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Department of State

232
271.104
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 301150Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY Dacca
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JIDOA NIACT IMMEDIATE 31
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4718
BT
~~SECRET~~ Dacca 4934

CONTROL: 8777Q
RECD: 30 OCT 14 20Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 232

FOR AMBASSADOR ATKINS FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SEC VISIT: AUDIENCE WITH KING FAISAL

1. YOU SHOULD SEE SAQQAF AND TELL HIM THAT IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS AT RABAT, I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE A TALK WITH KING FAISAL BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON. I WILL OF COURSE ALSO WANT TO MEET WITH SAQQAF IF IT IS CONVENIENT TO THE KING, AND HE AGREES, I WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE IN RIYADH FROM CAIRO IN THE AFTER-NOON NOV. 6, HAVE AN AUDIENCE WITH THE KING AND LEAVE LATER THAT EVENING FOR AMMAN.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF THIS IS AGREEABLE.

3. WE WILL SEND YOU THE ITINERARY FOR MY MIDDLE EAST TRIP, WITH ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES, AS SOON AS CONFIRMATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

KISSINGER

BT

#4934



~~SECRET~~

HR 6/27/02

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27-10X
Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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O 301152Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4720
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DACCA 4936

CONTROL: 8769Q
RECD: 30 OCT 13 50Z

NODIS

SECTO 227

FOR ENDERS FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 237488 AND PREVIOUS

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR FURTHER RATIONALE ON PRECONSULTATIONS. I REMAIN DUBIOUS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY TELLING THE REPRESENTATIVES TO THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE ABOUT MY PROPOSALS ON THE EVE OF THEIR DEPARTURE SINCE IT WILL THEN BE TOO LATE FOR THEM TO GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS ANYWAY. IF WE TELL THEM EARLIER, THEN WE RISK LEAKS.

2. NEVERTHELESS, I AGREE ON BALANCE THAT WE SHOULD ALERT THE EXPORTERU TO OUR SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE EXPORTERS GROUP. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY CALLING IN THEIR AMBASSADORS ON MONDAY MORNING NOVEMBER 4 AND TALKING TO THEM ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGEST. THEY SHOULD BE STRICTLY ADMONISHED ABOUT THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY UNTIL MY SPEECH.

3. AS FOR THE RESERVES GROUP THERE HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT FORESHADOWING THAT NO ONE WILL BE SURPRISED. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE THAT EITHER THE PRC OR THE USSR WILL JOIN OUR EFFORT. IN ANY EVENT I AM NOT YET SURE WE SHOULD START WITH SUCH A LARGE RESERVES GROUP. WE MAY WANT TO START WITH A SMALLER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AND THEN POSSIBLY EXPAND THE GROUP. THUS I WANT NO PRE-BRIEFING ON THIS ASPECT.

KISSINGER

BT
#4936



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HR 6/27/02



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Department of State

3
TELEGRAM

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ACTION COPY

O 301055Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 29
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4722

CONTROL: 8816Q
RECD: 30 OCT 15 41Z

BT

~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4938

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 235

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECVISIT. MEETING WITH BOURGUIBA

1. MY SCHEDULE AFTER ROME HAS BEGUN TO FORM UP AND I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO BOURGUIBA'S INVITATION TO VISIT TUNISIA BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON. THE BEST WE CAN MANAGE IS ABOUT FOUR HOURS MID-DAY ON NOVEMBER 9, LEAVING TIME FOR LUNCH AND A MEETING WITH BOURGUIBA ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON FROM MIDDLE EAST.

2. WOULD YOU CHECK THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF IT IS ACCEPTABLE. TELL BOURGUIBA HOW MUCH I AM LOOJING FORWARD TO HEARING HIS VIEWS OF RABAT AND HOW SORRY I AM THAT MY VISIT MUST BE SO BRIEF.

KISSINGER

BT

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HR 6/27/02

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 8810Q
RECD: 30 OCT 15 07Z

0 301159Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 22
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4725

BT

~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4939

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 238

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECVISIT: MEETING WITH USSEIN

1. I TOLD HUSSEIN DURING MY MOST RECENT VISIT THAT I WOULD RETURN TO AMMAN AFTER RABAT TO ASSESS WITH HIM THE RESULTS OF SUMMIT AND CONSIDER WHERE WE GO WITH NEGOTIATIONS. IN LIGHT OF PRELIMINARY INFORMATION WE HAVE ON WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED, THIS SEEMS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT. I WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE AMMAN THE NIGHT OF WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, FROM RIYADH AND DEPART LATE THE FOLLOWING MORNING.
2. PLEASE CHECK THIS PLAN WITH HUSSEIN AND LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IF HE AGREES. YOU SHOULD TELL HIM THAT I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO HAVING HIS VIEWS ON WHAT LIES AHEAD AND THAT HE CONTINUES TO HAVE OUR SUPPORT. YOU SHOULD ALSO GET ACROSS TO HIM DIPLOMATICALLY THAT HE SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY DEFINITIVE DECISIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA, ETC. UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TALK. (FYI: HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED OF CBS REPORT THAT HUSSEIN WILL BOYCOTT GENEVA CONFERENCE.)
3. WE WILL SEND YOU THE ITINERARY FOR MY MIDDLE EAST TRIP, WITH ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES, AS SOON AS CONFIRMATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.
KISSINGER
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#4939



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O 301157Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 27
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4723

CONTROL: 8783Q
RECD: 30 OCT 14 30Z

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~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4940

MODIS CHEROKEE

SECTO 236

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT

PLEASE TELL ALLON I AM TRYING TO AURN UP MY SCHEDULE FOR VISITING
THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER ROME. IF IT IS AGREEABLE TO GOI, I WOULD PLAN
TO ARRIVE IN ISRAEL THE EVENING OF THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7 FROM
DAMASCUS, AND TO DEPART THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON. I WOULD
APPRECIATE KNOWING SOONEST IF THIS IS CONVENIENT FOR GOI.

KISSINGER

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Department of State

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0 301158Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY DACCA

TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 28

INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4724

BT

CONTROL: 8797Q

RECD: 30 OCT 14 46Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DACCA 4941

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 237

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SEC VISIT: MESSAGE FOR FAHMY

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM ME TO FAHMY:

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR ISMAIL:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT FROM RABAT. IT OBVIOUSLY RAISES MANY QUESTIONS WHICH WE NEED TO DISCUSS, AND I WILL NOT TRY TO GO INTO THEM IN THIS MESSAGE. I AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO COME TO THE AREA AND WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S AND YOUR CONSIDERATION THAT I GO DIRECTLY TO CAIRO FROM ROME THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 5 AND DEPART EARLY THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 6. I WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT THE NIGHT OF MY ARRIVAL IF HE WISHES AND IF I ARRIVE AT A REASONABLE HOUR. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS SCHEDULE WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,
HENRY

END MESSAGE.

