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APR 11 1976

Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr.

Mr. Speaker:

I'm thoroughly convinced that the security review functions of the Department of Defense too often have been handled in an inept and confusing manner. The right to and the necessity of an objective security review of testimony given in executive session before the Department of Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations is not the issue. The problem is the operation or management of this important responsibility. Our Committee made a reduction of \$66,000 in funds included for these security review functions under "Operation, Defense Agencies." On page 32 of its Report, the Committee says, "Statements made by certain representatives of agencies have been deleted in some instances while statements of representatives of other agencies containing the same information have not been deleted from other portions of the record." Quite frankly the Committee in effect is saying that in the security review operation, in many instances the "right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing."

The dissemination of information on governmental activities is a vital cornerstone of any free society. The people of the country must be sufficiently well informed to make their wishes known on important issues. At the same time, information which is not of assistance to the people of the United States but would be of assistance to military intelligence agents of the Soviet Union or any other enemy should not be revealed. There is sometimes a fine line between the two. For this reason, those who are empowered to make the decisions as to what information shall be given the American people and what information shall be withheld from them must be persons of competence and complete objectivity. The use of security review to withhold information from the American people or to cover up vital issues for political reasons cannot be permitted. The Directorate for Security Review of the Department of Defense should be adequately manned by able, knowledgeable individuals, and they should be directed by persons who have no political axes to grind and who impress upon their staffs the need for objectivity and uniformity in their decisions.

In examples to be cited later I will show that the persons who deleted or censored portions of testimony in the Hearings of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations were not even aware of other testimony on the same point being given before the same Subcommittee within a very short period of time. The attempt to delete from the record my innocuous statement concerning the U-2 flights, in the face of the public testimony which has been available for almost two years now, seems like the attempt

of the totalitarian government described in George Orwell's book "1984" to rewrite history to suit the current viewpoint of the government.

The examples I will give are but two of many which the Members of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations had to contend with during this session of Congress. A great many, even more ridiculous, attempts at censorship were made. After inquiry by the Members of the Committee as to the reasons therefor, many of them were cleared for printing in the public record and the original censoring explained as a clerical error or inadvertent deletion.

Dr. Harold Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, presented a very interesting statement to the Committee. Upon the completion of this statement some of the Members asked Dr. Brown how such a statement could be unclassified and placed in the public record. After pointing out that the statement had been reviewed and that it did not contain material which it was thought would be helpful to an enemy he said, "My own judgment is that because the way we determine things in this country, and it is the right way, the way that distinguishes us from the other side, we must have an informed public. We can only have an informed public by giving out information that we perhaps sometimes wish not so many people knew."

This is the viewpoint which must be shared by those whose duty it is to review remarks by personnel of the Department of Defense. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has had extensive hearings on the censoring of speeches of military officers. I have no desire to involve myself or our committee in their deliberations. However, the Committee on Appropriations this year has had unfortunate experiences with the censoring of testimony not only of military officers but of questions of Members of Congress. Obviously all is not well with the Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense. And I urge that immediate steps be taken to see that a proper job is done in this important field. There have been enough excuses and alibis. The Committee wants an objective and consistent job done immediately.

Now let me illustrate what I mean and also present the basis for the Committee viewpoint. I have been deeply concerned about the vital necessity of proof or system testing of our ballistic missile systems with nuclear warheads such as the Atlas, Titan, and Polaris which means the firing of a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead by operational crews. Throughout the hearings in 1962 on the fiscal year 1963 military budget I repeatedly asked questions on the problem of General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, General Smith, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and General Decker, Chief of Staff of the Army. In 1961

during the hearings on F. Y. 1962 budget the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee, Rep. George Mahon (Dem. of Texas) made similar inquiries concerning this important matter.

The security review in this area, as I will illustrate, has been far from satisfactory. Let us look at the record, which speaks for itself, as found in the published hearing of 1961:

In the Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, Part 4, page 442, Mr. Mahon asked on May 1, 1961, the following question of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Joseph V. Charyk, and Lt. Gen. Roscoe G. Wilson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development:

"Mr. Mahon: ***Have we ever fired a fully equipped missile with an atomic warhead and had it explode and carry out its mission?"

After an off the record discussion General Wilson made the following statement:

"General Wilson: ***I think you can determine an estimate of reliability mathematically, but in the end you have to conduct tests to prove out your hypotheses. So testing is the only answer. Would you bear me out, Dr. Charyk?"

"Dr. Charyk: Sure.

"Mr. Mahon: Do you mean to say unless you fire an ICBM with a nuclear warhead, you have not sufficiently tested your weapon?"

"Dr. Chryk: I think that is correct; yes, sir.

"Your probabilities can run very high indeed without test, but they remain, until you test them, hypotheses. That has been the military view.

"We have been extremely nervous about having anything in stockpile that has not been tested, even though we are assured that the probability of success is very high. We feel so much depends upon a high order of success that we must test things."

A bit later Mr. Mahon asked this question:

"Mr. Mahon: ***Where are we going to get definite and complete assurance? If we are going to place the chief reliance at some future time on the intercontinental ballistic missile for the protection of this country, we need to know the facts of life with the greatest degree of accuracy.

"Dr. Charyk: Actually, we of course can fire a missile and check all elements of the system, but_____.

"Mr. Mahon: We have never fired a nuclear warhead, subjecting it to the shock it would be subjected to at the time of launch, and subjecting it to the speeds and atmospheric changes incident to its flight to its objective. How are we to know but that this might bring about some change in the weapon that would make it ineffective?"

