

The original documents are located in Box 39, folder “Vietnamese War - Secret Peace Talks (Mr. S. File), (7), 1/1/70 - 12/31/70” of the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969 - 1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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WITHDRAWAL ID 009486

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTranscript

CREATOR'S NAME Henry Kissinger

TITLE Transcript of telephone conversation
between Kissinger and President Nixon
re: peace talks

CREATION DATE 01/14/1970

VOLUME 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200024

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 39

FOLDER TITLE Vietnamese War - Secret Peace Talks
(Mr. S. File), (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 12/14/1999

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CIA 22 9/29/10; State 10/10/10
By del NARA, Date 12/21/10



K: For example, the invasion of Southern France. If those units had been put into the Balkans the whole thing would have been different.

P: I think you should scan through it and see just what happened. He would send a message over and obviously the American President was responding and was responding in an almost unbelievably naive way.

K: And these Kremlinologists were saying just what Thompson told you. You have to be in good faith.

P: Right and Truman turned down a meeting with Churchill first and then came back with the proposition that Truman ought to meet with Stalin first. Well that would have been the most terrible thing. It is well to read this stuff in order to know what we are dealing with now.

K: Hopkins wanted Truman and Roosevelt to be the intermediary between England and Russia, grossly overestimating the British strength and grossly underestimating the Russian intentions.

P: What I am getting it is that I don't know what these clowns want to talk about but the line we take is either they talk or we are going to sit it out. I don't feel this is any time for concession. And mainly because I feel that's the only way we are going to get anywhere is by talking this way.

K: Mr. President I presented these proposals to the meeting of the Special Studies Group today and Elliot Richardson has changed his mind. He says it would be a grave mistake. So we have some support in State. He said if they are willing I think you should take a shot at it on the 8th. I will give to you what I am going to say -- it will be a hard line.


P: First, say we have got to talk about a coalition government. Just close the book and walk out. They will say we have got to talk on basically more points than those.

K: If this analysis we have made is correct they are in trouble. That doesn't mean they are not going to hit us this year. They may hit us this year in the Delta and in I Corps. But that will be their last shot.

P: I agree, they may hit us but they haven't got a lot to hit us with, but it isn't like the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge. They don't have the forces to mount any kind of sustained thing.

K: If we had forces in the Delta I won't worry about it all. They may overrun the VN units, but I don't believe it.

P: Well I have been hearing some good reports about the South Vietnamese forces. Don't you agree?



K: I am going to suspend judgment until Haig comes back. But the smart thing for them to do would be to wait until we draw down more forces and wait until next year. If they hit us this year it will mean our analysis is correct and they are losing. One thing I can do is warn them and tell them if there is an offensive ~~and~~ there there will be no telling what we will do.

P: Yes, they will have to take note of what the President has said and you cannot be _____ as to any commitment on that point. And if ~~they state that~~ that is the way they want it that is the way it will be.

K: The French Ambassador came in with a personal message to you from Pompidou about the Mid-East, the sale of Mirages to Libya. The number they gave and that was in the papers is 50, and the fact of the matter is 100. It is just more than the Libyans can use in 50 years.

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K: It is really pushing the arms race several notches higher.

P: What ~~will~~ are the French up to.

K: With the Germans screwing around in Eastern Europe the French want to start their own _____ to Moscow. They know they have nothing to offer in Mid-Europe.

P: I suppose Pompidou has told the Russians.

K: The Russians most certainly know.

P: What is their game? Our game has to be to see if the Israeli can take care of themselves.

K: I think you have to move with the Israely aid request and be generous. Lucet told me this is going to represent 12% of their total exports. They are not going to give up that much money.

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K: Isn't that next year?

P: The pay increase does not come on. We are slipping the whole thing to the last half of FY 71 so it doesn't come into effect until January and it is \$800 million. What I am getting at is this -- and it may be what we are going to have to do -- we have to get the budget down to \$200 billion, \$500 million. Where would that get the three?

K: They would get the three by cutting each of the services -- we are taking about 100 out of R&D which is not good to do, but we can live with it. Then we are taking some out of Safeguard by stretching it a bit.

P: Stretching it a bit does not bother me too much.

K: But it is good to remain _____.

P: And the main thing the authorization has got to be for the whole thing.

K: We are taking \$50 million from each of the services ~~but~~ by knocking out \$10 million here and there.

P: We don't think you can get more than \$300? Why don't you talk to Laird on the basis on the other 200 just basically the fact of trying to absorb the pay increase to that extent. First see also the possibility that Congress may come up with the damn thing and go over it anyway. But if Congress doesn't that is fine. But, well anyway you are ~~at~~ at three now, you think you can get three, but the five is very difficult.

K: The five is almost impossible without cutting forces even more and they are really ---

P: Nothing you could stretch -- nothing that -- well we are taking a look at the thing but just continue to work on it, Henry. I am chopping that damn Space program by another 300. I don't think there is any problem there. You can turn that around you see.

K: But the trouble is you could easily find yourself in a situation two to three years from now ~~is~~ where you just don't have the forces for an emergency. If there is anything unexpected next year we are in trouble as it is.

P: I talked to Ehrlichman. He says you have got to have forces. I have no desire at all to cut -- I don't think we should have cut what we have cut. Frankly, we are in this kind of business where if you don't cut defense some you could not get to these other departments.



K: They cut already 11.15.

P: I know the whole story.

K: But then we took 435 on top and now we are talking about 300 more.

P: Maybe I should take 500 out of Space.

K: Well let me see what I can get out of CIA or are you doing that separately?

P: Both CIA and AEC, Ehrlichman is supposed to be working on those. Maybe we could clip them for a little bit more. I must say what we get from CIA is so ~~pusilanimous~~ pusilanimous -- how about NSA?

K: I am sure that is over funded but I don't know where to cut them without a study.

P: Talk about your 200. I will be talking to Ehrlichman. You help him on three things -- on CIA, on NASA. NASA is _____ -- the difference is between 3.5 and 3.2.

