBA'S FIDEL CASTRO.
- JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION -- PRESIDENT JOHNSON, UPON BEING ADVISED OF THE CIA PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS, MADE IT CLEAR HE DIDN'T WANT TO KNOW ABOUT THEM. THERE WERE SOME ACTIVITIES, HE INDICATED, THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULDN'T BE TOLD ABOUT.
- NIXON ADMINISTRATION -- PRESIDENT NIXON WAS GIVEN AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS, A BRIEFING WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN RECORDED ON THE SECRET WHITE HOUSE TAPES.

ANDERSON AND WHITTEN'S SOURCES SAY NIXON WAS "GUNG HO" ABOUT COVERT ACTIVITIES, THAT HE PERSONALLY ORDERED CA CHEF RICHARD HELMS TO FOMENT A COUP AGAINST CHILE'S LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE. BUT NIXON GAVE NO ASSASSINATION ORDERS. CLEARLY, NOT ONLY THE CIA BUT THE WHITE HOUSE MUST BE RESTRICTED AGAINST USING MURDER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. (D-18)

#### THE NEW YORK TIMES

BERNARD GWERTZMAN WRITES THAT AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS HAVE REPORTED TO THE FORD ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION RECENTLY CONSTRUCTED A LARGE-SCALE RADAR STATION ON THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA, RAISING NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE 1972 TREATY LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS. (1)

KENNETH BRIGGS WRITES THAT AN AFRICAN ECUMENICAL ORGANIZATION IS EMERGING AS AN INFLUENCE NOT ONLY IN THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES BUT ALSO IN THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUGGLES OF THIS CONTINENT. (2)

A SPECIAL TO THE TIMES REPORTS THAT ARABS AND ISRAELIS CLASHED FOR THE FIRST TIME OVER AN ATTEMPT BY JEWISH SQUATTERS TO SETTLE AT BIBLICAL SEBASTIA IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK OF JORDAN. (2)

TERENCE SMITH REPORTS THAT AN UNUSUAL PUBLIC DEBATE HAS





ERUPTED IN ISRAEL OVER THE TIMING, WISDOM, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AGAINST LEBANON ON TUESDAY. (3)  
MARGARET THATCHER WON REELECTION AS LEADER OF BRITAIN'S CONSERVATIVE PARTY. (3)

JUAN DE ONIS REPORTS THAT A WAVE OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS IN ARGENTINA CAUSED PRESIDENT PERON TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SECURITY SITUATION. (7)

PETER KIHSS REPORTS THAT AN INITIAL BATCH OF 894 PAGES OF CIA FILES HAVE BEEN RELEASED ON THE 25-YEAR-OLD CASE THAT SENT JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG TO THEIR DEATHS FOR PLOTTING ATOMIC SPYING IN BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION. (9)

DAVID A. ANDELMAN WRITES THAT ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POPULOUS NATIONS, INDONESIA IS A STUDY IN CONTRASTS. A DECADE AFTER THE COUP THAT OVERTHREW THE COMMUNIST-LEANING SUKARNO REGIME AND INSTALLED THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SUHARTO, IT IS AT ONCE ONE OF THE WEALTHIEST NATIONS IN ASIA. BECAUSE OF ITS OIL RESOURCES, AND ONE OF THE POOREST. (19)

A TIMES EDITORIAL COMMENTS THAT NOW THAT IT IS BACK IN SESSION, CONGRESS NEEDS TO GIVE CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE WARNINGS ISSUED LAST WEEK BY FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CONCERNING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE POINT THAT NEEDS MOST THOROUGH AIRING IS MR. SCHLESINGER'S CHARGE THAT AMERICANS ARE GUILTY OF AN "OSTRICH SYNDROME," BURYING THEIR HEADS IN THE SAND AND SUBSTITUTING "RHETORIC FOR REALITY WITH REGARD TO FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A MILITARY BALANCE" WITH THE SOVIET UNION. A LOOK AT PORTUGAL, COMMUNIST PROSPECTS IN ITALY, INSTABILITY ELSEWHERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE TINDERBOX IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE HUGE SOVIET MILITARY AIRLIFT TO ANGOLA SUGGESTS THAT THE WORLD IS STILL FULL OF DANGERS. WHAT PROSPECTS REMAIN FOR DETENTE DEPEND AT LEAST IN PART ON MAINTAINING A MILITARY BALANCE. A THOROUGH CONGRESSIONAL EVALUATION IS NEEDED. (38)