KISSINGER

BT

#4941



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HR 6/27/02

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O 301159Z OCT 74

CONTROL: 8815Q

FM AMEMBASSY DACCA

RECD: 30 OCT 15 38Z

TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 01

INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4726

BT

~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4942

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

SECTO 239

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT

PLEASE CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ASAD FROM ME THAT, NOW THAT RABAT SUMMIT IS OVER, I BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO FIRM UP MY PLANS FOR A QUICK VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING ROME WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE. IF PRESIDENT AGREES, I WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE IN DAMASCUS LATE IN THE MORNING THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, AND TO DEPART THAT AFTERNOON. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

KISSINGER

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#4942



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HR 6/27/02



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Department of State

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Z O 301225Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 28
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 23
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY DAMAASCUS FLASH 02
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY RIYADH FLASH 01
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS FLASH 30
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4728
BT

CONTROL: 8750Q
RECD: 30 OCT 13 08Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DACCA 4945

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

SECTO 241

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: SECVISIT

1. IN APPROACHING GOVERNMENT ON PROPOSED DATES FOR SEC VISIT
YOU SHOULD ENSURE THAT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU ARE DELIVERING
PERSONAL REPEAT PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY.

KISSINGER

BT
#4945

NOTE: NOT PASSED RIYADH POST CLOSED. 10/30/74



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HR 6/27/02

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O 301600Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4739
BT

CONTROL: 8889Q
RECD: 30 OCT 19 07Z

~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4956

NODIS CHEROKEE

SECTO 251

FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM GOMPERT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA IN UNSC

REF: BLANTYRE 1413

1. SECRETARY ASKED ME TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO REFTEL.
KISSINGER

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HR 6/27/02

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

DE RUEHCR #4975 3040240
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310130Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4758
BT
~~SECRET~~ DACCA 4975

CONTROL: 89970
RECD: 31 OCT '74, 9:32PM
30

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO ²⁶⁴~~4975~~

FOR EAGLEBURGER ONLY FROM THE SECRETARY

1. I WANT YOU TO TELL DINTZ THAT I AM ABSOLUTELY OUT-
RAGED BY ALLON'S LETTER AND DINTZ' ORAL MESSAGE. I
WANT YOU TO CONVEY THIS TO HIM WITH SOME HEAT, POINTING OUT
THAT I HAD TO PUSH THROUGH A NEGATIVE VOTE OVER THE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROTESTS OF OUR ENTIRE BUREAUCRACY.
IT IS ENTIRELY FALSE TO SAY WE WERE AMBIGUOUS WITH THE
EUROPEANS. WE WENT TO EVERY SINGLE COUNTRY ALLON SUGGESTED.
IN EACH CASE THE REPLY WAS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT ALLON
PREDICTED. IF THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THE EUROPEANS ON THIS, A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE.

2. TELL DINITZ I WILL NOT PUT UP WITH THIS KIND OF
INGRATITUDE AND SHORTSIGHTNESS ANY LONGER. HE
SHOULD KNOW THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN
WASHINGTON NOT JERUSALEM AND I DO NOT APPRECIATE HIS
GOVERNMENT'S CONSTANT HARASSMENT ANY LONGER.

3. I AM SENDING SCOWCROFT A MESSAGE ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

4. WITH RESPECT TO MY FORTHCOMING TRIP, DINTZ SHOULD
NOT TELL ME THE OBVIOUS. IT IS CLEAR THAT NO FINAL
DECISIONS CAN BE MADE AFTER THE RABAT SUMMIT. WE WILL
OBVIOUSLY NOT BRIEF THE PRESS IN AN UNPRODUCTIVE
DIRECTION.

5. MY SCHEDULE PROHIBITS ME FROM DOING THE
WEIZMANN INSTITUTE BEFORE NEXT MARCH AS I HAVE SAID
AT LEAST FIVE TIMES.

KISSINGER

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to
☐ Declassify in part and extend to
EO 12958, 25X () () ()
☒ Declassify ☐ After
☐ With concurrence ()
IPS by Walter Date 8/1/6
the 6/27/02



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11

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 016160

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Dacca (Cheslaw)
RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC
DESCRIPTION re rumors
CREATION DATE 03/22/1975
VOLUME 8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700046
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE Bangladesh - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/27/2002
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

REDACTED

2/4/10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 DACCA 01456 01 OF 02 221023Z

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COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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O 220745Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6180

CONTROL: 7027Q
RECD: MARCH 22, 1975

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 DACCA 1456/1

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 09-63, #4

CIA 11/25/10, State 11/21/10

By dal NARA, Date 3/17/10

NOOS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PFOR, BG, US, PINS, PINT
SUBJECT: COUP RUMORS

REF: STATE 03139

1. RELIABILITY OF REPORTS.

[REDACTED] REPORTS OF
LOW MORALE IN AIR FORCE AND ARMY HAVE BEEN CURRENT
FOR SOME TIME, AND SEVERAL [REDACTED] REPORTED
COUP PLOTS WITHIN THE MILITARY, BUT THESE REPORTS HAVE
SEEN WITHOUT DETAIL AND THUS COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS
INSUBSTANTIATED RUMORS.

2. LIKELIHOOD OF EFFORT. ASIDE FROM IMPATIENCE AND
FEAR THAT FURTHER DELAY COULD LEAD TO DISCOVERY, PLOTTER
APPARENT REASONS FOR WANTING TO MOVE AT THIS TIME ARE
THE DESIRE TO FORESTALL MUJIB'S CONSOLIDATION OF HIS
NEW NATIONAL PARTY, THE BAKSAL, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF
PRO-INDIAN AND PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS OF NAP/MUZAFFAR

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PAGE 02 DAUCA 01456 01 OF 02 221023Z

AND CPB IN POSITIONS OF POWER ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE DESIRE TO HEAD OFF WHAT PLOTTERS EXPECT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENT POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS, HOWEVER, REGARDING LIKELIHOOD OF A COUP ATTEMPT AT THIS TIME, BASED BOTH ON THE LIMITED SOURCE OF THE REPORTS AND THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. WHILE MUJIB HAS DONE NOTHING TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN BANGLADESH SINCE ESTABLISHING ONE-PARTY STATE, NEITHER HAS HE DONE ANYTHING YET DRASTICALLY REPRESSIVE OR FURTHER DAMAGING TO THE ECONOMY THAT WOULD SET STAGE FOR A COUP EFFORT. ALTHOUGH MOVING INTO ANOTHER SEASONAL PERIOD OF FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE AND DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS, BANGLADESH IS NOT SO FAR IN THE POSITION OF LAST FALL THAT CREATED CRISIS ATMOSPHERE AND ANGER AND FRUSTRATION AMONG THE PEOPLE.

