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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251524 T08EC 100246

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 7917 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS AND NICOSIA
22 OCT 75

QUOTE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 7917

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, CY, TU
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRIMIN DEMIREL TO PRESIDENT FORD
REF: STATE 244266

1. ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 22, MFA SEC GEN ELEKDAG CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER TO GIVE ME THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRIMIN DEMIREL TO PRESIDENT FORD. ELEKDAG APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN PREPARATION OF THIS RESPONSE BUT SAID THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE THE PRIMIN HAD WORKED ON IT PERSONALLY.
2. AFTER HANDING ME PRIMIN'S MESSAGE, ELEKDAG TURNED CONVERSATION TO FORTHCOMING US-TURK NEGOTIATIONS OF REVISED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. (HIS REMARKS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.)
DEMIREL'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD FOLLOWS:
BEGIN MESSAGE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS CONVEYED TO ME YOUR MESSAGES OF OCTOBER 3RD AND OCTOBER 15TH, 1975.
I AGREE WITH YOU ON THE NEED TO WORK TO REVITALIZE OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.
NO DOUBT THE RECENT DECISION OF THE CONGRESS ON ARMS SUPPLY (#)
A POSITIVE FIRST STEP TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. BUT I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK IF I DID NOT EMPHASIZE HERE THE DISAPPOINTMENT FELT IN TURKEY OVER THE SERIOUS LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THIS RESOLUTION UNDER WHICH TURKEY



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
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By HR NARA, Date 8/9/10

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STILL CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT OF DISCRIMINATION NOT ONLY AMONG THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO AMONG SOME COUNTRIES WITH WHOM YOUR COUNTRY HAS NO ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, AFFECT OUR FEELINGS OF APPRECIATION FOR THE VALUABLE EFFORTS THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR ADMINISTRATION AND THOSE WHO SUPPORTED OUR CASE IN THE CONGRESS HAVE DEPLOYED TO REMEDY THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION CREATED BY THE CONGRESS DECISION OF FEBRUARY 5TH, 1975. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE GREAT VALUE WE ATTACH TO OUR FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OF OUR VERY SINCERE DESIRE TO REVITALIZE THEM. I KNOW THAT THIS FEELING IS RECIPROCATED BY THE UNITED STATES, THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT THE TASK AHEAD OF US IS TO WORK OUT FOR OUR BILATERAL DEFENCE COOPERATION A STABLE CONCEPT WHICH WILL REFLECT A SOUND BALANCE BETWEEN OUR MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND WHICH WILL BE IMMUNE FROM ANY INTERVENTION INCONSISTENT WITH OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND THE FRIENDLY FEELINGS THAT BOTH NATIONS HAVE FOR EACH OTHER. IT IS WITH THIS SINCERE BELIEF THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, DESPITE THE SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RECENT DECISION OF THE CONGRESS, HAS DECIDED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUR FUTURE BILATERAL DEFENCE COOPERATIONS. OUR DETERMINED AIM WOULD BE TO COME TO A RAPID AGREEMENT SO THAT OUR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATIONS COULD BE RESUMED WITHOUT DELAY. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR RESUMED COOPERATION WILL BE MORE STABLE AND DURABLE IF BEFOREHAND UNCERTAINTIES AND DOUBTS COULD BE REMOVED AND A SOUND CONCEPT COULD BE WORKED OUT. AN EARLY RESUMPTION ON AN UNSTABLE BASIS WILL, IN MY VIEW, BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR A MORE STABLE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE ALL SINCERELY DESIRE TO ACHIEVE. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT DURING THE MEETINGS WHICH WE HAD IN BRUSSELS AND IN HELSINKI, I HAD STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM INJECTING INTO OUR RELATIONS THE COMPLEXITY AND THE MALAISE OF ISSUES SUCH AS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM OR THE TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE AND THAT THE REGRETTABLE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO LINK THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS WITH THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS A WHOLE WOULD NOT ONLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AS IT WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THE ENDEAVOURS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO CAUSE UNDUE HARM TO OUR RELATIONS. I AM CONVINCED TODAY MORE THAN EVER THAT FIRST TO REVITALIZE OUR RELATIONS AND THEN TO MAINTAIN THEM INTACT, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY SHOULD DISPLAY UTMOST CARE NOT TO IMMIX IN THESE RELATIONS ISSUES ALIEN TO THEIR REAL CONTEXT. THIS BEING OUR STAND, NOW I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE VIEWS OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN THE CYPRUS QUESTION FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS SETTLEMENT. AS IS KNOWN TURKEY HAS MADE PUBLIC VIEWS CONCERNING



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A VIABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, THE BITTER EXPERIENCES OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN THE LAST TWELVE YEARS HAVE STRONGLY DICTATED THE CONDITIONS OF SUCH A SOLUTION WHICH ARE A BI-ZONAL FEDERAL STATE WITH LIMITED POWERS FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF BOTH COMMUNITIES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS READY TO ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE IN THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY THE SETTING UP OF THE FEDERAL STATE ALONG THE ABOVE MENTIONED PRINCIPLES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE BORDER REARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SINCERELY DESIRE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM THROUGH SERIOUS AND BUSINESS-LIKE NEGOTIATIONS. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THE NEED AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF RECONCILIATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND GOOD WILL TO BE DISPLAYED BY GREECE AND GREEK CYPRIOTS SIDE IF SUCCESS IS TO BE HOPED FOR. SINCERELY, SULEYMAN DEMIREL, END MESSAGE.
MACOMBEG
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



PSN:049690 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:296/00:26Z DTG:222333Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1537 2960027
O 222341Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3293
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 2857

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251537 TOSEC 160249

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, LE

SUBJECT: ABDUCTION OF DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE
USIS REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER BEIRUT
USDEL PARTY FOR OAKLEY; RABAT FOR ATHERTON

1. FOLLOWING IS SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 3 AS OF 1830
HOURS EDT, OCTOBER 22 CONCERNING SUBJECT ABDUCTIONS,


2. THE EMBASSY'S DEBRIEFING OF THE TWO FEMALE USIS LOCAL
EMPLOYEES WHO WERE WITH GALLAGHER AND DYKES HAS PROVIDED
DETAILS OF THEIR ABDUCTION, BUT NOTHING THAT WOULD IDENTIFY
THE GROUP INVOLVED. THE LEBANESE ARABIC ACCENT OF THE
ARMED MAN WHO SPOKE TO THEM AND THE DIRECTION IN WHICH
GALLAGHER AND DYKES WERE TAKEN AWAY, RAISE THE POSSIBILITY
THAT SOME LEBANESE LEFTIST/MOSLEM GROUP IS RESPONSIBLE BUT
IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT A PALESTINIAN GROUP IS INVOLVED.

3. AMBASSADOR MURPHY IN DAMASCUS HAS HAD AN INITIAL MEET-
ING WITH SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF SHIHABI, WHO HAS PLEDGED
SYRIA'S FULL ASSISTANCE IN EFFORTS FOR RELEASE OF THE
AMERICANS.

4. DURING THE DAY, AMBASSADOR GODLEY AND OTHERS IN
EMBASSY BEIRUT HAVE CONTACTED A VARIETY OF LEBANESE LEADERS
(INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER KARAMI AND BEIRUT MOSLEM LEADER
SAEB SALEM), PLUS LEBANESE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGAN-

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IZATIONS, IN ORDER TO ELICIT A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO GET THE
TWO MEN FREED. KARAMI IS PUBLICLY REPORTED TO HAVE ISSUED
INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTENSIVE EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF. INGERSOLL
BT



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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1544 2960029
O 222348Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3295
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 2858

~~SECRET~~ STATE 251544 TOSRC 100251

EXDIS
FOLLOWING GEPEAT DAMASCUS 4124 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT 22 OCT 75
QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 4124

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING OF USIA OFFICERS IN BEIGUT
REF: STATE 250969; DAMASCUS 4123

1. HAVE JUST FINISHED MEETING WITH SHIHABI (1930Z). HE PLEDGES FULL ASSISTANCE. WANTS LATEST DETAILS GIVING ALL LEADS WHICH MIGHT IDENTIFY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING. DID FEMALE EMPLOYEES LEARN ANYTHING DURING PERIOD THEIR ABDUCTION?

2. AS PERSONAL ADVICE, SHIHABI URGES THAT WHEN INVESTIGATION BEGINS TO NARROW IN ON SUSPECTS THAT WE DECIDE WHICH AUTHORITY IS TO CARRY IT TO CONCLUSION. COMMENTED THAT TOO MANY PARTIES GOT INVOLVED IN MORGAN CASE. THAT COMPLICATED SECURING COLONEL'S RELEASE. EMPHASIZED HE NOT ASKING THAT HE OR ANY OTHER SYRIAN OFFICIAL BE OUR AGENT IN THIS CASE BUT MERELY THAT WE CONSIDER CAREFULLY DESIRABILITY OF LIMITING THE NUMBER OF THOSE INVOLVED.

3. HE HAS GIVEN ME PRIVATE TELEPHONE NUMBER SO I CAN REACH HIM AT ANY TIME DURING THIS NIGHT TO PASS ON DETAILS AS RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY BEIRUT. CONFIRMED THAT ARAFAT, JUMBLATT AS WELL AS JUMBLATT'S DEPUTY, ABBAS KHALAF, ARE ALL IN DAMASCUS TONIGHT.