JAMES RESTON COMMENTS THAT THE ONLY HAPPY THOUGHT AROUND HERE THESE DAYS IS THAT SO MANY THINGS ARE GOING WRONG THAT MAYBE SOMETHING WILL FINALLY BE DONE ABOUT THEM. BUT ONLY MAYBE. IT'S A WELL-KNOWN RULE IN WASHINGTON THAT NOTHING COMPELS REFORM LIKE SOME IMMINENT DISASTER, OR SPECTACULAR STUPIDITY, AND WE NOW HAVE SO MUCH OF BOTH ON THE NATIONAL AGENDA THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE SOME HOPE. EACH DAY'S HORROR STORIES ABOUT THE PAST CRIMES OF THE FBI AND THE CIA, FOR EXAMPLE, ADD TO THE PROSPECT THAT THE CONGRESS WILL FINALLY TAKE THESE SEC&ET AGENCIES BY THE THROAT. (39)

CHARLES BLUHDORN COMMENTS THAT WE SAY THAT WE ARE A WORLD



POWER TODAY BUT WE WERE A WORLD POWER IN DECEMBER 1941 AND NOBODY QUESTIONED IT. THERE WAS NO UN IN THOSE DAYS BECAUSE, AFTER ALL, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT WE WERE THE ORIGINATORS OF THAT WORLD BODY. HE IS HAPPY TO SAY THAT WE HAVE SINCE WATCHED THIS ORGANIZATION GROW TO A MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 100. HE IS SICK TO HIS STOMACH WHEN HE CONTEMPLATES HOW MANY MEMBERS OF THE UN HAVE NOW TAKEN TO A REGULAR DIET OF ABUSING THE ONE NATION THAT MADE THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THAT ORGANIZATION POSSIBLE. (39)

GORDON WADE RULE COMMENTS THAT THE MORAL CLIMATE IN OUR GREAT COUNTRY, AND OUR GREAT NAVY, IS SO ERODED TODAY THAT WE ARE HEADED FOR NATIONAL DISASTER. THERE IS ONE BASIC PHILOSOPHY AND ONE BASIC REASON THAT HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT THIS MORAL CLIMATE. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY WAS ACCURATELY DESCRIBED BY GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR WHEN HE SAID THAT WHAT WAS WRONG IN OUR COUNTRY WAS THAT PEOPLE WERE TRYING TO SEE HOW LITTLE WORK THEY COULD DO FOR HOW MUCH MONEY THEY COULD GET. THE BASIC REASON IS THE AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE TODAY FOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT. THE VERY SIZE OF TODAY'S DEFENSE BUDGET IS CORROSIVE AND CORRUPTIVE. (39)

TOM WICKER COMMENTS THAT THE LATEST GALLUP POLL SHOWS A SHARP DECLINE IN PUBLIC ESTEEM FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE CIA -- FROM 84 PERCENT "HIGHLY FAVORABLE" TO THE FBI IN 1965, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ONLY 37 PERCENT TODAY. AND ONLY 14 PERCENT OF A SAMPLE WERE ANY LONGER "HIGHLY FAVORABLE" TO THE CIA. THESE FIGURES CLEARLY REFLECT THE LONG, DISMAL SERIES OF DISCLOSURES THAT BOTH AGENCIES HAVE ABUSED THEIR POWERS AND HAD BEEN MISUSED BY THEIR POLITICAL MASTERS. (39)

#### THE BALTIMORE SUN

ACCORDING TO GILBERT LEWTHWAITE, THE VATICAN IS ENGAGED IN A BITTER PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO HEAD OFF A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE HOLY CITY OF ROME NEXT SPRING AND, LATER, THIS CATHOLIC NATION. POPE PAUL VI HAS ENDORSED THE CHURCH'S SUDDEN AND VEHEMENT ENTRY INTO THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE, IN WHAT IS BEING PRESENTED AS A DECISIVE BATTLE OF "GOD AGAINST MARX." (A-1)

HENRY TREWHITT REPORTS THAT IT NOW IS ALL BUT CERTAIN THAT HENRY KISSINGER WILL FLY TO MOSCOW LATER THIS MONTH WITH NEW PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, INFORMED OFFICIALS SAID YESTERDAY. SPECIALISTS WERE REPORTED BUSY YESTERDAY DRAFTING OPTIONAL OFFERS THAT MIGHT BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL, LEONID BREZHNEV, THE SOVIET LEADER, MAY YET VISIT WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT YEAR. (A-2)



