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STATE 130509. TOSEC 130335

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: YOUR MEETING WITH
 HUANG CHEN

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04
 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
 BY H2, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

REF: SECTO 13120

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTTEL, WE INFORMED PRCL0 YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT YOU WISH TO MEET WITH HUANG CHEN AT 10:00A.M., SATURDAY, MAY 29. PRCL0 HAS NOT YET CONFIRMED THE APPOINTMENT, BUT WE ASSUME IT WILL.

2. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHOM YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE; A POSSIBLE LIST WOULD BE MYSELF, DICK SOLOMON, AND OSCAR ARMSTRONG (NOTETAKER). (WIN LORD AND BILL GLEYSTEN WILL BE OUT OF TOWN.)

3. I BELIEVE THAT THE MAIN PURPOSES OF YOUR MEETING SHOULD BE TO RENEW CONTACT WITH HUANG AFTER HIS PROLONGED ABSENCE (HE WENT TO PEKING IN OCTOBER BEFORE YOUR VISIT); TO REAFFIRM CERTAIN BASIC POINTS ABOUT OUR POLICIES; AND TO TOUCH ON YOUR AFRICA TRIP AND YOUR NATO MEETING. ANOTHER PURPOSE IS TO SEE IF HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE ANY PARTICULAR POINTS. (WE BELIEVE HE MAY MENTION THE CONTINUITY OF PRC FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING TOWARDS THE U.S., BUT BREAK NO NEW GROUND. WE DOUBT HE FEELS FREE TO DISCUSS THE DOMESTIC PRC SITUATION, AND SUGGEST YOU NOT PROBE ON THIS SUBJECT.) MORE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ARE GIVEN LATER IN THIS MEMO.



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FROM: TOSFC 130335
(POST) (HRN)

4. AMBASSADOR GATES HAD A FRIENDLY, RELAXED AND LARGELY NON-SUBSTANTIVE 35-MINUTE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO ON MAY 15. (WE WILL PROVIDE THE REPORTING TELEGRAMS WHEN YOU RETURN.) RESPONDING TO A REMARK BY GATES, CH'IAO SAID THAT A MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA COULD BE ARRANGED. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG HOSTED A DINNER FOR GATES MAY 22. WHEN GATES NOTED HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH HUA, WANG COMMENTED THAT MATTER WAS IN THE HANDS OF THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT AND ALSO THAT PREMIER HAD BEEN VERY BUSY AND THAT BHUTTO WAS ARRIVING LATER THIS WEEK. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT HUA WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE VISIT STARTING JUNE 2 OF THE KING OF NEPAL, SO IT MAY BE ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE GATES APPOINTMENT IS POSSIBLE.

5. BACKGROUND

YOUR MEETING WITH HUANG CHEN WILL TAKE PLACE AT A TIME WHEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC ARE IN A HOLDING PATTERN, AND WHEN EACH COUNTRY IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN THE OTHER COUNTRY AND HOW THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP.


IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRC HAS BEEN:

- MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA WILL NOT AFFECT THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES, SPECIFICALLY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S., WHICH HAVE BEEN FORMULATED BY MAO;

-- TRYING TO CONVINCING OUTSIDERS THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE PRC IS UNDER FULL CONTROL;

-- MAINTAINING THEIR THREE-TRACK COMMENTARY ON THE U.S., I.E., AT TIMES EMPHASIZING OUR EFFORTS TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM; AT OTHERS CHARGING US WITH LACK OF FIRMNESS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS; AND GENERALLY, INCLUDING AT UNCTAD, PLAYING UP TO THIRD-WORLD POSITIONS CRITICAL OF THE U.S.

DESPITE OUR INTENSE SCRUTINY FOR SIGNS TO THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE COME ACROSS NO EVIDENCE SO FAR TO CHALLENGE THE VIEW THAT CHINA'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE CENTERS ON DOMESTIC ISSUES AND DOES NOT PRESAGE A CHANGE IN THE PRC'S FUNDAMENTAL FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK. IN PARTICULAR, PRC PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS SUGGEST NO CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.



ON THE DOMESTIC SITUATION, THERE IS CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE OUSTING OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING AND THE APPOINTMENT OF HUA KUO-FENG AS PREMIER AND NO. 2 IN THE PARTY HAVE NOT RESOLVED THE BASIC POLICY AND POWER-RIVALRY ISSUES. THERE IS AT LEAST THE OFFCHANCE THAT

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THESE COULD ERUPT OPENLY AGAIN WITH EVEN MORE DAMAGING EFFECTS THAN THE FIRST ROUNDS OF THE TENG AFFAIR. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TIEN AN MEN DISORDER WAS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT; REPORTS ARE ACCUMULATING THAT THERE HAS BEEN DISSIDENCE OR OPEN FACTIONALISM ELSEWHERE IN THE PRC. FINALLY, AND PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY OVER TIME, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT MAO'S PRESTIGE HAS DECLINED SHARPLY AS A RESULT OF THE LATEST LEADERSHIP IMBROGLIO. THIS, TOGETHER WITH POSSIBLE INDICATIONS OF HIS FAILING HEALTH (E.G. FROM MULDOON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH MAO), SUGGESTS THAT MAO'S ABILITY TO ENFORCE HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE FACTIONALIZED LEADERSHIP AND THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE MAY WELL BE ON THE DECLINE.

