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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 15, 1975

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following message to you:

"I arrived in Damascus shortly after noon today to discover that Foreign Minister Khaddam, who was to have left for Havana for a preparatory meeting for the non-aligned summit conference to be held this July in Peru, had delayed his departure to be present for today's talks. Khaddam, incidentally, had spent most of the night meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika, who stopped in Damascus en route to Tehran where he will be present for the first meeting of the Iranian and Iraqi Foreign Ministers following the recent agreement between their two countries. According to Khaddam, Bouteflika has pledged full political, economic and military support to Syria. It is clear that the Syrians continue their efforts to line up support against a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement that, they fear, would deal them out of the peacemaking process.

"In a two-hour meeting with President Asad, Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister Haydar and Air Force Chief (and Deputy Defense Minister) General Jamil, followed by more than two hours alone with Asad, my principal effort was directed at allaying Asad's suspicion and fear of a separate Egyptian agreement. I again reviewed the reasons why we cannot negotiate simultaneous Egyptian and Syrian agreements, stressed that success in the present negotiations would make a better atmosphere for an effort on the Syrian side, and reassured Asad that we would be prepared to make a major effort for Syria once a Sinai agreement is achieved. I also reviewed for Asad why we cannot now establish political contact with the Palestinians, to whose cause he is more genuinely devoted than most other Arab leaders, but told him we would receive any messages the Palestinians may pass through him.


"As a result of my last visit to Jerusalem and a private talk I had with Rabin, I was able to tell Asad that, for the first time, I think there is beginning to be some serious thought given in Israel for the

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review* SF 9/17/03

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

HR 9/29/03

need for movement also on the Syrian front. This was the principal new element I was able to inject into the conversation. I cannot yet judge whether it has been possible sufficiently to allay Asad's concerns that he will not in the end seek to undermine an Egyptian-Israeli agreement and to line up others, including Faisal, in support of such an effort. The atmosphere of today's meeting with Asad was considerably more relaxed than the last meeting, however, and Asad made an impressively eloquent statement in front of his colleagues of why Syria for the first time has said publicly it wants peace -- not for Israel's sake but for Syria's. It was in any event a good thing that I made this second visit to Damascus, and I have told Asad I am prepared to come again before returning to Washington to talk with him about how we might then proceed on the Syrian front. I urged that he be thinking about what Syria can do, in return for further Israeli withdrawal, to convince Israel things were moving in the direction of peace and to help foster a transition from a war to a peace psychosis in Israel which would be irreversible.

"I will spend tonight in Amman and, having just had word King Faisal cannot see me tomorrow due to a state visit by the President of Mali, will return directly to Jerusalem tomorrow (Sunday) afternoon and await word of what the Israeli Cabinet has authorized Rabin to say in response to President Sadat's latest ideas."



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Control: 603

Tab A

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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NFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4067

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1745

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, UR, SY, XF

SUBJECT: TALKS WITH RIFAI

REF: AMMAN 1742

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.5

State Dept Review

SF 9/17/03

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

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
DATE 9/29/03

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: RIFAI PASSED ON TO ME SUBSTANCE OF A MESSAGE FROM ASAD DETAILING FOR JORDANIANS HIS UNHAPPINESS OVER YOUR RECENT MEETING IN DAMASCUS. BASIC POINTS SAME AS THOSE PASSED ON EARLIER BY KING, (REFTEL). HE REPORTED ON VINOGRADOV VISIT. IN 8 HOURS OF TALKS, LATTER PERSISTED TO THE END IN TRYING TO CBNGUNMSHRIFWV TO CHANGE HIS POSITION ON GOING TO GENEVA. RIFAI SAYS HE DID NOT BUDGE. RIFAI DOES CONCLUDE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A REVISED POINT OF VIEW FOR HIM. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWGCG TALKS WITH KING NOON MARCH 13, MET WITH RIFAI IN EARLY EVENING. GOOD PORTION OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT SYRIAN VIEWS AND SOVIET VISIT PARELLEL WHAT KING TOLD ME EARLIER. FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS AND DIFFERENCE AS THEY EMERGED FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS.

3. RIFAI LED OFF WITH SYRIANS. HE SAID THAT MESSAGE FROM ASAD TO THEM WAS VERY HARD HIS TALKS WITH YOU ASAD CHARACTERIZED AS NOT HELPFUL. RIFAI GAVE ME FOUR OR FIVE POINTS WHICH ASAD SAID WERE NOT USEFUL: I.E., US INABILITY TO DO ANYTHING NOW ON GOLAN, NO US PROPOSALS FOR GOLAN, DESCRIPTION OF US AND ISRAELI INTERNAL IMPEDIMENTS TO MOVEMENT AND WILL NOT DEAL WITH THEM, ETC. RIFAI SAYS ASAD CONCLUDED FOR JORDANIANS THAT "WHAT WE LOST BY FORCES WE WILL HAVE TO REGAIN BY FORCE". NEVERTHELESS, RIFAI BELEIVES ASAD IS KEEPING HIS OPTIONS OPEN, BUT ALSO BELEIVES STRONGLY US SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO GET "SOMETHING" FOR ASAD AT THIS TIME. OTHERWISE, WHY IS US ENGAGING IN STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. RIFAI SENT MESSAGE BACK TO ASAD SAYING THAT JORDAN WAS NOT INFORMED ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON EXCEPT BY SYRIA AND THEREFORE COULD NOT OFFER ANYTHING. RIFAI ADDED THAT LEAST SADAT COULD DO FOR ASAD IS TO TELL HIM AT SOME POINT HE IS PREPARED TO HOLD UP IMPLEMENTATION OF WHATEVER HE CAN AGQL XHITH ISRAEL UNTIL LSCH TVOE AS ASSAD HIMSELF CAN WORK OUT SOMETHING.




ON THE VINOGRADOV VISIT RIFAI SAID THAT THE
LET WAS UNCOMMONLY PERSISTENT IN TRYING TO GET
THE JORDANIANS TO AGREE TO GO TO GENEVA. RIFAI MAIN-
TAINED HIS POSITION THAT THEY ARE OUT OF GENEVA, AND
THAT ONLY AN ARAB SUMMIT (NOT EGYPT, SYRIA AND THE PLO)
CAN BRING THEM BACK IN, AND ONLY THEN IF SUMMIT AGREES
TO SUPPORT JORDAN'S CONDITION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

5. VINOGRADOV WANTED JORDAN'S VIEWS IN DETAIL ABOUT
WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN AT GENEVA ON WIDE RANGE OF SUB-
STANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES. RIFAI AT FIRST RE-
FUSED, CLAIMING THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN SAY JORDAN HAD
A MORAL COMMITMENT TO GENEVA. VINOGRADOV SAID NO,
THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN. AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER,

(8 HOURS OF TALKS) RIFAI SAID THAT HE PULLED
ASAD PLOY ON VINOGRADOV BY SAYING THAT NOW THAT
YOU HAVE HEARD ALL THESE VIEWS, YOU SHOULD KNOW
THAT MY OWN PERSONAL FEELING IS THAT THERE IS
NO REAL CHANCE FOR A FURTHER PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. RIFAI SAID HE SERIOUSLY BELIEVES THIS.