K: At any rate that we can retrieve and nothing will happen to the country except postponing an opportunity. On NASA we can live with it.


P: All right, I will talk to Ehrlichman again. But you work with him tonight or tomorrow morning on CIA. See what you can do there. ~~They~~ They have got to take one. We took 175 out of HUD which was a hell of a cut.

K: Rogers has asked whether you objected if he went to Nigeria.

P: I don't ~~obj~~ object except for one thing. I don't want to have that Lagos government on the back when this Gowon is making speeches that are as strong as that. Tell him he has got to make a judgement on where he goes but tell him I think he has got to deal very strongly. Did you know they have had a demonstration in Rome. The Catholics. The Belgians are going to try to fly in some help. Basically we are talking about religious. This is a Catholic thing. Does Gowon refer to us as having blood on our hands?

K: No, he talks about these voluntary relief organizations.

P: I think the way with Bill -- we don't want to argue about it. You could just say to him look Bill, the President has confidence in you. But you must make a cold judgment on this. Here is where we need that Vatican ambassador. I would like to know what the ~~Vat~~ Vatican feels about this. Don't we have some responsibility for 400 million people? They are starving aren't they?



K: Yes, Mr. President, every week they kill a few tens of thousands of people.

P: I don't think they feel we are going sort of ~~big~~ hind-tit to Wilson and sucking around that government. Tell Bill if he announces he is going to Lagos he should do it on the basis that he wants to go and be of assistance. If he could play it that way. The purpose is not to go and then back down in front of this damn murderer Gowon. But certainly the Nigerians have got us where the hair is short. If they don't let us in we can't get in. I think Bill ought to play that cold and help the Nigerians too.

K: A lot of the State Dept people here say by our being so active this weekend that Gowon ~~didn't get mad at us~~ would get mad at us.


P: I understand that but this is a civil war. Tell Bill I think he has got a great opportunity here. I would appreciate it if he goes and that if ~~Kx~~ he does indicate Presidential concern that we have expressed so deeply and we don't want to interfere with internal affairs but he ought to make a little statement about ~~xxxxxxx~~ our interest in the humanitarian concern. He must talk to the leaders there. I do know that if we go in and just sort of turn our backs on this think, ~~the~~ Henry, we could look awful bad.

K: You have been getting a lot of mail from Catholicx leaders like Father Hessberg.

P: I would like Bill to contact Hessberg and Cardinal Cook. I think it would be very good internal American politics if he could indicate to the Catholics ~~x~~ leaders before he goes that he is going to exert all the influence of the U.S. to render relief. One other thing. I have been sitting here ~~k~~ working and I have reached the conclusion that-I have just read a book on all the messages that have been delivered. It really has to do with the concept of the Presidency. The State of the Union is really now an anachronism. I have found that many of the best State-of-the-Unions have been less than 30 minutes. Wilson's first was only 10 minutes. Eisenhowers were 55 minutes to an hour. So were Truman's. The reason was that the custom developed to make them a laundry list and they bored the people to death.

K: I would not do that, Mr. President.

P: The question is whether we should have 300 words about foreign policy. Could you figure up 300 words about foreign policy? I would like to ~~xxx~~ say I am going to treat foreign policy in a message to the Congress which I am going to send on blank. The main thing about that is to say something that indicates the State of the Union should be strong and forceful and also if we can use it as an occasion not simply to say well this is what we are doing, etc., but maybe to think of a new phrase.



You can talk a little to Sapphire if you like. Maybe he can help a little on it. Foreign policy should be very strong and I don't think we should say a hell of a lot about it.

K: In foreign policy you are in good shape. You just give a little of the philosophy doctrine and say you are going to cover it in greater detail.

P: We have to say a little about Vietnam -- maybe pick up what we said Nov 3rd and say it a little differently. We are for a just peace. We have seen progress in Asia, in Japan. We have seen progress here. There are other areas in the world where there are still problems. The Mid-East is still difficult. I will cover it all. We are not going to retreat from our world commitments. We are going to keep them. I would use it to make another whack at the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine is not a retreat from our world responsibilities. It is a method -- a new way. Whether it is Latin America or any other area in the world. If you don't mention everybody they will feel hurt. My point is that we feel that it is time for the industrial nations of the world -- all the nations of the world. You might give it a historical slant. As we enter the '70's more than 25 years ~~xxxxxx~~ have passed since WW II -- we made a new policy to deal with the new situation. For 25 years the US had to assume the major responsibility. We are for negotiation rather than for confrontation.

K: This is the theme already of it, from some of my notes on that. What I feel really was expressed by LBJ. Yesterday he said the Nixon that showed purposeful and confident is the old Nixon. This is the wrong way of putting it. But what he means is tough and strong and purposeful.


N: That says not soft and not begging and screaming. And I think this speech did not indicate a strong posture.

K: And this speech could have been given by any president or by Humphrey. It is not really addressed to the peoples' concern or to the real problems but to talk about solutions, yes, we have got to do something. What you said, we could be the richest people and be the unhappiest.

N: If that thing was said by the Kennedys the papers would have emoted all over the place and said it was great. As I set here, and I know I will be here all night, all day tomorrow, Saturday and Sunday, but to have to go through this.

K: It is too much ~~xxxxxx when you think what~~

P: It is too much when you think what I ought to be using my time for.



K The country hasn't heard from you now in a while and no one else can lead it. I think you shouldn't basically have to do it and as you have pointed out that is one of the basic weaknesses in our structure. You put it well on the plane the other day -- you have some good writers, but you don't have any good speakers.

N: When you think of TR and Wilson - they could take the time to do their own. But Roosevelt had a series of good speech writers.

K: He was fortunate in that respect. I think it ought to show strength and purpose and be a little off-beat from what the liberals are saying, because they will respect you for that. Getting back to the budget, on Defense I think there is another 50 to 100 more lying around but we are close to running risks now, specifically to the morale. I think we can get 3 and I think we can get Wheeler to defend it and stick with it.

P: But beyond that you don't know.

K: I think beyond that you have to just order it and if you order it you can get it, of course.

