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Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY *DS*
SUBJECT: REAGAN 1/2 HOUR - NBC

Attached are the A.C. Nielsen overnight rating projections for the Reagan half-hour program that ran last night between 10:30 and 11 PM on NBC.

In New York this program was viewed by 9.1% of the television homes or approximately 8.8% of the total homes in the New York market. In Chicago it was seen by 7.3% of television homes or 7.1% of total homes. In Los Angeles, Reagan's home base, it is not surprising that the rating was higher - 12.0% of TV homes or 11.7% of total homes.

National ratings are not yet available for this time period, however, taking into consideration the unusually high response in L.A., A.C. Nielsen estimates that this program was probably viewed by 8.6 to 9.0% of the total television universe or roughly 8.5% of the total homes in the U.S. This translates to a total audience of approximately 6,072,00 homes.

This viewing level is not particularly high, in fact, it is significantly lower than the average 7 o'clock network news program which reaches approximately 12 to 13% of U.S. TV homes.

cc: Stu Spencer
Peter Kaye
Peter Dailey
Clayt Wilhite
Peggy Pilas
Barry Lafer
George Karalekas
John Overaker
Jack Frost
master



REAGAN

1/2 HOUR NBC

OVERNIGHT A.C. NIELSEN RATING

	<u>AVERAGE 1/2 HOUR</u>		<u>AVERAGE 1/4 HOUR</u>	
	<u>SHARE</u>	<u>RATING</u>	<u>10:30-10:45</u>	<u>10:46-11:00</u>
NEW YORK	16.0	9.1	9.2	8.9
CHICAGO	11.0	7.3	8.1	6.5
LOS ANGELES	23.0	12.0	12.6	11.3
PROJECTED NATIONAL RATING (WEIGHTED AVERAGE)		9.6		
REALISTIC PROJECTION		8.6 - 9.0		

ESTIMATED # TV HOUSEHOLDS

PROJECTED NATIONAL RATING: 6,624,000

MORE REALISTIC RATING: 6,072,000



Campaign'76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY
SUBJECT: REAGAN COMPETITIVE ACTIVITY IN WISCONSIN

The commercial dexted to you from SFM is estimated to be carried on 45 stations in Wisconsin, 12-18 announcements per station, paid for by the American Conservative Union. Additionally, we have isolated radio activity paid for by the Wisconsin Citizens for Reagan. We are trying to get that script.

It is reported that the Wisconsin Citizen schedule has been running very heavily the last 5 days throughout the state. This translates to about 6 announcements per day per station.

cc: Clayt Wilhite




~~ORANGE~~ ~~WHOLE~~
From: Dan Sibley

^R
Gerald ~~Ford~~ appointed Nelson Rockefeller Vice President of the United States. He retained Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, and Kissinger's righthand man says we should abandon the people of Poland and East Germany to Communist enslavement.

Gerald Ford has spoken approvingly of massive bussing in Detroit. He refuses to back a constitutional amendment to bring the bussing to a halt. He has presided over \$100 billion in deficits for two short years.

Ronald Reagan, by way of contrast, says he would fire Henry Kissinger and support our anti-Communist allies around the world. Ronald Reagan's opposed to massive bussing and backs the constitutional amendment that would stop the busses in their tracks. The choice for Wisconsin voters is clear. Continued drift with bussing and detente or Ronald Reagan's new initiatives for freedom.

This message sponsored by the American Conservative Union. Not authorized by Ronald Reagan or his committee.



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY
SUBJECT: REAGAN 1/2 HOUR

This is to confirm that we have ordered Radio TV Reports to pull a Kine of the Reagan 1/2 hour this weekend in Wisconsin. The cost will be \$140.00 plus shipping.

cc: Clayt Wilhite
George Karalekas



Master

Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 5, 1976

MEMO TO: BRUCE WAGNER

FROM: PEGGY PILAS *P.*

SUBJECT: DEFENSE

Attached is an analysis of the President's voting record on defense during his service of 25 years in the House of Representatives.

The report focuses on major, rather than on all, subjects related to defense that arose during this period.

The issue profile is based primarily on remarks made, legislation introduced, and votes cast by Representative Ford.

cc: Peter Dailey
Clayt Wilhite
Phelps Johnston
John Overaker

Attachment



a bill to regulate surface mining of coal, on October 11, 1972; in the vote on that measure, he paired with Mr. Annunizio.²³

OIL IMPORT CONTROLS

The U.S. oil import control program originated as a restrictive amendment to laws otherwise designed to promote trade relations globally. The 1955 Reciprocal Trade Extension Act (P.L. 84-86) included a provision delegating to the President the responsibility of limiting oil imports to the level needed to maintain "national security" and this was reenacted in successive trade expansion laws. The 1957 voluntary import control program, the 1959 mandatory import control program and President Nixon's 1970, 1972 and 1973 moves to relax oil import quotas were objects of extensive legislative debate.

There is nothing in the record of Mr. Ford's votes or remarks to indicate any specific oil import position from 1955 up to 1973. While he voted consistently for the reciprocal trade expansion legislation, there are no votes of record on the oil import provisions or comments of record on the President's 1970 and 1972 moves to relax quotas. He endorsed only in very general terms the President's April 18th 1973 Energy message, which included announcement of elimination of "all existing tariffs on imported crude oil and refined products."²⁴ However, in the course of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline debate, he strongly articulated the need for U.S. independence of foreign oil sources as required by "national security interests", in terms fully consistent with the historical oil import protectionist philosophy.²⁵

WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Water resource programs of the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation and other agencies of the Federal Government have not undergone basic revision in the last 25 years. However, creation of the Small Watershed Program of the Soil Conservation Service and passage of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 were important developments in water resource policy.

The Small Watershed Program (P.L. 83-566) passed the House in 1954, but without a recorded vote. The Water Resources Planning Act (P.L. 89-80) passed the House in 1965, and Ford is recorded under the "yea" votes; there were no dissenting votes. In the 83rd Congress, Ford voted for establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation and for adding additional power facilities at Niagara Falls; on both issues Republicans were strongly in favor, and Democrats about evenly split.²⁶ In the 86th Congress, the fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation bill contained many unbudgeted projects, and was subsequently vetoed; a revised bill was passed, and it too, was vetoed, but the second veto was overridden. On the vote to override, Ford was paired against—most Republicans opposed the vote to override. In the 83rd and 84th Congresses, he opposed efforts to increase water diversion from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal.²⁷ In 1952, as a member of the subcommittee which produced the fiscal 1953 Public Works appropriation, he helped to manage its passage.²⁸ Otherwise, he has made few comments in the House relating to water resources. In the past four years, Ford has not testified before appropriations hearings on projects in his district.

WILDERNESS PRESERVATION

Representative Ford voted in support of the establishment of a National Wilderness Preservation System on July 30, 1964 when the measure was approved by a vote of 374-1.²⁹ He did not participate in floor debate on the proposal. He has since served as sponsor of several additional wilderness proposals including the administration omnibus wilderness expansion proposal in the 92nd Congress (H.R. 9965) and a current proposal for the designation of wilderness in Isle Royale National Park in Michigan (H.R. 5462).

²³ Congressional Record, (daily summary), October 11, 1972, p. H9610.

²⁴ Congressional Record, Vol. 119, Daily Summary, April 18, 1973, p. H2892, 93rd Congress, 1st session.

²⁵ Congressional Record, Vol. 119, Daily Summary, August 2, 1973, pp. H7266, 93rd Congress, 1st session.

²⁶ Congress and the Nation, Vol. 1, pp. 38a-97a.

²⁷ Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (1955), pp. 9991-9993, 1002-1003, and Congress and the Nation, Vol. 1, pp. 968-969.

²⁸ Congressional Record, Vol. 98 (1952), pp. 3295-3300, 5578-5581.

²⁹ Congressional Record, Vol. 110, July 30, 1964, p. 17458. Roll call vote no. 197.

The Wilderness System is to protect specific areas of National Parks, National Forests and Wildlife Refuges from development and to maintain the areas in a natural condition.

Mr. Ford has not been particularly active in the matter of wilderness protection or related National Park issues. When he has spoken on these items he has taken a position which seems to favor utilization of recreational resources rather than preservation. In debating the establishment of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Michigan, legislation which he cosponsored, Mr. Ford said the residents of the area had done a commendable job of protecting the natural conditions. He added:

But I think we have to recognize that the more certain way, the more positive way to see to it that this area is not only preserved but open to more people or to all the people is by the enactment of this legislation. I just feel that this is the better course of action in trying to save an area in our State, not only for the 8 million residents of Michigan but also the literally millions and millions and millions of other Americans who, we hope, will come to see this gorgeous spot and be inspired by the sight and the natural beauty of that area of Michigan.³⁰

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

UNITED STATES POLICY IN INDOCHINA

Representative Ford has been a consistent supporter of U.S. policy in Indochina since the administration of President Truman, though he did question the application of that policy during the latter part of the administration of President Lyndon Johnson. He supported President Nixon's efforts to end the war in Vietnam and in the 1970-1973 period opposed legislation aimed at setting a cut-off date for U.S. military operations in Indochina. However, he voted for a proposal, accepted by the White House, which set an August 15, 1973, deadline for U.S. military operations in Cambodia. He summarized his approach to Vietnam policy in a speech on the House floor on August 10, 1972, in which he said he believed that Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon had all done their utmost to solve and settle the problem.³¹

In June 1964 he said that he and other members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee had been concerned about the Vietnam problem for some time and had urged the Executive Branch to adopt firmer policies and strategies "for that area of the world." The United States could not, he added, run away from its obligations. Congress must exert every effort to urge the President to seek a "just and honorable solution for Southeast Asia and give our assurance that we will back up any decision based upon just and honorable terms, no matter how difficult they may be."³²

Representative Ford in August 1964 voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but said this did not mean that he approved without qualification administration policies toward Vietnam in the previous 3½ years. He said he had been critical of certain administration policies in Southeast Asia and that he would point out any deficiencies he saw in the new policies. Past policies, he noted, had not produced victory; more positive U.S. military action "affecting our own ground forces on prior occasions might have turned the tide our way much sooner."³³

On April 28, 1965, Representative Ford said he had both privately and publicly supported the President's "present firm policy" in Indochina. He said that a "very high degree of bipartisanship" was necessary to prevent the North Vietnamese from miscalculating on the basis of statements made by any public official including any Member of Congress.³⁴

Representatives Ford and Laird in August 1965, in a discussion with reporters, said they would urge the President and Members of Congress to cut back on domestic expenditures in order to meet the growing expenses of the Vietnam war. Both said they would not criticize the President for his course in Vietnam until there had been time to see whether the troop buildup had been effective.³⁵

In January 1966, Representative Ford said that neither he nor any other Republican in the Congress had sought to make the war a political issue: "No

³⁰ Congressional Record, Vol. 116, September 22, 1970, p. 33146.

³¹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, August 10, 1972: H7483.

³² Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 110, June 1, 1964: 12250-12251.

³³ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 110, August 7, 1964: 18551.

³⁴ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 111, April 28, 1965: 8648.

³⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 111, August 4, 1965: 19461.



Republican had called this the President's war. No Republican has called this McNamara's war." "On January 31, 1966, Ford said that the President's decision to resume the bombing of North Vietnam was one of the most critical in American history and "We . . . hope and pray that this decision is the right one."

