The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)" of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012702

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY TAIPEI RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION Re Ex-President Thieu's entourage
CREATION DATE
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400128 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012703

REASON FOR W	ITHDRAW	AL			National security restriction
TYPE OF MATE	RIAL .				Telegram
					AMEMBASSY TAIPEI SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE					Former Premier Khiem Requests Ambassador Unger's Assistance
CREATION DAT	Е				05/03/1975
VOLUME					2 pages
	ITLE .		•		NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER . FOLDER TITLE					China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)
DATE WITHDRAW					



TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL 2048

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02526 080930Z

11 ACTION SS=25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

063599

R 080743Z MAY 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5108

CONFIDENTIAL TAIPEI 2526

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 : GDS TAGS: SCUL, PFOR, TW, CH SUBJECT: GRUC BICENTENNIAL STAMPS

REF: STATE 14583 (EXDIS)

BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE:

1, THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM YANG MING-SHIH (WARREN), THE RETIRED DIRECTOR OF THE PHILATELIC DEPARTMENT OF THE ROC POSTAL ADMINISTRATION WHO IS LAOS AUTHOR OF A WEEKLY STAMP COLLECTOR'S COLUMN IN THE CHINA NEWS, LETTER STATES THAT THE USG HAS GIVEN "MOST GOVERNMENTS" INFORMATION FOR ISSUING COMMEMORATIVE POSTAGE STAMPS TO MARK THE USBICENTENNIAL, BUT THE ROC POSTAL ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT YET RECEIVED SUCH DATA, MR. YANG SUGGESTS FURTHERMORE THAT THE ROC HAS FAILED TO RECEIVE THE PROPER INFORMATION BECAUSE IT IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION. END LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2. BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS. THE EMBASSY IS NOT AWARE OF THE PRECISE NATURE OF BICENTENNIAL MATERIAL TO WHICH MR. YANG REFERS; HOWEVER, THE SUPPLYING OF THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION WOULD NT APPEAR TO BE PROSCRIBED UNDER THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED IN REFTEL FOR GROC PARTICIPATION IN BICENTENNIAL ACTIVITIES, WE RECOMMEND THE DEPARTMENT CONTACT THE US POSTAL SERVICE TO ARRANGE FOR TRANSMITTAL OF WHATEVER INFORMATION MAY BE AVAILABLE. PLEASE ADVISE THE



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TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02526 080930Z

EMBASSY ON WHATEVER ACTION IS TAKEN SO THAT WE CAN REPLY TO MR. YANG.

END CONFIDENTIWL EXDIS



-CONFIDENTIAL



TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL 8939

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05451 220834Z

LU AÇTION SS≖25

INFO OCT=01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE+00 /026 W

027613

D 220818Z AUG 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI FO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6738

CONFIDENTIAL TAIPEI 5451

EXOIS

EU 11652 GDS FAGS OTRA MASS TW US BUBJECT: GAO REQUEST FOR ENHANCE PLUS/F 5=E CO=PRODUCTION FILES

REF: 4 FAM 934.2

I. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) IS CONDUCTING A SURVEY OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM IN THE FAR EAST (CODE 46336). A TWO-MAN TEAM IS VISITNG TAIWAN THROUGH AUGUST 29 TO REVIEW THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM HERE WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE CURRENT PROGRAM, THE MERITS OF EMPHASIZING CUMMERICAL RATHER THAN FMS TRANS-ACTIONS, AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTW IN FMS.

2. THE TEAM HAS ASKED TO REVIEW MISSION FILES ON THE F=5E CO-production project in order to follow this major program In Detail from beginning to the current date, as department

IS AWARE, F=5E CO-PRODUCTION PROJECT IS PART OF ENHANCE PLUS PACKAGE AND EMBASSY HOLDS EXTENSIVE TOP SECRET MATERIALS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS A LARGE AMOUNT OF EXDIS TRAFFIC FROM 1973 THROUGH 1975.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY SEES NO PROLEM
IF IT ALLOWS GAO ACCESS TO NON-SENSITIVE MATERIAL, MUCH OF THE
BASIC DOCUMENTATION IS SENSITIVE TS OR EXDIS AND TEAM WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNIZE INADEQUACY OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH 4 FAM 934,2 (IN EMBASSY VIEW AT LEAST SUBSECTIONS A