Having attended the hearing in 1961, knowing what was in the published hearings and being deeply concerned about proof or system testing of nuclear warheads of ballistic missiles, on February 1, 1962 I asked the Secretary of Defense and General Lemnitzer certain questions about the situation. My questions and the answers were deleted from the printed hearings by the security review process.

This was difficult to understand bearing in mind the questions asked in 1961 by Chairman Mahon and the responses by Under Secretary of the Air Force Charyk and Lt. General Roscoe G. Wilson. The inconsistency of this decision is more flagrant if one reads the following from the printed hearings for this year, 1962.

On page 412 of the Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963, Part 2, I asked the following question of the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Mr. Ford: I think this is very impressive, but let me ask you this question: Have you ever fired a POLARIS missile with a nuclear warhead from a POLARIS submarine operating at sea?

"Admiral Anderson: No. We have done all the testing up to the point of having the nuclear head in the weapon itself. We have had instead, telemetering to give us the information back that we would presume would give us the degree of reliability, or the indication of reliability that we have to have."

No request was made by the Directorate for Security Review for this material to be deleted from the printed record. McNamara and Lemnitzer testified February 1, 1962 and Admiral Anderson 5 days later.

On page 507 of the same Hearing I asked the following question during the appearance of the Secretary of the Air Force and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"Mr. Ford: I am disturbed that scientists who designed these weapons are the ones who are telling us that they are going to work.

It would be very helpful, it seems to me, if the military people who have to use them had some practical experience in the firing of them.

"General Smith: Actually, I would like to expand on that, Mr. Ford, because as far as firing is concerned the military people do get practical experience. In our category 3 testing of ATLAS, for instance, and in category 3 that will come on for TITAN I and TITAN II and MINUTEMAN, the SAC crews actually fire the weapons system and fire it on a range where results are measured for accuracy. And crews are checked for their ability to handle the complex jobs they have to perform prior to, and during, launch.

"The only thing that has not been exercised in ATLAS, as an example, is the actual detonation of the warhead at the termination of an actual trajectory. All of the relays and other things which have to function after the reentry body comes back in have been tested."

In concluding a longer and somewhat detailed discussion of this problem, the following concluding question and answer were made (page 508):

"Mr. Ford: If such tests were undertaken, and assuming that the Soviet Union would have means of knowing such tests were made, it would certainly improve the credibility of our deterrent force.

"General Smith: I believe so, sir."

In this instance General Smith testified 12 days after McNamara and Lemnitzer. I am completely puzzled by the paradox that the testimony of General Smith, Admiral Anderson, Secretary Charyk can be published but the statements of Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer may not be printed. I can see no justification for a deletion in one and not in the other.

LET ME TAKE ANOTHER EXAMPLE. In this case inconsistencies in policy are obvious but in addition in this instance I confess there is some evidence that the deletion of my question and the answer have a political rather than a security flavor.

On February 1, 1962 while General Lemnitzer and Secretary McNamara were testifying in executive session before the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations there were questions raised and answers given concerning the adequacy of our military intelligence program. Because of an answer given by General Lemnitzer I asked a question about the U-2 program and the impact of its discontinuance in May 1960. In my judgment it was an important question which should have been answered for the

record. My reference in the question to the U-2 program by any definition, including past decisions by security review, was certainly printable. YET IT WAS DELETED IN THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Let me show how inconsistent and unreasonable the deletion was.

On June 2, 1960, the then Secretary of Defense, the Hon. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U. S. Senate, (page 124) stated:

"We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we are in all of our nation's intelligence collection results. For example, from these flights we got information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployment, and things like these.

"These were all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest."

The above testimony was printed and made available to the general public.

At a later point in the same Hearing the following colloquy took place

(page 136):

"Senator Hickenlooper: Now, these U-2 flights have been extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?"

"Secretary Gates: They have indeed, Senator."

Still further (page 138), the following colloquy took place:

"Senator Long: If it were essential or important that the U-2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of the United States adversely effected by an absolute discontinuance on May 13?"

"Secretary Gates: We have lost, through compromise, an important source of information.

"Senator Long: In other words, we do badly need the same information that we were gathering with the U-2 flights?"

"Secretary Gates: We need a continuity of this information, I think, Senator."

Still further on page 143:

"Senator Lausche: ***My question is, If you did not have the knowledge acquired through the U-2's, could you have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the actual, potential military power of the Soviet?"

"Secretary Gates: Not as well, Senator; by no means."

Still further, page 154, the following colloquy took place:

"The Chairman (Senator Fulbright): In other words, the result of your overflights and the information you got has given you a better appreciation of their military strength and that appreciation is that they are very well armed - is that correct - better than you expected?"

"Secretary Gates: In some case, yes. In some case, perhaps less well than they advertised."

The then Secretary of State, the Honorable Christian Herter testified

(page 7):

"The U-2 program was an important and efficient intelligence effort."

Later in the same Hearing (page 37) the following colloquy took place:

"Senator Hickenlooper: Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years?"

"Secretary Herter: Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us."

If all this testimony by responsible government officials could be printed, there was absolutely no reason to censor my question on the U-2 program.

The Committee action in reducing funds for security review by \$60,000 may appear to be harsh. However the reduction in funds is about the only method I know to straighten out the problem and accomplish better management. Certainly the current

operations as they affect testimony before our committee are unsatisfactory. Individual committee members and the committee staff could give many similar illustrations, some more ridiculous than those I have cited.

In conclusion let me assure those responsible in the Department of Defense that when there is evidence that the management and operation of the security review section is remedied I will personally do all that I can to see that adequate funds are available.

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