On August 8, 1967, in a major speech on Vietnam, Ford rose to voice misgivings "which have been growing for many months" about the conduct of the Vietnam war. He said he had given complete support to the President in the past, to the extent that he had been "branded a hawk, and worse" for urging firmness and for using U.S. conventional arms to "compel a swift and sure peace." The United States, he said, was pulling its punches in regard to the use of military power, particularly its air power. He said that whatever military plans the U.S. had for ending the war were not being used, or were being tried piecemeal. A war of gradualism, he added, could not be won, as the enemy was able to match each U.S. buildup. He said that present policy had produced a stalemate, that Republican warnings about getting involved in a land war in Asia had been ignored, that a Republican recommendation for a quarantine of Haiphong Harbor had been rejected. Ford said the Republicans were not urging escalation, but urging better use of present conventional weapons and a selection of more vital military targets. The President, he said, had indicated he would continue the "same inadequate level of pressure permitted in the past." He concluded by asking, "Is this any way to run a war?"—and said that ending the war should be given first priority among national aims, otherwise the U.S. would continue to "wallow and weave and wobble."

Ford has given strong support to the Vietnam policy of the Nixon administration. In May 1969, he opposed an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal 1969 which would have eliminated \$640 million in procurement funds for the Army. This amendment, he said, would "slow down materially hinder and hamper" the attempt to turn over more of the fighting to South Vietnamese troops.

He strongly supported the President's peace initiatives in 1969 and after, arguing that the program of phased troops withdrawals and Vietnamization were parts of a "carefully drawn plan to end the war." He noted after the October 1969 "moratorium" protest on Vietnam that press reports regarding the size of the crowds participating were exaggerated and that a sizable majority of Americans supported President Nixon's efforts to achieve "peace with honor."

Ford supported the sanctuary operations in Cambodia in May-June 1970, arguing that the operation would shorten the war and would enable the U.S. to continue withdrawal of combat forces from Vietnam. After the President's interim report on the Cambodian operation, Ford said the President had kept his word to the American people and deserved the broadest possible support. He said in September 1970 that the sharp decline in U.S. casualty rates since the Cambodian operation had borne out President Nixon's prediction.

Representative Ford supported the bombing of North Vietnam following the invasion of South Vietnam across the DMZ in April 1972.⁴⁵ In May 1972 he said President Nixon must be supported in the mining and blockading of North Vietnamese ports to shut off the supplies that were feeding the invasion of South Vietnam. He said that the mining was right and proved to the world that America's word was good.⁴⁶

In the 1970-1973 period, Ford voted consistently to oppose any cutoff date limiting the President's authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia. However, he supported the bill to end bombing operations in Cambodia on August 15, 1973. He said in a speech to the House that the President would accept and sign such a bill, and "if military action is required in Southeast Asia after August 15, the President will ask Congressional authority and will abide by the decision that is made by the House and the Senate." In the same speech, Ford summarized his past approach to cutoff date legislation:

⁴⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 112, January 25, 1966: 1086.

⁴⁶ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 112, January 31, 1966: 1556.

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 113, August 8, 1967: 21897.

⁴⁸ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 113, May 21, 1969: 12259.

⁴⁹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 115, October 21, 1969: 30882.

⁵⁰ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 115, October 21, 1969: 30882.

⁵¹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, May 5, 1970: 14192.

⁵² Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, May 6, 1970: 14422.

⁵³ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, September 28, 1960: 33923.

⁵⁴ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, April 17, 1972: H3054.

⁵⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, April 27, 1972: H3697.

⁵⁶ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, May 9, 1972: H4263.

My record is very clear from the beginning. I have time after time after time opposed any cutoff date, period. I have resisted many efforts by Members on the other side of the aisle who have repeatedly over a span of years sought to get the Congress to approve amendments that would limit the authority of the President to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia.

. . . But we have a different situation today. It seems to me that we should now, at this critical juncture, accept the language of the appropriation bill . . . It is a compromise that in my judgment reasonable people can accept as we face a very critical problem in the U.S."

U.S. POLICY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Congressman Ford has advocated bipartisan support for a United States policy toward the Middle East which would (1) maintain the military balance in the region by providing arms for Israel, (2) provide U.S. assistance for "moderate" Arab governments committed to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli problem, (3) seek an Arab-Israeli peace settlement derived from direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis, and (4) stop the Soviet Union from undermining U.S. security interests in the Middle East.

Stating that it is ". . . in the best interests . . . of the United States (and) the free world . . ." to sell jet aircraft to Israel, Congressman Ford has supported the U.S. policy of maintaining the arms balance and not allowing it to "turn against Israel." He has supported U.S. assistance to "moderate" Arab governments so that they could resist "radical forces" in the Middle East⁵⁷ and he has opposed giving assistance to "demagogues" such as Egypt's Nasser and favored the passage of legislation which restricted PL 480 sales to Egypt.⁵⁸ In Mr. Ford's expressed opinion, the Soviet Union is collaborating with the Arabs to impose a peace settlement on Israel, while the United States is against an imposed settlement and seeks a directly negotiated peace.⁵⁹ Congressman Ford has stated that ". . . the fate of Israel is linked to the national security interests of the United States . . ." and that the Soviet Union is trying ". . . to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East that would undermine vital American security interests . . ."

Mr. Ford's interest in Middle Eastern affairs appears to have emerged recently, particularly since the 1967 war, which he said was ". . . instigated by Communists . . ."⁶⁰ He has consistently advocated a bipartisan approach to foreign policy in the Middle East, although he was criticized by some of his colleagues in the House of Representatives for using American policy toward the Middle East for an attack on a prominent Democrat.⁶¹

U.S. POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE

Congressman Gerald R. Ford has spoken only briefly and infrequently on European questions during his service in the House of Representatives. He has limited his remarks on these occasions chiefly to defense issues and relations with the Soviet Union. On both of these topics he has generally taken unyielding positions, although he has adopted a more positive attitude toward detente since President Nixon's visit to Moscow.

In June 1973 Congressman Ford hailed the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting in June as having strengthened peaceful relations between Washington and Moscow and having been fruitful and productive.⁶² In the same month he spoke favorably of MBFR negotiations as providing an opportunity of reducing U.S. troops in

⁵⁷ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, July 9, 1970: 23517.

⁵⁸ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 117, June 17, 1971: 20536.

⁵⁹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, August 10, 1972: H7470, H7473.

⁶⁰ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 119, June 25, 1973: H5267.

⁶¹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 119, June 26, 1973: H5365.

⁶² Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, June 9, 1970: 19006.

⁶³ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, February 24, 1970: 4416.

⁶⁴ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38250, 38260.

⁶⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 111, January 26, 1965: 1190.

⁶⁶ Speech before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, reprinted in the Congressional Record, v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12933.

⁶⁷ Speech before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, reprinted in the Congressional Record, v. 115, April 24, 1969: 10321.

⁶⁸ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 113, May 23, 1967: 13628.

⁶⁹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 117, May 4, 1971: 13352-13356.

⁷⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 119, no. 99, June 25, 1973, p. H5348.

Europe without weakening NATO defense.⁶⁶ In 1972 he cosponsored a joint resolution approving the acceptance by the President of the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.⁶⁷ At the same time he warned against allowing any foreign power to achieve overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis the United States and strongly supported the President's military budget.⁶⁸

In 1969 he expressed the view that the United States should seek enforceable agreements with the Soviet Union aimed at avoiding a third world war but described as "the greatest hypocrisy" closing "our eyes to the wrongs that the Soviet Union has done to millions of human beings deprived of individual freedom and national independence."⁶⁹ In the same speech he cited with approval Dean Acheson's view "that the United States should enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union only from the strongest possible position."⁷⁰ In 1968 he spoke in favor of the United States strengthening NATO militarily and politically but urged the European allies to contribute their fair share.⁷¹ In the same year he inveighed against "the spirit of false co-existence" and described as a myth the belief that if the United States should furnish trade and aid to help the economies of the captive nations, "the Communist monolith would breakup."⁷² In 1964 in summarizing a report entitled American Strategy and Strength prepared by a task force of Republican Congressmen of which he was a member, he warned against "the subtle belief that survival against the Communist threat has ceased to be an issue." He quoted from an earlier report a statement that there is "no sound economic alternative for the cold war" which was described as a basic prerequisite for both preparedness and the preservation of economic freedom and strength.⁷³ He recommended exploring plans for nuclear sharing among the NATO "Big Four", entertaining the possibility of new command structures in the NATO alliance and urged a new entente cordiale with France. He attacked the Democratic Administration for abandoning military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union for parity and charged that the Administration had weakened NATO by negotiating unilaterally with the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ In 1963 he opposed Export-Import Bank loans to communist countries for the purchase of grain.⁷⁵ In 1960 he defended U.S. financial contributions to NATO.⁷⁶ In a speech in the House in the same year he called for a greater sharing of defense burden by NATO allies, supported the doctrine of massive retaliation, attacked the strategic concept of a "pause," and stressed the gravity of the Sino-Soviet peril.

Throughout his career in the House Congressman Ford has sponsored or supported resolutions protesting the Soviet subjugation of captive nations and regularly made strongly anti-Soviet statements on Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Romanian, Estonian, and Hungarian national days, and on the anniversaries of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1971 he spoke in favor of giving the President the right to determine when aid to Greece is justified as necessary for our own self-interest.⁷⁷

Congressman Ford's voting record has followed the same pattern. He has regularly supported Administration requests for Department of Defense budgets. Early examples of his views as reflected in his voting record were his vote in 1952 against limiting the amount specified in the military budget to \$46 billion and his vote in favor of the financing of a special committee to investigate the Katyn massacres.

U.S. ROLE AND POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Congressman Gerald Ford has, in general, supported the United Nations and argued for continued U.S. participation in and cooperation with the United Nations. In extending his support, however, he has emphasized what he regarded as a need for firm control over U.N. finances.

While Congressman Ford did, in 1950, vote against H.J. Res. 334, which increased the authorization on U.S. contributions to five international organiza-

⁶⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 119, no. 100, June 26, 1973, p. H5471.

⁶⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, no. 95, June 13, 1972, p. H5570.

⁶⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, no. 100, June 20, 1972, p. E6339-40.

⁶⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 115, part 14, July 14, 1969, p. 19350.

⁷⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 115, part 14, July 14, 1969, p. 19348.

⁷¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 111, part 13, July 27, 1965, p. 18477.

⁷² Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 110, part 12, June 29, 1964, p. 15282-6.

⁷³ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 109, part 19, Dec. 24, 1963, p. 25229-31.

⁷⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 106, part 10, June 16, 1960, p. 12912.

⁷⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 106, part 1, Jan. 20, 1960, p. 929-932.

⁷⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 117, part 22, Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29114.

tions and which also required the President to report to the Congress annually on the extent and disposition of all U.S. financial contributions to the international organizations in which the United States participated, his record also supports the statement made in the first paragraph.⁷⁸ He voted in 1958 in favor of a resolution calling for the development of U.N. peace forces.⁷⁹

Three years earlier, he had spoken out against the transfer of the U.N. Narcotics Division from New York to Geneva. In his remarks on the House floor in January 1955 he observed,

In fighting this international evil the U.N. needs the complete cooperation and assistance of the United States and the United States needs the same from the United Nations. This mutual cooperation and assistance will not be increased by moving the U.N. Narcotics Division to Geneva.⁸⁰

When he spoke out on this issue in March 1955 he voiced concern over the cost involved in building and equipping a new Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva, when at that time the Narcotics Division in New York was able to use the U.S. Treasury Department's laboratory in New York "at no additional expense to the United States or the United Nations." He indicated he would recommend that "the House Committee on Appropriations reduce the appropriation, namely the United States contribution, for the general operation of the U.N. by \$30,000 if the Narcotics Laboratory is transferred to Geneva. * * * To deduct \$30,000 will not destroy the effectiveness of the United Nations, but it will indicate to the Secretary General that the Congress is opposed to this uneconomical, unwise, and unnecessary transfer of the Narcotics Laboratory."⁸¹

Representative Ford also supported the authorization of funds for expansion of the U.N. Headquarters in 1970. He voted against recommitment of the resolution to committee and in favor of passage of the resolution.⁸²

In support of his vote he said: "as disappointed as I sometime am with the United Nations, and I think this is a reaction many of us have from time to time, do believe it is important to keep the United Nations alive so that it can possibly do a better job in the future."