RAY S. CLINE, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CIA SAID YESTER-  
DAY THAT RECENT INVESTIGATIONS AND DISCLOSURES HAVE "DE-  
STROYED MORALE" IN THE AGENCY AND "VERY NEARLY DESTROYED"  
ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS AN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING SYSTEM  
ABROAD. HE URGED CONGRESS TO ASSIGN A JOINT COMMITTEE OF  
BOTH HOUSES TO EXERCISE "RATIONAL" CONTROL OF THE AGENCY.  
HE SAID THE AGENCY HAD MADE "VERY SERIOUS MISTAKES," BUT  
ADDED THEY CHIEFLY WERE MADE IN FOLLOWING "THE ORDERS OF THE  
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PART 2 OF 2

PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.' REGARDING DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY LAW. (A-7)

ACCORDING TO A SUN EDITORIAL, FOR THE TIME SINCE JOHN F. KENNEDY SENT HIS "SPECIAL WAR" SCENARIO ON LOCATION TO LAOS A GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE IS PLAYING OUT A MAJOR ACT WITH NO ROLE FOR THE U.S. THE PATHET LAO HAS ENDED THE FORMER THE POWER IT SEIZED IN EFFECT LAST SUMMER. INSIDE THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, WHERE FOR A DECADE BOMBING, FOOD SUPPLY, AND OTHER LIFE-AND-DEATH QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DETERMINED DAILY FOR LAOTIANS, A SKELETON STAFF COULD ONLY HOPE THAT THE CULMINATION OF LAOS COMMUNIST REVOLUTION MIGHT NOT BRING A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WASHINGTON'S PROMPT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL NOT BREAK RELATIONS WITH THE NEW LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH A SERIES OF SMALL BUT UNMISTAKABLE GOODWILL GESTURES EXCHANGED WITH HANOI IN RECENT WEEKS. BOTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS SEEM READY TO STRESS CAUTIOUS STEPS TOWARD FORMAL CONTACT, THOUGH REAL PROGRESS MAY REMAIN IN ABEYANCE UNTIL AFTER HANOI UNIFIES VIETNAM'S GOVERNMENT, AND PERHAPS UNTIL AFTER NEXT FALL'S U.S. ELECTION. EVENTUAL NORMAL RELATIONS WOULD GIVE NORTH VIETNAM A COUNTERBALANCE TO HER GIANT COMMUNIST PATRONS AND AMERICA A PRESENCE IN AN AREA NOW DIPLOMATICALLY DOMINATED BY WASHINGTON'S ADVERSARIES. IF BOTH COUNTRIES TRULY WANT NORMAL DIPLOMACY, AN OBVIOUS STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL IS TO KEEP OPEN THE LEAN, 30-MEMBER AMERICAN EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE. (A-16)

FULL TEXT OF THE SUN EDITORIAL ENTITLED "DANGERS TO DETENTE" HAS BEEN FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

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FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

The following was just received from Colby.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS



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SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re: Angola and President Mobutu  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000006  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (4)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG



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MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION  
December 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift   
SUBJECT: Next NATO Summit



During the May 1975 NATO Summit in Brussels, Prime Minister Trudeau proposed that the NATO Heads of Government agree to meet more frequently. The President strongly endorsed that proposal. We are now at the point where a decision must be taken on whether or not to schedule a NATO summit for 1976.

State, via our Mission in Brussels, is currently entering into negotiations with Secretary General Luns and the Norwegians with a U.S. proposal to change the dates of the NATO Spring Ministerial Meeting currently set for May 19-20, 1976 in Oslo. State is pointing out that these dates conflict with the timing of the May 17-20 Giscard visit to the United States, noting that the Secretary of State will be participating in that visit, and, accordingly, requesting that the Spring Ministerial be rescheduled for May 20-21. The date for the Spring Ministerial will be confirmed by Alliance Foreign Ministers during their meeting next week, December 11-12, in Brussels.

I am advised by State's European Bureau that there presently are no papers either written or planned recommending a summit. Considering the clear stand the President took in favor of Trudeau's proposal, I do not believe this is an issue which should be neglected. If the decision is taken to hold NATO's Spring meeting at the ministerial level, a year will have elapsed when it takes place, and the 1975 words of the President and Prime Minister Trudeau will be empty.

