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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

R 190709Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2693
BT
~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 5195

CONTROL: 4 8 3 6 Q

Recd : 19, Aug

STADIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, TW
SUBJECT: FUTURE USE OF TAINAN AIR BASE

REF: A) STATE 126586; B) TAIPEI 3726

1. WE HAVE DROPPED THE IDEA OF MESSAGE TO KEY MILITARY ADDRESSEES REGARDING FUTURE USE OF TAINAN BECAUSE OUR LOCAL EFFORTS HAVE PROMPTED 13AF AND PACAF TO COME UP WITH PLAN WHICH WE FIND QUITE SATISFACTORY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH CONCEPT OF "CARE TAKER" STATUS. ALONG WITH CHIAYI AND CCK AIRBASES, 13/AFX WILL CONTINUE TO USE TAINAN FOR STORAGE OF CONVENTIONAL WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS. MAINTENANCE WILL BE CONTRACTED TO CHINESE AND TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AT TAINAN WILL BE ABOUT TWO HANDFULS WITHOUT DEPENDENTS.

2. ALTHOUGH PLAN NOT YET FINAL, WE WILL NOT PURSUE ISSUE FURTHER UNLESS TROLLEY GETS OFF THE TRACK AGAIN.

UNGER

BT

#5195

NNNNOTE BY CC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED BY MR TWOHIE, S/S-O.
PASS TAPE AND COPY TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

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44 4/23/01

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TELEGRAM

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R 230829Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2749
BT
~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 5338

CONTROL: 6 2 0 4 Q


R^Lcd : 23, Aug
5:06 A.M.

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, TW
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR DEATH OF NBRESIDENT CHIANG
KAI-SHEK

REQUEST DEPT AIR-POUCH SOONEST CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR USG
ACTIONS IN EVENT DEATH OF ROC PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
OUR RECOLLECTION IS 1971 CONTINGENCY PLAN WAS REVISED IN
DEPT LAST YEAR. WE EMPHASIZE THERE ARE NO RECENT OR NEW
DEVELOPMENTS THAT PROMPT THIS REQUEST.

UNGER



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66 4/23/01

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TELEGRAM

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R 240218Z SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3020

BT

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TAIPEI 5933

NODIS

E.O. 11652:

TAGS PFOR TW CH

SUBJECT: US CHINA POLICY AND THE GROC'S OPTIONS
REGARDING ITS INTERNATIONAL STATUS

CONTROL: 5 3 4 7 Q

RECD: 24 SEPTEMBER 74 -

12 01 AM

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG TRACK OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FORECAST KINDS OF ACTIONS WHICH GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF RECOGNIZING PEKING AND REDUCING ITS RELATIONS IN TAIPEI BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. PREDICTABLY, GROC WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL STATUS. WE BELIEVE AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEITHER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING, NOR WILL IT SERIOUSLY PURSUE A SOVIET CONNECTION. INSTEAD, IT WILL HAVE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT ABANDONING CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA, CONTINUE PRAGMATIC EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E. CONTINUE PRESENT POLICIES); OR (B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A STRATEGY SUSCEPTIBLE OF MANY GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM MINIMAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY UP TO OUTRIGHT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.

2. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING (UNLESS TO OBTAIN PRC AGREEMENT TO TAIWAN'S SEPARATION) WOULD BRING EXTREME DOMESTIC CRISIS WITH CIVIL DISRUPTIONS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. APPROACH TO SOVIETS (WHO IN ANY CASE ARE UNLIKELY TO BOARD SHIP WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN IMMINENT DANGER OF SINKING) WOULD OFFEND RIGHT-WING FRIENDS IN US AND JAPAN, WOULD CONFUSE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDICTRINATED POPULATION, AND WOULD BE MOST GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING.

3. MAINTAINING UNCHANGED PRESENT COURSE PROBABLY WOULD BE INSUFFICIENTLY REASSURING TO POPULACE SHAKEN BY LOSS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3

MR 03-22 #6: State 3/16/02

By date NARA 03/16/02

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TELEGRAM

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OF LAST VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND UNCERTAIN AS TO NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH US, DESPITE POPULARITY OF THIS STRATEGY WITH SOME DIE-HARD KMT ELEMENTS. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR GOVT TO DEMONSTRATE IT HAS THOUGHT THROUGH WAYS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR TRADE AND TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT NON-COMMUNIST CONTROLLED FUTURE IS STILL VIABLE. STANDING PAT, OR STANDING PAT WITH SLIGHT VARIATIONS WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUCH REASSURANCE.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE CCK WILL FEEL PRESSURED TO MAKE STATEMENT FORMALIZING ROC'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, YET THERE WILL BE FACTORS INHIBITING HIM FROM TAKING RADICAL ACTION--THE MOST RADICAL BEING A DECLARATION THAT TAIWAN IS FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA. SUCH A RADICAL ACTION, DESPITE UNDOUBTED POPULARITY WITH TAIWANESE MAJORITY ON ISLAND, WOULD OFFEND IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES IN MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS AND WOULD UNDERCUT PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER CONTROL. IT THUS WOULD INDUCE UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION PRECISELY AT TIME WHEN PUBLIC CALM AND STABILITY WOULD BE MOST NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD HAVE TO FEAR ADVERSE US REACTION, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE POSITION, AND WOULD UNDERSTAND INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT WHEN THERE COULD BE MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE COMMITMENT.

