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originally Feb. 12, 1974
retyped May 16, 1974

1. Lincoln's Birthday message - a few days late

We live in an
/unphilosophical and democratic era

difficult to discuss questions of morality

yet important practically for public support in democratic era/
many aspects:

1. US-USSR: cold war to detente
2. difference between friends and adversaries *friendly relations w tyrants*
3. need to maintain defense *covert actions*
4. how to be friendly with those who persecute Solzhenitzyn *arms sales*
5. Alliance with undemocratic regimes, Greece, Portugal, etc.

2. Lincoln

- slavery morally wrong
- distinguished self from Douglas "don't care"
- but also against abolitionists, who thought moral judgment that slavery was wrong settled whole question
- attempt to abolish slavery would destroy Union and Constitution: institutions and principles that were opposed to slavery
- one question--is slavery wrong?--moral question, and no doubt of answer
- another question--what to do about it?--Political question and lots of room for doubt
- Lincoln sought to avoid provoking conflict--to end slavery gradually and save the Union
- He sought a policy that would assure all that slavery was in "the course of ultimate extinction," but not by violence, and not by unconstitutional means.



3. Analogy for the 1970's

2

- no doubt there are regimes we cannot approve or condone:
- Communism, especially as practiced in Soviet Union
- Suppression of ordinary freedoms--speech and press
- Suppression of rights to life, liberty, pursuit of happiness
- not simply "ideological" differences--as if "they have their way, we ours"

we are not indifferent to injustice,

not morally neutral, we cannot follow a "don't care" policy

such practices are unjust and we have no doubt about it

- trial by jury, presumption of innocence, legal (habeas corpus) safeguards, etc.--these are not mere preferences or whims; these we know to be essential, indispensable characteristics of decent governments and we do not concede the rightness of regimes that deny these elementary safeguards to life and liberty.
- But, we know that regimes that protect these rights are rare in history, including now, that a nation has a strange and questionable career if it undertakes to correct the errors of other sovereign nations even when there is no doubt of the rightness of its position.
- great sufferings follow from the quixotic, self-righteous attempt to eradicate all evil in the world.
- to recognize that evil exists is important and a first step
- what to do about it in international affairs is a different question--especially in present time when war is such a ghastly prospect
- and especially is this true for a superpower when confronted by the only other superpower in the era of strategic nuclear parity
- confusion of rectitude of principles, and rectitude of the nation
- must acknowledge own flaws
- meaning of self-righteousness and why it is scorned



some rules:

- US should not approve, encourage, foster, promote, aid or even condone dictatorship or tyrannical rule
 - US should distinguish itself from those who "don't care" about tyranny elsewhere in the world.
 - US should try as effectively as possible to design policies to discourage tyrannical tendencies, encourage improvement-- avoiding the worst: world conflict
 - US should state clearly that detente doesn't mean friendship with Soviet Union
- doesn't mean illusions about Soviet Union
- doesn't mean approval of injustice
- doesn't mean we trust the Soviet Union
- detente means reduction of tensions that might lead to nuclear conflict; it has a potential, over the years, to become something more, but at present this is all it means.
 - detente means mutual restraint based on practical awareness of mutual danger, equally obvious to both sides, regardless of differences of principle
 - detente is the less unpleasant side of the relations of potential adversaries who cannot trust each other, but who would rather avoid war if possible.
 - We hope to avoid war that could lead to deaths of tens and hundreds of millions, endless suffering for any survivors, and perhaps the destruction of civilization.
 - that is a worthy and noble aim, but it may leave us in an imperfect world. We seek and hope for improvements in harsh regimes, but we are not willing to pay any price for that goal.

if a cool and implacable aloofness will help to do it, we're for that

if Alliance will do it, etc.

A just man can be happy--not perfectly happy, but happy-- in an imperfect world. The man who insists that happiness is not possible because the world is not perfect, is perverse and dangerous.



- From the start of the American Republic, the hope was that our good example would be most effective in combatting tyranny and promoting decent and limited governments. We have not been very admirable lately in eyes of world. That is one of our most urgent tasks. Much of it domestic.

But also in conduct of foreign affairs

- be clear on question of justice

we are against:

- * tyranny, dictatorship in all of its forms
- * deprivation of rights
- * denial of justice
- * persecution
- with potential adversaries, we will be non-provocative, firm in our principles of right, moderate, restrained, non-crusading
- with Allies and potential Allies:
 - correct
 - encouraging of improvements
 - willing to criticize, hoping to praise
- with those who share our principles:
 - friends

RAGoldwin



July 3, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO THE AMBASSADOR

FROM: Special Advisor: Robert A. Coldwin

SUBJECT: Detente

The Problem

Detente, considered as a continuing process, has one grave drawback: it seems to generate problems at a rate proportionate to its rate of progress.

The greatest difficulty comes from lack of understanding of the relation of detente to US efforts to provide defense and deterrence. Many honest and thoughtful people--in Congress and among the press and general public--do not grasp the compatibility of the two. Detente suggests that we are not in danger from the Soviets, the need for defense efforts suggests that we are in danger from them--and the seeming contradiction is more than most people can cope with. The confusion can be seen in the attitudes and behavior of Allies, for example, who applaud the successes of US detente efforts and simultaneously attempt to reduce their contribution to the common defense effort that is the basis of progress in detente.

A different but related confusion stems from the notion that detente is based on trust and friendship with the Soviet Union. This notion leads to the moral condemnation of US detente policy for ignoring or condoning the evils of the Soviet political system. This position holds that detente is not only amoral, or worse, but also practically dangerous because the Soviets cannot be trusted and will turn on us as we let down our guard.



The two confusions lead to two opposing positions, one pro-detente and anti-defense, the other anti-detente and pro-defense. But both stem from the same misunderstanding; that sees detente and defense efforts as incompatible and even contradictory, as exclusive alternatives, that one or the other can be pursued, but not both.

The Response

What is needed, therefore, is a clear and persistently repeated explanation of US policy in which detente and defense are presented as two elements of one consistent whole--two sides of the same coin. And this formulation should be designed to meet two tests: it should be serviceable in arguing for defense appropriations and against troop reductions, on the one hand, and for support of arms limitation agreements and other detente efforts, on the other; and, secondly, it should respond to the morality problem, most manifest in the opposition to the Trade Bill, but also bedevilling all of detente efforts by endangering support in Congress and elsewhere. The most important requirement is that the same argument be used for all purposes.

Simply put, US policy seeks to build a durable structure of peace--to make war as unlikely as humanly possible. In this single endeavor there are two main lines of effort: one is defense-deterrence, the other is detente. Our defense and deterrence efforts seek to convince a potential adversary that it would be irrationally dangerous to initiate war even if he has the motive and the inclination to do so. Detente seeks to reduce or remove the inclination or the motive to begin a war, mostly by decreasing fear and tension and by appealing to motives of self-interest and advantage.

The single policy is the search for peace in the world.



Defense efforts alone, without detente, in an era of approximate strategic nuclear equivalence, have the tendency to generate tensions, fears, and misunderstandings that make war a possibility at all times and too close to a probability in moments of crisis. Detente efforts alone, without adequate defense efforts, are too great a temptation to attempt quick solutions to complex problems by military force, or the threat of it. In an armed world, inadequate defense is a provocation--and therefore inconsistent with the search for peace.

Detente

Nations do not seek detente with other friendly nations. Detente is sought in relations with a potential adversary. The Soviet Union has a harsh and repressive political regime based on rigidly doctrinaire principles, and it has a massive array of military forces. Our security efforts seek to assure that they will be defeated if they attack, our deterrence seeks to persuade them that it will be unprofitable and perhaps fatal to attack, and detente seeks to remove the desire or motive to attack. But the key point is that detente does not assume friendship; it assumes potential enmity.

Nor is detente based on trust. In fact, the chief characteristic of US detente efforts is its untrustingness. Detente is a relationship with nations in whom we are not yet justified in trusting. Can we trust the Soviet Union? Some might say yes, most would say no, but for policy purposes the answer must be, we cannot be sure. For that reason, detente is not based on trust. The agreements and arrangements we have been making with the Soviet Union are prudently appropriate because they are based not on trust but on mutual advantages and interests. They are designed to be either self-enforcing because the parties agree only to do what is in their interests in the first place, or enforceable without requiring trust.



They are designed not to end the opposition of the two sides in a glow of trusting friendship, but rather to introduce restraint into that opposition and to diminish it somewhat.

In short, in answer to the question, can we trust the Soviet Union, the answer is that we cannot be sure, and therefore we do not build on trust, but on interest and advantage. Detente is a policy that permits the improvement of relations of nations that are potential adversaries and who cannot deal with each other on the basis of trust.

The Moral Question

In the light of the understanding that detente does not mean friendship and is not based on trust, it is easier to grasp the moral aspect of detente with the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State has addressed this question cogently on several occasions, most prominently in the Pacem in Terris speech on October 8, 1973, but probably because that speech was given just as the Middle East War was starting, its argument received too little attention at home and abroad, and its themes have not been repeated. In that speech the Secretary said, "America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose," but he added that "excessively moralistic" policy "may turn quixotic or dangerous." Those two statements, taken together, define the boundaries of the problem of how to think about and talk about morality in American foreign policy, and they point to the solution of the rhetorical problem of explaining clearly and persuasively the compatibility of detente and defense-deterrence.

I would add, as a corollary to the Secretary's point about "moral purpose," that it is impossible to gain public and Congressional support for policies that do not have an obvious moral content. The difficulty faced by the Trade Bill stems from the widespread opinion that the Administration is indifferent to the immorality of Soviet treatment of Soviet citizens. In the face of flagrant injustice, we



seem to say that we "don't care." It cannot suffice to express an "emotional" sympathy with the victims of oppression. Nor will arguments of a pragmatic nature, such as the impropriety of raising issues not previously mentioned in the course of negotiation, be effective with the public or the Congress in the face of the suspicion that we "don't care" about injustice. The only kind of argument that can be persuasive in this critically practical situation is one that takes morality fully into account. What is needed is a sound moral position that is not "excessively moralistic."

The way to make moral purpose clear in speaking about detente with the Soviet Union without becoming excessively moralistic is to divide the subject into two distinct parts. First is our moral judgment of the character of the Soviet Union as a political regime. Second, and a separate consideration, is our practical judgment--also very much a moral judgment--of what we should do about it.

In expressing our moral judgment of the Soviet regime we should follow the Secretary's formulation that "we shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice." We should say, frankly, that the Soviet political system presents us with a grave problem: that they live by principles that we in the United States find abhorrent; that their attacks on political and religious freedoms by censorship, prohibitions on immigration, arrest by secret police, slave labor camps, and religious persecution, and their abuse of the principles of justice and due process, would not be tolerated by Americans and should not be tolerated anywhere in these modern times; and that we look forward to the time when all men, everywhere, will be free from such bonds of tyranny. Further, we should emphasize that this is not a mere difference of "ideology" or an emotional preference, not a matter of "their ways" or customs compared to ours. Absolute authority, violations of due process, an officially controlled press,



political imprisonment, and similar evidences of tyranny, are wrong in themselves and not mere differences of national taste. On these moral and political grounds we should be firm in our condemnation of their system and their practices. It will be fatal to chances of public and congressional support for detente if the erroneous impression grows that in matters involving the fundamental political principles of liberty, equality, and justice, Americans must be indifferent.