6. RIFAI CONCLUDES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE GENUINELY
CARED AND INTERESTED IN FINDING A WAY
OF THE NO-WAR, NO-PEACE SITUATION IN THE
AREA. RIFAI WAS STRUCK BY ONE OF VINOGRADOV'S
QUESTIONS WHICH WAS PREMISED ON AN EGYPTIAN SETTLE-
MENT FOLLOWED BY A SYRIAN PULL OUT OF ALL PEACE
EFFORTS. VINOGRADOV THEN PLAINTIVELY ASKED "WHAT
WOULD YOU HAVE US DO IF YOU WERE IN OUR POSITION?"
RIFAI DID NOT TELL HIM HIS FULL ANSWER ONLY "THAT DE-
PENDS ON WHAT YOU WANT TO ACHIEVE". NEVERTHELESS THE QUESTION
RIFAI SAYS IMPRESSED HIM WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET CONCERN

7. RIFAI LOST NO OPPORTUNITIES TO NEEDLE THE SOVIETS
FOR THEIR ROLE IN HAVING HELPED TO CAUSE THE PRESENT
PROBLEM AT GENEVA BY EGGING ON THE PLO AND THEIR ARAB SUPPORTERS
PRIOR TO RABAT. HE TOLD VINOGRADOV YOU ARE ACTING LIKE THE
PILGRIM IN AN OLD MOSLEM PROVERB WHO CAME TO THE
HAJ WHEN ALL THE OTHER PILGRIMS WERE GOING
HOME. HE ASKED WHERE WERE YOU THREE OR FOUR
MONTHS BEFORE RABAT? VINOGRADOV REFUSED TO BE-
LIEVE THAT JORDAN WAS CENTRAL TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT
PROBLEM AND AGREED THE SOVIETS HAD SOMEWHERE ALONG THE
LINE LOST SIGHT OF THAT FACT. JORDAN ACCORDING
TO VINOGRADOV, WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAWN IN TO ANY
SOLUTION THAT WAS DEVELOPED. RIFAI SAID THE SOVIETS
NOT HAVE A CLUE ABOUT HOW TO SOLVE THE PRACTICAL
PROBLEM OF GENEVA INCLUDING THE INITIAL ONE OF WHAT
TO DO ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS.



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8. RIFAI SAID THAT ISLAMIC SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL
HASHAM TOHEMI HAS VISITED JORDAN AFTER RECEIVING
ARAFAT. HE RELAYED TO RIFAI THAT ARAFAT IS INCREAS-
INGLY PESSIMISTIC AND FRUSTRATED. HE IS DEEPLY WORRIED
ABOUT EGYPT GOING AHEAD ON A NEXT STEP, WITH ASAD
TO FOLLOW, LEAVING HIM DANGLING. R

TO BE AT ALL UPSET BY THE REPORT. FAI DID NOT APPEAR
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017118

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME Pickering

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador, Amembassy Amman

RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger

RECEIVER'S TITLE RUEHHAK/USDEL Aswan

DESCRIPTION Talks with King

CREATION DATE 03/1975

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100043

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER
REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST
DISCUSSIONS

BOX NUMBER 3

FOLDER TITLE March 7-22, 1975 - Kissinger's Trip -
Vol. I (10)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/03/2003

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Sanitized 9/9/04

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~~SECRET~~

AMMAN 1742

Tab B
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MODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, JO, US, UR, SY

SUBJECT: TALKS WITH KING ON SOVIET VISIT, SYRIAN ATTITUDES AND NEXT STEPS

1. SUMMARY. KING TOLD ME MARCH 13 THAT SOVIET (VINOGRADOV) PROPOSED WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS, PLUMBED JORDAN POSITION ON GENEVA AND PUSHED FOR RETURN TO CONFERENCE SOONEST. SYRIANS REPORTED TO HIM THEIR CONTINUING DISAPPOINTMENT YOU CANNOT PROMISE THEM MORE AND THAT THEY STILL FEEL "CUT OUT" OF INFORMATION FLOW BY US AND EGYPT. KING HOPES YOU WILL HAVE TIME DURING VISIT TO TALK WITH HIM ABOUT NEXT STEPS IN THE AREA, GENEVA, DEVELOPMENTS AFTER EGYPT, ROLE FOR SYRIA, IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, TO HOW YOU SEE THINGS GOING IN CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. FINALLY, HE RAISED A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION WITH YOU--OMAN, YEMEN, ERITREA, MILITARY AID, ETC. (COVERED IN FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS) AS WELL AS HIS HOPE TO SET A TIME FOR HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

2. TALKED FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR MARCH 13 WITH KING ABOUT YOUR IMPENDING VISIT, EVENTS IN THE AREA AND JORDANIAN DISCUSSIONS WITH VINOGRADOV.

3. KING BEGAN BY FILLING ME IN ON RECENT SOVIET VISITS. HE DISCUSSED EARLIER PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION AS PURELY PROTOCOL. HE NOTED THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER HAD BOTH HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH VINOGRADOV. LATTER HAD IMPRESSED THEM AS ARTICULATE AND EARNEST. KING SAID THAT CONTRARY TO PRIOR IMPRESSION WHICH SOVIETS HAD LEFT WITH HIM, HE NOW CONCLUDED THAT SOVIETS DID WANT TO MOVE THINGS IN A PEACEFUL DIRECTION. HE CHARACTERIZED VINOGRADOV VISIT AS AN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE FOR SOVIETS; THEY WANTED TO EXPLORE IN-DEPTH JORDANIAN POSITION FROM VERY BEGINNING ON WEST BANK AND NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO WANTED TO PROBE FOR CONCRETE IDEAS OR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA--I.E. EXPLORE POSSIBLE ECENARIOS AND SO FORTH. NOT SURPRISINGLY, KING NOTED THAT CONSTANT THEME OF SOVIETS WAS NEED TO RETURN TO GENEVA WHERE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS, WHICH, SOVIETS SAID, WAS GOOD FOR SMALL PUSHES FORWARD, COULD BE CONSOLIDATED AND A FINAL DRIVE MADE TOWARD CONCLUDING A FULL SCALE PEACE. SOVIETS, HE SAID, IN COURSE OF PROBING JORDAN POSITION; ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PERSUADE JORDAN TO TAKE MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION ON GENEVA

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4. KING TOLD ME THAT SOVIETS HAD NO REAL IDEAS ABOUT HOW GENEVA WOULD WORK OR WHAT IT WOULD DO. SOVIETS, HE SAID, TALKED ONLY ABOUT CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID SOVIETS COULD OFFER NOTHING MUCH ON IMPASSE WHICH YOU PREDICTED WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESULT OVER PALESTINIAN ISSUE IF GENEVA CONVENED. I ASKED KING IF SOVIETS TALKED AS IF PALESTINIANS WERE WILLING TO COME TO GENEVA AND HE SAID YES THAT WAS HIS STRONG IMPRESSION. I ASKED HIM IF SOVIETS WERE AWARE THAT SYRIANS HAD TOLD RIFAI THEY WOULD NOT GO TO GENEVA AFTER A NEXT STEP BY EGYPT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THIS TO VINOGRADOV AND LATTER SEEMED SURPRISED AND SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK. HE CONCLUDED THAT SYRIANS HAD NOT MADE THIS POINT CLEAR TO SOVIETS.