THERE HAS BEEN NO SHARP CHANGE IN PRC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE U.S. FOREIGN MINISTER CH·IAO ASSURED CODEL PRICE THAT PRC POLICY TOWARDS THE U.S. WOULD NOT CHANGE, AND HE TOLD GATES THAT "OUR RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE ALONG THE LINES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE." IN MID-APRIL, A PRC-CONTROLLED HONG KONG PAPER APPROVINGLY NOTED RECENT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO SEEK NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. PEKING MEDIA REPORTED THE PROPOSAL BY SECRETARY RUMSFELD TO BUILD MORE WARSHIPS AND THE ACTION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET COMMITTEE IN APPROVING A FY '77 BUDGET WHICH INCLUDED A LARGER ALLOCATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. AN ARTICLE ON YOUR AFRICAN TRIP SUGGESTED THAT YOUR PRIMARY MOTIVE WAS TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA--THOUGH IT ALSO SAID THAT

AFRICANS "WANT NEITHER U.S. NOR SOVIET INTERVENTION." ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE THE ALLEGED SOFTNESS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. NCNA CARRIED AN ARTICLE WHICH TOOK AT FACE VALUE THE INITIAL CRITICAL COMMENT ON THE SO-CALLED "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE," AND ANOTHER ARTICLE IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED THE ADMINISTRATION BY CLAIMING THAT THERE IS A GROWING SENTIMENT IN THE U.S. AGAINST "TAKING A WEAK, RETREATING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND SCRAMBLE FOR HEGEMONY."

PEKING COMMENTARY CLAIMED THAT YOUR UNCTAD SPEECH CAUSED RESENTMENT AMONG MANY THIRD WORLD DELEGATES, AND THE CHINESE DELEGATE, WHILE DIRECTING MORE OF HIS ATTACKS AT THE SOVIETS, CLAIMED THAT U.S. POLICIES ARE DESIGNED TO "MAINTAIN THE CONTROL, PLUNDER AND EXPLOITATION OVER THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." ON BILATERAL MATTERS, PRCLO PROTESTED THE SURVEILLANCE OF TWO PRC "OCEANOGRAPHIC" VESSELS BY U.S. NAVY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

6. TALKING POINTS

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE SUGGEST YOU MENTION THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR MEETING WITH HUANG CHEN (ASIDE FROM WELCOMING HIM BACK AFTER HIS PROLONGED ABSENCE):

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~~SECRET~~FROM: TJSEC
(POST)130335
(HRN)

-- SAY THAT WE HAVE NOTED VARIOUS CHINESE STATEMENTS THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN PRC FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING TOWARDS THE U.S. WE WELCOME THIS.

-- STATE THAT FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED THE CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC, INCLUDING OUR DETERMINATION TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, E.G. IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO PREMIER HUA AND IN HIS REMARKS DURING THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR AMBASSADOR GATES.

-- NOTE THAT GATES HAD A FRIENDLY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO ON MAY 15, AND THAT CH'IAO SAID THAT A MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA COULD BE ARRANGED. REFER TO THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PREMIER WHICH GATES HAS, AND SAY THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE.

-- SAY THAT WE HAVE ALSO NOTED CONTINUING CHINESE CRITICISM OF AN ALLEGED LACK OF U.S. FIRMNESS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. YOU COULD REITERATE OUR TWO-TRACK POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS OF REDUCING TENSIONS WHILE RESISTING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, INCLUDING OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE (E.G. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET COMMITTEE APPROVAL OF AN INCREASED DEFENSE BUDGET).

-- NOTE PRC PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REFERENCES TO THE SO-CALLED "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE" WHICH SEEM TO ACCEPT THE MISINTERPRETATIONS AT FACE VALUE, AND EXPLAIN OUR CONSISTENT POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE. (WE WILL GIVE YOU AFTER YOUR RETURN A TELEGRAM WE SENT FOR GATES' GUIDANCE IN CASE THE CHINESE RAISE THE MATTER WITH HIM.)

-- REVIEW THE OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF YOUR AFRICA TRIP, AND THE PURPOSE OF YOUR PROPOSALS AT UNCTAD (PERHAPS NOTING CRITICAL PRC COMMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE).

-- REVIEW HIGHLIGHTS OF YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP.

-- HUANG CHEN MAY MENTION THE PRCLD PROTEST (FIRST TO GLEYSTEN, THEN TO ME) ABOUT THE SURVEILLANCE BY U.S. NAVY AIRCRAFT OF THE TWO PRC VESSELS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. IF SO, YOU COULD BRIEFLY NOTE THAT THE RECONNAISSANCE WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS, BUT THAT AS HABIB TOLD AMBASSADOR HAN, HABIB IS LOOKING INTO THE MATTER AGAIN AND WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HAN. (THE SHIPS HAVE LEFT THE SOUTH PACIFIC, AND WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CLOSE-IN SURVEILLANCE SINCE THE FLIGHTS PROTESTED BY PRCLD. WE WILL PROVIDE DETAILS WHEN YOU RETURN.)

7. CLEARANCE: WIN LORD CLEARED THE DRAFT MEMO ON WHICH THIS MESSAGE IS BASED.

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Date JUN 11 1976

Initial *WHA*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

NODIS

DATE: May 29, 1976
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
PLACE: The Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: US-PRC Relations, Policy towards the Soviet Union, Africa, NATO, Turkey-Greece Relations

PARTICIPANTS: People's Republic of China

Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office
Shen Jo-yun, First Secretary, PRC Liaison Office

United States

The Secretary
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, EA
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, EA/PRCM (Notetaker)

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(The meeting, held at the Secretary's request, started at 10:05 a.m. and ended at 10:55 a.m. Miss Shen interpreted.)