B. MUJIB'S PACE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO BUY TIME AND KEEP COUNTRY GUESSING; SO FAR, BENGALIEES HAVE LARGELY ACQUIESCED IN CHANGE IN SYSTEM WHILE AWAITING EVIDENCE OF PRESIDENT'S REAL INTENTIONS. PRESENTLY HE IS CONCENTRATING ON BUILDING APPEARANCE OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH ATTEMPTING TO BROADEN BASE OF HIS BAKSAL PARTY TO INCLUDE OTHER POLITICAL AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS IN COUNTRY, POSSIBLY INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MILITARY.

C. ALTHOUGH MUJIB'S REPUTATION HAS GREATLY ERODED IN PAST THREE YEARS, HE IS STILL ONLY REAL NATIONAL POLITICAL FIGURE, PARTICULARLY IN HIS ROLE OF "FATHER OF THE NATION." HIS ASSUMPTION OF ALL POWER REMOVED THE OPTION OF BLAMING OTHERS FOR THE FAILURES OF HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT TWO OR THREE MONTHS HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTION TO REDOUND UPON HIM.

D. GIVEN ABOVE POINTS, WE QUESTION WHETHER RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE THE CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES NOW TO GO BEYOND PLANNING, HOWEVER SINCERE, TO PUT INTO EFFECT AN IRREVERSIBLE EFFORT, OR THE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO CONTROL AND TO RELY ON THEIR MANY COLLEAGUES UPON WHOM THE PLAN WOULD DEPEND FOR SUCCESS.

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PAGE 03 DACCA 01456 01 OF 02 221023Z

E. ANOTHER ELEMENT IN OUR DOUBTS IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT MUJIB, THROUGH HIS OWN OR INDIAN OR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, IS AWARE OF THE PLOTTING AND WOULD MOVE TO THWART IT. WE CANNOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MUJIB WOULD SIT UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE TO GAIN CLEARER PROOF AND THUS STRONGER GROUNDS FOR MORE STRINGENT CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AS FURTHER PROTECTION AGAINST "ENEMIES" AND "ANTI-SOCIAL ELEMENTS AND "ANTI-SOCIAL ELEMENTS"

3. ABILITY TO TAKE CONTROL OVER SHORT RUN. THE ARMY, IF UNITED, HAS THE FIREPOWER TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY OVER THE SHORT RUN, THEY NUMBER ABOUT 50,000 AND ARE EQUIPPED WITH TANKS, ARTILLERY, OTHER HEAVY WEAPONS, TRANSPORT, SUPPLIES, AND AMMUNITION, ONE FULL BRIGADE (FOUR BATTALIONS) PLUS ALL THIRTY F-54 TANKS OF THE FIRST BENGAL LANCERS ARE POSTED IN DACCA, AS IS ALL THE AIR FORCE WHICH ALLEGEDLY ALSO SUPPORTS THE COUP. FOUR ADDITIONAL ARMY BRIGADES (40,00 MEN) ARE POSTED IN OTHER KEY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE LARGEST OTHER ARMED FORCE, THE JATIYO RAKKHI BAHINI, ESTABLISHED BY MUJIB AS A PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION, HAS A TOTAL OF 16,000 MEN, AND THEY ARE LIGHTLY ARMED AND SPREAD RATHER THINLY AROUND THE COUNTRY. THEY WOULD BE NO MATCH THEMSELVES OR IN CONCERT WITH ANOTHER GROUP SUCH AS THE POLICE OF THE BANGLADESH RIFLES IF THE ARMY WERE UNITED AGAINST THEM. THE KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL COUP, ONCE MUJIB WAS IN CUSTODY, WOULD BE THE UNITY OF THE ARMY. IF THE INHERENT FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE ARMY PREVENTED A CONCERTED EFFORT OR LED TO A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS TAKING NEUTRAL OR LOYALIST POSITIONS, THEN IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PLOTTERS COULD GAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL. IF THE PLOTTERS DO HOLD THE ARMY TOGETHER AND GET SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH THE COUP, THE BENGALIEE PUBLIC WILL BE AWED AND INTIMIDATED & THEIR SUCCESS AND THOUGH HOPES FOR BETTER THINGS, WILL PROBABLY OFFER THE JUNTA A GRACE PERIOD.

4. CONSEQUENCES FOR ARMY CONTROL IF MUJIB REMOVED. WERE MUJIB TO BE KILLED IN A KIDNAP ATTEMPT, HIS DEATH MIGHT THROW THE PLOTTERS INTO DISARRAY INITIALLY. IF THE

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 DACCA 01456 01 OF 02 221020Z

COUP GOES ON AND SUCCEEDS, HIS DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT
WOULD SERVE AS A RALLYING POINT FOR MUJIB'S ACTIVISTS

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PAGE 01 DACCA 01456 02 OF 02 221034Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

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O 220745Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6181

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION 2 OF 2 DACCA 1456/2

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PARTY CADRES, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD BE NO MATCH FOR THE ARMY AND WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY HARASSMENT AND TERRORIST HIT-AND-RUN TECHNIQUES. AS IN 1971, THE CHIEF LEADERS OF THE RULING PARTY WOULD PROBABLY FLEE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE IF NOT TO INDIA. AS FOR THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, NEWS OF MUJIB'S DEATH MIGHT AROUSE SOME OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE APATHY WITH WHICH THEY GREET MOST POLITICAL EVENTS, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY MOB ACTION WOULD AFFECT THE ARMY'S CONTROL IN THE SHORT TERM UNLESS MILITARY DISCIPLINE BROKE DOWN AND CROWDS WERE FIRED UPON. IF MUJIB WERE KILLED OR JAILED IN A RELATIVELY DISCIPLINED TAKEOVER, THEN THE ARMY WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS PRELIMINARY CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, HIS DEATH WOULD SOONER OR LATER BE USED BY HIS FOLLOWERS AND OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIETS, IN THE SAME WAY THAT ALLENDE'S DEATH WAS USED, I.E., HE WOULD BECOME A "MARTYR FOR THE SOCIALISTS."

5. IF HE WERE EXILED, HOWEVER, MUJIB WOULD BE A PROBLEM FOR THE JUNTA AND PROBABLY FOR THE INDIANS TO WHOM HE IS LIKELY TO TURN FOR ASSISTANCE IN REGAINING THE COUNTRY. AT A MINIMUM, MUJIB AS THE LEADER IN EXILE OF THE "PATRIOTIC SOCIALIST FORCES" WITHIN THE COUNTRY (OR DEAD AS A MARTYR) COULD SERVE TO DRUM UP A GAMRAGE OF THIRD WORLD PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR AGENTS IN BANGLADESH WHO WOULD ALLEGEDLY HAVE OUSTED HIM. [REDACTED] THE COUP PLOTTERS ARE AWARE OF THE DAMAGE MUJIB COULD DO TO THEIR GAINING ACCEPTANCE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





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PAGE 02 JACCA 01456 02 OF 02 221034Z

INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY AND THUS DO NOT, AT THIS TIME, PLAN TO EXILE THE SHEIKH.