P: Remember I want you to look at NASA, CIA and you don't think you could knock NSA down some?

K: Let me see what I can do. I ~~know~~ just don't know their budget but I will take a look at that one. That doesn't bother me as much as the Defense budget.

P: Yes, but if we can get it out of that -- that is part of the Defense budget. I think after all we have kept Helms around and he has got to play our game.



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FOLLOWING YOUR PROPOSAL OF 14 JAN 70 WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RECEIVE YOUR FRIEND ON THE 20 OR 21 OF FEB AT 1000 HOURS IN THE MORNING AT A HOUSE WE HAVE IN THE LOCAL SUBURB. WE FEEL THAT YOU SHOULD ADOPT A MORE UNDERSTANDING AND REALISTIC VIEW AND MAKE SOME NEW AND REASONABLE OFFERS IF YOU REALLY WANT TO SEE THIS DEAL GO THROUGH AND THE DISCUSSIONS HERE ON THIS WHOLE QUESTION PROGRESS ON A SATISFACTORY MANNER. (END OF TEXT) I HAVE THE ADDRESS AND IT IS A PLACE WHERE THEY PREVIOUSLY MET WITH ROCKYS PREDECESSOR. TALK WAS VERY CORDIAL AND WE HAD TWO CUPS OF TEA INSTEAD OF ONE.

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E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept
By lit, NARA, Date 12/20/99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

At 1:05 p.m., I received a call from General Walters which contained the following message:

Walters stated that he had just returned from a meeting with Mai Van Bo in which he was told that Mai Van Bo, Xuan Thuy and their "visitor", if he is still in Paris, would like to meet with Dr. Kissinger at 10:00 a.m. on February 20th or 21st and that they would like to have an answer by 0730 hours tomorrow morning Paris time (1:30 a.m., February 17th, Washington time).

General Walters stated that he was given tea, was treated amiably and that the other side said that they hoped that the U.S. would be willing to make some conciliatory moves which could get the negotiations off of dead center. Mai Van Bo also added that he is working on his English because the world is changing and he may be, in the future, working on our side.

I told General Walters that we would be back to him with guidance shortly and that he should immediately sit down and write a detailed memcon of the entire exchange. It is necessary for us to instruct Walters on the following:

- a. Whether or not you will accept the meeting time.

Note: I recommend that you accept Saturday.

- b. How General Walters should transmit to us in an expedited fashion the details of his discussion with Mai Van Bo.

Note: I believe we have reasonable assurance that a message from Walters via back channels directly to the White House via DIA, exclusive net, will arrive here uncompromised. It would be especially secure if I had General Walters take out any names

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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BY ML nsc/state guidelines
DATE 7/17/09



in the message and address it to me on a personal basis, but it would not be likely to attract any attention should there be some unforeseen exposure. With your approval, I will tell General Walters to dispatch the message now using this route.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

I talked to Don Hughes about transportation and recommend the following:

Depart Andrews at 9:00 a.m., Friday, February 21 and arrive Paris at approximately 9:00 p.m. on Friday (local time), including Lake and Smyser in your party, with return flight Saturday evening after dinner in Paris.

If we notify the French of your trip, with a view toward getting authority to land at a French military facility, I think you can then also stay with General Walters without any fear of compromise beyond the French Government.

With your approval, we will set up the trip along the above lines, to include meeting with Lucet privately to get air clearance. I would also emphasize the security rationale you gave to me.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____



MEMO FOR RECORD

Maj Gen Vernon A. Walters

17 February 1970

On February 12, 1970, I received telephonic instructions from Brig Gen Haig to contact Mai Van Bo and to tell him that I would be leaving Paris around February 20th and that Dr. Kissinger would be willing to meet with his visitor (Le Duc Tho) if latter were still here. I called the General Delegation of North Vietnam and asked to speak to Mai Van Bo. The Vietnamese girl who answered asked who was calling and I told her. In a moment she said she would take the message. I told her that I would be leaving Paris around the end of the forthcoming week. That was all I told her. That evening at my home she called back and said that the Delegate General would receive me on Monday February 16, 1970, at 1730.

On that date and at that time I went to the DRVN house at 78 rue Jules Lagaisse in Choisy-le-Roi. I was cordially received by Mai Van Bo who took out of his pocket a piece of paper and read it to me. I copied it down in French and at the end read it back to him. He agreed that it was an exact copy of what he had read to me.

The text is as follows:

"Following the American proposal of 14 January 1970 Minister Xuan Thuy and Delegate General Mai Van Bo would be willing to meet with Mr. Henry Kissinger on the 20th or 21st of February at 11 rue Darthe in Choisy-le-Roi.

"We continue to feel that the United States should adopt an attitude of understanding and realism and should offer new and reasonable



proposals, if they are really desirous of achieving a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese problem and advancing the negotiations." End text.

Mai Van Bo then said that this offer had been made as they believed that Dr. Kissinger would prefer to come on a weekend. I then said that if their visitor was still here, Dr. Kissinger would be willing to meet with him. Mai Van Bo hesitated for a minute and then said that he did not know whether Le Duc Tho would still be here but if he were, he would take part in the meeting.

Tea was then served and I said something about a Vietnamese poster on the wall. Mai Van Bo asked me if I was studying Vietnamese and I said I was. He said that he was also trying to study English. Our countries would not always be at war and he might some day go to the United States. He said his people were fighting for what they thought was right and had taken a greater tonnage of bombs than any other people. I said that no one could challenge the courage of the Vietnamese people. As a soldier I took off my hat to them but we too were fighting for what we thought was right. My country four times this century had poured forth its blood for what it thought was right. He shook hands and poured me another cup of tea. I asked him what the proposed location was. He said it was a house they used. It was discreet and it was here that they had received Governor Harriman for his private meetings with them.

We had a brief non-political discussion on the Vietnamese, Chinese and Japanese languages and I promised to telephone Mai Van Bo an answer as soon as I got one.

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~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Draft Statement by Mr. Kissinger
Meeting in Paris with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy

I.