* * * The United Nations is a hope for peace and we should not back out at this crucial hour when the U.N. can perform a useful function. To defeat the rule of the bill, undoubtedly, the U.N. will be fragmented and New York and the United States will lose the benefits of this organization."⁸³

During the South Asian conflict in 1971 Congressman Ford urged the United States to "take the lead in shifting the India-Pakistan cease-fire resolution away from the Security Council and placing it before the General Assembly. Only there can the peace-loving nations of the world work their will."

He noted, in concluding, his view that "any nation that refuses to cooperate with the U.N. in its peace-keeping efforts should not expect a receptive atmosphere in the Congress or by the American people."⁸⁴

Mr. Ford's statement on not appropriating funds for the Narcotics Division illustrates his concern with fiscal responsibility as early as 1955. In the 1960's Congress passed legislation which authorized and appropriated funds for the \$1 billion loan to the United Nations (in 1962) and passed a resolution (in 1964) which urged the United States to continue efforts to secure payments by U.N. members of assessments in arrears. Representative Ford spoke and voted in support of each of these measures.⁸⁵ In 1964 he said:

I would like to state categorically that I fully support what I believe to be the intent of this concurrent resolution, but in my support of it I want it clearly understood that the President and our representatives at the United Nations will be very hard and tough. There is no room for compromise. Our U.N. delegates should demand that those other nations make their payments as they are required to do under the charter and the World Court decision. This is not a negotiable issue in the U.N. Payment is to be made, or else."⁸⁶

⁷⁸ Congressional Record, v. 96, June 22, 1950: 9092-9093.

⁷⁹ Congressional Record, v. 104, August 21, 1958: 18973-18974.

⁸⁰ Congressional Record, v. 101, January 11, 1955: 232-253.

⁸¹ Congressional Record, v. 101, March 29, 1955: 3927.

⁸² Congressional Record, v. 116, December 21, 1970: 43151.

⁸³ Congressional Record, v. 116, December 21, 1970: 43111.

⁸⁴ Congressional Record, v. 117, October 26, 1971: 44894.

⁸⁵ Congressional Record, v. 108, September 14, 1962: 19485-19486; Congressional Record, 110, August 17, 1964: 19886-19887. Statement in 1962: Congressional Record, v. 108, September 14, 1962: 19467-19468.

⁸⁶ Congressional Record, v. 110, August 17, 1964: 19884.

During the 1972 discussions in the House on reducing contributions to the United Nations and its agencies to 25 percent of the total budget of each agency, Representative Ford voted and argued in support of the Derwinski amendment which would have restored the cuts made by the House Appropriations Committee.

Ford acknowledged that much of the progress made by the United States in getting its assessments reduced throughout the years was due to the "pressure from that Congress . . . that we have been contributing too much." He noted that, "the mere fact that the Committee on Appropriations recommended that cut ought to be a signal to our people up at the United Nations and to the other nation members that we anticipate at the next negotiation, which takes place in 1973, that our contribution had better be down to 25 percent or less."⁸⁵

However, Congressman Ford pointed out that if the United States should default on its obligations, U.S. credibility in getting other nations to pay up would be eroded very seriously. (The Derwinski amendment was rejected, 152 ayes, 202 noes, 72 not voting.)⁸⁶

THE MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 480

Representative Ford's position on both the multilateral financial institutions and P.L. 480 is basically the same: he has consistently given strong support to the basic goals of the programs and to assure their continuation, but at various times has opposed specific aspects or amounts proposed.

From the beginning of P.L. 480 in 1954, he has supported the program and, except for 1962,⁸⁷ has voted for final passage of the successive bills. However, he was in favor of prohibiting P.L. 480 sales to any country trading with North Vietnam,⁸⁸ and against P.L. 480 sales to Egypt.⁸⁹ During the major overhaul of P.L. 480 in 1966, he opposed granting 40-year dollar credits on sales because he felt that the loans would most likely not be repaid such a long time after the food was consumed. In addition, he indicated his feeling that any country poor enough to qualify for the 40-year credits should be considered under the provisions of the bill grants in place of sales.⁹⁰ That year he voted to recommit the P.L. 480 authorization and, when that failed, voted in favor of final passage of the bill.⁹¹ This pattern—opposition to specific provisions, perhaps support for recommitment, then a favorable vote on final passage—has been common in Congressman Ford's votes on P.L. 480.

Congressman Ford's support for the multilateral financial institutions has been fairly consistent over time. He voted for the creation of the Development Loan Fund in 1957,⁹² and for the increased U.S. subscription to the World Bank and the IMF in 1959.⁹³ He supported the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959,⁹⁴ and the International Development Association in 1960.⁹⁵ In 1966, he favored U.S. membership in the Asian Development Bank,⁹⁶ and in early 1972 spoke out clearly in favor of the third replenishment of the IDA and in favor of a U.S. contribution to the Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank.⁹⁷

In 1964, he supported the increase in the U.S. subscription to the IDA,⁹⁸ but opposed the increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF in 1965 on the grounds of his concern over President Johnson's management of the economy.⁹⁹ His votes to reduce the U.S. share of the increase in the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, and to recommit the bill were cast because of his reluctance to "rubber stamp" decisions made by President Johnson at Punta Del Este.¹⁰⁰

⁸⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, May 18, 1972: H4690.

⁸⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, May 18, 1972: H4695.

⁸⁷ Congressional Record, v. 108, July 19, 1962: 14198, and September 20, 1962: 20129.

⁸⁸ Congressional Record, v. 112, August 20, 1966: 21288.

⁸⁹ Congressional Record, v. 111, January 20, 1965: 11190.

⁹⁰ Congressional Record, v. 112, June 9, 1966: 12861.

⁹¹ Congressional Record, v. 112, June 9, 1966: 12893, 12894.

⁹² Congressional Record, v. 103, July 19, 1957: 12226.

⁹³ Congressional Record, v. 105, March 25, 1959: 5239.

⁹⁴ Congressional Record, v. 105, July 27, 1959: 14369.

⁹⁵ Congressional Record, v. 106, June 26, 1960: 14967.

⁹⁶ 1966 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 854.

⁹⁷ Congressional Record, v. 118, February 1, 1972: H483.

⁹⁸ Congressional Record, v. 110, May 13, 1964: 10722.

⁹⁹ Congressional Record, v. 111, April 27, 1965: 8575.

¹⁰⁰ Congressional Record, v. 113, July 26, 1967: 20231.

THE U.S. BILATERAL AID PROGRAM

Speaking in 1961 Congressman Ford stated, with reference to the foreign aid program: "Also the record should show that I have consistently supported the program both for the authorization and the appropriation."¹ He particularly supported the military assistance program and the defense support program, several times offering amendments to restore cuts or increase expenditures in those areas. He also backed the Development Loan Fund. However, he opposed long-term Treasury financing of aid as "backdoor financing," and during the early and mid 1960's a pattern appeared in his voting record whereby he voted for motions whose effect was to reduce the amount of assistance, and then voted for the final authorization or appropriation bills. This dual pattern is no longer apparent.

The substance of Congressman Ford's position is that he supported U.S. foreign assistance, but his support was more vocal with respect to military assistance and defense support than with respect to economic aid. However, the purpose of the Development Loan Fund was economic, and Ford was a steady supporter of its full funding in its early years. When, in 1961, he opposed long-term development lending, he made the point that such a program would weaken Congressional control over the foreign aid program. He also argued that long-term planning was possible without Treasury financing, citing the phenomenal improvement of Formosa under traditional methods of Congressional review, and defended the record of Congress in funding administration foreign aid requests.²

As indicated above, Congressman Ford's position changed during the years a Democratic administration was in power, but only to the extent that he would vote for amendments or recommitment motions which aimed at reducing the amounts to be authorized or appropriated for foreign aid. Thus on August 23, 1963, he voted to recommit the Foreign Assistance Act in order to reduce the foreign aid authorization by \$585,000,000, and on the same day voted for the final passage of the authorization.³ On May 25, 1965 he voted to recommit the Foreign Assistance Act to reduce funds for development loans, and then vote for passage of the authorization bill, again on the same day.⁴ He consistently voted for the final authorization and appropriations bills. This pattern emerged before Mr. Ford became Minority Leader. With a Republican administration in power, he has consistently supported the administration's position. Thus, for example, he was paired for the foreign aid authorization adopted on January 25, 1972.⁵

The Congressman's record may be said to have featured a strong anti-Communist position. His strong backing for military aid and defense support reflected this point of view. In 1960, for example, he sponsored amendments to both the authorization and appropriation bills which would have substantially increased the defense support program.⁶ In other words, his emphasis in supporting foreign aid is on building up the military strength of the non-Communist nations. The record shows somewhat more space devoted to expounding this philosophy than to advocating the economic benefits of aid, either to the developing countries or the United States.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (SELECTED ISSUES)

In the area of general foreign policy it is difficult to characterize or find a pattern in Congressman Gerald Ford's remarks on any one subject. Therefore, an attempt is made in this brief report to give an overall picture of the Congressman's views by looking at his statements on several subjects.

One issue which Congressman Ford addressed again and again throughout the fifties and sixties was Congress' role in foreign policy making. In 1950, for example, he sponsored legislation which would prohibit the unreasonable suppression of information from the Congress by the President,⁷ and in 1951 he sponsored legislation which would set up a select committee on foreign policy.⁸ In a floor speech in 1966 on legislation allowing the President to make Export-Import Bank loans to certain Communist countries, he stated: "Mr. Speaker, there is nothing in the Constitution which precludes the Congress from having an impact on or playing a role in the determination of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, since dollars have become so involved in the execution of our foreign

¹ Congressional Record, v. 107, August 15, 1961: 15813.

² Congressional Record, v. 107, August 15, 1961: 15813.

³ Congressional Record, v. 109, December 24, 1963: 25589.

⁴ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. 21, 1965: 962.

⁵ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. 28, 1972: 2-II.

⁶ Congressional Record, v. 106, June 17, 1960: 13117; August 31, 1960: 18693.

⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 97, October 2, 1951: 12500.

⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 96, August 26, 1951: 13571.



policy through foreign aid legislation, the Congress has a specific responsibility to help guide and direct foreign policy. Over the years, the Congress, whether there was a Democratic or a Republican President, has helped to shape foreign policy by the use of the various foreign aid programs."⁹

Earlier, in 1963, Mr. Ford made a speech on Executive Privilege. At that time he said concerning the role of the Congress that "The investigatory power of Congress is well founded in law and so basic to its legislative function that without freedom to investigate thoroughly Congress can have no effective check on the executive branch. It should be superfluous to say that without adequate information no investigation can succeed."¹⁰ Further in the speech he said either "It is one of the great legislative challenges of our time and we must either face it or accept the certainty of continued assaults upon Congress' right to know."

In June 1959, during the debate on the foreign aid bill, Congressman Ford spoke in favor of limiting the executive's discretion in the use of foreign aid funds with the reasoning that the Congress must retain fiscal control over the foreign aid program. He stated that "the Congress should retain certain control over how these programs should be administered; and if this provision is left in the bill we will lose fiscal control for the Congress. I think that is bad for the country."¹¹

Nevertheless, a statement made by Congressman Ford in 1970 may indicate a change in his feeling on this subject. During a speech in the House on February 21, 1970, Mr. Ford made the following statement.