5. TURNING TO HIS OWN POSITION, KING TOLD ME HE HAD MADE VERY CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT RABAT HAD DETERMINED THE JORDANIAN POSITION AND THEREFORE THEY COULD NOT GO. (ONE OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS TELLS ME THAT JORDANIANS MADE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT USSR SUPPORT FOR PLO AT RABAT HAD HELPED TO DETERMINE JORDAN'S POSITION AND THEREFORE SO SOVIETS WERE IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR JORDANIAN POSITION ON GENEVA WHICH THEY WERE NOW TRYING TO CHANGE.) KING CONTINUED THAT IF OTHER ARABS WANTED JORDAN TO GO TO GENEVA, HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER DOING SO. HE WOULD HOWEVER NOT CHANGE HIS MIND AT ARAB REQUEST UNLESS THEY AGREED TO AT LEAST ONE CONDITION. HIS CONDITION WAS THAT IF JORDAN NEGOTIATED FOR RETURN OF WEST BANK, IT HAD TO BE ON BASIS THAT THERE WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE FREED TERRITORY FULL EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY ITS INHABITANTS. HE SAID SOVIETS HAD BEEN TOLD THIS POSITION AND HAD NOT RAISED ANY PROBLEM WITH IT. HE SAID HE IS NOT SURE WHAT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE WOULD BE, IS PRETTY SURE THE PLO COULD NOT ACCEPT IT, AND REMAINS CONFIDENT THAT ANY SUCH EXERCISE WOULD RESULT IN A CONTINUED CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR JORDAN IN THE AREA. I SAID THAT IF THE ISRAELIS FELT THE PROCESS WOULD LEAD TO AN OUTCOME THEY COULD NOT CONTROL OR THAT WOULD NOT LEAVE JORDAN IN A SIGNIFICANT ROLE, THEN THEY MIGHT HAVE SOME PROBLEM WITH IT; NEVERTHELESS, EVEN THOUGH THE PLO STOOD AGAINST SELF-DETERMINATION AT RABAT, IT WAS A PRETTY DIFFICULT CONDITION TO DISAPPROVE IN EUROPE AND THE US GIVEN OUR BACKGROUND AND TRADITION.

6. THE KING THEN SAID THAT HIYE HAD BEEN BRIEFED IN SYRIA ON YOUR VISIT THERE. SYRIAN REACTION WAS THAT YOU HAD TAKEN A HARD POSITION WITH THEM--THERE WAS POSSIBILITY OF A SIMILTANEOUS MOVE FOR THEM ON JORDAN, ONLY THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE WORKED OUT TO

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PAGE-3

FOLLOW ON OVER TIME. SYRIANS ALSO COMPLAINED AGAIN THAT THEY WERE BEING KEPT IN DARK ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITH EGYPT AND THAT THEY SEEMED TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT YOU WERE GOING TO GO AHEAD WHATEVER THEY DID. ONE BRIGHT SPOT KING SAW WAS THAT SYRIANS WERE PREPARING TO RECEIVE YOU AGAIN. I ASKED KING IF HE THOUGHT THAT SYRIANS WERE NOT TRYING TO MARSHALL MAXIMUM LEVERAGE NOW TO GET SOMETHING FOR THEMSELVES, BUT THAT THEY DID NOT REALLY FORECLOSE WHETHER OR NOT SUBSEQUENTLY THEY DECIDED TO STICK WITH NEGOTIATIONS, OR ALLOW THINGS TO DRIFT BACK TOWARD WAR. HE SAID THAT HE AGREED THERE WERE SOME ELEMENTS OF BARGAINING IN THE SYRIAN POSITION AND THAT HE FELT THEY WERE STILL RETAINING THE OPTION OF NEGOTIATING OVER THE GOLAN NO MATTER WHAT THEY DID OR SAID NOW. HE ADDED THEY SEEM MOST AGGRAVATED ABOUT NOT KNOWING WHAT THE FULL GOAL IS; WHETHER THEY WILL GET BACK THE GOLAN OR NOT AND THAT THIS WAS THE CRUX OF THEIR FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH.

7. LEADING ON FROM THE ABOVE POINTS, THE KING MENTIONED THAT JORDAN WAS GETTING SOME VERY [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT FAIAH AND THE PLO (NOT NECESSARILY THE REJECTIONISTS) WERE PREPARED TO TAKE SOME FAIRLY DRASTIC STEPS AGAINST JORDAN, THE US AND THE UK, PARTICULARLY, HE SAID, IN REACTION TO ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL STEP WITH EGYPT. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE WITH SYRIAN ENCOURAGEMENT, OR IF NOT THAT, WITH SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS OWN AIRLINERS AND WAS TAKING SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR THE DAYS AHEAD. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT I PASS ON THIS WARNING AND INDICATED IT CONCERNED HIM GREATLY. [REDACTED]

8. HE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO HEARING FROM YOU ON NEGOTIATING PROGRESS, HE HOPED TO HAVE SOME TIME TO GET YOU TO DESCRIBE WHERE YOU SEE THINGS MOVING IN THE FUTURE. HE SEEMS IMMEDIATELY MOST CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIA. AFTER THAT, HE SAID HE COULD SEE SOME MERIT IN GENEVA AND UNDERSTOOD FROM YOUR PAST MESSAGES THAT GENEVA MIGHT FIT IN WITH YOUR OWN THINKING. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT YOU VIEWED GENEVA NOW AS PREMATURE, BUT WOULD BE PREPARED LATER TO ATTEND. KING WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE HAD IN MIND FOR GENEVA. HOW PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAD DESCRIBED FOR HIM IN AQABA MIGHT BE ATTACKED. HE SAID IT IS NOT EARLY IN HIS JUDGEMENT TO GIVE IT SOME THOUGHT AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU. FINALLY, HE IS INTERESTED TO KNOW YOUR THINKING ON THE PERIOD FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD WHEN THE WEST BANK AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS MIGHT WELL COME UP FOR CONSIDERATION. HE REAFFIRMED

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PAGES 4

THAT HE BELIEVES THAT HIS POSTURE NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE OF PLAYING ONLY A BYSTANDER'S ROLE IS BEST. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO HIS FELLOW ARABS IF ASKED TO COME BACK, AND ALSO TOLD ME THAT SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD WE HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE ISSUE OF THE PALESTINIANS. ALSO, HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE PLO AT GENEVA IF THEY WANT TO ATTEND.