MURPHY
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT

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By HR NARA, Date 8/9/10

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DE RUEHC #1543 2960042
O 222348Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3302

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251543 TOSEC 160255

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 7925 ACTION SECSTATE INFO
ATHENS NICOSIA ADANA ISTANBUL IZMIR NATO SECDEF DIRNSA
USNMR SHAPE USCINCEUR CINCUSAFE CINCUSAREUR USDOCOSOUTH
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST DTD 22 OCT
GTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 7925

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: HARR, PFOR, TU,
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS OF NEW DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

1. IN MEETING OCTOBER 22, AFTER HANDING ME PRIMIN DEMIREL'S RESPONSE
(ANKARA 7917 NOTAL) TO PRESIDENT FORD'S RECENT MESSAGE, MPA
SECGEN ELEKDAG TURNED CONVERSATION TO UPCOMING USG-TURK
NEGOTIATIONS OF REVISED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT.
ELEKDAG SAID HE WISHED TO COMMENT AGAIN ON USG CONCERNS
OVER INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES
ON COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS (CDI'S) HERE. HE SAID THAT
GOT UNDERSTOOD ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL AND PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS THAT CONTINUED IDLENESS PRESENTED FOR US. I INTER-
RUPTED TO SAY THAT I WAS NOT EARLIER SUGGESTING THAT WE WOULD
SUDDENLY
BEGIN REMOVING OUR PEOPLE IN DISILLUSIONMENT OR AS A MATTER
OF PIQUE, BUT ONLY THAT INEVITABLE PERSONNEL ATTRITION AND
FINANCIAL INHIBITIONS WOULD OVER ANY SUSTAINED PERIOD OF TIME
ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN WHAT IN EFFECT WOULD BE A VERY
SUBSTANTIAL EVACUATION OF THESE BASES BY US PERSONNEL. ELEKDAG
SAID "THAT WOULD BE A DISASTER," ESPECIALLY, HE ADDED, IN THE MIND
OF SOMEONE LIKE HIMSELF WHO HAS WORKED FOR SO MANY YEARS TO
STRENGTHEN THE US-TURK-NATO RELAYIONSHIP. HE REPEATED THAT THE
GOT UNDERSTOOD THESE CONCERNS AND HE SAID HE WAS NOT REFERRING SIMPLY
TO THE CIVILIAN ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO TO THE
TURKISH MILITARY. IN FACT, HE SAID, HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT THE
SIX WEEKS TIME PRAME WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MENTIONED
TO ME (AS A TARGET FOR GETTING THE MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
COMPLETED) HAD BEEN MADE BY CAGLAYANGIL AT THE

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By *WR* NARA Date *8/9/10*




SPECIFIC SUGGESTION OF TURK GENERAL STAFF CHIEF GENERAL SANCAR,

2. ELEKDAG NEXT RECALLED OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION (ANKARA 7873) WHERE WE HAD BOTH AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A NEW AGREEMENT SETTLED WITHIN SIX WEEKS. NEVERTHELESS, HE ASSURED ME, THIS WAS THE GOT OBJECTIVE AND WOULD BE HIS OBJECTIVE AS THE CHIEF GOT NEGOTIATOR. HE SAID, "IN THE PACKAGE WE PRESENT TO YOU THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE SOME THINGS THAT YOU CAN ACCEPT AND OTHERS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATION. MY HOPE IS THAT WE WILL FIND ENOUGH THINGS THAT WE CAN AGREE ON FOR THE GOT TO BE ABLE TO SAY AT THE END OF SIX WEEKS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT AGREEMENTS REACHED TO ENABLE ACTIIVITIES ON THE CDI'S TO BE RESUMED."

3. I SAID THAT I SHARED HIS HOPE BUT THAT I HAD NO WAY OF JUDGING WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNTIL I HAD SEEN THE CONTENTS OF THE POSITION THAT THE GOT WOULD PRESENT TO US AT THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND I ASKED WHEN HIS SIDE WOULD BE READY TO BEGIN THESE KEY TALKS. BETWEEN TURKISH NATIONAL HOLIDAYS, THE VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN, AND HIS OWN TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA, ELEKDAG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GET STARTED NEXT WEEK, BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY ATTACHED TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE GOT, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD BREAK AWAY FROM THE SHAH'S VISIT SO THAT WE COULD START THESE MEETINGS OFF NEXT TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28. THEREAFTER HE WOULD BE TAKING OFF FOR SAUDI ARABIA, BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS PROCEED AT THE WORKING LEVEL AND THEN WHEN HE RETURNED FROM SAUDI ARABIA THE FOLLOWING WEEK HE AND I COULD DETERMINE WHETHER TO RESUME THE DISCUSSIONS OURSELVES OR CONTINUE THEM AT THE WORKING LEVEL.

4. COMMENT: I BELIEVE SOME TURK OFFICIALS ARE NOW SOMEWHAT CONCERNED OVER THE EFFECT ON USG OFFICIALS OF THE GOT FAILURE EVEN PARTIALLY TO LIFT THE SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES ON THE CDI'S IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL VOTE. WHETHER THIS GOT CONCERN WILL HAVE A MITIGATING EFFECT ON THE TURK NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE FORTHCOMING TALKS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. I REMAIN SKEPTICAL, HOWEVER, THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A NEW NEGOTIATION (THE GOT CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE CDI'S) IN SIX WEEKS TIME. A BETTER JUDGMENT ON THIS, HOWEVER, CAN OBVIOUSLY BE MADE AFTER WE SEE THE PROPOSAL PRESENTED NEXT TUESDAY.

MACOMBER
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #1674 2960043
 P 230012Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3303

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 251674 TOSEC 160256
 FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN 5223 ACTION ~~SECSTATE 22 OCT 75~~

QUOTE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 5223

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF

SUBJECT: SC CONSULTATIONS ON UNEF

RE: USUN 5206

1. TEXT FOLLOWS PARA 2 OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ON UNEF PREPARED BY SC PRESIDENT ON BASIS OF EARLIER SC DISCUSSIONS (REFTEL). IN CONSULTATIONS THIS EVENING, SC MEMBERS AUTHORIZED PRESIDENT TO INTRODUCE THIS TEXT AT FORMAL MEETING NOW PLANNED FOR MORNING OCT 23. PRESIDENT TELLS US HE HAS CONSULTED WITH EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI DELS, AND NEITHER HAS RAISED OBJECTIONS.

2. QUOTE: THE SECURITY COUNCIL, RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974), 362 (1974), 368 (1975 AND 371 (1975), HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (S/11849), HAVING NOTED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HAVING FURTHER NOTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VIEW THAT ANY RELAXATION OF THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT COVERING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM COULD BE ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN THE MONTHS TO COME AND THAT IT IS HIS HOPE THEREFORE, THAT URGENT EFFORTS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALL CONCERNED TO TACKLE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, WITH A VIEW BOTH TO MAINTAINING QUIET IN THE REGION AND TO ARRIVING AT THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION 338 (1973),

1. DECIDES

(A) TO CALL UPON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

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(B) TO RENEW THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, THAT IS, UNTIL 24 OCTOBER 1976;

(C) TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD A REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND THE STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

2. EXPRESSES ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THE FORCE WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY. UNQUOTE

3. DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY IF DESIRED.

MOYNIHAN
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



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OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #1545 2960049
O P 222349Z OCT 75 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 251545 TOSEC 100257
FOLLOWING REPEAT BEIRUT 13135 ACTION SECSTATE 22 OCT 75
QUOTE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 13135

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC PINS LE

SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING OF TWO USIA OFFICER

REF: BEIRUT 13114

THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE
PRIOR TO AND DURING TIME OF KIDNAPPING AS RELATED
TO RSO BY MISS SALWA FAKHOURY. MISS FAKHOURY
WAS ONE OF TWO LEBANESE LADY EMPLOYEES WHO
WAS WITH GALLAGHER AND DYKES.

1. GALLAGHER PICKED UP FAKHOURY AND MARGO ZILIPIAN,
BOTH RSC EMPLOYEES, IN FRONT OF THE SQUAD 16 (POLICE)
HQ ON CORNICHE MAZRAA AT APPROXIMATELY 0630 HR ON
22 OCTOBER 1975. AT APPROXIMATELY 0640 THE CAR WITH
FOUR PEOPLE WAS JUST CROSSING RUE OMAR EL KHATTAB
WHEN A MAN YELLED "STOP" IN ARABIC. THERE WAS ONLY
ONE MAN ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE ROAD. THERE
WERE 4-5 ARMED MEN ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE
ROAD BESIDE A LITTLE SHACK ON THE CORNER OF
RUE BILAL 62 AND CORNICHE MAZRAA. THE
LATTER WAS NOT OBSERVED AT THIS TIME. GALLAGHER
AND DYKES DO NOT SPEAK ARABIC. BOTH MEN WERE

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SEATED IN THE FRONT AND GALLAGHER WAS DRIVING. HE APPARENTLY HEARD THE MAN YELL BECAUSE HE SLOWED DOWN BUT DID NOT COME TO A COMPLETE STOP. AGAIN THE MAN YELLED "HALT" IN ARABIC AND WAS READY TO FIRE. HE WAS ARMED WITH AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLE. OF THE TWO WOMAN EMPLOYEES OF RSC ONLY MARGO ZILIFIAN COULD SPEAK ENGLISH AND SHE TRANSLATED THE MAN'S CALL TO HALT, WHICH GALLAGHER DID.

2. WITH THE CAR HALTED IN THE EAST BOUND LANE OF CORNICHE MAZRAA THE ARMED MAN CAME AND LOOKED AT THE CD 104 LICENSE PLATES IN FRONT AND REAR AND WALKED OVER TO GALLAGHER. GALLAGHER SPOKE TO THE MAN IN ENGLISH. THE MAN LOOKED ACROSS GALLAGHER TO THE WOMEN AND ASKED, "WHERE ARE YOU GOING?" FAKHOURY REPLIED "THERE", INDICATING THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF EAST. GALLAGHER ATTEMPTED TO PULL OUT HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY ID CARD AND AS HE EXTRACTED THE CARD THE ARMED MAN OPENED GALLAGHER'S CAR DOOR AND TOOK THE ID CARD. AT THIS POINT, THE MAN SEEMED VERY PLEASED SAYING, "AN AMERICAN--WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. VERY GOOD."

3. THE ARMED MAN THEN MOTIONED GALLAGHER AND DYKES TO GET OUT OF THE CAR AND TOLD THE WOMEN TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE. THEY ALL ASSEMBLED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE CORNICHE. GALLAGHER AND DYKES WERE DIRECTED BY WAVES WITH THE AK-47 RIFLE. AGAIN THE MAN ASKED, "WHERE ARE YOU GOING?" FAKHOURY, AT THIS POINT, NOT WISHING TO REVEAL HER CONNECTION WITH THE AMERICANS, AND THEREBY PERHAPS RETAIN HER FREEDOM TO REPORT THE INCIDENT, ADVISED THAT SHE AND ZILIFIAN WERE ENROUTE TO THE PALACE OF JUSTICE WHICH IS ON CORNICHE, JUST DOWN FROM WHERE THEY WERE STOPPED. THE ARMED MAN ASKED WHERE THE MEN WERE GOING. FAKHOURY REPLIED THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW. THE ARMED MAN ASKED HOW IT WAS THAT THEY WERE IN THE CAR WITH THE AMERICANS IF THE WOMEN DID NOT KNOW WHERE THEY WERE GOING? FAKHOURY RESPONDED THAT SHE AND ZILIFIAN WERE WAITING FOR A SERVICE TAXI WHEN GALLAGHER AND DYKES DROVE UP AND OFFERED THEM A LIPT WHICH THEY ACCEPTED. THE ARMED MAN APPARENTLY BOUGHT THIS STORY, NOT THINKING IT REMARKABLE THAT THE WOMEN WERE SPEAKING ONLY IN ARABIC AND GALLAGHER WAS SPEAKING ONLY IN ENGLISH.