6. MUJIB AND COOPERATION. THREE MONTHS AGO, THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT MUJIB WOULD COOPERATE WITH, IF NOT CO-OPT, COUP PLOTTERS IN ESTABLISHING A MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION. THEN HE COULD HAVE JUSTIFIED IT AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF A CORRUPT AND UNCONTROLLABLE AWAMI LEAGUE AND BUREAUCRACY THAT HAD FAILED HIM. NOW HE HAS DEPRIVED HIMSELF OF THAT OPTION; ONLY THREE MONTHS AFTER HIS TAKING ALL POWERS INTO HIS OWN HANDS HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT ANY COUP ATTEMPT WOULD UNMISTAKABLY BE DIRECTED AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY. THE SHEIKH WOULD BE HARD PUT TO JUSTIFY TO HIMSELF COOPERATING AFTER THE FACT IN A POWER PLAY THAT CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS A REPUDIATION OF HIS OWN RULE. WHILE MUJIB MAY PREFER, ONCE MORE, TO ASSUME THE MARTYR'S ROLE, HE CANNOT PRECLUDE THAT HE HAS BECOME SO ACCUSTOMED TO THE PANOPLY OF OFFICE THAT HE MIGHT AGREE TO PLAY A FIGUREHEAD ROLE.

7. IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OR DISCOVERY. SHOULD AN ATTEMPT FAIL, THE MILITARY WOULD BE PURGED QUICKLY, FULL EMERGENCY POWERS WOULD LIKELY BE INVOKED TO ROUND UP SUSPECTED CIVILIAN SYMPATHIZERS, AND THE POSITION OF THE LEFTISTS GREATLY STRENGTHENED. MUJIB IS UNLIKELY TO SEE A COUP ATTEMPT SIMPLY AS A DOMESTIC AFFAIR AND WOULD CALL IT ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF FOREIGN CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE OF BANGLADESH. SUCH A DIRECT ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW HIM WOULD BRING HIS AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES TO FULL FLOWER AND HE WOULD USE THE INCIDENT TO INCREASE HIS CONTROLS OVER THE COUNTRY AND PUSH THE RHETORIC OF HIS SECOND REVOLUTION. SHOULD THE PLOT BE DISCOVERED BEFOREHAND, THE REACTION OF MUJIB AND HIS ADVISORS WOULD ESSENTIALLY FOLLOW THE SAME PATTERN, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MUJIB WOULD NOT WANT TO PUBLICIZE THE PLOT BECAUSE IT WOULD REFLECT UPON HIS CONTROL. HE IS MORE LIKELY TO QUIETLY JAIL THE PLOTTERS AND MOVE TO VET THE ARMY POLITICALLY AND ESTABLISH GREATER CONTROL OVER IT.

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PAGE 03 Dacca 01455 02 OF 02 221034Z

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR USG POLICIES.

A. ASSUMPTION: NO COUP ATTEMPT, OR PLOT DISCOVERED; NO PUBLICITY, NO SIGNIFICANT POLICY SIMPLICATIONS.

B. ASSUMPTION: UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT. AS MENTIONED IN PARA SEVEN, MUJIB AND HIS ADVISORS WILL LIKELY LABEL THE ATTEMPT THE WORK OF AGENTS OF FOREIGN IMPERIALISM OUT TO DESTROY BANGLADESH. MUJIB WOULD PROBABLY GIVE FAIRLY FREE REIGN TO HIS BAKSAL WORKERS TO "ATTACK" THE "IMPERIALIST" CONSPIRACY, VERY LIKELY SPECIFICALLY BLAMING THE PAKISTANIS. WHETHER MUJIB PERMITS ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES WOULD DEPEND UPON THE ASCENDANCY OF HIS LEFTIST ADVISORS IN THE AFTERMATH AND THE EXTENT OF HIS EMOTIONAL RESPONSE. WE DOUBT THAT MUJIB ON REFLECTION WOULD WANT TO JEOPARDIZE THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BY TRYING TO FABRICATE ANY DIRECT US-PAKISTANI LINK TO A COUP ATTEMPT. SHOULD HE KEEP SUCH RHETORIC WITHIN BOUNDS AND NOT PERMIT MUCH OVERT PROTEST BY YOUTH OR STUDENT CADRES AGAINST US, THEN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP SHOULD NOT MATERIALLY AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. SHOULD MUJIB, HOWEVER, INSTITUTE A PROGRAM OF WIDESPREAD AND RUTHLESS REPRISALS AGAINST PERCEIVED "TRAITORS" IN BANGLADESH, IT WOULD CALL FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF OUR CONTINUING ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AT CURRENT LEVELS. IF MUJIB WERE LOST IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP, US MIGHT BE MORE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BECAUSE A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LESS ABLE TO RESTRAIN AN ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN THAT LEFTIST ELEMENTS MIGHT LAUNCH.

C. ASSUMPTION: SUCCESSFUL COUP. PROVIDED THE COUP IS A QUICK AND RELATIVELY BLOODLESS ONE AND INTERNAL STABILITY IS MAINTAINED, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP OUR HEADS DOWN AND COPE WITH THE INEVITABLE SPECULATION THAT THE JUNTA IS "PRO-AMERICAN". WE WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID OVER-IDENTIFICATION WITH A RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD VERY SOON WANT TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. WE COULD CONTINUE OFFERING ASSISTANCE TO A NEW GOVERNMENT ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AS WE DID WITH THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT

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PAGE 04 Dacca 01456 02 OF 02 221034Z

BANGLADESH IN 1972.