If the President is looking forward to a NATO Summit in 1976, I believe it would be most appropriate to have the Heads of Government meeting replace the Ministerial meeting scheduled for Oslo in May. While the late May/early June period would seem relatively good in terms of the President's crowded 1976 calendar, State's new proposed dates of May 20-21 would not seem satisfactory again because of the timing of the Giscard visit.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (EXEMPTED) GDS  
NEO Memo, GDS, 2/4/11  
NR 2/4/11

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
EXEMPTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTHORITY DOWNGRADED Dec. 31, 1981.

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If you agree, I recommend that you discuss this with Secretary Kissinger and that you then sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A seeking his approval in principle. Action on this will be required before Secretary Kissinger departs for Brussels next week.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you review the question of a 1976 NA'TO summit with the Secretary of State.
2. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LAB A



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Brent Scowcroft

SUBJECT: 1976 NATO Summit



During the May 1975 NATO Summit in Brussels, Prime Minister Trudeau proposed that the NATO Heads of Government agree to meet more frequently, and you endorsed his proposal. At present, there is no planning underway for a 1976 summit. However, the December 11-12, 1975 NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels presents the United States with the appropriate occasion to propose a Heads of Government meeting during the coming year.

This memorandum is forwarded to obtain your guidance on the desirability of scheduling a 1976 NATO Summit. I have discussed this with Secretary Kissinger, and we agree that the pros and cons relating to such a meeting are as follows:

Pros

- a 1976 NATO Summit would advance U.S. foreign policy interests, publicly demonstrating the continuing strength and cohesion of the Alliance, as well as the importance attached to regular consultations by the member Heads of Government.
- a summit would permit a frank review of the major tasks before the Alliance, including a review of the progress in implementing the six primary tasks you identified in your 1975 NATO address.
- by the Spring of 1976, it would be timely to have a NATO Heads of Government review of developments relating to SALT, MBFR and CSCE implementation.
- the majority of NATO Heads of Government and the NATO Secretary General would quickly support a U.S. proposal for a summit. (In keeping with their longstanding policy toward NATO, the French initially would oppose. The Greeks and the Turks might reserve their positions pending some forward movement on Cyprus.)

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GDS

EO 13526 (unclassified) GEORGE  
H. W. BUSH, 41 CFR 101-11.6  
24/11

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-7-

- a 1976 summit would implement the Trudeau proposal which you endorsed in 1975.

Cons

- The principal drawback to a 1976 summit would appear to be your very crowded Bicentennial/election year calendar.
- If a summit is to be scheduled it would be logical for the Heads of Government meeting to replace the NATO Spring Ministerial meeting now scheduled for Oslo, May 18-19, 1976. These NATO Spring Ministerial dates overlap with President Giscard d'Estaing's May 17-20 visit to the United States.

If there are not other scheduling complications, the United States should be able to negotiate a change in the NATO dates to avoid a conflict with the Giscard dates. In my opinion, because of the foreign policy advantages involved, we should explore the possibility of a 1976 summit with our NATO allies. With your approval, I will so advise the Secretary of State.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

December 5, 1975

TOSCO

94

TO: General Scowcroft

FROM:

Lora Simkus

*Remfor*

1. Thought you might wish to have a preview of your schedule thus far for next week:

Monday, December 8

8:00 White House Staff

[ a.m.

Possible meeting with Don Kendall; it would appear that lunch is now out because of the following Presidential meeting, unless you wish to dine early; however, Kendall's appointment with D is at 12:00.]

2:00 -  
3:30

President/EPB Meeting (Believed domestic - Normats checking)

6:00

Ambassador Harry Barnes



Tuesday, December 9

8:00 White House Staff

10:00 -  
11:30

President/GOP Leadership  
(President's Trip Report and Republican Politics)

1:00

Barber

4:00

Possible VP on SALT

5:00

Staff Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958 (2) (S) GPO 63  
1200 Hours, 02/04/11, 02/04/11, 02/04/11  
DR 10/11, 02/04/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY - 2 -

Wednesday, December 10

8:00 President/Senior Staff Meeting

9:30- President/HAK  
10:30

11:00- Cabinet Meeting (Subject undecided)  
12:30

7:00 Cocktails - Chinese Room

8:00 Dinner Meeting of the Business Council - Chinese Room  
(Mayflower Hotel - Informal)

Thursday, December 11

8:00 White House Staff

9:15- President/Secretary Rumsfeld  
10:30

2:15- Meeting in Secretary Dunlop's Office on ILO  
3:15 (w/Asst. Secy Hufum of State and Under  
Secy Baker of Commerce)