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TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05451 220834Z

AND C APPLY) REQUEST
DEPARTMENT ADVISE ASAP 1) WHETHER GAO TEAM SHOULD BE
GIVEN ACCESS TO THIS LARGE BODY OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL AND
2) IF NOT, DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS FOR THE GROUNDS
ON WHICH EMBASSY SHOULD DENY GAO ACCESS.
UNGER



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TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL 9108

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05458 220929Z

21 ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

028158

O 220927Z AUG 75 FM: AMEMBASSY: TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE: 6744

GONFIDENTIAL TAIPEI 5458

EXDIS

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS CVIS, SCUL PFOR TW CH US
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF ROC VOLLEYBALL TEAM

REF A. TAIPEI 4876 B. STATE 176655 C. STATE 171835 D. TAIPEI 4490

1. VOLLEYBALL TEAM WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF REFTELS HAS REVISED ITS ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:
AUGUST 25 DEPART TAIPEI
AUGUST 25 ARRIVE LOS ANGELES
AUGUST 28 ARRIVE CHICAGO
AUGUST 30 ARRIVE NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 4 ARRIVE WASHINGTON DC
SEPTEMBER 5 ARRIVE MIAMI
SEPTEMBER 7 ARRIVE LOS VEGAS
SEPTEMBER 9 ARRIVE SAN FRANCISCO
SEPTEMBER 14 ARRIVE HONOLULU
EPTEMBER 17 DEPART HONOLULU

2. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE TEAM HAS REVISED ITS ITINERARY AT MOFA'S REQUEST FOLLOWING EMBASSY'S DEMARCHE (REF A), WE WOULD LIKE TO ISSUE VISAS EXPEDITIOUSLY DESPITE THE SHORT LEAD. THEREFORE, UNLESS YOU HAVE OBJECTIONS, WE PLAN TO ISSUE VISAS ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 25. UNGER

PORD J.BRAARY

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TELEGRAM

-CONFIDENTIAL 5128

PAGE 01 TAIPET 05943 1109072

14 ACTION SS=25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

056426

R 110845Z SEP 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHOC 6975

CONFIDENTIAL TAIPEI 5943

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SREF, US, TW
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER KHIEM AND FAMILY

REF 8 STATE 212287

1. EMBOFF SPOKE WITH KHIEM AND TOLD HIM OF DEPT AUTHORIZATION HIS TRAVEL TO U.S. AT THIS TIME. KHIEM WAS APPRECIATIVE AND PLANS TO DEPART TAIPEI IN EARLY OCTOBER. HE WISHES TO BYPASS REFUGEE SYSTEM, TRAVELING AT OWN EXPENSE TO JOIN HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW BUI VAN ANH, 1710 MARK LANE, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND.

2. EMBASSY PLANS TO ISSUE NEW PAROLE LETTER AND WILL NOTIFY DEPT AND INS/POE WHEN TRAVEL PLANS ARE FIRM.

3. KHIEM READILY AGREED TO COOPERATE IN EFFORT TO AVOID PUBLICITY.
UNGER



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012704

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL	 . National security restriction	
TYPE OF MATERIAL	 . Telegram	
CREATOR'S NAME RECEIVER'S NAME		
DESCRIPTION	 . Re Republic of China	
CREATION DATE	 . 09/12/1975	
VOLUME	 . 9 pages	
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDE COLLECTION TITLE	. 032400128 . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTI COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
BOX NUMBER		
DATE WITHDRAWN	04/26/2001	

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG



TELEGRAM

SECRET 4335

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 06550 060945Z

10 ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 \$50-00 /026 W

003504

R 060929Z OCT 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7260

S E C R-E T TAIPEI 6550

EXDIS

FO 11652 GDS
TAGS PFOR PINR TW CH
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 4 CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

REF TAIPEI 6519

AFTER I INFORMED THE PREMIER ABOUT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE PRC, HE REFERRED TO THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE COMMUNIST REGIME IS EXPERIENCING ON THE MAIN-LAND AND MENTIONED SPECIFICLLY THE CHEKIANG SITUATION AND THE CELEBRATION OF THE OCTOBER 1 ANNIVERSAY. IN THE LATTER CONNECTION HE NOTED THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 26 YEARS THERE WERE NO JOINT EDITORIALS (SIC) HAVING IN MIND THESE EVIDENCES OF INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND TENSIONS THE PREMIER HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT WOULD NOT GIVE THE COMMUNIST CHINESE A BOOST OR ANY UNDUE ENCOURAGEMENT.