4. THE ARMED MAN THEN DEMANDED THE ID CARD OF THE TWO WOMEN, HE LOOKED THEM OVER AND HANDED THEM BACK. AS HE HANDED THE CARDS BACK HE TOLD THE WOMEN TO GO. THEY DID NOT GO. FAKHOURY APPROACHED THE ARMED MAN AND PUT HER HAND ON HIS ARM ASKING HIM TO LET THE AMERICANS GO. SHE ASKED FOR THE ARMED MAN'S NAME BUT HE DID NOT REPLY. THE ARMED MAN THEN TOLD THE WOMEN TO GO AND MOTIONED GALLAGHER AND DYKES AWAY FROM THEM, SEPARATING THEM INTO TWO GROUPS.

5. AT THIS POINT, GALLAGHER TURNED AS IF TO SPEAK TO ZILIFIAN BUT FAKHOURY MOTIONED TO GALLAGHER NOT TO TALK AND TRIED TO INDICATE THAT SHE WOULD TELEPHONE. FAKHOURY WAS NOT SURE WHETHER OR NOT GALLAGHER UNDERSTOOD, BUT HE MADE NO FURTHER EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE. THE ARMED MAN AGAIN, VIRGOUROUSLY, TOLD FAKHOURY AND ZILIFIAN TO LEAVE, THEN CALLED THEM BACK TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE ADRESSES ON THE ID CARDS. BOTH ZILIFIAN AND FAKHOURY LIVE IN THE MAZRAA AREA AND THEIR ID CARDS SO INDICATED, HE ALSO TOLD THEM, " YOU HEARD NOTHING YOU SAW NOTHING".

6. THE MAN AGAIN TOLD THEM TO GO, AND THIS TPME THEY DID, THEY CROSSED RUE OMAR EL KHATTAB, THEN CUT ACROSS THE MEDIAN STRIP TO THE HOSPITAL. AS THEY WERE LEAVING, ONE OF THE ARMED MEN WHO WAS STANDING BY A LITTLE SHACK ON THE CORNER OF RUE BILAL 62 CAME OVER TO JOIN THE FIRST MAN. THE FIRST MAN MUST HAVE NOTICED A GROUP OF PEOPLE BY THE HOSPITAL FOR THE FIRST TIME BECAUSE HE YELLED AT THEM TO GET BACK INSIDE, TO EMPHASIZE HIS POINT HE FIRED TWO BURST OF ROUNDS IN THEIR GENERAL DIRECTION. THE WOMEN WERE ON THE MEDIAN STRIP WHEN THE SHOTS WERE FIRED.

7 AT THE TWO BURST OF RIFLE SHOTS, THE WOMEN RAN ACROSS THE STREET TO THE HOSPITAL AND STARTED WALKING WEST. AS SOON AS THEY GOT TO THE CORNER OF CORNICHE MAZRAA AND THE RUE BASTA, THE CAR WITH GALLAGHER AND DYKES IN THE BACK SEAT WAS SEEN TURNING FROM THE CORNICHE ON TO RUE BASTZ, HEADING NORTH, TOWARD THE BORJ. THE WOMEN THEN TOOK A SERVICE TO THEIR HOME AREA AND CALLED MR. EVANS RSC TO REPORT.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. AT NO TIME WERE ANY NAMES USED.

2. ONLY THE FIRST ARMED TALKED WITHIN THE HEARING OF SOURCE.

3. THERE WAS NO ROAD BLOCK, PER SE. THERE WERE 4-5 MEN ON THE NORTH SIDE (WEST BOUND LANE) NEAR A SMALL SHACK AT THE CORNER OF RUE BILAL 62 STANDING NEXT TO A SOLID GREEN LAND ROVER WITH A MACHINE GUN MOUNTED ON A PYLON IN THE BEB OF THE TRUCK. THE TRYCK WAS FACING NORTH, TOWARD THE SOUK AREAM NO LICENSE PLATE WAS OBSERVED. THERE WAS THE ONE ARMED MAN ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF



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THE CORNICHE MAZRAA (EAST BOUND LANE). ALL WERE DRESSED IN THE SAME UNIFORM EXCEPT FOR ONE MAN WHO WORE A "KAPPUR" ON HIS HEAD. THE KAPPUR WAS WHITE WITH NAVY BLUE STRIPES AT EACH END.

4. ONLY ONE MAN COULD BE DESCRIBED WITH ANY ASSURANCE; THIS WAS THE MAN WHO STOOPED THE CAR AND DID THE TALKING

HEIGHT: ABOUT 6 FEET

WEIGHT: UNKNOWN, 140-150 (097,3)

-83; YOUNG

BUILD: VERY THIN

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: NONE

NATIONALITY BY ACCENT THE MAN WAS LEBABSES.

5. UNIFORMS:

SHIRT: DARK GREEN FATIGUES

TROUSERS: DARK GREEN

HEADGEAR: NONE (WITH THE EXCEPTION NOTED)

ARMS: AK-47

IDENTIFYING INSIGNIA: OVAL, APPROX 3" (LONG AXIS).

BY 2" (SHORT AXIS) RED BORDER GREEN BACKGROUND, RED DEVICE WHICH RESEMBLED A ROUGH CRESCENT, ENDS POINTING UP, SHAPED SOMETHING LIKE THE BLADE OF A SCIMITAR.

GODLEX

UNQUOTE, INGERSOLL

BT



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TOR:296/00:58Z

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1675 2960052
O 230012Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3306
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 2861

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251675 TOSEC 160258

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10664 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT 22 OCT 75
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIR

10664

EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE EG
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING IN BEIRUT
REF: STATE 251019

1. UPON RECEIPT OF REPTTEL I CONTACTED OSAMA EL-BAZ, FAHMY'S CHEF DE CABINET, TO SEEK GOE ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. OSAMA SAID THEY WERE ALREADY WORKING ON THE CASE AND HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THEY HAD NOT YET ASCERTAINED IDENTITY OF ABDUCTORS, HOWEVER, I PASSED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED REPTTEL ABOUT KIDNAPPING HAVING TAKEN PLACE IN AREA NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY PALESTINIANS AND LEFTIST MUSLIMS.

2. I EXPRESSED MY APPRECAITION FOR THE PROMPT AND ACTIVE INTEREST GOE WAS DEMONSTRATING IN THIS MATTER AND ASKED THAT I BE KEPT POSTED ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

3. COMMENT: OVER AND ABOVE USUAL HELPFUL ATTITUDE NORMALLY DISPLAYED BY EGYPTIANS IN SUCH MATTERS, THERE IS ALSO THEIR CONCERN OVER IMPACT SUCH ACTIONS BY ARABS MIGHT HAVE ON SADAT'S UPCOMING VISIT TO

US.
MAESTRONE
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT

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EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
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By HR NAFA, Date 8/10/10



PSN:249725 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/01:01Z DTG:230012Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #1739 2960053
 O 230025Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3308

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251739 TOSEC 160200

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OCON, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: ARA C.O.M. CONFERENCE
 (S/S NO. 7522036)

REF: SECTO 16052

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

1. I BELIEVE THAT SCHEDULING THE ARA C.O.M. CONFERENCE DECEMBER 20-23 MIGHT BE IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO CHRISTMAS. I HAVE CHECKED WITH YOUR STAFF AND HAVE LEARNED THAT YOU MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN OUR CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE FOR AN HOUR OR SO NOVEMBER 24-26. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD SCHEDULE THE C.O.M. CONFERENCE BEFORE YOUR TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA. IF THE NOVEMBER DATES ARE NOT SATISFACTORY, WE WOULD SCHEDULE IT IN EARLY JANUARY.

2. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ARA CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE FOR AN HOUR OR SO SOMETIME IN THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 24-26.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

3. ALTERNATIVELY, THAT YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE IN JANUARY BEFORE YOUR LATIN AMERICAN TRIP.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1740 2960054
O 230027Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3309

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251740 TOSEC 160261

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), -FOR

SUBJECT: YOUR APPEARANCE BEFORE THE PIKE COMMITTEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MCCLOSKEY

1. AS YOU INSTRUCTED, WE HAVE CONFIRMED OCTOBER 31 WITH THE PIKE COMMITTEE AND REQUESTED A STARTING TIME OF 1100 A.M.

2. AGENDA. PIKE SAID HE WANTED THE HEARING TO COVER (A) ALL DOCUMENTS THUS FAR DENIED TO THE COMMITTEE, INCLUDING THE BOYATT MEMORANDUM; (B) CYPRUS; (C) KUI ISH SITUATION; (D) ANY OTHER ISSUES IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS INDICATE YOU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING THE ANGOLAN SITUATION, WHICH MAY PROVE TO BE ONE OF THOSE ISSUES.

3. PIKE SAID THE COMMITTEE WOULD GIVE "ADEQUATE NOTICE" OF THE SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED. ONCE THE AGENDA HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN OPEN AND EXECUTIVE SESSION WOULD BE WORKED OUT.

4. WE SPOKE SEPARATELY WITH THE RANKING REPUBLICAN, MCCLODY. HE ADVISED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE, THE COMMITTEE WOULD LIKELY COVER A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS. HE WOULD EXPECT PIKE AND OTHERS TO DELVE INTO DOMESTIC WIRE

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TAPS, THE MID EAST, PORTUGAL, AND CHILE, AMONG OTHERS.

5. MCCLORY SUGGESTED THAT YOU OUGHT TO BRING THE BOYATT MEMORANDUM WITH YOU AND MAKE THE GRAND GESTURE OF SHOWING IT TO THE COMMITTEE AS EVIDENCE THAT YOUR CONCERN IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVING JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS AND NOT, AS SOME COMMITTEE MEMBERS ASSUME, A DESIRE TO CONCEAL ADVICE, GOOD OR BAD, WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTED.

6. WE SUGGESTED TO BOTH PIKE AND MCCLORY THAT THE AGENDA BE LIMITED TO PERMIT SERIOUS COVERAGE OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED, BUT NEITHER RESPONDED. INGERSOLL
BT



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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1745 2960055
O 230039Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251745 TOSSEC 166262

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SO, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOMALI AMBASSADOR
FOR BREMER FROM DAVIS

1. PRESIDENT HAS NOW SIGNED FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH IS
READY FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT SIAD OF SOMALIA:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: IT WAS A PLEASURE TO
RECEIVE YOUR AMBASSADOR, MR. ABDULLAHI AHMED ADDOU, WHO
DELIVERED YOUR LETTER TO ME. IN OUR CONVERSATION WE
RECALLED THE GOOD MEETING YOU AND I HAD IN WASHINGTON A
YEAR AGO.

