

**The original documents are located in Box 298, folder “Appointments and Meetings with Non-Media Groups (2)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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Secret Service  
Sept 2 - 2 pm

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SECRET SERVICE MEETING

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2

2:00



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1975

Ron --

I think we need to protest to the Secret Service the way we were treated at Andrews AFB yesterday.

As soon as we learned there were difficulties, I contacted Les McClellan for coordination with the Secret Service so we would not have the usual ramp freeze hinder our movements in the event we were delayed until the departure of the President. I later reconfirmed this was our agent, Jim Boyle, and was assured there would be no difficulties.

At the last minute, after the helicopter had departed the White House and we had one more bus load of passengers to be boarded, I got the word we were under the usual freeze. I immediately went to see Dick Keiser at Air Force One, who said that under no circumstances could we move the bus while the helicopter was on the ground. His comment was, "It is not my fault the press plane is late." Further, he made us wait until Air Force One was moving before we were allowed on the tarmac with the bus. This cost us 10 minutes.

There have been times in the past when we were allowed to work out an alternate route by going around the back of the control tower. We were not allowed to do so yesterday.

On those occasions when there are mechanical problems beyond our control, and American Airlines and Andrews AFB have gone the extra mile to get us out as soon as possible, we sure don't need unnecessary problems from our own people.

RAY ZOOK





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223

May 20, 1975

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
Technical Security  
Division

MEMORANDUM TO: Ronald H. Nessen  
White House Press Secretary

FROM : Robert R. Snow  
Special Agent in Charge

SUBJECT : Press Corps - West Wing Lobby

Your memorandum for the staff, dated March 24, 1975, came to my attention with an incident complaint from Executive Protective Service. As you recall, your March 24th memorandum changed previous policy, and permits reporters to wait in the West Lobby for scheduled meetings with White House staff members.


On May 13, 1975, Congressman Rhodes was in to see the President on an off-the-record meeting. While he was waiting in the West Lobby, he was approached by a Mr. Shabecoff (Press Corps) who was also waiting in the West Lobby to see General Scowcroft.

Mr. Shabecoff began questioning Congressman Rhodes as to why he was at the White House. The congressman could not answer his questions and it appeared to EPS to be an embarrassing situation.

Mrs. Elizabeth MacBeth, the receptionist in the West Wing, indicated to EPS that this is not an isolated incident.

This type of problem is why the procedure of excluding the press from the West Wing Lobby area was initiated.

According to EPS, not everyone in the West Wing nor all press personnel are aware of your March 24th memorandum. If you wish further discussion regarding this change on procedures or possible reconsideration of your policy, please contact Inspector Freeman or myself.

  
Robert R. Snow

cc: Inspector Freeman - EPS



A B

W22STAIRS 8-21

ADV FOR WEEKEND AUG 22-23

(COMMENTARY)

BY HELEN THOMAS

UPI WHITE HOUSE REPORTER

VAIL, COLO. (UPI) -- BACKSTAIRS AT THE WHITE HOUSE:

THE PRESS CORPS TRAVELING WITH PRESIDENT FORD IS HAVING ITS TROUBLES WITH THE SECRET SERVICE.

THE AGENTS WHO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ALSO DECIDED IT IS THEIR ROLE TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF THE FIRST FAMILY.

THUS THERE ARE INCONSISTENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH COVERAGE OF FORD AT THIS ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESORT. HE HAS BEEN SPENDING ABOUT FIVE HOURS A DAY ON THE VAIL PUBLIC GOLF COURSES.

REPORTERS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS WHO MOVE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL MOTORCADE ARE PERMITTED TO OBSERVE THE PRESIDENT TEE OFF FROM A DISTANCE IN A ROPED OFF AREA. VAIL VACATIONERS AND SPECTATORS WHO COME OFF THE STREET, HOWEVER, CAN GET MUCH CLOSER TO THE PRESIDENT AND WATCH HIM DRIVE.

ALAN GREENSPAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS AND ONE OF FORDS FREQUENT GOLFING COMPANIONS, CAME UP TO THE PEN ON DAY WHERE REPORTERS WERE CORRALLED AND SAID, "THIS IS RIDICULOUS."