2. I SAID THAT WE HAVE ALSO HAD SOME REPORTS ABOUT CONTENDING FACTIONS IN THE PRC; HOWEVER, AS REGARDS THE SECRETARY'S AND LATER THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE PRC, WE CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH THE PRC AND THAT THE VISITS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT LIGHT.

3. IN THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED THE PREMIER MENTIONED HIS FEELING THAT THE PRC LEADERS HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING TO THE US CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS THE MILITARY THREAT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION POSES TO THE PRC, PRESUMABLY IN AN EFFORT TO ENLIST US.

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PAGE 02 TAIPET 06550 060945Z

SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BUT POINTED OUT THE PRO IS ALSO EMPHASIZING TO EUROPEAN LEADERS AND OTHERS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, THE THREAT THE SOVIET UNION POSES IN EUOPE. I SOLICITED THE PREMIER'S VIEWS ON THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN THE PRO TO WHICH HE REFERRED AND HIS COMMENTS ADDED NOTHING NEW TO THE SITUATION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT. HE MADE THE POINT THAT THE "CHIANG CHING-WANG HUNG-WEN FACCTION" IN THE PAST AND TODAY LACKS AY SUPPORT FROM THE PLA, PRESUMABLY TO INDICATE THAT IN ANY STRUGGLE WITH THE "TENG HSIAO-PING FACTION"WHICH MIGHT FOLLOW AFTER THE DEATH OF CHOU EN-LAI THEIR CHANCES WERE NOT VERY GOOD.

4. CCK ALSO COMMENTED THAT IT APPEARED THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE RESULTS FROM THE NEW YORK CONVERSATIONS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA AND PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA. I SAID OUR INFORMATION TENDED TO CONFIRM THAT BUT WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TALKS WERE EXPECTED TO BE RESUMED AND THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY FINAL BREAKDOWN.

5. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS PEKING AND HONG KONG. UNGER



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TELEGRAM

-SECRET 3057

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07922 1208272

21

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

001375

R 120805Z DEC 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7873

SECRET TAIPEI 7922

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, TW, US
SUBJECT: DECISIONS REGARDING SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TO TAIWAN.

REF: A. STATE 2905311 B. STATE 288220

- 1. CH/MAAG INFORMED GENERAL LAI MING-TANG, CGS, USG PLANS FOR APPROVING TRANSFER EQUIPMENT AS LISTED REF. A.
- 2. APPROVAL FOUR ADDITIONAL SZE AIRCRAFT AND TWO MINESWEEPERS EXCESS TO USN REQUIREMENTS MUCH APPRECIATED, AIM-9J MISSILE CONVERSION KITS ALSO HELPFUL.
- 3. ROC DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REQUIRE THREE T-28C AIRCRAFT.
 ROCAF POSSESS T-28 A&D MODELS WHICH HAVE DIFFERENT ENGINE
 CONFIGURATION. FURTHERMORE, T-28'S BECOMING UNSUPPORTABLE
 AND ROCAF PUTURE PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS KEYED TO
 T-CH-1 ROC BUILT TRAINER. ROCAF ANXIOUSLY AWAITING USG
 APPROVAL FOR ROC PURCHASE 43 LYCOMING T53-701A TURBO PROP
 ENGINES TO POWER T*CH-1 AIRCRAFT NOW IN FABRICATION.
- 4. GENERAL LAI AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO NO PUBLICITY ON THESE DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS AND STATED IT WAS GROC POLICY NOT TO PUBLICIZE ANY WEAPONS ACQUISITION.
- 5. GENERAL LAI ASKED ABOUT STATUS OF MAJOR PROJECTS AWAITING USG APPROVAL, PRIMARY CONCERN AT MOMENT IS USG