The Secretary: I'm very glad to see you again.

Huang Chen: I'm also glad to meet with you again.

The Secretary: I've missed you.

Huang Chen: I also missed you.

The Secretary: We appreciate the friendly reception given to Ambassador Gates in Peking. I think you'll find him an excellent man. He's a good friend of mine and of the President.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04
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BY 142, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

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Huang: I understand.

The Secretary: I haven't seen you for some time, and wanted to have this opportunity to review the world situation.

I spoke to former President Nixon after his return, and found his remarks very interesting. As you know, I always worked very closely with him and have great respect for him.

Huang: Did you read his report?

The Secretary: Yes, and I had several conversations with him. In China you always read our press, and you probably noticed that when the press was carrying various stories about Mr. Nixon's visit, I always said I would read his report. I believe he's the only senior American to have met your Premier; I don't think the recent Congressional delegation met him.

(Miss Shen initially translated this incorrectly, i.e. that the Congressional delegation had met with the Premier. There was a brief back-and-forth to clarify the matter.)

Huang: Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao met with the Congressional delegation.

The Secretary: I speak with Mr. Nixon about every two weeks, so we are in close contact.

I have followed with great interest the various statements about the main line of your foreign policy. I remember, of course, that Chairman Mao said that foreign policy is determined by the basic interests of each country.

Huang: During President Ford's visit, as well as yours, Chairman Mao made a clear presentation on our position on international and strategic issues, as well as on relations between our two countries.



The Secretary: On our side, we will pursue the policy discussed with Chairman Mao.

You will have noticed that during the Presidential campaign some candidates try to take advantage of our China policy and to raise embarrassing issues. But we are sticking to the Shanghai Communique and all the discussions we have had with your government. And I think that even if the Democrats win, they will follow the same policy. That's my strong impression. Only one man wouldn't follow that policy, and he won't be elected. (Huang laughed.)

Huang: So far as the Chinese side is concerned, we will always carry out the line and the policy formulated by Chairman Mao, not only for foreign policy but also domestic policy.

The Secretary: I understand. As far as we are concerned, we deal with Chinese foreign policy, not domestic policy.

I hope you will understand--you are a careful student of the American scene--that during this election period we phrase our statements very carefully; we don't want any upheavals here.

Huang: We understand this. Frankly speaking, we have heard that some Senators and Congressmen have made anti-Chinese statements. We attach no importance to them. We also heard that a Senator said that you had told him that the US would not normalize relations after the elections.

The Secretary: That report is not correct. I said that we have made no concrete agreement; you know why I said that. We discussed this question in Peking on many occasions; the President has discussed it, and I have discussed it, with your leaders. We will continue on the course we started.

Huang: I am very clear about this point, and about the discussions with Chairman Mao.

The Secretary: Some of the stories come from Taiwan. The stories will probably stop when the nomination process is completed, because the Democrats will not make it an issue. So for about two months we'll have a lot of noise. But you're used to that; you've heard a lot of noise before.


Huang: Yes.

The Secretary: I remember when Watergate started...People in America sometimes say that China is incomprehensible, but I sometimes think we are incomprehensible to the Chinese.

On other parts of the world, Mr. Ambassador... Incidentally, when I was in England I spoke to former Prime Minister Heath; he has warm memories of his visit to China last year.

Huang: You have been very busy. You were in England, before that there was the NATO meeting, and in London there was also CENTO.

The Secretary: We are going to organize, in the context of our discussions with Chairman Mao, barriers to Soviet expansionism. First of all, in Africa, we are not going to permit another Angola to develop. You must have noticed my repeated statements that if there is another Soviet-supported military adventure, we will do something. We are attempting to organize various of these countries to increase their capabilities. The Secretary of Defense will go to Zaire in July to discuss military assistance to that country. We are working closely with Zambia and other countries. I know that you are also quite active in Africa, and you will have noticed that we have raised no obstacles to your activities.



Huang: Frankly speaking, we think the United States should learn a lesson from Angola.

The Secretary: What lesson?

Huang: Well, the fact that the military situation in Angola developed to the point it did is inseparable from US policy towards the Soviets. US policy abetted the Soviet efforts.

The Secretary: We discussed our Angola policy in Peking. Congress stopped us from doing what was necessary. We would have defeated the Soviets in Angola if Congress had not stopped our assistance.

Huang: (Deliberately changing the subject) It is said that the ministerial meeting of NATO went well.

The Secretary: It was the best meeting in many years. It took decisions on the strengthening of defense and on close cooperation and coordination of policies against the Soviet Union on a world-wide basis. In this connection, I can tell you, so you can tell your government--it won't become public for about a week--that President Ford has invited the leaders of England, France, Germany, Italy and Japan to a meeting in Puerto Rico to develop a common strategy. The meeting will probably be June 27-28.

Huang: From reading press stories, I learned that the ministers attending the NATO meeting expressed concern about Soviet expansion, and that they stressed the need to resist Soviet military and political pressures. I also noticed that the European Governments and the European public are seeing that the Soviet threat is getting more serious. All this shows that the ministers' understanding of the situation is clearer.



The Secretary: At NATO, and also at CENTO, I said that we cannot accept the principle of coexistence in one part of the world and permit aggression in another part. That is our policy.

Huang: The Soviet Union will not change its policy of dividing and weakening Europe, with military strength as its backing and detente as the smokescreen.