9. FINALLY, WE MOVED ON TO A DISCUSSION OF A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AND ARAB WORLD ORIENTED ISSUES WHICH WILL BE COVERED IN A FOLLOWING CABLE, BUT WHICH HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU. HE STILL HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON IN THE LATE APRIL PERIOD AND WILL PROBABLY RAISE THAT QUESTION WITH YOU ALSO.

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#1742

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017119

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME Pickering

CREATOR'S TITLE Ambassador, Amembassy Amman

RECEIVER'S NAME RUEHHAK/USDEL Aswan

DESCRIPTION Talks with King

CREATION DATE 03/13/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100043

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER
REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST
DISCUSSIONS

BOX NUMBER 3

FOLDER TITLE March 7-22, 1975 - Kissinger's Trip -
Vol. I (10)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/03/2003

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

sanitized 9/9/04

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*Jordan
C. G. ...*

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, JO, XF
SUBJECT: TALKS WITH KING MIDDLE EAST
AND BILATERAL ISSUES

1. SUMMARY: [Redacted]

[Redacted] NORTH YEMEN IS WORRIED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN ERITREA AND FEARS ADDITIONAL COMMUNIST INROADS IN HORN OF AFRICA SOAHH YEMEN, AREA AND KING WANTS ALSO TO RAISE THIS WITH THE SECRETARY. FINALLY, KING HOPES TO BE AJZE TO GET INFORMATION ON NEXT YEAR'S (FY 1976 LEVELS OF AID TO JORDAN AND ALSO ON WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO ABOUT AIR DEFENSE FOLLOWING THE VISIT OF THE US STUDY TEAM.
END SUMMARY.

[Large Redacted Block]

3. YEMEN - PRESIDENT HAMD I OF NORTH YEMEN HAD JUST SENT HIM A MESSAGE. FIRST YEMENIS WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE 80 SOME MILITARY ADVISORS FROM JORDAN NOW IN YEMEN. THEY WANTED ALSO TO MOVE TO REPLACE THEIR SOVIET EQUIPMEFKWITH UWIMATERIAL WHICH THE SAUDIS WOULD PAY FOR. THE YEMENIS HAD ASKED ABOUT BUYING HAWKER HUNTERS FROM JORDAN, BUT NOW THEY WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. (HE ALSO SAID LEBANON, WHICH HAD FIRST TURNED DOWN THE HUNTERS, NOW WAS ANXIOUS TO BUY THEM.) CONTINUING, THE KING SAID HAMD I EXPRESSED REWN CONCERN ABOUT THE ERITREAN SITUATION. THE YEMENIS ARE BEING CAREFUL ABOUT SUPPORTING THE ERITREANS BECAUSE THEY FEAR THAT

DECLASSIFIED, in Jordan
AUTHORITY *9/9/03*
BY *...* NLF, DATE *6/21/07*



THE COMMUNIST WILL CONTROL THEM. KING ALSO SAID HE WAS QUIETLY RESERVING HIS POSITION ON ERITREAN INDEPENDANCE WITH SOUTH YEMEN, SOMALIA, POSSIBLY THE TFAI AND ERITREAN GOING COMMUNIST, IT WOULD BE A VERY DIFFICULT CHANGE TO ACCEPT IN THE AREA. KING WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON THIS POINT WHEN HE COMES.

4. ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS KING SAID HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT SECRETARY COULD GIVE HIM AN IDEA OF WHAT NEXT YEAR'S MILITARY AID AND BUDGET SUPPORT WOULD BE. I FILLED HIM IN ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT HERE. TOLD HIM I WOULD PASS ON TO THE SECRETARY HIS INTEREST IN THE ISSUE,

5. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON AIR DEFENSE. I TOLD HIM THAT THE REPORT WAS NOW BEING WORKED ON IN WASHINGTON AND THAT WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO GIVE THE JORDANIANS A READING BY THE TIME EITHER HE OR THE CHIEF OF STAFF VISITS WASHINGTON THIS SPRING. I NOTED THAT WE HAD WORKED OUT A LIST OF PRIORITY TARGETS FOR DEFENSE AND OF THE VARIOUS TYPE SYSTEMS BEST SUITED TO DEFEND THEM. THE KING SAID HE HAD JUST ABOUT

COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ADDITIONAL F-5E AIR CRAFT MADE THE MOST SENSE FOR JORDAN AND THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BUY ANY OF THE VARIOUS A-4 TYPES NOW BEING OFFERED TO HIM. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE A-4'S TO JORDAN IF THEY WANTED TO ACQUIRE THEM, BUT THAT WAS OF COURSE UP TO HIM TO DECIDE.

PICKERING

BT
#1745

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*Jordan
Checklist*

NNN VZCZCEHLSAB
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DE RUEHAM #1743/1 272 2721785
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHHAX/USDEL AFSAN IMMEDIATE II
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4064
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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, US, UK, MU
SUBJECT: TALKS WITH KING: OMAN

1. SUMMARY. KING NOTED FIRST JORDANIAN CASUALTIES IN OMAN. ALSO CALLED MY ATTENTION TO JORDANIAN ASSESSMENT THAT BRITISH NOT DOING ALL THEY COULD TO HELP OMAN PROSECUTE WAR MORE SPEEDILY. I URGED KING TO AVOID A DISPUTE WITH UK OVER THESE ISSUES AND TO EXPLORE THEM FULLY WITH UK MAJ GENERAL PERKINS ARRIVING HERE MARCH 15, WHO COMMANDS SULTAN'S ARMED FORCES. KING PROMISED HE WOULD DO SO. KING WARNED QABOOS AGAINST POSSIBLE DANGERS IN PRESENT SITUATION. HE HAS ALSO ASKED IF WE WOULD SELL OMAN SOME CONVENTIONAL EQUIPMENT, HELP IN PROVIDING ADVICE ON ANTI-INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES AND AERIAL PHOTO DETECTION, AND ALSO LOAN TO JORDAN 6 MORE T-37'S TO HELP IN TRAINING JORDANIAN AND OMANI PILOTS. END SUMMARY.

2. KING NOTED FOR ME THAT A QUESTION WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN DISCUSSION WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY TROUBLESOME FOR HIM--OMAN. HE NOTED FIRST IN PASSING THAT JORDAN HAD HAD ITS FIRST CASUALTIES-- ONE KILLED AND TWO WOUNDED, ONE OFFICER VERY SERIOUSLY SO. THREE BRITISH OFFICERS HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE SAME OPERATION. JORDANIANS WERE ON ORIENTATION PATROL WITH THE BRITISH OUTSIDE THEIR OWN AREA. (RUMOR MILL IN AMMAN IS ALREADY CHURNING WITH NEWS THAT 30 JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND WE DETECT SOME BUILD UP OF SOME POPULAR BACKLASH IN THE SENSE OF WHY IS JORDAN FIGHTING SULTAN'S BATTLES FOR HIM.)