First, I want to express my hope that we can maintain here the businesslike and candid tone of our last meeting.

You should also know that everything I say here today is said on the explicit authority of the President.

At our last meeting, we met at a place we proposed and you gave me the opportunity to speak first. This time we are meeting at a place you proposed, and I therefore believe it proper that you speak first.

* * * * *

II.

I would like to begin by discussing our attitude toward my meetings with you and toward the general question of negotiating a settlement of the war.

We realize that there are two elements which make these negotiations particularly difficult. One is the question of agreeing on what we are trying to achieve. The second is the complexity of the issues to be negotiated.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Conf.

By Lct, NARA, Date 12/20/99



One is no less important than the other. Without an agreement on our goals, it will be difficult to negotiate solutions to the specific issues. On the other hand, we know that a settlement must resolve the specific issues in a way which will be to the advantage of each party, so that all parties will wish to preserve it.

We are under no illusion about the existence and depth of the mistrust between us. It is a fact rooted in history. There is no point in discussing whether your mistrust of us is justified. History is not at issue here. If these talks are to have a real chance of success, they must look to the future rather than the past.

We both must now try to transcend this mistrust, since there will be no less reason for suspicions a year from now -- or whenever you decide you are ready to settle the conflict. Now is as good a time as later.

We will therefore not try to trick you in our discussions. This is not out of generosity, but simply self-interest. Central to our approach is the recognition that a settlement must be in your side's interest as well as ours: This is the only kind of agreement which all parties will wish to maintain. After a settlement in which all non-South Vietnamese forces are withdrawn, you will be closer to South Vietnam than we. It is thus in our interest that a settlement be realistic and truly meet the interests of both sides.



In recognition of this fact, and in this spirit, I have traveled a long way to make one basic point. It is easy to use phrases like "good will," and we could use this channel for endless disputes on specific points at issue. But the basic question is whether there are to be successful negotiations leading to a fair settlement. There are two requirements for such negotiations: an agreement on objectives, and an agreed work program. We are prepared to fulfill both these requirements, and suggest we begin today.

III.

At our meeting last August, I suggested that we should try to reach a negotiated settlement within a specific period of time. You did not agree. Since that meeting, there have been important changes.

-- Then, I pointed out that you should not make this "Nixon's war"; yet that has been the result of the impasse of the last several months.

-- Then, we faced an uncertain domestic situation; yet today the President's support is extremely strong, and he will not be able to ignore the millions of voters who are increasingly moving toward a tougher stance in the light of the failure of the negotiations thus far.

-- Then, you may have been more certain of your position in the South. I will not debate this point here, except to



say that today, we can both see the course of events in the South, and that the continuation of that course is not in your interest. I should call your attention to the President's statements that he prefers a rapid settlement through negotiations, but if this is impossible we will proceed with Vietnamization.

-- The international situation is such that complications in various parts of the world might make it in the interests of great powers to bring about a settlement with less regard for your interests than they might otherwise have had.

In view of these factors, we believe that time is not on your side. But we will not lose interest in the negotiations because of this fact. Everyone can benefit if you join us now in establishing an agreement on the goals of our negotiations and on a work program and timetable. The President has made abundantly clear that we will be flexible and forthcoming in a serious give-and-take negotiation.

IV.

We do not believe that these talks should be a guessing game or any other kind of game. Some observers seem to believe that our negotiations are like a long, drawn-out mystery in which your side



throws out faint clues and we guess at the solution. Some in the United States saw such a game, for example, in Minister Xuan Thuy's press conference here in Paris last September, or in President Ho Chi Minh's reply to President Nixon's letter, or in your meetings with Professor Starobin. These people believe that if we had made further declarations of general principles in response to your hints, the negotiations would have moved toward success. Our view is that the stakes are certainly too high -- and that you are too serious -- to play such games. We clearly have no intention of playing them ourselves. But all the same, I will here restate our general approach to the major issues in a settlement.

We recognize that there is this basic problem:

- It seems to us that you want as a condition of negotiations to be guaranteed political predominance, with us then to rely on your good faith and self-restraint.
- On the other hand, we understand that it may seem to you that we seek military predominance and that you would have to rely on our good faith and self-restraint.

The only way to see if we can resolve this problem is through negotiations in an established framework.

The President has specifically authorized me to make these points about our position in such negotiations:



- We hereby reaffirm our acceptance of the principle of total withdrawal of American troops.
- We recognize that you have a special problem in placing the withdrawal of your troops on the same legal basis as ours in a settlement, because you do not now acknowledge their presence in South Vietnam and you cannot admit they are "foreign." We do not believe that this need present an insurmountable obstacle to an agreement, provided that there is some sort of guarantee against the reintroduction of your forces into the South. We require no public admission of their presence on your part and would seek no propaganda advantage from such a settlement.
- As I said at our last meeting, we believe that certain principles are valid in defining the political process by which an outcome could be achieved:
 - a. We realize that neither side can be expected to give up at the conference table what had not been conceded on the battlefield.
 - b. We believe that a fair political process must register the existing relationship of political forces.
 - c. We realize that we will differ with you on how to achieve this, but neither side should be asked to



accept the proposition that it can be defeated without noticing it. We are not asking you to disband the organized Communist political forces and you should not ask us to disband the organized non-Communist political forces.

-- We agree with the statement in point five of your ten points that no retaliation must be made against those who had cooperated with one side or the other. We believe this principle should be observed in a fair settlement.

V.

We would like to establish in this channel two things: agreements on the objectives of our negotiations and on a work schedule.

With regard to the objectives, we could proceed in this channel to discuss your ten points and our eight points. But as realistic men, we must recognize that such a procedure would probably lead quickly to strong disagreements on specific points. We suggest, therefore, that we set aside these old statements and start afresh, seeking agreement on a new list of objectives, issue by issue. If you disagree with this procedure, we are still willing to join you in attempting to match and put together your ten and our eight points -- if you wish to do that.