Having said these things, however, we should add, at once and with equal emphasis, that there is a difference between knowing what is right and wrong, on the one hand, and knowing what to do about it, on the other hand. When one comes to this point in the argument, one turns to pragmatic questions of consequences, but the moral reasons for urging restraint are even more persuasive. The moral argument has two parts: first, it is a moral error to confuse the rectitude of one's principles with one's own rectitude. That is why we praise righteousness and scorn self-righteousness. Second, the world has suffered untold misery down through history at the hands of leaders who sought to eradicate all evil from the face of the earth by the use of force in the name of righteousness. The use of military force, or even the threat of it, to attack another nation because its government is evil is, in all ages, of questionable morality; in the nuclear age, it is morally unpardonable. Especially in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, superpowers of unprecedented destructive capability, there is a clear moral imperative not to use military force, or the threat of it, except to deter the other from similar use or threat, and for defense should deterrence fail.

The policy recommendation is that the US express clearly, but not belligerently, its distaste for the regime of the Soviet Union. We think it is wrong in principle and harsh in practice, and we know that the American people disapprove its injustices. But a moral judgment does not settle the question of policy nor chart a course of action.



Moral men must exercise restraint in a dangerous world. It is immoral to pursue policies, even those claiming to stem from sound moral judgments, that endanger the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings.

It has been said that Karl Marx was the ultimate 19th Century reformer who carried to the extreme the desire to eliminate all evil from the face of the earth, and as a result the world has suffered unlimited misery at the hands of his followers. The ruling principle of American politics, on the other hand, is well expressed in The Federalist: men are not angels, and two consequences follow from that--men must be governed, and those who govern must have limits on their powers. In short, the ruling principle of American political theory and experience is the imperfection of man and therefore the importance of restraint and moderation in everything we do, including foreign policy. We may have full confidence in the rectitude of our principles of liberty, equality, and justice, but can we have full confidence in our own rectitude and the purity of our motives at all times? The only true American answer must be a resounding no to every invitation to crusade.

Special Advisor: Robert A. Goldwin



July 26, 1974

3,

The detente policy of the present Administration gives rise to unfortunate misunderstandings primarily because it is complex, and not simple. But complexity can be explained and understood, and it can be the basis of an effective policy that seeks peace and security for the United States.

We must not allow the yearning for simplicity to stand in the way of the great objective of finding a basis for peace and decency in the world. It is just that yearning for simplicity, in my opinion, that has led to an erroneous analysis of detente in a recent column in The New York Times (William Safire, International Herald-Tribune, June 28, 1974).

In that column it was suggested that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger have been locked in a kind of combat for the soul of American foreign policy--a rough and tumble of giants that dwarfs the negotiations between Nixon and Brezhnev.

Kissinger, according to this account, wants to ignore the immorality of the Soviet Union, while Nixon keeps in mind the nature evil/of the Soviets and their long-range intentions.

A close look at the speech the President gave in Annapolis in June raises strong doubts that he then was, as is asserted, under pressure to mouth an amoral position and that the speech was a "victory of amorality." Rather, it points up effectively the sensibly complex nature of US foreign policy in seeking to establish and strengthen detente.

Morality is a central thread throughout the speech: "both pragmatism and moral force had to be the double prongs of any American foreign policy. A sense of moral purpose is part of our heritage and part of the tradition of our foreign policy. Pragmatism, realism, and technical efficiency must not be the sole touchstone of our foreign policy."



Does that sound like "the victory of amorality"? A policy devoid of moral purpose, the speech continued, "would have no roots or inspiration," and could not win support from Americans, nor "deserve the respect of the world." How can such words be called amoral?

The Administration view on morality in foreign policy is not simple, but it can be intelligible and, compared to the alternatives available, can be persuasively argued, as in the Annapolis speech. "Pragmatism and moral force are the double prongs." "Unrealistic idealism can be impractical and potentially dangerous." We must not forgo results that are good because they are not perfect. What could be more sensible? "A blend of the ideal and the pragmatic in our foreign policy is especially critical in our approach to the Soviet Union."

It has long been recognized by those who are concerned with the problem of morality in action that conditions are not always propitious for achieving the best results. For that reason, moral action must be considered in two steps:

First, knowing the right and the wrong of the situation.

Second, judging what can be done about it.



It is one thing to discern right and wrong, to judge what is best. It is another thing to judge the circumstances of a situation and know what can be achieved. This is only to state the obvious difference between theoretical understanding and practical judgment: Life, after all, is not a seminar.

The dominant view has always been that the Soviet regime is wrong in its principles and harsh in its practices. Most Americans are aware of and decry the suppression of human liberty and the denials of basic rights that characterize the Soviet political system. Those in government are aware, more fully than most observers with less access to the daily flow of information about the growth and spread of Soviet power, of the dangers to our safety and survival presented by the Soviet Union. All of the public utterances of both Nixon and Kissinger show that they share an understanding of the nature of the Soviet regime, and condemn it.

But moral judgment does not by itself determine a course of action nor set foreign policy. It is an appropriate starting point, but only a starting point.



In plain language, the problem can be stated this way: We think the Soviets have an evil system and we don't like what they do to their own citizens, nor do we like the threat they pose to the rest of the world. What should we do about it? And then we must add to the question, what should we do about it in an era of nuclear strategic parity, when any conflict has the potential of escalating into a globally terminal war?

It makes great sense, in that circumstance, to say what was said in Annapolis, and what some deride as amoral: "Peace between nations with totally different systems is also a highly moral objective."

Marxism advocates the view that all evil can be eradicated from the face of the earth if the enemies of the classless society are liquidated, with the expectation that men can live, eventually, without government.

The American view starts from the acceptance of the fact that men are not angels and ~~the denial that anyone~~ ^{the denial that anyone} has the right to undertake a program of liquidation. Two consequences follow from the fact that men are not angels: men must be governed, ^{by other men}



and the men who govern must be limited in their powers. The grand themes of American political theory and experience are tolerance, restraint, and moderation--not moral crusading.


Two mistakes must be avoided, one amoral, the other self-righteous. We must not say, "We have our way and they have theirs; there is nothing to choose between them, so why fight about it."

the differences in our system are great and basic..

The truth of the matter is that/denial of rights of freedom of speech and religion, government ownership of the press, denial of legal due process, and political imprisonment are not mere matters of national preference immune from judgment, but completely wrong in themselves. The principles of justice and decency have their validity, not because we are for them, but because they are true in themselves.

But let us not make the equally dangerous mistake of self-righteousness, confusing the rectitude of our principles with our own rectitude. There is a difference. We must adhere to righteousness, but it is imperative that we scorn self-righteousness. ¶ That, in brief, is the moral position I am sure reasonable men, on reflection, must share in today's world, and to the best of my understanding it is the basis of Administration efforts to establish detente.

SPECAD:RAGoldwin:ajm



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO:

Bob Goldwin

FROM: PAUL THEIS

F41.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/23/74

TO:

BOB HARTMAN

FROM: PAUL THEIS

Regarding the Rumsfeld swearing-in,
attached are some suggested
remarks for the President which
Bob Goldwin drafted.

President says
no. need - he
will ad lib it



(Goldwin)

FIRST DRAFT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 26, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY
OF DONALD RUMSFELD AS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

AT , EDT

The appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as Assistant to the President, with Cabinet rank, strengthens my entire Administration. He will have responsibility for co-ordinating White House operations.

For a man so young, Don Rumsfeld has unusually broad experience in government.

--He has campaigned as a candidate four times, and won election each time.

--He was an outstanding Congressman. I valued him as a colleague in the House of Representatives.

--He knows the workings of the Executive branch as well as the legislative branch.

--He served with distinction in the White House and he has administered important agencies, most notably the Cost of Living Council during Phase II.

--And now, as Ambassador to NATO, he has added experience in foreign policy and military matters.



PAGE TWO

Don is a hard-driving leader who demands maximum effort from those he works with, and then works harder than anyone else.

He is honest, he is smart, he is dedicated, and he is experienced. That is why I have asked him to take on this job.

I am grateful that ^{HE} has accepted.
A

Mr. Chris:

Attached are from
White House personnel office,
Who's Who, & Int'l Who's Who.

Am awaiting from State Dept. a 1973
Rumsfeld statement in their
bulletin entitled "Department opposes
proposals for unilateral reduction
of U.S. troop levels in Europe".

Also, in a few minutes I'll bring
you xeroxed copies of articles on
Rumsfeld in Time, U.S. News, et alia.

Christie

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 26, 1969

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY
OF DONALD RUMSFELD AS DIRECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY
THE ROSE GARDEN

AT 10:12 A.M. EDT

Mr. Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, Mayor Lindsay, Mayor Washington, ladies and gentlemen:

This is another one of our swearing-in ceremonies and one of very great importance to this Administration and also to the Nation.

Don Rumsfeld will, after his swearing-in, assume several responsibilities: one is an Assistant to the President; second, as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; and, third, as a member of the Cabinet by designation of the President.

He will be the youngest member of the Cabinet, but one very experienced in all of the responsibilities that he will have.

You have already met him. I have already introduced him at the time that his nomination was sent to the Senate.

Now, he will be sworn in. Judge Flickling, of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, will administer the oath and Mrs. Rumsfeld will hold the Bible.

(Judge Fickling administered the oath of office.)

END

AT 10:14 A.M. EDT



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 21, 1969

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced his intention to nominate Donald Rumsfeld, 36, of Wilmette, Illinois, as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The President will also appoint him as an Assistant to the President with Cabinet rank.

Rumsfeld, a Congressman from Illinois' thirteenth Congressional district since 1963, is a member of the Government Operations, Science and Astronautics, and Joint Economic Committees.

He has been active in the drafting of legislation which would streamline the function and responsiveness of both the legislative and executive branches of government. Rumsfeld has also been a strong advocate of "Freedom of Information" legislation to eliminate unnecessary secrecy in government. During debate on extension of the draft in 1967, he introduced an amendment, which was passed by the House, directing a study of the creation of an all-volunteer army.

Following graduation from Princeton University in 1954, Rumsfeld joined the Navy and served as a naval aviator and flight instructor until his discharge in 1957. He served as administrative assistant to former Congressman David Dennison of Ohio in 1958 and Robert Griffin in 1959 while he was a Congressman from Michigan. He then became associated with the investment banking firm of A. G. Becker & Co. in Chicago. He was elected to Congress November 6, 1962.

Rumsfeld is married to the former Joyce Pierson and they have three children.

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HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL DELIVERED TO THE SENATE

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

NOMINATIONS SENT TO THE SENATE ON JANUARY 4, 1973:

Elliot L. Richardson, of Massachusetts, to be Secretary of Defense.

Frederick B. Dent, of South Carolina, to be Secretary of Commerce.