5. CCK THEREFORE IS LIKELY TO REDEFINE ROC STATUS IN MORE MINIMAL WAYS. FROM VARIETY OF SHADINGS AVAILABLE, HE PROBABLY WILL GO ONLY SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD TOTAL SEPARATION AS HE THINKS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN FUTURE AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING WITH TAIWAN, RETAINING OPTIONS TO MOVE FURTHER ALONG IN FUTURE AT TIMES AND IN WAYS WHICH LEAST UPSET CONSTITUENCIES ON ISLAND AND INTERNATIONALLY. ONE POSSIBLE INITIAL FORMULA, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD BE SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS MAY BE AND HOWEVER WIDELY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONALLY, PRC EXERCISES NEITHER SOVEREIGNTY NOR JURISDICTION OVER TAIWAN AND ROC DOES.

6. EVEN AT POINT OF RECOGNIZING PEKING, US WILL RETAIN ENORMOUS LEVERAGE HERE AND CAN USE IT IN WAYS WHICH

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REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS MAKING FOR CATION ON CCK'S PART. SPECIFICALLY, US SHOULD: (A) EASE RADICAL TENDENCIES HERE BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE NOT ONLY TO LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BUT ALSO TO IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END OF THEIR WORLD, A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN CAN NEVERTHELESS BE ACHIEVED; (B) ATTEMPT TO PUT ACROSS IDEA THAT SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS UPON MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF STABILITY SUFFICIENT TO DETER PEKING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE TAIWAN'S STATUS; (C) DISCREETLY BUT POINTEDLY WARN OF R RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROC ACTION TO UNDERMINE BASIS OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP, AS WELL AS ADVERSE US REACTION TO UNILATERAL ALTERATION OF TAIWAN'S JURIDICAL STATUS; (D) IN USG ITSELF, HAVING DETERMINED HOW WE WISH HANDLE ISSUES AFTER RECOGNITION OF PEKING! OFFER GROC BEST ASSURANCES WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE ON ISLAND, MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACCESS TO US.

7. THROUGHOUT PROCESS, WE SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND REST OF ASIA, AS WELL AS WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE AND ON BASIS OF RESPONSIBLE, CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS. END SUMMARY.

A. GROC OPTIONS

8. AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG RACK OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FORECAST KINDS OF ACTIONS WHICH GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF RECOGNIZING PRC AND ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND AT SAME TIME REDUCES ITS RELATIONS WITH ROC BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. WE MUST CAVEAT OUR ANALYSIS BY NOTING THAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES ARE MANY AND THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND UPON SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AT THAT POINT IN TIME. NEVERTHELESS, WE CAN IN GENERAL TERMS FORESEE THE COURSES OF ACTION GROC WILL HAVE OPEN TO IT.

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9. PREDICTABLY, GROC WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL STATUS. ASSUMING AS WE DO THAT AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEITHER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC FOR INCORPORATION INTO A COMMUNIST-RULLED STATE, NOR HAVE A TRUE "SOVIET OPTION," GROC WILL HAVE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT FORMALLY ABANDONING CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA, CONTINUE PRAGMATIC EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E., CONTINUE PRESENT POLICIES); OR (B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A STRATEGY SUSCEPTIBLE OF SEVERAL GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM A MINIMAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH JURIDICAL FORMULAS SUCH AS "TWO STATES WITHIN ONE NATION" TO AN OUTRIGHT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.

B. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC

10. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. INDEED, CRITICAL FACTOR IN TAIWAN'S DOMESTIC STABILITY IS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THAT PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO INTENDS KEEP TAIWAN SEPARATE FROM PRC RULE, COUPLED WITH BELIEF (SHARED BY TAIWANESE AS WELL AS MAINLANDERS) THAT HE IS LEADER MOST CAPABLE OF DOING SO. THUS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH PEKING IS CCK'S FIRMEST POLICY COMMITMENT. ABANDONMENT OF THAT COMMITMENT AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ANY BASIS OTHER THAN SEEKING PRC ACQUIESCENCE IN TAIWAN'S CONTINUED SEPARATION WOULD GREATLY DESTABILIZE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION AND THREATEN CCK'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL.

C. SOVIET CONNECTION

11. WE DOUBT CCK HAS TRUE SOVIET OPTION. DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE USSR REACHING APPRAISAL THAT ROC COULD BE SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR POWER ON MAINLAND AT SOME FUTURE TIME, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER INCURRING ANY DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAIWAN. SHOULD CCK, IN EXTREMIS, PURSUE SOVIET OPTION, IT IS DOUBTFUL USSR WOULD JUMP ABOARD SHIP WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN IMMINENT DANGER OF FOUNDERING.