REPORTERS ALSO WERE ROPED OFF ON PLATFORMS THAT LOOKED LIKE AN AUCTION BLOCK AT TWO POLITICAL RALLIES FORD ATTENDED IN HOTEL BALLROOMS IN DES MOINES, IOWA, AND MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

STANDING BY THE PLATFORMS, KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON THE REPORTERS, WERE AGENTS WITH FOLDED ARMS. AGENTS ALSO BLOCKED A REPORTER FROM GOING INTO A FRENCH RESTAURANT AT VAIL WHERE FORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER WERE DINING WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

THEY ASKED THE REPORTER IF SHE HAD "A RESERVATION."

IN ANOTHER CASE AN AGENT RIPPED A CAMERA CASE OUT OF THE HANDS OF A FREE-LANCE MAGAZINE PHOTOGRAPHER AND THREW IT ON THE GROUND EVEN AFTER THE CAMERAMAN HAD AGREED NOT TO TAKE PICTURES OF FORD AND HIS WIFE DANCING IN A DISCOTHEQUE WHERE THEY HAD GONE TO HEAR THE INK SPOTS.

ONE REPORTER WAS KICKED IN THE SHINS BY ONE AGENT DURING FORDS TWO DAY TRIP TO IOWA, MINNESOTA AND ILLINOIS.

THE SECRET SERVICE ASSUMED DUTIES OF CONTROLLING OF THE PRESS IN THE LBJ ERA ON PRESIDENT JOHNSONS ORDERS, INCLUDING THE ISSUANCE OF CREDENTIALS TO REPORTERS AND CAMERAMEN. IN THE PROCESS THE AGENCY BECAME SOMETHING OF A SCOUTMASTER TO THEIR CHARGES.

DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION THE AGENTS ALSO WERE USED TO KEEP THE PRESS IN LINE AND AT TIMES TO HUSTLE AWAY ANTIWAR PROTESTORS THAT MIGHT DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE PRESIDENT.

IN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION THE AGENTS ARE CALLING THE SHOTS AND EVEN OFFICIALS OF THE PRESIDENTS PRESS OFFICE HAVE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING THEIR OWN PLANS FOR COVERAGE STICK.

MANY OLDTIMERS AMONG THE WHITE HOUSE SECRET SERVICE DETAIL ARE NO LONGER AROUND AND THE NEWER AGENTS APPEAR TO BE MORE JUMPY WITH PRESS.

WHATEVER IS HAPPENING, SOME OF THE AGENTS NO LONGER SEEM TO KNOW WHERE THEIR LINE IS DRAWN AND THE REPORTERS RIGHT TO COVER FORD BEGINS.

AGENTS TRIED TO BLOCK REPORTERS FROM GOING INTO A SPORTS STORE WHERE MRS. FORD WAS SHOPPING AFTER SHE MADE HEADLINES WITH ANOTHER INTERVIEW EXPRESSING HER CANDID VIEWS ON HER PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH HER HUSBAND. AT FIRST THE AGENTS BLOCKED THE DOOR TO THE STORE BUT AFTERWARDS THEY PERMITTED SOME OF THE PRESS TO ENTER. THE REPORTERS STOOD ASIDE AWHILE SO MRS. FORD COULD MAKE HER SELECTIONS UNDISTURBED.



# Secret Service

- 1- Every reporter is, first, a citizen and therefore should have some access as citizen (church, restaurant, sidewalk, street)
- 2- In "secure area" he has special privileges + some privileges as the public. (With help of P.O. staff)
- 3- Eric will take press to where it wants to go, but he always alerts S.S. on radio so they know of movement. (Pool in Berlin) This will not work with other P.O. staff or by reporters alone.
- 4- If writers want to go elsewhere than photo, they should be with Nissen, Greener, etc., for their help.
- 5- New agents. Overly-cautious and not adequately instructed.
- 6- Press office press guide should discuss movements before an event.
- 7- Efforts to restrict pool is a "challenge" and test of manhood; use a little psychology.



- 8- Reporters don't like to be "pushed" or "fouled."
- 9- Attitude reflected out to be of "help" instead of "restrict." When press has suggestion for a change of plan, consider it. (But it should be discussed with S.S. BEFORE carrying it out.)
- 10- Good, close working relationship between S.S. and P.O. is important.
- 11- Pool should stay with the Pres, to the door of the event, or elevator, in most cases. (Exceptions = McCormack place, etc.)
- 12- Mini-Cams. The pool moves, and the mini-com crew lags behind and catches up.