Peter J. Brennan, of New York, to be Secretary of Labor.

Caspar W. Weinberger, of California, to be Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

James T. Lynn, of Ohio, to be Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Claude S. Brinegar, of California, to be Secretary of Transportation.

John A. Scali, of the District of Columbia, to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and the Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations.

Kenneth Rush, of New York, to be Deputy Secretary of State, vice John N. Irwin II.

William J. Porter, of Massachusetts, a Foreign Service Officer of the Class of Career Minister, to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, vice U. Alexis Johnson.

William J. Casey, of New York, to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. (New Position)

Donald Rumsfeld, of Illinois, to be the United States Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, vice David M. Kennedy.

John N. Irwin II, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to France, vice Arthur K. Watson, resigned.

Daniel P. Moynihan, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to India.

Richard Helms, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador

36th ed. 1972-1973

Publs. *Yoga: Art or Science, Message of Beauty to Civilisation, Women as Artists, Dance and Music, The Creative Spirit, Art and Education*. Kalakshetra, Madras-41, India. Telephone: 74836.

Rumbold, Sir Anthony, Bart., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.; British diplomatist; b. 7 March 1911, Tokyo, Japan; s. of Rt. Hon. Sir Horace and Lady Rumbold; m. Felicity Bailey 1937; one s. three d.; ed. Eton and Magdalen Coll., Oxford. Laming Fellow, Queen's Coll., Oxford 33; Foreign Office 35; Washington, Allied Headquarters (Mediterranean), Prague, Paris; Principal Private Sec. to Sir Anthony Eden 54, to Mr. Macmillan 55; Asst. Under-Sec. of State, Foreign Office 58-60; Minister in Paris 60-63; Amb. to Thailand 65-67, to Austria 67-70. Leisure interest: country pursuits. Home: Hatch House, Tisbury, Wiltshire, England. Telephone: Tisbury 238.

Rumbold, Sir (Horace) Algernon (Fraser), K.C.M.G., C.I.E.; British government official (retd.); b. 1906, North Berwick, Scotland; s. of Col. William Edwin Rumbold, C.M.G.; m. Margaret Adél Hughes 1946; two d.; ed. Wellington Coll., and Christ Church, Oxford. Assistant Principal, India Office 29, Private Sec. to Parl. Under-Sec. of State for India 30-33, to Perm. Under-Sec. of State 33-34, Principal 34, Asst. Sec. 43; Commonwealth Relations Office 47; Deputy High Commr. in South Africa 49-53; Asst. Under-Sec. of State, Commonwealth Relations Office 54-58, Deputy Under-Sec. of State 58-66; Chair. Cttee. on Inter-Territorial Questions, Central Africa 63; Deputy Chair. Air Transport Licensing Board 71. Shortwoods, West Clandon, Surrey, England. Telephone: Clandon 757.

Rumiantsev, Alexei Matveyevich; Soviet journalist and politician; b. 16 Nov. 1905, Mintsovo, Galich District, Kostroma Region; ed. Kharkov Economics Inst. Commissariat of Agriculture, later Justice, Ukraine 26-30; Dir. Inst. of Econ., U.S.S.R. Acad. of Sciences, Head Social Science Dept., Ukrainian Acad. of Sciences 30-43; mem. C.P.S.U. 40; party work, Kharkov Regional Cttee., Communist Party of Ukraine 43-52; on staff of Central Cttee. of C.P.S.U. 52-56; Editor-in-Chief *Kommunist* 56-58, *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Problems of Peace and Socialism) 58-64, *Pravda* Nov. 64-66; Sec. Econ. Branch of the U.S.S.R. Acad. of Sciences 66; mem. Central Cttee. of C.P.S.U. 52; corresp. mem. U.S.S.R. Acad. of Sciences 60-66, mem. 66-, Vice-Pres. 66. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 14 Lenin Prospekt, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Rumor, Mariano; Italian politician; b. 16 June 1915, Vicenza (Venezia). Member of Parl. 48; Deputy Sec. Christian Democrat Party 54-64, Sec.-Gen. 64-65, now Political Sec.; fmr. Under-Sec. for Agriculture, fmr. Under-Sec. to the Presidency; Minister of Agriculture 59-63, of Interior 63; Pres. European Union of Christian Democrats 65; Prime Minister of Italy Dec. 68-Feb. 70, March 70-July 70; Minister of Interior Feb. 72-. Camera dei Deputati, Rome, Italy.

Rumsfeld, Donald; American government official; b. 9 July 1932, Chicago; s. of George and Jeannette Rumsfeld; m. Joyce Pierson 1954; one s. two d.; ed. Princeton Univ. Administrative Asst. to Congressman Dennison 58; mem. 88th-91st Congresses; Republican; Dir. Office of Econ. Opportunity 69-70; Counsellor to Pres. 70; Dir. Cost of Living Council 71; Chair. Property Review Board 71; mem. of Cabinet 69. Leisure interests: sports, history and reading. Second Floor, West Wing, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500, U.S.A.

Runciman, The Hon. Sir Steven (James Cochran Stevenson), Kt., M.A., F.B.A.; British historian; b. 7 July 1903, Northumberland; s. of 1st Viscount Runciman and Hilda Stevenson; ed. Eton Coll., and Trinity Coll., Cambridge.

Fellow Trinity Coll., Cambridge 27-38; Lecturer Cambridge Univ. 31-38; Press Attaché, British Legation, Sofia 40-41; Prof. of Byzantine Studies, Istanbul Univ. 42-45; Rep. of British Council, Greece 45-47; Chair. Anglo-Hellenic League 51-67; Trustee, British Museum 60-67; Pres. British Inst. of Archaeology at Ankara 62; Fellow British Acad. 57; Hon. Fellow Trinity Coll., Cambridge; Foreign mem. American Philosophical Soc. 65; Kt. Commdr. Order of the Phoenix (Greece); Hon. Litt.D. (Cambridge, Chicago, Durham, London, Oxford and St. Andrews); Hon. LL.D. (Glasgow); Hon. D.Phil. (Salonika); Hon. D.D. (Wabash, U.S.A.); Silver PEN award 69; Apptd. by Oecumenical Patriarch, Grand Orator of the Great Church 70.

Publs. *The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus* 29, *The First Bulgarian Empire* 30, *Byzantine Civilisation* 33, *The Medieval Manichee* 47, *History of the Crusades* (3 vols.) 51-54, *The Eastern Schism* 55, *The Sicilian Vespers* 58, *The White Rajahs* 60, *The Fall of Constantinople 1453* 65, *The Great Church in Captivity* 68, *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* 70, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State* 72.

Elshieshields, Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland. Telephone: Lochmaben 280.

Runciman of Doxford, 2nd Viscount, cr. 37; **Walter Leslie Runciman**, Bt., A.F.C., O.B.E., M.A.; British shipowner and industrialist; b. 26 Aug. 1900, Newcastle upon Tyne; s. of 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford, P.C.; m. Katherine Schugler Jarrison 1932; one s.; ed. Eton and Trinity Coll., Cambridge.

Chairman, Walter Runciman & Co. Ltd., Anchor Line Ltd., Currie Line Ltd., Chair. Trustees Nat. Maritime Museum; Pres. Royal Inst. of Naval Architects 51-61; Chair. North of England Shipowners' Asscn. 31-32; Chair. Council, Armstrong Coll., Durham Univ. 35-37; Dir.-Gen. British Overseas Airways Corp. 40-43; Air Attaché, Teheran 43-46; Pres. Chamber of Shipping of the U.K. 52, Chair. Gen. Council of British Shipping 52; Hon. D.C.L. (Durham).

Leisure interests: sailing, shooting. 46 Abbey Lodge, Park Road, London, N.W.8, England.

Runcorn, Stanley Keith, M.A., SC.D., PH.D., F.R.S.; British physicist; b. 19 Nov. 1922, Southport, Lancs.; s. of W. H. Runcorn and Lily Idena Roberts; unmarried; ed. George V Grammar School, Southport and Gonville and Caius Coll., Cambridge.

Experimental Officer, Radar Research and Devt. Establishment, Malvern 43-46; Asst. Lecturer, Univ. of Manchester 46-48, Lecturer 48-49; Asst. Dir. of Research in Geophysics, Cambridge Univ. 50-55; Fellow, Gonville and Caius Coll., Cambridge; Prof. of Physics and Head of School of Physics, Univ. of Newcastle upon Tyne; recipient lunar samples from *Apollo XI* and *XII*; Rutherford Memorial Lecturer, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 70; Napier Shaw Prize, Royal Meteorological Soc. 59, Charles Chree Medal and Prize, Inst. of Physics 69.

Publs. Editor of *Continental Drift* 62, *Methods & Techniques in Geophysics* (2 vols.) 66, *Mantles of the Earth and Terrestrial Planets* 68, *The Application of Modern Physics to the Earth & Planetary Interiors* 69, *Palaeogeophysics* 70; Co-Editor of *Physics and Chemistry of the Earth* (Vols. 1-7) 56-66, *Methods in Palaeomagnetism* 67, *Magnetism and the Cosmos* 67; author of approximately 80 scientific papers.

School of Physics, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU; Home: 16 Moorside Court, Fenham, Newcastle upon Tyne, England. Telephone: Newcastle 28511 (Office).

Congressional Directory

ILLINOIS

Biographical

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1952, and reelected 1956 and 1960; married to the former Audrey B. Vasey of Toronto, Canada, who died September 3, 1967; one daughter, Beatrice (Mrs. Andre Donald Etienne); two sons, Michael and Oliver; member Chicago, Lake County, Illinois State, and American Bar Associations, Law Club of Chicago; elected to the 88th Congress November 6, 1962; reelected to the 89th, 90th, and 91st Congresses.

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT.—COOK COUNTY: Townships of Elk Grove, Evanston, New Trier, Niles, Northfield, Palatine, Schaumburg, and Wheeling. Population (1960), 467,682; estimated to July 1967, 507,000.

DONALD RUMSFELD, Republican, of Wilmette, Ill.; born in Chicago, Ill., July 9, 1932; attended Winnetka public schools; graduated Princeton University, 1954, in politics; served as a naval aviator and flight instructor until 1957; married the former Joyce Pierson of Wilmette; two daughters, Valerie and Marey; son, Donald Nicholas; administrative assistant to Congressman David Dennison, Ohio, 1958; formerly associated with A. G. Becker & Co., Inc., Chicago investment bankers, as registered representative; elected to the 88th Congress November 6, 1962; reelected to the 89th, 90th, and 91st Congresses.

FOURTEENTH DISTRICT.—DU PAGE COUNTY: All of Du Page County except that part that lies within the boundaries of O'Hare Field in the city of Chicago. WILL COUNTY: Townships of Du Page, Joliet, and Lockport. Population (1960), 439,182; estimated to July 1967, 550,000.