Friday, December 12

8:00 President/Senior Staff Meeting

11:30 President/Hugh Sidey  
[to discuss President's quest for peace, what  
he wants from the Soviets, what it is like to  
deal with the Soviets]

5:00 Staff Meeting

6:30 Reception

7:30 Annual Wright Memorial Dinner (guests of Dick Cook)  
(Washington Hilton Hotel - Black Tie)



CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

Saturday, December 13

10:00- President/OMB Appeals (Defense Budget)  
12:00

p. m. Tom Brokaw of NBC  
or  
Ann Compton of ABC

2. The only additional request for appointment/invitation received for next week:  
so far: The Ambassador of Thailand invites you to a small luncheon party at 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 11, at his residence (3125 Cathedral Avenue, NW). Other invitees include people from State and the NSC.

Accept \_\_\_\_\_ Regret \_\_\_\_\_

N.B. Secretary Dunlop (as you will have noted above) has invited you to a 2:15 p.m. meeting in his office to discuss ILO on that same day. Subject to your approval, I committed you to this meeting.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Ask if Horan can represent \_\_\_\_\_

Warm regards.



CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

give the impression of a growing deficit. More importantly, we will have a decline in real terms, and perhaps even in nominal terms, in 1975.

3. The insert in the second section strengthens the statement.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOSCO-96

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEACTION

December 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THROUGH: WILLIAM G. HYLAND  
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *PO*  
SUBJECT: Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan -- Proposed Meeting with the President, December 9 or 10

Attached is a schedule proposal which you could use in seeking the President's approval of a meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan in Washington on December 9 or 10. State NEA is on board for a meeting on one of those dates (Ambassador Pickering has reported that King Hussein is agreeable) and plans for a meeting with the Vice President will be dropped.

We have checked informally with the scheduling office here and have been told that a meeting on December 9 is doable, or alternatively, December 10 if necessary.

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's agreement to a meeting with the Crown Prince on December 9 or 10 via the attached schedule proposal and that you report your decision back to us as soon as possible.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL  
DATE:  
FROM: Brent Scowcroft  
VIA: William Nicholson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEETING: With Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan

DATE: December 9 or 10

PURPOSE: To reaffirm our continuing interest in strong bilateral relations with Jordan, and cooperating with Jordan in the Middle East negotiations.

FORMAT: -Oval Office call  
-20 minutes

CABINET PARTICIPATION: Secretary Kissinger

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points will be provided through the NSC staff.

PRESS COVERAGE: Meeting will be announced as part of your schedule; White House photo session at beginning of meeting.

STAFF: Brent Scowcroft

RECOMMEND: Brent Scowcroft

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: You met with the Crown Prince in May 1974 during his last visit to the US.

BACKGROUND: King Hussein has delegated full responsibility for Jordan's economic development to Crown Prince Hassan. Hassan comes to Washington periodically to discuss Jordan's needs with State, AID and members of the Congress, as well as to promote interest among US business firms in investment possibilities in his country, and he is extremely serious in his efforts. Hassan is also one of the inner council of Hussein's



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advisors on political affairs. He is thus an important asset to our own interests in a viable Jordan, particularly with respect to the future of the West Bank and the eventual resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The Crown Prince will want to review Jordan's economic plans as well as the prevailing Middle East situation, in advance of King Hussein's planned visit to the US in March.

At this sensitive period in the Middle East negotiations, a meeting with Hassan would provide you a timely opportunity to emphasize to the Jordanians the importance we attach to their cooperation in the peace-making process and our determination not to permit the momentum of the negotiations to falter.

\_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVE

\_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVE



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TOSCO-97  
OK

5 December 1975

(W)



TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

VIA: WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS

FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

REF: SECDEF MESSAGES 3 AND 4 DEC (TOSCO 66 and TOSCO 79)

1. As mentioned in my previous messages, I believe that beyond the obvious importance of the substance, the deliberative process and perceptions of that process are of considerable importance by themselves. That is why it is exceedingly important to have a VP meeting and NSC meeting in Washington with all the principals in attendance. Unless there is some aspect of it of which I am unaware, I cannot see why the selection of a particular day for a visit to Moscow should be allowed to affect adversely either the process or perceptions of it. Accordingly, one obvious alternative would be to check with the Soviets to see if a delay of two or three days in HAK's meeting could be arranged. The only other alternative would be for me to delay my departure for NATO. Since you will arrive in Washington early on 8 December and the DPC begins on the ninth, I could delay my departure until early evening of the eighth to permit a VP meeting beforehand. However, I plan to leave for Brussels in the A.M. of 7 December for bilateral meetings on the eighth. Further, HAK would still have to return for the NSC if we are to avoid the problems mentioned in referenced messages.