O. ASSUMPTION: PROLONGED OR INDECISIVE ATTEMPT, AMERICAN INTERESTS OF PROMOTING STABILITY IN BANGLADESH AND THE SUBCONTINENT WOULD BE MOST ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF THE COUP NEITHER SUCCEEDED NOR FAILED, BUT LET TO A PERIOD OF UPHEAVAL THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE INDIANS TO INTERVENE. CHESLAW

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FM AMEMBASSY DACCA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8531

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DACCA 5293

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PFOR, BG, IN

SUBJECT: PLEA FOR HELP FROM PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE AHMED

1. PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE AHMED TELEPHONED ME AT 0810 AND WE HAD THE FOLLOWING BRIEF CONVERSATION. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, AS I KNEW, THERE WAS SOME TROUBLE. MOSHARRAF HAD DONE IT, HE SAID. I ASKED IF MOSHARRAF HAD SUCCEEDED AND THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT MOSHARRAF WANTED TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THERE WERE TWO OR THREE OTHER POINTS. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THERE WAS NO HARM IN THIS - LET HIM COME AND TALK TO ME (THE PRESIDENT). THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT MOSHARRAF HAS NOT DONE THAT BUT WAS MAKING A SHOW OF STRENGTH WITH THE MIGS. WHEN I ASKED IF MOSHARRAF HAD ALL THE MIGS UNDER HIS CONTROL, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE HAD ONE MIG WHICH WE HAD UNDOUBTEDLY HEARD FLYING OVER THE CITY. HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE HELPING MOSHARRAF AND THAT THE INDIANS MIGHT BE HELPING AS WELL. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE RIGHT LANGUAGE WAS OR WHAT TO REQUEST OF US, BUT HE WANTED NO BLOODSHED. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO FIRING AS YET. HOWEVER, THERE WERE OPPOSITION TROOPS AT SAVAR TOWER (THE MAIN TRANSMITTER OF RADIO BANGLADESH) AND IT WAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL. I ASKED IF THE BASIC SITUATION WAS STILL UNDER HIS (THE PRESIDENT'S) CONTROL, AND THE PRESIDENT REPLIED "IF I CAN CLAIM THAT." HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO IN THIS SITUATION BUT IN THINKING OF THE FRIENDS OF BANGLA

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HR 6/27/02

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
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☐ With concurrence
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DESH HE HAD THOUGHT OF ME AND HAD DECIDED TO CALL AND LET ME KNOW OF THE SITUATION. HE CONCLUDED: "IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU CAN DO, I LEAVE THE MATTER TO YOU." I REPLIED THAT I WAS EVEN AT THE MOMENT MEETING WITH MY SENIOR STAFF TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AND WE WERE OF COURSE IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON. I CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY WISHING THE PRESIDENT GOOD LUCK.

2. WHILE HIS MANNER WAS LOW-KEY, THE PRESIDENT'S HIGHLY AGITATED STATE WAS BETRAYED BY A STUTTERING WHICH IS NOT NOTICEABLE DURING HIS NORMAL CONVERSATION.

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAS IDENTIFIED THE SOVIETS AS ALLIED WITH MOSHARRAF, AND HAS EXPRESSED HIS SUSPICION OF INDIAN INVOLVEMENT, WE AS YET HAVE NO OTHER INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THIS, ALTHOUGH SUCH POSSIBILITIES CLEARLY CANNOT BE DISMISSED. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER BEING IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET AND INDIAN GOVERNMENTS ATNLEAST TO SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION HERE AND TO INDICATE THE DESIRABILITY FOR RES- TRAIT ON ALL SIDES.

3. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
BOSTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 016161

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Dacca (Boster)
RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC
DESCRIPTION possible request for asylum
CREATION DATE 11/03/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700046
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE Bangladesh - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/27/2002
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

*open with portions exempted
State Dept Review 8/2/00
HR 6/27/02*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY Dacca
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8534

~~SECRET~~ Dacca 5304

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PINT, PINS, SREF, BG

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR ASYLUM FOR PRESIDENT MOSHTAGUE AHMED,
AND PERHAPS OTHERS IN PRESIDENT'S RETINUE

1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT, MAHBULE ALAM CHASHI, CALLED ME AT 1420 LOCAL TIME TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED HIM TO INQUIRE WHETHER, IF SITUATION SHOULD SO DEMAND, "CERTAIN PERSONS IN BANGLADESH" COULD BE GIVEN ASYLUM. WOULD THAT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, HE ASKED.

2. I SAID IT WAS NOT OUR USUAL PRACTICE TO GRANT ASYLUM OVERSEAS AND THUS COULD NOT GIVE HIM AN ENCOURAGING REPLY. IN VIEW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND AS HE WAS CALLING AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, I SAID I COULD NOT GIVE A FINAL REPLY BUT WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

3. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT TIME IS MOVING VERY FAST AND THEY ARE IN AN AWKWARD POSITION. I ASKED WHAT THE TIMING WAS AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IF AT ALL IT HAS TO BE SOME TIME THIS EVENING -- BY SUNDOWN (0618 WASHINGTON TIME, NOVEMBER 3).

4. THE SECRETARY ADVISED THAT BEYOND THE TWO MAJORS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ALSO WISH TO FOLLOW THEIR COURSE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED with portions

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *6/27/00**State Dept. Review 8/24/00*

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PAGE 02 DACCA 05304 030954Z

I ASKED HIM TO REPEAT THAT AND THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF MAY WISH TO ACT AT THE SAME TIME AND REQUEST ASYLUM, AS WELL AS SOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S COLLEAGUES.

5. SECRETARY CHASHI CALLED ME BACK AT 7425 TO CLARIFY THE FOLLOWING POINT. HE SAID THE ARRANGMENTS DESCRIBED TO ME WERE CONDITIONAL ON A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE FORCES WITH WHOM THEY WERE NEGOTIATING. HE EXPLAINED, PARTLY IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTIONS, THE WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND WAS TEMPORARY ACCOMODATION WITHIN THE PROTECTION OF OUR MISSION, FOLLOWED BY A TRANSFER TO A THIRD COUNTRY WHICH NEED NOT BE THE UNITED STATES -- HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THE U.K. TO MY QUESTION WHETHER THEY WERE MAKING THIS REQUEST OF ANY OTHER POWER, HE SAID THEY WERE NOT. HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN MINDFUL OF OUR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST AND WERE THEREFORE TURNING TO US. I WARNED HIM THAT TIME WAS EXTREMELY SHORT TO HANDLE SUCH A REQUEST BUT WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS SOON AS I COULD.

6. PLEASE INSTRUCT IMMEDIATELY. I SHOULD IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE SOME KIND OF REPLY WITHIN THE NEXT THREE HOURS.
BOSTER

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 016162

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Dacca (Boster)
RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC
DESCRIPTION possible request for asylum
CREATION DATE 11/03/1975
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700046
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE Bangladesh - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/27/2002
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 016163

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Dacca (Boster)
RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC
DESCRIPTION possible request for asylum
CREATION DATE 11/03/1975
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700046
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE Bangladesh - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/27/2002
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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State Dept Review 8/2/00
HJR 6/27/02*

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT, PINS, SRDJ, BG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR ASYLUM

REF: Dacca 5304, Dacca 5310, Dacca 5311

1. IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN REPTELS CONCERNING EVACUATION OF MILITARY FIGURES TO BANGKOK, I CALLED PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY CHASHI AT 2030 TO ASK IF REQUEST TO ME ABOUT ASYLUM HAD NOT BEEN OVERTAKEN BY ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT BY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. CHASHI REPLIED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THERE WAS STILL OUTSTANDING THE QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE DESIRE TO REQUEST ASYLUM THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ME. HE SAID HE WOULD REPEAT THAT ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD ONLY BE THE RESULT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE "AUTHORITIES WHO RULE THIS COUNTRY." WHEN I SAID I WAS STRUCK BY HIS USE OF THE LANGUAGE "THE AUTHORITIES WHO RULE THIS COUNTRY," HE SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CLARIFY THIS FURTHER BUT THE POINT WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EMBARRASSMENT TO US FROM ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.