We suggest that these very private meetings be used to establish the outlines of what we wish to accomplish in the negotiations -- that is, the general shape and principles of a settlement. We are convinced that once we have established this general outline, the details of a settlement will not present insurmountable difficulties, and could better be negotiated in the meetings between our delegations here in Paris than in this channel. In those conditions, we would appoint a new negotiating team for the new negotiations. We would wish to continue to join you in preserving the secret and private nature of this special channel.

With regard to a work program, we propose that we set ourselves a date by which time we shall have outlined the general pattern of a settlement. We suggest June 1. This is not proposed as a strict deadline. It is suggested as a timetable to assist us in our work.

We would like to keep to such a timetable, and will ourselves do everything possible to maintain it. Our progress together will depend, of course, not only on what new steps we can take, but also on maintaining the progress we have made -- as, for example, in the reduction in the level of violence in South Vietnam since last summer. An increase in violence would be to no one's advantage.

As a sign of our mutual good faith, we propose that the next meetings between our delegations be free of abusive propaganda.*



The President has also asked me to make two other general points about the character of our dialogue.

You asked General Walters if we had new proposals to make today. We believe there is nothing more to be gained by our side's now tabling specific substantive proposals which you, in effect, only store away, without reciprocation. There is ample material for discussion; our problem is to decide where we are heading.

In addition, the President has asked me to stress the fact that, as I said earlier, we believe that a settlement must be in your interest as well as in ours, if it is to be lasting. So I will tell you frankly that we will not waste our time or yours in a vain effort to trick you somehow into accepting an agreement that would not be in your interest. History teaches us too much respect for your own skill as negotiators as well as the strength of your determination. By the same token, of course, you should not make a wasteful effort to deceive us.

All of our proposals thus can be summarized in this statement: We believe that our discussions can lead by June 1 to agreement on the shape of a settlement only if both sides are frank and flexible. We are prepared to negotiate in this spirit.

VI.

At our last meeting in August, you said you wanted "peace, not war." So do we.



I have spoken here frankly of what we believe is necessary to achieve a fair settlement.

We are ready to act on our words and to seek a settlement in which your side's interests as well as ours are recognized and protected. Both sides have proven at a terrible cost that they can make war. It is now time for you to turn your proven courage and determination to making peace. We are ready to do just that. We have no thought of humiliating you. There can be no victory, let alone lasting peace, in humiliation. We want a peace in which both sides can find some repayment for the price they have paid.

In his discussion of Vietnam in his report to the Congress on foreign policy, President Nixon repeated his hope for the future of Vietnam. The President thought this would be an appropriate conclusion to my first statement today. It is a passage from his speech before the United Nations on September 18:

"The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century. And I speak from personal observation. I have been to North Vietnam, to Hanoi, in 1953, and all over South Vietnam. I have seen the people of the North and the people of the South. The people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve a better future.

"When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam -- all of them -- in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. And when peace comes at last to Vietnam, it can truly come with healing in its wings."



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

We had noticed that in their propaganda and ~~K~~ in the Paris discussions, they were attempting to make this "Mr. Nixon's War." We did not believe that this was in their interest. If it is Mr. Nixon's War, he cannot afford not to win it. Dr. Kissinger then said, "you are a courageous, indeed a heroic people," and no one knows what the final result would be of such a sequence of events. We believe that such a tragic conflict to test each other can be avoided.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FILE
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~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

February 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

Al Haig *AH*

SUBJECT:

Physical Arrangements for the Weekend

General

All appropriate personnel in the White House have been informed that Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lake, together with Dianne Matthews, will be at Camp David, departing by helicopter at 9:15 a.m. on Friday, with an as yet undetermined return time.

Telephone operators at Camp David, press personnel at Camp David and elsewhere have been provided with this information, as have your office personnel.

Detailed Schedule and Points of Contact

9:15 a.m. (Friday)

Mr. Kissinger and Tony Lake to depart the Elipse by helicopter for Andrews, with cover story they are departing for Camp David (Dianne will go by sedan directly to Andrews, with necessary supplies and equipment) and will be on board for take-off as soon as helicopter arrives at Andrews.

10:00 p.m. (local)

Arrive Avord French Strategic Air Command Air Base in Central France. Will be met by Colonel Guignard, French Air Force, who will escort Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lake to a civilian Mystere 20 aircraft for a 30-minute flight to Villa Coublay, just outside of Paris (Air Force One will proceed to Weisbaden Air Base in Germany and remain there until return flight from Avord.)

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By *W*, NARA, Date *12/25/99*

Mr. Lake should obtain from the pilot, Colonel Albertazzi, precise information on how to contact him in Weisbaden, should there be any change in schedule. It is possible that we will not have confirmation of meeting with Pompidou on Saturday afternoon prior to party's arrival at Avord. If so, it may be necessary to contact Colonel Albertazzi to modify takeoff time Saturday afternoon or evening.

10:30 p. m. (local)

Arrive Villa Coublay Air Field. Will be met by General Walters in rented civilian automobile and will be driven directly to General Walter's apartment at 49 Boulevard Commandant Charcot in Nevilly District.

General Walters will turn over one bedroom to Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Lake will share a second bedroom with General Walters.

10:00 a. m. , Saturday morning (local)

Mr. Kissinger, General Walters, Mr. Lake will meet the other side at 11 Rue Darthe in Choisy District.

3:00 p. m. or later, Saturday (local)

To be confirmed by President Pompidou's Diplomatic Adviser, M'sieur. Gaucher to General Walters. The party may have an appointment with President Pompidou for the purpose of discussing last minute arrangements for Pompidou's visit to the U.S. For this reason, in addition to what other Vietnam papers Mr. Kissinger wishes to take off of Air Force One, it will be necessary to carry the Pompidou visit book, as well as the NSC issues paper which will be aboard Air Force One.

Saturday Afternoon or Evening (local)

Depart Villa Coublay by Mystere 20 aircraft for Avord Air Base. Air Force One will be at Avord. Because of the uncertainty of the



meeting with President Pompidou, it is necessary that General Walters knows how to contact Colonel Guignard throughout Saturday to insure that the civilian airplane will be ready as needed at Villa Coublay. It will also be necessary for General Walters to provide for the movement of his baggage to Air Force One since he will return with the party to Washington.