## Complaints by Agents.

- 1- Pool not always together.
- 2- A few want to do things differently than the others.

## Complaints by Press

- 1- Restricted too much of SS and PO staff. (More you give, the more they demand).
- 2- Pool not allowed to follow as closely as they used to. (They want to stay close when they don't have anything else to do, forget this when they have to file.)
- 3- 95% of press is content; only the same quipsters complain.
- 4- Press agent is important; should be related. (But should be a veteran of a year or so.)





Georgi Katiani - Pravda  
(cancelled) Oct 14, 75

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NESSEN MEETING WITH GEORGIY RATIANI

Tuesday, October 14, 1975

1:30 p. m.

White House Press Office

FROM: Margaret Vanderhye *John*

I. PURPOSE:

You have agreed to meet with Georgiy Ratiani, a senior editor for Pravda, the official Soviet Community Party newspaper. Mr. Ratiani is travelling throughout the United States and wanted to take the opportunity while in Washington to pay a courtesy call on you. Your purpose in this meeting will be to welcome Mr. Ratiani to the White House and to explain to him the daily operation of the Press Office and how you view your role as the official spokesman for the President.

II. BACKGROUND AND PARTICIPANTS:

A. Background: Pravda, which means "truth" is the official newspaper of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It has a circulation of approximately 12 million and is published in Moscow. It should be distinguished from the government news service TASS, which reviews Pravda articles on a daily basis and runs some of its articles and/or summaries.

You will want to avoid discussing matters of substance with Mr. Ratiani and will want to concentrate instead on Press Office routine and organization, as well as Mr. Rantiani's proposed itinerary. You may wish to take him on a tour of the Press Office and Briefing Room and perhaps show him the Rose Garden, where the President received the astronauts and cosmonauts yesterday, October 13.

B. Participants: Georgiy Ratiani and Ron Nessen.

C. Biographical information on Mr. Ratiani is at Tab A.



III. TALKING POINTS:

1. Welcome to Washington and to the White House. You have selected an opportune time to visit our capitol; the crowds and the heat have departed and yet the weather still permits many outdoor activities. Have you had a chance to do much sightseeing since you have been here? (The National Gallery recently had an exhibition of paintings from the Hermitage in Leningrad.)
2. We were fortunate enough to welcome Mr. Leonov and Mr. Kubasov yesterday with our astronauts for a presentation in the Rose Garden during which mementos of the joint space flight were exchanged. Our astronauts tell me that they were very warmly received in your country and thoroughly enjoyed their visit there last month. As you know, the astronauts and cosmonauts have a full itinerary planned for their tour throughout the United States. We hoped that Messrs. Leonov and Kubasov and their families carry away from this trip as many warm memories as our astronauts brought back with them.
3. Perhaps you would be interested to hear how our Press Office is organized and how we conduct our briefings.
  - A. Typical day.
  - B. Staff organization.
  - C. Briefing format.
  - D. Functions as official spokesman: How you view your role; how your office is organized.
4. I understand you are planning to visit the West Coast. Where will you be stopping? (Depending on his response, cite restaurants, national parks or other tourist attractions you particularly like). As you may know, President Ford has a condominium in Vail, Colorado. It's a beautiful setting and despite his busy schedule, he and his family try to get out to Colorado two or three times each year to relax and enjoy the scenery.



5. As you may know, I travelled to the Soviet Union last year with President Ford. (Mention what you particularly enjoyed about the trip, and whether you had a chance to meet General Secretary Brezhnev).
6. I have enjoyed meeting with you and hearing about your travels throughout the United States. I hope you enjoy the rest of your trip; I'd be interested in hearing your impressions.





Georgiy Ratiani, 57, has been reporting for Pravda--the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--for nearly 30 years. He has been chief of the American Countries Department of Pravda since about 1964.

A frequent traveler, Ratiani is currently visiting the United States to prepare a special series of reports on the American scene. During earlier visits to the United States, he filed reports on a variety of topics, including the US Presidency and American politics, US foreign policy with Western Europe and Latin America, Asian security and détente.