AS I SAID TO YOU ON THAT OCCASION, THE UNITED STATES
DESIRES GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT. I
AM PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU THAT IT IS A PRINCIPLE OF
YOUR GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. I
AM CONFIDENT SUCH A POLICY SHOULD FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE IMPROVED RELATIONS WE BOTH SEEK.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST
REGARDS. SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD. UNQUOTE

2. IN VIEW QUESTIONS SECRETARY HAS RAISED REGARDING SOMALIA
IN CONNECTION ITS POSITION ON KOREAN ISSUE, WOULD APPRE-
CIATE YOUR INFORMING US WHETHER HE WOULD LIKE US TO HOLD
UP LETTER OR TO PROCEED WITH TRANSMITTING IT TO EMBASSY
MOGADISCIO FOR DELIVERY. INGERSOLL



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OP IMMED /PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #1540 2960110
 O P 222343Z OCT 75 ZFF5
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 7449
 AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 7275
 AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 8861
 AMEMBASSY MANILA 0536
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5884

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3311
 AMEMBASSY PARIS 1215
 USMISSION USUN NY 5354
 AMEMBASSY WARSAW 6393
 AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 2437
 AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0011
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9904
 USMISSION GENEVA 4530
 AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3307
 CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251540 TOSEC 100263

E.O. 11652:NA TAGS: CASC, XX, VS, LA

SUBJECT: AMERICANS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

REFS: A) STATE 250584 B) GENEVA 7993 C) VIENTIANE 5998
 (ALL NOTAL)
 FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB WITH SECRETARY.

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM UNHCR NEW YORK THAT US AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART HANOI OCTOBER 30 AT 10:30 AM ON UNHCR CHARTERED AIR LAOS AIRCRAFT. FLIGHT MAY STOP (POSSIBLY FOR LUNCH) AT VIENTIANE AND CONTINUE TO BANGKOK, PER OUR REQUEST.

2. UNHCR STILL DOES NOT HAVE LIST BUT HOPES TO HAVE IT BY TOMORROW. WE CONTINUE TO ASSUME THOSE TO BE RELEASED ARE PRIMARILY THE BAN ME THUOT GROUP.

3. SUGGEST OTTAWA AND CANBERRA INFORM HOSTS OF THIS INFO

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AND SUGGEST THEIR EMBASSIES IN BANGKOK COORDINATE WITH OURS.

4. FOR MANILA: WE ASSUME ENRIQUE TOLENTINO IS AMONG GROUP, PLUS POSSIBLY ANOTHER (UNIDENTIFIED) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL. IF APPROPRIATE YOU COULD SUGGEST PHILIPPINE EMBASSY ALSO CONTACT OURS IN BANGKOK.

5. FOR BANGKOK: DR. LOUIS L. KING, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN MISSIONS OF CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY ALLIANCE, PLANS ARRIVE BANGKOK BY OCTOBER 29 TO HELP GREET RETURNEES. HE ASKS IF EMBASSY COULD CONTACT BOB GUNTHER AT CMA RESIDENCE, TEL. 75834, ADDRESS: 28/2 PRACHA UTIT LANE, PRADIPAT RD., BANGKOK 4, TO INFORM HIM OF FORTHCOMING REPATRIATION AND DR. KING'S ARRIVAL.

6. FOR VIENTIANE: UNHCR REP CASELLA PLANS ACCOMPANY FLIGHT FROM HANOI. HE PLANS TRANSIT VIENTIANE ON HIS WAY IN AROUND OCTOBER 25-26 AND WILL CONTACT EMBASSY. INGERSOLL
BT



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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #1276 2960554
P 22211Z OCT 75 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1216
ZEN/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3308

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3312
USLO PEKING 6440
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7450
ZEN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 7276
USMISSION GENEVA 4542
ZEN/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5885
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5355

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 251276 TOSEC 100264
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ETEL, PFOR, ITU, VS, VN

SUBJECT: SOUTH VIET-NAM AGREES TO POSTAL SERVICE FROM US
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB WITH SECRETARY

1. US POSTAL SERVICE INFORMED DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 22 THAT
USPS HAS RECEIVED TELEX FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE POSTAL
AUTHORITIES AGREEING TO ACCEPT MAIL FROM US ON SAME BASIS
AS MAIL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, I.E. SMALL LETTER MAIL,
VERY SMALL PARCELS, NO REGISTERED MAIL, BY OPEN TRANSIT
THROUGH HANOI.

2. USPS PLANS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS TO
LOCAL POST OFFICES NEXT WEEK. DEPARTMENT PLANS TO MAK
NO RPT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR COMMENT PRIOR TO USPS
RELEASE.

3. FOR PARIS AND HONG KONG: SUGGEST YOU INFORM LOCAL
POSTAL AUTHORITIES OF THIS DEVELOPMENT IN VIEW OF RECENT



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CONTACTS ON THIS SUBJECT. INGERSOLL
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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #1277 2960127
P 222114Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 251277 FOSEC 160265

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, UR, US, PARM, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT COLUMN ON OP-ED PAGE, NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, HEADED "ANDREI AMALRIK, ON DETENTE."

2. THE WRITER OF THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE, A 37-YEAR-OLD HISTORIAN AND DISSIDENT, IS BEST KNOWN IN THE WEST FOR HIS BOOK "WILL THE USSR SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?" IN WHICH HE POSTULATES THAT HOSTILITY AMONG VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS AND AN EVENTUAL WAR WITH CHINA COULD TEAR THE SOVIET UNION APART. LAST MAY, HE RETURNED TO MOSCOW AFTER FIVE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT AND INTERNAL EXILE ON CHARGES ARISING FROM HIS WRITINGS. BARRED FROM RESIDENCE IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH, HE NOW LIVES IN A NEARBY TOWN AND IS PERMITTED TO VISIT THE CITY TWO AND THREE DAYS AT A TIME. THIS WAS TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY THE NEW YORK TIMES.

3. MOSCOW--ASSESSING THE ADVANTAGES OF DETENTE OVER THE COLD WAR, WE DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT, IT SEEMS, TO SAY THAT DETENTE IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. THE COLD WAR, BEING A FORM OF SUBLIMATION OF HOT WAR, WAS NOT LESS EFFECTIVE THAN "DETENTE" IN AVERTING A REAL WAR, BECAUSE PEACE DEPENDED, AND STILL DEPENDS, ON THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER. THEREFORE, EVEN A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF WEAPONS, SHOULD IT EVER BE ACHIEVED, WOULD NOT REDUCE AND WOULD NOT INCREASE THE RISKS OF WAR.



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4. THE RISE IN ARMAMENTS IS A CONSEQUENCE OF CONFRONTATION, NOT ITS CAUSE, AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IS A CONSEQUENCE OF SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS. INASMUCH AS AN ACCORD ABOUT REDUCTIONS IN THESE OR THOSE AREAS WILL NOT END EITHER CONFRONTATION OR PROGRESS, THE ARMS RACE IF SUPPRESSED IN ONE AREA WILL MERELY EMERGE IN ANOTHER. A REDUCTION IN ARMS MAY BE A RESULT OF DETENTE BUT IT IS NOT ITS SOLE NOR BASIC CONTENT. THEREFORE, IT IS BETTER TO LOOK UPON DETENTE AS AN INSTRUMENT NOT FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE BUT RATHER FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORLD. OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE IN DETENTE.

5. AN IMPRESSION IS GROWING, HOWEVER, THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. IN DETENTE IS PRECISELY THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE EXISTING SITUATION. IT SEEMS TO BE STRIVING TO ENTANGLE THE U.S.S.R. IN A WEB OF TREATIES AND MUTUAL COMMITMENTS, AND THEREBY DEPRIVE IT OF THE ABILITY TO DISRUPT WORLD STABILITY WITHOUT CONCERN THAT THESE TIES MIGHT BE SEVERED.

6. SOVIET UNION'S AIMS. FOR THE USSR, THE SIDE STILL ON THE OFFENSIVE, THE OBJECTIVES OF DETENTE ARE MUCH BROADER. THE USSR IS STRIVING TO EMERGE FROM ISOLATION FOR AT LEAST THREE REASONS: FIRST, TO USE DETENTE WITH THE WEST TO MANIPULATE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ONE BY ONE RATHER THAN AS A GROUP, AND THIS IS ALREADY HAPPENING TO A CERTAIN EXTENT; SECOND, TO ASSURE ITSELF OF A SECURE REAR IN VIEW OF THE HOSTILE RELATIONS WITH CHINA; THIRD, TO OVERCOME THE ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS DERIVING FROM THE ISOLATION.

7. DESPITE IMPORTANT MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL ACHIEVEMENTS, THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR REMAINS BOGGED DOWN AND NEEDS TECHNOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODERNIZATION, AND THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. IN ADDITION, THE BACKWARD STATE OF AGRICULTURE COMPELS THE USSR TO BUY GRAIN REGULARLY IN THE WEST. TWO BAD HARVESTS IN SUCCESSION WITHOUT SUCH PURCHASES COULD SHAKE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND EVEN PROVOKE MASS UPHEAVALS.

8. FURTHER, DETENTE IS EXPLAINED, AS I SEE IT, BY TWO NOT FULLY CLEAR BUT REAL CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST, BY THE FACT THAT THE US AND THE USSR REGARD EACH OTHER AS THE ONLY EQUAL PARTNERS; SECOND, THAT THEY ALONG WITH OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES NOT ONLY RIVALS BUT ALSO TO A CERTAIN DEGREE AS ALLIES--



SOMEWHAT LIKE A GROUP OF WELL-FED IN A CROWD OF HUNGRY.

9. I SPEAK OF THESE TENDENCIES RECOGNIZING THAT OPPOSING TENDENCIES ARE AT WORK AND THAT THE USSR REMAINS IN THE EYES OF THE US, AS BEFORE, A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE. WHETHER OR NOT THE AMERICAN LEADERS RECOGNIZE IT, A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT A CHANGE IN ITS INTERNAL SITUATION.

10. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A STATE COMBINING CONSTANT SUPPRESSION AND VIOLENCE INTERNALLY WITH PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR AND ACCOMMODATION EXTERNALLY. SUCH "PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR" COULD ONLY BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF MILITARY WEAKNESS OR OF DECEPTIVE CAMOUFLAGE. THEREFORE, ANY RELAXATION IN THE INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE USSR SHOULD BE DESIRABLE TO THE AMERICANS NOT ONLY OUT OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS ALSO VITALLY IMPORTANT TO THEM FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN SECURITY, AND THEREFORE CAN BE REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF U.S. POLICY.

11. SINCE THE U.S., IN WORKING OUT ITS POLITICAL STRATEGY, CHOSE COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. RATHER THAN ITS ISOLATION, TWO TACTICAL VARIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE:

1. TO MOVE TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT EXPECTING THAT THE COOPERATION OF THE US AND THE WEST IN GENERAL WOULD GRADUALLY "SOFTEN" THE USSR.

2. TO TIE EVERY STEP TOWARD THE USSR TO A DEMAND FOR A PARTICULAR CHANGE IN BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES, UNDERSTANDING THEIR INTERDEPENDENCY.