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3. CONTINUING, KING NOTED THAT HE HAS ASSESSED UK ROLE AND FOUND IT WANTING. HE DISCUSSED THIS POINT, ESPECIALLY WITH SULTAN QABOOS WHEN HE WAS HERE AND BELIEVES HE HAS BEGUN TO OPEN QABOOS' EYES SOMEWHAT TO WHAT IS GOING ON. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SULTAN'S ARMED FORCES COMMANDER, UK MAJOR GENERAL PERKINS IS COMING ON SATURDAY. WHILE HE IS NEW, HE ENJOYS A GOOD REPUTATION WITH THE JORDANIANS AND THE KING SAID HIS FIRST INTEREST IS TO HAVE A VERY FRANK TALK WITH HIM ABOUT THE SITUATION.

4. KING SAYS HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE BRITISH COMES IN THREE AREAS: (A) THE UK DOES NOT SEEM TO BE PUSHING FORWARD HARD ENOUGH TO GET THE WAR OVER. IT'S TOO MUCH BUSINESS AS USUAL. THIS HAS RAISED JORDANIANS SUSPICIONS THAT THE UK MILITARY HAS A GOOD THING GOING AND THAT IT WANTS TO DRAG THINGS OUT INDEFINITELY. KING WARNED THAT SUCH WAS ATTITUDE TAKEN BY UK BEFORE JORDAN HAS TOSSED OUT BLUBB PASHA IN 1957, AND QABOOS HAD BEEN WARNED BY JORDANIANS THAT THEY COULD NOT STAND THE DRAIN INDEFINITELY. SECOND POINT (B) WAS THAT UK HAD TAKEN A VERY CONSERVATIVE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO REPLACING BRITISH OFFICERS WITH OMANIS. KING SAID THAT BY 1982 OMANIS WERE TOLD BY THE UK THAT THEY COULD HAVE A FEW OF THEIR OWN COMPANY COMMANDERS. AND FINALLY (C), BRITISH SEEMED TO BE SELLING THE OMANIS AN AWFUL LOT OF HIGH-PRICED MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITH THE OMANIS LITERALLY HAVING NO CHANCE TO LOOK ELSEWHERE OR EXAMINE CAREFULLY WHAT WOULD BE BEST THEMSELVES. AT SAME TIME, UK WAS PUTTING OUT THE WORD THAT OMAN OVER THE NEXT YEAR WOULD BE IN REAL FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY. THIS SHOCKED QABOOS WHO WOULDN'T BELIEVE IT UNTIL, KING SAID, HE GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE UK REPORT.

5. I HAD HAD SOME WARNING OF THIS LINE OF APPROACH. YESTERDAY CHIEF OF STAFF MAX ASKED ~~BY~~ DEFENSE

ATTACHE WHETHER US WAS INTERESTED IN REPLACING UK IN OMAN ALONG WITH JORDAN. I TOLD KING LAST THING WE WANTED TO DO WAS SEE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES EMERGE BETWEEN UK AND JORDAN IN OMAN. (BUT DISLIKE OF BRITISH RUNS DEEPER THAT I SUSPECTED OR HAVE PREVIOUSLY FOUND IT HERE.) I ENCOURAGED KING TO LAY IT ON THE LINE WITH UK GENERAL WHEN HE COMES. I ALSO ADDED (PER RECENT COMMENTS FROM EMBASSY LONDON) THAT WILSON GOVERNMENT HAS SOMETHING OF A SPECIAL PROBLEM ABOUT TOO MUCH PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN OMAN AND GULF AND OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO AVOID HEAVY UK PRESS INTEREST IN THESE ACTIVITIES IN OMAN BY KEEPING UK CASUALTIES DOWN. KING AGREED THAT A ROW WITH THE UK WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, BUT REPEATED THAT OVER TIME UK WAS GOING TO GET OUT OF OMAN AND THEY SHOULD DO SO LEAVING OMANIS IN A POSITION TO RUN THINGS, NOT LIKE THEY DID IN JORDAN BY BEING KICKED OUT. HE SAID QABOOS WAS NOW BEGINNING TO SEE ALL THIS MORE CLEARLY AFTER HIS VISIT HERE AND HE EXPZCTED IT WOULD BEGIN TO SHOW UP IN OMAN. HE HAD ENCOURAGED QABOOS TO GET OUT MORE WITH HIS PEOPLE AND TO TAKE A FIRMER PERSONAL INTEREST IN A

~~SECRET~~



MORE RAPID EFFORT TO END THE WAR.

6. KING ALSO ASKED ABOUT OUR OWN SALES POLICY FOR OMAN. I SAID THAT WE HAD SOLD TOW AND WOULD PROBABLY SELL OTHER WEAPONS OF LESSER SOPHISTICATION WHICH OMAN NEEDED. KING THEN NOTED THAT OMAN COULD USE GRENADE LAUNCHERS, LIGHT 105 MILIMETER ARTILLERY, ETC. HE ALSO SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD BE SENDING TWO PHOTO RECON HUNTERS IN THE NEXT BATCH OF 16. THESE WOULD BE MANNED BY JORDANIANS. COULD JORDAN GET SOME INFRA-RED FILM FOR DETECTION OF INFILTRATORS ETC. TO HELP OUT OMAN.

7. ON LATTER POINT, I SUGGESTED THAT WHILE WE HAD HAD LONG EXPERIENCE WITH ANTI-INFILTRATION TECHNICAL DEVICES IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND, HE MIGHT ALSO WANT TO RAISE IT WITH GENERAL PERKINS. IF PERKINS AGREED, OR IF KING WANTED TO PERSIST, I WOULD BE GLAD TO ASK WASHINGTON FOR ITS ADVICE ON WHETHER ONE OR TWO US EXPERTS COULD COME HERE OR TO OMAN OR BOTH AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS AREA. KING SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME. (THIS APPROACH IS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM A SIMILAR ONE MADE TO MY DEFENSE ATTACHE BY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR TECHNICAL HELP IN CONTROLLING JORDAN'S NORTHERN BORDER AGAINST FEDAYEEN, BUT TWO MIGHT BE SOMEHOW COMBINED IF KING COMES BACK TO US.)

8. ALSO, KING SAID THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH QABOOS TO BEGIN TRAINING SOME OMANI PILOTS IN JORDAN. OMANIS WOULD PAY FOR TWO MORE LIGHT PROPELLER DRIVEN AIRCRAFT TO DO THIS. COULD THE US, THE KING ASKED, LOAN JORDAN ANOTHER SIX T-37 AIRCRAFT FOR THE ADVANCE TRAINING. MONEY WHICH OMAN WAS GIVING JORDAN FOR THE HAWKER HUNTERS WAS ALL ALLOCATED TO IMPROVING AND BUILDING NEW AIRBASES HERE AND NONE IS AVAILABLE NOW FOR A PURCHASE OF T-37'S. TWELVE OMANI PILOTS WOULD START SOON, BUT MORE WOULD FOLLOW. I TOLD KING I WOULD PUT THIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND SEEK AN EARLY RESPONSE. ACTION REQUESTED: A RESPONSE, HOPEFULLY POSITIVE, ON WHETHER SIX MORE T-37 AIRCRAFT CAN BE LOANED TO JORDAN FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS TO ASSIST IN TRAINING JORDANIANS AND OMANI PILOTS.