2. I THEREFORE STILL NEED INSTRUCTIONS SOONEST FOR THE PORTION OF THE ORIGINAL REQUEST AFFECTING THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR HELPING THE PRESIDENT WITH HIS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: [signature] NARA, DATE 6/27/02
State Dept. Review 8/2/00

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PAGE 02 DACCA 05312 031621Z

ASYLUM ARRANGEMENTS,
BOSTER.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 016164

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME Amembassy Dacca (Boster)
RECEIVER'S NAME Secstate WashDC
DESCRIPTION asylum request
CREATION DATE 11/04/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032700046
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA
BOX NUMBER 2
FOLDER TITLE Bangladesh - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/27/2002
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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~~SECRET~~ DACCA 5322

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT, PINS, SREF, BG
SUBJ: ASYLUM REQUEST FOR PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE

REF: STATE 259786

1. I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO REACH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT, MAHBOULE ALAM CHASHI, AT 11:30 TODAY TO INFORM HIM THAT USG WAS CONSIDERING HIS REQUEST AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER HE HAD ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER THANKING ME FOR OUR HELP IN FACILITATING THE SPECIAL FLIGHT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BANGKOK, CHASHI SAID THAT THEY STILL HOPED FOR OUR POSITIVE REPLY TO THEIR REQUEST FOR THE PRESIDENT IF HE WERE TO WISH TO FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE. HE ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE ONE OR TWO OTHER TOP OFFICIALS WHO MIGHT BE INCLUDED WITH THE PRESIDENT, IDENTIFYING THEM, WHEN I ASKED, AS GENERAL USMANY, DEFENSE ADVISOR, AND MAJOR GENERAL M. KHALI RAHMAN, CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF.

2. CHASHI REPEATED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY TO THE US THAT THE PARTY WOULD WISH TO MOVE AND THAT IT LOOKED MORE AND MORE LIKE THE UK, WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE TO GO AT ALL, HE ADDED, DEPENDS ON FURTHER CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS AND HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT EVENTS WERE MOVING IN A DIRECTION WHICH WOULD PROBABLY NOT REQUIRE THEM TO UTILIZE ANY OFFER OF ASSISTANCE SUCH AS THEY HAVE SOUGHT FROM US. NEVERTHELESS, THEY MIGHT

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Dept. Review*
BY *HR*, DATE *6/27/02* *8/21/00*

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STILL NEED IT AND WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR US TO EXPEDITE OUR REPLY WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD BE FAVORABLE. THIS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO THEM, HE SAID, AT THIS STAGE OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, CHASHI SAID, THEY WOULD LIKE (1) THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING BROUGHT TEMPORARILY TO OUR DIPLOMATIC ENCLAVE -- ALTHOUGH THE NEED FOR THIS MIGHT BE VERY SLIGHT SINCE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPARTURE WOULD BE PART OF A SETTLEMENT WITH THE OTHER PARTY -- AND (2) ASSISTANCE IN FLYING OUT TO A THIRD COUNTRY, I.E., A U.S. PLANE. TO MY QUESTION ABOUT ACCOMPANYING FAMILY MEMBERS, CHASHI SAID THE PRESIDENT MIGHT BE ACCOMPANIED BY ONE OR TWO OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF, GENERAL USMANY WOULD BE ALONE, AND THAT GENERAL RAHMAN WOULD BRING HIS FAMILY.

4. I ASKED CHASHI IF HE CONSIDERED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LIFE WAS IN ANY DANGER AT PRESENT (HAVING IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF TEMPORARY REFUGE IN THE EMBASSY). AFTER A MOMENT OF UNCERTAINTY, CHASHI SAID IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SAY BUT THAT DID NOT THINK THE DANGER WAS VERY HIGH AT THE PRESENT TIME. I SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE IN TOUCH WITH ME IF IT REACHED A POINT WHERE THE PRESIDENT'S LIFE WAS BELIEVED IN DANGER, HE SAID HE WOULD.

5. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD ADVISE WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY OF OUR CONVERSATION AND THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF HE WOULD CALL ME IMMEDIATELY IF THEIR REQUEST WERE TO BE OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS HERE, HE SAID HE WOULD.

6. COMMENT. TO RESPOND TO THE POINTS RAISED IN REFTL, I NO LONGER BELIEVE THAT AN OFFER OF ASYLUM IS ESSENTIAL TO AVERT WIDESPREAD BLOODSHED SINCE THE EVACUATION OF [REDACTED] MILITARY PERSONNEL HAS DEFUSED THE SITUATION, SO ACUTE YESTERDAY, TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE. OBVIOUSLY I CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LIFE MAY NOT YET BE ENDANGERED, ALTHOUGH THIS LOOKS LESS AND LESS LIKELY. I AM NOT INCLINED, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO BELIEVE THAT OUR OFFER TO HELP WOULD BE A SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT TO US IN BANGLADESH'S INTERNAL POLITICS AS THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE NEW AUTHORITIES.

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DEPARTMENT'S QUESTION ABOUT NUMBERS INVOLVED HAS BEEN ANSWERED BY THE PRIOR EVACUATION OF THE MAIN GROUP AND CHASHI'S INDICATION THAT ONLY THREE PRINCIPALS ARE BEING CONSIDERED AT PRESENT.

7. IN SUM, I BELIEVE THAT THE DISADVANTAGES OF RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST FOR HELP FROM A PRESIDENT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ARE ACCEPTABLE AND RECOMMEND A POSITIVE REPLY. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE MOST WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO PROVIDE IS AN AIRCRAFT TO FLY THE PARTY TO ITS DESTINATION AND THE CHANCES THAT WE WOULD NEED TO DO EVEN THAT ARE BEGINNING TO APPEAR SLIM. I HOPE I CAN HAVE IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS.
BOSTER

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EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: DIPINT, PINS, SREF, BG
SUBJ: ASYLUM REQUEST

REF: DACCA 5322

CHASHI TELEPHONED ME AT 1830 LOCAL TIME AND ASKED IF I HAD RECEIVED FURTHER REPLY YET TO THEIR REQUEST. I SAID I HAD NOT. REFERRING THEN TO OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD KEEP ME INFORMED OF MATERIAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION, HE SAID THAT DEVELOPMENTS WERE NOW AT A STAGE WHERE ASSISTANCE WAS NOT REQUIRED AT THE PRESENT TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE UNLESS THE SITUATION WERE TO DETERIORATE. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, THEY WOULD STILL LIKE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE THE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IF NECESSARY. I SAID I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME.
BOSTER