12. AN IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED THAT RICHARD M. NIXON AND HENRY A. KISSINGER CHOSE THE FIRST PATH AS THE ONE SEEMINGLY REQUIRING LESS EFFORT AND GIVING VISIBLE RESULTS PROMPTLY. MR. KISSINGER SOUGHT TO RESOLVE IN BARELY TWO YEARS THE CHALLENGE OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE USSR, A TASK REQUIRING, LET US SAY, TWO DECADES. SUCH WASTE POSSIBLY REFLECTS NOT ONLY THE MENTALITY OF MR. KISSINGER HIMSELF BUT ALSO THE FEATURES OF AMERICAN MENTALITY IN GENERAL-- THE MENTALTY OF BUSINESSMEN WHO WANT TO SEE AT ONCE THE TANGIBLE RESULTS OF THEIR EFFORTS.



13. THIS LED THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE HASTY SIGNING OF A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRESENTING THEM TO THE CITIZENS ON TELEVISION AND SAYING: "LOOK! WE HAVE DONE THIS AND THIS AND THIS," BUT T U. S. I IS DEALING WITH A PARTNER WITH WHICH IT IS DANGEROUS TO

MAKE HASTE. EVEN IF THE SOVIET LEADERS DO NOT POSSESS THE MANY BRILLIANT QUALITIES OF MR. KISSINGER, THEY ARE ABLE TO A SUPERLATIVE DEGREE TO SET THEMSELVES DISTANT GOALS AND ALSO TO WAIT PATIENTLY.

14. AMERICAN POLICY DIFFERS FROM SOVIET POLICY IN TWO OTHER FEATURES. FOREIGN POLICY IN A WAY IS A PUPIL OF INTERNAL POLICY. THE MENTALITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RISING TO FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN SHAPED FOR YEARS BY DEALING WITH INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND ALL THE METHODS THEY HAVE MASTERED INSIDE THE COUNTRY ARE APPLIED ABROAD.

15. AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE BASED ON A PLAY OF FREE FORCES, SETTLED BY COMPROMISE, WHILE SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE BASED ON A NO-COMPROMISE IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTRUCTIONS. AND WHILE THE US MAY SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE CONSCIOUSLY OR SUBCONSCIOUSLY THINKING OF COMPROMISE, THE USSR SITS DOWN WITH THE INTENTION OF ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES IN FULL, AGREEING ONLY TO FICTITIOUS CONCESSIONS.

16. THE OTHER STRANGE FEATURE OF AMERICAN POLICY, AS WITH THE POLICY OF THE WEST IN GENERAL, IS THE TREATMENT OF THE USSR LIKE A SMALL CHILD WHO MUST BE ALLOWED EVERYTHING AND NOT BE IRRITATED BECAUSE HE MIGHT START SCREAMING--ALL BECAUSE, THEY SAY, WHEN IT GROWS UP IT WILL UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING.

17. DR. SPOCK! METHODS. THIS PROLONGED "UPBRINGING" OF THE USSR BY THE METHODS OF DR. SPOCK IS REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN AN ENDLESS NUMBER OF MINOR CONCESSIONS BY THE US BUT ALSO IN ACTIONS THAT ARE SIMPLY HUMILIATING FOR ITS PRESTIGE AS A BIG POWER. THIS WAS MOST CLEARLY ILLUSTRATED BY THE RELUCTANCE OF PRESIDENT FORD TO INVITE ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN TO THE WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE MR. KISSINGER FEARED THIS WOULD INFURIATE LEONID I. BREZHNEV.

18. SUCH BEHAVIOR IN GENERAL IS VERY TYPICAL FOR REPRESENTATIVE



SENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. THUS, AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN ACQUAINTED FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS AND WHO RECENTLY RETURNED TO MOSCOW DECLINED FOR THE SAME REASONS TO MEET WITH ME, ALTHOUGH HE DID SEND EXPRESSIONS OF HIS SYMPATHY VIA AN INTERMEDIARY.

19. KNOWING THE CHARACTER OF THOSE WHOM THE AMERICANS ARE TRYING TO PLAY UP TO BY SUCH BEHAVIOR, I BELIEVE THAT EVEN THOUGH IT WINS APPROVAL FROM THEIR SIDE IT ALSO AROUSES A DEGREE OF CONTEMPT.

20. AS I GET OLDER, IT BECOMES EVER CLEARER TO ME THAT THE BEST IN THE WORLD FINDS ITS EXPRESSION IN SIMPLE HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS: THE LOVE OF A HUSBAND FOR HIS WIFE AND PARENTS FOR THEIR CHILDREN, THE COMRADESHIP OF MEN, COMPASSION, PATIENCE AND SIMPLE DECENCY; WHILE ANY IDEOLOGY AND DOCTRINE, IF NOT USED WITH CARE AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS, MAY LEAD TO THE CHOPPING OFF OF HEADS OR, IN THE BEST OF CASES, TO THE STUFFING OF MONEY BAGS.

21. THE FACT THAT TWO PERSONS WHO WERE ABLE TO MEET MORE THAN 10 YEARS AGO WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE AND NOW, IN THE PERIOD OF "DETENTE," ARE UNABLE TO MEET DOES NOT SPEAK IN FAVOR OF DETENTE'S HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS.

22. IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME CORRECT, IN LIGHT OF THE LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. RATHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE ONES, THAT THERE IS A DESIRE "NOT TO OVERLOAD" DETENTE, AS MR. KISSINGER HAS SAID, WITH HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, AND TO YIELD ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS POLITICALLY UNIMPORTANT AND ANNOYING TO THE U.S.S.R., ALL IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SALE OF PEPSI-COLA.

23. THE BASIS OF STABILITY. IF THE US SETS ITSELF THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING TRULY FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND WANTS TO BE ASSURED OF THEIR DURABILITY, THEN IT MUST STRIVE FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CLOSED SOVIET SYSTEM TO AN OPEN ONE. THE AWAKENING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FORCE WORKING IN THIS DIRECTION.

24. INASMUCH AS THE MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAS NO TROOPS, THE POLITICIAN-POLICEMEN AND THE POLITICIAN-BUSINESSMEN ARE INCLINED TO SLIGHT IT. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT



IT IS PRECISELY THE WORLD MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS THAT WILL BECOME A WORLD-TRANSFORMING FORCE THAT WILL OVERCOME BOTH INHUMANITY BASED ON VIOLENCE AND INHUMANITY BASED ON INDIFFERENCE.

25. GENUINE STABILITY COMES ONLY IN A PROCESS OF MOVEMENT, ONLY IN THE EXPANSION OF INFLUENCE. THE US MUST STRIVE FOR A TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD IF IT WANTS IT TO BE MORE STABLE. A SYSTEM THAT DOES NOT SET EXPANSIONIST GOALS FOR ITSELF CONTRACTS AND DIES AWAY. THE WORLD HAS EXPERIENCED MANY FORMS OF EXPANSION--MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL. IF THE US CAN BECOME THE CENTER OF A NEW EXPANSION, A HUMANITARIAN EXPANSION BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, ITS FUTURE WOULD BE ASSURED FOR A LONG TIME.

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26. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THIS IDEALISTIC ELEMENT HAS ALREADY, TO A LESSER OR GREATER DEGREE, BEEN FELT IN AMERICAN POLITICS DURING THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE U.S. THE OLD-FASHIONED EUROPEAN POLITICAL MENTALITY--WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND WITHOUT INTEREST IN HIGHER GOALS--IS NOT LIKELY TO LONG DOMINATE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S. NO MATTER HOW MUCH MORE MR. KISSINGER WANTS TO CAST ASIDE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, THEY COME TO THE SURFACE BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER. THIS IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS OVER THE QUESTION OF TRADE AND OF EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR.

27. THESE DIFFERENCES, ALTHOUGH RESTRICTING THE ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DO GIVE IT CERTAIN BENEFITS. THE TRIANGLE OF MR. KISSINGER, MR. BREZHNEV AND HENRY M. JACKSON REMINDS ME SOMEWHAT OF THE SITUATION WHEN A CRIMINAL IS BEING INDUCED TO CONFESS BY TWO INTERROGATORS, ONE OF WHOM--SENATOR JACKSON--SHOUTS AND BEATS HIS FIST ON THE TABLE, AND THE OTHER--SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER--WHO SMILES AND GENTLY PROMISES LENIENCY. SO THE HEART OF THE CRIMINAL, FACED WITH SUCH CONTRASTS, OPENS UP TO THE KIND SMILE.

28. THE US GOVERNMENT EVIDENTLY IS FEELING THE PRESSURE OF BUSINESS CIRCLES, HEADED BY MAKERS OF SOFT DRINKS, INTERESTED IN COOPERATION WITH THE USSR BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER IT A GIGANTIC POTENTIAL MARKET FOR THEIR PRODUCTS AND A SOURCE OF RAW MATERIALS AND CHEAP LABOR. ONE CAN



ONLY WELCOME ECONOMIC COOPERATION IF IT IS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE, BUT NOT A FORCE SHAPING THIS POLICY.

29. WITHOUT DOUBT, BUSINESSMEN HAVE MADE AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREATION OF MODERN AMERICA, BUT WHEN THEY BECAME THE LEADING POLITICAL FORCE THEY LED THE U.S. TO THE BRINK OF DISASTER--TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF THE 1930's.

30. AMERICANS ARE A PEOPLE EASILY CARRIED AWAY. WHEN THEY WERE CARRIED AWAY BY THE COLD WAR, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE WERE SOBER VOICES PROPOSING SOME KIND OF ALTERNATIVE. NOW THE AMERICANS ARE CARRIED AWAY BY "DETENTE," AND IT IS GOOD THAT WARNING VOICES ARE BEING HEARD. THE WARNING IS THAT DETENTE REQUIRES RESTRAINT AND DETERMINATION--NOT MERELY A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE --AND THAT MEEK CONCESSIONS WILL ONLY LEAD TO DEMANDS FOR MORE CONCESSIONS. PERHAPS THE VOICES WILL BE HEEDED.

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31. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTE, WHICH ITS SUPPORTERS HAVE DEMANDED TO HEAR FROM ITS CRITICS, IS DETENTE CARRIED OUT DIFFERENTLY, DETENTE IN WHICH LONG-RANGE GOALS ARE NOT SACRIFICED TO SHORT-TERM GOALS? AND ONE MUST LEARN TO WAIT FOR WHAT IS DESIRED.

32. FOREIGN POLICY DOES NOT EXIST BY ITSELF. IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A COUNTRY'S INTERNAL CONDITION, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDS UPON EXTERNAL CONDITIONS. IF ONE ACCEPTS THE PREMISE THAT WITHOUT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE USSR THE US CANNOT EXERT INFLUENCE ON IT, THEN ONE MUST SAY THAT IF THIS INFLUENCE IS NOT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION THE RAPPROCHEMENT WILL BE EVEN DANGEROUS FOR THE US. WHEN THE USSR MUST PAY FOR EVERY BUSHEL OF GRAIN AND FOR EVERY TECHNOLOGICAL SECRET NOT SO MUCH WITH GOLD AS WITH A STEP TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION OF ITS SOCIETY, ONLY THEN WILL ITS FOREIGN POLICY CEASE TO PRESENT A THREAT TO THE WEST.