9. KING WILL VERY DEFINITELY, AVUSOME POINT WANT TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS WITH SECRETARY.

10. DEPT MAY WANT TO REPEAT TO LONDON AND MUSCAT FOR INFORMATION.

PICKERING



tapbook
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CHECK LIST FOR JORDAN

MARCH 15-16, 1975

OBJECTIVES

1. Brief Hussein and Rifai on our efforts to bring about a second round of Israeli-Egyptian disengagement and ask him about the Vinogradov visit. The King and Rifai are both particularly concerned about the Syrian role and want to discuss this with you. (Tabs A and B).


2. Hussein has told Pickering (Tabs C and D) he wants to discuss with you regional relationships such as Syria-Jordan, the PLO, Jordanian troops in Oman, Iraq-Iran, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. You will want to hear what he thinks Arab positions are. The King has also said he wants to discuss bilateral issues such as (a) military supply, (b) supporting assistance, (c) King Hussein's April visit to Washington, and (d) Tapline.

I. NEGOTIATING ISSUES

-- You will know what you want to tell the Jordanians about the progress of negotiations, balancing their strong desire to be fully briefed against the dangers of overdisclosure, particularly since Jordan is presently in a phase of very close relations with Syria. There is a continual exchange of views between the two governments on negotiations.

-- The King has told Pickering that he is particularly interested in what role you see for Syria, in prospects for Geneva, and in how the Palestinian/West Bank problem can eventually be resolved. He and Rifai have expressed particular concern that Syria get something out of the current round, and Jordan could be associated with Syrians, Saudis, Palestinians and Soviets in an effort to hold up implementation of a Sinai agreement until there is a new agreement on the Golan.

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-- Vinogradov impressed Hussein and Rifai favorably as showing a serious Soviet desire for a final settlement and a much more sympathetic attitude toward Jordan (vice the PLO) than ever before (Tab B). He pressed the idea of going to Geneva to "consolidate" small step-by-step gains and conclude full-scale peace, but had no specific ideas on how to proceed at Geneva.


II. REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The King has said he wants to discuss these issues with you, and it would be interesting to ask Hussein's and Rifai's thinking about certain regional relationships which bear upon but are not directly related to your present negotiations.

-- Syrian-Jordanian relations are currently on the up-swing as Syria seeks to protect itself against what it fears will be an Egyptian sell-out while Hussein and Rifai -- still miffed over Rabat which left Egypt free to negotiate but blocked Jordan -- seek to strengthen Jordan's position vis-a-vis the PLO and take out insurance against the possibility that the Sinai negotiations will cause Syria to move toward war. As you know, this Syria-Jordan rapprochement worries the Israelis and encourages the Syrians.

-- Jordan's view of the PLO position would also be useful. There are reports that the PLO is considering public acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist within 1967 boundaries and limiting its own objectives to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, the Jordanians have reports of an imminent PLO terrorist campaign against Jordan.

-- Jordan's view of Iraq's relations with its neighbors (Iran, Syria and Jordan) after the Iraq-Iran agreement will be valuable since Hussein had taken an active personal role in trying to reconcile the two. Hussein wishes to have your views of the Iraq-Iran agreement. He is concerned that the Kurds will be decimated and wants to discuss his concern with you.




-- Hussein wishes to talk to you about the threat of increasing Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, specifically that the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict will enable the Soviets to expand their beachhead in Somalia.

III. BILATERAL ISSUES

1. King's visit to Washington. You can tell the King that President Ford is looking forward to seeing him in Washington on April 29 for an exchange of views in the office and an informal working dinner if this will be convenient for the King. We have not conveyed the April 29 date to the King or to Pickering, thinking you would want to do it personally on this visit.

2. Military Supply. (a) Tell the King and Rifai that the air defense team which visited Jordan in February has made its report and submitted recommendations which are under review. We believe we will have at least a summary for Jordanian use before the end of this month. We will be prepared to discuss these recommendations in detail with Jordanian military representatives in Washington next month. (b) If they raise the question of A-4's, tell them that the U. S. has approved the release of any model and it is now up to the GOJ to decide what it wants to buy in light of its overall defense program and available funds. (c) If they ask for the loan of additional T-37 trainers for another two years, you can say you agree in principle, subject to availability. (d) Cobra Helicopters with TOW. We have under consideration a Jordanian request for this weapons system. The problem is complicated in that Cobra with TOW is not yet fully in production and the requirements of our forces have not been met.

3. PL 480. Tell Rifai that we are making an additional 20,000 tons of PL 480 wheat available to Jordan this quarter. (This brings our total FY 75 program to 40,000 tons and makes good on your February commitment to Prime Minister Rifai to attempt to locate an additional 10,000 tons for Jordan.)



4. Jordanian Special Forces in Oman. After an exchange of notes amending our 1957 Mutual Defense Treaty, Jordanian Special Forces (and their U.S.-supplied military equipment) have departed for Oman and have suffered their first casualties. There are potential problems ahead:

-- The King, Rifai and General Ben Shaker are very unhappy over the UK role in Oman and are suggesting (to the Sultan and to Pickering) that perhaps the US should replace the UK as Oman's major-power supporter. Our view is that you should discourage this idea and urge the Jordanians to try and work with the British, not against them.


-- Jordan has supplied Oman with Hawker Hunter aircraft and Jordanian pilots. The King spoke to Pickering about these aircraft possibly attacking rebel bases in South Yemen. You may wish to advise caution since overly aggressive Jordanian (or Iranian) action in the immediate border area could produce an escalation of military activity toward Oman by South Yemen, and an escalation of Soviet support for South Yemen. It would probably also dash all hopes for success of the Saudi-Egyptian-Kuwaiti effort to encourage a shift to moderation by South Yemen's leaders. At the very least, Jordanian strategy toward the Oman/Dhofar/South Yemen problem should be coordinated with other moderate Arab governments.

5. Supporting Assistance. Hussein wants to know about next year's military aid and budgetary support. The King may press for an additional \$10 million in Supporting Assistance promised in FY 74 but funded from FY 75 monies. You will want to repeat that we regard that as a moral commitment. But in the absence of a foreign assistance appropriation we are still not in a position to make any commitment on this \$10 million. Nor can we say how much Congress will approve out of our FY 76 request for Jordan, which is the same as last year.

6. Tapline. Jordan (and Lebanon) are caught in a squeeze between the Saudis and Tapline (Aramco) with the latter about to stop supplying oil unless



Jordan (and Lebanon) pay their debts due to higher oil prices, while the Saudis have thus far refused to grant concessionary prices for the two Arab states. Hussein or Rifai may ask you to intercede with the Tapline parent companies (Exxon and Mobil). You can tell the Jordanians we are aware of the problem and will try to help but that this is essentially a matter for Jordan and Lebanon to sort out directly with the Saudis.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

King Hussein of Jordan
Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister
of Defense and Foreign Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, U. S.
Ambassador to Jordan

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff

Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant
to the Secretary for Press Relations

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday, March 15, 1975
8:30 - 8:45 p. m.