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TELEGRAM

-SECRET

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 07922 120827Z

APPROVAL OF IMPROVED HAWK BATTALION FOR SOUTHERN TAIWAN. CLOSE-OUT OF FY 76 US ARMY PROCUREMENT OF IMPROVED HAWK FOR US ARMY AND OTHER NATIONS IS 31 DECEMBER. ROC PARTICIPATION WOULD SAVE BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY-FIVE MILLION. APPRECIATE ACTION UNDERWAY TO GET USG APPROVAL. UNGER



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 6990

PAGE 01

TAIPET 06272 01 OF 03 151030Z

12

ACTION 88-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

119528

P 151056Z SEP 76
PM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
BO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1043

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 TAIPEI 6272

me 02-22 #18: pt. lar 3/6/02

By dal NARA Dots 4/17/02

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MNUC, TW
SUBJECT: ROC'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS: CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER
CHIANG CHING-KUO

REF: TAIPEI 6100

The state of the s

PREMIER SAID HE HAD ASKED ME TO COME IN TO TALK ABOUT
"THE NUCLEAR MATTER", ALTHOUGH FORMIN SHEN'S REPLY TO MY
SEPTEMBER 7 DEMARCHE "SHOULD HAVE LEFT NO QUESTION ABOUT THE
GROC'S NUCLEAR RESEARCH POLICY". HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO CLEAR
UP ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, PREMIER WISHED TO RESTATE
THAT THE POLICY OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS "NOT TO MANUFACTURE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS". THIS HAD BEEN PRESIDENT CHIANG'S POLICY
AND HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY THE 9TH PLENUM OF THE KMT IN THE FORM
OF A RESOLUTION ADOPTED SOME SIX YEARS AGO (SIC; CORRECT
REFERENCE IS 10TH PLENUM, 1969). THIS RESOLUTION, SAID THE
PREMIER, DECLARED THAT ALL NUCLEAR RESEARCH ON TAIWAN WOULD
BE DIRECTED TOWARD PEACEFUL USES; AND THAT WHEN THE MAINLAND
WAS RECOVERED, THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES EXISTING THERE WOULD
BE DIVERTED TO PEACEFUL USES AS WELL. THIS, SAID THE PREMIER,
WAS "FUNDAMENTAL ROC POLICY".



TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

TAIPEI 06272 01 OF 03 151030Z

3. THE PREMIER SAID THAT THE GROC WAS CONDUCTING NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVITIES "BECAUSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED TT"; WHEN THE LATE PRESIDENT CHIANG HAD SEEN THE CHING HUA REACTOR, HE HAD JUDGED IT TO BE "TOO SMALL" AND HAD THEREFORE ORDERED THE PROCUREMENT OF ANOTHER REACTOR FROM CANADA --"WITH THE SAME PEACEFUL PURPOSE". "WE DO NOT DENY THAT WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH, " CONTINUED THE PREMIER. "BUT THIS PROGRESS IS NOT TOWARD WEAPONS; IT'S TOWARD PEACE." THE PREMIER ADMITTED THAT "REPROCESSING IS NOW A PROBLEM" BUT TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING GROC HAD STOPPED RESEARCH IN-DUIRIES RELATING TO A REPROCESSING FACILITY. (WHEN INTERPRETER USED THE TERM "LABORATORY" IN TRANSLATING PREMIER'S REFERENCE TO A REPROCESSING FACILITY, FORMIN SHEN INTERRUPTED TO CORRECT HIM AND TO EXPLAIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN LABORATORY-TYPE FACILITY AND PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT. SHEN ASSERTED GROC HAD NO INTENTION TO DEVELOP "LARGE-ACALE" REPROCESSING CAPABILITY AND WAS NOT IN PROCESS OF "ACQUIRING ANYTHING TO PRODUCE A LARGE QUANTITY OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL". A LABORATORY FACILITY, SAID SHEN, COULD NOT PRODUCE QUANTITIES SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A WEAPON.)