Finally, General Walters should arrange to have his rented automobile disposed of following takeoff from Villa Coublay.

Attached is a memorandum prepared by Colonel Albertazzi which outlines the scope of the training flight which has been established as cover for Air Force One. There will be, according to General Hughes, adequate food for all meals on Air Force One, as well as a tape recorder and tapes available. Classified documents can be stored in the safe on Air Force One which will be physically guarded throughout the period. Colonel Albertazzi will also make arrangements for accommodations for Dianne Matthews at the Von Steuben Hotel in Weisbaden on Friday night. She should be instructed to stay in continuous contact with Colonel Albertazzi on Saturday in case there should be a change in departure time.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 89th MILITARY AIRLIFT WING, SPECIAL MISSIONS (MAC)
ANDREWS AFB, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20331

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PILOT



46

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

16 February 1970

SUBJECT:

TO: MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG GEN JAMES D. HUGHES

1. I propose to operate a training mission to Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, departing approximately 0900 EST Friday 20 February, and returning Saturday PM. I propose a stop at an enroute base, going and coming. The requirements for the enroute stop will be:

a. One set boarding stairs positioned so that the top level is 10 feet above ground level.

b. Instrument approach facilities to insure capability of making the drop and pick-up during IFR conditions.

c. Customs and Immigrations facilities or a pre-arranged clearance at enroute stop.

d. No fuel for the drop. However, 20,000 U.S. gallons will be required at pick-up point or else another enroute stop (Shannon, Prestwick or Mildenhall) programmed with Pax remaining on board.


2. Other Factors:

a. Enroute Voice Communications should be kept to minimum. Secure Teletype should be primary, *for PAX COMMUNICATIONS.*

b. Customs clearance at Andrews should be pre-arranged for return.

c. Arrival and Departure from Andrews should be from the Flight Line as far from the Passenger Terminal as possible and the Pax ought to arrive by Air Force automobiles.

3. If I try to accomplish any of the "out of the way" things openly, suspicion will be aroused. I would handle only the training aspects. Special handling ought to be requisitioned through covert contacts.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DoD Directive 5200.30
BY *Let* Date *12/20/99*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Brig Gen Hughes

16 February 1970

4. The proposed Flight Schedule:

Friday 20 Feb	0900 local	Depart ADW
Friday 20 Feb	2200 local	Arrive ??
Friday 20 Feb	2230 local	Depart ??
Friday 20 Feb	2330 local	Arrive Rhein-Main
Saturday 21 Feb	0900 local	Depart Rhein-Main
Saturday 21 Feb	1900 local	Arrive ??
Saturday 21 Feb	2000 local	Depart ??
Saturday 21 Feb	2215 local	Arrive ADW



RALPH D. ALBERTAZZIE, Lt Colonel, USAF
Presidential Pilot

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



5

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, February 21, 1970

I met with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy near Paris for about seven hours on February 21. It was a significant meeting. We had a frank exchange of views. They basically accepted our proposed procedure for future private meetings, dropped their preconditions for substantive negotiations, and gave the impression of being much more ready for business than before.

I will send you a separate memorandum on where we go from here.

I. What Happened

- I presented our prepared statement during the almost three-hour morning session. The remainder of the morning I rebutted some of their statements, replied to questions, and had them clarify some elements of their position.
- During the morning session, Xuan Thuy produced a very perfunctory speech full of standard accusations with some interesting omissions (see below). In the afternoon session, Le Duc Tho made a long, rather defensive speech in which he rejected my statement that our situation had improved and claimed that in fact it had deteriorated. He even claimed that we had lost the war. He then proceeded to accept most of our suggestions for the format of future meetings, and to accept some rather significant changes in their position with just a minimum of face-saving.
- The atmosphere during the meeting was remarkably frank and free of trivia. Tho readily agreed to the proposed time for the next meeting. He did not appear to have a prepared statement, suggesting that he had some latitude on what he could accept. His long speech was apparently triggered by my suggesting that our position had improved since my August meeting with Xuan Thuy.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By lk, NARA, Date 12/21/99

II. What Was Agreed

- To continue private talks in this channel.
- On that basis, to meet again on Monday, March 16, at 9:30 a. m., as the first of a series of meetings.
- To discuss all problems related to the war. They will do so on the basis of their ten points, we on the basis of anything we choose, including our eight points.
- If there is progress, we will ~~soon thereafter~~ appoint a successor to Ambassador Lodge.

It was also implicitly agreed that,

- after we have discussed all the issues, and if we reach agreement, the other parties will be brought in to ratify it. It is not clear whether this will be done at the Majestic or at some other special meeting, and it is also not clear whether and how the Majestic sessions will be coordinated with our private negotiating process.

III. What Was New, or Dropped

- They dropped their demand that the GVN be changed as a precondition to substantive talks, saying that this could be discussed later. Instead, they linked the change in the GVN variously to private GVN talks with the PRG, to the ratification process, and to gestures of U. S. good will which could lead to a "rapid settlement." They implied that the main problem was not the composition of the GVN per se but the PRG's refusal to deal with Thieu, Ky and Khiem, and the GVN's possible unwillingness to accept an agreement and abide by it.
- They did not use the word "unconditional" when speaking of U. S. withdrawals, and did not challenge me when I said we would discuss the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces.
- When I spoke of "reciprocity," they did not argue. Xuan Thuy even said that we would "meet each other" on the road to peace.
- There was little emphasis on a coalition government, or any suggestion that we had to accept one as a precondition to talks.



- They stressed that they wanted an overall settlement, a "package."
- They also stated flatly that now is the time to negotiate one.