"It has been a basic tenet of our government that while we may be divided at home on foreign policy matters we are nevertheless willing to permit our Government to deal in an orderly and diplomatic manner with other governments."¹²

In discussing actual foreign policy matters Congressman Ford in a November 19, 1970, statement said that the "greatest single American national interest is the avoidance of a Third World War—a war which could destroy all mankind."¹³ He elaborated on this further by stating the need to deter the "predatory instincts and appetites of aggressors" by a world system of collective security arrangements. Furthermore, he stated: "In all of these free world collective security arrangements, there is one constant ingredient: The power of the United States of America and the credibility of this power—the recognition by the world at large of the fact that the United States will use its power to deter aggression and support its friends and allies if they come under attack. The credibility of the American deterrent is vital to the prevention of aggression—either by calculation or by miscalculation—aggression which could lead to a third world war."¹⁴

Among the friends and allies which should thus be supported in order to maintain U.S. credibility, Congressman Ford consistently mentions the state of Israel: "the United States Government must continue to give Israel the backing necessary to maintain the credibility of our friendship. This is in our own self-interest. We will not dip the Stars and Stripes in retreat and defeat in the Mediterranean."¹⁵

In a speech on April 24, 1969, Congressman Ford stated: "I firmly believe that the fate of Israel is linked to the national security interests of the United States: I therefore cannot conceive of a situation in which the U.S. Administration will sell Israel down the Nile."¹⁶

The same sentiment was again reiterated in a speech in April, 1971, when he said: "It is vital that we retain our unity in supporting the Israeli cause. The Soviet Union, collaborating with the Arabs, is trying to impose a unilateral peace that would compromise Israel's future. The Arabs would achieve through diplomacy what they failed to win on the field of battle. The Russians would serve their own aggressive ends."¹⁷

In addition to giving verbal support to Israel, Congressman Ford has supported giving Israel U.S. arms: "I am very gratified to be part of an Administration that responded to the realities in the Middle East by providing Israel with some of the finest U.S. weapons."¹⁸

⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 112, October 21, 1966: 28601.

¹⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 109, April 4, 1963: 5819.

¹¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 105, June 18, 1959: 11304.

¹² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, February 24, 1970: 4616.

¹³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38240.

¹⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38240.

¹⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12954.

¹⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 115, April 24, 1969: 10321.

¹⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12953.

¹⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12953.

Congressman Ford also expressed support for the establishment of "defensible frontiers" for Israel: "Israel, the victim of aggression, is entitled to reasonable claims for new and secure boundaries. Israel has every right to seek a defensible frontier which may not correspond identically with the frontiers of 1967 when the forces of aggression imposed an unwanted war upon Israel."¹⁹

In discussing United States foreign policy in its relations with states in the Western Hemisphere, Congressman Ford in 1965—speaking in support of H. Res. 560 (Resolution on Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere)—stated: "I specifically endorse the resolution because of two features: First, the fact that it reaffirms against the Monroe Doctrine after some lapse and doubt about its application in the last several years; and second, it does call for collective action by the Organization of American States. Such joint action is most important."²⁰

He stated further that he would support and in fact had supported (specifically in the case of the Dominican Republic) action taken by the Chief Executive against Communist subversion in the hemisphere. He concluded this statement, however, with the reservation that: "I want to make it crystal clear that by our voting for the resolution it does not mean that we, in advance, endorse any specific method of meeting the challenge of Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere."²¹

Congressman Ford's 1970 statements concerning the events around the death of Dan A. Mitrione, chief safety advisor for AID in Uruguay indicate some elements of his view of the U.S. aid role: "Indeed he was trying to help the police assume their proper role in Uruguayan society."²²

In remarking on what United States policy should be in view of the tragic event, Congressman Ford stated: "It is suggested by some that this tragedy raises questions as to whether the United States should be engaged in this activity. I submit that it proves how important it is for us to persevere in this essential task."²³

Moreover, Congressman Ford denied the existence of the "political prisoners" whose release was sought: "The frequent reference we have heard to 'political prisoners' is totally misleading. The MLN demanded release of all 'political prisoners' held by the Government as ransom. It should be noted that these people are not being held nor were they convicted because of their political beliefs. They are criminals arrested for murder, bank robbery, extortion, and the like. Constant reference to them otherwise by us all gives an erroneous impression as to why they are being held by the Uruguayan Government."²⁴

U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY: GENERAL

Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., was appointed to the House Appropriations Committee in 1951, two years after he entered Congress. In 1953 he became a member of the Department of Defense Subcommittee where he served from the 83rd through the 88th Congress. During the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ford became known as a Republican spokesman on defense and mutual security policies. In addition to supporting close adherence to overseas commitments, he has consistently advocated adequate active duty and reserve force levels, balanced and powerful weapons systems, and attractive and equitable conditions of military service. In terms of current policy, he endorses the "triad" concept of strategic deterrence, backs the all-volunteer force, and supports the "total force concept." He has reservations, however, concerning the depth and durability of detente, the promptness with which reserve forces can be made combat-ready following call to duty, and the country's capability to sustain the rising costs of military pay and incentives.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY

Throughout the 1960s Congressman Gerald Ford was a member of the large bipartisan House majority supporting authorizations and appropriations for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and supporting U.S. participation in arms limitations negotiations. In 1972, Ford endorsed the interim SALT agreement with the Soviet Union, urging House approval of the agreement.

¹⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12954.

²⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 111, September 20, 1965: 24352.

²¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 111, September 20, 1965: 24352.

²² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

²³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

²⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

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Ford did not record a vote on 1961 legislation initially authorizing the Arms Control Agency. In 1963,²⁵ 1965,²⁶ 1966,²⁷ and 1970,²⁸ however, he voted in favor of extending the Agency's authorization. (In 1965 he voted with the House majority to limit the authorization to 3 years instead of the Committee-recommended 4 years; in 1968 he again voted with the majority to limit the Agency's authorization to 2 years, although the reported bill had recommended 3 years.) While supporting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the achievements of the SALT negotiations, Ford has never argued for cuts in U.S. defense spending. In a 1972 speech supporting the SALT agreement, he maintained that "we can have peace in the age of nuclear weaponry and so-called wars of liberation only if we remain strong." He described the effect of the agreement as "slowing the Russians' headlong rush into nuclear superiority"; while the agreement would limit the quantity of U.S. weapons, "we can still maintain the quality of our nuclear weapons."²⁹ In urging support for a House resolution approving the SALT agreement, Ford noted that the agreement should not be considered a unilateral Executive action, because throughout the negotiation process the President must bear in mind the attitudes and opinions of Congress.³⁰

ATOMIC ENERGY

The nominee appears to have few remarks on the record associated with atomic energy. Three instances of discussion in an atomic energy context have been found in the Congressional Record Index—in 1957, 1967, and 1972.³¹ In 1958, a one-page discussion of H.R. 12575—creation of a civilian space agency—was presented by the nominee, which included favorable mention of the Atomic Energy Commission as an example of the kind of agency which ought to be established.³² The nominee appears to have voted with the prevailing side in the principal enactments relating to atomic energy³³ which are taken to be the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the extension in 1955 of the (Price-Anderson) amendments which provide for Federal indemnification of AEC licensees and contractors, in the event of liability in excess of that available from private insurers. Both of these enactments may be regarded as for the purpose of opening up the development of atomic energy to the private sector; under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, atomic energy had been the domain of government.

[NOTE: See also profiles on Arms Control and Disarmament Policy (p. 89) and Strategic Policy and Weapon Program (p. 98)]

INTERNAL SECURITY

From his first days in the Congress, Mr. Ford has spoken of the influence of Communists in the United States. On August 8, 1950, he decried Owen Lattimore

²⁵ Congressional Record, v. 109, part 17, Nov. 20, 1963: 22538.

²⁶ Congressional Record, v. 111, part 3, Feb. 17, 1965: 2018.

²⁷ Congressional Record, v. 114, part 5, Mar. 6, 1968: 5427.

²⁸ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 10, April 28, 1970: 12214, 12215.

²⁹ Congressional Record, v. 118 [daily ed.], June 20, 1972: E6339. Speech before VFW convention, Grand Rapids, Mich.

³⁰ Congressional Record, v. 118 [daily ed.], Aug. 18, 1972: H7953.

³¹ Ford, Gerald R. Authorizing appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission (debate in the House) Congressional Record v. 103, Aug. 8, 1957: Pp. 14116, 14125, 15523.

³² Ford, Gerald R. Action taken by Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to correct format of bill (floor discussion in House), Congressional Record, v. 113, June 29, 1967: Mr. Ford's remark thanking the committee for correcting the format of a bill is on p. 17894.

³³ Ford, Gerald R. Addition to legislative program (floor discussion in the House), Congressional Record (daily edition), May 1, 1972. Mr. Ford elicited comment from Mr. Rogers as to the relationship of the bill being scheduled to a bill passed the previous week. The bill being scheduled was H.R. 14655, authorization for the Atomic Energy Commission to issue temporary operating licenses for nuclear power reactors. Pp. H3790-H3791.

³⁴ Ford, Gerald R. National Aeronautics and Outer Space Act of 1958 (debate and vote in the House), Congressional Record, v. 104, June 2, 1958, P. 9939. Mr. Ford spoke in favor of the bill under consideration, commented on AEC programs in space nuclear propulsion and stated: "Civilian control . . . is a must. . . . It will not jeopardize our military effort. We have after all the example of the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC has perfected the A-bomb and H-bomb capability for the military, while at the same time built a whole new world through its advances in the field of peaceful nuclear and thermonuclear energy."

³⁵ Ford, Gerald R. Voting and attendance record, Congressional Record, v. 101, Mar. 13, 1955, P. 6007 and v. 111, Oct. 22, 1965, P. 28716. The record shows that Mr. Ford voted against recommitment and for passage of H.R. 9757, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (passed 251 to 154). On Sept. 16, 1965, the nominee was absent; a footnote indicates that at present, he would have voted yes to S. 2042: extending authority of the Atomic Energy Commission to indemnify licensees and contractors for public liability. The bill passed (337 to 30).

more—whom he described as a "fellow traveller"—for his urging of a UN seat for Red China and on August 29, 1950, he praised Richard Nixon in his fight against the "insidious Communist forces that would destroy our Nation." 96 Cong. Rec. 11906, 13737. In 1965, Mr. Ford qualified his support of a resolution which would have given the President support in any action he may take "to prevent in a timely manner Communist subversion in the hemisphere" by stating that "those of us on the minority side of the aisle must reserve independent judgment as to the precise way in which the challenge to subversion is undertaken by our Government in Latin America." 111 Cong. Rec. 24352 (9/20/65). Alleged communist influence in anti-war demonstrations led by Mr. Ford in 1967 to demand a report by the President on the extent of Communist influence in the October 21, 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon. 113 Cong. Rec. 33706 (11/22/67).

During the 1967 riots, Mr. Ford decried the exploitation of the disturbance for partisan purposes and criticized President Johnson's alleged delay in allowing use of Federal troops in Detroit and his explanation of the riots as being due to Congressional rejection of Democratic legislation such as the ratification bill. 113 Cong. Rec. 19949 (7/25/67). He also supported granting subpoena power to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 113 Cong. Rec. 20605 (9/31/67).

Anti-war and student demonstrators came in for criticism by Mr. Ford in the late sixties and seventies. On March 25, 1969 he supported withholding of financial aid to disruptive college students. 115 Cong. Rec. 7384. On November 24, 1969, he outlined in the Record the cost of the "destruction and violence engaged in by the relatively small radical elements among the [Nov. 15] demonstrators." 115 Cong. Rec. 35540. On November 19, 1969 he contrasted the "astronauts and the spirit of American courage exemplified by them and the radicals who pulled down the American flag at the Justice Department last Saturday and raised the Vietcong flag in its place." 115 Cong. Rec. 34972-3. He decried the tactics of Mayday demonstrators in 1971:

To try to block traffic and keep others from getting to their jobs is an action which cannot be tolerated. Such tactics are counterproductive.