12. FOR HIS PART, CCK IS UNLIKELY TO SERIOUSLY PURSUE SOVIET CONNECTION, BUT WILL CONTINUE OCCASIONAL COVERT,

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DISOWNABLE CONTACTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ELEMENTS HERE-- IN MILITARY, AMONG INTELLECTUALS, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE--WHO BELIEVE ROC MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A SOVIET OPTION, PREMIER MUST BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS: WOOLING SOVIETS WOULD BE GRAVEST POSSIBLE PROVOCATION TO PEKING, MOST LIKELY WOULD EVOKE OPPOSITION WITHIN KMT AND CONFUSION IN POPULATION LONG EXPOSED TO MASSIVE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDIC- TRINATION, AND COULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT RIGHT-WING FRIENDS IN JAPAN AND US.

D. MAINTAINING STATUS QUO

13. SOME THIRTY-ODD COUNTIRES OW RECOGNIZE ROC, A NUMBER BOUND TO DECLINE FURTHER IN DAYS AHEAD. US RECOGNITION OF PRC UNDOUBTEDLY WILL ACCELERATE DE- RECOGNITION PROCESS, PROBABLY LEAVING ONLY SUCH STALWARTS AS PARAGUAY, SOUTH AFRICA OR SOUTH VIETNAM FORMALLY RECOGNIZING GROC AS GOVT OF CHINA. GREAT UNCERTAINTY AS TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH US WHICH US RECOGNITION OF PEKING WOULD ENGENDER, PLUS RAPID LOSS OF LAST VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ROC AS MEMBER OF FAMILY OF NATIONS, WILL BE EXTREMELY UNXSETTLING TO PUBLIC, INDEED COULD CAUSE SOMETHING OF PANIC REACTION UNLESS GOVT INTERVENES SWIFTLY AND IN WAYS OTHER THAN SIMPLE SECURITY CRACKDOWN.

14. SIMPLY CONTINUING TO ASSERT CLAIMS TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE TO SHAKEN POPULATION. PREMIER MIGHT TRY TO DEALHHXLUSSM DOMESTIC SITUATION BY REMAINING ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE PRESENT POLICY FRAME- WORK, BUT STATING MORE EXPLICITLY WHAT IS ALREADY IN- FERENTIALLY HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. THAT IS, WHILE NOT FORMALLY ABANDONING PRO FORMA CLAIMS TO BE CHINA'S ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT, PREMIER COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY IS LIMITED TO TAIWAN AND ASSOCIATED ISLAND, NOTING THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO DEAL WITH TAIWAN ECONOMICALLY OR IN OTHER WAYS MUST DO SO ON BASIS OF CONTINUING TO TEAT GROC AS EFFECTIVELY SOVERIEGN WITHIN AT LEAST THAT AREA. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT TAKING SUCH A POSITION, HOWEVER, STILL WOULD NOT BE SEEN DOMESTICALLY AS DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH ROC'S SITUATION, NOW WOULD IT BE SUFFICIENT REASURANCE THAT GOVT HAS THOUGHT THROUGH

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WAYS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR TRADE AND TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT A NON-COMMUNIST FUTURE, THEREFORE, IS STILL VIABLE.

E. INDEPENDENCE?

15. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT FACED WITH THIS SITUATION, CCK WOULD BE STRONGLY TEMPTED TO DECLARE AN INDEPENDENT "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN", PERHAPS TO SABOTAGE US-PRC NORMALIZATION, PERHAPS TO CAPITALIZE ON CONTINUING SYMPATHY FOR NATIONALIST CHINA AND ON SENTIMENT IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE IN FAVOR OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, AND IN ANY CASE TO SOLIDLY UNITE TAIWANESE MAJORITY BEHIND HIS RULE. CERTAINLY ESTABLISHMENT OF "REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN" IS ULTIMATE IDEAL OF ALMOST ALL POLITICALLY CONSCIOUS TAIWANESE ON THIS ISLAND, YET THERE ARE A GREAT NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO INHIBIT CCK FROM TAKING SO RADICAL AND DRAMATIC A STEP.

16. UNLESS CAREFULLY AND LENGTHILY PREPARED IN ADVANCE, DECLARING TAIWAN FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA WOULD IMMEDIATELY UPSET PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF STATE (WITH "NATIONAL" GOVT SUPERIMPOSED ATOP "PROVINCIAL" GOVT) AND WOULD UNDERMINE PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER CONTROL. KMT "OLD GUARD"--MANY OF WHOM WOULD STAND

TO LOSE THEIR SINECURE JOBS--AND DIE-HARD MAINLANDERS WOULD BE BOUND TO OPPOSE. MILITARY LEADERSHIP, STILL HEAVILY INDOCTRINATED WITH MAINLAND RECOVERY MISSION, WOULD FEAR THEY TOO WOULD LOSE THEIR PRESENT FAVORED POSITION IN SOCIETY. SECURITY APPARATUS, WHICH HAS SO LONG AND SO VIGOROUSLY TRACED DOWN ALL TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WOULD BE DISORIENTED AND MIGHT FEAR REPRISALS.

IN SHORT, DESPITE POPULARITY WITH TAIWANESE, INDEPENDENCE WOULD BRING CONFUSION, WOULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT CONSTITUENCIES ON WHICH CCK DEPENDS, AND WOULD CREATE GREAT UNCERTAINTY AT PRECISELY THE TIME STABILITY AND PUBLIC CALM WOULD BE MOST NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD HAVE TO FEAR AN ADVERSE US REACTION, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE POSITION, AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INDEPENDENCE

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DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT WHEN THERE MIGHT BE MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE COMMITMENT.