2. Please let me have your thoughts.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958 (Declassify) SEC 2.3  
PROHIBIT, CONTROL, State Dept. Classification  
HR JWA, GMS 2/4/11

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~~SECRET~~ / FLASH

gm

T09co-98

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH, PHIL BUCHEN, LARRY EAGLEBURGER, WILLIAM HYLAND

SUBJECT: State Department Subpoena



The following are our thoughts concerning the contempt resolution against Secretary Kissinger and the chances of compromise.

First, all of the information available to the various Congressional liaison staffs indicates that if the contempt citation is put to a floor vote next week the vote will be heavily against Pike. Estimates range from two to one or three to one. At the same time there is, of course, no guarantee of the level of votes that might be cast against the Secretary of State. Les Aspin, for example, estimates about 75 to 100 votes against, but the White House staff believes that it could run higher, especially if there is a rather emotional and acrimonious debate about Kissinger.

Pressure has been put on Pike from many sources including the Speaker and key Congressional leaders to dissuade him, but our information is that he is determined to force a vote and go down fighting. Indeed, he may relish this role as a martyr and use it as a pretext to close down his Committee. ~~On the other hand, it is possible that he is playing chicken and on Monday or Tuesday, will back off.~~

Third, the rumor is spreading that a compromise is in the air, and accordingly, if we do not now go forward with something, however minimal, we may be accused of provoking a conflict and alienate some

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E.O. 12958 (Declassified) GROUP 3  
NCS Memo, 01/10/00, State Dept. Collection  
by HR Date 2/4/11

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-2-

Congressional elements and increase at least somewhat the size of the vote against us.

Thus, all of us (Jack Marsh, Phil Buchen, Larry Eagleburger, Nino Scalia and Bill Hyland) believe that an offer should be made.

However, any offer raises two problems: (1) should we tie the offer to the Executive privilege issue (and thereby appear to be compromising with the principle) or make the offer in the context of the "40 Committee" Subpoena. We recommend the latter as a unilateral gesture of cooperation. We also recommend reaffirming the President's assertion of Executive privilege although this would alienate some members. (2) should we agree to provide information or State recommendations which were disapproved by the 40 Committee. We have consistently declined to provide disapprovals because to do so erodes the confidentiality of the President's decision process. On the other hand, not to include them may make it harder to get a compromise.



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3

A new development is that Pike intends to file his report on Monday morning, thereby circumventing any Committee meeting in which he could be voted down. Even if this is so, we still have the problem of whether to offer a compromise, if only to strengthen the hands of our supporters in the House debate.

The unanimous recommendation here is (a) that a letter be sent to Pike signed by Phil Buchen answering the Pike letter of November 21; (b) that the letter address itself only to the issue of extending the examination of 40 Committee material to the period of 1961 to 1965; that this be offered under the same "guidelines" as followed thus far -- which as you know would mean looking at highly sanitized descriptions and decision lines; (c) that we not specifically offer State Department recommendations nor mention in any way examination of disapprovals.

We believe that this will be seen as a constructive move that does not impair the principle of executive privilege but will demonstrate a willingness to work out a reasonable compromise. On balance, we believe this will not be read as a last-minute capitulation, which has been our main concern here. The text for you, the Secretary, and the President to consider follows.

BEGIN TEXT:



~~SECRET~~

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

The President has asked me to reply on his behalf to your thoughtful letter of November 21. He has further asked me to tell you that he appreciates the fact that you and your Committee permitted representatives of the Executive Branch to appear for testimony on November 20, and shares your hope that the remaining "underlying issues" may be removed.

We are pleased that, by working together in a spirit of compromise, we have already moved a long way toward resolving the issues that have arisen since November 6. It is our hope that by continuing to work together in that same spirit, we can find a way to accommodate the few issues still outstanding.

As you know, in order to provide your Committee with the substance of the information it sought to obtain by the November 6 subpoenas, the Executive Branch identified the originating agency with respect to all covert actions conducted from 1965 to the present. The President authorized this step because of his desire to meet the legitimate needs of the Committee for information on covert operations, although such detail was not required under any of the three subpoenas.