PLACE:

Royal Palace
Amman, Jordan



[His Majesty greeted the Secretary and his party. Photographers were admitted briefly.]

Kissinger: I told Zaid I would like to talk to you tomorrow about the situation and how to proceed. Because of your knowledge of the area, we need your advice.

I told Zaid the worst mistake we ever made was not to force a negotiation for the West Bank. I can't say we weren't warned!

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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When is Your Majesty coming to Washington?

Atherton: We have a date now, Mr. Secretary. The 29th. We can set it here.

Kissinger: You see, when we are in meetings, I move my lips and Roy Atherton speaks. [Laughter]

Marilyn Berger -- I apologize in advance -- if she asks tactless questions, I have an arrangement with Sadat I can shoot her without being prosecuted. I would like the same arrangement here. [Laughter]

Rifai: We read the news from your briefing and every account is different.

Kissinger: I don't tell them much and they speculate. If they analyzed the situation and the pressures, they would understand what I mean. But they are interested in tactical issues -- they want to conduct the negotiations for me -- the oil fields, the passes. They ask Sadat something so he rejects it -- which really means he is preparing to accept something very close to it. [Laughter]

Rifai: What about joint patrols?

Kissinger: That is another Marilyn Berger story. She asked Sadat, "What about joint patrols?" He thought she meant joint commissions and said it is not excluded. Going back into the room, he said to me, "Now I gave them joint commissions." I said, "No, you gave them joint patrols." He said: "I didn't mean it." [Laughter] So they issued a correction.

Rifai: Yes, we saw it.

Kissinger: And I told him: "Now the Israelis will have plans all worked out by the time I get to Jerusalem." [Laughter]

If they analyzed it and considered the trends, they would understand and get most of it.

Rifai: The problem is that the declared policies of the governments in the area aren't always the real policies.



Kissinger: Sometimes they have to do what they declare!

Rifai: Like Asad's joint command. We checked the tape of what he said -- he said, "We could even have a joint command."

Kissinger: But he is going to do it. I said to him: "You know, Mr. President, this joint command idea of yours will create some problems," and he said, "I know, but I declared it!"

Rifai: I don't think it is serious.

Kissinger: Really? I think they will do it. They may do it in a week.

By next week, we will know [about the negotiations]. Then I will have to pay farewell visits in the area. The Kuwaitis are waiting. Is it safe now, do you think?

Hussein: I don't think it is very safe.

Kissinger: I told someone they will give me a 21-gun salute, all aimed at me. [Laughter]

Rifai: Ashraf Marwan was here and we compared notes and both agreed it wasn't too safe. He said it is a great responsibility to give advice. I asked him, "Would you advise the Secretary to go?" And he said no. It could be that nothing happens, but it is an unnecessary risk.

Kissinger: We'll send Sisco! My staff is unanimous that I go. [Laughter]

Rifai: Especially because of the plans we found last time.


Kissinger: Against me.

Rifai: It is not safe generally, but you are target number one.

Kissinger: Look at my staff. They are perking up! They see the light at the end of the tunnel. [Laughter]

Rifai: It's mostly PFLP. We had information about it.

Kissinger: Habbash?



Rifai: Habbash. But also Fatah.

Kissinger: Did you give this to our people?

Rifai: It is general information; we follow it up and if we get more specific information we pass it on. We get this every day.

Kissinger: In other words, you are waiting to see how I behave myself?
[Laughter]

Rifai: Yes! But seriously, it is an unnecessary risk and we don't think it is safe.

Kissinger: Can I tell Your Majesty what a pleasure it is to come to Jordan.

[The meeting ended and the Secretary's party departed for the Secretary's quarters at Prince Hassan's Guest Palace to prepare for dinner.]



HAK/Hussein
memcon (dinner)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

King Hussein of Jordan
 Crown Prince Hassan
 Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister of
 Defense and Foreign Affairs
 General Zaid Bin Shaker, Chief of Staff

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, U. S.
 Ambassador to Jordan
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
 for Political Affairs
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
 of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
 Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant
 to the Secretary for Press Relations
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff **PWR**

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, March 15, 1975
Dinner - 9:15 - 11:15 p. m.

PLACE:

The Prime Minister's Residence
Amman, Jordan



[Following are highlights of the conversation over cocktails with the King and General Bin Shaker before dinner.]

-- The Syrians made the mistake in October 1973 of advancing along a broad front in the Golan instead of making a sharp penetration and mopping up afterward. [Bin Shaker]

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

-- The Egyptian army is better than the Syrian but is not very good. The Syrian commanders stayed behind in their bunkers instead of leading their troops. They could have done better. [Bin Shaker]

-- In the next war, neither can achieve surprise. It will be a prolonged war, with heavy casualties on both sides. [King Hussein]

-- After 1967 the Israelis should have offered return of all territories in exchange for peace. The Arabs might have accepted because the Israelis were in a position to take all their capitals. Nasser told Hussein he had no forces left between Cairo and the front. Such an offer would have left Hussein with a difficult choice. [King Hussein]

-- The Israelis before October 1973 were too "bigheaded" -- considering it unthinkable that Egypt would even attempt a Canal crossing. [Bin Shaker]

-- The Turks say that three-quarters of all the tanks in the world are surrounding them -- in Russia, Greece, Syria, and Iraq! And it is probably true. [Kissinger]

-- Kissinger always believed the Israelis should have made a specific peace proposal immediately after the 1967 war. [Kissinger] Oakley: They did talk about a willingness to withdraw. Kissinger: But they had no intention of doing it. They didn't mean it.

[The party moved to the dinner table.]

* * *

Rifai: Vinogradov came to visit us.

Kissinger: I know.

Rifai: He came to urge us to go to the Geneva Conference and he wanted Geneva convened as soon as possible. I said we were bound by the decisions of the Rabat Conference and stood by them. He said the Soviet Union is bound only by the decisions it participated in, such as resolutions of the UN Security Council. He said Jordan had a duty to go to Geneva as representative of the West Bank. I said Jordan fully intends to abide by the decision of Rabat.



This appeared in our newspapers. [See cable Tab A] He was very embarrassed.

Kissinger: How did it get into the newspapers?

Rifai: Our newspapers are independent. We own only 40 percent of that newspaper; we don't control it.

Kissinger: But how did the newspapers get it?

Rifai: I haven't any idea. [Laughter]

* * *

Kissinger: Do you think Syria will go to Geneva?

Rifai: No.

Kissinger: What is the significance of this joint command?

Hussein: I don't think it will come.

Kissinger: He told me it would happen.

Hussein: Arafat is under attack for being too rational.

Rifai: Syria stands to gain, whatever happens. They score points against Egypt anyway.

Hussein: Our Ambassador there says there is talk about inviting Egypt and Jordan to join.