JOHN N. ERLNBORN, Republican, of Elmhurst, Ill.; born in Chicago, Ill., February 8, 1927; graduated Immaculate Conception High School, Elmhurst, 1944; served with the U.S. Navy in World War II; undergraduate Notre Dame, Indiana State Teachers College, University of Illinois, and Loyola of Chicago; graduated Loyola of Chicago LL.B. 1949; engaged in the practice of law in Elmhurst, Ill., law firm of Erlenborn, Bauer and Hotte; married to the former Dorothy Fisher of Glen Ellyn May 10, 1952; three children, Debra, Paul, and David; assistant State's attorney 1950-52, Du Page County, Illinois; State representative (36th District) 1957-65; elected to the 89th Congress November 3, 1964; reelected to the 90th and 91st Congresses.

FIFTEENTH DISTRICT.—COUNTIES: DeKalb, Grundy, Kane, Kendall, and La Salle (5 counties). Population (1960), 410,650; estimated to January 1969, 465,500.

CHARLOTTE T. REID, Republican, of Aurora, Ill.; attended public schools of Aurora and Illinois College at Jacksonville, Ill.; under the name of Annette King, served as staff vocalist on NBC and appeared as a vocalist for 3 years on Don McNeill's radio program; active in civic and political affairs; married to the late Frank R. Reid, Jr., in 1938; two sons, Frank R. Reid III and Edward Thompson Reid; and two daughters, Patricia (Mrs. George Lindner) and Susan Reid; elected to the 88th Congress November 6, 1962; reelected to the 89th, 90th, and 91st Congresses.

SIXTEENTH DISTRICT.—COUNTIES: Boone, Carroll, Jo Daviess, Lee, Ogle, Stephenson, and Winnebago (7 counties). Population (1960), 394,481; estimated to January 1969, 425,000.

JOHN B. ANDERSON, Republican, of Rockford, Ill.; born in Rockford, Ill., February 15, 1922; graduated from Rockford Central High School in 1939; A.B. and J.D. degrees from the University of Illinois; LL.M. degree from Harvard Law School; while at Harvard served on the faculty of Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Mass.; admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1946; during World War II enlisted in the U.S. Army and served in the Field Artillery for 2½ years, 10 months of which were spent overseas in four major campaigns in the European Theater of Operations; member of the U.S. State Department's Career Diplomatic Service in 1952 and then sent abroad and stationed in West Berlin for 2½ years as an adviser on the staff of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany; engaged in practice of law in 1955; State's attorney of Winnebago County 1956-60; married to Keke Machakos; four children, Eleanor, John, Jr., Diane, and Karen Beth; member of Winnebago County Bar Association, American Legion, the University Club of Rockford, and the First



1972-1973

RUNCIMAN, WALTER LESLIE, (Viscount Runciman of
Doxford), shipowner; b. Newcastle upon Tyne, Eng. Aug. 26, 1900.
s. Walter Viscount Runciman of Doxford and Hilda Stevenson; King's
scholar, Eton Coll., 1914-19; M.A. Trinity Coll., Cambridge (Eng.) U.
1928; m. Katherine Schuyler Garrison, Apr. 11, 1932; 1 son, Walter
Garrison. With Walter Runciman & Co. Ltd., 1924—, chmn., 1937.

November 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

This is my reworking of the draft Lee sent to you.

Lee was mistaken in thinking that I had done a separate draft. She never asked me to work on one for Gene. I did do two others for her.

Attachment




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Attachment



DRAFT

The Honorable
Eugene V. McAuliffe
Acting Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, Belgium

Dear Gene:

As you already know, I am deeply grateful for your superb backing while I was Chief of Mission.

I cannot imagine ~~how one could have~~ a better deputy: your judgment is sound, you know how to keep the ^Mmission humming smoothly, and you have a deep and exhaustive knowledge of the Alliance's political-military affairs.

Your knowledge and experience, coupled with your talent for facts, names ^{and} figures, both large and small, impressed me. Who else could switch ^{so} easily from a discussion of the grand design of Atlantic relations to the complexities of the Infrastructure program, and catch the experts up short in their own field?

In all candor, however, I must acknowledge that you were not without fault. Although you drafted well, in a clear and vigorous style, you were not always able to decipher my handwriting and tell me what I had written. Then there was also ^{you} a barely concealed lack of interest in invitations to the ballet. Finally, there was the lack of Midwestern birth. True, you tried to compensate for



Page 2

this by avowing that you were just a country boy from Boston; but I must tell you, Gene, that your accomplishments at the negotiating table made your story unconvincing.

I appreciated your ability to understand what I wanted and to get it done. You regularly anticipated my requests and the results surpassed my expectations. These qualities are rare: they place you among the very few who are capable of directing large staffs and getting out of them the maximum in quality and quantity.

I am grateful to you for your dedication, your hard work, your devotion to the concept of service inherent in the nature of the Foreign Service, and for your loyalty. I could not have found a better deputy.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld
Assistant to the President

11/12/74



December 5, 1974

Dear Don:

The small Chinese box is really splendid. I am grateful for it and for the note that accompanied it.

But I must, once again, add some words of advice. When one begins to move in a new direction, it is important to avoid excess. You used the word "thanks" twice in a letter of three short sentences. You mustn't allow yourself to be carried away. Moderation must be the rule.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Goldwin

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
White House

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1974

Dear Bob:

Thanks so much for the use of your coat.
It was most thoughtful and certainly came in
handy.

Here's a small Chinese box I brought back
for you to say thanks.

Regards,

Donald Rumsfeld

Mr. Robert A. Goldwin
Room 128 E.O.B.



December 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO:

DON RUMSFELD

FROM:

BOB GOLDWIN


Here is a photocopy of the letter from Irving Kristol describing in detail a proposed Council of Social Advisers.

You asked me last night to send you another copy at once.

Kristol left out of his letter the chief point he made in his conversation with us: a Council of Social Advisers would give the White House the initiative in setting "the public agenda."

In answer to your question about James Q. Wilson, I agree with Kristol that Jim would be outstanding as a member of this group or as its chairman.

Attachment



December 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD
FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

I have been informed by the Chief Executive Clerk's office that I will be sworn in as soon as my commission is signed--in a day or two. They propose to do it in my office with no formal ceremony.

Would you do me the favor of allowing the swearing-in to be held in your office, in your presence, to add dignity and elegance to the occasion?



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12/10/74

Mr. Goldwin:

I talked to Mr. Ratchford in Bob Linder's office (he is Chief Executive Clerk) and he said that you would be sworn in as soon as your commission is signed which should be tomorrow or Thursday.

Mr. Ratchford said he would probably swear you in in your office - there isn't any formal ceremony.

Mary

Check w DR



December 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO:

DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM:

ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

Feldstein is an unusually interesting young economist. The articles he refers to in the letter have been sent to Alan Greenspan, but his brief explanations are instructive in themselves.

Enclosure



January 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
THROUGH: RICHARD CHENEY
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

Irving Kristol called to say that Robert Bork has spoken to Senator Hruska about the Edward Levi appointment. Bork thinks that Hruska has been brought around at least to the point that he will not oppose the Levi appointment if the President continues to support it vigorously.

Bork told Kristol that he thinks Eastland is the problem and that similar talks ought to be held with him. Bork's suggestion was that William Buckley, Milton Friedman (the economist), and Bork could meet with Eastland and appropriate senior staff in the White House to try to persuade Eastland that a good conservative should not oppose the Levi appointment.

I responded to Kristol that I thought Buckley, Friedman and Bork might be more persuasive to a Republican like Hruska than to a Democrat like Eastland. Kristol tended to agree and said he doesn't know the answer but he thinks the right question is, who does Senator Eastland listen to? Whoever it is, efforts should be made to carry the argument to Eastland to diminish his opposition to the appointment.

In a subsequent conversation I had with William Safire, he brought up the matter of the Levi appointment and offered the opinion that nothing could have been more helpful to President Ford at this time than to have the vociferous criticism of a Mississippi Democrat. Safire doubts that there will be buckets of blood on the floor, as Evans and Novak predict. Safire thinks that if the President continues to push the nomination of Levi, that Eastland and others will do little more than grumble, that the nomination will go through, and that the President and Levi will look good as a result.



*copy handed Dick Cheney
1/2/75 - mch*

January 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

In case you missed it, as I did, the enclosed article is important for three reasons:

1. Elie Wiesel is an exceptionally good Jewish author and playwright who is very likely to catch and express the mood of Jewish people here and in Europe as well as in Israel.
2. The mood of deep anxiety among Jews may be exaggerated but it is very real, very strong, and growing.
3. The handwritten note at the bottom is from a relative of mine who escaped from Vienna in 1938, one day before the storm troopers came to arrest her family. Almost all of the rest of the relatives were killed. She and her husband and young daughter have had an exceptionally good life in the United States. Her comment at the bottom, in case you cannot make it out, is, "I too am reminded of the past, but I'm confident our President cares about us!" That impression may not be widespread, but it exists among some Jewish Americans and should be carefully nurtured.

Encl.

*Copy sent Dick Cheney also
1/14/75*



January 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
RICHARD CHENEY

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

The enclosed letter and brief paper are from Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University.

If you choose to respond to him, please send me a carbon. If you want me to respond, let me know.

Etzioni has a good reputation and the suggestion makes some sense.

Attachment



January 16, 1975

Dear Dr. Etsioni:

Thank you for sending me your description of a suggested task force on dis-government. I have forwarded it to others in the White House to get their reaction. You will be hearing from them directly, or from me.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Goldwin
Special Consultant to
the President

Dr. Amitai Etsioni
Director
Center for Policy Research, Inc.
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N. Y. 10027



January 17, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

The attached copy of a letter from Irving Kristol makes an interesting argument for appointing professors to ambassadorships.

Encl.

Copy sent Dick Cheney



THE Public Interest

EDITORIAL OFFICES: 10 East 53 Street, New York, N. Y. 10022

Editors: IRVING KRISTOL • NATHAN GLAZER

Associate Editor: PAUL WEAVER

January 15, 1975

Mr. Robert Goldwin
Room 170
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:

I'd like to call to your attention an important reason why professors should be appointed to more ambassadorships than now seems to be the practice of either the White House or the State Department. It's not that professors will necessarily be better than appointees from the Foreign Service or the business community -- though I have no reason to think they will be worse. The point is that there is a superior long-term "payoff." When Foreign Service types or businessmen cease being ambassadors, they also tend to cease to play any important role in foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, when professors cease being ambassadors, they return to the academic community, and are then accepted naturally as having a special expertise and distinction in the field of foreign policy. This means that their voices are heard more frequently and more loudly. It also means, one hopes, that the level of foreign policy discussion in this country would be improved.

So it would be nice if the White House and the State Department got together and appointed a few friendly professors to ambassadorial positions, even minor ones.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Helmut Sonnenfeldt of Kissinger's staff. Perhaps you and he can have a chat about it one of these days.


Best,

Irving

Irving Kristol

IK:rl

cc: Helmut Sonnenfeldt



Publisher: Warren Demian Manshel

Chairman of the Publication Committee: Daniel Bell

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Stanley Simon • Arthur L. Singer, Jr. • Robert M. Solow • Roger Starr • James Q. Wilson

January 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

In our meeting on Sunday, you asked me to write down the argument I gave on the subject of the presidential veto, partly derived from The Federalist. I have done it in the form of Q & A.