33. HOWEVER, THIS EXCHANGE, THIS "GENTLE PRESSURE" SHOULD NOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF WOUNDING THE SELF-RESPECT OF THE USSR. LET IT PROCEED UNDER THE BANNER OF DEMANDING FULFILLMENT FROM THE USSR OF THE INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS IT HAS SIGNED. AND EVERY CONCESSION SHOULD BE



LOOKED UPON NOT AS A "VICTORY FOR THE WEST" BUT RATHER AS A STEP TOWARD COMMON GOOD.

34. IN THE EMERGING TRIANGLE OF POWERS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE US TOWARD THE USSR AND CHINA, AMID SOME SIMILARITIES, IS VERY DIFFERENT. CHINA HAS NOT DEVELOPED YET TO THE LEVEL OF TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US ECONOMICALLY, SOCIALLY OR POLITICALLY; AND MILITARILY IT PRESENTS MUCH LESS OF A DANGER TO THE US THAN DOES THE USSR. FURTHER, THE MAINSPRING OF REVOLUTION STILL HAS NOT UNWOUND IN CHINA. ANY ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON CHINA FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERNAL CHANGE MOST PROBABLY WILL YIELD NO RESULTS. CHINA IS STILL SO FAR FROM THE WEST THAT EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS THERE IS REGARDED ALMOST LIKE SOMETHING ON THE MOON. CHINA IS STILL TOO "ALIEN" FOR PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST TO REACH OUT A HAND TO THOSE WHO ARE SUBJECTED TO PERSECUTION.

35. PRESSURE FROM THE WEST. IT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER WITH THE USSR. FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS TRAGIC EURASIAN GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION, RUSSIA HAS ALWAYS BEEN BOTH MORE SENSITIVE TO THE WEST AND MORE DANGEROUS TO THE WEST THAN HAS CHINA. THE MAINSPRING OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION HAS COMPLETELY UNWOUND. AND MOVING NOW ONLY BY THE FORCE OF INERTIA, THE USSR WILL BE HIGHLY RESPONSIVE

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TO PRESSURE FROM THE WEST, ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE OF A HOSTILE CHINA AT ITS BACK. AND IT IS FULLY CLEAR THAT THE MORE THE RELATIONS OF THE USSR WITH THE WEST EXPAND, THE MORE IT BECOMES "FAMILIAR" TO THE WEST, THE MORE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST WILL KEEP AN ALERT WATCH ON EVENTS IN THE USSR.

36. IF THE RIVALRY OF THE USSR AND CHINA BECOMES EVER SHARPER, AND I BELIEVE THAT IT WILL, THEN THE TIES OF THE US TO THE USSR AND CHINA WILL BECOME LIKE TWO SETS OF REINS IN THE HANDS OF THE AMERICAN LEADERS, WHICH THEY CAN USE TO GUIDE THE COURSE OF WORLD HISTORY.

37. BUT THE QUESTION IS, WILL THEY?

38. LET US ASSUME THAT A STATE OR A GROUP OF STATES, WORKING OUT LONG-RANGE POLICIES, SHOULD DEFINE THE GOALS,



STRATEGY AND TACTICS. AS VIEWED FROM HERE IN RUSSIA, ONE MIGHT SAY THAT THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE US IS CORRECT, BUT THAT ITS TACTICS IN EFFECT ARE UNDERMINING THAT STRATEGY. BUT WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT, THE POLICIES OF THE U.S.--AND EVEN MORE SO OF THE WEST IN GENERAL--REVEAL VERY DIM OBJECTIVES OR EVEN THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVES; THE PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ARE NOT REALLY OBJECTIVES.

39. PERHAPS THE DISSENT AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE THAT HAVE SEIZED THE WEST AND HAVE FOUND PARTIAL REFLECTION IN "DETENTE" WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A PERCEPTION OF THE SIGNIFICANT OBJECTIVES--THE OBJECTIVES OF RESHAPING THE WORLD, AT THE BASIS OF WHICH WILL BE THE HUMAN PERSONALITY, A PERSONALITY IN ITS BROAD HUMAN, NOT EGOISTIC, ESSENCE. THEN THE WEST, SURE OF ITSELF, WILL BEGIN TO SPEAK IN A DIFFERENT VOICE. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, H. A.)

SUBJECT: TRAVELLING PRESS REPORTAGE, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS
NO. 18

MODERATE COVERAGE, WITH MAO MEETING AS MAJOR ITEM.

1. WIRES

UPI SAYS HAK "UNDAUNTED BY MAO'S WARNING AGAINST SOVIET AMERICAN DETENTE, WORKED TODAY TO SET STAGE FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S COMING VISIT." DIPLOMATS CITED THAT HAK TRYING TO CORRECT THE "MISUNDERSTANDING" OVER US/SOVIET RELATIONS. HE MET TODAY WITH CHIAO AND TENG AFTER ASST SEC HABIB MET WITH LIN PING ON BILATERAL ISSUES IN MORNING. NO ANNOUNCEMENTS OF TOPICS FROM MEETINGS.

DURING TUESDAY MEETING WITH MAO, DIPLOMATS SAID, CHAIRMAN-POET "SWITCHED FROM LYRICAL LANGUAGE TO TOUGH PROSE WHEN HE SPOKE OF DANGERS OF DETENTE...KISSINGER REPORTEDLY RESPONDED TO CRITICISM BY SAYING DETENTE SERVES INTERESTS OF GLOBAL PEACE AND DOES NOT HARM ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN WORLD".

AP - NO REPORT ON WIRE AS OF 1130 A.M.

2. PAPERS -

NYTIMES - GELB (ON FRONT PAGE WITH PHOTO OF HAK/MAO HAND-



SHAKE) SAYS MEETING SYMBOLICALLY DRAMATIZES "WHAT BOTH SIDES HAVE SOUGHT TO CONVEY: IDEA THAT CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE GETTING BETTER ALL TIME." NCNA RELEASE AND STATE SPOKESMAN CITED, WITH LIMITED DETAILS, "THAT WAS ALL THAT WAS SAID AS AMERICAN OFFICIALS CONTINUED A POLICY OF SCRUPULOUS SECRECY". SPECULATION THAT LAST TRIP DID NOT INCLUDE MAO MEETING BECAUSE OF CONTINUED US/TAIWAN TIES GAVE WAY TO BELIEF THAT IT REFLECTED INSTEAD GENERAL DISORDER WITHIN PRC.

"CHINESE DO NOT GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF WHO WILL BE DOING NEGOTIATING...AND UNTIL EACH DAY DRAWS TO A CLOSE, HAK IS NOT TOLD WHETHER THERE WILL BE A MEETING NEXT DAY." OBSERVATIONS ON NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCES SHARED WITH REPORTERS: PRC HAS ONLY ONE NEGOTIATOR AND ONLY ONE POSITION; "THIS IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO RUSSIANS, WHO HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO SPEAK THROUGH MANY OFFICIALS AND WITH DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW."

"ANOTHER POINT OF DIFFERENCE IS THAT CHINESE WILL TAKE ONE POSITION AND NEVER CHANGE, WHILE RUSSIANS WILL HAGGLE TO SHOW THEIR COLLEAGUES THAT THEY HAVE MADE A GOOD BARGAIN... CHINESE DO THEIR MANEUVERING NOT BY CHANGING THEIR BARGAINING POSITIONS, BUT BY KEEPING OUTSIDERS GUESSING AND OFF BALANCE."

WASHINGTON POST - GREENWAY (ALSO ON FRONT PAGE, WITH SAME PHOTO) SAYS HAK HAD FOURTH MEETING IN EIGHT VISITS. "MEETING WITH MAO CAME AS IT WAS BEGINNING TO APPEAR THAT CHINESE WERE PREPARED TO BE TOUGHER ON AMERICANS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS THAN THEY WERE A YEAR AGO."

"IT WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT, HOWEVER, FOR CHINESE TO WANT TO BLESS BASIC SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND UPCOMING VISIT OF PRESIDENT FORD WHILE VOICING THEIR COMPLAINTS AND FEARS ON DRIFT OF AMERICAN POLICY AT WORKING SESSION." VICE PREMIER TENG IS "NO-NONSENSE TYPE OF FELLOW...LESS LIKELY TO BE CHARMED BY HAK THAN WAS CHOU EN-LAI."

"IN CONVERSATIONS WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS HERE, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE A BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINESE AND "SENIOR OFFICIAL" WHO BRIEFS PRESS ON HAK'S PLANE, THAT CEMENT THAT BINDS CHINESE AND AMERICANS TOGETHER IS FEAR OF SOVIET UNION."

CHINESE OFFICIALS SAY TAIWAN IS U.S. PROBLEM, NOT THEIRS, BUT INDICATIONS ARE THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED U.S. HAS NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH PROBLEM. DETENTE IS MAJOR DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER.



(CHITRIB AND LATIMES NOT IN. NOTHING FROM KEATLEY IN WSJOURNAL.)

3. NETWORKS -

DON OLIVER, NBC TV - "IT WASN'T UNTIL LATE IN DAY THAT SECSTATE HAD A FORMAL MEETING, THIRD SO FAR, WITH VICE PREMIER TENG. OFFICIALLY, NEITHER SIDE IS SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT THESE MEETINGS. BUT ONE SOURCE IN AMERICAN DELEGATION SAID THAT DETENTE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN A MAIN TOPIC. SOURCE SAID CHINESE STILL MISUNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION ON DETENTE AND THAT NO HEADWAY HAS BEEN MADE ON ISSUE.

"HAK'S NEXT SCHEDULED STOP WAS THIS RECEPTION. TWO HUNDRED FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS WERE GATHERED TOGETHER BY U.S. LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING. GUESTS WERE ALL HERE AT 6:30 P.M., BUT HAK WAS NOT. IN A SURPRISE MOVE, HE HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF BY CHINESE FOR MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO.

"HAK HAD ONLY A HALF AN HOUR TO PREPARE FOR TALKS WITH MAO. HE, HIS WIFE, NANCY, AND SEVEN MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF WERE DRIVEN TO MAO'S RESIDENCE NEAR FORBIDDEN CITY IN PEKING. CHAIRMAN MAO RECEIVED THEM ALL IN A PICTURE-TAKING CEREMONY; HE EVEN SHOOK HANDS WITH ONE OF HAK SECRETARIES WHO HAPPENED TO BE ALONG.

