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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 2302

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT PFOR CH UR US

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION BETWEEN SENATOR MANSFIELD AND
CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON CURRENT WORLD ISSUES

SUMMARY. AT A DINNER DISCUSSION DEC 10, SENATOR MANSFIELD AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA DISCUSSED WEST EUROPEAN MILITARY STRENGTH, THE RESULTS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING, CHINESE NUCLEAR POSTURE AND VIEWS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, CONTINUITY IN CHINESE POLICY, THE FORTHCOMING NPC, KOREAN AND SINO-US RELATIONS. CHIAO WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN CLARIFYING SENATOR MANSFIELD'S POSITION ON US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM WEST EUROPE AND LAID CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY FOR PREPAREDNESS AGAINST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK. CHIAO INDICATED THAT THE POLICIES SET BY CHAIRMAN MAO WOULD BE CONTINUED BY OTHERS AFTER HE HAD PASSED FROM THE SCENE. SPEAKING OF THE NPC, CHIAO SURPRISINGLY STATED THAT THIS CONGRESS WOULD "ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT". CHIAO'S COMMENTS ON SINO-US RELATIONS WERE ALONG STANDARD LINES, EMPHASIZING THAT FURTHER MOVES IN NORMALIZATION IN RELATIONS WERE UP TO THE US, BUT THAT CHINA WAS PATIENT AND WILLING TO WAIT. END SUMMARY.

1. ON DEC 10, 1974, FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA HOSTED A DINNER FOR SENATOR AND MRS. MIKE MANSFIELD. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, CIFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR CHOU CHIU-YEN, AND

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
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CPIFA DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL KANG TAI-SHA, DEPUTY CHIEF HOLDRIDGE WAS PRESENT FOR USLO. FOLLOWING TOPICS OF INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT WERE DISCUSSED;

2. US FORCES IN EUROPE. CHIAO BEGAN BY DECLARING THAT THE PRC BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF WESTERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO TO INCREASE THIS STRENGTH. HE ASKED FOR THE SENATOR'S VIEWS.



SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID HE THOROUGHLY AGREED, AND STATED THAT HE REGARDED THE NATO TREATY AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE US FOREIGN POLICY. HE HAD FELT THIS WAY FOR YEARS, AND WAS AN ADVOCATE OF THE WE COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTING MORE TO NATO.

CHIAO REFERRED TO SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCTION IN US TROOP STRENGTH IN EUROPE AND ASKED IF THE SENATOR STILL SUPPORTED SUCH A REDUCTION.

SENATOR MANSFIELD CONFIRMED THAT HIS POSITION ON REDUCTIONS WAS UNCHANGED. HOWEVER, WHAT WAS NOT GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD WAS THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ACTUALLY MEAN AN INCREASE IN US MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE. BY REDUCING BY HALF THE PRESENT US FORCE LEVEL IN WE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AND BY CUTTING OUT THE 225,000 DEPENDENTS OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE, THE US FORCES WOULD BE MADE LEANER, TOUGHER, LESS EXPENSIVE, AND MORE EFFECTIVE; THIS WOULD ADD UP TO AN ACTUAL INCREASE IN MILITARY STRENGTH.

SENATOR MANSFIELD REFERRED TO THE ROMAN TROOPS STATIONED ALONG THE RHINE, NOTING THAT IT WAS ONLY AFTER THESE TROOPS WERE ALLOWED TO HAVE DEPENDENTS THAT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS HAD DIMINISHED. IN HIS PLAN, ALL DEPENDENTS WOULD BE SENT HOME, AND THE US FORCES WOULD SERVE 12-MONTHS TOURS OF DUTY. THROUGH THE "REFORGER" PROGRAM, SOMETHING LIKE THIS WAS ALREADY BEING DONE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS RATHER EXPENSIVE.