Q. There has been a lot of criticism of your threat to veto any new spending legislation. Can you explain that threat, and especially how it is consistent with your other statements that you seek conciliation and compromise with Congress?

A. Yes, I think it is important to understand why the Constitution gives the President the veto power. As I see the veto, it is not a threat but a means for any President to work in cooperation with the Congress.

The veto, as provided in the Constitution gives the President an occasional role in the legislative process, just as some other constitutional provisions, like advice and consent, give Congress a role in the executive process.

My view of the veto, the best and most constructive use of it, is that it does not pit the President against the Congress in a test of strength, nor does it substitute executive will and judgment for legislative will and judgment. A veto that can be overridden enables the Congress and the President to interact on the most important matters before the decision becomes final.



January 21, 1975

If the President thinks the Congress has acted too hastily, he can make them take more time and reconsider. If the President thinks that the deliberation was incomplete, that there were arguments or facts that should have been considered but were not, he can present those facts and arguments to Congress as part of his veto. And finally, if the majority is narrow, and perhaps not truly national, as sometimes happens through the ordinary working of the majority-rule system, the President by veto brings into effect the constitutional requirement that passage be by two-thirds. Such a majority is sure to be truly national, as befits a very important decision.

Now, in my Message to the Congress, I said, "I will not hesitate to veto any new spending programs." And I will not hesitate, especially if I think they were adopted too hastily, with incomplete deliberation, or with less than a truly national majority. By vetoing I will assure that additional time is given to the question, that more deliberation takes place, and test whether a decisive majority exists in opposition to my views.

At the root of this stand is my conviction that high levels of spending are in themselves a national danger, which we must face promptly or suffer the consequences. And use of the veto is a constitutional means to bring this danger to the attention of the Congress and the people.

If I am sustained in these vetoes, I am convinced that a good purpose will be served. If I am overridden, I will regret it, but I am convinced that I will have done what the Constitution intended--thorough congressional deliberation and action in good time, expressing the will and judgment of the nation.

I will judge my success not by keeping score on how many times my veto is sustained, but rather by judging how well my cooperation with the Congress serves the national interest.



January 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

Here is the first try at writing up our conversation of last Sunday. You will recognize much of it as your own first responses to my questions. In some cases I have made an attempt to amplify your thoughts and follow some of the implications.

I recommend as the second step that you give me your additional thoughts and comments and I will then make a second effort. We can continue in that way until you are satisfied.

By this process, we can also develop an agenda for the next conversation, and so continue in your search for over-arching themes.

Attachment



Q. What would you say is your chief characteristic, as a man and as a political leader?

A. I like people. I like to talk to them, I like to listen to them, I like to ask them questions. It is a pleasure for me to discuss things with all sorts of people.

And when a decision has to be reached, my practice is to be sure that everyone has a chance to have his full say. I think it is better to develop a consensus than to impose a decision on unwilling people.

I enjoy doing things that way, and I also think it is the most constructive way. The spirit of the American system requires that we listen to the other fellow and appreciate his viewpoint, what his legitimate interests are.

In Congress you conduct affairs every day with people whose thoughts and convictions are different from yours, but the national interest demands that you work smoothly with these people. When I disagree with someone, he goes away with a good feeling that I knew what he was saying and why he was saying it.

I've known people in public life who would make you mad at them even when they were saying yes. They usually don't last long.

America is made up of a great diversity of interests, and we have to develop unity out of the competition of these differing groups and persons. That's why we have to be strong in the skills of conciliation and co-operation.

Q. How does someone learn these skills? Is it something that should be studied or taught in schools?

A. For me, it has come out of my long years of experience in Congress. Of course, some Congressmen and other political leaders never learn it no matter how long and hard they try. Some don't seem to try. I guess you have to have the temperament, and you have to like people, as I do. Maybe it can be taught or learned from books. Harry Truman said he learned a lot of his political savvy from



reading history books. Basically it is a matter of understanding how American government works and how important it is always to try to influence the actions of the majority in order to get results that are good for the people.


Q. Your mention of being part of the majority reminds us that through just about your entire congressional career you were part of a Republican minority. Has that influenced your view of the political system and your role in it?

A. Yes, I was in the minority for all but two years of my congressional career. I would have been very pleased to have more majority experience. But I think what we have been talking about is the same, whichever party you are in. Many bills that pass are supported by a majority of both parties. And the majorities keep shifting, with a different composition from bill to bill. At all times it is important to use the skills of compromise and to be trustworthy in your dealings with others, those who support you and those who oppose you.

Q. The word compromise has a bad connotation as well as a favorable one. It often means that someone abandons principle for selfish or unscrupulous advantage. But you always speak of compromise approvingly. Do you see a danger in being too ready to compromise?

A. In a political career it is very important to stand by your principles, to stand for something, and to follow a meaningful course. Without that you have no sense of direction, no rudder, no map. This matter of compromise is complicated, but not too complicated for anyone to understand--and if you are in political life as your lifetime career, you had better understand it, or you will make a mess of things.

There are two dangers. One is that you will have no principles, no scruples, and just make any deal that advances your interests or your career. That is contemptible. I have no respect for such people. The other danger is that you will be too rigid and inflexible, too sure that you are right and that everyone who disagrees with you is wrong.




Rigid people find it hard to modify their position and compromise. They fail to influence the majority. You have to be able to agree with others in part in order to get them to agree with you in part.

One reason that I like people and get along with them is that I find most people make a lot of sense when they explain why they are working for some result. They might not have hold of the whole truth, but there is usually a lot of truth in what they are saying, and that makes it easier to co-operate and compromise with them.

Some people are too self-righteous. It is important to live by sound principles, but some people confuse the rightness of their principles and their own rightness. I try not to be self-righteous. A self-righteous man finds it hard to compromise with anyone. A righteous man can compromise with other decent people.

- Q. Mr. President, what comments do you have on the upheaval now taking place in Congress, the ouster of Committee Chairmen?
- A. I have mixed emotions about it. There is some cruelty in turning out men who have served for a long time and worked hard for what they think is right. On the other hand, I take into account that some of them were inflexible and unyielding. I also take into account that these new people in Congress feel they have an important mission and changing the chairmen and the way of appointing them is important to their objectives.

The real question, and we'll have to wait a while for the answer, is whether the government will run better now. Time will tell. These things cannot be judged in the abstract. I judge by results. Will the legislation be better or worse? Will relations with the Administration be better or worse? Will there be a stalemate of forces when the needs of the Nation require leadership? The verdict on whether what is happening now is good or bad will depend on the answers to those questions.



January 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

Attached are two short selections from Plain Speaking, the oral biography of Harry Truman.

The first is a humorous example of how Truman used his reading of history directly for his practical guidance rather than for scholarly purposes.

The second gives an interesting list of books Truman recommended to a friend to teach him about "the nature of man and about the culture and heritage of Western civilization in general."

I leave it to your judgment whether they should be passed on to the President.

Also enclosed is one more interview with "the White House's lightning rod."

Attachments



January 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

You asked me to look up the beginnings of the seniority system in Congress, in relation to the rule of Speaker Clarence Cannon.

The historical origins of the seniority system of choosing Committee Chairmen are complex, according to the best scholarly analyses (see accompanying chart).

But it is probably not inaccurate to simplify the story, somewhat as follows, if you want to give an historical comment on the present "reform" in the House:

The method of appointing committee chairmen has often been a matter of contention in the House of Representatives. There was a time, until around 1910, when the Speaker made all committee appointments, and there was a time when the party caucus made all committee appointments. That era was called King Caucus, and it was called a "reform" movement because it overthrew the one-man rule of the Speaker, "Czar Cannon."

When chairmen began to be selected primarily by seniority, around 1920, that was also looked on as a reform, as a way of ending the abuses of the caucus system.



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The seniority system was considered a reform because it gave party leaders much less control over the selection of chairmen and gave members much more freedom to vote their own mind.

Seniority, rigidly adhered to, had its abuses, no doubt. We must wait to see, however, how the newest "reform" will work.



GROWTH OF THE SENIORITY SYSTEM 195




FIGURE 5 Historical causes of seniority system

coalition undermined the Democratic caucus.⁴¹ Meanwhile, longer-term pressures for routinization and specialization were having marginal effects. This is the complexly interrelated set of historical "causes" of seniority as it exists today that we have attempted to diagram in Figure 5.

Seniority is also an ongoing social process that helps to maintain itself

by creating conditions favorable to its own perpetuation. Our speculation as to the important causal relations in this process and their connections with the processes that established the system are diagrammed in Figure 6.

To summarize, we believe that our data show the effects of four main influences upon the growth of the seniority system in the U. S. House of



January 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

The enclosed article from Roll Call may be of interest to you. The book from which it is derived is available in the White House library.

Enclosure



January 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN


Morality is not easy to talk about publicly. It would probably be better if a President could answer such questions by letting his actions speak for him. But John Chancellor did ask the question, and others will, too, in the future. It seems necessary, therefore, to develop strong answers that are well grounded in moral philosophy.

I have composed one possible alternative answer to Chancellor's question, based on a discussion of the same question by John Locke, the British philosopher whose writings had such a profound influence on the authors of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

I also attach the excerpt from Locke, to show you his argument in its original form.

- Q. (Chancellor) What about the moral implications? If a country is being strangled by a country or another set of countries that own a natural resource, is it moral to go and take that? It is their oil, it is not ours. Isn't that a troublesome question?
- A. Yes, it is a troublesome question, but it is a question that I have thought about and there are answers that seem to make sense to me.

We start with the fact that there is, and always has been, uneven ownership of goods and resources, among individuals and among nations. But I think



Memorandum to the President

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that ownership does not give one man or one nation the moral right to use his ownership to subjugate or starve another. What kind of morality would that be, to strangle or subjugate others by withholding food or water or oil or some other necessity? It has been done, from time to time, through history, I know, but that doesn't make it right. Such actions cannot be defended on the grounds of morality.

I believe that being rich doesn't give a person or a nation a just power over the life and liberty of others. I also believe that resisting the efforts of others to strangle or destroy our nation is morally right. That's my view of the moral question you raise.

Attachment



January 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

My judgment of the TV conversation with John Chancellor and Tom Brokaw was overwhelmingly favorable. The general impression was honest and favorable. You showed many aspects of your character to good advantage--calmness, even temper, a habit of hard work, attentive listening to questions, consideration for the views of others who disagree with you, candor, equal attention to the main points and the details, good humor, leadership, deliberation, and moderation.

I would think that the general public would not only be favorably impressed but downright proud of you as their President.

I would recommend that you do more such programs. The aim should be three-fold:

ONE, to argue for your program, at whatever stage it is at the time of the interview;

TWO, to continue your effort to change the taste of Americans in favor of moderation--away from glib talk and toward deliberate action; and

THREE, to make Americans proud of themselves again as Americans.