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HR 6/27/02

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: SREF, PINS, PINT, US, BG
SUBJECT: ASYLUM REQUEST FOR PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE

REF: STATE 261785; DACCA 5322; DACCA 5331

1. I TELEPHONED THE PRESIDENT AT 13:30 LOCAL TIME TODAY BUT SPOKE TO CHASHI INSTEAD WHEN HE TOLD ME IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REACH THE PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME. DRAWING ON REFTEL, I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS PERSONAL WELFARE, THAT WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD AVOID BLOODSHED APPEARED POSSIBLE, AND THAT PRESIDENT MOSHTAQUE WOULD BE WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES IF HE DESIRED TO GO THERE. I TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THE CONVERSATION CHASHI AND I HAD YESTERDAY, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY REFUGE WITHIN EMBASSY TO THE PRESIDENT IF HIS LIFE SHOULD APPEAR TO BE IN IMMINENT DANGER. I SAID FURTHER THAT IF A RESOLUTION WERE NEGOTIATED WHICH INCLUDED SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, WE WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO OFFER THE ASSISTANCE OF ADMITTING THE PRESIDENT AND A SMALL NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICIALS TO OUR DIPLOMATIC ENCLAVE TEMPORARILY BEFORE THEY LEFT BANGLADESH.

2. CHASHI SAID HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THESE ASSURANCES

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PAGE 02 DAGCA 05356 051041Z

AND REPEATED THAT ANY OF THESE ARRANGEMENT WOULD "ALWAYS BE PART OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL KEEP YOU AWAY FROM EMBARRASSMENT, AND ALSO NATURALLY US." HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN FOREVER GRATEFUL FOR OUR GENEROUS RESPONSE.

3. I ASKED CHASHI WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE OUTLOOK. HIS RESPONSE WAS CAUTIOUS AND RESTRAINED. HE SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING NORMAL BUT THAT A FEW MORE THINGS WERE YET TO BE SETTLED. I ASKED WHEN HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION WOULD BE NORMALIZED AND HE SIMPLY REPLIED THAT "EVERY LITTLE STEP MUST BE TAKEN BEFORE WE CAN SAY." WAS HE SATISFIED THAT THINGS WERE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, I ASKED, AND HE REPLIED THAT THAT DEPENDED ON A DEFINITION OF THE "RIGHT DIRECTION." HE SAID THAT THINGS WERE SETTLING DOWN AND THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS AND TO SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS, A RESPONSE WHICH I TOOK TO MEAN THAT HE THOUGHT A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS WAS PROBABLY NEAR BUT THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT INCLUDE MOSHTAGUE'S RETENTION OF THE POWER HE WAS EXERCISING BEFORE NOVEMBER 3.

4. I ASKED HIM FINALLY WHETHER HE STILL FELT, AS HE HAD YESTERDAY, THAT THEY WOULD NOT NEED TO UTILIZE THE FACILITIES THEY WERE REQUESTING OF US, AND HE SAID HE DID.

5. COMMENT. CHASHI DID NOT RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND I DID NOT REFER TO IT EITHER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHASHI WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE FORTHCOMING RESPONSE WE HAVE MADE, AS THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO BE.
BOSTER

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, BG

SUBJECT: CONFIRMATION OF ZIAUR RAHMAN'S CONTROL

1. MAHSULE ALAM CHASHI CALLED AMBASSADOR AT 0630 HOURS THIS MORNING, NOVEMBER 7, TO SAY THAT, AS WE KNEW, GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN HAS TAKEN CHARGE AS MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR. HE SAID THE FIGHTING WAS OVER, THE FORCES OF ZIAUR RAHMAN WERE IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE CITY, AND THE FIRINGS TO BE HEARD NOW WERE CELEBRATORY.

2. CHASHI ALSO SAID THAT KHANQAKER MOSHTAQUDUAHMED HAS BEEN TAKEN TO THE RADIO STATION WHERE HE WAS CONSULTING WITH FORCES LOYAL TO ZIAUR WHO WERE ASKING HIM TO RESUME THE PRESIDENCY. HE HAD NOT YET REACHED A DECISION.

3. HE ADDED THAT, IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, THERE WOULD BE REPERCUSSIONS AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THEREFORE WANTED US TO BE INFORMED.

4. DEPARTMENT MAY PASS AS DESIRED.
BOSTER

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FOR SECRETARY FROM BOSTER

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, IN, BG
SUBJECT: BDG REQUEST OF USG SUPPORT

REF: STATE 265069

1. I TELEPHONED THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY CHASHI AT 0935 NOVEMBER 8 AND GAVE HIM RESPONSE PROVIDED IN REFTEL (HE PREFERRED THAT I GIVE IT TO HIM BY PHONE IN THE INTEREST OF SPEED). HE SAID HE WOULD COMMUNICATE OUR REPLY IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD MAKE NO FURTHER RESPONSE AT THIS TIME.

2. I ASKED WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT THE SITUATION TODAY. WAS IT CALM? CHASHI SAID YES, IT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN WHEN WE HAD TALKED YESTERDAY BUT THAT THEY WERE STILL KEEPING CLOSE WATCH INTERNALLY AND WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE OUR ATTEMPTS TO INFORM INDIA AND PAKISTAN OF THEIR CONCERN AND ALSO OF THEIR MOTIVATION BEHIND THIS CONCERN, WHICH WAS EXCLUSIVELY INTERNAL. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO AVOID INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS IN NEW DELHI WHICH MIGHT DISTURB THE FEELINGS OF THE PEOPLE IN BANGLADESH. HE SAID THAT ANY WORDS USED BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT, ITS SPOKESMEN, OR BY THE PRESS IN INDIA, WHICH BECAME KNOWN HERE, WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD

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PAGE 02 DACCA 05417 080710Z

ISSUED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD IN NO WAY IMPAIRED THE SECURITY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY OF ANY FOREIGN NATIONAL LIVING IN BANGLADESH. HE SAID THIS STATEMENT HAD BEEN ISSUED BECAUSE THE INDIAN RADIO IN NEW DELHI AND CALCUTTA HAD QUOTED OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN ON THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BANGLADESH.

3. I ASKED IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE PRESS TODAY THAT PRESIDENT SAYEM HAD TAKEN OVER FROM GENERAL ZIA AS CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR HAD AFFECTED THE EQUATION OR HAD DEPARTED FROM THE SENSE OF THE STATEMENT HE HAD GIVEN ME YESTERDAY ABOUT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BEING THE RESULT OF STRONG SUPPORT FROM ALL THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CONCERNED. CHASHI REPLIED THAT THIS CHANGE ONLY CONFIRMED THE STATEMENT HE HAD MADE TO ME YESTERDAY, THAT THIS WAS WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND ALL ALONG. HE ADDED THAT EVERYTHING THAT HE HAD TOLD ME WAS NOW PUBLIC AND THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOW KNOWN TO THE WORLD, AND IT WAS EXACTLY AS THEY HAD INTENDED.