3. SENATOR MANSFIELD EMPHASIZED AT SEVERAL POINTS IN



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
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THE CONVERSATION THAT HE WAS NOT CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE HALVING OF US TROOP STRENGTH IN WE, BUT RATHER A PHASED REDUCTION OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. MEANWHILE, HE HOPED TO SEE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION ON THE PART OF THE OTHER NATO MEMBERS TOWARD THE COMMON DEFENSE. CHIAO COMMENTED IN RESPONSE THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE PRC TO JUDGE HOW THE MATTER OF ESTABLISHING FORCE LEVELS IN WE WAS HANDLED--IT COULD BE DONE WITH US PARTICIPATION OR ON AN ENTIRELY EUROPEAN BASIS. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS, AS HE HAD ALREADY SAID, NOT JUST TO MAINTAIN WE'S DEFENSIVE MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT TO INCREASE IT.

4. VLADIVOSTOK. CHIAO BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK ON ESTABLISHING CEILINGS ON US AND USSR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REMARKING THAT SEVERAL SENATORS HAD EXPRESSED CRITICISM OF THIS AGREEMENT. WHAT WAS SENATOR MANSFIELD'S OPINION?

SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID THAT PRESIDENT FORD FELT THE AGREEMENT WAS A GOOD ONE AND SECRETARY KISSINGER FELT THE SAME. PRESIDENT FORD HAD PROVIDED THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF IT IN A BRIEFING FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEWS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE ALSO IN ACCORD. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED FOR A LOWER CEILING, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO GO ALONG. CHIAO WONDERED WHETHER SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD WITHHELD ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT FROM THE PRC WHEN IN PEKING. SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS BRIEFING THE PRC FULLY, AND THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF POLICY, BOTH THIS TIME AND OTHER TIMES.

5. CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY. CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD ENGAGED IN A DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL SITUATION, WITH THE SENATOR OBSERVING THAT THE US AND THE USSR ALREADY POSSESSED ENOUGH NUCLEAR STRENGTH TO DESTROY EACH OTHER MANY






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TIMES OVER. HE EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRC SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. CHIAO SAID THAT, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT GOOD WOULD IT DO FOR CHINA TO HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? SENATOR MANSFIELD MENTIONED THAT CHINA POSSESSED MRBM'S, IRBM'S, AND SOME ICBM'S, TO WHICH CHIAO RESPONDED BY SAYING THE SENATOR WAS NOT ENTIRELY CORRECT--CHINA HAD NOT YET TESTED ANY ICBM'S. CHIAO ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT CHINA HAD "A FEW" MISSILES WHICH THE PRC WOULD USE TO SHOOT AT THE SOVIET UNION "IF THEY SHOT SOME AT US." (MRS. MANSFIELD NOTED AT THIS POINT THAT CHINA HAD A DETERRENT.)

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
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6. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID THAT THE CHINESE NOW APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT THE MAIN SOVIET THREAT WAS NO LONGER AGAINST CHINA BUT AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. CHIAO AGREED THAT IT WAS. HE WANTED TO POINT OUT, THOUGH, THAT CONTRARY TO SOME ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS, CHINA WAS NOT HOPING FOR A SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST WE. THE FORCES IN EUROPE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE, BUT SO WERE THE CHINESE FORCES; OTHERWISE WHY WOULD THE CHINESE BE DIGGING AIR RAID SHELTERS? CHIAO OBSERVED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO ATTACK CHINA WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE CHINESE WOULD WAIT NOT JUST A BRIEF WHILE BUT A LONG TIME BEFORE RESPONDING. THIS WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE WORLD TO SEE CLEARLY WHO WAS THE AGGRESSOR.

7. CONVENTIONAL WAR PREPAREDNESS. CHIAO ASKED SENATOR MANSFIELD'S OPINION ABOUT WHO WOULD BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF A WAR INVOLVING THE US AND THE USSR. SENATOR MANSFIELD ASSERTED THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST. CHIAO THEN SAID THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY HIS POINT--IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A WAR WITHOUT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE DAMAGE EACH SIDE COULD INFLICT ON THE OTHER. THIS WAS WHY THE CHINESE STRESSED THE NEED FOR INCREASING THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE WE NATIONS. HE REITERATED THE POINT MADE SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND FURTHER

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
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BUILDING UP DEFENSIVE STRENGTH IN WE. HE ALSO TOUCHED AGAIN ON THE MATTER OF IT NOT BEING FOR CHINA TO SAY TO THE US HOW THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