January 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

Tom Brokaw's question about "the credibility of American justice" especially "as young Americans see it," gave an opportunity to talk morality in a straightforward, down-to-earth way. The question was: Agnew "is going to become a millionaire" and "Mr. Nixon is in California. How do you suppose that squares with the idea of justice as young people ought to see it in this country? "

Most of your answer was excellent, and the line--I wouldn't buy the books"--was brilliant. But the last part could have been strengthened by an argument something like the following.

I think it will bother a good many Americans, young and old, that some people seem to be rewarded for wrongdoing, but of course we are all familiar with the fact of life that money rewards don't always correspond with human goodness. If they always did correspond, then the measure of any person would invariably be the size of his pocketbook--and we know that isn't the case. Good people are poor as well as rich, and rich people are bad as well as good.

But I don't think most Americans think that the only rewards and punishments in life are money gains and losses. For people who choose public service as their way of life, for example, honesty and self-respect and good reputation are their own reward, and money does not replace them if they are lost.



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I think that most Americans who care about justice would agree that financial gain does not make up for the kind of disgrace suffered by the people we are talking about.

Justice works in funny ways and does not always follow a fixed path. Some really severe punishments have been handed out by the American people. I don't think young Americans who care about justice would trade places with people who have been removed from office, had their careers terminated, and suffered public disgrace--even for a lot of money.

I wouldn't buy the books, let me add.



January 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

The two attached short articles are an example of how alleged facts sometimes get manufactured and then develop a life of their own. Note how Childs speaks of people buying dog food and the account, from The Public Interest, of how that story, unverified and unverifiable, got started in the first place.

Attachments



January 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

This article on open enrollment by John McAdams reopens the possibility of a voluntary substitute for forced busing. I think it merits serious attention.

McAdams is a graduate student in the government department at Harvard.

Attachment



January 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

The attached article by Irving Kristol on "Republican Virtue" is one of the best and deepest I have read in a long time. It seems to me to be just the kind of writing you were asking for in our conversation a week ago.

The original is attached in case you think it should be forwarded to the President.

This article would be an excellent basis for a conversation of an hour or more. Important conclusions and themes might easily develop from such a discussion.

Attachment





Irving Kristol

Republican Virtue vs. Servile Institutions

In the end, when all has been said and done, the only authentic criterion for judging any economic or political system, or any set of social institutions, is this: what kind of people emerge from them? In this sense, it is true to say that institutions are made for the people, not vice versa. But today we understand this proposition in a very different way: we worry whether our institutions are sufficiently "responsive" to the people *as they are*, and assume that any discordance between the two constitutes strong evidence that the institution needs to be changed. Behind this assumption there lies a deeper dogma: that the very idea of helping people to shape themselves in a certain way is both presumptuous and superfluous. Presumptuous, because there is no superior knowledge available as to how people should be shaped. Superfluous, because the people will, if left alone, shape themselves better than anyone or anything can shape them. This might be called the democratic dogma, and it is a very different thing from the republican philosophy which animated this nation during its earlier decades but which gradually has become ever more incomprehensible to us. Indeed, it is by now so incomprehensible we find it difficult even to imagine that, as we remake—"restructure," as we say—our traditional institutions to suit us, we may simply be debasing these institutions so that they will more snugly fit our diminished persons.

It will be said that even to suggest such a hypothesis shows a remarkable lack of faith in the American common people. I would half-heartedly deny that accusation. I do indeed have faith in the common people—only I don't have very much faith in them. Nor is there anything snobbish or, as we now say, "elitist"

about such a statement. I include myself among those common people and, knowing myself as I do, I would say that anyone who constructed a political system based on unlimited faith in my good character was someone with a fondness for high-risk enterprises.

To put it another way: The common man is not a fool, and the proof that he is not a fool is that he has such modest faith in himself. On the other hand, the common man is human, too, and if politicians go around saying nice things about him, he'll not deny them either. What *will* happen is that the common man will simply become cynical about politicians and politics and public life in general—and this cynicism will, in the long run, have a deleterious effect on his character. For cynicism about others is always accompanied by a proportionate increase in self-centeredness. And as we become self-centered, we become less open to reason, have a weaker sense of obligation to our fellow citizens.

That it is possible to corrupt a citizenry—or for a citizenry to corrupt itself—is something the Founding Fathers understood but which we seem to have forgotten. Today we are sometimes prepared to believe that the people have been deceived into thinking erroneously. But we find it well-nigh impossible to admit that they are corrupt—behaving as if they had a bad character as distinct from a bad opinion or two. This is why we tend to take it for granted that all expressions of *material* grievances by the people must be basically legitimate. After all, people do have intimate as distinct from abstract—knowledge of their material circumstances. To regard this knowledge as less than authoritative is to cast doubt on their *innate* capacity for self-government. The Founding Fathers

permitted themselves to have such doubts, which their political theory then encompassed. We give ourselves no such license. Our instinct is always to assume that, once these material grievances are satisfied, the people's natural goodness of character will reassert itself.

Yet the evidence is much to the contrary: satisfying material grievances, these days, does not seem to calm people or make them more reasonable—it often rather encourages them to be even more unreasonable, and even sometimes to invent grievances as an occasion for being more unreasonable. The relation between satisfying men's material wants, or even material needs, and the quality of their moral nature is evidently an ambiguous and equivocal one.

This ambiguity was something the Founding Fathers were much more alert to than we are. They were sufficiently close to their Puritan heritage, and to traditional republican political philosophy, to believe that "luxury," as they called it—by which they meant merely that degree of material well-being which we today call "affluence"—would always represent a grave threat to the spirit of our institutions. None of the Founding Fathers, to my knowledge, ever praised their handiwork by suggesting it would lead to a "society of abundance." We may think that the Sears, Roebuck catalogue is a splendid testimonial to American civilization. Most of the Founding Fathers would have found it a worrisome document. And, had they been informed that people were purchasing this incredible variety of merchandise *by going into debt*, they would have been wildly alarmed.

Perhaps, nothing better signifies the difference between the spirit of democratic capitalism in our old Republic and

in our contemporary one than their contrasting attitudes toward debt. To be a debtor, in the older view, was to mortgage your future and to surrender a portion of your independence. They regarded indebtedness as a condition to be avoided, if possible. And they had a low opinion of those who were perpetually in debt, or who seemed uncaring as to whether they were in debt or not—such people were then called “feckless.” It isn’t that the Founders were simply less sophisticated about economics than we are today. They were very sophisticated, in a different way. They judged an economic system, not merely by whether or not it improved one’s standard of living, *but also by what it did to the character of the people who participated in that system.* Our sophistication about economics completely ignores this aspect of the matter—to some degree, one suspects, because we assume that “the character of the people” is inherently unproblematic, but also because we assume that improved material conditions, no matter how achieved, cannot possibly mean an unimproved people.

This last is one expression of that “democratic dogma” which has supplanted the republican philosophy of the early period of this republic. A clear sign of the transformation I am referring to is the way in which the very words “republican” or “republic” have given way before the terms “democratic” or “democracy.” This verbal shift mirrors a profound political and psychological change. It is not that the two terms stand for distinctly different conceptions of the proper relations between a citizen and his polity. They need not, and for a long time did not: up until about fifty years ago, they were used without any sense of tension or contrariness existing between them. Indeed, they were frequently and familiarly conjoined together, so that one could speak easily of “our democratic republic” or “our republican democracy” without giving the matter much thought. Yet today the term “republican” has fallen into disfavor, and is rapidly falling into disuse. It is still the title of one of our major parties, but it is not exactly a proud title: Republicans (with a capital “R”) do not speak about “republicanism” (with a small “r”) but instead, like everyone else, speak about “democracy” and claim to represent the spirit of democracy, properly understood, not the spirit of republicanism, properly understood.

Why does the word “republican” make us so uncomfortable? Why have history textbooks ceased bearing such titles as “The American Republic: from its Founding to the Present Day,” in favor of something like “The Democratic Experiment” or “The Democratic Experience”? Why don’t we ever talk about “The Republican Experiment” or “The Republican Experience”? I don’t think it is merely fashionable linguistic convention which is at work here, but a much deeper and extremely significant habit of

mind. The two terms have assumed, over the decades, very different connotations. “Republican” is something we used to be; “democratic” is what we have become. As a matter of fact, one can put it more strongly than that: being “republican” is what we have been *liberated from* so that we could become “democratic.”

There is no doubt that the term “republican,” today, has about it an aura of confinement, constriction, a limitation of possibilities, whereas “democracy” suggests a genial expansiveness. If I were to say to a group of American educators that the purpose of our public schools is to produce republican citizens, they would either assume that I was being hostile or, more likely, that I had meant to say “democratic” and was merely engaging in a literary fancy. They would certainly sense that a school for republican citizens is something different from the kinds of schools they now administer and teach in.

At the root of that term, “republican,” there lies the idea of self-government. Not merely popular government, and not

“We cannot imagine how an increase in prosperity could possibly make people worse; rather than better. Neither the Old Testament nor the New had any difficulty in conceiving such a possibility; nor did John Adams or Thomas Jefferson.”

merely individual liberty, but a popular government and an individual liberty that is defined—and is therefore self-limiting—in a certain way. Self-government is self-definition. It is something strenuous, something which involves our making painful demands upon ourselves, something which directs us to a normative conception of the self to which we should properly aspire. You cannot have “self-government” in the individual case unless you have a clear—if general—idea as to the kind of person you ought to be, and you cannot have self-government collectively unless the members of that collectivity have a clear idea as to the kind of people they want to end up being. The idea of self-government is intrinsically normative and stands in opposition to any social and political system which fails to link popular government or individual liberty to a set of accepted values. That is why it is possible to speak of “republican virtue”—we do not in fact speak of it today but we do not find the phrase meaningless, either. On the other hand, one apparently cannot talk about “democratic virtue”—not only do we not use that phrase, but the very phrase itself

does not exist: it seems not to be a possible political expression. And the reason why this is so must have something to do with the fact that we conceive of democracy as a way of government and a way of life which has liberated us from the confines of such “virtue.” We have separated the democratic idea from the idea of self-government.

Montesquieu, whose political philosophy so powerfully shaped the thinking of the Founding Fathers, understood that in a large, commercial republic, whose stability was based on an equilibrium of economic interests and a balance of political factions, this stability could very easily dissolve into a war of all against all. To prevent this from happening, he said, one could not rely on any set of institutions but on the “spirit” of its citizens. It is this spirit to which the term “republican virtue” refers.

Because the very word “virtue” so frightens us today, suggesting, as it does, fixed ideas of right and wrong which circumscribe our liberty—it is important to emphasize that “republican virtue,” in the American meaning of that phrase, is a very different kind of virtue from, say, Christian virtue or classical virtue as the ancient Greeks understood it. It does not signify an excellence of the soul, a perfection of the person. Our idea of “republican virtue” derives from the Romans, and it is a political conception rather than a religious one. Which is to say, “republican virtue” has fairly modest moral implications, rather than high and ambitious ones. Because these moral implications are so modest, “republican virtue” is compatible with a liberal society in which people can have, within limits, different opinions as to ultimate religious truths and different preferences as to their ways of life. What “republican virtue” asks of people is merely that they be public-spirited.