F. LESS RADICAL SEPARATION

17. EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT IS THAT ABOVE FACTORS WILL DISSUADE PREMIER FROM DECLARING TAIWAN INDEPENDENT OF CHINA BUT THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD DECIDE ON SOME LESS EXTREME FORMALIZATION OF TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GRADATIONS POSSIBLE. FORMING A KIND OF SPECTRUM BEGINNING WITH FAIRLY SIMPLE AND AMBIGUOUS FORMULATIONS NOTING THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS MAY BE, AND HOWEVER WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THOSE CLAIMS, GOVT IN PEKING EXERCISES NEITHER JURISDICTION NOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN AND GOVT IN TAIPEI DOES. FORMAL, JURIDICALS

YXBLEASED STATEMENTS SUCH AS "ONE CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS" OR "TWO STATES IN ONE NATION" FORM PART OF THAT SPECTRUM. TOTAL, FORMALLY DECLARED INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA--WHICH WE HAVE ANALYZED AS UNLIKELY-- IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE SPECTRUM.

18. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT CURRENT THINKING HERE ON THESE QUESTIONS (WHICH, AFTER ALL, IS PROSCRIBED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS) IS HAZY AND CONFUSED. EVEN SENIOR AND KNOWLEDGEABLE GOVT OFFICIALS WHO, OCCASIONALLY, HAVE INFORMALLY DISCUSSED "THEORETICAL OPTIONS" WITH US TEND TO SLIDE AMONG THESE POSSIBILITIES WITHOUT PRECISION. TAIWANESE INTELLECTUALS TEND TO CALL ALL OF THESE POSSIBILITIES "INDEPENDENCE."

19. BUT CCK, IN HIS TWO YEARS AS PREMIER, HAS SHOWN HIMSELF A VERY CAUTIOUS MAN WHOSE CHARACTERISTIC APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IS GRADUALIST. WE BELIEVE THAT WHEN IT APPEARS UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR US INTENDS RECOGNIZE PEKING IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, PREMIER WILL SEE IT NECESSARY TO REDEFINITE ROC'S STATUS TO EMPHASIZE SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. IN SO DOING, HE WILL TRY TO REASSURE HIS PEOPLE THAT TAIWAN, AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, HAS VIABLE FUTURE IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY

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TERMS. HE WILL ACT PRIMARILY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (AVOIDING CAPITAL FLIGHT AND DOMESTIC INSTABILITY) AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING WITH TAIWAN. HE WILL GO ONLY SO FAR AS HE THINGS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE PURPOSES, RETAINING OPTION OF FURTHER, GRADUAL MOVEMENT IN FUTURE, IN WAYS AND AT TIMES WHICH LEAST UPSET CONTITUENCIES AND BALANCES ON THE ISLAND AND INTERNATIONALLY.

G. US ROLE

20. WE BELIEVE THAT IN CRISIS CAUSED BY US RECOGNITION OF PEKING, CCK ACTUALLY WILL BE MORE RATHER THAN LESS DEPENDENT UPON US. HE WILL BE MOST CONCERNED AS TO HOW NEW DEVELOPMENT WILL AFFECT MULTIPLE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS (LOANS, TRADE, INVESTMENT, ETC.), SUPPLY OF ARMS AND SPARES FOR HIS MILITARY AND, ABOVE ALL, SECURITY GUARANTEES. HIS OWN AND TAIWAN'S FUTURE WILL STILL DEPEND TO EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE ON HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH US--INDEED THAT ABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR CRITERION IN PUBLIC'S JUDGMENT OF HIM AS A LEADER.

21. THESE FACTORS SHOULD BE USED BY US AS LEVERAGE TO STEER GROC AWAY FROM ANY DECLARATION OR OTHER PROVOCATIVE ACTION WE WOULD CONSIDER EMBARRASSING OR ADVERSE TO OUR INTERESTS. WE SHOULD EMPLOY THIS LEVERAGE TO REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS ALREADY MENTIONED WHICH MAKE FOR CAUTION ON CCK'S PART. ASSUMING THAT FULL NORMALIZATION LIES AHEAD, WE SHOULD:

A. IN OUR USE OF THE CONDITIONING PROCESS, EASE RADICAL TENDENCIES BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE HERE NOT ONLY TO THE LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC RECOGNITION BUT ALSO TO THE IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END OF THEIR WORLD, A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN CAN BE ACHIEVED.

B. SUBTLY BUT PURPOSIVELY ITERATE AND REITERATE POINT THAT TODAY SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY PER SE THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF STABILITY SUFFICIENT TO DETER PERKING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE TAIWAN'S STATUS.

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C. DISCREETLY BUT POINTEDLY WARN VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY--UP TO AND INCLUDING CCK, IF WE CONCLUDE IT IS NECESSARY--OF RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROG ACTION TO UNDERMINE BASIS OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP; WARN AS WELL THAT US WOULD REACT ADVERSELY TO UNILATERAL GROG ATTEMPTS TO ALTER TAIWAN'S JURIDICAL STATUS

D. IN US GOVT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DETERMINE HOW WE INTEND TO HANDLE ISSUE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR GROG, FOLLOWING RECOGNITION OF PEKING, AND HOW TO ACHIEVE PRC ACQUIESCENCE IN OUR INTENDED ARRANGEMENTS. THEREAFTER, WHEN RECOGNITION IS IMMINENT, OFFER GROG BEST ASSURANCES WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL AND EFFECTIVE USG PRESENCE, MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACCESS TO US.