Ratiani started his career in the diplomatic service. After the Second World War he was assigned to Paris as a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy and attended the foreign ministers Conferences in Moscow and New York as an assistant to the General Secretary for Protocol of the Soviet delegation. In 1947 he was a member of the USSR delegation to the UN General Assembly. Ratiani returned to the UN as a special correspondent in September 1955, then became Pravda's chief reporter on the French political scene. Ratiani continued to report on French and European events until his focus shifted to the United States.

In October 1970, Ratiani defended his dissertation on the class and Party state "revolutions" in France of 1940 and 1958 at the USSR Academy of Science, Institute of General History. Ratiani is married. He does not speak English.

14 October 1975



October 11, 1975

**MEMORANDUM FOR: MARGIE VANDERHYE**

**FROM: JAN BARBIERI**  
**OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY**

**SUBJECT: PRAVDA EDITOR REQUESTS MEETING**  
**WITH RON NESSEN**

We have received a request from the Soviet Embassy (Mr. Babenko) for Mr. Nessen to meet with Pavadel Ratiani -- one of the chief editors of Pravda, according to Babenko.

Mr. Nessen would like background information on Ratiani and NSC's recommendation on whether or not he should meet with him.

Since a meeting is requested for Monday or Tuesday of the coming week, we need this information as quickly as possible.

Thank you.

Connie --

I told Babenko you would be calling him on Monday (243-0634) when you have firmed up RN's schedule.

Re purpose of meeting -- Ratiani is traveling around the country to gain "impressions" and general views. He has nothing specific in mind to discuss -- more of a courtesy call.

Margie said they would get the above info to you on Monday.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

6861

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

October 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:           RON NESSEN  
FROM:                        BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*  
SUBJECT:                    Requested Meeting with Pravda Editor

Your office has informed the NSC Staff that Mr. Pavadel Ratiani, a chief editor of Pravda, has asked to pay a courtesy call on you on October 13 or 14. Our recommendation is requested. From the standpoint of foreign policy, there is no objection to meeting with Mr. Ratiani. Should you agree to do so, we would be happy to provide talking points for the discussion.



ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 15, 1975

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Ron Nessen

FROM: NEA/P - George F. Sherman, Jr.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Tahsin Bashir, Spokesman  
for President Sadat

Ron,

You will remember that during our own meeting we talked about two main subjects for your meeting with Bashir: 1) U.S. financing for the "up-link" to the satellite for Egyptian television coverage of the visit; 2) the Egyptian request for an interview with President Ford just before Sadat's arrival in Williamsburg October 26. Since then, the Egyptian advance team, including Bashir, has arrived, has had lengthy talks with Protocol at State, and is now touring the cities which Sadat is to visit. (Bashir went as far as Chicago, and then returned to Washington.) A number of other issues have arisen, most of them technical--e.g., can the Sadat speech to Congress be televised, can television crews have the necessary special van, where will the press be housed. If Bashir raises any of these with you, I suggest you indicate ~~that~~ that either State or USIA is dealing with them, and will be in contact.

Here is where we stand on the two main topics:

- 1) USIA is studying whether they can help finance part of the satellite costs, and they think something can be worked out. Two events are under discussion--the welcoming session on the White House lawn October 27, and Sadat's speech to Congress either October 28 or November 5. USIA is almost certain to do the first live for the Egyptians, and is close to agreeing to do the second. The Egyptians will pay for the down-link, while we handle the up-link. Bashir is probably aware of these details. But I do not think you should volunteer any of this to him since

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nothing is final and another member of the Egyptian advance team is handling those negotiations.

- 2) Bashir has already raised with me the proposal for an interview by the three leading editors who will be accompanying President Sadat around the United States. They would be prepared to come early for an interview on October 25. At a meeting last Friday, which Ambassador Eilts attended, I relayed to him your suggestion about adding a television commentator and putting the whole half-hour interview on camera. Bashir agreed. I have left it with him that the whole thing is under study, so no commitment has been made. We have asked Secretary Kissinger for his reaction to the proposal, both through our own channels and through Brent Scowcroft. Our hope is that he will discuss it with the President before leaving for China Friday. The four interviewers would have to agree on the focus of the interview--keep it general, no specific questions on arms aid. Furthermore, the October 25th date gives Kissinger time to brief the President after his return from China the day before.

Talking Points

Against that backdrop, here are the talking points I propose. On most topics, I suppose Tahsin will take the lead, so you will be responding to questions.