I congratulate the authorities for handling the situation as skillfully as they have. Law-abiding citizens owe them a debt of gratitude, 117 Cong. Rec. 13104 5/3/71).

On May 1, 1971, Mr. Ford singled out college protests as being the "most lacking in logic." 92d Cong., 2d Sess., H3813.

Mr. Ford has supported the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (117 Cong. Rec. 31766 (9/14/71)) and making it a Federal crime to illegally possess, use or transport explosives (116 Cong. Rec. 9377 (3/25/70)). On January 23, 1973, Mr. Ford reiterated his support of the work of the House Committee on Internal Security and opposition to a resolution to abolish it. 119 Cong. Rec. H1390 1/23/73) and on May 23, 1973 he stated his support of President Nixon's statement on Watergate and national security. 119 Cong. Rec. H2970.

Throughout his twenty-five years in the U.S. Congress, Mr. Ford has voted in favor of such major national security legislation as the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954. More recently, Mr. Ford voted in 1971 to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950).

MILITARY MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

As an advocate of a strong military defense, Representative Ford has generally supported administration requests for active duty and reserve personnel strengths. In June 27, 1961, he not only supported the Kennedy administration's recommendations for 25,000 more active duty personnel than proposed by the outgoing Eisenhower administration in January, but also called for retention of 70,000 reserve billets which had been scheduled for elimination by both administrations. On this same occasion, however, Ford remarked that he had "grave doubts" that a new program announced by President Kennedy would make it possible for sizeable reserve forces to be deployed overseas within two to four weeks after activation for federal duty. He regarded four to five months as a more realistic goal for putting National Guard and Reserve divisions into combat in the event of war.³⁴

While somewhat skeptical of the prompt deployability of major reserve units, which is a key assumption in today's "total force concept," Ford has emerged as

³⁴ Congressional Record, v. 107, June 27, 1961: 11442.

"a firm, strong supporter of the volunteer military force," another major tenet of the Nixon administration's thinking on defense policy.³⁵ He is aware that increased personnel costs associated with the volunteer force are responsible for a large share of growing defense costs but has stated that he happens "to prefer getting the people for our Defense Department by a volunteer method."³⁶ As precautionary measures preparatory to the launching of the all volunteer force, Ford urged a two-year rather than a single-year extension of the draft, and sufficient funding to enable the Selective Service to continue registration (but not induction) of young men. Earlier, he had resisted attempts to remove the draft exemptions of undergraduate college students and of divinity students.

Ford has supported pay increases for active duty military personnel, but he has shown concern that raises and incentives designed to attract and retain men and junior officers might be applied too liberally to the higher grades. He once worked to reduce hazardous duty payments (principally flight pay) to general officers whose primary duty did not involve aerial flight or comparable risk. Ford has introduced measures to increase the family allowances and to improve the housing of military personnel. He also successfully urged that military personnel be permitted to retire at the highest grade ever held while on active duty in any one of the services. He voted for recomputation of retired pay in 1960 but voted against it in 1963, pointing out that in the interim he has become aware of the enormous cost implications of the provision. He admitted that disallowance of recomputation might entail a breach of contract on the part of the government but pointed out that in that event opportunities should be explored for review and renegotiation of the issue.³⁷

Attempts to secure disability benefits and retirement credit for reservists marked Ford's early years in the Congress. He was particularly concerned that reservists on active duty receive treatment equal to that accorded personnel of the regular services. Although resistant to cuts in reserve strength, he has not tended to regard the reserves as a substitute for an adequate force in being. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he proposed that reserve call-ups be limited to Air Force and Navy elements, and in 1965 he opposed Presidential mobilization of the reserves without congressional endorsement.

MILITARY COMMITMENT AND OPERATIONS ABROAD

From the outset of his career as a Congressman, Representative Gerald Ford has been a forceful and consistent advocate of a strong U.S. national defense. He has supported an active role for the United States abroad, involving close working ties with this country's allies and a willingness to confront serious challenges to the nation's security whenever and wherever such threats might appear. In this regard, he has on a number of occasions criticized the administrations of Democratic Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson for not responding firmly enough in the face of provocations and hostile acts. In 1951, during the height of the Korean War, he called for the bombing of Communist China's supply bases and a blockade of the coast.³⁸ He criticized the withdrawal of vital support by the administration of John F. Kennedy in the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.³⁹ Four years later in 1965, Representative Ford urged the administration of Lyndon Johnson to crack down on Cuba because of its suspected involvement in the Dominican Republic revolt.⁴⁰ He also criticized the Johnson Administration in 1967 and 1968 for not prosecuting the war in Indochina with sufficient vigor.⁴¹

The inauguration of President Nixon in January 1968 marked the beginning of an historic transformation in U.S. foreign policy toward longstanding rivals—the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This change also involved a rearrangement of the country's approach to military commitments and activities abroad. A key feature of the so-called Nixon Doctrine has been the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces overseas and greater self-reliance by American allies on their own armed forces in the time of crisis. An important corollary of the Nixon Doctrine and has been U.S. willingness to provide generous military support to its allies in the form of material assistance and advice. Representative Ford

has supported the Nixon Doctrine and its provisions, an observation which is consistent with his reputation of party adherence on most major policy issues.

In introducing President Nixon's February 1970 report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, Representative Ford endorsed those provisions relating to the country's military commitments and activities abroad. He stressed that the underlying theme of the Nixon Doctrine was "a willingness to help those who are willing to help themselves."⁴² However, the Congressman's statements on the Nixon Doctrine have not precisely mirrored those of the current Administration. It is possible to detect in his views a difference in degree if not in direction. He appears, for example, to exhibit greater wariness towards the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and their international intentions. He also appears to place a somewhat greater stress on the need for firm and unwavering U.S. support of its allies around the world. Over the years, Representative Ford has regularly supported the Mutual Security Act appropriations and similar legislation providing military grant aid and credit sales to deserving allies. During the administration of Dwight Eisenhower he even sought to increase these programs to a level higher than that recommended by the Republican leadership.⁴³

STRATEGIC POLICY AND WEAPON PROGRAMS

The legislative activities and public statements of Representative Ford during his 25 years in Congress have evidenced consistent support for a strong U.S. military posture predicated on the strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China and involving reliance on the "triad" concept of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched missiles, and strategic bombers. At the same time, he has advocated the maintenance of strong and balanced conventional forces and air defense capabilities.

For example, during the 1959 debate on Defense appropriations Representative Ford argued in favor of a mixture of air defense weapons including various Army and Air Force missiles systems then in operation or under development as well as fighter-interceptors and manned aircraft programs. Declaring that "this air defense program is bigger than any service, bigger than any contractor," Ford observed that it involved "the national security of our homeland," and he deplored interservice rivalry in matters of such national importance. During this debate Ford also expressed his support for aircraft carriers which he deemed essential for "small wars such as the Lebanese crisis" of 1958.⁴⁴ Since that time, Ford has adhered to the main thrust of these positions and has generally supported the development and deployment of most of the major weapon systems proposed by the Defense Department. When the FY 1974 military procurement bill was before the House in July 1973, Ford was recorded as voting against efforts to halt or limit development of such programs as the CVAN-70 nuclear aircraft carrier and the B-1 strategic bomber.⁴⁵

An active supporter of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense program,⁴⁶ Representative Ford argued in 1969 that the ABM program would not hinder disarmament talks with the Soviet Union and, in fact, might make a positive contribution to these negotiations. He observed that shortly after President Johnson announced deployment of the Sentinel ABM the Soviets had asked for strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the United States. "If the United States enters into negotiations naked," Ford stated during the 1969 ABM debate, "we will come out of these negotiations naked." He compared the ABM decision with President Truman's decision to proceed with development of the H-bomb despite objections from some members of the scientific community.⁴⁷ The view expressed by Ford in 1969 to the effect that continued development of weapon systems furthers negotiations with the Soviets in the area of arms control has characterized his position on current weapon programs and the ongoing SALT activities.

During his early years in the Congress, Representative Ford expressed some concern over the high cost of defense programs, although in later years he has not been outspoken on this point and has generally opposed efforts to reduce military spending. In 1951, Ford addressed the House on the problem of cost escalation in weaponry and stated that "the high cost of our military defense

³⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, June 22, 1973: H5232.

³⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, Jan. 31, 1973: H589.

³⁷ Congressional Record, v. 109, May 8, 1963: S973-S974.

³⁸ Congressional Record, v. 97, Jan. 19, 1959: 454.

³⁹ Congressional Record, v. 110, June 29, 1964: 15284.

⁴⁰ New York Times, May 4, 1965: 21.

⁴¹ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. XXIII, 1967: 939.

⁴² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, Feb. 18, 1970: H925.

⁴³ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. XIV, 1958: 189.

⁴⁴ Congressional Record, v. 105, June 2, 1959: 9599-9600.

⁴⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 31, 1973: H6932, H6950.

⁴⁶ New York Times, Apr. 30, 1969: 9. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. XXIII, 1967: 13.

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, v. 115, Oct. 2, 1969: 28137-28139.

programs should make us realize that inflation as well as Communist aggression is damaging our national security."⁴⁴ However, in 1952 Ford was one of 11 Republican members who voted with 120 Democrats in an unsuccessful effort to defeat an amendment to the FY 1953 defense appropriations bill limiting military spending to \$46 billion.⁴⁵ More recently, Ford has repeatedly opposed similar limiting amendments, such as the one offered by Representative Aspin in 1971 and another passed by the House in 1973. As on earlier occasions, Ford voted in 1972 against the Aspin amendment which would have placed a ceiling on over-all defense spending.⁴⁶

WAR POWERS

Congressman Gerald Ford has consistently maintained the position that Congress should take a greater role in decisions concerning U.S. involvement in undeclared wars. However, Ford has opposed current proposals which would terminate a Presidentially initiated involvement of U.S. forces if Congress takes no action to approve the involvement.

In 1970,⁴⁷ 1971,⁴⁸ and 1972⁴⁹ Ford voted with a nearly unanimous House in support of legislation which would have required the President to consult with Congress whenever he introduced U.S. troops abroad. In a 1970 House floor statement Ford noted that the proposed resolution would, in effect, change nothing under the Constitution. At that time he also stated that "without hesitation or qualification I know of no Presidents [during his tenure in Congress] who have been false or deceptive in the information that has come from the White House."⁵⁰ In addition, in a 1971 address before an American Legion convention in Pittsburgh, Ford called for legislation stating that any military action begun by a President must be approved, altered, or terminated by Congress within 30 days of its initiation.⁵¹ He did not formally submit such a legislative proposal, which the Administration reportedly was opposed at that time. In the 93rd Congress, Ford argued and voted against the war powers bill⁵² reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, maintaining that if the Congress does not want a military conflict continued it "ought to have the guts and will" to vote against the action, rather than expressing disapproval by doing nothing. He supported an amendment comparable to the legislation he called for in 1971 which would have required Congressional action either to approve and authorize continuation of U.S. military involvement or to disapprove and require discontinuation of the action.⁵³ When the amendment failed, he voted against final passage of the war powers bill and against approval of the conference report. During debate on initial House passage of the 1973 war powers act, Ford read a telegram from President Nixon which indicated the President's intention to veto the bill as reported, while expressing Presidential interest in "appropriate legislation" to provide for an effective contribution by the Congress.⁵⁴

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

AID TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS (PAROCHIAL AID)

Although a one-time detractor of many Federal aid-to-education programs, Gerald Ford has recently been a staunch supporter of Federal aid, particularly by tax credits, to parochial education.