H. CONCLUSIONS

22. IF AND WHEN US RECOGNIZES PRC, WE BELIEVE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL LEAD CCK TO MAKE STATEMENT FORMALIZING AT LEAST SOMEWHAT ROC'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, AS WELL AS HIS OWN CHARACTERISTIC CAUTION, PROBABLY WILL LIMIT THE STATEMENT TO LOWER END OF SPECTRUM, KEEPING IT WELL AWAY FROM ANYTHING SO RADICAL AS A DECLARATION OF TAIWAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA. US CAN AND HOULD OPERATE IN WAYS WHICH WILL REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS TO MAKE SURE THAT US-PRC NORMALIZATION PROCESS IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

23. EVEN IF FACTORS NOT NOW FORESEEN INTRUDE AND MOVE GROG TO MAKE DECLARATION WHICH IS EMBARRASING TO US-PRC RELATIONS, WE WILL HAVE NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSES AVAILABLE. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD STILL RETAIN ABILITY TO PROCEED WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING, ATTENUATING RELATIONS HERE TO DEGREE THAT SEEMS DICTATED BY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIME, UP TO IN THE EXTREME CASE, EXPLICIT DISASSOCIATION FROM AND NONRECOGNITION OF ANY NEW STATUS.

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24. AS WE MOVE UP TO AND BEYOND POINT OF RECOGNITION, WE SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND REST OF ASIA, AS WELL AS WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE, AND ON BASIS OF RESPONSIBLE, CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS.

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TELEGRAM

R 080835Z NOV 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3402
BT
~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 6773

Control: 22840
Recd: Nov 8, 1974
3:49 AM

NODIS


E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, TW
SUBJECT: US-ROC DIALOGUE
REF: STATE 244329

1. APPRECIATE MESSAGE CONTAINED REFDEPTEL WHICH ARRIVED JUST IN TIME FOR USE WITH PREMIER CHIANG.
2. RECORD OF MY PRESENTATION, WHICH IN ESSENCE FOLLOWED TALKING POINTS AS AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH PREMIER'S COMMENTS WILL BE POUCHED FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION. IT WAS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO USE LANGUAGE IN LAST PARAGRAPH DEPTEL AS AUTHORIZED EXPRESSION OF VIEWS.

UNGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 66, NARA, DATE 4/23/01

~~SECRET~~



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012707

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

TITLE Conversation with Premier Chiang
Ching-Kuo

CREATION DATE 11/22/1974

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400129

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 5

FOLDER TITLE China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/27/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempted
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, State visit 8/2/00
BY GG, NARA, DATE 4/27/01
SANITIZED 7/02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOD483

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07012 221053Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

R 221000Z NOV 74
PM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3514

072467

Control: 6607Q

Recd: Nov 22, 1974
6:00 AM

~~TOP SECRET~~ TAIPEI 7012 CORRECTED COPY

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGOS-2

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, PINR, TW, CH

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO

FOR EA/HUMMEL

1. I CALLED ON PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO AGAIN TODAY, NOV. 22. I TOLD HIM THAT, AS HAD HAPPENED ON SIMILAR PAST OCCASIONS, WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS WITH HIM SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENT FORD'S AND DR. KISSINGER'S CURRENT TRAVELS IN AREA, INCLUDING PEKING. ON OUR PART, I ASSURED HIM, WE WERE TAKING ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID ANY ACTIVITIES IN AREA WHICH PEKING COULD CONSIDER PROVOCATIVE, AND WE HOPED THAT GROC COULD ALSO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE ANY REACTION AT THIS TIME.

DURING PREVIOUS VISIT WE AGAIN SOLICITED GROC COOPERATION IN MAKING CERTAIN NO UNUSUAL MOVEMENTS OR ACTIONS OCCURRED IN THE STRAIT AREA. I ADDED THAT WE BELIEVED CHICONS WOULD MAINTAIN SIMILAR NON-PROVOCATIVE POSTURE DURING THE VISIT PERIOD, AS THEY HAD DONE ON PAST OCCASIONS.

2. PREMIER CHIANG UNHESITATINGLY RESPONDED THAT "YOU NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT US". HE RECALLED THE EMBASSY'S APPROACH ON THE EVE OF THE NIXON VISIT, AND SAID HE COULD GIVE US THE SAME ASSURANCES THAT THE GROC WOULD DO NOTHING TO DISTURB THE CURRENT VISIT. I EXPRESSED

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR 02-23 #7; CIA Jan 7/12/02

By dal NARA, Date 8/1/02

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TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 87012 221053Z

OUR APPRECIATION AND SAID I WOULD RELAY HIS ASSURANCES TO WASHINGTON.