---Welcome the opportunity to renew old acquaintance. We are all looking forward to President Sadat's visit as a celebration of the new American-Egyptian relationship and of the new prospects for peace in the Middle East.

---Because of the importance we attach to the visit, I want you to know that everything possible is being done to make it a success. The press aspect is especially important, since the visit gives the American people a chance to see and hear President Sadat and also a chance for him to reacquaint himself with the United States. (He was here once before as President of the Egyptian National Assembly.)

---Building on our good experience in working together in the Salzburg Summit, I hope we can coordinate as



closely as possible what we say to the press after the various meetings of the two Presidents.

- I note that the maximum is being done to give President Sadat public exposure: the White House welcoming ceremony, a speech to the National Press Club, a meeting with leading columnists and editorialists, a press conference here in Washington, finally, President Sadat's address to Congress. I know the State Department is doing everything necessary about accreditation, and press arrangements to make these events a success.
  
- Regarding your request for help in sending television transmissions live: I understand discussions are going on with your advance team at USIA, and we are hopeful something can be worked out. Decisions should be forthcoming shortly.
  
- Regarding the request for an interview with the President: We understand the importance of this request to you. We are actively looking into whether the President's schedule will accommodate such a meeting. I understand it would be for a half-hour on camera. I cannot give you any commitment at this time. But an interview is possible, and I will be in contact with you through our Ambassador in Cairo.
  
- Regarding special facilities for the Egyptian press, transportation, accommodations, etc.: I understand all these matters are being discussed with your people at the State Department and USIA. I know arrangements will all be worked out. We are determined to give you the same hospitality and cooperation which you showed our press during the visits of Secretary Kissinger and former President Nixon.

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TWELFTH DISTRICT  
OHIO

SAMUEL L. DEVINE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 2, 1975

Dear Ron:

Belatedly, I did want to express my appreciation and that of the "Good Guys" for your excellent appearance last month. You did a great job and made friends, not only for yourself, but for the President.

Thanks again,

Mr. Ronald H. Nessen  
Press Secretary to the President  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington, D. C. 20500





SAMUEL L. DEVINE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TWELFTH DISTRICT  
OHIO

Wed. - Nov. 12<sup>th</sup>

Dear Ron,


I very much appreciate your willingness to be the guest-speaker for the 'Good Guys' meet Tuesday, the 18<sup>th</sup> at the Capital Hill Club.

Our guys look forward to seeing you and furthering the understanding between the Executive and Legislative.

Thanks again,

Sam





Mr. Ron Nessen  
Presidential Press Secretary  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



P. R. People  
Nov. 19, 1975

JACK A. GERTZ  
1000 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

November 10, 1975

Mr. Ronald H. Nessen  
Press Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Ron:

As reviewed with Bob Hartmann, our group is set to meet with you, Bob, Jack Marsh and Bill Seidman Wednesday, November 19 in the International Club's Asian Room, 18th & K Streets, N. W.

Cocktails will be served at 6:30 P.M. and dinner at 7:15.

Attached is a list of the persons (check marked) who plan to represent our group.

It'll be nice seeing you again, Ron.

Warmest regards,



EDWARD M. BLOCK, Vice President, Public Relations  
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Mr. Ronald H. Nessen  
Press Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036



David Belin  
Nov. 20

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JEFFREY E. LAMSON  
EDGAR H. BITTLE  
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CURT L. SYTSMA  
DAVID L. CLAYPOOL

November 4, 1975

AREA CODE 515  
TELEPHONE  
244-1116

DWIGHT BROOKE  
COUNSEL  
LAWRENCE E. POPE  
COUNSEL

The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As I discussed with you after the completion of the Rockefeller Commission investigation, I am preparing a series of monthly basic strategy papers for 1976. These papers seek to maximize the chances of winning both the Republican nomination and the general election while minimizing strategy conflicts between these two goals.

My November paper is entitled: "Defusing the Reagan Challenge." Tom Stoner, the newly-elected Iowa Republican State Chairman, who was Governor Ray's campaign manager in the last two campaigns, has reviewed this paper. He fully concurs in its conclusions.

