

The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “November-December 1975 – People’s Republic of China - TOSCO (3)” of National Security Adviser's Trip Cables of Brent Scowcroft at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC_ILCC-5-2-4-3

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70900-64?

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH *Jack Marsh*



Rabbi Korff called here this afternoon on a transportation request. He had earlier tried DOD, but was advised White House approval was necessary.

His request was to bring Dr. Sakharov from Moscow to Washington, D. C., via military aircraft, in order that Sakharov might receive an award at the First Bicentennial Awards Dinner of the U. S. Citizens Congress. This event is scheduled for December 14 at the Shoreham-Americana in Washington, D. C. Other recipients this year include Secretary Bill Simon, Senator Carl Curtis and Admiral Arleigh Burke. Korff has spoken directly with Sakharov concerning prospective award. Sakharov verbally responded that he would "accept the award with pleasure", and hoped to attend. Korff purchased Pan Am ticket for Sakharov from Moscow to Washington.

Here is where the factual situation gets fuzzy. Korff advises that Russians will not permit Sakharov to leave Soviet Union. He suggests U. S. military flight is only acceptable alternative. Korff has no solid evidence that Soviet Union would permit Sakharov to leave even if a U. S. military flight was arranged. A Deputy of Korff's has discussed this matter with Dobrynin. Results of that conversation are confusing and unreliable.

After failing to reach Bill Clements, Korff presented the transportation request to Col. Ken Bailey at DOD. Korff indicates that Bailey advised him that they "would need White House approval before moving forward". Consequently my office has been contacted. Korff is staying in Washington, D. C., and has indicated he'll continue to maintain contact with my office until final decision is made.

Russ Rourke talked with Korff and gave him no encouragement and simply received his views and noted his request without encouragement of any sort.

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EO 12958 (Declassify) GROUP 3

2/11/11

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-2-

However, because of the personality involved, it was felt best to handle this rather carefully.

Of course, we have not encouraged him and are trying to turn off the request.

cc: PBuchen
DChency

P.S.

Another report follows on a more recent development.



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WHA069
OO WTE12
DE WTE 7066 3372327
O 032342Z DEC 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 065//
TO PETER RODMAN FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH52393

TOSCO 065

DECEMBER 3, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCOFT
FROM: BILL HYLAND
SUBJECT: ODDS AND ENDS

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958-2/2001
HR 21111

1. YOU ARE CARRYING A GRANGER ACTION (NO. 6982 DATED NOVEMBER 12, 1975) PROPOSING A D TO AUTHORIZE THE TRANSFER OF \$1,000,000 FROM AID TO STATE FOR USE IN PROVIDING RELIEF TO CHILEAN REFUGEES. SINCE IT WAS SUBMITTED, THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED THE STATE AUTHORIZATION BILL WHICH INCLUDES A PROHIBITION OF SUCH TRANSFERS. THUS, IF YOU WANT TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PD, IT WILL HAVE TO BE BACKDATED BEFORE LAST SATURDAY.

2. WHEN (IF) THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF WE CAN GO AHEAD TO NOTIFY THE HILL ON THE \$2 BILLION FMS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA (PEACE HAWK). YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU HAD EARLIER HELD UP ON THIS TO AVOID CREATING A STIR DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE AMENDMENT. FURTHER INFO IS CONTAINED IN AN OAKLEY/GRANGER MEMO SENT TO YOU IN TOSCO 43.

3. JON HOWE HAS MADE A LOW-KEY INQUIRY FOR A REPORTING CABLE FOR THE V.P. ON HOW THINGS ARE GOING.

4. DENIS NOTED A STATE ACTION MEMO SENT TO THE SECRETARY (TOSEC 100) ONCE MORE URGING THAT HE RAISE WITH THE PRESIDENT THE IDEA OF PRESENTING THE MEDAL OF FREEDOM TO DE STARCKE. AS YOU KNOW, WE RECOMMEND AGAINST IT AND I BELIEVE YOU ARE CARRYING THE NSC ACTION IN THIS REGARD (CLIFT/NO. 7606).

5. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS MUST GO UP ON FRIDAY. HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT THE NSC REDO (TOSCO 32).

6. DON KENDALL CALLED TO SAY HE HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AT NOON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, FOR DISCUSSION PRIOR TO KENDALL'S DEPARTURE FOR THE SOVIET UNION ON DECEMBER 9. KENDALL WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE YOU, AND SUGGESTED LUNCH ON



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 8, TO INFORM YOU OF SOME PROGRESS WHICH HAS OCCURRED.
IF LUNCH IS NOT POSSIBLE, HE WOULD LIKE AN A.M. APPOINTMENT PRIOR
TO HIS MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN. REQUEST GUIDANCE (SINCE YOU WILL
HAVE JUST RETURNED THAT MORNING.)

WARM REGARDS.

0398
7066

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FROM: The Situation Room
TO: Dirk Cheney

INFO: General Scowcroft

DEX _____

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PAGES 4

CITE _____

DTG: 040133Z

RELEASED BY:
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TOR: 040140Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1975 DEC 4 01 25



MESSAGE

FROM: Secretary Rumsfeld


TO: Mr. Cheney

The following is the letter I plan to send to Senator Stennis regarding the nominee for the position of the second Deputy Secretary of Defense. The letter has been coordinated with Bill Clements, Mel Laird, Bob Ellsworth, Doug Bennett, Bill Hyland, and the Acting OSD General Counsel. Also, the appropriate Congressional bases have been touched including Pike and Church. Before the letter is sent to Senator Stennis, Bill Clements will clear it with Bill Colby and General George Brown. I also plan to inform DIA, NSA, and the Service Intelligence Chiefs, and Assistant Secretary Al Hall of the contents of the letter prior to sending it to Senator Stennis.

I would appreciate your passing this through Brent Scowcroft, the President and Ambassador Bush and advising me as soon as possible. I hope an announcement can be made either Friday or Monday.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The President, as you know, is determined to assure that the United States Government has an intelligence capability that is effective and efficient, and which he is confident is functioning



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within the appropriate legal constraints. I share his belief that this is an important responsibility.

To provide the proper leadership within the Department of Defense, which, of course, carries a substantial portion of the operational intelligence responsibility, I have come to the conclusion that, during the period ahead, the Department of Defense would be best served by having the responsible civilian appointee be above the level of Assistant Secretary. Under present law, the office which is available to be utilized, in a timely manner, is the position of the second Deputy Secretary of Defense under the terms of 10 US Code 134. Accordingly, the President proposes shortly to submit to the Senate a nominee for the second position of Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The assignments of the second Deputy, upon confirmation, would include, but not be limited to, reviewing and making appropriate recommendations concerning:

- The utility of the Department's intelligence product to potential users, including focus, quality and timeliness.
- The efficiency of the Department's intelligence activities in terms of the value returned for dollars expended, and with attention to any unnecessary duplication and possible improvements in management arrangements.



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- The adequacy of existing management controls with respect to the Department's intelligence activities, including responsiveness to senior management and compliance with the law and Executive Branch regulations and policy guidance.

In fulfilling these responsibilities the Deputy would assume, on my behalf, a close working relationship with the DIA, the NSA, and the Service intelligence activities. In addition, he would represent the Department, as appropriate, on various intergovernmental groups and committees concerned with this subject matter.

After reviewing the legislative history of 10 US Code 134, and the recommendations of various panels and studies which have been made on this subject, and being sensitive to Congressional concern and desire to assure that national intelligence activities are effective, economical, and managed within existing legal constraints, I have decided to recommend this management approach. It will enable the Department, during this particularly important period, to provide the high level leadership which I believe is needed.



In accordance with the provision of 10 US Code 134, the President will establish precedence within the Department of Defense between the two Deputy Secretaries. He will, upon submission of the nomination to the Senate of the second Deputy, designate Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., as the principal Deputy Secretary of Defense, retaining the full statutory authority of that post. In view

of this, there will be absolutely no confusion as to authority and responsibility within the Department.

I am hopeful that the Senate will act favorably on the nomination to be submitted by the President so that the Department will be in the position to give the special leadership and attention which this most important area of responsibility requires at this time.