The Secretary: That is one reason we are opposed to the inclusion of European Communist parties in government. That is bound to weaken the defense of Europe.

Huang: It seems that the West is getting very nervous about this possibility. But there are contradictions between the European Communists and the Soviets.

The Secretary: Maybe, to some extent. Perhaps the Italians, but not the French. But in any event, we favor the strength and unity of Western Europe, and will not let the Soviets succeed in their policy of dividing and weakening Europe.

Huang: That's very important.

The Secretary: At the same time, we shouldn't overestimate Soviet strength. It is strong in some categories, but it is not as strong as some newspaper stories suggest.

Huang: This point was also touched on in the conversations between the President and the Secretary and our leaders. The Soviets have wild ambitions but their capacity is not adequate to living up to those ambitions. On the other hand, it is important to keep up the guard. At a minimum, the Soviets will continue their policy of dividing and weakening. It is very important to strengthen unity and defense.



The Secretary: Defense should be strengthened, but we should not have an attitude of being afraid of the Soviets. They cannot feed their people. In Europe, I found many, including in Sweden, who feel that the Soviet army is overrated. They have many men, but their army is not as strong as the numbers suggest. But we do have to strengthen defenses; all the NATO countries--almost all--are doing it.

Huang: How are relations between Turkey and Greece? They are in the Southern flank.

The Secretary: What success the Soviets have had has (not) been due to mistakes by the West.

The Turkey-Greece situation is complicated by the domestic situation in the two countries, and also, frankly, by the domestic situation here, because of the Greek lobby. I've talked to the Foreign Ministers of both Turkey and Greece. It is a weird situation. In the Middle East, the problem is objectively difficult. But Turkey and Greece have practically agreed on a solution. However, because of Makarios in Cyprus and their domestic situations, they have not been able to carry out what has been practically agreed upon. When the two Foreign Ministers met in Oslo, they spent most of the time not on substance but on procedures for putting forward a solution so they would not be attacked at home. I think that during this year they will move to a solution.

Will your Foreign Minister be coming to the General Assembly, or is it too early to know?

Huang: I don't know yet--I think he will come.

The Secretary: I will be delighted to see him and review matters with him. But we'll have opportunities before then to discuss matters.



Huang: It is always good to exchange views.

The Secretary: Always.

Huang: We are also good friends.

The Secretary: True. I have known you many years and consider you a good friend.

Huang: I understand you will visit Latin America next week.

The Secretary: Yes, for an OAS meeting. Then at the end of the month I will go back to Europe for an OECD ministerial meeting. While in Europe, I will try to do something to bring majority rule to Rhodesia, by meeting with black African leaders and maybe South African leaders.

Huang: You are always very busy, always keep moving.

The Secretary: It is better to dominate events rather than to let events run away. It also keeps me out of the political campaign.

Huang: Every time I come, I always like to exchange views. Are there any other points you wish to bring up?

The Secretary: Whenever you wish to discuss matters, you will always be welcome. When I come back from my next trip, I will ask you if you wish to exchange views again.

Huang: I am always pleased to exchange views.

The Secretary: If anything comes up in our political campaign that raises some question, you should not draw conclusions without consulting us. We have conducted our policy for five years with great care, and will not let it fail because of two months of political campaigns.



Huang: I understand.

(Miss Shen wanted to clarify the term "OECD" and there was a brief discussion of its membership.)

The Secretary: Mr. Habib is getting promoted.

Huang: I know--congratulations. I understand Mr. Hummel is coming back.

The Secretary: Yes, as Assistant Secretary.

Huang: He is also Chinese.

The Secretary: Yes. I think he was born in China.
(There followed a brief discussion of Ambassador Hummel's China background.)





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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 312104
BY HA, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFDR, CH, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH HUANG CHEN

1. SECRETARY MET AT HIS REQUEST WITH PROLO CHIEF HUANG CHEN MAY 29, TO REESTABLISH CONTACT AFTER HUANG'S LONG ABSENCE AND TO REVIEW SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS.

2. SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FRIENDLY RECEPTION GIVEN YOU IN PEKING. "I THINK YOU WILL FIND HIM AN EXCELLENT MAN. HE IS A GOOD FRIEND OF MINE AND OF THE PRESIDENT."

3. SECRETARY NOTED THAT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SOME CANDIDATES ARE TRYING TO RAISE EMBARRASSING ISSUES ABOUT OUR CHINA POLICY, AND SAID THAT DURING THIS CAMPAIGN PERIOD HE PHRASE OUR STATEMENTS VERY CAREFULLY TO AVOID "UPHEAVALS." HUANG SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THIS. SECRETARY

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LABELED AS INCORRECT THE REPORT THAT HE HAD TOLD GOLDWATER THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS. INSTEAD, HE TOLD GOLDWATER THAT "WE HAVE MADE NO CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS." SECRETARY SAID THAT IF ANYTHING COMES UP IN OUR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN THAT RAISES SOME QUESTIONS, PRC SHOULD NOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING US. "WE HAVE CONDUCTED OUR POLICY FOR FIVE YEARS WITH GREAT CARE, AND WILL NOT LET IT FAIL BECAUSE OF TWO MONTHS OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS."

4. DURING DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT, HUANG SAID, "SO FAR AS THE CHINESE SIDE IS CONCERNED, WE WILL ALWAYS CARRY OUT THE LINE AND POLICY FORMULATED BY CHAIRMAN MAO, NOT ONLY FOR FOREIGN POLICY BUT ALSO DOMESTIC POLICY." SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, WE DEAL WITH CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, NOT DOMESTIC POLICY.