3. COMMENT: I THINK WE HAVE NOW DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DETER POSSIBLY PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY GROG, [REDACTED] ALSO HAD OPPORTUNITY IN DISCUSSION WITH CAFCING CHIEN I-FAN EARLIER TODAY TO WARN AGAINST UNDERTAKING UNUSUAL ACTIVITY AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME.
UNGER

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NOD167

CONTROL: 88570

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07108 300352Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

030698

O 300325Z NOV 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3504

~~SECRET~~ TAIPEI 7108

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: US-PRC COMMUNIQUE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

REF: SECTO 265

1. I CONVEYED TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AND ASSURANCE RE NORMALIZATION AS AUTHORIZED REFTEL TO PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO AT 5:00 PM LOCAL NOVEMBER 29.


2. PREMIER THANKED ME AND THEN NOTED THAT JUST ADJOURNED KMT CONCLAVE HAD GIVEN ITS BLESSING TO HIS POLITICAL REPORT WHICH CALLED FOR CONTINUATION GROC FOREIGN POLICY BASED UPON "PRINCIPLE AND MORALITY" NOT UPON EXPEDIENCY NOR SHORT-TERM BENEFITS OR NARROW SELF-INTEREST. PRESUMABLY HAVING IN MIND "ASSURANCE" MENTIONED REFTEL, HE ASSERTED THE GROC WOULD WORK TO EXPAND ITS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ALL "FREE" NATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE WITH WHICH IT HAD NO FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TIES. PREMIER MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SECRETARY'S TRIP, THE COMMUNIQUE OR "ASSURANCE".

3. IT WAS VERY HELPFUL TO OUR RELATIONS WITH GROC TO BE ABLE TO GIVE THIS ADVANCE WORD ON COMMUNIQUE AND IMMEDIATE ALBEIT BRIEF READOUT ON SECRETARY'S PEKING VISIT. I BELIEVE IT ALSO HELPFUL TO PREMIER TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

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GA 4/23/01





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
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 07100 300352Z

LEADERS HIS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH USG AND THUS RETAIN
THEIR COOPERATION IN HIS EFFORT TO DEVELOP RATIONAL
AND PRACTICAL RESPONSE TO CREEPING INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC
ISOLATION DESPITE PRESSURES OF DIE-HARD KMT ELEMENTS AND
OTHERS WHO MIGHT ADVOCATE EXTREME COURSES OF ACTION. UNGER

NOTE: Not passed Tokyo by OC/T.

~~SECRET~~



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NOD11

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00079 0710424

CONTROL: 906Q

RECD: 7 JAN 75

5:19AM

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ACTION NOD5-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

070118

O 070945Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE NIAC 3874

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 0079

NODIS

FOR EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, TW

JSUBJECT: ROC REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT TO NEW AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 2686

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () () _____
☒ Declassify ☐ After _____
☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
PS by WV Date 8/3/00

1. WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST FOR TWO REASONS RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION TO DENY AGREEMENT TO CHOW SHU-KAI. (A) FACT THAT PROPOSED CHANGE IS ALREADY KNOWN IN TOP CIRCLES HERE, AND THEREFORE RESPONSE WILL BE MATTER OF SOME EMBARRASSEMENT AND PUZZLEMENT. (B) THOUGH CHOW QUITE NATURALLY WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO PROTECT ROC INTERESTS, HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS, GENERAL SUPHISTICATION AND HIS ENTREE TO CCK ARE ASSETS WHICH COULD BE DISTINCTLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN CERTAIN FUTURE CON-
TINGENCIES.

2. IN EVENT IT NEVERTHELESS IS DETERMINED INADVISABLE TO GRANT AGREEMENT TO NEW ROC AMBASSADOR, I URGE THAT WE PRESENT A DIFFERENT RATIONALE. ALTHOUGH THE ASSURANCES REGARDING PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND US-PRC NORMALIZATION PROCESS CERTAINLY WILL BE WELCOME AND SHOULD BE GIVEN, NEVERTHELESS OUR MAJOR REASON ("PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT A COOLING IN US-PRC RELATIONS") PUTS THE MATTER MUCH TOO SQUARELY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING. AT THIS TIME AT LEAST, OUR LINE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ROC EVEN WHILE WORKING FOR A BETTER RELATIONSHIP


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State v. 1/1/01

BY GB NARA, DATE 4/13/01



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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 00079 0710424

WITH THE PRC. CERTAINLY WE DO NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING OPERATES TO PREVENT CCK FROM HAVING THE AMBASSADOR OF HIS CHOICE IN WASHINGTON SO LONG AS ROC MAINTAINS AN EMBASSY THERE. THAT ALMOST SURELY WOULD BE SEEN AS SERIOUSLY INSULTING.

3. THEREFORE IF WE MUST TURN DOWN THE REQUEST, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE PALATABLE TO SAY THAT WE FEAR CHANGING AMBASSADORS AT THIS JUNCTURE WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING SOME CRISIS OR UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENT IN US-ROC (KPEAT, US-ROC) RELATIONS, AND THAT THIS IS AN IMPRESSION BEST AVOIDED. EVEN THOUGH THIS IS HARDLY LESS TRANSPARENT AS AN EXCUSE, NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE HERE.