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld



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Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: Russ Rourke
TO: General Scowcroft
INFO: Dick Cheney

DEX _____
DAC 058
LDX _____
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PAGES 2
CITE _____

DTG: 040156Z

RELEASED BY:
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TOR: 040207Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:



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1975 DEC 4 01 43

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RUSS ROURKE

Brent, both Jack Marsh and I were concerned that Rabbi Korff might interpret any extended silence following his initial request to the White House as an indication of possible approval or, at the very least, that the request was under active consideration. It was felt, therefore, that we should start turning him off as soon as possible. We obtained, therefore, a very preliminary recommendation on the basic proposal from Dudley Chapman via Phil Buchen. Basically, Legal Counsel's initial view is that the approval of this request would constitute an inappropriate use of appropriated U. S. funds.

I then spoke with Rabbi Korff by telephone, and indicated that it appeared unlikely that the request could be approved, without citing any firm legal basis for that rejection. Specifically, I was only attempting to prepare him for the prospect of a final solid decision, in the event that decision were negative.



The following is my own recounting of Rabbi Korff's reaction to my basic message. "You have very good minds at the White House, but you tend to look at things in strictly legalistic ways. You should have an advocate look at this request from a different perspective. We send jets to get foreign leaders. Sakharov is a symbol. Nothing could help detente more than to exercise detente. This would be all to the good. Dobrynin returned my phone call a few minutes ago, but I was out when he called. I would like to come to the White House to confer with those individuals who will make this decision, and to refute their arguments. There is no question of improper use of taxpayer funds here. We are not flying dogs around like Roosevelt use to fly Fala. We could have an already-scheduled U. S. military plane stop off in Moscow and pick Sakharov up. I don't want to cause any ruckus. I don't want to embarrass anyone, but this man represents a symbol to the American

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EO 12958 (Rev. 10-13-90) GPO 9.9

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people. They would want it to happen. He is a key to the very foundations of our being. I will get on the three major networks to raise the money to repay the U. S. Government for whatever it costs."

I made no effort whatever to conduct a running debate on each of the above points. I merely thanked him for his reaction, and told him that we would be back in touch with him as soon as a final decision is made.

I would appreciate your guidance.

cc: DCheney
PBuchen



~~SECRET~~

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 66 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

INFO:

DEX _____

DAC 056

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DTG: 040126Z

RELEASED BY:
DN

TOR: 040133Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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1975 DEC 4 01 11

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3 December 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

VIA: WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS.

FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

*Scowcroft
approved
(w)*

1. As you know, we discussed at the last VP meeting on SALT the possibility of a meeting in Brussels with HAK on the morning of 11 December. As I understand it, the purpose of the Brussels meeting would be to view where we stand and develop options for Presidential decision as a basis for further guidance in negotiations with the Soviets. While I could stay over in Brussels an extra day, if it is necessary and would serve a productive purpose, I believe it would be prudent to have an NSC meeting in Washington for the President to review the matter, hear first-hand views, and arrive at a decision which would then be formalized in the form of guidance for HAK's 18 December visit to Moscow. Further, so that the process is sound as well as defensible, perhaps a VP meeting ought to take place in Washington just prior to the NSC meeting. Such a VP meeting would make the Brussels meeting unnecessary.

2. In connection with the FY 77 budget reclama, it would be helpful for the President to have a meeting with the JCS prior to the formal DOD reclama session with the President. This will enable him to assess the Chiefs' views on the significant budget issues which they believe impact on force capabilities. I understand that the reclama session with the President is scheduled tentatively for 13 December. Under these circumstances, a Presidential meeting with the JCS should take place on the 12th.



3. Please check out these two items and let me have your thoughts.

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AUTHORITY *DOD Directive 5200.30*

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BY *WJ* NARA, DATE *2/1/11*

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032847

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 67
CREATION DATE 12/03/1975
VOLUME 33 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000005
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ T00

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 68//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

WH52395

TOSCO 68

DECEMBER 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

YUGOSLAVIA REPORT WARNS OF PRO-SOVIETS: YUGOSLAV LEADERS HAVE PASSED THE WORD TO THEIR SUBORDINATES THAT THE THREAT FROM PRO-SOVIET SUBVERSIVES IS MORE SERIOUS THAN BELGRADE HAS ADMITTED IN PUBLIC.

THE PARTY PRESIDIUUM HAS CIRCULATED A REPORT ON RECENT COM-INFORMIST ACTIVITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA. THE REPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN SEEN BY A BROAD SPECTRUM OF YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS, REFLECTS THE LEADERSHIP'S DEEP-SEATED DISTRUST OF MOSCOW. IT ASSERTS THAT KIEV AND PRAGUE ARE STILL THE MAIN CENTERS OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR COMINFORMISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THAT SOME COMINFORMISTS FROM EASTERN EUROPE ARE NOW MOVING TO WESTERN EUROPE, WHERE THEY ARE TRYING TO SUBVERT YUGOSLAVS EMPLOYED THERE. THE DOCUMENT SAYS TITO AND HIS TOP AIDES HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED MOSCOW TO CLOSE DOWN THESE SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS, AND THEY ARE SEEKING NEW TALKS ON THE ISSUE.

SOVIET INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT MAY HAVE MIG-25S: A SOVIET INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT LOCATED AT KOTLAS SOUTH, AN AIRFIELD STRATEGICALLY LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 450 NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF MOSCOW IS BELIEVED TO HAVE MIG-25S. THIS WILL BRING TO SEVEN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET AIR DEFENSE REGIMENTS

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

END OF PAGE 01

NSA review completed

NSA Review completed

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : NLF-CODEWORD-46-3-1-7

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AUTHORITY NSC CODEWORD-46-3-1-7
NSC State guidelines 5/24/06
 BY NA NARA DATE 5/3/10

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EQUIPPED WITH THE MACH 2.8 INTERCEPTOR. [REDACTED]

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PREVIOUSLY BASED THERE HAVE BEEN [REDACTED] III-1285
 EMPLOYING TO OTHER BASES. FORMATION OF AN ADDITIONAL
 BATTALION LENDS CREDENCE TO PREVIOUS ESTIMATES THAT THE SO-
 VIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY THE MIG-25 FOR
 HIGH-ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE OF STRATEGIC MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL
 ZONES THROUGHOUT THE USSR.

THE WASHINGTON STAR

S. FORD IS PICTURED WITH HER SHOES SHUCKED OFF AT A PEKING
 DANCE SCHOOL TODAY AND JOINING A GROUP OF REHEARSING STUDENTS
 IN A FEW MISSTEPS. VISITING THE CENTRAL MAY 7TH COLLEGE OF
 DANCE, MRS. FORD TOOK TWO PRACTICE WARMUPS BEFORE JOINING IN
 DANCE WITH EIGHT GIRLS. (A-1)

MARY BRADSHAW REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT CHINESE-AMERICAN
 RELATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN SO UNCHANGED BY PRESIDENT
 FORD'S VISIT THAT IT IS UNLIKELY A COMMUNIQUE WILL BE IS-
 SUED TO REPLACE THE 1972 SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE FRAMEWORK FOR
 RELATIONS. U.S. OFFICIALS DESCRIBED THE RELATIONSHIP AS
 FRIENDLY, IF STILL SOMEWHAT DISTANT. (A-1)

A SPEECH TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, AMBAS-
 SADOR BUNKER HAS WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENCE AND THE
 CLOSURE OF THE PANAMA CANAL IF THE U.S. AND PANAMA ARE UNABLE
 TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A NEW CANAL ZONE TREATY. "IF WE TRY TO
 MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, WE WILL FACE MOUNTING HOSTILITY IN BOTH
 PANAMA AND LATIN AMERICA -- AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE VERY
 INTEREST WE WANT TO PRESERVE." (A-3)

PRESIDENT FORD IS PICTURED TALKING WITH VICE PREMIER TENG
 DIAO-PING AND FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA. (A-8)