Gerald Ford did not support the Federal Government's earlier programs of aid to elementary and secondary education. He voted against the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which included aid to parochial schools, Cong. Rec. 6152, 89th Congress, 1st Session 1965. He voted against the 1966 amendments, Cong. Rec. 25588, 89th Congress, 2d Session, 1966, and the 1967 amendments to that act, Cong. Rec. 13899, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967:

⁴⁴ Congressional Record, v. 97, Mar. 13, 1951: 2325.

⁴⁵ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Oct. 17, 1973: 8.

⁴⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 31, 1973: H6961.

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 28, Nov. 16, 1970: 37407-37408.

⁴⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, Aug. 2, 1971: H7620. (Passed by voice vote under suspension of the rules.)

⁴⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 118, Aug. 14, 1972: H7576.

⁵⁰ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 28, Nov. 16, 1970: 37403.

⁵¹ Washington Post, July 17, 1971, p. A4, Representative Ford Urges Bars to Undeclared Wars.

⁵² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6284-H6285, and Oct. 11, 1973: H8963.

⁵³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6256.

⁵⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6241.

In 1969, however, Mr. Ford supported amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Cong. Rec. 10099, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969. Since that time he has supported such aid to parochial schools.

In 1973 Gerald Ford introduced three bills relative to aid for parochial schools. His bills, H.R. 1176, H.R. 2689 and H.R. 13020 all provided for tax credits to be granted for tuition paid to private nonprofit schools including parochial schools.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Although not a vocal supporter of civil rights, particularly in his early years, Mr. Ford is recorded as voting yea on passage of the score of major and minor civil rights bills enacted during this period. Not infrequently in the early legislative stages, he has registered support for Republican sponsored alternative proposals. This is particularly true since election by his Republican colleagues as Minority Leader in the mid-1960's. Although his elevation to the Republican Leadership position generally marks the end of his floor silence on civil rights concerns, it also coincides with a number of procedural votes, viz., votes to recommit, seemingly at odds with his ultimate vote to pass the legislation in question. Notwithstanding statements explaining these apparent equivocations in procedural terms, these actions are resented by civil rights groups. *The Washington Post*, Thursday, October 18, 1973, at A2. In particular, his position on Fair Housing in 1966, and his backing for the Administration alternative proposals on voting rights in 1970 and equal employment opportunity in 1972, are denounced as attempts to "gut . . . the final product." *Ibid.* Neither his apparent switch on Fair Housing nor his consistent yea vote on passage seems to have effectively altered this image.

In the immediate post war years, the civil rights drive focused on legislation to outlaw the poll tax and to guarantee equal employment opportunity (then called fair employment practices). On at least three occasions in the 1940's the House passed poll tax legislation which went on to die in the Senate. The last of these came in 1949, Mr. Ford's first year in the Congress. Of the four roll call votes on the measure, Mr. Ford is recorded as voting yea on the rule, on consideration and on passage and nay on the motion to recommit. 95 Cong. Rec. 10097, 10098, 10247, and 10248 (1949).

Two lesser civil rights related measures were subject to House roll call votes in 1949. On one of these—an unsuccessful effort to recommit the Military Housing Act of 1949 to conference because it did not contain a non-discrimination clause—Mr. Ford is recorded as not voting. 95 Cong. Rec. 10294 (1949). The second proposal, a bill to establish a woman's Coast Guard reserve was recommitted after the House adopted an amendment barring segregation or discrimination because of race, creed, or color. Mr. Ford voted yea on the amendment. 95 Cong. Rec. 3806 (1949). There was no record roll call vote on the motion to recommit.

In 1950, civil rights supporters were successful in bringing an equal employment opportunity (FEPC) bill to the House floor for the first time. The reported bill provided for a compulsory FEPC commission having broad powers and recourse to the courts for enforcement. However, on the floor Pennsylvania Republican Samuel K. McConnell Jr. offered an amendment substituting a voluntary FEPC without any enforcement powers. The substitute was adopted. Mr. Ford voted yea to substitute the voluntary bill, nay on the motion to recommit it, and yea on passage. 96 Cong. Rec. 2253, 2300, 2301 (1950).

In another development, Mr. Ford voted with an overwhelming majority of House Members against recommitting the Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1950 with instructions to insert an anti-discrimination amendment. 96 Cong. Rec. 17061 (1951). The motion had been offered by Mr. Smith of Virginia, an acknowledged opponent of the legislation.

On June 6, 1951, Mr. Ford joined 222 Members in killing (i.e., striking out the enacting clause of) a bill for construction of a veterans' hospital for Negroes in Virginia. 97 Cong. Rec. 6201 (1951). The measure had been denounced as "class legislation" by Representatives Dawson and Powell.

In the interval between 1950 and 1956—in the latter year the House began laying the foundations of the 1957 Civil Rights Act—Members acted on countless civil rights matters, principally Powell amendments which would have banned discrimination in a variety of contexts including public housing, public schools and the National Guard. A great many of these proposals were disposed of either procedurally or by standing or teller votes. Because of this and the absence of

⁵⁵ This report deals with legislative developments in the post World War II years to improve the political, economic, and social status of the Nation's black population. Treated elsewhere are the related subjects of school desegregation and busing.

Masth

Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 5, 1976

MEMO TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: CLAYT WILHITE
SUBJECT: TEXAS CREATIVE

Below is a summary of Texas creative options (and their status where appropriate) that we will address on Monday.

1. Competitive Newspaper

Based on the Friday Morton meeting, it appears this may be used in Texas as a second insertion. Phelps is working on a revision to Who's Who for discussion today.

2. Defense Advertising

This breaks down into TV, radio and newspaper options. Based on comments from downstairs and Texas late last week, we can anticipate use of all three during the media schedule.

Television

Most extreme option, but also the most potent if the issue develops momentum. Major question is creative format. Gene Russo is working on a John Tower presenter :60 and :30. I think John Overaker should develop a President Ford defense commercial that is compatible with Future, Accomplishment, etc. As you know, the Texas people feel it would be stronger than a Tower spot.

Radio

Two suggestions in this area:

1. Tower radio (Gene will have a :60 ready to discuss today).
2. "Facts-Defense" :60



Bruce Wagner
April 5, 1976
Page Two
Texas Creative

Newspaper

We have already prepared Wisconsin defense copy for the generic ad. This will probably carry-over unless we find a potent quote by the President for insertion. We should consider moving this issue up in the copy block. I don't recommend a specific ad on defense as TV and radio seem the more powerful communicators of this message... plus we will have a defense brochure to serve as a mailer if needed.

3. Communication of Delegate Voting Slate

There are two issues at work here:

1. Education of the voter about ballot format (vote for delegate - not candidate, vote for four delegates).
2. Encouraging the voter to elect the straight Ford delegate ticket.

Direct mail is already planned to address Republican voters on these points. Two letters, one from John Tower and a second from each district delegate slate, will be mailed to voters just prior to election day.

From our standpoint, we should examine insertion of appropriate "cast your four votes for delegates pledged to President Ford" copy in all radio and TV advocate advertising, plus "Facts" radio, and the full-page newspaper ad. We should also encourage the Texas PFC to insert a 3" x 8" flyer in all future direct mail pieces and hand-outs at the polling place.

The only vehicle which would not seem appropriate for this hard-sell would be our current Future, etc. TV format... it is simply out of character with the tonality of those commercials and unnecessary, given the other options.

4. Advocates

This list is necessarily short in Texas: John Tower. Goldwater and Connally are possibles, however, Spencer said they will not endorse any candidate although the PFC will continue to pursue both of them.



Bruce Wagner
April 5, 1976
Page Three
Texas Creative

5. Issues

We are extremely weak in this area with only a small survey from Houston and qualitative comments. At present, the conclusions are as follows:

1. Economy- still most important.
2. Defense- on judgement, #1 or #2.
3. Government Spending- important as outgrowth of general Texas conservatism.
4. Energy/Agriculture- President weak on both according to Spencer, et al, but this has not been confirmed.

Fred Slight is supposed to have some insights on this today. Will proceed after this material has been obtained. We are also checking Tower's office.

Let's discuss all of the above at your earliest convenience.

cc: Gene Russo
John Overaker
Phelps Johnston
Jack Frost
Peggy Pilas



Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 6. 1976

MEMO TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: CLAYT WILHITE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DEFENSE STATEMENT FOR TEXAS

Stu Spencer has asked the agency to develop its recommendations on a 5-minute Presidential television statement on defense for use in Texas.

He envisions it being shot in the Oval Office or some other appropriate Presidential setting, utilizing a prepared text. The announcement would run during the final days of the Texas campaign.

Our thoughts on the subject should be more crystallized following a continuation of our overall strategy discussions with Pete Dailey.

cc: Peter Dailey
John Overaker
Jack Frost
Phelps Johnston
Peggy Pilas
Marcy Pattinson



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 6, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY *DS*
SUBJECT: REAGAN COMPETITIVE ACTIVITY IN TEXAS

We have just been informed that Reagan is buying 30 second spot schedules in major markets in Texas to begin April 17. It appears that he will be buying the maximum weight per week available - approximately 350 - 400 points per week. He has requested availabilities for 30 second, 5 minute and 1/2 hour units, however, nothing has been ordered other than the aforementioned 30 second schedules.

These schedules are being placed by Goodwin, Dannebaum, Littman, Wingfield, Inc., a local agency in Houston. We are informed that additional orders will probably be placed on Thursday or Friday.

cc: Clayt Wilhite
Peggy Pilas
Carol Karasick
Denise Considine



April 7, 1976

X: Peter Dailey
Clant w. White
Pessy Pilas

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRUCE WAGNER

FROM:

FRED SLIGHT

SUBJECT:

Energy Issue in Texas

I have attached for your information the following materials pertaining to the energy issue in Texas:

1. Brief comparison of the President's and Reagan's position on energy-related issues.
2. Overview of the President's energy policy.
3. Summary of Reagan's major statements on energy.
4. FACTBOOK excerpt on the Administration's energy actions.
5. Sample letter to oil men who objected to the President's signing of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975.

These items should be helpful to your writers in getting a much clearer understanding of the issue. In addition, I will send to you under separate cover more detailed information on EPCA and the President's rationale for signing the compromise bill.

Let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Attachments

cc: Stu Spencer
Roy Hughes
Peter Kaye



April 7, 1976

x: Peter Dailsey
Clant W. H. H.
Pessy P. H. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRUCE WAGNER

FROM:

FRED SLIGHT *FS*

SUBJECT:

Energy Policy

In follow-up to my earlier memorandum of this day, I am providing the following additional materials on the President's energy policy:

1. Statement by the President (December 22, 1975) on the signing of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
2. Message to the Congress (February 26, 1976) reviewing governmental action and calling for additional legislation.
3. Summary fact sheet (February 26, 1976) of the President's special message to the Congress.
4. Detailed fact sheet (February 26, 1976) reviewing the President's special message to the Congress.

Particular attention should be given to the President's rationale for signing EPCA.

Attachments

cc: Stu Spencer
Roy Hughes
Peter Kaye



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 7, 1976

x: Stu Spencer
Don Hughes

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY
SUBJECT: REAGAN - TEXAS

SFM informs us that Reagan is in Lubbock in a TV station recording commercials. We are informed that he is cutting a 1/2 hour program and possibly other time lengths. The story is that any place that gives him free time, no matter where is is or where it is to be placed, he will go to the station and record.