4. AS FAR AS HANDLING IS CONCERNED, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST TO GRANT WHEN THE APPOINTMENT HE HAS REQUESTED WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND HAVE THE MATTER SURFACE IN THAT VENUE. ONCE THAT DISCUSSION HAS TAKEN PLACE, I CAN THEN SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH CCK TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH HIM, OR TAKE IT UP WITH HIM THE NEXT TIME WE MEET.

UNGER

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NOD309

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00113 081541Z

ACTION COPY

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

092881

O 081513Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0892

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 0113

NODIS

EA FOR ASST SEC HABIB

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TW
SUBJECT: ROC REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT: CALL ON PREMIER

REF: A. STATE 3603
B. TAIPEI 0079

1. I CALLED ON PREMIER CHUIANG SIX PM JANUARY 8 AND MADE PRESENTATION PER REF A, TAKING CUE FROM PREMIER'S QUESTIONS, I STRESSED THAT PERSONALITIES WERE NOT A FACTOR (THAT WE, IN FACT, ESTEEMED BOTH MEN VERY HIGHLY), BUT THAT IN REQUESTING THAT NOTIFICATION OF RESIGNATION BE WITHDRAWN OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS NOT TO FUEL SPECULATION OF UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENTS IN US-ROC RELATIONS, OR IN CHINA SITUATION GENERALLY.
2. PREMIER NOTED HE HAD RECEIVED REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR SHEN WHICH LAID GREAT STRESS ON "SHOCK" WITH WHICH DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD REACTED TO SHEN'S PRESENTATION. ACCORDING TO PREMIER, SHEN'S REPORT HAD ALSO EMPHASIZED INOPPORTUNITY OF REQUEST "AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME." IN REPLY, I SAID THAT WHILE INOPPORTUNITY OF THE MOMENT CERTAINLY WAS TRUE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GUESS DURATION OF "THE MOMENT" OR PREDICT WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 00113 0815414

ALTERED.

3. PREMIER'S Demeanor throughout conversation was calm, though somewhat puzzled by developments. He asked for time for further consideration. My judgment is that the pill, though bitter, has been swallowed.
UNGER

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NOD067

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 0021W 1404274

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ACTION NOUS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

017713

R 140414Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3948

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 0210

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGOS-3
TAGS: PFOR, TW
SUBJECT: ROC REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT TO NEW AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 007826


1. LAST NIGHT PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO TOLD ME THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO "POSTPONE" ANY CHANGE IN ROC AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND HAS WRITTEN JAMES SHEN TO THIS EFFECT. PREMIER EMPHASIZED THIS MATTER BEING CLOSELY HELD BUT DID ASK ME TO EXPLAIN TO CHOU SHU-K'AI WASHINGTON'S THINKING LYING BEHIND REQUEST NOT TO MAKE CHANGE.

2. PREMIER AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO POLITICAL INTENT IN PROPOSING THIS CHANGE, RATHER THAT JAMES SHEN HAS SPOKEN OF BEING VERY TIRED AND GIVEN EVIDENCE OF BEING SOMEWHAT LESS VIGOROUS.

3. PREMIER IN SAME CONTEXT MENTIONED TO ME UP-COMING CHANGES IN OTHER ROC POSTS ABROAD INCLUDING PANAMA, SAUDI ARABIA AND POSSIBLY KOREA. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM JIDDA FOR HSUEH YU-CH'I, PRESENTLY VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
UNGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State visit 8/3/00
BY 66 MARA, DATE 4/23/00

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EQ 12958, 25X() () ()
☒ Declassify ☐ After _____
☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
IPS by SV Date 8/3/00



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NOD220

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00513 291037Z

12
ACTION CCU-00

~~md 02-22, #8, State ltr 3/6/02~~

~~del NARA-DIA 4/16/02~~

INFO OCT-01 NODS-00 /001 W

077237

O 290049Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4092

CONTROL: 6189Q
RECD : JAN 29, 1975
5:45 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~ TAIPEI 0513

EQ 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS PFOR, PTNR, TW
SUBJECT: ROC COVERT EFFORT TO ACQUIRE TORPEDOES IN U.S.

REFS: STATE 19383, STATE 19449, STATE 19450, STATE 19451

NQ019

1. WE AGREE REFTELS PROVIDE COMPELLING EVIDENCE ELEMENTS
GROC ENGAGED IN ILICIT EFFORT PURCHASE MARK-37 TOPEDOES.
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION HERE WHICH WOULD REFUTE THIS EVIDENCE.
FURTHERMOKE, THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE FOR SOME TIME THAT ROC
MILITARY STRONGLY FEEL NEED TO SECURE TOPEDOES FOR THEI

I

SUBMARINES. WHILE I DOUBT PREMIER PERSONALLY
INVOLVED OR AWARE THE FULL NATURE THIS BIZARRE AFFAIR,
ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US/ROC
RELATIONS OF SUCH A SERIOUS NATURE THAT I BELIEVE IT WARRANTS
MY REQUESTING AN IMMEDIATE PRIVATE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM.
SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S -- AND I ASSUME FBI'S -- CONCURRENCE,
MY REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PREMIER WOULD BE ALONG FOLLOWING
LINES:

--THAT MY REQUEST TO SEE HIM WAS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS
IN ORDER TO INFORM HIM THAT WE HAD RELIABLE INFORMATION
THAT CERTAIN GROC OFFICIALS WERE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO
PURCHASE ILICITLY, AND CLANDESTINELY, STOCKED MARK-37
TORPEDOES IN THE UNITED STATES. TRANSACTION CALLS FOR
PURCHASE OF 30 TORPEDOES AT UP TO \$75,000 EACH FOR THE
TWO ROC SUBMARINES PURCHASED FROM THE U.S.