If this doesn’t sound like such a formidable demand, it is because we no longer quite understand what it means to be public-spirited. We think it means to have passionate opinions about the public good and to work furiously to translate these opinions into reality. In truth, public-spiritedness, in its original sense, means almost the opposite of that. It means curbing one’s passions and moderating one’s opinions in order to achieve a large consensus that will ensure domestic tranquility. We think of public-spiritedness as a form of self-expression, an exercise in self-righteousness. The Founding Fathers thought of it as a form of self-control, an exercise in self-government. If we are asked to identify a public-spirited citizen, we are likely to point to someone like Ralph Nader. The Founders pointed to “that noblest Roman of them all,” George Washington, as a model for the American citizen. And whatever Ralph Nader’s merits may be, they are not George Washington’s.

I have said that “republican virtue,” in its original American meaning, had only

modest moral implications. But it did (and does) have *some* moral implications, and if we look at George Washington, we see what they are. They include probity, truthfulness, self-reliance, diligence, prudence, and a disinterested concern for the welfare of the republic. In short, they are those virtues which we familiarly associate with "the Protestant ethic" or "the bourgeois ethic"—though, as a Jew, I might point out that they could also be properly associated with "the rabbinical ethic," a fact which the Puritans were certainly very conscious of.

Now, there are two things to be said about such virtues, and about the kind of human character they are supposed to give rise to. First, they are compatible with practically all the religions of Western civilization—including such essentially secular religions as Deism and Stoicism—and are therefore appropriate to a liberal and pluralistic society. And, secondly, they are rather "dull" virtues, precisely because they are so modest in their scope. This "dullness" was always taken to be meritorious, since it meant that you didn't have to be an exceptional person to be a perfectly good citizen. "Republican virtue" is an easy virtue, by the traditional standards of religion and moral philosophy: George Washington is—and was always supposed to be—a model American whom every school boy could assemble from his own parts.

So the question naturally arises: if "republican virtue" is so easy, why do we find the very suggestion of it so irksome? More than that: why do we find the very conception of it so repugnant? For the better part of American history, it was thought proper that every American boy should be encouraged to want to grow up to be like George Washington. Today, that would be regarded as a dismal fate, and we have even taken Washington's birthday away from him for the convenience of a long weekend.

I would say that the basic change in American history took place when it came widely to be believed that it was both natural and right for our republican institutions simply to adapt themselves to the American people, rather than vice versa. It was a gradual change—so gradual that only a few observers took notice of it. For the most part, it was simply accepted as the predestined fulfillment of "the democratic promise" and the full flowering of "the democratic faith"—phrases which are themselves by-products of this transformation. The history of the United States came to be written as the progressive liberation of the American people from all sorts of prior restraints which our rather narrow-minded ancestors insisted on establishing for the people's own good. I think that the history of the United States can indeed be fairly written in these terms. The key question is the degree to which one wishes to regard this history as progressive or otherwise.

We do, of course, regard it as progressive because this history has made

the United States into a wealthy and powerful nation. Above all, wealthy: we find sufficient justification in American history by reason of the fact that it has raised our standard of living so spectacularly. But we are not moved to inquire whether this has made us a better people or worse, in terms of the original ideals of this republic. In truth, we cannot imagine how an increase in prosperity could possibly make people worse, rather than better. Neither the Old Testament nor the New had any difficulty in conceiving such a possibility; nor did John Adams or Thomas Jefferson. They believed that people, if they lived carelessly and unreflectively, could corrupt themselves. We think the people are naturally good and that only their institutions can be corrupt.

It is not surprising that the first sphere of human action in which this new spirit manifested itself was the economic. It was the American businessman who first liberated himself from the idea of "republican virtue," in order to create as

"If we are asked to identify a public-spirited citizen, we are likely to point to someone like Ralph Nader. The Founders pointed to 'that noblest Roman of them all'... And whatever Ralph Nader's merits may be, they are not George Washington's."

much wealth, as quickly as possible, for himself as for us. Prior to the Civil War, a businessman was a professional man, in the same sense that doctors and clergymen were professional men. That is to say, it was taken for granted that there was a connection between what he did and what he was—between his vocation and his character—a connection that intimated a code of behavior which defined what was "honorable" and what was not. Thus, it was thought to be dishonorable for a businessman to go bankrupt—not because this was a sign of failure, but because it meant that he was cheating his creditors, who had trusted him. And if a businessman did go bankrupt, it was thought honorable for him to spend the rest of his life paying off his creditors nevertheless—and for his children to assume this burden as well. This may not make any economic sense; our present casual and impersonal attitude toward bankruptcy might be more economically productive. But it did emphatically make *political* sense—if you believe that the effects of economics on our standard of living are less momentous than its effects upon our character.

"Free enterprise," until the Gilded Age, was supposed to be—it wasn't always in fact, but it was supposed to be—a form of moral behavior, and the business life was supposed to be a morally satisfying life. I know it will seem incredible but, up until the advent of the morally neutral entrepreneur who is nothing but an economic instrument—up until the Civil War, that is—most Americans seemed to be of the opinion that to be a businessman was to be an honest and trustworthy man. They were greedy and unscrupulous "speculators," of course. But a sharp distinction was made between such "speculators" and a businessman—not least by the businessmen themselves, who did not permit "speculators," no matter how wealthy, to become members of their clubs. The American businessman had "character," as we now say. And he was in good repute among his fellow citizens. Not in the very best repute, it must be said: prior to the Civil War, it was statesmen and soldiers who were the heroes of popular biographies, since they were thought to have an even greater measure of "republican virtue." But businessmen were much respected, and were thought to be an honorable class of men engaged in an honorable activity—i.e., an activity from which they emerged better men than when they first entered it, as a result of the discipline which this activity exercised upon their characters. The institution of business was thought to make for self-improvement and not simply self-enrichment.

This "bourgeois" businessman—about whose life and work there was absolutely nothing value-free—was succeeded by a more "liberated" type, a more "democratic" type, whose attitude toward economic activity was purely instrumental. The businessman ceased being a kind of man and became a kind of function, devoid of any specifically human qualities. Still, it is astonishing how long the bourgeois ethos lingered on. When I was very young, people who bought things on the installment plan were still regarded as feckless and irresponsible. But people who *sold* things on the installment plan were regarded as engaged in a shady enterprise—because they were, after all, corrupting other people into fecklessness.

All that was in another time, of course, and, I sometimes think, in another country. Today, businessmen assemble in solemn meetings in order to figure out what they should do to achieve public respect and favor. Their concern is both serious and sincere, and one almost does not have the heart to tell them that their problem is not in the area of *doing* but in the area of *being*. They, like the rest of us, were born into a world they never made, and—again like the rest of us—find it close to impossible to imagine that the trouble they are in is organically related to their having become the kind of successful people our society said they should become.

Another illustration of what I have in mind is the extraordinary increase, in recent years, of strikes which, for quite trivial reasons, inflict enormous damage on the community. I am thinking especially of strikes by policemen, firemen, garbage collectors, and transport workers. These are quite common today, though they were yesterday very rare, and the day before yesterday were close to unthinkable. American trade unions used to be essentially defensive institutions—protecting the human rights and economic position of their members—and their ethos was one of fraternity. They have become purely acquisitive combinations, exercising monopoly power in a spirit of the-public-be-damned.

Now, I am not saying that, in some instances, these Americans who go on strike do not have legitimate grievances. On the contrary: I assume they do. But a legitimate grievance can become illegitimate—just as a just war can become unjust—if the means employed are incommensurate with the ends sought. And I must say that I am appalled that a group of American workers should cease performing essential services to their fellow Americans because they seek a 5 percent or 8 percent increase in pay over what they receive or over what was offered them. Something is definitely wrong when that can happen, as it now does with increasing frequency. How can that rather trivial goal possibly justify such aggressive and costly action?

I have used the phrase, "that rather trivial goal," in order to put the matter as provocatively as possible. (Sometimes we do have to be provoked to think clearly.) I know I will be told that these workers have a difficult time making ends meet and that a 5 percent or an 8 percent increase is not to be sneered at. That is true enough—but I would also insist it is really beside the point. Very few of our workers live on the margin of subsistence; they are not in the kind of extreme and desperate condition which might justify such extreme and desperate action. The extra money, after taxes have been deducted, will make their situation slightly more comfortable than it was. And for *this* they are prepared to convulse the community and threaten the livelihood of their fellow-citizens—many of whom are surely less well off than they are. This can only be described as selfishness. And that description applies whether one regards their grievances as legitimate or not.

Nevertheless, very few of us seem to be able to say this bluntly, without embarrassment. We are more likely to point out that these ordinary people are behaving no differently from many greedy and unscrupulous businessmen. This argument has some truth in it—but what a strange truth it is! It implies, in effect, that the legitimate criteria of behavior in a democracy are to be found somewhere in the vicinity of the lowest common denominator. And, of course, under the pressure of this perverse moral egal-

itarianism, the lowest common denominator sinks ever lower.

After business and organized labor, just about every other area of American life followed a similar path. Religion may have followed more reluctantly, but follow it did. The sermon which denounced the failings of the congregation slowly gave way to the sermon which denounced the inadequacy of our social, economic, and political institutions. Making demands upon oneself became unpopular; making demands upon others became habitual. It is interesting to recall that, up until about a hundred years ago, it was common for Congress or state legislatures to call, by resolution, for a day of fasting, to take note of some particularly solemn occasion. Moreover, such calls were directed toward all citizens, rich and poor, indiscriminately. It is quite impossible for Congress even to contemplate such a resolution today. And should some brave Congressman introduce such a resolution, it would quickly be studded by amendments exempting all those below a certain level of income or who were engaged in various essential

"Self-government is self-definition. It is something strenuous, something which involves our making painful demands upon ourselves, something which directs us to a normative concept of the self to which we should properly aspire."

services. We find the very idea of a fast-day barbarous—it violates the nutritional rules established by HEW. And the idea that poor people should fast, just like everyone else, would strike us as utterly preposterous. We *know* that only people with full stomachs and on a well-balanced diet can be expected to meet such a harsh moral obligation. The fact that our ancestors, who were much poorer than we, thought otherwise is attributed to their lack of enlightenment—as is the fact that, even today, observant Jews and Catholics and Moslems think and act otherwise. Dostoevsky predicted, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, that when the anti-Christ came, he would have inscribed on his banner: "First feed people, and then ask them to be virtuous." We have improved on that slogan to the extent of adding decent housing, good schools, free medical care, and adequate public transportation as necessary preconditions of virtue. And then we wonder why such benevolence seems not to encourage people to have a good opinion of their political order. It does not occur to us that, in a democracy, if the citizenry lack

self-respect they will be incapable of any kind of respect—that to the degree we officially propound a mean and squalid view of humanity, there will emerge mean and squalid human beings. All of us normally become what we are expected to become, and if our society thinks it is normal for us to be enslaved to our appetites and our desires rather than to govern them, then we shall come to regard such enslavement as true liberty—and shall simultaneously regard any suggestion of self-government as an infraction of this liberty.