As a further demonstration of our desire for accommodation, the President has authorized me to inform you and your Committee that,



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since the 40 Committee subpoena covered only the period 1965 to the present, we will supplement the information already given to your Committee by providing similar information for the years 1961 through 1964 under the guidelines we have followed thus far. This additional step should, we believe, make it possible for the Committee to obtain the information that your letter indicated was necessary without affecting the President's claim of Executive privilege.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that this further example of the President's desire to help the Committee carry out its important responsibilities will receive a favorable response by the Committee.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

We feel that if we are to make this move we <sup>should so</sup> need to do ~~it~~  
tomorrow morning (saturday) Washington time, in order to permit our  
supporters on the Pike Committee to mount a counteroffensive and  
to have it on the public record for the weekend press and for the opening  
of Congressional business on Monday.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

~~SECRET~~

TO SCO 99

December 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

BUD McFARLANE

Secretary Rumsfeld has asked that a copy of the following messages be passed to Dick Cheney: TO SCO 66, 79, 97 and SCO TO 11 and 20.



~~SECRET~~

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EO 12958 (EXEMPT) GPO 23  
1980 Memo, OMB, 10/10/80, Class. & Ext. Guidelines  
by HR (JPA) Date 2/4/11

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM/TOSCO  
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

ZEM

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONTAINS CODEWORD WH52420

TOSCO 100

DECEMBER 5, 1975

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

FIRST CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS: FIDEL CASTRO ANNOUNCED DECEMBER 4 THAT THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S FIRST CONGRESS WOULD BE HELD FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 22. CASTRO SPOKE AT A MEETING TO FORM THE CONGRESS' COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES, A BODY OF MIDDLE AND LOW LEVEL PARTY FUNCTIONAIRES FROM ALL SIX PROVINCES. THE COUNCIL APPARENTLY HAS THE JOB OF HANDLING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS AND ENSURING THAT ALL CONGRESS DELEGATES KNOW WHICH WAY TO VOTE ON THE MANY MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED. CIA EXPECTS THE CONGRESS TO DO LITTLE MORE THAN PUT THE OFFICIAL STAMP OF APPROVAL ON DECISIONS MADE MANY MONTHS AGO. CASTRO MAY USE THE OCCASION TO ANNOUNCE CUBA'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA; HE ENDED HIS SPEECH THURSDAY NIGHT WITH THE SLOGAN: "TO THE FIRST PARTY CONGRESS WITH NEW VICTORIES OF THE FATHERLAND AND SOCIALISM."

NEW SOVIET SAM: A STRATEGIC SOVIET SAM SYSTEM IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AT SARY SHAGAN MISSILE TEST CENTER. THE SAM HAS BEEN LINKED TO A NEW MISSILE FOR AIR DEFENSE FORCES THAT USES A SOLID MOTOR. THE ASSEMBLED MISSILE, WHOSE DESIGNATOR IS NOT YET KNOWN, IS BEING DEVELOPED AT THE SVERDLOVSK GUIDED MISSILE PRODUCTION PLANT WHICH ALSO ASSEMBLES THE SA-4. EVIDENCE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE KIROV PLANT IS BUILDING THE SYSTEM'S LAUNCHER. THE ROCKET MOTOR BOOSTER DESIGNATOR SUGGESTS THAT IT WILL BE THE FIRST HYBRID ROCKET MOTOR -- ONE THAT USES A SOLID PROPELLANT FUEL AND A LIQUID OXIDIZER.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY RAC NIS-60 DECLASS-46-4-4-3

BY NIS State/Intelligence NARA DATE 5/3/10

NSA review completed

Presidential Library Review

END OF PAGE 01





**TOP SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

THE WASHINGTON STAR  
MARY MCGRORY WRITES THAT TWO WEEKS TO THE DAY AFTER THE  
ASSASSINATION REPORT WAS PUBLISHED, CIA DIRECTOR COLBY  
WAS SEATED IN THE PACEM IN TERRIS CONVOCATION. THE GREAT CHAMPION  
OF COVERT ACTIVITIES WAS REAPING THE REWARDS OF OPENNESS.  
HIS AGENCY'S PLIGHT HAS MADE HIM A CELEBRITY. HE WAS  
STORMILY APPLAUDED DURING THE SESSION AND AFTERWARDS BE-  
SIEGED BY AUTOGRAPH SEEKERS. IN AMERICA, TO BE A CELEBRITY  
IS TO BE FORGIVEN EVERYTHING. (A-3)

NORMAN KEMPSTER REPORTS THAT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN SANTIAGO  
AT THE TIME SALVADORE ALLENDE BECAME PRESIDENT SAYS THE  
U.S. TREASURY WAS READY TO BAIL OUT THE FALTERING CHILEAN  
ECONOMY AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE CIA WAS TRYING TO STRANGLE  
IT. (A-3)

A STAR EDITORIAL SAYS THAT PORTUGAL'S PROGRESS TOWARD  
DEMOCRACY MAY NOT SURVIVE MANY MORE DETOURS. BUT THE DIVER-  
SION OF RECENT WEEKS HAD THE MERIT OF SETTLING SEVERAL AC-  
COUNTS WITH ANTIDEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS AND STRENGTHENING THE  
MORE MODERATE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE CULMINATION LAST  
WEEK WAS A BOUNDED COMMUNIST-BACKED COUP ATTEMPT. IN RETRO-

END OF PAGE 02

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

SPECT, THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY CAN THANK THE IMPATIENCE AND OVER-CONFIDENCE OF THE FAR LEFT FOR CLEARING THE AIR. A MODERATE MAJORITY OF THE SUPREME MILITARY AUTHORITY HAS SHOWN IT WILL HONOR THE DESIRE OF MOST PORTUGUESE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN HOLD. THE TASKS OF ADOPTING A CONSTITUTION AND ELECTING A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY. (A-14)

HENRY BRADSHER REPORTS FROM JAKARTA THAT UNDER WARM, RAINY SKIES, PRESIDENT FORD ARRIVED TODAY IN THE CAPITAL OF THIS FIFTH-MOST POPULOUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS FOR A 19-HOUR VISIT, INCLUDING A TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO. HE WAS GREETED WITH FULL CEREMONY BY SUHARTO, FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK, AND OTHER OFFICIALS. (A-17)

HENRY BRADSHER REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA SHOWED A WIDE RANGE OF SIMILAR INTERESTS RANGING ACROSS THE WORLD FROM ANGOLA THROUGH EUROPE TO JAPAN, BUT RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PEKING ARE LOGGED DOWN ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. (A-17)

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CONTAINS CODEWORD

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AUTHORITY ADCMR CODEWORD-46-4-5-2 9/2/8  
BY h NARA, DATE 5/3/10

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 FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 101//  
 TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONTAINS CODEWORD WH52421~~

TOSCO 101

DECEMBER 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

NSA, DIA reviews completed

1 FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
 SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

PRC SEEKS PANAMANIAN COMMERCIAL OUTLET: KEY CHINESE OFFICIALS ARE REPORTEDLY URGING PEKING TO ESTABLISH A COMMERCIAL FIRM IN PANAMA'S FREE ZONE, AND THE PANAMANIAN WILL PROBABLY ALLOW OPERATIONS TO BEGIN EARLY NEXT YEAR. TOP PANAMANIAN OFFICIALS ARE SAID TO HAVE ASSURED A CHINESE TRADE DELEGATION IN OCTOBER THAT THEY WOULD TRY TO AID CHINA IN ESTABLISHING A FIRM IN THE GOVERNMENT-OPERATED COLON FREE ZONE. ACCORDING TO DIA, PANAMA HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND MAY NOT BE WILLING TO RISK THEM AT THIS STAGE IN CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE OBVIOUS POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ALLOWING SOME CHINESE COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION MAKE GRANTING SUCH A REQUEST LIKELY. PANAMANIAN OFFICIALS, CURRENTLY CONCERNED WITH A LAGGING ECONOMY AND DECLINING GOVERNMENT INCOME, WOULD ALSO TEND TO FAVOR ADDITIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT. FOR THEIR PART, CHINESE TRADE REPRESENTATIVES REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THE VENTURE WOULD BECOME PROFITABLE QUICKLY AND WOULD ALSO ALLOW FOR THE EVENTUAL EXPANSION OF CHINA'S

Presidential Library



END OF PAGE 01

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

CONTAINS CODEWORD

EYES ONLY

3) INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. IF PEKING APPROVES THE PROJECT, WHICH APPEARS LIKELY, AN ADVANCE TEAM SHOULD ARRIVE IN PANAMA TO BEGIN THE PROCESS WITHIN A FEW MONTHS.

, 7189

NNNN

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SENSITIVE

CONTAINS CODEWORD