4. FOLLOWING UP ON SHEN'S REMARKS REGARDING THE REPROCESSING LABORATORY, THE PREMIER STATED THAT COMPONENTS FOR THE SMALL LABORATORY HAD BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE U.S., JAPAN AND EUROPE. HE HAD PERSONALLY INQUIRED ABOUT EQUIPMENT BOUGHT FROM EUROPE AND HAD FOUND IT "NOT SIGNIFICANT". SOME STANDARD PIPE AND GLASS HAD BEEN PURCHASED "BUT NOTHING LARGE-SCALE". "WE HAVE CHECKED INTO THE AVAILABILITY FROM EUROPE, BUT WE HAVE NOT BOUGHT ANY LARGE-SCALE EQUIPMENT", THE PREMIER DECLARED. NOTING THAT "U.S. EXPERTS HAVE VISITED OUR (REPROCESSING) FACILITIES", THE PREMIER SAID THAT "WE HAVE FOR THE TIME BEING DECIDED NOT TO EXPAND THEM AND THEREFORE WE COULD NOT PRODUCE ENOUGH MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS". (NOTE: THE FOREGOING COMMENTS DBVIOUSLY OBSCURE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REPROCESSING LABORATORY AND A PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT. WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THIS STEMS FROM A POOR UNDERSTANDING OR A DESIRE TO OBFUSCATE.)

THE PREMIER THEN CITED TWO POLITICAL REASONS IMPELLING
THE ROC TO REFRAIN FROM THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
FIRSTLY, SUCH WEAPONS COULD NOT BE USED AGAINST CHINESE PEOPLE,

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TAIPEI 06272 01 OF 03 151030Z

AND SECONDLY, HE UNDERSTOOD THE USG'S STRONG OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION. THE ROC WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GROC WILL ALWAYS KEEP ITS PROMISES TO THE USG. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY INFORMED THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN THAT HE WILL AGAIN STATE PUBLICLY WHEN HE APPEARS BEFORE THAT BODY ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT "WILL NEVER MANUMFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO KILL ITS OWN PEOPLE". THE PREMIER THEN RECALLED THAT HE HAD ASSURED ME (A REFERENCE TO MAY 27 CONVERSATION) THAT "ROC WILL NEVER MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AND THAT HE CONSIDERED THIS ASSURANCE AS "A BINDING COMMIT MENT TO AN ALLY".

FERENCE" HE HAD USED THE OLD CHINESE DICTUM "DO TODAY, REGRET TOMORROW; NOT DO TODAY, REGRET TOMORROW" TO POINT UP HIS DIFFERING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE 10 MAJOR PROJECTS, ON THE OTHER HAND. "TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE LIKE DROPPING A ROCK ON ONE'S OWN FEET," HE HAD TOLD HIS MILITARY LEADERS.

7. YESTERDAY, CONTINUED THE PEMIER, HE HAD MET WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COUNCIL (AEC) CHIEN TZU-LIANG; VICTOR CHENG, SECY-GEN OF THE AEC; AND LT. GENERAL T'ANG CHUN-PO, DIRECTOR OF CHUNG SHAN INSTITUTE (CIST), TO "EXPLAIN TO THEM HIS (THE PREMIER'S) POSITION" AND THEY HAD ASSURED HIM THAT "IT WAS NEVER IN THEIR THOUGHTS TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THAT THEIR PURPOSE WAS PEACEFUL RESEARCH".

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Department of State TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TAIPET 06272 02 OF 03 151045Z

ACTION SS-25

TNFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SS0-00 /026 W

P 151056Z SEP 76 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 1044

a. IN VIEW OF USG SENSITIVITIES AND IN ORDER TO CLEAR UP ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS, SAID THE PREMIER, HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT, WITH USG CONCURRENCE, THE ROC ACCEPT U.S. GOVERNMENT EXPERTS AS RESIDENT, LONG-TERM ADVISORS TO THE CHUNG SHAN INSTITUTE CCTST), INER, AND THE AEC. ALL EXPENSES RELTED TO THESE EXPERTS WOULD BE PAID BY THE GROC. THEY COULD ACT AS INSPEC-TORS. THE ROC WOULD ACCEPT ONE, OR TWO, OR THREE.