"HAK AND TWO AIDES REMAINED BEHIND FOR TALKS THEMSELVES. MEETING LASTED AN HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES. CHINESE SAID LATER CONVERSATION COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AND WAS HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. BUT ONE U. S. SOURCE SAID MAO STRONGLY QUESTIONED U.S. POLICY OF DETENTE WITH SOVIET UNION. PUBLICLY, CHINESE HAVE SAID THAT DETENTE IS A FRAUD. BUT PRIVATELY, THEY ARE SAID TO VIEW SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AS A THREAT TO CHINA.

"CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THAT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL NOT IMPROVE UNTIL THREAT OF DETENTE IS ELIMINATED."

TED KOPPEL, ABC TV - "HE IS OLD AND HIS HEALTH IS FAILING. THERE IS SOME QUESTION OVER HOW MUCH CONTROL HE HAS OVER DAY-TO-DAY AFFAIRS IN CHINA. AND A HANDSHAKE WITH MAO STILL WON'T BUY YOU A RIDE ON A N.Y. SUBWAY UNLESS YOU'VE GOT A TOKEN.

"BUT IN THIS COUNTRY HIS INFLUENCE IS STILL SUCH THAT A HANDSHAKE WITH CHAIRMAN OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY OPENS DOORS THROUGHOUT LAND. AND MEETING WITH HIM FOR AN HOUR



AND FORTY MINUTES, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER DID YESTERDAY, SIGNIFIES THAT FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST, MOVE TOWARD IMPROVED SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE.

CHINESE ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE. IF IT WERE WITHIN THEIR POWER, THEY WOULD PREVENT IT. BUT THEIR OWN FEAR OF SOVIETS IS SUCH THAT THEY'RE WILLING TO SWALLOW THEIR DISPLEASURE WITH WASHINGTON'S POLICIES SO THAT THEY CAN CONTINUE TO USE U.S. AS A COUNTERBALANCE, POSSIBLY EVEN AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST SOVIET INVASION.

"OFFICIALLY, AMERICANS MERELY SAID TALKS WITH MAO WERE USEFUL. CHINESE SAID THEY WERE HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. BUT WHEN MAO TSE-DUNG MEETS WITH HAK, YOU CAN READ A LOT MORE BETWEEN LINES THAN THAT."

BERNARD KALB, CBS RADIO - "HAK BEGAN WINDING UP HIS FOUR DAY VISIT TO CHINA TONIGHT WITH A FRONT PAGE PHOTO IN CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER, PEOPLE'S DAILY, SHOWING HAK AND MAO SHAKING HANDS."

"SECRETARY AND 81-YEAR OLD CHINESE LEADER MET LAST NIGHT. IT WAS MAO'S WAY OF PUBLICLY SIGNALING HIS ENDORSEMENT ONCE AGAIN OF SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROACHMENT, EVEN THOUGH WASHINGTON AND PEKING REMAIN IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS, FUNDAMENTALLY DIVIDED ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. CHINESE, FOR EXAMPLE, REGULARLY BLASTING HAK POLICY OF DETENTE WITH SOVIET UNION; ALSO BLASTING RECENT EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI, WHICH BROUGHT PRESIDENT FORD AND SOVIET LEADER LEONID BREZHNEV TOGETHER AT CONFERENCE ON SECURITY."

"BUT NOTWITHSTANDING THESE DIFFERENCES, IT IS THEIR MUTUAL WARINESS OF SOVIET POWER THAT IS MUCILAGE OF SINO-AMERICAN CONNECTION."

(CHARLES OSGOOD, ANCHORMAN): "MEMBERS OF HAK'S PARTY SAY THAT CHAIRMAN MAO IS IN FRAIL HEALTH, BUT HIS MIND REMAINS ACTIVE AND ALERT, AND THEY DETECT NO SIGN OF SINILITY."

IN SEPARATE REPORT, KALB FILED FOLLOWING: HAK DEVOTED MORNING TO TOURING PEKING'S MUSEUM OF CHINESE HISTORY, A VAST REPOSITORY OF REMNANTS, REPLICAS AND REAL THING, INCLUDING TWO LIFE SIZE CLAY STATUES OF ANCIENT CHINESE AND LIFE SIZE HORSE, EXCAVATED LAST YEAR IN SIAN AREA OF CHINA. THESE FIGURES DATE BACK TO CHIN DYNASTY ABOUT 200 B.C. CHINESE OFFICIALS SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL

THOUSAND SUCH FIGURES THAT WERE UNEARTHED IN MOST SPECTA-



CULAR FIND IN RECENT ARCHEOLOGICAL HISTORY.

"THIS AFTERNOON SECRETARY HELD HIS FOURTH OFFICIAL MEETING WITH TENG, THEIR MUTUAL WARINESS OF SOVIET POWER BRINGING THEM TOGETHER DESPITE THEIR FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES ON A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS, NOTABLY, DETENTE WITH MOSCOW.

"TONIGHT HAK HOSTS A RETURN BANQUET FOR CHINESE; TOMORROW HE BEGINS JOURNEY HOME."

STOP PRESS: LATE MOVING ITEM FROM AP -- FREED, SAYS HAK AND CHIAO "EXCHANGED CHILLY TOAST TONIGHT AT A BANQUET MARKING END" OF HAK'S VISIT. HAK SAID ONLY, "WE ARE SATISFIED WITH OUR VISIT", ADDED THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS WAS THROUGH RESPECT FOR EACH COUNTRY'S NATIONAL INTEREST. "CHIAO SPOKE FOR LESS THAN TWO MINUTES AND WAS MARKEDLY FORMAL...THE HAK TOAST WAS NOT SO MUCH NEGATIVE AS IT WAS FLAT." HE SAID, "WE BENEFITTED GREATLY FROM FRIENDLY AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS (WITH MAO)." PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT ARE GOING WELL. MAIN THEME: REALISM, NOT RHETORIC, SHOULD GOVERN U.S./PRC RELATIONS. "OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE TOO SELF-RELIANT TO NEED REASSURANCE AND TOO EXPERIENCED TO CONFUSE WORDS WITH REALITY, OR TACTICS WITH STRATEGY." U.S./CHINESE ISOLATION ENDED BECAUSE DECISION IT WAS IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS TO DO SO. "WE WILL NURTURE OUR RELATIONSHIP BY RESPECTING EACH OTHER'S VIEWS REGARDING OUR NATIONAL INTEREST."

"LACK OF WARMTH CAME AS SURPRISE, SINCE IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE EXPECTED AFTER SUNDAY BANQUET AND LECTURE ON DETENTE. AFTER DINNER, HAK LEFT FOR CONFERENCE WITH TENG." INGERSOLL
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TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: TRAVELING PRESS REPORTAGE, EVENING, OCTOBER 22,
1975

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS
NO. 20

WIRES:
A. AP (KENNETH FREED): "SECRETARY... SAID TODAY HE WAS
SATISFIED WITH HIS TALKS IN CHINA, BUT HIS VISIT WAS ENDING
ON A MUTED NOTE.

IN A TOAST AT A DINNER HE GAVE FOR CHINESE LEADERS, THE
SECRETARY SET A RATHER CHILLY TONE BY POINTING OUT THAT
SELF-INTEREST, NOT FRIENDSHIP, GOVERNS RELATIONS BETWEEN
PEKING AND WASHINGTON.

'WE ENDED OUR ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER BECAUSE OF OUR
PERCEPTIONS OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST,' HE SAID, 'AND WE WILL
NURTURE OUR RELATIONSHIP BY RESPECTING EACH OTHER'S VIEWS
REGARDING OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.'

FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S ANSWERING TOAST DID
LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO WARM THE AIR. 'OUR TALKS,' HE SAID,
-HAVE ENABLED US TO HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH
OTHER'S VIEWS, THIS IS USEFUL.'

IN THE BACKGROUND, UNMENTIONED BY EITHER SPEAKER, WAS THE
SOVIET UNION -- THE POWER THAT BOTH JOINS THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA AS WELL AS KEEPS THEM APART.

ONE OF KISSINGER'S GOALS WAS TO TELL THE CHINESE THAT THEY

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

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SHOULD ACCEPT THE AMERICAN POLICY OF DETENTE -- BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

HE HAD NO GREAT HOPES CHINESE LEADERS WOULD SUDDENLY DROP THEIR PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS OF THAT POLICY, NOR THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT HIS ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT BEING LULLED INTO COMPLACENCY BY RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF COOPERATION.

BUT HE DID EXPECT THEM TO REALIZE THAT CHINA'S SELF-INTEREST IN THE FACE OF SINO-AMERICAN RIVALRY CAN BE BETTER SERVED BY MAINTAINING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH AMERICA.

THE NATURE OF THE TOASTS, WHICH SERVE AS A GAUGE OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE PRIVATE TALKS, INDICATED THE SECRETARY NEITHER GAINED NOR LOST. CHINA WILL KEEP UP ITS CURRENT STATE OF CONTACTS WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT NOT DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE THEM."

B. UPI (RICHARD GROWALD): "FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUANG-HUA, SPEAKING AT A FAREWELL BANQUET TONIGHT FOR SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, USED SOME OF THE COOLEST WORDS SINCE RESUMPTION OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

BUT THE APPARENT COOLNESS AND CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. POLICY OF DETENTE WITH "USSR" IS NOT EXPECTED TO AFFECT PRESIDENT FORD'S PLANNED VISIT TO PEKING AFTER THANKSGIVING.

'THE PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA LATER THIS YEAR ARE PROCEEDING WELL,' KISSINGER TOLD NEWSMEN. 'IT WILL SERVE TO PROMOTE SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIPS....'

DIPLOMATS SAID CHIAO'S WORDS UNDERLINED CHINESE OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. POLICY OF DETENTE WITH RUSSIA, PEKING'S ARCH ENEMY, AND THE FORD ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO STICK TO THAT POLICY.

WE WILL NURTURE OUR RELATIONSHIPS BY RESPECTING EACH OTHER'S VIEWS REGARDING OUR NATIONAL INTEREST,' KISSINGER SAID IN HIS TOAST. 'WE ARE SATISFIED WITH OUR VISIT.'

IN HIS REPLY THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER USED NO OTHER WORDS THAN 'USEFUL' TO DESCRIBE HIS TALKS WITH KISSINGER.

'OUR TALKS HAVE ENABLED US TO HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS,' CHIAO SAID. 'THIS IS USEFUL.'

THE ONLY TOUCH OF LIGHTNESS IN THE TWO TOASTS CAME WHEN



KISSINGER REFERRED TO HIS SPEAKING A FEW WORDS OF CHINESE DURING A SUNDAY NIGHT WELCOME BANQUET IN HIS HONOR, KISSINGER SAID TONIGHT THAT AS A MARK OF RESPECT FOR HIS CHINESE FRIENDS, 'I WILL NOT AGAIN INFLICT ON THEM CHINESE WITH A CANTONESE ACCENT.'