5. ON AFRICA, SECRETARY SAID WE ARE NOT GOING TO PERMIT ANOTHER ANGOLA TO DEVELOP AND THAT IF THERE IS ANOTHER SOVIET-SUPPORTED MILITARY ADVENTURE, WE WILL DO SOMETHING. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES. SECDEF WILL GO TO ZAIRE IN JULY TO DISCUSS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH ZAMBIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. LATER IN CONVERSATION SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT WHEN HE GOES TO EUROPE FOR OECD MEETING END OF JUNE, HE PLANS TO MEET WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AND MAYBE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS TO HELP BRING MAJORITY RULE TO RHODESIA.

6. HUANG SAID U.S. SHOULD LEARN A LESSON FROM ANGOLA, AND IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S "WHAT LESSON?", SAID "THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA DEVELOPED TO THE POINT IT DID IS INSEPARABLE FROM U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS. U.S. POLICY ABETTED THE SOVIET EFFORTS." SECRETARY SAID WE DISCUSSED OUR ANGOLA POLICY IN PEKING (DURING PRESIDENT'S VISIT) AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE DEFEATED SOVIETS IN ANGOLA IF CONGRESS HAD NOT STOPPED OUR ASSISTANCE.

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7. SECRETARY CALLED NATO MEETING BEST IN MANY YEARS. IT TOOK DECISIONS ON STRENGTHENING OF DEFENSE AND ON CLOSE COORDINATION OF POLICIES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS. HUANG COMMENTED THAT PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT EUROPEANS NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET THREAT, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT CHANGE THEIR POLICY OF DIVIDING AND WEAKENING EUROPE, WITH MILITARY STRENGTH AS ITS BACKING AND DETENTE AS THE SMOKESCREEN. SECRETARY MENTIONED OUR OPPOSITION TO INCLUSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT, AND SAID WE WILL NOT LET THE SOVIETS SUCCEED IN THEIR POLICY OF DIVIDING AND WEAKENING EUROPE.

8. SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE TURKEY-GREECE PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED BY THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND BY THE PROBLEM OF MAKARIOS ON CYPRUS. HOWEVER, THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PRACTICALLY AGREED ON A SOLUTION AND WILL PROBABLY MOVE TO THE SOLUTION THIS YEAR.

9. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HUANG SAID HE DID NOT YET KNOW IF FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO WILL COME TO THE UNGA, BUT THAT HE PROBABLY WILL. SECRETARY SAID HE WILL BE DELIGHTED TO REVIEW MATTERS WITH CH'IAO. KISSINGER



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 139556

THEMSELVES. THIS IS THE US VIEW AS WELL. IN THIS REGARD, THE US INITIATIVES ON THE RHODESIA PROBLEM ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT SINCE THEY CAN HELP CONTRIBUTE TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AND PRECLUDE CONDITIONS

WHICH WOULD BE TO THE SOVIETS' ADVANTAGE. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER RECENTLY INFORMED AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, WHEN HE IS IN EUROPE LATER THIS MONTH, HE PLANS TO TALK WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA TO HELP FIND A WAY TO ACHIEVE EARLY MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.

3. INSERT BETWEEN PARAS 11 AND 12:

IT IS ENCOURAGING TO NOTE THE CUBAN INTENTION TO REDUCE THEIR PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, AS INDICATED IN CASTRO'S LETTER TO SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER PALME ABOUT WHICH THE LATTER INFORMED SECRETARY KISSINGER LAST MONTH. THIS REFLECTS OUR FIRM EFFORTS BOTH IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW RAPID AND COMPLETE THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISSUE.

4. IN VIEW OF FLUID LEBANON SITUATION, DELETE PARA 15.

5. INSERT BETWEEN PARAS 16 AND 17.

THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN OSLO DEMONSTRATED A JOINT DETERMINATION AMONG THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN DEFENSES AND VIGILANCE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE US COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGARD, AND THERE WAS SOLID SUPPORT AND COHESION AT THE MEETING.

6. DELETE LAST SENTENCE PARA 21, AND INSERT FOLLOWING BETWEEN PARAS 21 AND 22: WE NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S VISIT SERVED TO REAFFIRM THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND YOUR COUNTRY. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 139556

7. REVISE PARA 23 TO READ: AT THE REQUEST OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT, WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY FOR THOSE UNFRIENDLY TO THE US, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. THE DETAILS OF ANY RESIDUAL US FACILITIES IN THAILAND ARE BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT.

8. IN PARA 24, REVISE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN RESOLVE SOME ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES WILL REMAIN STRONG, ROBINSON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PEKING 01048 101617Z

CHIEF TING; NANCY TANG INTERPRETED.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HUA'S OPENING REMARKS ON SINO-US RELATIONS (OTHER ASPECTS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY): QUOTE THANK YOU FOR INFORMING US OF THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I HAVE RECEIVED PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER WHICH YOU CONVEYED, THANK YOU FOR BRINGING IT. IN THE LETTER THE PRESIDENT GAVE A GOOD INTRODUCTION OF YOU WHICH INCLUDED HIGH PRAISE, HE EX-

T
PRESSED HIS HIGHEST CONFIDENCE IN YOU AND THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS, HE SAID YOU WOULD EFFECTIVELY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENT FORD ALSO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES THEY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS, HE ALSO GAVE HIS VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS, PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED HIS GOOD WISHES TO ME, I WANT YOU TO THANK HIM FOR ME, HE ALSO ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO CHAIRMAN MAO, I CERTAINLY WILL.