Sisco: If the Syrians seek to use the joint command to gain operational control over, say, Fatahland, this gives them more influence.

Kissinger: But why do it publicly? It makes them more vulnerable.

Pickering: It has anti-Egyptian potential.

Oakley: They are more interested in propaganda than operational value.



Hussein: We heard from Khaddam that they are very concerned about an Egyptian move, and they said if it takes place, they would not hesitate to encourage any anti-American operations in the entire area.

Kissinger: Does His Majesty think they will do it?

Hussein: I don't think they have made up their mind. This announcement was a surprise to us.

Rifai: There is nothing they will not do if they are convinced they won't share in the movement on their front.

Sisco: Including war?

Rifai: The timing is important.

Hussein: I don't think they have any illusions.

Kissinger: They would be patient if Egypt gained nothing?

Rifai: Yes.

Kissinger: They would be patient. For how long?

Rifai: They would want Geneva and would hope for general movement, and if nothing happens, it is an Arab decision and not a Syrian decision. But all would be in the same boat.

Kissinger: What would happen?

Rifai: If there is no withdrawal, the assumption is another round of fighting. As long as there is occupation of Arab lands.

Hussein: The Syrian-Egyptian collision is part of the two schools of thought which always existed in this part of the world. The Syrians represent the extremist one.

Kissinger: If I understand the Syrians, they would settle for something intermediate.

Hussein: They want withdrawal from the entire Golan.



Rifai: They would go to Geneva and seek withdrawal. As His Majesty said, it is part of a long-standing struggle.

Kissinger: How did I get involved? [Laughter] You got me involved! The worst mistake Israel ever made is not to move with you last summer. You didn't do so badly.

If they wanted peace, they would have gained a breathing space if they had reached agreement with you on any of the schemes that were available.

Rifai: They have the territory but not peace, which they wanted. It is shortsighted. If I were an Israeli, I would give not only the passes and oil fields but as much as possible, because the bigger the settlement, the more it looks like it is permanent.

Kissinger: Exactly. If I were an Israeli leader, I would give whatever it takes to get Egypt off my back.

Hussein: From the Arabs' point of view, time is on our side, inevitably. And the Israelis seem to think time is on their side. It is difficult to find the logic.

Kissinger: Because Israel's domestic situation is such that if they can avoid a difficult situation today, they would rather do that than take a long-term decision. An American baseball manager once said, "Use your best pitcher today because tomorrow it may rain." I tried to give them a lecture about understanding the Arabs. They said, "Well when we meet face-to-face, we behave well. It is only when we deal through you that we do this." [Laughter] I said, "From what I know about your face-to-face meetings, you didn't make a lasting impression." Am I right? [Laughter]

Hussein: Why is there this short-term outlook?

Kissinger: Basically this government can't make a decision.

Hussein: But they can decide for a military buildup.

Kissinger: That is easy. They are using our resources.

Rifai: Maybe it is built-in seeds of destruction. Because they never had a state that lasted longer than 70 years.

Kissinger: Basically, you of all the Arabs . . . all the others may be using peace as a tactic. Asad still sees Israel as southern Syria and its existence as an aggression. But Your Majesty has no objection to their existence; they should have made peace with you.

Rifai: They see a possibility now with Egypt. It took us 100 hours to convince them.

Kissinger: Tomorrow, Your Majesty, we have to have a detailed discussion of the situation in the area. I need your advice. If there is going to be a war anyway, why should we exert ourselves? I can send Sisco around; he has a well-established record of failure. [Laughter] Seriously, we are willing to do something with Syria. But as Ziad points out, it is much more difficult on the Golan than on the Sinai because of the distances. Raising the question of their settlements raises the question of the viability of their whole presence.

Rifai: Maybe it is easier to have a complete settlement on the Golan than a limited withdrawal.

Kissinger: I have thought of that.

Rifai: Total withdrawal. But it is hard to do it for nothing.

Kissinger: Good will. Don't underestimate good will!

Rifai: Asad told me: If someone occupies my land, I don't have to pay for it.

He is willing to give a peace treaty.

Kissinger: He is very intelligent.

Rifai: "As long as they give our land." I asked him, "Why not take a partial withdrawal in the southern part, if they are not willing on the Golan?" He said, "If they are not willing to withdraw from the Golan, what is the use of all these talks? If they are willing, then it makes no difference where it starts." But from my talks, I don't have the impression he is planning for war now.


When I asked about UNDOF -- I said, "You will have to make some hard decisions in May." He said, "The question of the UNDOF is of secondary



importance. If it is in our interest to keep them, we will keep them. If it is in our interest to remove them, we will remove them." My impression was if removal gives Israel a pretext to start war, he might keep them.

I will let Gromyko try for a year and a half. [Laughter]

[The dinner ended.]



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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, UR
SUBJECT: VINOGRADOV'S MISSION TO JORDAN

1. GOJ-SPONSORED DAILY AR-RAYY MARCH 15 PRINTS ACCOUNT OSTENSIBLY OUTLINING DETAILS OF CURRENT VISIT TO AMMAN OF SOVIET GENEVA REMP VLADIMIR VINOGRADOV. ACCORDING TO PAPER, VINOGRADOV IS IN AMMAN TO CONVINCe JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA; LATTER SHOULD BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. VINOGRADOV QUOTED AS SAYING THAT SOVIET GOV STILL CONSIDERS JORDAN TO BE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF WEST BANK, AND THAT "THE RESTORATION OF THE WEST BANK IS LEGALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY THE DUTY OF THE JORDANIAN GOV IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RESOLUTIONS IN GENERAL, AND NO. 242 IN PARTICULAR. THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AFTER RESTORATION "LIES WITH JORDAN." ENVOY FURTHER STATED THAT USSR WILL, ON HER PART, CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UN DECISIONS WHICH SOVIET GOV HAS APPROVED BEFORE.

2. AR-RAYY QUOTES GOJ AUTHORITIES AS ANSWERING THAT JORDAN FULLY INTENDS TO ABIDE BY RESOLUTIONS OF RABAT CONFERENCE, INSISTING AGAIN THAT JORDAN WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA DUE TO FACT THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALESTINIANS NOW LIES WITH PLO. JORDAN, HOWEVER, WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT PLO.

3. COMMENT: GIVEN SOVIETS' WELL-KNOWN FAVORITISM OF PLO REGARDING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE, WE FIND IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT SOVIETS WOULD HAVE MADE ABOVE POINT THAT USSR CONSIDERS JORDAN "LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF OCCUPIED WEST BANK". WHILE FACT THAT VINOGRADOV REPORTEDLY ASKED JORDANIANS TO ATTEND GENEVA CONFERENCE IN ITSELF MAY COMPLICATE SOVIET-PLO RELATIONS, WE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT GOJ MAY HAVE ADDED ABOVE INFO REGARDING WEST BANK REPRESENTATION AS A MEANS OF FURTHER EMBARRASSING SOVIET-PLO RELATIONS.

PICKERING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HR 9/29/03





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