A LEAD EDITORIAL SAYS THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SUSTAINED
 AN IMPORTANT DEFEAT IN LAST SUNDAY'S VOTE IN THE UN SECURITY
 COUNCIL EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
 FORCE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS. A CERTAIN
 COSMETIC COVER GIVEN TO THE COUNCIL VOTE DOES NOT DISGUISE
 THE POTENTIAL GRAVITY. AS THINGS ARE, CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE
 HAS BEEN DONE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. SYRIA AND THE MILITANT
 ARAB STATES, ALONG WITH THE PLO, ARE JUBILANT AT THEIR "VIC-
 TORY" OVER THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. THE EGYPTIANS ARE EMBARRASSED
 BY SYRIA'S DEMONSTRATION OF NEGOTIATING MUSCLE. THE ISRAELIS
 ARE BITTERLY ACCUSING THE U.S. OF SUBMITTING TO SYRIAN BLACK-
 MAIL AND VOWING TO BOYCOTT THE FORTHCOMING DEBATE. INDEED,
 WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS NO SMALL THING. THE QUESTION NOW IS WHAT



END OF PAGE 02

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CONDITIONS WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE NEXT RENEWAL OF THE UN
 MANDATE IN MAY, AND WHAT FURTHER PRICE THE U.S. WILL BE WILL-
 ING TO PAY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ELECTION SEASON. (A-18)

ARL T. ROWAN WRITES THAT ONE OF THESE DAYS THE CHURCH AND
 LIKE COMMITTEES WILL DROP THEIR LAST BOMBSHELLS ABOUT U.S.
 PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS AND OVERTHROW FOREIGN
 GOVERNMENTS. ONCE THE CRIES OF SHAME AND OUTRAGE HAVE FADED,
 THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH
 A SIMPLE QUESTION: DO WE WANT TO CONTROL THE IDEOLOGY, DE-
 TERMINATE THE LEADERSHIP, OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, OR DO WE NOT?
 THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT AMERICANS WILL GO ON MEDDLING AND SCHEMING
 ROAD AND THAT CONNIVING AND SUBVERTING WILL CONTINUE TO MEAN
 DEATH FOR A LOT OF FOREIGN LEADERS. AND OCCASIONALLY SOME OF
 OUR LEADERS. (A-19)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

8

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032848

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 69
CREATION DATE 12/04/1975
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000005
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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92
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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM 7011

TO: GENERAL SORCRAFT

INFO:

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DTG: 04 14 24Z

RELEASED BY: JP

TOR: 041530Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO 70

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1975 DEC 4 13 58



In his first public appearance since his dismissal, former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger on Nov. 23 posed on NBC's "Meet the Press" a challenge to the critics of his policies. Excerpts from his remarks, and an invited response to his challenge from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy follow.



SCHLESINGER:

"There is some question whether the forces of the United States are equal to a military challenge."

If we want to stay at peace and we want to maintain a stable world order, then we must maintain an adequate military balance. The trends are starkly adverse over the last seven or eight years with respect to U.S. and Soviet military capability.

We still have an edge in strategic nuclear power, though that will diminish as the Soviets deploy their new generation of weapons. We probably have a qualitative edge in tactical air. We have equivalent naval forces to the Soviet Union, but the demands upon us are much stronger.

The great problem of the United States and its allies is the very powerful ground and attack forces and growing mobility forces of the Soviet Union that can be used around the periphery. There is some question whether the forces of the United States are equal to a military challenge.

If one includes the question of political will—and this is reflected in sensitive barometers such as the attitude of the nations represented in the United Nations—there is a grave question about the stability of the United States; the effectiveness with

which it can reach decisions, political will, cohesion. I hope these questions do pass. But for the moment, the Soviet Union is in the position in which it has the initiative.

We as a nation are indulging in an ostrich syndrome, in burying our heads in the sand and not observing what is going on. The Soviets have increased their military establishment to over 4 million men. Today, they have twice as many men as we have. They have, in recent years, produced four times as many subs and surface combatants as we have. They are producing 70 per cent more tactical aircraft. In ground

forces equipment, it is a production ratio of seven and eight to one.

As a share of their national effort, they are at about 15 per cent compared to about 5 per cent for the United States. If you convert that into dollar terms, they are outspending us, leaving ponies aside, by some 45 per cent, and the trend is worsening.

What we have is a slight from reality, and I regard that as most unfortunate for the United States. I have said these things in the past, but the press picks up these questions at budget time and says we are waving the flag of alarm.

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

KENNEDY:

"In no area of the world do we now conceive any military threat to our security which our forces...would be unable to meet."

I believe that Dr. Schlesinger is, indeed, again waving what he called "the flag of alarm." His perspective both misses the essence of the task facing the United States in the world for the years immediately ahead, and makes debate more difficult on our real defense needs. Yet in view of his distinguished career in this area, we must look carefully at his approach and take seriously his concerns.

Too often, however, in attempting to justify its military programs, it is all too tempting for the Pentagon at budget time to present a grim picture of growing Soviet military strength, while our own supposedly declines. A blizzard of statistics seeks to emphasize areas in which the Soviet Union is ahead or gaining; while ignoring or playing down real American advantages in the equality of manpower and weapons—practically across the board; the far higher level of effective U.S. seapower that makes Soviet percentage increases seem far more meaningful than they are; and the statistical devices used to inflate the Soviet defense costs in terms of U.S. prices for our more effective and sophisticated manpower and weapons.

This last technique has led the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to testify that "the absolute value figures (for Soviet defense spending) remain suspect, and the aggregation of such figures to a total budget number is highly suspect.

Meanwhile, a principal Senate supporter of a strong defense, Chairman John Stennis of the Armed Services Committee, decries "alarmist charges and speculation on the weaknesses of U.S. seapower."

At the same time, raw comparisons of budget, weapons, and manpower figures ignore—where there have been Soviet increases—the vast differences in the military objectives of the two superpowers: where, for example, the Soviet Union has a million men on the Chinese frontier (but we have no similar commitment), and uses sizeable forces to maintain control over East European countries;

Yet even if we accepted the figures advanced by Secretary Schlesinger—and the interpretation he has made of them for the future—his case remains unpersuasive. U.S. security is not defined primarily by particular Soviet defense efforts, but rather by the threats potentially facing this country and its allies. In no area of the world do we now conceive any military threat to our security which our forces, in being and projected, would be unable to meet. In Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific—and in strategic forces—the United States is well prepared to deter threats to our vital interests, and, if need be, to defend those interests. This is the "balance" that matters: not an effort to outspend the Soviet Union for reasons of prestige or an unsubstantiated belief that total military spending—rather than ef-

fective forces—to meet specific threats—defines national military power. Nor can we ignore the fact that, despite cuts made by Congress in this year's defense budget, it is higher in real terms than last year's.

Dr. Schlesinger is on even weaker ground in discounting U.S. political will to meet its commitments abroad, or to counter genuine threats to our security or that of our allies. This is a rebash of a view presented last spring, during the closing days of the Indochina war. Yet there is little evidence that any ally—or any adversary—doubts that the United States would respond to threats to its security. Questioning of U.S. will has been a wound self-inflicted by a few administration leaders, not by the Congress of the American people.

But there is an even broader sense in which we need to approach problems of national security. There is no denying the need for military forces fully adequate to our needs. But it also imperative for the United States to look at other sources of strength and weakness—both at home and abroad. At home, we are threatened by a failure of administration leadership in managing the economy far more than any putative deficiencies in military power. And abroad, we face a challenge to U.S. leadership—especially in the realm of international economics—rather than any lack of will or ability to counter military threats.

The current misstatements of U.S.

priorities is nowhere more evident than in the continuing surge in our strategic nuclear programs. This is an area in which even Dr. Schlesinger concedes "we still have an edge," though again he sees ominous trends for the future. Yet instead of applying our best efforts to get real agreements at SALT—advancing U.S. security—we are preparing a whole new generation of weapons (the cruise missile), while planning doctrines of counterforce and "limited" nuclear war that could still result in 20 million or more American deaths. Here, as elsewhere, we are subjected to comparisons of raw numbers, carefully selected by the Pentagon, without being told about U.S. advantages in quality (and often in numbers); the nature of real threats, or the relevance of U.S. threats to meet these threats. "Overkill" in nuclear arms is pursued for its own sake, then justified in terms of a calculus of nuclear balance that bears little relation to the tasks confronting us in the strategic arena.

If we are truly concerned to meet the challenges facing us as a nation in the years ahead, we must regain perspective about the military threats facing us and our allies, and both analyze and react to those in their own terms—in an atmosphere of reason and calm debate.

C 1975, International Dialogue

(International Dialogue, which appears from time to time on this page, is a series of debates, organized by syndicated columnist, Victor Zorza.)