4. YOU HAVE CONVEYED YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, STRATEGIC ISSUES AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE DISCUSSED BY CHAIRMAN MAO WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN DECEMBER AND WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS EARLIER VISIT. THESE DISCUSSIONS WENT VERY WELL. IN HIS LETTER PRESIDENT FORD FURTHER REITERATED U.S. COMMITMENT TO FURTHER DEVELOPING SINO-US RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, HE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRM POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. AS FOR SINO-US RELATIONS, WE BELIEVE AS LONG AS BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE RELATIONS WILL DEVELOP FORWARD, THERE DO EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, BUT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WE HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON. WE SAY THAT IN SINO-US RELATIONS THE MAJOR ASPECTS CONCERN INTER-

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TELEGRAM

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NATIONAL ISSUES. THE MINOR ASPECTS CONCERN BILATERAL
ISSUES. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN
WHICH REMAINS OUTSTANDING. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS
PROBLEM ON MANY OCCASIONS. END QUOTE
GATES



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 01049 101644Z

AND OPPOSE SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, HE SMILINGLY MENTIONED THE "SONNENFELT DOCTRINE" AND ENDED HIS REMARKS ON EUROPE AND DETENTE.

3. JAPAN: IN A LONG DISCOURSE ON JAPAN THAT APPEARED TO EMBARRASS HIS AIDES, HUA CHARACTERIZED SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS "GENERALLY-SPEAKING GOOD", NOTED CHINA HAD TOLD JAPAN TO LOOK FIRST TO THE U.S. AND THEN TO CHINA, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO COMPLAIN THAT PRIME MINISTER MIKI HAD NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON FORMER PRIME MINISTER TANAKA'S AGREEMENT TO SIGN THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY. HE SAID THAT THE TREATY REMAINED UNSIGNED BECAUSE OF THE HEGEMONY ISSUE BUT THEY AGAIN CHARACTERIZED SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS "STILL GOOD" AND REAFFIRMED STANDARD PRC SUPPORT FOR RETURN OF JAPAN'S FOUR NORTHERN ISLANDS.

4. ASEAN: HUA NOTED VISITS TO PRC BY ASEAN LEADERS, HE COMMENTING THAT THE PRC HAD NOT ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH SINGAPORE DURING LEE'S VISIT BUT THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD GONE "NOT BADLY" AND NOTED RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA REMAIN SUSPENDED. HUA SAID THE PRC "GENERALLY SUPPORTS" ASEAN AND WAS GLADDENED BY THE RAISED VIGILANCE TO "KEEP THE TIGER FROM ENTERING THE BACK DOOR WHILE THE WOLF WAS BEING DRIVEN OUT FROM THE FRONT".

5. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: HE SAID THAT THE PRC "FAVORS AND ADMIRES INCREASED VIGILANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AGAINST THE THREAT OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND INCREASED ATTENTION TO DEFENSE. HE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAD BOTH EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THE BASIS OF QUALITY AND THAT THE TALKS WITH MULDOON HAD GONE WELL.

6. SOUTH ASIA: TAKING A TOUGH AND WARY LINE AGAINST INDIA AS SEEKING "PETTY HEGEMONY" IN THE REGION, HE CRITICIZED INDIAN ACTIONS TOWARD BANGLADESH AND NEPAL. HOWEVER, WHILE INDIA WAS PUSHING "PETTY HEGEMONY" AND THE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN BIG POWER HEGEMONY, HE SAID THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND THEY WERE NOT MONOLITIC. ACCORDING TO HUA, CHINA DOES NOT BELIEVE

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 PEKING 01049 101644Z

INDIA WILL BECOME A COMPLETE "RUNNING DOG" OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO USE INDIA AND SEEK OVERLAND ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. HE SAID CHINA HAD AGREED TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH INDIA AND WILL WORK TO DEVELOP SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, BUT THAT CHINA WOULD UPHOLD ITS PRINCIPLES IN THIS PROCESS. HE CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND NEPAL AS "VERY GOOD" AND VOICED SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, AND TURKEY AS WELL AS WITH INDIA. HE NOTED THAT CHINA BELIEVED THE U.S. SHOULD HELP PAKISTAN WIN OVER INDIA FROM THE SOVIETS.

7. EGYPT: IN A POINTED DIFFERENCE WITH MY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REASONS FOR EGYPT'S MOVE AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION, HUA SAID THEY BELIEVED EGYPT'S ACTIONS RESULTED FROM SOVIET TEACHING BY NEGATIVE EXAMPLE.

8. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS AND REFTEL TO HONG KONG.

9. FULL TEXT WILL FOLLOW JUNE 11.
GATES



~~SECRET~~

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

IMMEDIATE

O 150240Z JUN 76
FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5794

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1075

FOR EA/PRCM
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LIN PING

1. AMBASSADOR GATES HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH MFA AMERICAS/
OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR AT 1100 ON JUNE 16. IN ORDER TO
PRESERVE OUR POSTURE OF HAVING THE AMBASSADOR DEAL ON SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, WE INTEND TO TREAT THE SESSION AS A
COURTESY CALL. IF, HOWEVER, YOU HAVE AN OVERRIDING ITEMS THAT
SHOULD BE RAISED WITH DIRECTOR LIN, WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE HAPPY
TO DO SO, YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE INVITED WANG HAI-
JUNG, LIN, AND OTHERS FOR A RETURN LUNCH AT THE RESIDENCE ON
JUNE 18 OR 19.

2. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY ITEMS YOU HAVE FOR THE
LIN MEETING BY OPENING OF BUSINESS JUNE 16.
GATES

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

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N0018

FOR THE SECRETARY

PASS ALSO TO SCOWCROFT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: JUNE 10 MEETING WITH PREMIER: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I INTEND TO SEND A LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA EXPRESSING GRATIFICATION FOR JUNE 10 MEETING WITH THE PREMIER. PURPOSE OF DOING THIS THROUGH CHIAO IS TO SHOW PERSONAL COURTESY TO HIM.
2. WHILE NOT LIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY "TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE" WITH HUA OR TO PROVIDE HUA WITH SOME PERSONAL SUBSTANTIVE REACTION TO THE JUNE 10 MEETING. JUST IN CASE THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO USE THIS OCCASION FOR (1) A LETTER OF IMPORTANCE, (2) A LETTER FOR THE RECORD SHOWING CONTINUED PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONS, OR (3) A LETTER WHICH PERHAPS COULD BE USEFUL TO PUBLICLY REFER TO AFTER THE NOMINATION, I THOUGHT IT WORTH MENTIONING TO LET YOU CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY BEFORE I SEND MY LETTER TO CHIAO.
3. I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR I AM NOT RECOMMENDING ANOTHER LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THERE IS A CHANCE THAT A LETTER WITHOUT SUBSTANCE WOULD RISK GILDING THE LILY AND CHEAPEN THE CHANNEL. IF I DO NOT RECEIVE A REPLY BY COB JUNE 23, I WILL SEND THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO CHIAO:

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR NARA, DATE 7/11/08



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE #2 PEKING 01106 210604Z

TO: FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE HAD A REPORT OF MY MEETING ON JUNE 10 WITH THE PREMIER. I WANT TO TELL YOU HOW MUCH I, AND MY GOVERNMENT, VALUED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION WITH HIM. KNOWING THE PREMIER'S OTHERWISE DIFFICULT SCHEDULE, ESPECIALLY IN THIS SEASON OF FOREIGN VISITORS, I ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED BOTH HIS WILLINGNESS TO GIVE ME AS MUCH TIME AS HE DID AND HIS CORDIALITY TOWARDS ME AND MY STAFF. WHEN AN OPPORTUNITY ARISES, I HOPE YOU WILL INFORM THE PREMIER OF MY SINCERE APPRECIATION.

I, OF COURSE, HAVE REPORTED FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT, AND HE HAS ASKED ME ALSO TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL GRATIFICATION.

MY WIFE AND I ARE FINDING OURSELVES QUITE AT HOME IN PEKING, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO A PLEASANT-- AND WE HOPE PRODUCTIVE-- SERVICE HERE.

WITH MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES,
SINCERELY,

THOMAS S GATES

GATES

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FM USLO PEKING

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1357
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 697
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 378
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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LIMDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT CH
SUBJECT: MAO'S HEALTH
REF: PEKING 1124 (NOTAL)

1. BRITISH EMBOXX TOLD US JUNE 23 THAT TWO INDEPENDENT CHINESE SOURCE S HAVE SAID MEETINGS ARE NOW BEING HELD IN PEKING TO INFORM PEOPLE OF THE PARLOUS STATE OF MAO'S HEALTH--SPECIFICALLY THAT HE IS ABOUT T O DIE--AND TO MAKE PLANS TO ENSURE THERE IS A MINIMUM OF DISRUPTION FOLLOWING HIS DEATH.

2. THE EMBOFF ALSO RELATED A COMMENT BY A COMMUNIST CADRE IN HONG KON G THAT MAO COULD ONLY MAKE IT THROUGH THE SUMMER IF HE WERE HOOKED UP TO A MACHINE. A PEKING CHINA TRAVEL SERVICE GUIDE EMPHATICALLY TOLD A VISITING AMERICAN A FEW DAYS AGO, DURING A DISCUSSION OF MAO'S HEALTH, THAT CHINA HAD WAYS TO KEEP PEOPLE ALIVE INDEFINITELY. ACCORDING TO THEM RST GERMANS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIM THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO KEEP MAO ALIVE WAS MOVED INTO CHUNGNANHAI SIX WEEKS AGO.

3. (17, - 43)-535 -,9,-)6, THE BRITISH HAVE HEARD THAT A RANKING FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AND A PERSON CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT RECENTLY TOLD FOREIGNERS THAT THE PRESS STORIES THAT MAO WILL NO LONGER MEET WITH FOREIGN VISITORS ARE "RUBBISH". WHEN QUERIED JUNE 22 IF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT STILL STANDS

,
PRC SPOKESMAN MA YU-CHEN EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT IT DID AND THAT IT WAS AUTHORITATIVE.

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2104*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 142, NARA, DATE *7/11/08*



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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
 BY 1JR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, US, VN
 SUBJECT: U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM

REF: STATE 112467

1. DRV FIRST SECRETARY DO THANH ACCOMPANIED BY DRV THIRD SECRETARY NGO NGUYEN PHUONG CAME TO EMBASSY AT 16:00 LOCAL TIME JUNE 21. THEY PRESENTED DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE (IN VIETNAMESE AND IN ENGLISH) TO THE DEPARTMENT DATED JUNE 19 UNDER COVER OF DRV EMBASSY NOTE OF 21 JUNE IN RESPONSE TO OUR MAY 8 NOTE. TEXT OF ENGLISH VERSION FOLLOWS PARA 7.