8. CONTINUITY OF PRC POLICY. SENATOR MANSFIELD RECALLED THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN CHIAO AND HIMSELF THAT AFTERNOON ON PRC POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE US, AND RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUITY IN THIS POLICY WHEN LEADERS LIKE MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI, WHO WERE IDENTIFIED WITH IT, WERE SUCCEEDED. CHIAO PONDERED A MOMENT, AND THEN REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD A LONG HISTORY BEGINNING IN 1921 AND THAT MAO TSE-TUNG HAD BEEN CHAIRMAN SINCE THE TSUNYI CONFERENCE OF 1935 AND HAD INITIATED CCP POLICIES. HISTORY HAD SHOWN THAT THESE POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE CCP UNDER THE INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP OF CHAIRMAN MAO WERE IN ACCORDANCE BOTH WITH THE NEEDS AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. MOREOVER, PRACTICAL EVENTS HAD SHOWN THAT THESE POLICIES WERE CORRECT. THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THIS SITUATION OVER THE ENSUING YEARS--THE POLICIES SET BY MAO WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY OTHERS.



9. NPC. CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT A PORTION OF THE AFTERNOON CONVERSATION DEALING WITH THE CONVENING OF THE PRC NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. CHIAO NOTED THAT THIS CONGRESS WOULD "ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT." THERE WAS ALSO A JOINT REFERENCE TO THE NEW SITUATION IN THE US CONGRESS, IN WHICH SENATOR MANSFIELD DECLARED THAT US POLICY TOWARD CHINA WOULD REMAIN BIPARTISAN IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT LINE.

10. KOREA. CHIAO SAID HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT KOREA. IT SEEMED TO HIM THE US WAS OPERATING UNDER THE FALSE ASSUMPTION IN STATIONING TROOPS THERE THAT CHINA WAS GOING TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK. THE SAME THING WAS TRUE ABOUT INDOCHINA. SENATOR MANSFIELD STATED IN RESPONSE THAT THERE ONCE HAD BEEN SUCH AN



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
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ASSUMPTION, BUT THIS WAS NO LONGER THE CASE.

11. US - PRC RELATIONS. CHIAO TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZING US-PRC RELATIONS. IF THE US WANTED TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD MORE QUICKLY, THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD APPROVE; ON THE OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, THEY WERE "NOT IN A HURRY" (CHIAO REPEATED THIS LATTER COMMENT SEVERAL TIMES). IT WAS UP TO THE US TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS. CHIAO SAID HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE LOGIC OF EVENTS WHICH WERE REQUIRED BY THE US SYSTEM, BUT IF THE US WANTED TO WAIT, THAT WAS ALL RIGHT. THE CHINESE PEOPLE WERE ALSO WILLING TO WAIT. THEY HAD WAITED 25 YEARS FOR THE PRESENT US-PRC RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOP (HE MENTIONED THIS SEVERAL TIMES), AND COULD WAIT ANOTHER 25 YEARS. IT WAS ALL UP TO THE US. OF COURSE, CHIAO ADDED, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID, IN POLITICS, AS WELL AS IN DIPLOMACY, ONE SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE APPROACH. AFTER NORMALIZATION, THERE COULD BE MORE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US. CHIAO COMMENTED THAT US TRADE WITH TAIWAN WAS GREATER THAN US TRADE WITH THE PRC. THE CHINESE HAD NOTICED THIS FACT, BUT DIDN'T MIND.


12. IN CONCLUSION, CHIAO DECLARED THAT WHAT HE HAD JUST STATED WOULD BE SAID ONLY IN PRIVATE AND NOT IN PUBLIC.

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, CH, US
SUBJECT: SEN. MANSFIELD'S CONVERSATIONS.