4. DCM HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MAKING PARALLEL RESPONSE TO ACTING FOREIGN SECRETARY WHO EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT WITH OUR RESPONSE AND HIS PROFOUND GRATITUDE.

5. WE WILL BE COMMENTING IN SEPARATE MESSAGE ON SITUATION HERE TODAY BUT ESSENTIALLY THE ATMOSPHERE IS CALM AND THE APPEARANCE OF THE CITY, AFTER YESTERDAY'S WILD DAY, IS NORMAL.

6. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO NEW DELHI AND ISLAMABAD.

BOSTER

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EO 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: KOR, IN, BG

SUBJ: STATUS REPORT FROM PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY

REF: STATE'S 265269 ; DACCA'S 5417

SUMMARY: CHASHI HAS PROVIDED RESPONSE TO OUR STATEMENT TO HIM YESTERDAY

(REFTELS) IN WHICH HE HAS INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH OUR ASSESSMENT AND INFORMED US OF STEPS THEY HAVE TAKEN TO REASSURE THE INDIANS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE HINDU MINORITIES. HE HAS OFFERED A MODERATELY ENCOURAGINGESTIMATE OF IMPROVING SITUATION IN DACCA TODAY, SUGGESTING THAT REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT LOWER MILITARY RANKS BEING OUT OF CONTROL WERE TRUER YESTERDAY THAN TODAY. FINALLY, HE HAS ADVISED US OF INTENTION TO DISCUSS BOG'S CONCERN ABOUT CONTINUING ATTACKS ON BANGLADESH RIFLES GUARD POST ON INDIAN BORDER IN MYMENSIGH DISTRICT WITH INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER THIS AFTERNOON. END SUMMARY

1. WHEN I CALLED CHASHI AT 1345 TODAY (NOVEMBER 9) FOR A STATUS REPORT ON SITUATION HERE, HE FIRST GAVE ME FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO STATEMENT I HAD PROVIDED HIM YESTERDAY IN REPLY TO THEIR REQUEST FOR OUR SUPPORT: "WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE ACTIONS YOU HAVE TAKEN. WE AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE STEPS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY. EFFECTIVELY, WE HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND HINDU MINORITIES. WE ARE INFORMING THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE STEPS TAKEN AND ALSO THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY THROUGH OUR HIGH COMMISSION. THESE STEPS ARE, FIRST, WE HAVE INCREASED SECURITY IN

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PAGE 02 DACCA 05425 791136Z

AREAS WHERE MINORITIES LIVE, THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS IN DACCA, AND WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF ANY INCIDENT WHICH WOULD AFFECT COMMUNAL HARMONY. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN GLAD TO SEE THAT OUR SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ABOUT THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO THREAT TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HERE HAS BEEN CARRIED BY ALL-INDIA RADIO. WE HAVE ALSO SENT A REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN TO THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IMMEDIATELY AFTER ZIA HAD ANNOUNCED HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE TEMPORARILY AS CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR TO REASSURE THEM THAT THE EVENTS WERE ENTIRELY INTERNAL AND SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY

AFFECT OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH OUR GREAT NEIGHBOR. THE TELEPHONES OF SOME OF THE STAFF MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSION, WHICH HAD BEEN OUT OF ORDER, WERE ESPECIALLY RESTORED IN A SPECIAL EFFECT ON THEIR BEHALF, WHILE MANY OF OUR OWN PHONES REMAIN OUT OF ORDER."

2. I SAID I WAS PLEASED TO KNOW THAT THEY AGREED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT AND PARTICULARLY TO KNOW OF THE STEPS THEY HAD TAKEN, WHICH SHOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. I INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AT A HIGH LEVEL YESTERDAY ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE HARMFUL EFFECT IN PRESENT EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE AND I THOUGHT THIS POINT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD. CHASHI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS.

3. AS FOR PRESENT INTERNAL SITUATION, CHASHI SAID IT REMAINED THE SAME. THE PEOPLE IN THE ARMY WHO HAD COME OUT YESTERDAY HAD FOR THE MOST PART GONE BACK TO THEIR UNITS AND MORE WERE RETURNING. THE CURFEW

LAST NIGHT HAD BEEN USED TO CHECK THOSE MILITARY PEOPLE WHO HAD NOT RETURNED. "APART FROM POLITICS, THERE WAS A LOT OF PURELY PERSONAL MISCHIEF AND THE SETTling OF OLD SCORES, RESULTING IN A LOT OF LOCAL LAW AND ORDER PROBLEMS. I SAID THIS WAS WHAT HAD PROMPTED MY CALL AS I HAD BEGUN TO RECEIVE REPORTS THAT THE LOWER RANKS MIGHT BE OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS WERE BEING HELD. CHASHI INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT WHAT I WAS DESCRIBING HAD APPLIED TO YESTERDAY. AS OF THIS MORNING, HE SAID, THE SITUATION WAS RETURNING TO NORMAL. THE MILITARY CHIEFS HAD BEEN GOING AROUND FROM GROUP TO GROUP AND WERE FINDING REASSURING RESULTS. HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION WAS WELL UNDER CONTROL NOW BUT THEY WOULD BE LOOKING AT IT AGAIN THIS EVENING."

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PAGE 03 DACCA 05425 091156Z

4. CHASHI ADDED THAT THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER SAMAR SEN, WAS CALLING ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON AND HE WOULD TELL SEN THAT THEY WERE A LITTLE DISTURBED ABOUT FIRING WHICH HAD BEEN GOING ON AGAINST ONE OF THEIR BANGLADESH RIFLES GUARD POST AT HALUAGHAT IN MYMENSINGH DISTRICT FOR A FEW DAYS. THIS FIRING HAD BEEN INTENSIFIED IN THE LAST DAY OR TWO; THEY HOPED IT WAS A LOCAL MATTER BUT THEY WOULD BRING IT TO SEN'S NOTICE, INDICATING THAT ANY SUCH INTENSIFICATION WAS CONTRARY TO THE EFFORTS WHICH BEING MADE TO BRING ABOUT STABILITY. CHASHI ADDED THAT THERE WERE ALSO INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE BUT THEY WERE NOT MAJOR.

5. I TOLD CHASHI THAT I HOPED HE WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ME WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINED UNEASY AND HE SAID THEY WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR INFORMATION WITH US AS WE ALSO SHARED THE SAME GOAL OF RESTORING STABILITY TO THE COUNTRY.

6. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH PASS TO NEW DELHI AND ISLAMABAD.
BOSTER

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