We are checking further to try and get the content of his spots.

cc: Peter Dailey
Clayt Wilhite



Campaign'76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

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Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 8, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: LEN MATTHEWS *LSM*
SUBJECT: ADVERTISING PRODUCTION HISTORY

Looks like Marcy and Barry have done a superlative job of documenting the advertising production history -

The critical question is this:

How come actual production costs exceed the original estimate of production costs so much?

Partial answer

- a) Original estimate made before any experience on that kind of work was much too conservative.
- b) Time pressures - getting the first commercial in the pool involved a number of revisions and overtime charges which have been avoided on later commercials in the pool - e.g. 1st commercial cost more than double commercial #2 and almost double commercial #3 for these reasons.
- c) All early costs were high because whole operation (from 2nd floor to 10th floor) got geared up late and expensive moves had to be made to "make up for lost time" - shipping costs, print costs, production costs etc., were all increased for that reason - fortunately - that's behing us now - we are ahead of events.

All other questions I can see are literally details - like - how come \$14,000 overtime etc., - you know the answer better than anyone else.

Marcy and Barry have any detailed support you need -

I don't intend to minimize or over-simplify this task but my view of it is just as stated above.

c.c. Peter Dailey



Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

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c.c. Peter Dailey



MHSTK

Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-9950

April 8, 1976

MEMO TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: CLAYT WILHITE
SUBJECT: TIMING AND COVERAGE OF 5-MINUTE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

Setting aside the strategy of the Presidential message for a moment, I want to address the dual subjects of timing and coverage.

Timing

Some discussion yesterday focused on airing the program a full week before the primary in an attempt to get ample media coverage and allow for voter consideration of the content. While this is logical, it doesn't consider the realities of the moment:

1. The large bloc of undecided voters who will apparently make their choice 3-4 days before the Primary.
2. The gap of time after the message that would allow Ronald Reagan a well-conceived response... probably giving him the "last word" on the subject before Primary Day.
3. The ability of the media to instantaneously generate nationwide interest in the event solely on the basis of PFC press releases prior to delivery of the message... and correspondingly, to react instantaneously after the delivery.
4. The apparent success of timing the Reagan speeches just before the Primary.

For these reasons, I would strongly recommend that we air the message no more than 2-3 days before May 1, on either Wednesday or Thursday. It would run once across the state and then be repeated in major markets on Thursday or Friday.



Bruce Wagner
April 8, 1976
Timing and Coverage of 5-Minute Presidential Message
Page Two

Coverage

Given the content of the message and, more important, its news value/impact potential for the entire nation, the use of network time becomes more worthy of consideration (as an addition to blanket Texas coverage).

There would be no need to air on all networks for one would give us the publicity value needed to generate coverage by the national media and the wire services. (Because NBC gave Reagan a half-hour, they are obliged to grant time to the President. Dawn estimates we could buy a 5-minute spot for about \$17,000 net.)

If the speech is to reassert the President's momentum and fortify his leadership image, the additional cost seems justified... particularly in view of the critical primaries that come only a few days after Texas in Alabama, Georgia and Indiana.

A major provision to this approach, however, concerns the tone of the message. Speaking to a national audience that is more moderate in philosophy than Texas Republicans, makes it imperative that the President does not come across as a saber-rattler... as simply a Reagan in sheep's clothing. We must maintain the righteous indignation of a President... a man who will protect the nation's security first, but not forget the ultimate objective of world peace.

Let's discuss at your convenience.

cc: Peter Dailey



April 8, 1976

4/8/76
BMX: Peter Dailey
CLAY W. WHITE
PESSEY P. LAS
Phelps Johnston
Jack Frost
Bob Teeter
747: comment
Bucher
4/8

TO: BRUCE WAGNER (cc Morton, Spencer, Slight, Hughes)
FROM: PETER KAYE
SUBJECT: UNSOLICITED ADVICE

I read your memo to Rog Morton re: a 5-minute televised commercial by the President to Ronald Reagan.

I disagree with the premise, content, timing and strategic consideration.

First, the President cannot gain credibility by an outright attack on his opponent. Even if he is President; Nixon's experience proved that.

Second, leadership is not the issue. The issue is defense and detente. Besides, you don't look like a leader by attacking your opponent on paid radio and TV.

Third, Texas does not lend itself to this approach or through heavy media buying in metropolitan centers. The race is in 24 CDs.

Fourth, we look like copy-cats.

Fifth, man-to-man on this issue, we'd lose in Texas.

I do agree with the concept of both a 5 and 15-minute Ford TV piece. Immediately. We should have prepared one weeks ago. Before North Carolina.

I would use a mini-documentary. Film clips. Newspaper editorials attacking RR, of which we have plenty. Ford talking tough to reporters or, better still, non-political third party groups.

This can be produced in time for final four days of Texas if we get going now.

I realize I wasn't asked to comment on this.



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 13, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: SKIP WATTS
FROM: BRUCE WAGNER
SUBJECT: TEXAS

I understand we haven't shipped any of our issue brochures into Texas as yet:

- . Economy
- . Federal Spending
- . Jobs
- . Crime

I'm sure we have funding problems in Texas, but I think we should try to get at least a minimum amount of this material into key delegate battlegrounds.

c.c. Peter Dailey
Roy Hughes
Stu Spencer



April 14, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO:

BRUCE WAGNER

FROM:

FRED SLIGHT *FWS*

SUBJECT:

Ronald Reagan's Attack

*X: Peter Dailey
Clayt
Pessy
Phelps
Len
Gene
Jack
Buer B.*

I am providing my reaction to your April 7 memorandum to the Chairman and your draft copy of your proposed five-minute television response in Texas to Ronald Reagan's defense/foreign policy attacks. My response follows the same order and section classifications as your memorandum.

*Ed Spiegel
OK
Bzm*

Advertising Objectives

The first and foremost objective should be to neutralize Reagan's charges against the President. I do not believe this can be accomplished by reinforcing President Ford's perception as a national leader nor by trying to expose the shallowness of Reagan's negative appeal. A concerted effort must be made to deal with the substance of the charges.

Background

Let me first begin with your evaluation of the success of Reagan's commercial message. The primary issue is in fact, the continued weakening of our national defense and foreign policy reversals under the Ford-Kissinger administration. As I have stated on several occasions, these two issues have a genuine "cutting edge" when Reagan cites the numbers in the Soviet Union's conventional superiority and when he reminds people of U.S. "failures" in Indochina, the Middle East and Africa and when he charges appeasement at Vladisvostok and Helsinki.

The secondary issue is not indecisive Presidential leadership but weak and misguided leadership. In short, we must go far, far beyond simply asserting President Ford's leadership.

Recommended Message

With regard to this section I am not certain that the President can or should in a personal message to the American public, attempt to communicate the following:

- A. That Reagan is irresponsible and politically ambitious;
- B. Reagan has sacrificed his principles for his quest of the Presidency;
- C. Reagan is naive in national affairs.



These personal types of attacks should at best be delivered by a third party such as advocates and not by the President himself.

I am not certain that the President or any other candidate could destroy the credibility of a challenger. Rather, this type of goal is accomplished by the reporting of the media in depicting Reagan as dangerous, extremist, naive or whatever and cannot occur as a result of one candidate making spurious remarks against another.

In terms of the way in which the message is to be communicated, I have no particular feelings on this matter at this time. Let me say in terms of timing however, I believe whatever your commercial spot is, it should occur within the last week of the campaign and not the Saturday preceding the election. More specifically Bruce, I think something along the lines of a Monday or Tuesday airing would be much more appropriate.

Discussion

In regard to this area, I generally agree with your observations with the exception that a loss in Texas for Reagan will not end his challenge. He will continue to go all the way through California. A loss in Texas will be a set-back for him and will shift the momentum back to our camp.

While a hard hitting campaign in Texas is essential for a variety of reasons, we must be very sensitive to the attitudes of the voters in Texas regarding an issue such as defense and foreign policy. More simply stated, Texas is not the ideal state to be making a hard line attack on Reagan on such issues as these.

Broadcast Copy

I reviewed the draft of your proposed five-minute speech by the President and have no specific reactions at this time with the exception of two points:

1. I am not certain that the dollar amounts are effective in communicating the President's record in support of strong defense. Something that deals with the number of battleships, aircraft carriers, ICBM's, B-1 Bombers, or whatever can be afforded as a result of the President's request is much more tangible and I think more understandable for the public.
2. Reference to "American boys fighting senseless wars in Africa or elsewhere" should be reworked. The suggestion that Africa is not worth fighting for could definitely have racial overtones which would be most unfortunate.



Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY
SUBJECT: REAGAN - CHURCH MEDIA BUY

Ronald Reagan has bought time from CBS on Wednesday, April 28, for a 5" spot to be aired from 10:55pm - 11:00pm.

Senator Frank Church has bought time from CBS on Monday, April 19 for a 5" spot to be aired from 10:55pm - 11:00pm.

c.c. ✓ Peter Dailey
Ed DeBolt
Roy Hughes
Peter Kaye
Dick Mastrangelo
Rogers Morton
Peggy Pilas
Fred Slight
Stu Spencer
Clayton Wilhite



Campaign'76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: BOB WINKLER
SUBJECT: ESTIMATED COST FOR 5 MINUTE DOCUMENTARY

VERY ROUGH ESTIMATES

WASHINGTON SHOOT.....	\$6900
AUSTIN TEXAS.....	4500
EDITING.....	3500
MUSIC.....	500
STILLS.....	2500
(require blow-ups etc.)	
MISC. FILM FOOTAGE.....	1000



Campaign'76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 22, 1976

MEMORNADUM FOR: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: LEN MATTHEWS *LSM*
SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR ADVISORY BOARD MEETING
(APRIL 26, 1976)

Here is an agenda for the Advisory Board meeting on Monday.

Suggest we give books to the new members only.

See no reason to propose a lot of new material for one meeting.

I asked Clayt to pull the creative exhibits together.

I'll be flying in on the 6:40am flight Monday - arrival 9:30am D.C. time.

We can discuss Monday morning who does what ---

c.c. Peter Dailey
Clayton Wilhite



CAMPAIGN '76 ADVISORY BOARD

APRIL 26, 1976 - AGENDA

1. SITUATION REVIEW -

- a.) Primary results since last meeting
- b.) Future primaries and the "tasil" they present
- c.) Ford delegate picture as we move toward Kansas City

2. CREATIVE REVIEW -

- a.) Review TV commercials to date as refresher and first exposure to new members
- b.) The 5 minute film
- c.) Newspaper ads
- d.) Radio commercials

3. BUDGET REVIEW -

General statement of our budget problems and how they affect media and staffing problems.

4. CONVENTION

- a.) Objectives - campaign momentum
- b.) A major media event
- c.) Entertainment/message modules
 - 1. live
 - 2. film



5. GENERAL ELECTION STRATEGY

- a.) Incumbency strategy
- b.) The key issues
 - 1. leadership
 - 2. economy
 - 3. defense
- c.) Expected Democratic stance
 - 1. "The Nixon - Ford Administration"
 - 2. Conservative platform?
- d.) Other key questions
 - 1. Reuniting the Ford and Reagan supporters
 - 2. The view towards 1980
 - 3. The coalition of support Ford will need
 - 4. Etc. etc.



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO:

BRUCE WAGNER

FROM:

BRUCE BENDINGER

SUBJECT:

CALIFORNIA CREATIVE



x: Peter
Dailey
Clay + White
Peggy A. Las

This is summary of television ideas that might be appropriate as part of the next Ford TV effort in California...and onward through the campaign.

1. Presidential Q&A.

BLANK SCREEN

ANNCR: Sir, how would you evaluate the first year of the Ford administration?

CUT TO PRESIDENT FORD

FORD: Discusses accomplishments.

FREEZE FRAME & SUPER

ANNCR: President Ford is your President.
Keep him.