I hope that you will find that some of the thoughts and ideas that I have expressed will be helpful to you.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

  
David W. Belin

DWB:cs

Encl.

c.c. Philip Buchen  
c.c. Robert Hartmann  
c.c. Donald Rumsfeld  
c.c. Richard Chaney



THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT FORD

BASIC STRATEGY PAPER NO. 1 - NOVEMBER, 1976

David W. Belin

Defusing the Reagan Challenge

From the viewpoint of securing the Republican nomination, the major risk to the President in meeting the challenge of Governor Reagan is not the risk of loss in a particular Republican primary. Rather, the major risk is the ramifications of such a loss.

From the standpoint of winning the November election, the major risk to the President in meeting the Reagan challenge is the risk of losing the Independent vote that is absolutely essential for victory in November.

From the viewpoint of Governor Reagan, the major risk is the loss in any primary where the President does not heavily campaign. This arises from the fact that Reagan will be a full-time candidate.

When we search for a basic strategy that will best resolve these three problems, there is an obvious starting point: The major strength of Gerald Ford is that he is a full-time President. The major weakness arises if he spends too much time in campaigning, which in turn undermines that basic strength.



(As a matter of fact, I believe that in the past several months the President may have spent too much time on the campaign trail, even though in part this has been on behalf of other Republican candidates or fund-raising events. In some respects, this has weakened his overall standing and undermines the basic posture that he must maintain if he is to win both the nomination and the election: The fact that he is first and foremost, a full-time President.)

The best possible scenario for Reagan would be to defeat Gerald Ford in a series of primary elections in states where Gerald Ford heavily campaigns.

Therefore, it is obvious that it is not to the benefit of the President to heavily campaign in any state in which the Republican leadership is strongly committed to Governor Reagan.

Yet, the President cannot remain completely aloof from the presidential primaries.

In resolving this conflict, I would like to suggest for consideration the following basic strategy program:

At an appropriate time after the Reagan announcement, and in an appropriate forum, President Ford should candidly state that he will enter every primary.



However, in contrast to Governor Reagan, who is a full-time candidate, President Ford should point out that the President must first and foremost discharge the responsibilities of the Presidency. Accordingly, President Ford will state that he will not be able to devote a lot of time to primary campaigning, and there undoubtedly will be some states where he does no campaigning at all.

The President should then further state that because Governor Reagan will be campaigning full time and because the President will be campaigning on a very part-time basis, Governor Reagan might very well win primary elections in some states and that as a practical matter the President should say that he is going to win some primaries, he is going to lose some primaries, but that ultimately he will win a majority of the votes of the delegates to the Republican National Convention.

Furthermore, the President should declare that if he loses primaries because he is a full-time President and is therefore unable to campaign extensively in a particular state, so be it. And if that, in turn, results in Governor Reagan's securing the Republican nomination, so be it. The President will not set aside the duties of the office of the Presidency in order to win primary elections.



In addition, the President should publicly state what most pragmatic political experts believe: Regardless of whether or not Governor Reagan wins any primaries, President Ford will be by far the stronger candidate for the Republican Party in a general election, and to nominate Governor Reagan would be a repetition of 1964.

This strategy has several key advantages:

a. This strategy emphasizes the major underlying strength of President Ford.

b. This strategy has a basic appeal to the independent voter. This will be further discussed in the December strategy paper.

c. This strategy affords a rationale in the event the President loses a primary and at the same time puts the burden on Governor Reagan to win primary elections in states where he heavily campaigns.

d. This strategy puts Governor Reagan in a position of having not much to gain if he wins a primary election but a lot to lose if he does not win. Thus, if Governor Reagan wins New Hampshire when President Ford campaigns only two or three days in New Hampshire, so what. But if Reagan loses New Hampshire under such circumstances, he has indeed lost a great deal.



The success of McGovern in New Hampshire was not necessarily in winning the election. Rather, it was running stronger than it was anticipated that he would run.

e. This strategy leaves open to the President the option of picking and choosing states in which he can more heavily campaign for the primary elections. Obviously, the states will be in areas where he has a favorable chance to win.

In order to consider adopting the foregoing overall strategy, the President must sharply reduce the number of his political trips. Instead of being seen on television screens waving at crowds, President Ford should be seen with leaders of this country and international leaders in Washington--conducting the business of this country. Furthermore, when he campaigns, it should be in his own behalf and not for others, particularly since President Ford has never run for national office in his own right. The real issue is not how much President Ford campaigns, but rather how he campaigns. And the how must include the candid statement that he does not expect to win the nomination by acclamation, that he expects in some places to run well and in some places not to run well.