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TOSCO 71

DECEMBER 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: MORNING NEWS SUMMARY

THE WASHINGTON POST


LOU CANNON REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT FORD AND CHINESE LEADERS, AT THE END OF FOUR DAYS OF TALKS TODAY, WERE SO FAR APART ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A JOINT COMMUNIQUE. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN ANNOUNCED LATE LAST NIGHT THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER AND CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA HAD DECIDED AGAINST TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON A COMMUNIQUE AT A MEETING PRECEDING THE THIRD ROUND OF TALKS YESTERDAY. NO DETAILS WERE GIVEN ON THIS AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE, BUT WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS MADE IT CLEAR THAT CHINESE OPPOSITION TO U.S. INSISTENCE ON SEEKING PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WAS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE. (A-1)

MARILYN BERGER REPORTS THAT EGYPT YESTERDAY CALLED TUESDAY'S ISRAELI AIR RAIDS INTO LEBANON "A VIOLATION OF...THE SPIRIT" OF THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS AND A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST EGYPT AND THE ENTIRE ARAB NATION. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IMAM FAHMI CALLED YESTERDAY FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. (A-1)

LAURENCE STERN WRITES THAT TESTIMONY THAT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS GOING BACK TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT MISUSED THE FBI FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES WAS PRESENTED YESTERDAY BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE. THROUGH THE YEARS, THE NEW DOCUMENTATION SHOWED THE TARGETS HAVE BEEN JOURNALISTS, DISSENTING POLITICIANS, CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO PREVAILING NATIONAL POLICY. (A-1)

DON OBERDORFER WRITES THAT THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS TOLD A HOUSE COMMITTEE YESTERDAY THAT THE

END OF PAGE 01



1968 TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS A U.S. INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS, NOT THE FAILURE THAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN CHARGED. WILLIAM COLBY, LAME-DUCK DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, SAID "CLEAR WARNINGS" OF A FORTHCOMING COMMUNIST ATTACK AROUND THE TIME OF THE JANUARY 30 LUNAR NEW YEAR HAD CAUSED ALERTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH AIDED MILITARY COMMANDERS AND MINIMIZED THE LOSSES OF LIVES AND RESOURCES. (A-27)

JAMES L. ROWE JR. REPORTS THAT ASSISTANT TREASURY SECRETARY GERALD PARSKY SAID YESTERDAY THAT PRICE INCREASES BY OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES ARE WORKING OUT TO BE MUCH LOWER THAN THE TEN PERCENT RISE ANNOUNCED LAST SEPTEMBER. PARSKY, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TOLD REPORTERS YESTERDAY THAT THE INCREASES ARE AVERAGING BETWEEN SEVEN PERCENT AND EIGHT PERCENT "WITH THE HIGH PROBABILITY THAT IT WILL BE CLOSER TO SEVEN THAN EIGHT PERCENT." (A-27)

WALTER PINCUS WRITES THAT THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY TURNED DOWN AN AMENDMENT THAT WOULD HAVE CUT OFF MILITARY AID OR MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS TO ANY COUNTRY THAT DISCRIMINATED BECAUSE OF RACE, RELIGION OR SEX AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAMS. (A-3)

MURREY MARDER REPORTS THAT FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. MUST PURSUE DETENTE "WITHOUT ILLUSION" THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO LIVE PEACEFULLY WITH THE WEST. "TO THE CONTRARY," SCHLESINGER TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SOVIET LEADERS "...HAVE INDICATED THAT DETENTE IS ITSELF A REFLECTION OF THEIR GROWING MILITARY POWER, WHICH IN THEIR INTERPRETATION HAS FORCED CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST." (A-8)

MARILYN BERGER WRITES THAT A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. HAS "NO EVIDENCE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS" OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION. RESPONDING TO CHARGES BY RETIRED ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT, FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, JOHN TRATTNER, WHO SAID HE WAS SPEAKING FOR KISSINGER, LABELLED PREPOSTEROUS THE SUGGESTION THAT INFORMATION ON VIOLATIONS HAD BEEN WITHHELD FROM PRESIDENT FORD BY KISSINGER. (A-8)

JOHN SAAR REPORTS THAT JAKARTA APPEARS UNEXCITED ABOUT FORD'S VISIT. THE LACK OF FANFARE OR ANY VISIBLE PREPARATION FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S DECEMBER 5 VISIT TO THE INDONESIAN CAPITAL HAS PROMPTED TWINGES OF ANXIETY AMONG SOME AMERICAN OFFICIALS. THOUGH INDONESIAN OFFICIALS SAY MR. FORD MAY EXPECT A WARM WELCOME ON HIS ARRIVAL FROM PEKING, THE VISIT IS RECEIVING



LOW-KEY TREATMENT. (A-13)

LEWIS M. SIMONS REPORTS THAT INDIAN ARMY FORCES SUPPORTING DISSIDENT BENGALI GUERRILLAS HAVE EASED THEIR ATTACK ON THREE NORTHERN BANGLADESH BORDER OUTPOSTS. (A-14)

HOBART ROWEN WRITES THAT THERE IS MUCH MORE THAN FIRST MET THE EYE IN THE FRENCH-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE RAMBOUILLET SUMMIT SESSION IN FRANCE A FEW WEEKS AGO. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT -- ONE THAT WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT HAS BEEN WORKING FOR BEHIND THE SCENES -- IS AN INTANGIBLE ONE: INSTEAD OF SNIPING AT EACH OTHER, THE U.S. AND FRANCE SEEM TO HAVE FOUND A GREATER REWARD IN COOPERATING AND COMMUNICATING. (A-19)

ROD MACLEISH WRITES THAT DOUBTLESS THERE ARE PROFOUNDLY-WROUGHT DIPLOMATIC AND REALPOLITICK MOTIVES FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. BUT THERE IS ALSO A DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOTIVE. MR. FORD IS TRYING TO POSTULATE HIMSELF AS THE ONLY WHITE MAN THE APACHES WILL TALK TO. YOU REMEMBER THAT FIGURE FROM OUR FRONTIER FOLK-LORE; HE IS THE MAN IN SHABBY BUCKSKINS WHOSE EYES BURN WITH SOME PRIMORDIAL UNDERSTANDING. HE COMES BACK TO THE FORT AT DUSK TO TELL THE UPTIGHT WHITE COMMANDER WHAT GERONIMO REALLY THINKS. HE IS STRONG, SOLITARY AND WISE. THAT IS WHAT MR. FORD IS TRYING TO BE IN THE MUDDLED CONTEMPORARY SETTING OF DETENTE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND GREAT POWER BACKGAMMON. THE PRACTITIONERS OF AMERICAN POLITICS HAVE BECOME POSSESSED OF THE NOTION THAT YOU HAVE TO MAKE IT IN PEKING IN ORDER TO MAKE IT IN DES MOINES. YOU GET TO BE THE ONLY MAN THE APACHES WILL TALK TO BY FIRST HAVING SOMETHING TO DISCUSS WITH GERONIMO. IN GOING TO PEKING THIS TIME, MR. FORD HAD LITTLE ON REAL SUBSTANCE TO DISCUSS. BY THAT LIGHT HIS TRIP SUGGESTS A CERTAIN FRIVOLITY WHERE WE CAN LEAST AFFORD IT. (A-19)

FORMER SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S CHALLENGE TO CRITICS OF HIS POLICIES AND SENATOR KENNEDY'S RESPONSE WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

CHRISTOPHER S. WREN REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET HARVEST APPEARS TO HAVE YIELDED AS LITTLE AS 137.2 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN, ABOUT A THIRD LESS THAN PLANNED. (1)

HENRY GINIGER WRITES THAT A DELEGATION FROM THE DUTCH LABOR PARTY ENDED A FIVE-DAY VISIT TO SPAIN WITH A WARNING THAT THE NETHERLANDS WILL OPPOSE SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY UNTIL DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS ARE FULLY



ESTABLISHED IN MADRID. (2)

MARVINE HOWE REPORTS THAT PORTUGAL'S RULING HIGH COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION MET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE LAST WEEK'S ABORTED LEFT-WING COUP, WHILE THE CRACKDOWN ON LEFTISTS CONTINUED. (3)

RICHARD HALLORAN REPORTS THAT JAPAN'S GOVERNMENT WORKERS' UNIONS CAPITULATED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRM STANCE YESTERDAY AND CALLED OFF AN ILLEGAL STRIKE THAT HAD LASTED EIGHT DAYS AND BROUGHT THE NATION TO THE BRINK OF A POLITICAL CRISIS. (5)

HENRY TANNER REPORTS THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EIGHT YEARS, AN EGYPTIAN TANKER WAS LOADED IN ABU RUDEIS YESTERDAY. AHMED HILAL, THE EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM MINISTER, ANNOUNCED THAT "THE FIRST REFINED OIL PRODUCTS FROM THE SINAI WILL BE ON THE MARKET IN CAIRO IN A FEW DAYS." (7)

FOX BUTTERFIELD NOTES THAT THE ABOLITION OF THE SIX-CENTURY OLD LAOTIAN MONARCHY AND OF THE COUNTRY'S COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENT THE CULMINATION OF A TREND THAT BEGAN LAST MAY WHEN COMMUNIST-LED PATHET LAO FORCES MOVED INTO VIENTIANE, THE CAPITAL, VIRTUALLY WITHOUT OPPOSITION AND BEGAN INSTALLING THEIR OWN OFFICIALS. (11)

JUAN DE ONIS WRITES THAT MANY OF THE GRACIOUS AND RELAXING THINGS THAT ARGENTINES ESTEEM IN LIFE ARE BEING BLIGHTED BY THE PREVAILING STATE IN BUENOS AIRES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ACUTE INFLATION AND SOCIAL DISCORD. (14)

AUDREY TOPPING WRITES THAT CHINA IS PUSHING A DRIVE TO MECHANIZE FARMS. (22)

JOHN W. FINNEY WRITES THAT PENTAGON OFFICIALS ARE WORKING ON A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BRITISH-AMERICAN AIRCRAFT DEAL IN WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BUY A BRITISH-DEVELOPED FIGHTER IN RETURN FOR A BRITISH PURCHASE OF SOME AMERICAN RADAR-SURVEILLANCE PLANES. (23)

A TIMES EDITORIAL COMMENTS THAT IF AIR BOMBARDMENT OF POPULATION CENTERS IS ISRAEL'S ONLY ANSWER TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND TERRORISM THE ONLY ANSWER OF ARABS, THEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS -- AND OTHER PEOPLES ACROSS THE WORLD -- ARE IN EVEN GREATER DANGER OF UNENDING MIDDLE EAST WAR THAN HERETOFORE IMAGINED. THE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE IS TO ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING ISSUES THAT PERPETUATE AND INFLAME THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT. AS A RECENT STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY PAPER PUT IT: "WHAT IS NEEDED AS A FIRST STEP IS A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS WHICH WILL HELP BRING FORTH A REASONABLE



DEFINITION OF PALESTINIAN INTERESTS." IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD BE PERSUADED TO SOFTEN ITS INITIAL HOSTILITY TO THIS IDEA AND PARTICIPATE IN NEXT MONTH'S SCHEDULED SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ALONG SIDE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, A RESOLUTION MIGHT BE SHAPED TO START SUCH A PROCESS. AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION FOR A FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSION IS CONTAINED IN THE FORTHCOMING ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY QUARTERLY. GIDON GOTTLIEB, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, FINDS USEFUL PARALLELS -- DESPITE OBVIOUS DIS-SIMILARITIES -- IN THE EVIAN AGREEMENT OF 1962, BETWEEN DE GAULLE'S FRANCE AND THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FLN). "THE EVIAN AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT THE FLN WOULD BE CONSIDERED A LEGAL POLITICAL BODY ONLY. IT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE FLN AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE. THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION WAS SETTLED BY BALLOT." THE EVIAN PRECEDENT THUS AVOIDS THE "MUTUAL RECOGNITION" DEADLOCK WHICH HAS PRECLUDED OFFICIAL ISRAELI-PLO CONTACT UP TO NOW. WHATEVER THE NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUE EVOLVED, THE MOST URGENT TASK FOR MOVING THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST TOWARD PEACE IS TO PERSUADE ISRAEL AND THE PLO TO ENTER INTO MORE MEANINGFUL, CONSTRUCTIVE CONTACTS. (40)

A TIMES-- EDITORIAL NOTES THAT THERE WAS LITTLE TALK OF PEACE ON EARTH AT THE "PACEM IN TERRIS" CONVOCATION IN WASHINGTON. INSTEAD THERE WAS DANIEL MOYNIHAN CHARGING THAT SOVIET AID FOR THE MARXIST POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) WAS PART OF A KREMLIN DRIVE TO "COLONIZE" ALL OF AFRICA. THE ALLEGATION INEVITABLY BROUGHT ANGRY RETORTS FROM AFRICAN UN DELEGATIONS; BUT THE DANGERS ARISING FROM THE ANGOLAN COCKPIT OF A DEVASTATING WIDER WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, CARRYING THE MENACE OF GREAT-POWER CONFRONTATION, ARE INDEED CLEAR AND PRESENT. PART OF THE DIPLOMACY MUST BE MR. KISSINGER'S CONTINUING EFFORT TO IMPRESS ON MOSCOW THE MENACE TO DETENTE ARISING FROM THE SOVIET INTERVENTION. ANOTHER PART OUGHT TO BE A RENEWED EFFORT BY THE OAU-- DESPITE NIGERIA'S ABERRATION -- TO PULL ITSELF TOGETHER AND TRY AGAIN TO GET THE FEUDING ANGOLANS TO COMPROMISE, PERHAPS IN SOME KIND OF FEDERATION. IF THE OAU AGAIN PROVES HELPLESS, THE MATTER INEVITABLY WILL WIND UP AT THE UN: FOR ANGOLA IS ALREADY A DEFINITE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. (40)

WILLIAM SAFIRE COVERS FORMER PRESIDENTS' USE OF THE FBI AND COMMENTS THAT, IF HE WISHED, CONGRESSMAN PIKE COULD HAVE EXPOSED THE FIRST -- AND WORST -- WHITE HOUSE ABUSE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE BY PUBLICLY EXAMINING KENNEDY HATCHETMAN CARMINE BELLINO, WHO APPEARED AT THE IRS ONLY SIX DAYS AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S INAUGURATION WITH A LIST OF ENEMIES



TO INVESTIGATE. MR. PIKE IS PURSUING NONE OF THE ABOVE. INSTEAD, HE SEEKS THE APPROBATION OF DEMOCRATS BY LEADING THE CHARGE TO CITE HENRY KISSINGER FOR CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS. SECRETARY KISSINGER DOES NOT FREQUENTLY FIND A DEFENDER IN THIS SPACE, AND HE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRE-DICAMENT BY FOOLISHLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ON SALT VIOLATIONS TO WHICH THE CONGRESS WAS CLEARLY ENTITLED. BUT THE ATTEMPT TO USE THE CONTEMPT POWER OF CONGRESS TO FORCE ANY INDIVIDUAL IN THE ADMINISTRATION TO DISOBEY A PRESIDENTIAL ORDER IS A BASIC VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. THE DECLINE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHICH WILL ACCELERATE IF RICHARD HELMS BECOMES A GRAND JURY TARGET, IS NOT SPED BY MR. PIKE'S OVERKILL. HIS CONTEMPT THREAT IS IDLE, THE THREAT OF A BLOWSOFT; BY USING IT TO AGGRANDIZE HIMSELF IN HEADLINES, MR. PIKE JOINS THAT LITTLE GROUP OF WILLFUL MEN WHO ONLY MAKE OUR GOVERNMENT HELPLESS AND CONTEMPTIBLE. (41)

THE BALTIMORE SUN

MATTHEW SEDEN WRITES THAT A BLANKET OF SECRECY CONTINUES TO SURROUND THE BILATERAL TALKS IN PEKING. (A-1)

HENRY TREWHITT WRITES THAT THE U.S., TRYING TO KEEP NEGOTIATING LINES OPEN, REACTED SOFTLY YESTERDAY TO ISRAEL'S LATEST AIR ATTACKS ON LEBANON DESPITE RISING TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND PROTESTS ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, PRIVATELY, U.S. OFFICIALS WERE MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE ISRAELI RAIDS. ONE U.S. SPECIALIST WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE DELAYED PUBLIC REACTION TO WHAT HE CALLED ISRAEL'S "JACKHAMMER" TACTICS. ANOTHER OFFICIAL RECALLED PUBLIC REPUDIATION OF U.S. BOMBING THAT CAUSED CIVILIAN DEATHS IN VIETNAM, EVEN WHEN IT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY CENTERS. (A-1)

ARNOLD ISAACS COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST REGIME IN LAOS. (A-1)

MURIEL DOBBIN WRITES THAT THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST HALF A CENTURY OF POLITICAL ABUSE OF FBI POWERS, INVOLVING REPEATED PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS TO SPY ON ADMINISTRATION CRITICS -- AND INVARIABLE FBI COMPLIANCE, ACCORDING TO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES YESTERDAY. (A-1)

EDWARD WU WRITES THAT CHINA HAS SCORED A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN SPACE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY BY SUCCESSFULLY BRINGING BACK TO EARTH FOR THE FIRST TIME AN ARTIFICIAL EARTH SATELLITE. (A-4)

ICELAND'S PRIME MINISTER GEIR HALLGRIMSSON SAID YESTERDAY THERE WAS NO HOPE OF RESOLVING THE FISHERIES DISPUTE WITH



BRITAIN UNLESS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RADICALLY CHANGED
ITS POLICY ON PRESERVING FISH STOCKS ON THE ICELANDIC BANKS,
ACCORDING TO A REUTERS REPORT. (A-6)

AP REPORTS THAT ANGRY REACTION FROM SPAIN'S ENTRENCHED
RIGHT HAS FORCED KING JUAN CARLOS I TO RECONSIDER HIS LIB-
ERALIZATION PLANS AND TO ASK CONSERVATIVE PREMIER CARLOS
ARIAS NAVARRO TO STAY ON FOR THREE MORE YEARS. (A-8)

ACCORDING TO A NEW YORK TIMES REPORT, THE ADMINISTRATION IS
PREPARING TO ANNOUNCE SHORTLY THE REMOVAL OF THE \$2-A-BAR-
REL TARIFF ON IMPORTED CRUDE OIL THAT PRESIDENT FORD IM-
POSED EARLIER THIS YEAR. (A-10)

AN EDITORIAL STATES THAT MR. RABIN WILL HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE
MORE CLEARLY THAT ISRAEL IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLE-
MENT THAT WILL DO JUSTICE TO THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE ALTERNATIVE IS ONLY MORE DANGER
AND MORE DEATH. (A-24)

ARNOLD ABRAMS COVERS THE PLIGHT OF THE MEO REFUGEES IN
THAILAND. (A-24)

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM/TOSCO 72
PETER RODMAN FOR
TO: GENERAL SCHWARTZ

MR. COVEY FOR
SECRETARY KISSINGER

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December 3, 1975
Martin Agronsky Show
WETA PBS Channel 26



Agronsky chats with Rep. Otis Pike, Chairman House Select Committee on Intelligence and Myron Waldman, Newsday.

Agronsky: The House Intelligence Committee remains locked in a struggle with the Executive Branch over what material the Committee needs to do its job and although the Committee had previously voted to hold Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in contempt for failing to comply with the three subpoenas the Chairman now says he has obtained substantial compliance on two of those subpoenas but that he will pursue the third. Mr. Chairman, you have substantial compliance you say on two of your committee's subpoenas but you have received nothing.

Pike: Absolutely nothing.

Agronsky: In response to the third. Now the third, as I understand it is the one that directs the Secretary of State to supply documents on recommendations for covert operations between 1962 and 1972.

Pike: That is correct.

Agronsky: This is the one the President has invoked the Executive privilege.

Pike: That is right. We want the recommendations of the State Department for covert actions during that period.

Agronsky: OK. Now the President stands on Executive privilege therefore the Secretary of State stands on Executive privilege.

Pike: I think maybe it was the other way around. I think the Secretary of State stood on Executive privilege and then the President stood on Executive privilege.

Agronsky: Have you any reason to believe the House will support the Committee.

Pike: I don't know. I think that if they don't it is going to be a rather sad day because what we are dealing with if they tell us the truth and I have no reason to doubt them, Executive privilege being claimed, not for this President but for prior Presidents by this President, which is an extension of the concept which has never been attempted before.

Agronsky: Now.

Well,

Pike: /if he helps.



Agronsky: Does not support you your whole investigation falls down.

Pike: Well I in fairness to our investigation - we issued seven subpoenas on the particular day this one was issued we now have substantial compliance on six of them. I can't in all honesty say that the whole investigation is doomed because we don't get compliance with this one subpoena but I think it is material and I think it is necessary to the proper completion.

Agronsky: Is it true that the House leadership is in effect bringing pressure to bear on you to lay off.

Pike: I think the only fair thing to say would be that the House leadership and a lot of members of the House would just as soon not have to vote on the issues, but I don't feel that the House leadership has brought any pressure on me to lay off. I have discussed it with the House leadership. They have asked me why I think this is necessary. I have told them why I think this is necessary and they are not twisting my arm any.

Waldman: When do you plan to bring this to the floor?

Pike: Well I thought it would be poor taste,,to say the least, to bring it to the floor while Mr. Kissinger was in China. It is my intention to bring it to the floor shortly after he returns.

Waldman: That would be sometime before the end of the year?

Pike: I would hope so.

Waldman: And a vote before the end of the year?

Pike: Yes. I think it would be voted on the day it is brought to the floor.

Waldman: Well - doesn't this do pretty bad things according to the State Department to our foreign policy, the conduct of our foreign policy.

Pike: According to the State Department telling us anything does bad things to the conduct of our foreign policy.

Waldman: But this is a particular slap at the Secretary of State.

Pike: Now let's be fair and let's be reasonable. Earlier we tried to get recommendations and what we tried to get was a specific document but the man in charge of the Cyprus desk as to what happened in Cyprus at the time of the coup and the Turkish invasion. They said if you will just lay off these low level people, we policy makers will give you whatever you want. Now we are asking what the policy makers recommended and they are saying well that is Executive privilege. Now if Congress can't get what the middle level people recommended and can't get on the grounds of McCarthyism, and can't get what the top level people recommended on the grounds of Executive privilege Congress can't ever exercise any oversight.

Waldman: You know the Senate Committee on Intelligence goes after all kinds of secret information and obviously gets quite a good deal.



And they don't get nearly half the flack that you get. They don't get accused of McCarthyism. Is there any reason why you get...

Pike: I think one of the reasons that we may have a little more difficulty is the fact that I think we are looking at more contemporary activities than the Senate has been looking at. I think that we have not had too much trouble with getting information as to older stuff and we have had a little more difficulty getting some of the more current stuff.

Waldman: And yet the basis for the grounds of Executive privilege that you denied - at least your argument against it is that they can't claim Executive privilege for actions of past Presidents.

Pike: I feel that they cannot. I think they have greatly stretched it even if it were for the present President.

Agronsky: Now you have, as Mike points out, come in for a lot of flack in two very strong editorials, for example, one in the Washington Post, one in the L.A. Times. The L.A. Times editorial on November 19th, the House Select Committee on Intelligence and its Chairman, Representative Otis Pike, have gone to far. They have mocked their responsibilities by recommending that the House find Secretary of State Kissinger in contempt of Congress, all because of a bitter and confused dispute over sensitive intelligence reports. The Committee's action is politically motivated. It is unnecessary. It is plainly damaging to the country.

Pike: Well, first of all the worst allegation there is that it is politically motivated. We had eight out of the nine Democrats vote for the citation and two out of ^{the} four Republicans vote for the citation, so that doesn't sound terribly politically motivated.



I can't remember the rest of the litany of things that were wrong with it.

Agronsky: It is unnecessary, it is damaging to the country.

Pike: I think that what is most damaging to our country at the present time is the fact that large numbers of Americans don't believe that their government tells them the truth. I think perhaps the greatest risk to the survival of our democracy is the dissolution of large numbers of Americans with their government leaders and their belief that they aren't getting the truth. We have no axe to grind with Secretary Kissinger or anything else. This contempt citation - if he had given us those documents involving these recommendations for covert action nobody would have noticed it in a million years - it would have been a nothing. We are not talking about publicising them. We are talking about Congress getting access to these facts. This Committee felt that it needed those documents to do its job.