REF. A. PEKING 2302, B. PEKING 2306

WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY COMMENTS, ATMOSPHERICS, OR SPECULATION THAT USLO CAN SUPPLY CONCERNING CHIAO'S STATEMENT (PARA 4 REF A) WONDERING WHETHER ANY INFORMATION HAD BEEN WITHHELD CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. WE NOTE ALSO MANSFIELD'S ASSURANCES TO TENG ON THIS SCORE IN REF B, PARA 12; AND WE WONDER WHAT WAS CONTEXT IN WHICH MANSFIELD RAISED THE MATTER, AND WHAT TENG'S RESPONSE WAS, IF ANY. KISSINGER

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY LLR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08



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
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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINESBY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08

E. 11652: GDS

TDS: CH US PFOR PROPS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRC STIMULATION OF THE PRESS

REF: STATE 277439



1. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT PRC OFFICIALS ARE USING THE PRESS TO CONVEY DISSATISFACTION CONCERNING PACE OF NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS. MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THOSE CASES MENTIONED REFTEL IS JAFFE INTERVIEW WITH YU CHAN REPORTED PEKING 2305. AS WE NOTED JAFFE WAS TOLD IN ADVANCE THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT INTERVIEW, AND MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WENT OVER JAFFE'S TEXT WITH A FINE TOOTH COMB, THE FINAL SESSION LASTING UNTIL 2:30 A.M. TEXT WAS THEN SENT TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES FOR FINAL APPROVAL, POSSIBLY BY YU CHAN OR EVEN CHIAO KUAN-HUA. WE ASSUME JAFFE ARTICLE HAS NOW BEEN PUBLISHED AND DEPARTMENT HAS OBTAINED TEXT.

2. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, CHINESE ASSUMED THAT JAFFE WOULD DISCLOSE SOURCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO USG, THEN THIS OBVIOUSLY IS A CAREFULLY PREPARED MESSAGE. CHINESE ARE SAYING THAT WHILE BASIS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP REMAINS SOUND AND, ON THE WHOLE, RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THEY EXPECTED MORE FROM U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE U.S. DECLARATION ON TAIWAN CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. SLIGHT TOUGHENING IN YU CHAN'S TERMS

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
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FOR FULL NORMALIZATION MAY ALSO BE PEKING'S WAY OF INDICATING ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, AND CAN BE READ AS A MOVE TO STAKE OUT ITS BARGAINING POSITION.

3. CHINESE STATEMENTS APPEAR TO BE TAKING ON ASPECT OF ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN. WE NOTE HONG KONG'S 13708 REPORTING LOCAL LEFTIST NEWSMEN ARE NOW SPREADING THE LINE THAT PRC IS DISSATISFIED WITH PACE OF NORMALIZATION. JAFFE TOLD US HERE THAT AT DINNER PARTY PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING FOR PEKING PRCLO DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU HAD POUNDED THE TABLE WHEN DISCUSSING OPENING OF TWO ROC CONSULATES OF U.S. WE EXPECT THAT WE WILL SEE SIMILAR STORIES APPEARING ELSEWHERE. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL SPATE OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS EARLIER THIS YEAR DESCRIBING PRC OFFICIALS AS CONCERNED ABOUT PRESSURE BEING BROUGHT ON CHOU EN-LAI BY CHIANG CHING OVER US-PRC RELATIONSHIP. USLO SPECULATED AT THE TIME THAT THESE REPORTS MIGHT BE PART OF A COORDINATED EFFORT, PERHAPS BY CHOU HIMSELF, TO APPLY PRESSURE ON US. WHAT WE ARE SEEING NOW IS SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH LESS SUBTLE CAMPAIGN, AND IT SEEMS TYPICALLY CHINESE--CONVEYING DISPLEASURE INDIRECTLY WHILE EXPRESSING PATIENCE AND SEEMING UNCONCERN IN FACE TO FACE DISCUSSIONS WIT AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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December 24, 1974

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EA:Philip C. Habib



Contact with PRCLO

I saw PRCLO Ambassador Han Hsu today at 3:00 P.M.

I delivered the message concerning Cambodia. Ambassador Han had no comment, and only said he would inform Peking.