2. THE NOTE SHARPENS EVEN FURTHER THE DRV INSISTENCE ON THE VALIDITY OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE INSISTENCE THAT THE U.S. IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 21 IF IT EXPECTS DRV PERFORMANCE UNDER ARTICLE 8(B). IT ACCUSES THE U.S. OF RUNNING "COUNTER TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE" BY INSISTING ON 8(B) WHILE RENEGING ON ARTICLE 21. THE NEW ASPECT OF THIS DIALOGUE IS THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 4 THAT "AS AN INITIAL STEP, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM REPRESENTATIVE IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS".



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PAGE

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FROM:

TJSEC 170276

(RN)

3. DO THANH CLARIFIED THIS POSITION SOMEWHAT BY SAYING THAT "THE REPRESENTATIVES" IN PARIS, REFERRED TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. FOLLOWING SUCH CONTACTS, U.S. AND DRV REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE ALTERED, PERHAPS USING OTHER STAFF MEMBERS IN PARIS (DCM PERHAPS), OR, DEPENDING ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED, CALLING IN REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI AND WASHINGTON. DO THANH COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE ONE OF FIRST MATTERS DISCUSSED IN THE EARLY MEETINGS BETWEEN THE AMBASSADORS.

4. DO THANH SAID THAT AS HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOTED BEFORE, THE DRV WAS PREPARED TO PUBLISH THE CORRESPONDENCE OR TO KEEP IT CONFIDENTIAL AS THE U.S. PREFERRED. EMBOFF REPEATED THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW (PARA 2, STATE 125114) THAT USG SPOKESMAN WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THESE EXCHANGES. EMBOFF AND DO THANH AGREED THAT IF CONVERSATIONS ULTIMATELY TOOK PLACE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT EFFECTIVELY TO DENY SUCH CONTACTS EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AND PROBABLY DESIRABLE, NOT TO ANNOUNCE THE MEETINGS IN ADVANCE NOR TO DISCUSS THE CONTENTS FOLLOWING EACH MEETING. DO THANH THOUGHT JOINT COMMUNIQUEES AGREEABLE TO BOTH SIDES AFTER THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CERTAIN STAGES IN THE CONVERSATION WOULD BE PREFERABLE.

5. DO THANH SAID THE DRV HAD NOT THOUGHT YET OF A LOCATION FOR SUCH TALKS, BUT AGREED THAT PREVIOUS LOCALES IN THE PARIS SUBURBS OR AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC MIGHT BE UNDESIRABLE AND THEY WOULD DISCUSS SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS ALTERNATE MEETINGS IN THE TWO EMBASSIES OR THE SELECTION OF A MORE DISCREET COMMON LOCATION NEAR CENTRAL PARIS.


6. THE VIETNAMESE ORIGINAL AND THE DRV ENGLISH VERSION ARE BEING POUCHED TO EA/VLC.

7. TEXT OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

"NOTE OF THE D.R.V.N. FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE D.R.V.N. HAS RECEIVED THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT'S NOTE DATED MAY 8, 1976.

SINCE THE COMPLETE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIET NAM, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE D.R.V.N. HAS, ON REPEATED OCCASIONS, MADE CLEAR ITS VIEWS ON THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM. THE UNILATERAL U.S. DENUNCIATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS AIMED AT EVADING THE PLEDGES IT HAS



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CONT.

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FROM: Tasec 170276

PAGE 3

SOLEMNLY UNDERTAKEN IN SIGNING THE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ARTICLE 21 WHICH PROVIDES FOR A U.S. OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO HEALING THE WOUNDS OF WAR AND TO POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN VIET NAM AND INDOCHINA WITHOUT SETTING ANY POLITICAL CONDITIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS THAT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 8(B) OF THE AGREEMENT AS A CONDITION FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. OBVIOUSLY, IT WANTS TO RENEGE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET NAM WHILE DEMANDING THAT THE OTHER SIDE IMPLEMENT ANOTHER ARTICLE OF THE SAME. THIS COMPLETELY RUNS COUNTER TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE.

FOR ITS PART, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE UNITED STATES A SETTLEMENT OF POST-WAR ISSUES THAT CONCERN VIET NAM AND THE UNITED STATES SUCH AS THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO HEALING THE WOUNDS OF WAR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE TWO ZONES OF VIET NAM, THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN MISSING IN THE WAR, THE EXHUMATION AND REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD AMERICANS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAS MADE AND

WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE ANXIETY OF THOSE AMERICAN FAMILIES WHOSE RELATIVES HAVE DIED OR ARE STILL CONSIDERED MISSING IN VIET NAM.

ONCE AGAIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AFFIRMS ITS SERIOUS AND GOODWILL ATTITUDE. IT HOLDS THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD RESOLVE THE ISSUES OF INTEREST TO EACH OF THEM, THUS CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AS AN INITIAL STEP, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM REPRESENTATIVE IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IF IT REALLY WANTS 'EARLY DISCUSSIONS' WITH THE D.R.V.N. GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ITSELF SHOULD ADOPT A GOODWILL AND SERIOUS ATTITUDE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NA TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGH CONSIDERATION.

HA NOI, JUNE 19, 1976."
RUSH UNQTE ROBINSON

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