Agronsky: He argues, and let me use another quotation after he learned of the contempt proceeding. The Secretary said this "That it would raise serious questions all over the world what this country is doing to itself and what the necessity is to torment ourselves like this month after month. I would like for you to respond to that.

Pike: Well, the only thing I can say is that the argument has been raised before in other context.

Agronsky: You have the Watergate context.

Pike: Of course, the Watergate context. Anybody who was taking a hard position of don't tell them anything says oh they are going to destroy us if we find out anything. I think very frankly that





Mr. Kissinger is a brilliant man but I think he is overboard on the concept of secrecy, secret negotiations, secret agreements, secret recommendations, and to me a great deal of this has had a bad result for one thing. Some of the secrets which have been revealed, not only about the CIA but about the FBI and what have you, just show horrible violations of the law. I think that in my judgment this country has gone overboard on secrecy and we are not messing around with his ongoing negotiations in China, or SALT II, or France, or wherever he wants to go and negotiate. What we are looking at is past covert operations recommended by the State Department.

Waldman: Why do you want them?

Pike: Well we want them for a lot of reasons. One of the things that Congress told us to do was to look at how much oversight there has been, both by Congress and by the Executive Branch of Government. All of the things we found as we went down this route was that the CIA is not all bad. The CIA doesn't go charging off in doing things by itself. The CIA is told to do things quite frequently but the CIA itself thinks ... operations. It has seemed to me and I think to most of the members of the Committee, that where the CIA recommended programs they were likely to be more professional than when they were told to do things that they didn't really want to do and I feel rather strongly about this that when the White House or the State Department says to the CIA you go do this it is much more likely to be a very dubious operation.

Agronsky: Lets come to something that really emerges from all of your operations. Do you think that the Secretary of State in his conduct of the office has overstepped his jurisdiction and his authority?

Pike: No, I don't think you can say he has overstepped his past jurisdiction and authority; he had so much jurisdiction and authority. He was special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He is still Secretary of State. He was a member of the NSC, he presided over meetings and he is the Chairman for the SALT verification panel. He had so much authority. It is almost impossible to say he overstepped it. I do think that he has done things in secrecy which other people should have known about.

Agronsky: Tell us.

Pike: Well, Admiral Zumwalt testified that there was a secret agreement entered into by Mr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin involving an interpretation of the SALT I agreement, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the then Secretary of State/^{Mr.}Rogers were not aware of for eleven months after this agreement was signed.

Agronsky: Can you conceive he could have entered into such an agreement by himself and without the President of the US telling him to do so.

Pike: I don't doubt that the President of the US

Agronsky: Can you fault them then or do you fault the President who was Mr. Nixon at that time?

Pike: It was Mr. Nixon.

Agronsky: What was that year by the way?

Pike: That would have been 1972, I believe, and I think the Secretary of Defense found out about it in '73 when the Russian delegates over in Geneva mentioned this agreement to our delagate.



Agronsky: Aren't you seeing here Mr. Nixon perhaps call with Mr. Kissinger the Watergate mentality with which event we had to deal into the conduct of foreign policy.

Pike: I think that is possible. I think that's a very possible scenario.

Agronsky: Is it fair then to fault the Secretary?

Pike: I don't know. I think so. I think that I would even fault the President in that case.

Agronsky: So would I.

Pike: If the President and the Secretary and in this case he was acting as Special Assistant to the President for NSA makes an agreement affecting our SALT Treaty and there was a loophole in this secret agreement that they worked out, but without telling the Secretary of Defense what he is doing - yes, I fault him.

Waldman: Should he resign for this.

Pike: Oh no he shouldn't resign for this but let's get over the concept that he is not mortal too.

Agronsky: Listen Mr. Chairman, we are really getting to the guts of what you are trying to do. Now we are talking about accountability, we're talking about oversight.

Pike: Absolutely.

Agronsky: Is that the thrust of your investigation.

Pike: That is the thrust of our investigation and I think we have established accountability. Secretary Kissinger said that there were no covert actions without the knowledge of the President and there was your accountability. The CIA was not going off doing these things by itself. They did what the President told them.

Agronsky: You believe this?



Pike: I believe that. I do. I will say that in those have looked at it has been true every single time. I won't that we have looked at every covert operation that the CIA has ever undertaken.

Agronsky: Now you are back to number one. You are back to the President of the US. Can you legislate accountability for the President in this area? What can your Committee do?

Pike: Well, I think so. I think that we can prohibit, if we want to, certain actions. I think we could pass legislation, like I think we have past legislation which would present the kind of secret war that the CIA was conducting in Laos, for example. The only people that didn't know about this were the American people. The Laotians certainly knew that the bombing was going on. The Communists know that this was going on and I think we have legislate against that. Now there is going to be a grey area, there is no question about it, the President has the constitutional responsibility to conduct our foreign affairs, but I don't think he can do covertly anything which he can't do overtly, and one of the things he can't do overtly is go off and get us involved in a war without Congressional approval.

Agronsky: This is what you are trying to stop?

Pike: Of course it is.

Waldman: Is that part of the risks that you talk about, war. What are some of the other risks that your Committee

Pike: Well, the risks that Americans are involved with range from the risk of war, down to the risk of having your phone bugged, down to the risk of having your mail intercepted. Let's get off the CIA for awhile and talk about some of the things the FBI has





been involved with. A basic risk I would say for America a different set of law enforcement regulations if your skin color, than if your skin is another color and I think that we have fairly well documented that.

Waldman: Well but because of a covert action do you know of any covert actions that have been undertaken by the US that have led or could have led us into war, anything at all?

Pike: Oh yes, I know of some covert actions/^{which} have been taken by the US which could have led us into war. I think, that the odds of their doing so were fairly remote.

Agronsky: Can you give us an example?

Pike: Well obviously the Pueblo was a classic example that could have led us into war. Sure, and there have been others which I can't discuss.

Agronsky: The ship that was sunk by the Israelis in the Med.

Pike: Now the Pueblo was the one that was seized by the N. Koreans. The Liberty is another one but that/^{one} was not about to lead us into a war because it was our friends the Israelis....

Waldman: Were these covert actions worth it?

Pike: No, they weren't it. At the price you paid on the Pueblo, of course they weren't worth it. I don't say that if the Pueblo had not returned home unharmed it wouldn't have been worth something. I think that it wouldn't have been worth an awful lot but it would have been worth something.

Waldman: How do you make a determination? Where do you draw the line. What is a good covert action? What is a bad covert action?

Pike: That is a very tough question and a lot of thought does go into some of them. I think that once a ship like the Pueblo star

to sail from there on its pretty routine and it sailed every month on a schedule. Let's take another area of great national importance you have been dealing with say the testimony of Admiral Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, before your Committee, former Chairman John Cheeks. He charged the Secretary of State had withheld information on gross violations by the Soviet Union of the 1972 agreements, a limitation of strategic arms. Now you say you have received substantial compliance of the subpoena relating to SALT. Is that correct? Do you believe that the Soviets violated the 1972 SALT Agreement the way Zumwalt said.

Pike: I think that the Committee is almost unanimous in feeling that the Soviets have violated the agreement as it was explained to Congress and as it was sold to Congress. I think that there is a much greyer area as to whether they have violated the letter of the agreement given a liberal interpretation on behalf of the Soviets.

Agronsky: Well the other part of it though that is of interest to you and to everyone in the country is Zumwalt's point that the Secretary of State when he briefed the President did not brief him accurately. That's the point. As Zumwalt key officials without naming the Secretary of State were deceived by Kissinger. The President himself was grossly badly briefed about Soviet clearcut violations of nuclear arms agreements. Do you think that Admiral Zumwalt goes to far.

Pike: I simply don't know. I have know way of knowing how the President was briefed about Soviet violations.

Agronsky: Are you going to dig into that?

Pike: Well, we have tried from the day we started to get the President's daily briefings and this is a written document. We did get some of them actually on some issues. I don't know



whether we are going to or not. Very frankly we have a time problem with our Committee. We are just plain running out of time, our charter expires in January. I am not sure that that is within our jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is in intelligence and I suppose it would be, I'm not sure it would be. How the President gets his briefings on SALT violations, all I will say is that comes a lot closer to the doctrine of Executive privilege than their refusal to obey our subpoenas on recommendations

Agronsky: ... self in January. Why does that have to be an arbitrary deadline? You can't finish by January. Why don't you go on?