I also read the text of the other message you wanted passed. The only question Han raised was to ask for clarification of the statement that "the appearance of pressures complicates the process. . . ." He asked for citations of particular newspaper reports so that he could examine the evidence. I said we did not want to point the finger at any particular story, but that there appeared to be a pattern in which Chinese officials are cited as being dissatisfied with the course of US-PRC relations. I stressed the importance of appearances as well as substance. Han strongly implied that the newsmen who wrote the stories may have had no PRC sources at all. I did not think it desirable to cite any particular story and thereby get involved in specifics. There is no doubt that Han understands the problem we raised, despite his questioning only one aspect of it, and will report verbatim what we said.

On the invitation to Chiao, Han merely took note and said he would report.

Drafted by:EA:AHummel:jnp
12/24/74 Ext. 23368

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA DATE 7/1/08

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Dec 24, 1974
mem to Nan Hsu
by PCH


Secretary Kissinger has asked me to meet with you today to inform you of certain matters of mutual interest.

In accordance with his desire to keep your government informed about important actions which we may be taking, he asked me to tell you about contacts we have been having with the French on the subject of Cambodia.

We have been informed by the French that Prince Sihanouk has discussed with them the question of achieving a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. It is our understanding ^{from the French} that your government is aware of this.

We are authorizing the French to give Sihanouk our response. We are working on the details, ~~of that response~~ ^{responsive} which will be ~~responsive~~ with respect to the issues which we understand are of concern to Sihanouk.

If all goes as planned, we expect a French representative to present our views to Prince Sihanouk sometime soon after the new year. We will be in touch with the Chinese again on this matter to inform them more fully of our views. At this point we only wished them to know what we are doing.



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
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TO USLO PEKING~~SECRET~~ STATE 281889NODIS
CHEROKEEE.O. 11652:
TAGS: PFOR, CH
SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH PRCLD

1. ON THE SECRETARY'S INSTRUCTIONS HABIB CONVEYED A MESSAGE TO PRCLD DEC. 24. THE TEXT, WHICH WAS READ TO PRCLD ACTING CHIEF HAN HSU, IS AS FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINESE SIDES RECONFIRMED DURING THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES ON COURSE AND HAS NOT COOLED. THIS IS CERTAINLY THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONSIDERS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC A KEY ELEMENT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE BASIC STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS REMAINS SOUND.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS THAT APPEAR AT VARIANCE WITH THESE JUDGMENTS. CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO CHINA HAVE ADDED TO THIS PROBLEM. THESE DEVELOPMENTS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/1/08



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
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HAVE RESULTED IN SOME COMMENTARY AND SPECULATION IN THE MEDIA THAT COULD CONFUSE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS OF OUR RELATIONS. TO CARRY OUT COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS NOT ONLY THE SUBSTANCE BUT THE APPEARANCE IS IMPORTANT.

AS THE CHINESE SHOULD BE AWARE FROM RECENT DISCUSSIONS, THE APPEARANCE OF PRESSURES COMPLICATES THE PROCESS OF ENSURING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. THERE WAS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN PEKING THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT WAS AGREED WITHOUT CONDITION, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE NECESSARY CLIMATE TO CARRY ON THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS IN EITHER SIDE'S INTEREST TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ONGOING PROCESS. MOREOVER, THIS IS MISLEADING WITH RESPECT TO OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES.

WE WERE ALSO SURPRISED BY STATEMENTS MADE TO SENATOR HANSFIELD QUESTIONING WHETHER THE SECRETARY HAD PROVIDED THE CHINESE WITH A FULL BRIEFING CONCERNING AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AT VLADIVOSTOK. YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO COUNT ON THE SECRETARY'S WORD IN THE PAST AND IT CAN CONTINUE TO DO SO.



WE OFFER THESE COMMENTS IN A SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO PROCEED WITH NORMALIZATION WHICH WE REMAIN FIRMLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO ASKED ME TO ENQUIRE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA TO VISIT WASHINGTON, PERHAPS IN THE SPRING, OR IF THIS SHOULD BE INCONVENIENT, TO COME TO SOME OTHER POINT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S TRIP TO PEKING. SUCH A VISIT COULD HELP TO SET THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. MEETING IN THE UNITED STATES WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERING THOSE WHO WISH TO SUGGEST THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP. END TEXT.