IV. Significance

- It was clearly a significant meeting. While it is still very hard to assess their objectives, they seem to want very much to get some exchange of views in a private forum separate from the Majestic sessions, and they appear prepared to pay the price of dropping their preconditions and perhaps some of their more extreme demands. But our positions are still very far apart, and we must expect that once they have got us talking they will prove tough for at least a while. In the past, the first meetings with them in a new channel have often sounded more promising than was justified by the results of later meetings.
- They have accepted a procedure which has a built-in time pressure that may work to their disadvantage. They know they cannot keep this channel going very long if they do not offer anything new. At the present frequency of meetings, they cannot get agreement in the near future unless they make some progress in at least one of every few meetings.
- They appear worried about Vietnamization, because if it succeeds they have lost and if it fails we may keep some forces there a long time.
- They showed some concern about whether we would live up to an agreement, which provides a piece of evidence that they are at least thinking ahead to the real possibility of a settlement.
- There are faint suggestions that they may be ready to talk seriously about troop withdrawal, on a reciprocal basis.
- They are entering discussions in an overall settlement without including the PRG or insisting as a condition of talks that the Saigon government be changed -- a key point for the PRG.
- This has been an important meeting, certainly the most important since the beginning of your Administration and perhaps even since the beginning of the talks in 1968. It remains to be seen what will happen next, but the early clues suggest that the course is certainly worth pursuing seriously.



- They accepted the condition for the appointment of a new Ambassador.
- Their omission of the word unconditional from their demand for U. S. withdrawal suggests that they are ready to pay some price.
- They may be in a hurry to reach some agreement, since they indicated several things that they wanted a quick settlement.

Times



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Professor Herbert A. Markovich
University of Paris
Paris, France
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

DATE and PLACE Thursday, September 17, 1970, 3:00-3:15 p.m.
4:00-4:15 p.m.
in Dr. Kissinger's office, Washington

After some opening pleasantries, Mr. Markovich said that he had seen Mai Van Bo on August 29. He had expected to spend one-half hour with him but the session lasted one-and-a-half hours and Mai Van Bo was extremely friendly. In response to Dr. Kissinger's query, Professor Markovich said that he had told Mai Van Bo that he hoped to see Dr. Kissinger. He and Mai Van Bo talked at length about Kissinger, for whose intellect Mai Van Bo holds the highest esteem. He considered Kissinger many heads above the others in the White House; the others do not carry his weight. In response to Mai Van Bo's query whether Kissinger was responsible for the Cambodian operation, Markovich had replied that, "Well, he makes foreign policy."

Markovich and Mai Van Bo had discussed the Soviet Union. Markovich thought that if a Lon Nol-type general took power in Hanoi the Soviet Union would not stand for it. Mai Van Bo agreed. Markovich had said to Ha Van Lau in Hanoi that the Czechoslovakian events had made Vietnam more difficult for the U. S. In response to Kissinger's query whether he considered North Vietnam in the U, S. sphere, Markovich replied affirmatively that it was his supposition. Egypt had more weapons from the Soviet Union than the North Vietnamese had. Kissinger asked what Lau's reply was. Markovich said that he understood and said nothing.

Returning to Mai Van Bo, what he hadn't said was significant. Two years ago he had used harsh expressions concerning President Johnson and Mr. Rostow, but he had never used such language with this Administration.

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By lit, NARA, Date 12/26/99

Kissinger interjected, "Despite Cambodia?", and Markovitch replied, "Yes." Mai Van Bo had said that Dr. Kissinger was very intelligent, though he might have illusions about solving the Vietnam problem within seven years. The North Vietnamese didn't believe in Vietnamization. The U. S. could withdraw its forces in substantial amounts, but if they withdrew all their troops, the GVN would collapse.


Mai Van Bo had told Aubrac that they considered Kissinger an adviser, not a decision-maker, and therefore not responsible for what occurred. Therefore, they had favorable prejudices about him. Markovitch had told Mai Van Bo that the French press had been very positive and never spoke of Kissinger like the others. Le Monde and other papers could be very sharp. He had never seen Kissinger quoted in a different manner than what he conceived of him.

Kissinger remarked that all this was interesting, since it would be in the North Vietnamese interest to paint him in a bad light. Markovitch repeated that they had never made any bad comments about him, only that he harbored illusions. As for his comment to Lau that Czechoslovakia worsened the situation, Lau replied that Czechoslovakia was not relevant and had nothing to do with Vietnam. When Markovitch relayed this to Mai Van Bo, he said that Lau was naive, or something to that effect.

(Dr. Kissinger then had to go to a meeting and, upon agreement, Markovitch returned in about forty-five minutes.)

Markovitch recalled that when he and Aubrac had come from Hanoi they had told Kissinger that the North Vietnamese were Western-oriented. If a Communist regime were to take over in the South, it would be like Yugoslavia and could be the best barrier against the Chinese and even the Soviets. This had remained his impression; he thought they were really ripe to cooperate with Westerners. His opinion was that all of Indochina should become oriented toward the West.

Last time, in talking to Mai Van Bo, he cited Hue as one type of difficulty for the U. S. in implementing withdrawals. He made a proposal to the North Vietnamese. He told them that keeping prisoners of war would not decrease the military power of the U. S., and giving them back would not increase the military power of the U. S. If, in the absence of negotiations, the North Vietnamese set the POWs free unilaterally and without conditions, this would be taken as a sign of good will. In saying this, he, Markovitch had not quoted the conversation he had had with Kissinger on this subject.



Mai Van Bo's face changed and became opaque. He said that he couldn't answer, that this was a difficult problem, that it would take a long time to consider, and that they should talk again. He did not know that Markovich would be talking to Kissinger on this subject. Markovich had offered himself or Aubrac to assist in this matter. He thought that a possible reason for the North Vietnamese position on POWs was their view that release could be taken in the U. S. as a sign of weakness and could make the situation dangerous for them. Markovich repeated that he was more and more convinced that the North Vietnamese were Western-oriented, no matter what happened. He confirmed that he would be seeing Mai Van Bo when he returned to Paris.

Kissinger said that Markovich could tell Mai Van Bo that he had seen Kissinger. He could report what Kissinger had said and add his own judgment. He could say that Kissinger had mentioned again that prisoner release would be taken as a generous gesture. He added that not freeing the prisoners did not influence our policy; they were not hostages. He thought it would be better if Markovich said that Kissinger had raised this. Kissinger continued that the main idea to get across to the North Vietnamese is that we are at a crucial point. If we do not negotiate a peace soon, then events will take their course. Maybe their assessment of future events is correct, maybe ours.

(Markovich got some paper to take notes at this point.)

Kissinger, returning to the prisoner question, said that a release of all or some of the prisoners would be appreciated. This is a very important time to begin serious negotiations. He didn't want to test whether they were right or we were right, whether time was on their side or on ours. This subject provided fruitless discussion. We needed serious talks to bring the war to a conclusion. We would certainly approach such discussions with great good will on our side.

Markovich commented that when he and Kissinger had spoken three years ago about serious negotiations, a gesture by the other side was not accepted. Kissinger remarked that there were certain conditions attached to ending the bombing. In response to Markovich's query whether a gesture would mean more now, Kissinger said he believed so. He repeated that we would approach negotiations with a serious attitude and good will. We believe negotiations are the quickest and most reliable way to end the war. We know that the North Vietnamese do not trust us, but this problem of trust



would not be any easier if the war continues. We think it is in our interest to make a settlement that they will want to keep. We have learned that if they think they were tricked they will start fighting again.

Kissinger recalled that the North Vietnamese have made two proposals -- withdraw our troops and change the Saigon government. These two together do not make sense. If we withdraw our troops, it is the North Vietnamese problem to make a change in the Saigon government if they can do it. He didn't wish to carry on a debate. If the North Vietnamese would meet with us to try and settle the conflict within a definite time limit, we would do our best to take their point of view into account. They must do the same with us. We could then work out a way to make an agreement.

Markovich asked again whether liberation of prisoners would be taken as a sign of good will and Kissinger replied that it would certainly be taken as such. Markovich then asked Kissinger to suggest what the U.S. response might be. Kissinger remarked that we would certainly release their prisoners, but in any event he did not wish to negotiate through Markovich now.

Markovich said that he understood and he would tell Mai Van Bo that his impressions were his own, not Kissinger's. He would say that one factor that made the U.S. reluctant to withdraw quickly and unilaterally was incidents like Hue and that the release of prisoners would be a good sign.

Kissinger said that the U.S. was prepared to be flexible. In response to Markovich's question, Kissinger replied that he did not know whether the other side knew this. The issue is not a question of one more proposal. We have no problem with national communism in Hanoi. In reply to Markovich's query whether the U.S. could accept communism in all of Indochina, Kissinger said that it could so long as it was spread by non-military means. We would make no effort to arrest a political process once it started. In this regard, Markovich asked whether nothing would be done on Chile; Kissinger responded that he couldn't get into that subject.

Kissinger concluded that the main thing to convey to the North Vietnamese was a mood, the fact that we had no interest in trying to trick them. We know they are serious people and negotiations would not depend on a gimmick.

Markovich closed the conversation by saying that he would tell Mai Van Bo that Kissinger was the same except that he laughed less. Kissinger said that he unfortunately had to close the meeting for other business.

At the conclusion of the meeting, at Kissinger's suggestion, Lord gave Markovich his home address in case the latter had anything interesting to communicate.



Le 3 novembre 1970

Cher Henry ,

Je n'ai pas oublié notre conversation du 27 septembre à mon domicile et je ~~vous=confirme~~ puis vous confirmer ce que je vous ai dit au sujet de l'ambassadeur de Chine en France. Il s'agit bien d'un ancien général, ayant participé à la Longue Marche et resté en bons termes avec Mao. Le fait qu'il soit l'un des deux seuls ambassadeurs membres du Comité central prouve qu'il doit être écouté à Pékin. Le seul autre ambassadeur également membre du Comité central est en Albanie.

Rappelé en Chine au moment de la Révolution culturelle, Huang Chen, après presque deux années d'absence, semble être revenu consolidé à Paris.

Je vous confirme que j'entretiens avec lui de bonnes relations et qu'il me serait sans doute possible de lui parler dans le sens envisagé au cours de notre entretien. J'attends de vos nouvelles.

Fidèle ment John

7



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓ 11/9/70

Envelope
to Dick Simpson

Please do for
HAR telling
Linn to do
So.

JD



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

November 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. Smyser

SUBJECT: Letter from Your Friend in Paris, and Other Chinese Miscellanea

I have received a note for you from your friend Jean in Paris (Tab A). The translation reads:

"Dear Henry:

"I have not forgotten our conversation of the 27th of September at my home and I can confirm to you that which I told you about the Chinese Ambassador in France. He is indeed a former general, having participated in the Long March and remained on good terms with Mao. The fact that he is one of the two only ambassadors who are members of the central committee proves that he must be listened to in Peking. The only other Ambassador who is also a member of the central committee is in Albania.

"Recalled to China at the moment of the Cultural Revolution, Hoang Chen, after two years away, appears to have come back to Paris with his position solidified (consolidated).

"I confirm that I have good relations with him and that it would doubtless be possible for me to speak to him along the lines we envisaged in our conversation. I await your word.

Faithfully yours,
J."

I cannot suggest a reply to this since I do not know the state of play of all our Chinese efforts. But I note that he appears to have taken a long time to obtain rather basic information and that he does not

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By wt, NARA, Date 12/20/99



70
Re: Albania
W. R. Smyser
etc.

refer to the interpreter problem he cited in our conversation. So I do not really know what to make of it. Maybe Jean first checked with his government. In any case, I stand ready to transmit a reply on my personal stationery.

The French Delegate in Hanoi has told Ambassador Godley that the Chinese Ambassador there has several times recently spoken of the possibility of China being admitted to the UN. He finds this remarkable because until the last two or three months the Chinese gave every appearance of having little or no interest in being admitted to the UN.

An official of the French Embassy here, M. Bujon, told me yesterday that he thought the Chinese were indeed interested in getting into the UN (which he also probably got from their man in Hanoi). He thought that their chances were pretty good, even this year. He cited Canada and Italy and said that Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Singapore and others would also support China's admission as well as vote against us on the "important question" issue.

Attachment