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PAGE 02 TAIPEI 00513 291037Z

--THESE OFFICIALS INCLUDED: ADMIRAL CHIU HUA-KU, ROC NAVAL ATTACHE, WASHINGTON; HSU YA-MING, ASSIGNED TO ROC CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES; HAN MIN, A JUNIOR OFFICER IN ROC NAVY;

--AT LEAST ONE OF THE ABOVE IS KNOWN TO BE AWARE THAT TORPEDOES IN QUESTION WERE TO BE STOLEN FROM BROOKLYN NAVY YARD;

--THESE ROC OFFICIALS WERE NEGOTIATING PRINCIPALLY THROUGH RONALD COLITTI, A LOS ANGELES MUNITIONS DEALER; IRVING I. REFKIN, VICE PRESIDENT, PACIFIC ORDNANCE AND ELECTRONICS CORPORATION.

--IN TAIPEI, ALFRED C TAI, (DESCRIBED AS A RETIRED ROC ADMIRAL) IS INVOLVED IN TRANSACTION AND HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH COLITTI AND OTHERS.

--MR. TAI ARRANGED TO SEND THE NAVAL OFFICER TO U.S. IN LATE JANUARY TO MEET WITH REFKIN AND COLITTI FOR PURPOSE OF INSPECTING TORPEDO SPECIFICATIONS AND TO VERIFY POSSIBILITY REPAIRING SUBMARINES' FIRE-CONTROL SYSTEMS SO THAT TORPEDOES COULD BE INSTALLED AND FIRED. THE NAVAL OFFICER SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED ADMIRAL CHIU AND A CONTACT IN TAIPEI THAT HE WAS SATISFIED FIRE-CONTROL SYSTEM COULD BE REPAIRED.

--THE NAVAL OFFICER ENTERED THE UNITED STATES UNDER FALSE PRETENSES ON JANUARY 20.

--COLITTI AND REFKIN HAVE INFORMED ADMIRAL CHIU THAT SELLER OF TORPEDOES WANTS TO SEE PURCHASE MONEY BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO TURN TORPEDOES OVER TO THEM ADMIRAL CHIU SO INFORMED TAIPEI.

--WE WOULD ADD THAT FOREGOING FACTS PRESENTED TO PREMIER PRIMARILY TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SPECIFICITY AND RELIABILITY OF OUR INFORMATION.

--I SHALL STATE MY BELIEF THAT HE WOULD AGREE THAT SUCH FOOLISH AND FUTILE SCHEME CAN DO INESTIMABLE HARM TO OUR RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, SUCH BEHAVIOR IS BOUND TO HAVE AN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TAIPEI 00513 291037Z

ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. I WOULD ALSO REMIND HIM THAT NO SURMARINES WERE RELEASED TO ROC NAVY SOLELY TO EXERCISE ITS ASW CAPABILITYIES AND WE HAVE EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED ANY TRANSFERS OF TORPEDOES. I SHALL EXPRESS MY

CONFIDENCE THAT HE WILL IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PUT AN END TO THIS INEXCUSABLE ACTIVITY AND TO ANY OTHERS OF A SIMILAR NATURE WHICH MAY BE UNDERWAY OR CONTEMPLATED.

--I SHALL ALSO URGE UPON PREMIER THAT IN ORDER TO SAVE BOTH OF US EMBARRASSMENT THAT HE ENSURE NO PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF MATTER ARE MADE, WE WILL DO THE SAME HERE AND IN THE U.S.

2. REQUEST DEPARTMENT ADVISE ME ASAP AND NO LATER THAN OPENING OF BUSINESS TAIPEI TIME, THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, ITS CONCURRENCE ABOVE APPROACH. I SHALL BE REQUESTING APPOINTMENT WITH PREMIER FOR AFTERNOON JANUARY 30. ALSO REQUEST ANY INFORMATION IN ADDITION THAT CONTAINED REFTELS, INCLUDING ANY LAST MINUTE DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH MIGHT BEAR ON CASE AND MY PRESENTATION TO PREMIER. BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL I ACCOMPLISH THIS BUSINESS ON JANUARY 30 SINCE I AM SCHEDULED TO DEPART TAIPEI EARLY JANUARY 31 ON TRIP AS GUEST OF MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WHICH WOULD BE VERY EMBARRASSING TO TURN OFF.

3. ASSUME DEPARTMENT TOGETHER WITH FBI WILL EXAMINE CAREFULLY OUR STATEMENTS OF FACT WHICH I PROPOSE TO PUT BEFORE PREMIER IN ORDER TO VERIFY THEIR PRECISE ACCURACY. ATTENTION CALLED INPARTICUL TO REFERENCE TO OUR EXCLUDING TRANSFER OF TORPEDUES.
UNGER

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