3. AFTER HE HAD LISTENED TO IT, HAN HSU RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SOURCES AND CITATIONS OF PARTICULAR NEWSPAPER REPORTS SO THAT HE COULD EXAMINE THE

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
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 STATE 281889

EVIDENCE. HABIB SAID WE DID NOT WANT TO POINT THE FINGER AT ANY PARTICULAR STORY, BUT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A PATTERN IN WHICH CHINESE OFFICIALS ARE CITED AS BEING DISSATISFIED WITH THE COURSE OF US-PRC RELATIONS. HABIB STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF APPEARANCES AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE. HAN STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THE NEWSMEN WHO WROTE THE STORIES MAY HAVE HAD NO PRC SOURCES AT ALL. HABIB DID NOT THINK IT DESIRABLE TO CITE ANY PARTICULAR STORY AND THERE BY GET INVOLVED IN SPECIFICS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HAN UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEM, DESPITE HIS QUESTIONING ONLY ONE ASPECT OF IT, AND WILL REPORT

VERBATIM WHAT WAS SAID. ON THE INVITATION TO CHIAO, HAN MERELY TOOK NOTE AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT. MAW



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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6031Q

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
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, CH, US
SUBJECT: SENATOR MANSFIELD'S CONVERSATIONS

REF: STATE 277531



1. CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT HAD BEEN WITHHELD FROM THE CHINESE OCCURRED DURING COURSE OF INFORMAL GIVE-AND-TAKE BETWEEN CHIAO AND SENATOR MANSFIELD. CHIAO RAISED THE POINT MORE IN PASSING THAN MAKING A MAJOR ISSUE OUT OF IT. POSSIBLE THAT HE HAS TRYING TO SOW DOUBTS ABOUT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT IN SENATOR MANSFIELD'S MIND, PERHAPS IN HOPES OF AFFECTING CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. IN THIS RESPECT, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT CHIAO ASKED MANSFIELD FOR LATTER'S OWN VIEW OF AGREEMENT, AND AT THIS PARTICULAR SESSION THE SENATOR WAS NOT AS POSITIVE IN HIS SUPPORT AS HE WAS DURING LATER CONVERSATION WITH TENG HSIAO-PING.

2. REGARDING MANSFIELD-TENG CONVERSATION, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE SENATOR THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TO CLEAR UP ANY MISCONCEPTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE ARISEN IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH CHIAO OVER VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. HE WAS FIRM IN ENDORSING IT, AND ALSO WAS QUITE EMPHATIC IN EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE TO CHINESE THAT THEY HAD BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON AGREEMENT BOTH BY THE SECRETARY IN PEKING AND AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. TENG HSIAO-PING DID NOT RPT NOT EXPRESS SAME DOUBTS WHICH WERE RAISED BY CHIAO CONCERNING FULLNESS OF SECRETARY'S BRIEFING, ALTHOUGH TENG CERTAINLY PRESSED CHINESE POINT OF VIEW THAT SOVIETS BENEFITTED MORE FROM THE AGREEMENT THAN DID THE US.

BUSH

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028016

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram
CREATOR'S NAME George Bush
CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador
RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary
DESCRIPTION re conversation with Chiao Kuan-Hua
CREATION DATE 12/28/1974
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200127
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
 KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
 FILES
BOX NUMBER 4
FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN 08/07/2008
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

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
DECEMBER 28, 1974

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE AND MRS. HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: GEORGE BUSH

ON DECEMBER 26 AT THE NEPAL RECEPTION -- MME CHANG HAN-CHIH,
 WIFE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT I CONVEY
 TO YOU HER THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER. AT A DINNER AT OUR RESIDENCE
 ON DECEMBER 27 THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO THANK THE DOCTOR
 FOR HIS NOTE (WHICH I AM NOW DOING) AND SAID MY WIFE WANTS TO
 THANK MRS. KISSINGER TOO. AT WHICH POINT HIS WIFE SAID "I
 ALREADY ASKED MR. BUSH TO CONVEY MY THANKS." THEY WERE BOTH
 PLEASED WITH YOUR LETTERS.
 WARM REGARDS.

BT



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*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, RODMAN....NOT SENT TO HAKI

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 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:362/05:46Z DTG:280430Z DEC 74

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