2. The Ford Team

Premise - One of the major reasons Independents and Democrats vote for Republicans is the quality of both the candidates and the men and women in their administrations.

INAUGURAL FOOTAGE

ANNCR: Since taking office, President Ford has built a new administration, bringing in some of the finest, most able men and women to serve our country. Nelson

CABINET FOOTAGE

FOOTAGE OF PEOPLE
AS MENTIONED

Rockefeller, Elliot Richardson, Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General Levi, Carla Hills, etc.

GROUP SHOT W/FORD

The Ford Team. Working for America.

3. Reagan for Governor/Ford for President.

Background - April 20 Post article (attached).

Format - Endorsements by people who thought Reagan was OK as Governor, but not good enough to be President. They state further why they support Ford.

4. Ford vs. Reagan
Fact vs. Fancy.

Background - Fred Slight memo regarding Reagan's March 31 address. Responses prepared by House Wednesday Group.

PEOPLE WATCHING TV

ANNCR: You hear a lot of fancy statements in a Presidential campaign, and some of them are just plain wrong. We'd like to set the record straight.

BLACK SCREEN
(Optional-words appear on screen with quote)

REAGAN: "quote"

ANNCR: Fact. (rebuttal)

Now let's hear from another candidate.

FORD STATE OF UNION

FORD: We must promise no more than we can deliver, and deliver on all that we promise.

NONSPECIFIC ACTIVITY

ANNCR: Since taking office, President Ford has held the line on spending...and the economy has started to turn around. He has brought some of the most talented men and women in America into his Administration. And he's been honest with the American people. President Ford is your President. Keep him.

5. Do-It-Yourself Testimonials.

Idea - Populist TV. Set up a camera with instructions on how to do your own Ford Testimonial. Edit testimonials into montage ala



Florida/New Hampshire. Add additional PR impact by publicizing
taping and production. Provide for street corner playback.

6. Betty.

FADE UP ON BETTY

BETTY: Gerry has tremendous strength.

I think some people may have already forgotten what a tremendous job he faced when he took office, and how well he's done. He's brought excellent people into the Cabinet.

The economy's started to turn around.

And he's still always ready to listen to new ideas.

I'm very proud of him.

ANNCR: President Ford is your President.

Keep him.

There are two major differences between these approaches and the current efforts.

First, there is a broadening of focus and perspective from President Ford to The Ford Administration, one of the finest collections of individuals in public service in quite a while.

Second, these formats contain somewhat more inherent impact than our traditional documentary and endorsement formats.

The reasons vary: surprise value, (Q&A), halo effect (Ford Team), direct competitiveness (3&4), artless reality (do-it-yourself), and personality (Betty).

California is a media situation where impact is vital, these offer an impact that we do not have to date.



Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 23, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: BRUCE BENDER
SUBJECT: VIDEOTAPE PRODUCTION

I have looked into costs and suppliers for "24 hour notice" videotape production. A few preliminary conclusions:

1. If money is a consideration, and you have 5 days lead time, 16mm film may be a better option. Crew and equipment costs are substantially less. Editing costs are also less.

With luck, you can roll a conformed, edited work print onto videotape four days after shooting, for an air-ready commercial.

2. Even if all things are not equal, you are probably better off going with the closest competent videotape supplier. Travel costs are considerable, involving moving an entire mobile unit (a dollar a mile each way) and crew. Many "suppliers" merely end up subcontracting to these local production units anyway, and you pay double mark up.


Finally, you have a better chance of getting an hourly rate vs. a day rate.

3. The "best bet" suppliers for Texas and California are:

TEXAS - MCI Productions - (512)282-1015
(Steve Klein & Bob Heller) - (214)630-1262

This is the company that taped the Tower spot. They have done a lot of work for both Tower and Bentsen.

I have been advised from other sources that they do not have good directors or cameramen, and we would be advised to bring in our own.



BRUCE WAGNER
VIDEOTAPE PRODUCTION
APRIL 23, 1976

Page Two

I have also been advised that WFFA in Dallas has a good operation and might be available.

CALIFORNIA - Videotape Enterprises - (213)659-4801
(Clare Higgins & Perry Ward)

A well-regarded west coast supplier. A lot of equipment, good crews. Used to working with outside directors.

4. Costs are approximately \$2000 a day. This will vary according to distance and equipment.

My inclinations are to use two cameras, so you could cut within the speech.

This would increase costs somewhat, but it gives you much better flexibility and interest for the finished product.

cc: Peg Pilas
Clayt Wilhite
Pete Dailey
Barry Lafer
Dawn Sibley



Campaign'76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY *DS*
SUBJECT: COMPETITIVE REPORTS - REAGAN

Attached please find competitive reports updated for Reagan.

Does this format fulfill your requirements?

We will update this constantly and circulate. Please advise to whom we should be sending this to at the PFC.

CC: Clayt Wilhite
Peggy Pilas
Carol Karasick
Denise Considine

Master



4/27/76

COMPETITIVE REPORT

STATE: ALABAMA
CANDIDATE: REAGAN

I. CITIZENS FOR REAGAN

<u>MEDIUM</u>	<u>COMMERCIAL LENGTH</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED TOTALS</u>			
			<u>#WEEKS</u>	<u>#MARKETS</u>	<u>PRESSURE</u>	<u>EXPEDITURE</u>
TELEVISION	1/2 HOUR	4/20	1	BIRMINGHAM	1 TIME + 5 :10 ID'S TO PROMOTE PROGRAM	-

UPDATE:

If Reagan adheres to his pattern of placing last minute activity just prior to primary date, an additional burst of half hour shows can be anticipated for the weekend of May 1st.



4/27/76

COMPETITIVE REPORT

STATE: TEXAS
CANDIDATE: REAGAN

I. CITIZENS FOR REAGAN

<u>MEDIUM</u>	<u>COMMERCIAL LENGTH</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED TOTALS</u>			
			<u>#/WEEK</u>	<u>#/MARKETS</u>	<u>PRESSURE</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE</u>
TELEVISION	:30	4/17	2	18	350-400 GRP'S	80,000
	1/2 HOUR	4/20	2	18	-	EST. 20,000
RADIO	:60	4/17	2	STATEWIDE	36/STA/WK	<u>85,000</u>
					TOTAL EST:	\$185,000

UPDATE:

- 1) Reagan is trying to increase pressure as much as possible for the last week of the campaign, however, station's political limitation of availabilities are making it tough for him to get more time.
- 2) Other groups for Reagan such as the American Conservative Union and Delegates for Reagan have been turned down when they have requested time because Citizens for Reagan has already bought up the maximum time available.
- 3) Reagan has asked for availabilities on Spanish radio stations in Texas.

LATEST

Reagan cancelled radio activity on radio station in Ft. Worth - reason: not enough money. Tracking this right now.



COMPETITIVE REPORT

4/27/76

STATE: INDIANA
CANDIDATE: REAGANI. CITIZENS FOR REAGAN - AGENCY: CARLSON & CO.ESTIMATED TOTALS

<u>MEDIUM</u>	<u>COMMERCIAL LENGTH</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>#WEEKS</u>	<u>#MARKETS</u>	<u>PRESSURE</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE</u>
TELEVISION	:30 & :60	4/16	2 1/2	6 (TOTAL STATE)	350 GRP's	65,000
	1/2 HOUR	5/3	1	2	LIGHT SO FAR	-
RADIO	:60	4/16	2 1/2	STATEWIDE	36/STA/WK	<u>68,000</u>
						133,000

UPDATE:

Reagan bought this market early; there have been no recent changes.

Like Ford, he is not utilizing the Chicago ADI TV stations to cover the state of Indiana.



COMPETITIVE REPORT

4/27/76

STATE: GEORGIA
CANDIDATE: REAGANI. CITIZENS FOR REAGAN

<u>MEDIUM</u>	<u>COMMERCIAL LENGTH</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED TOTALS</u>			
			<u>#WEEKS</u>	<u>#MARKETS</u>	<u>PRESSURE</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE</u>
TELEVISION	1/2 HOUR	4/19	2	3	1-2 PER MKT.	-
				(ALBANY) (COLUMBUS) (ATLANTA)		

UPDATE:

If Reagan adheres to his pattern of placing last minute activity just prior to primary date, an additional burst of half hour shows can be anticipated for the weekend of May 1st.

Avails were requested by Christiansfor Reagan in Atlanta, however, nothing was purchased.



Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: PETER DAILEY
FROM: BRUCE WAGNER *B*
SUBJECT: ROG MORTON COMMENTS

In casual conversation with Rog Morton, he mentioned a couple of things:

1. "Electability" is the key thought in his mind these days--President Ford can be elected... the other guy, can't.
2. President Ford is a 'man of the times'...'he's got what it takes to lead a modern society.'
3. I think he's looking for some conceptual assistance in developing some directions.



master

Campaign '76

Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 29, 1976

MEMO TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: CLAYT WILHITE
SUBJECT: MICHIGAN PRIMARY

BACKGROUND

The Michigan Republican Primary selects its 84 convention delegates by proportional allocation based on the total statewide vote for each Presidential candidate. There is no Party registration in the state.

President Ford, because of his native-son appeal, at this point, is considered substantially ahead of Reagan in voter preference across the state. Reagan has a small pocket of strength in the Thumb region of Michigan, but even there the President is considered ahead.

ISSUES

Michigan's heavy dependence on the labor intensive automotive industry makes the economy the overriding issue with voters. This is followed by national defense and, to a much lesser degree, agriculture.

The PFC Field Personnel stress the importance of President Ford's leadership image with Michigan voters. Because voters feel his image reflects on all Michiganders (and are sensitive to attacks on leadership capabilities), they need to be reassured that the President is decisive and authoritative.

ADVOCATES

Michigan has two extremely popular national figures: Governor William Milliken, a moderate who has state-wide appeal, and Senator Robert Griffin, the Senate Minority Whip.

Bruce Wagner
April 29, 1976
Page Two

CREATIVE

Given the issues that are important to Republicans in Michigan, our basic creative package will serve as the foundation for our advertising effort.

TELEVISION

Accomplishment :60 & :30
Future :60 & :30
Trust :30
Faces (Generic 5-minute)

RADIO

Facts - General
Facts - Older Americans
Facts - Farmers
Responsibility :60
First Lady :60

In addition, we will plan to produce Milliken and Griffin :60 advocate radio commercials emphasizing the President's Michigan heritage and his leadership capability.

We will not run newspaper advertising for budgetary reasons.

SCHEDULING

This is being completed today. The major anticipated change will be heavier use of the First Lady spot as she is held in particularly high regard in Michigan. Advertising is scheduled to begin May 4, unless the budget is reduced.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

cc: Bruce Bendinger
Peggy Pilas
Dawn Sibley
Phelps Johnston
Jack Frost
Marcy Taylor Pattinson
Peter Dailey



Campaign '76
Media Communications, Inc.

1828 L STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 833-8950

April 29, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: BRUCE WAGNER
FROM: DAWN SIBLEY

DS

Per our discussion, we have contacted CBS network to determine the cost and length of a five minute national announcement. Dependent upon specific network clearance of the time period in which the five minute would be placed, the cost would be approximately \$15,000 gross or \$12,750 net. Additionally, to this must be added mechanical charges for integrating the program into the network. These charges would run around \$800 to \$1,000. The length of a five minute program is actually four minutes and 30 seconds.

This cost and this length requirement would be true for NBC also. To our knowledge, ABC is not currently accepting political broadcasts. We have not contacted them because we are not sure you wish to pursue this issue, nor do we wish to alert the Reagan troops to our possible intent.

Please let me know if you wish me to move further on this.

cc: Clayt Wilhite
Carol Karasick