9. AT THIS POINT OF THE CONVERSATION THE PREMIER STATED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM HONG KONG WHICH "EXPLAINS WHY RUMORS WERE CIRCULATING". HE HANDED ME A DOCUMENT CONSIST-ING OF SEVERAL PAGES HANDWRITTEN IN CHINESE, THE PREMIER SAID THAT THIS DOCUMENT PROVIDED "DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE BACK-GROUND OF THE RUMORS". HE SAID THE INFORMATION "INVOLVES SEVERAL U.S. CONGRESSMEN WHOSE INTENTIONS WERE GOOD, BUT .. HE THOUGHT WE "WOULD FIND IT AN INTERESTING DOCUMENT".

10. PREMIER THEN SAID HE WANTED TO RESTATE HIS "BASIC POLICY THAT ROC WOULD NEVER MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- AND IT HAS NEVER BROKEN A PROMISE". HE "WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM ROC'S BASIC POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE -- ALTHOUGH FORMIN SHEN HAD ALREADY DONE SO".

11. I HEARD OUT THE FOREGOING PRESENTATION WITHOUT INTERRUPT-ING THE PREMIER. I TOLD HIM I WOULD REPORT HIS REMARKS FULLY AND CAREFULLY TO WASHINGTON, INCLUDING HIS PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. EXPERTS IN GROC NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVI-TIES -- A PROPOSAL I FOUND INTERESTING AND WORTH CONSIDERATION.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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I ALSO THANKED HIM FOR PASSING TO US THE INFORMATION HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HONG KONG AND SAID WE WOULD TRANSLATE IT AND FORWARD IT TO WASHINGTON.

12. I THEN REFERRED TO MY EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH FORMIN SHEN, AND REVIEWED IN DETAIL FOR THE PREMIER THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PARA 4 OF DEPTEL 219733, EXPLAINING THAT GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES I FELT IT IMPORTANT TO COVER THE GROUND VERY CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MIS-UNDERSTANDING. DURING COURSE OF MY PRESENTATION, I LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON OUR CONCERN OVER THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESS= ING FACILITIES, MENTIONING PREVIOUS OCCASIONS ON WHICH SUBJECT WAS RAISED WITH GROC AS WELL AS NITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA. I SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO MY MOST RECENT REVIEW WITH SHEN OF THE REPRESENTATIONS WE MADE IN 1973 AND THE ASSURANCES WE HAD RECEIVED FROM SHEN AT THAT TIME WITH RESPECT TO ROC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A REPROCESSING FACILITY. IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THE STRENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL FEELING ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, I ALSO INFORMED PREMIER THAT I HAD JUST LEARNED FROM WASHINGTON THAT SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MAY BE HOLDING HEARINGS NEXT WEEK CENTERED ON RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF ROC ACTIVITIES IN NUCLEAR FIELD. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I COULD NOT OVEREMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE USG PLACES ON THIS ISSUE, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GROC WILL RE-AFFIRM THE ASSURANCES WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED.

HTWO STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ORDER TO CLARIFY MISUNDERSTANDINGS (1) "ALL REPROCESSING RESEARCH, PEACEFUL OR OTHERWISE,
WILL BE TERMINATED" AND (2) MINISTER SHEN WILL PREPARE A
WRITTEN MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH GROC COMMITMENT NOT TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I ASKED IF FIRST STEP REFERRED TO
PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT, POINTING OUT THAT THERE WERE
ESSENTIALLY TWO LEVELS OF REPROCESSING WHICH WERE BEING TALKED
ABOUT: (A) THE LABORATORY LEVEL FOR WHICH USG NOW HAS UNDER
CONSIDERATION GROC REQUEST FOR PUTTING INTO OPERATION, AND
181 A PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT, I.E., AN "INDUSTRIAL" SCALE
OPERATION, THE TYPE OF PROJECT ABOUT WHICH WE HAD MADE REPRESENTATIONS IN 1973. I TOLD PREMIER THAT IT WAS THIS LATTER
TYPE OF PROJECT WHICH WAS IN GUESTION WITH REGARD TO OUR
INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT INQUIRIES INER WAS MAKING IN EUROPE.