Pike: I don't think the job of overseeing the intelligence community will ever be finished, if you take the intelligence community to mean the CIA, and the NSA and the FBI, and all of them. I think it requires continuing oversight. Our committee was not established for that purpose, or to do that job. I think there must be continuing oversight, but I think it would be an act of self-aggrandizement on my part if I said 'Let us continue to do this job for which we were not chosen.'

Waldman: Can you finish by January 31?...and do a good job?

Pike: I think we will do a reasonable job. I think there's no question but that people can say, 'You should have looked at this, you should have looked at that, but my only answer... that can say that forever, no matter how much we look at, there will always be more things we could have looked at.'



Waldman: Now, of all the things you've looked at, and all the things the Senate looks at, on the Senate side, we never hear anything good about the intelligence community. You hear about attempted assassinations and beards falling off of Castro ...

Pike: Well, that just isn't fair.

Waldman: That's what I was wondering. Does the intelligence community do anything right?

Pike: Sure the intelligence community does some things right, and they have a great many thousands of very dedicated, hard working men, risking their lives. They have some absolutely brilliant men, giving their lives to this kind of operation. My basic feeling is that in the gathering of intelligence, they do a great many things right. I think that the policy makers, in the utilization of intelligence, very frequently fall on their faces.

Agronsky: Now, that is terribly important, because you yourself have said, and this is a really tough accusation, ... you said in September, if an attack were to be launched on America in the very near future, it is my belief that America would not know the attack was about to be launched. I don't know how you can criticize more profoundly the operation of our intelligence.

Pike: Uh uhn. The radars picked up the Japanese planes at



Pearl Harbor. That was intelligence. The message didn't get through to the people who were supposed to analyze the intelligence. We have had, time after time, when intelligence said ...we had intelligence that the North Koreans were making threats before the Pueblo went in there. Nobody paid any attention. Our intelligence said that the Yom Kippur war was going to break out. Nobody believed it. The intelligence has been there time after time after time, but nobody used it, nobody analyzed it, nobody believed it.

Agronsky: Well, what do you do about that?

Pike: I don't ... there isn't any easy answer, there's no question about that. There isn't any easy answer. I happen to think that our intelligence community drowns in paper. I think we just gather infinitely more intelligence than we absorb and utilize. I think we've got to put a lot more emphasis on the analysis side of intelligence, as opposed to the gathering side of intelligence.

Agronsky: We need better people?

Pike: You always need better people, but in saying that, I don't mean to indicate that ^{the} the people we have are not good people. I think that a great many of them are tremendously...

Agronsky: 'You don't mean to say,' but you say it when they continually make mistakes - fundamental mistakes - in judgment.

Pike: The mistakes as far as I can see are human mistakes.



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which will probably continue to be made, but I still say we can do a much better job of analysis than we have done, and perhaps one of the things that we might do that would help would be to cut down the amount that we have to analyze.



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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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TOSCO 073

FROM: GENERAL HAIG, SACEUR, SHAPE

TO: LTG SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE

SHP 4335 EYES ONLY

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR 271508Z NOV 75 WHICH CONTAINED SUCH GOOD NEWS. I HAVE HAD SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION FROM GEORGE BROWN AND CANNOT BUT FEEL DELIGHTED THAT YOU AND HENRY CAUGHT THIS THING BEFORE WE REAPED UNNECESSARILY TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES.

2. I AM SCHEDULED TO SEE RUMSFELD NEXT MONDAY MORNING IN BRUSSELS. IF I CAN BE OF HELP ON ANY ISSUE, LET ME KNOW.

3. THANKS AGAIN FOR THE EARLY FAVORABLE NEWS.

4. WARM REGARDS.

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HR 1000, Date 2/1/11



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032849

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 74
CREATION DATE 12/04/1975
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000005
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT
BOX NUMBER 1
FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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O GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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OSCO 075

DECEMBER 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION ITEMS

ANGOLAN AIRLIFT: AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI REPORTS THAT HE HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT COSTA COMES TO YOU OF THE ANGOLAN AIRLIFT, WITH THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH AS FOLLOWS:

"THE AIRLIFT BETWEEN LUANDA AND LISBON THAT PERMITTED THE EFFECTIVE EVACUATION OF ALL PORTUGUESE THAT WISHED TO RETURN TO PORTUGAL TERMINATED ON THE 31ST OF LAST MONTH (OCTOBER). THIS GIGANTIC EFFORT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, WITHOUT THE HUMANITARIAN AID OF FREE COUNTRIES, AMONG WHICH IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO SINGLE OUT THE NORTH-AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH TRANSPORTED MORE THAN 30,000 PASSENGERS. FOR THESE REASONS, MR. PRESIDENT, I TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU FOR THE GOODWILL WHICH YOU REVEALED WITH REGARD TO OUR REQUEST AND WHICH WITHOUT A DOUBT CONTRIBUTED A GREAT DEAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE AIRLIFT WITHIN THE SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IMPOSED ON US BY CIRCUMSTANCE. I SHOULD ALSO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE APPRECIATION OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT AND PARTICULARLY OF THOSE THAT DIRECTLY BENEFITTED FROM THE AIRLIFT."

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8. TO MAKE APPROACH TO ROK ON NUCLEAR REPROCESSING: THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO INCREASE OUR PRESSURE ON THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) TO ABANDON ITS PLANS TO PURCHASE FRENCH NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT (WHICH PRODUCES WEAPONS-GRABABLE PLUTONIUM). STATE HAS INSTRUCTED OUR AMBASSADOR IN SEOUL TO APPROACH THE ROK PRIME MINISTER ON THIS QUESTION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A FAVORABLE REPLY WITHIN ONE WEEK, TO CONVEY U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED PROJECT DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT PAK. THE AMBASSADOR IS INSTRUCTED TO TELL THE KOREANS THAT IF THEY PROCEED WITH THE PLANNED PURCHASE, WE WILL WITHDRAW THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REQUEST TO CONGRESS FOR \$249 MILLION IN CREDITS FOR A SECOND ROK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THE AMBASSADOR IS ALSO TO INDICATE U.S. INTENTION NOT TO AUTHORIZE ROK REPROCESSING OF U.S.-DERIVED NUCLEAR FUEL AND TO STATE THAT ACQUISITION OF THE PLANT COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR FUTURE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE ROK. FURTHERMORE, THE AMBASSADOR IS TO INDICATE THAT A PERCEPTION THAT KOREA WAS IN A POSITION TO PRODUCE, SEPARATE, AND STOCKPILE PLUTONIUM INDEPENDENTLY COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS AND HAVE UNDESIRABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE REGION.

WE DEPARTMENT WILL CONCURRENTLY INFORM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OF OUR REINFORCED PRESSURE ON THE KOREANS TO CANCEL THE PLANT PURCHASE.

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POSSIBILITY OF BREZHNEV TRIP TO CUBA: ON DECEMBER 2, AMBASSADOR STORSEL ASKED BREZHNEV'S INTERPRETER, VICTOR SUKHODRYEV, IF BREZHNEV WOULD VISIT HAVANA TO ATTEND THE 1ST CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS. SUKHODRYEV SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT YET KNOW DEFINITELY, IT WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY LONG AND TIRING JOURNEY, BREZHNEV HAD BEEN IN CUBA RELATIVELY RECENTLY, AND HE "RATHER DOUBTED" THAT BREZHNEV WOULD GO.

NEW LEADERS IN LAOS: RADIO VIENTIANE REPORTED ON DECEMBER THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG IS THE NEW PRESIDENT OF LAOS. SOUPHANOUVONG, HALF BROTHER OF DEPOSED PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUA, HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME PATHET LAO MEMBER. HE WILL LIKELY BE ONLY A FIGUREHEAD, AND COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY AYSON PHOUVICHAN, THE NEW PRIME MINISTER, WILL NO DOUBT EXERCISE REAL POWER. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEWS AYSON AS BEING CLOSELY LINKED TO NORTH VIETNAM.

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