At all times, the President must remember that he is the President and Ronald Reagan is not. He must stick more to his case--a candid, thoughtful, hard-working, capable President-- a case which will have several other important elements which I will discuss in the December strategy paper.

The overall strategy I suggest for consideration has an additional benefit to the President of timing. Sooner or later, Governor Reagan is going to put his foot in his mouth. And when he does, the best place to take advantage of this is not Manchester or Tallahassee. Rather, the best place is from the White House in Washington. And when this happens, the President can then adjust his schedule to campaign in the right states at the right time and defeat Governor Reagan in those particular primaries with the added advantages of pouncing on the opportunity of a fumble of the ball by Governor Reagan.

Looking at this strategy from the viewpoint of Governor Reagan, it presents an insurmountable problem: If the Governor wins a particular primary where the President has not heavily campaigned, the President can readily explain that loss, since he did not heavily campaign in that particular state.



On the other hand, if Governor Reagan as a full-time candidate loses a state in which he heavily campaigns, and in which the President did not heavily campaign, how can Governor Reagan explain that loss? The President can seize the opportunity to come forward with one of his basic positions of strength: The Republican Party must nominate a candidate who will have the most appeal to both Republican and Independent voters. If Governor Reagan loses a Republican primary as a full-time candidate, how can he possibly garner the support of the necessary Independent vote that is essential for Republican victory in November?

There is yet an additional overall advantage to the strategy I suggest: It will enable the President to do a better job in office, because he will be devoting more time to that office. As I said at the beginning, the basic strength of Gerald Ford is that he is the President of the United States. Let us never underestimate or undermine that strength in seeking the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976.

Finally, there is one other crucial element in defusing the Reagan challenge: Organization. There is just no substitute for a sound, aggressive, coordinated campaign organization. There are many people who believe that the performance thus far in the




area of campaign organization leaves much to be desired. Time is of the essence.

Initially, the organization must be centered around leading Republicans in each of the fifty states. However, there will have to also be a parallel organization primarily directed for the Independent voter. This will be further developed in the January strategy paper.

In summary, the best way to defuse the Reagan challenge is to combine a sound strategy with first-rate aggressive political organization. The key to the strategy is that Gerald Ford is the President and Ronald Reagan is not the President and that Gerald Ford as President is going to be doing his job and will not be devoting a lot of time to primary campaigning. Therefore, there will be states where he will win and there will be states where he will lose. His goal is not to win the nomination by acclamation, but rather to win a majority of the delegates to the Convention, and that if he wins the nomination he will be far the strongest candidate for the Republican Party in a general election.

The greatest risk to the President is to campaign heavily and fall prey to the so-called Washington political pundits who



would write that a 20% or 30% Reagan showing is a psychological victory for Reagan. This has to be turned so that the burden is placed on Governor Reagan to win primary elections in states where he heavily campaigns, and if he does not win those elections, it is he, the full-time campaigner, who has lost. But even if he wins some, this has to be expected. And if he wins too many, the President can pick and choose his own battleground. It may be Wisconsin, it may be Oregon, it may be in some other state--perhaps even California. But let the President pick his own battleground and not try to campaign on every battleground. And wherever the President picks the battleground, he should be sure that he has a first-rate campaign organization on which he can rely.

David W. Belin  
2000 Financial Center  
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

November 4, 1975





Speech to  
Natl War College  
Nov. 25, 1975



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

NWCCD

28 November 1975

Mr. Ron Nessen  
White House Press Office  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Nessen:


It was most kind of you to take time off from your busy, indeed hectic, schedule to come and speak to The National War College's elective course on "Impact of the Mass Media on National Security."

No aspect of our public image and press relations is of more interest and importance than the White House. Every pronouncement from there has an effect not only in our country but around the world. It was therefore most important that the class hear the words of the man who is most directly involved in that vital source of media information.

Lieutenant Colonel Graf has told me how well the students received your lecture and the candid way that you answered questions. Your presentation was certainly one of the highlights of the course.

This is the first year that we have presented an elective course on the media, and if it is presented again next year I hope that you will be able to come back again and talk to the Class of 1977.

Sincerely,

  
JAMES S. MURPHY  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant