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THIS, I ADDED, WAS OUR SPECIAL CONCERN AT THE MOMENT. THE PREMIER REPLIED THAT "THE USG WAS ALREADY AWARE OF INER'S LABORATORY REPROCESSING PROJECT, BUT IF THE USG CONSIDERED IT DANGEROUS, IT WOULD BE TERMINATED; ALL OPERATIONS ARE KNOWN TO THE USG." I AGAIN ASKED THE PREIER IF HIS REMARKS INCLUDED A PILOT REPROCESSING FACILITY. HE REPLIED THAT "GROC WOULD NOT PROCEED". I THEN REITERATED THAT USG WOULD BE OPPOSED TO ANY LEVEL OF REPROCESSING NOT PLACED UNDER SAFE-GUARDS, BUT THAT WITH RESPECT TO A PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT USG WOULD BE OPPOSED WHETHER OR NOT SAFEGUARDS WERE APPLIED. I THEN AGAIN REFERRED TO THE INFORMATION WE HAD RECEIVED FROM EUROPEAN SOURCES AND ASKED THE PREMIER IF ROC HAD INTENTION OF MAKING FURTHER SUCH INQUIRIES (AS THOSE REPORTED). PREMIER RESPONDED "NO, NO." I SAID I WOULD SO REPORT TO WASHINGTON.



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14. THE PREMIER FOLLOWED UP THIS EXCHANGE WITH COMMENT THAT "THEY HAD MADE INQUIRIES FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES, BUT WILL DISCONTINUE THEM SINCE USG HELD THE VIEW THAT IT WAS DANGEROUS". I SAID I WOULD SO REPORT.

THE PREMIER REPEATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR ASSIGNING USG EXPERTS TO OVERSEE GROC NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVITIES, SAYING THAT "THEY COULD STAY ON A PERMANENT BASIS, COULD INSPECT AND WORK TOGETHER WITH GROC PEOPLE". I SAID THAT HIS PROPOSAL APPEARED TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE AND ASSURED THE PREMIER THAT I WOULD CONVEY IT TO THE DEPARTMENT. I ASKED THE PREMIER ASSIGNED, THEY WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ROC NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. HE REPLIED "YES" AND MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ACTIVITIES AT CHING HUA, CHUNG SHAN (NOTE: WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT BE CONFINED TO INER) AND THE AEC. CONVERSATION ENDED WITH PREMIER ASSURING ME THAT WE WOULD BE RECEIVING MEMORANDUM FROM FORMIN SHEN IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

THE FOREGOING IS PRETTY MUCH A VERBATIN RENDITION OF THE CONVERSATION AND IS BEING SO TRANSMITTED NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF ACCURACY, BUT ALSO IN AN EFFORT TO GIVE THE DEPARTMENT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, - "FEEL" FOR THE PREMIER'S MANNER OF HANDLING THIS VERY STICKY ISSUE. I COULD NOT ESCAPE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PREMIER HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO OBFUSCATE OR SKIRT THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF OUR CURRENT CONCERN, NAMELY, GROC INTEREST IN ACQUIRING A PILOT REPROCESSING FACILITY. FOR THIS REASON, I FELT IT NECESSARY TO SUBJECT HIM

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TO A FULL REVIEW OF THE GROUND I HAD COVERED A WEEK EARLIER WITH FORMIN SHEN AND ABOUT WHICH HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FULLY INFORMED. ULTIMATELY, I BELIEVE I RECEIVED THE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE I WAS SEEKING. IN ANY EVENT, NO DOUBT CAN NOW REMAIN THAT THE PREMIER IS FULLY AND CLEARLY INFORMED OF OUR CONCERN AND WHAT WE EXPECT IN THE WAY OF REMEDIAL ACTION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. THERE CAN ALSO BE NO DOUBT THAT HE IS FULLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES IN STORE SHOULD THE GROC PERSIST IN ITS COVERT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A PILOT PLANT REPROCESSING CAPABILITY.

17. WE SHALL BE COMMENTING SEPARATELY ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER, INCLUDING THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL FOR STATION-ING UG EXPERTS HERE TO PARTICIPATE IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVITIES. UNGER