CHIAO'S ONLY MENTION OF FRIENDSHIP CAME WHEN HE SAID, 'YESTERDAY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG MET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND THEY HAD A CONVERSATION ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE.'

ALTHOUGH HE REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING THE POLICY OF DETENTE, THE MOST CHIAO WOULD SAY OF HIS TALKS WITH KISSINGER, BESIDES BEING USEFUL, WAS THAT THEY WERE 'FRANK.'

2. NEWSPAPERS:

A. NOTHING FROM ELEGANT IN L.A. TIMES.

B. CHICAGO TRIBUNE (JOHN MACLEAN): "...MAO...ISSUED A SURPRISE SUMMONS TO SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER TUESDAY EVENING AND THEN MET WITH KISSINGER AND SEVERAL AIDES FOR AN HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES.

UNITED STATES SPOKESMEN SAID THE TALKS WERE 'VERY USEFUL' AND THE CHINESE SAID THEY WERE CONDUCTED IN A 'FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE' ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS."...

(BRACKETS WITH NEWS FROM UPI ON MAO'S DETENTE WARNING)

"THE OFFICIAL NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY SAID MAO ASKED KISSINGER TO CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO PRESIDENT FORD, WHO IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT CHINA AFTER THANKSGIVING.

MAO AND SEVERAL AIDES, INCLUDING DEPUTY PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING, MET FOR FIVE MINUTES OF HANDSHAKING WITH KISSINGER AND SEVEN OTHER AMERICANS... KISSINGER WAS HOLDING HIS THIRD MEETING OF THE LAST THREE DAYS WITH TENG AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE WHEN THE

SUMMONS CAME FOR THE MEETING WITH MAO."...

(BRACKETED NEWS FROM UPI ON FAILURE OF SECRETARY AND TENG

TO REACH UNDERSTANDING ON DETENTE, EUROPE AND ASIA)

"KISSINGER CANCELED AN APPEARANCE AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY BUSH DUE TO THE LENGTH OF THE MEETING WITH MAO. HE ALSO



CANCELED A BACKGROUND BRIEFING SCHEDULED EARLIER WITH NEWSMEN, APPARENTLY TO AVOID QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SESSION WITH MAO.

THE MEETING ENDED SPECULATION THAT KISSINGER'S VISIT HERE MIGHT END WITHOUT A FIRST-HAND CHECK ON MAO'S HEALTH. IT WOULD BE A BREACH OF PROTOCOL WERE FORD TO VISIT CHINA AND BE UNABLE TO SEE MAO....

KISSINGER EARLIER PLAYED THE GAME OF POWER POLITICS, INVITING SOVIET ENVOYS TO A DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION DESPITE CHINA'S ATTACK AGAINST DETENTE.

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS SAID KISSINGER APPEARED TO BE UNDERLINING AMERICA'S DEVOTION TO DETENTE BY ASKING CHINA'S ARCH ENEMIES TO A RECEPTION FOR THE PEKING DIPLOMATIC COLONY...."

3. EVENING TELEVISION:

A. ABC: REASONS: SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER WAS HOST TO CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA IN PEKING TONIGHT IN THE LAST FORMAL FUNCTION OF HIS CURRENT VISIT TO CHINA. THE FINAL TOASTS OF THE TWO DIPLOMATS WERE COOL, BUT KISSINGER SAID LATER THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE

VISIT, AND THAT PREPARATIONS ARE GOING AHEAD FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S CHINA TRIP AFTER THANKSGIVING.

YESTERDAY IN AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT OF SIGNIFICANCE, KISSINGER HAD A LENGTHY MEETING WITH MAO TSE-TUNG. ABC'S DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, TED KOPPEL, REPORTS:

KOPPEL: THE CHINESE PROVIDED THIS FILM, AND YOU'LL HAVE TO JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES, JUST HOW FRAIL THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY REALLY IS. MAO IS ALMOST 82 AND SAID TO BE IN FAILING HEALTH. BUT MEETINGS SUCH AS THIS HAVE A SYMBOLIC VALUE HERE IN CHINA THAT IS BEYOND MEASURE. SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS INVITED TO BRING HIS WIFE, NANCY, AND SEVERAL OF HIS STAFF -- SEVEN ALL TOLLED INCLUDING HIS SECRETARY. ONLY AMB. BUSH AND WINSTON LORD, A TOP KISSINGER AIDE, STAYED FOR THE CONVERSATION.

THE AMERICAN SIDE DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS 'USEFUL'. BY COMPARISON, THE CHINESE NEARLY BUBBLED OVER WITH INFORMATION THE CONVERSATION, SAID THE CHINESE, WAS HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE ON A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS.



CHAIRMAN MAO ASKED DR. KISSINGER TO CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO PRESIDENT FORD. IT WAS A VERY POSITIVE OMEN, NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE CHINESE ARE VERY UPSET OVER U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE. THEY'VE MADE NO BONES ABOUT THAT, BUT THE HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES THAT MAO SPENT WITH KISSINGER LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING, AT LEAST, THE CHINESE ARE WILLING TO SWALLOW THEIR DISPLEASURE AND KEEP SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS MOVING IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION.

B. NBC
CHANCELLOR: SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S VISIT TO PEKING ENDED TODAY ON A CHILLY NOTE. IN A FINAL TOAST TO CHINESE LEADERS, KISSINGER SAID THAT 'SELF-INTEREST, NOT FRIENDSHIP' GOVERNS RELATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PEKING.

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA REPLIED, COOLY, THAT THE TALKS GAVE EACH SIDE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER SIDE. ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH THEY HAVE VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS IS DETENTE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. THAT WAS AMONG THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED YESTERDAY WHEN KISSINGER AND HIS PARTY VISITED CHAIRMAN MAO. DON OLIVER REPORTS:

OLIVER: CHAIRMAN MAO RECEIVED THEM ALL FOR THE PICTURE-TAKING CEREMONY. HE EVEN SHOOK HANDS WITH ONE OF THE KISSINGER SECRETARIES WHO HAPPENED TO BE ALONG. KISSINGER AND TWO AIDES REMAINED BEHIND FOR THE TALKS THEMSELVES. THE MEETING LASTED AN HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES. THE CHINESE SAID LATER THE CONVERSATION COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS, AND WAS HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. BUT ONE U.S. SOURCE SAID MAO STRONGLY QUESTIONED THE U.S. POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PUBLICLY, THE CHINESE HAVE SAID DETENTE IS A FRAUD BUT PRIVATELY THEY ARE SAID TO VIEW THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AS A THREAT TO CHINA. THE CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THAT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL NOT IMPROVE UNTIL THE THREAT OF DETENTE IS ELIMINATED.

C. CBS
CRONKITE: KISSINGER ENDED HIS LATEST TRIP TO CHINA WITH A DIPLOMATIC MIXED POUCH. HE DID GET TO MEET AT LENGTH WITH CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG, THEREBY GAINING A RENEWED PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS, BUT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE SEEN AS A REASON FOR A CHILLY TOAST TONIGHT FROM THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID HIS TALKS WITH KISSINGER WERE USEFUL AND FRANK -- TERMS OFTEN TAKEN TO MEAN THINGS DIDN'T GO SO WELL. INGERSOLL
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DECLASSIFIED
EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By NR NARA, Date 8/10/10
State Review
12/9/03

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR,UR,XO,PARM
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV ON NAVAL LIMITATIONS IN INDIAN OCEAN

REF: THE HAGUE 3408

1. SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV, HIS REMARKS TO CODEL HUMPHREY-SCOTT REGARDING THE SOVIET POSITION ON NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN STEMMED FROM BREZHNEV HIMSELF. THIS WAS LATER CORROBORATED BY USA INSTITUTE STAFFERS. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING A LENGTHY CONVERSATION ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN VANIK OCTOBER 16, ARBATOV SAID ON A STRICTLY "OFF-THE-RECORD" BASIS (PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY) THAT PRIOR TO CODEL HUMPHREY-SCOTT'S




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MEETING WITH BREZHNEV, SEVERAL MEMBERS ASKED ARBATOV WHETHER THE USSR WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH THE U.S. ON A BILATERAL BASIS. ARBATOV DID NOT HAVE AN AUTHORITATIVE ANSWER, SO WHEN HE PERSONALLY BRIEFED BREZHNEV JUST BEFORE THE LATTER'S MEETING WITH THE CODEL, ARBATOV NOTED THAT THIS QUESTION WAS LIKELY TO BE RAISED. BREZHNEV REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT IF ASKED, HE WOULD SAY THAT THE ANSWER WAS "YES."

3. HOWEVER, ARBATOV CONTINUED, FOR WHATEVER REASON THE QUESTION WAS NOT ASKED OF BREZHNEV WHEN HE SAW THE CODEL, ARBATOV THEREFORE LATER APPROACHED ONE OF THE CONCERNED SENATORS, SAID HE HAD LOOKED INTO THE QUESTION AND COULD STATE THAT THE USSR WAS INTERESTED.

4. AT DAD LUNCHEON FOR GENERAL GRAHAM OCTOBER 17, USA INSTITUTE MEMBERS B.D. YASHIN AND G.I. SVYATOV (BOTH RETIRED CAREER NAVAL OFFICERS WHO WORK ON NAVAL MATTERS) REMARKED IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS THAT THEY THOUGHT SOVIET POLICY ON NAVAL LIMITATIONS IS "UNCLEAR," AS THEY CONSIDERED U.S. POLICY TO BE. AT SAME TIME, MORE VOLUBLE SVYATOV, WHILE DISCLAIMING SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE AND STRESSING HE WORKED MAINLY ON SALT AND MBFR, NOTED RECURRENT BREZHNEV STATEMENTS ON NAVAL LIMITATIONS, CONFIRMED "HIGHEST LEVEL" CLEARANCE OF ARBATOV'S INDIAN OCEAN REMARKS TO SENATORS, AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SOVIETS HAD TAKEN SMALL PRIVATE STEPS TOWARD U.S. CONCERNING INDIAN OCEAN POSSIBILITIES, BUT U.S. HAD NOT RESPONDED. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT U.S. RESPONSE WOULD BE TO PROPOSAL FOR TALKS ON "PARITY OR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" OF GENERAL-PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES WORLDWIDE, WITH A REFERENCE TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCES BETWEEN THE WARS, AND SURMISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE VERY POSITIVE AT THIS POINT.

5. COMMENT. PICTURE IS SOMEWHAT MURKY, BUT OUTLINES OF TWO FACTS WOULD SEEM TO EMERGE: ARBATOV'S REMARKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN WERE IN FACT CLEARED WITH BREZHNEV, AND SOVIET POLICY CONCERNING NAVAL LIMITATIONS IS



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State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By HR NARA, Date 8/10/10

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