Our politicians have, over these past decades, learned this lesson well, in the sense that they have successfully debased themselves to what they take to be the appropriate common level. The average politician of today sees it as his role to gratify the appetites of the people—to liberate them from deprivation, as we say. The truly creative politician of today is more "far-sighted" in that he discovers new and original deprivations, popularizes them, makes them keenly felt. "What have you done for us lately?" is now assumed to be the absolutely proper question for the citizen to address to his representative, who, in turn, frantically speculates as to what he can do for them tomorrow. What this means, quite simply, is that by our traditional standards of republican political philosophy, American politics today is the politics of demagoguery, the politics of bribery. We obscurely recognize this fact by reserving the term "statesman" for those exceptional politicians who hold themselves somewhat aloof from this process of soliciting and pandering—though we are also so suspicious of our own sentiments, which smell ever so slightly of indecent elevation, that we will quickly and cynically wonder whether the "statesman" is merely a politician who is not running for re-election.

If anyone were to suggest that, in a self-governing republic, it should be normal for the people's representatives to wish to be as statesmanlike as possible, continually engaged in a reasonable conversation with their constituents, he would be informed that he is not living in the real world. But this real world is something which we have ourselves constructed. American politics wasn't always like this, and wasn't ever supposed to be like this. Unbelievable though it may seem, there was a time—in living memory—when those who campaigned too energetically for public office were, for that reason alone, viewed with more suspicion. Public office was thought to be a burdensome obligation to which only the more public-spirited would aspire. I don't want to idealize the past or exaggerate its merits—what we are talking about is a matter of degree. The "democratic politician" has always co-existed, in this country, with the "republican statesman." But he certainly never predominated so absolutely as he does today.

The one group which seems to understand this situation best of all is the

politicians themselves. Most of them will admit, in private conversation, that they would much prefer to be statesmanlike, only they don't see how that is possible. They must, they say, be "responsive" to the people if they are to be able to function at all. The irony is that, as they become ever more "responsive," the people put less and less faith in them and in our political institutions generally.

Very much the same thing has happened in the field of education. When our schools were "republican" institutions, instructing young citizens in the three R's, in elementary civics, and in the rudiments of good manners, they had both self-confidence and universal respect. Today, when they are "democratic" institutions, when they are making few demands on their students but feverishly trying to satisfy all the demands which students make on them, they are in a condition of perpetual crisis. Most of the "progressive" and "liberating" reforms in education, over these past decades, have resulted in most of us being more dissatisfied with American education than was previously the case. You would think that this might give us food for thought—but, no, it only incites us to invent new and better reforms, all in the direction of encouraging students to express more freely their appetites, to more freely indulge their desires. And, inevitably, students end up lacking confidence in these institutions which, lacking all self-confidence, seem to have no other purpose than to pander to them.

And this, I think, is the main point which emerges from the American democratic experience of recent years. People do not have confidence in institutions which do not have confidence in themselves. People do not have respect for institutions which, instead of making demands upon them, are completely subservient to their whims. In short, a people will not respect a polity that has so low an opinion of them that it thinks it absurd to insist that people become better than they are. Not simply more democratic; not simply more free; not simply more affluent; but, in some clear sense, better.

The original republican idea of self-government was what we would today call high-minded. The self which is supposed to govern is necessarily conceived of as being a better self than the self which naturally exists, and the purpose of the republic, in all its aspects, is inherently a self-improving one. The later democratic idea of self-government is based on the premise that one's natural self is the best of all possible selves, and that it is the institutions of society which

are inevitably corrupting of natural goodness. These are two very different readings of human nature, and they lead to different kinds of politics. The first results in people making moral demands upon themselves; the second results in people making moral demands upon social reality.

I know of no way in which this philosophical argument about human nature can be settled in the abstract. But our own political experience does, I think, give us some empirical clues as to which reading of human nature is more humanly satisfying. And the evidence seems overwhelmingly favorable to the republican reading. After all, it is a fact that Americans today "have never had it so good," as one says, in the sense that they are wealthier and healthier and enjoy greater personal freedom than did their fathers or grandfathers. But it is also a fact that they don't feel at all good about themselves and their condition, and a great many of our young people seem to feel positively miserable about their human condition. It can hardly be without significance that, among the

"Scarsdale is obviously an experiment that has failed. And the reason—equally obvious, I should think—is that the life it proposes to its citizens is so devoid of personal moral substance, and is therefore so meaningless."

young especially, the idea of "liberation" from a "repressive" actuality should now be so popular. There are some of us who will delude ourselves into believing that these young people are fretful at the remnants of republican restrictiveness, and they will assert—in the words of Al Smith—that the only and sure cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy. If you are committed to the democratic dogma, that is the only possible remark you can make. You are not likely to contemplate the possibility that it is the very society based on this dogma which comes to be felt as "repressive" and from which "liberation" is sought.

Some ten years ago, in the midst of the rebellion on our campuses, an article appeared in the *New York Times*

Magazine. It was written by a Yale psychologist, and its title was a quotation from one of the student leaders. That title was "You Don't Know What Hell Is Like Unless You Were Raised in Scarsdale." Now, Scarsdale is one of our most affluent and sophisticated suburbs. It is also, so far as young people are concerned, one of the most tolerant and "permissive" places in America. Nothing is too good or too expensive for the children of Scarsdale. And yet, the children for the most part despise it and leave it as soon as they can.

This is a serious matter. For the American democracy today seems really to have no other purpose than to create more and more Scarsdales—to convert the entire nation into a larger Scarsdale. That is what our political leaders promise us; that is what our economic leaders promise us; and even our religious leaders will issue indictments against the nation because there are still so many people who are "underprivileged" by the Scarsdale standard. But Scarsdale is obviously an experiment that has failed. And the reason—equally obvious, I should think—is that the life it proposes to its citizens is so devoid of personal moral substance, and is therefore so meaningless.

We are troubled by this phenomenon, and we wonder why it is that Americans, even as they improve their material conditions, are losing faith in their institutions. We also begin to wonder how these institutions can be made more "responsive" to the people, so as to soothe their discontent. What we do not wish to see is that our institutions are being made ever more "responsive" to the wrong people—to the people as they are, not as they might be. People do not respect institutions which are servile; people only respect a society which makes demands on them, which insists that they become better than they are. Without such a moral conception of the self, without a vivid idea as to the kind of person a citizen is supposed to become, there can be no self-government. And without self-government, the people perish—from boredom, from a lack of self-respect, and from a loss of confidence in their institutions which, they realize, only mirror their alienation from the better selves that lie dormant within their actual selves. □

The above essay was delivered as a Poynter Lecture at Indiana University. Reprints are available at \$.50 each from The Poynter Project, Sycamore 217, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401.

January 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

This lecture by Irving Kristol on the American Revolution is a companion piece to the lecture I sent you a day or so ago on "Republican Virtue." It is a similar message, but in an historical context.

The thesis is that we have much more to be proud of than we seem to realize. The American Revolution was unique because it was so successful. I attach two copies in case you agree with my recommendation that it ought to be given to the President for serious reading.

Kristol is the most articulate spokesman today of ideas and themes that are wholly in accord with the spirit and style of the Ford Administration. This judgment leads me to recommend that an effort be made to find a high level position in the White House or Administration for Kristol, so that we have the benefits of his intelligence and expressive abilities on a full-time basis.

In a recent letter to me, Kristol urged that we try to recruit some professor. He assumed that the man would be initially unwilling but then went on to say, "I see no reason why he should be permitted to languish comfortably up there. It's time he performed some service for this country, and I am sure he would do this task extremely well." My recommendation is that we say the same thing to Kristol.

Attachments



January 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DON RUMSFELD

FROM: BOB GOLDWIN

I have never met Dick Heffner, but will try to do so soon. In the meantime, I will stick with my rule not to recommend someone I don't have a personal line on.

Now that Moynihan is back, he should definitely be invited soon. We talked briefly on the phone today and agreed to meet at his first opportunity, in two or three weeks.

But the fact that we can think of other good people who should be considered does not convince me that the recommendations for February 17 should be revised. That list is not a grab bag that can be shuffled around without harm. It has balance and variety and stands on its own. That is my judgment; if you tell me that, nevertheless, it must be changed, I will do as you say.



January 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

In your meeting with the National Council of Churches yesterday, you spoke of the difficulty of explaining a complex program when the TV commentators are forced, by the nature of their medium, to reduce everything to "headlines." In my opinion, the President has a better chance than anyone else in the nation to overcome this difficulty, because his own words will be listened to, and will continue to sound in the ears of the listeners, even as the TV interpreters strive to simplify and abbreviate.

The formula that can work is the one you stated in the meeting--"lay all the options before them"--especially if you pose the options very sharply and repeatedly.

For example, the chances of the energy program getting through Congress in its present form are doubtful, primarily for two reasons: first, it imposes a burden on the American people--and Congress doesn't like to impose burdens; and second, the tendency is to look at it in isolation, not in comparison with other realistic alternatives.

If people are asked whether they want to impose an import tax on themselves that will cause an increase in the price of all petroleum products, or to leave things as they are, the natural reaction is to say no to import taxes. But your



Memorandum to the President
Page 2
January 31, 1975

position is that doing nothing at all about our dependence on the increasing flow of imported petroleum is not one of the responsible alternatives.

The realistic choices are (1) the President's program, (2) mandatory rationing of oil and gasoline, or (3) a large increase in the tax on gasoline at the filling station. The President has the platform to keep these three options before the Congress and the people by repeated words and actions. The public and Congress can be persuaded to look at your program as one of these three options if you continue to pose them very sharply, on every occasion. And they may be won over to your program if you continue to reiterate your support for it as superior to the others.

The preceding paragraphs are based on your remark in the meeting yesterday; on conversations over the last 10 days with Martin Diamond and Irving Kristol, who are eagerly exploring ways to help muster support for your program; and on a letter Kristol wrote to me, at my request, after a long phone conversation on the subject.

In his letter (copy attached), Kristol goes on to link use of the veto to the lay-all-the-options-before-them approach. Knowing your reluctance to speak of veto possibilities in advance, I simply forward Kristol's letter without additional comment. It may be useful at a later time.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1975

Lee
5 Ave

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DONALD RUMSFELD

Subject: Handling of the President's Effort to
Achieve our National Energy Goals
(and other similar efforts).

1. Problem: Ron Nessen is getting advice from many different people each day. He feels forced, in a sense, to answer a great many questions each day, as are other Administration spokesmen. As a result, the staff gives their best advice on each specific question from the slant the question is asked. Ron poses the questions to the staff. Then Ron gives the answer which represents the best judgment of the people he talked to on that specific matter. Yesterday, for example, when asked if the President was ready to compromise, he was advised to say, and he said, "the answer is, a firm 'no'."

2. Question: What is the best way to handle this particular effort concerning energy? And for that matter, from a technique standpoint, what is the best way for the Administration to handle efforts of this nature, which last over a period of months? Needless to say, it is vital that the President's credibility be preserved, that Ron's and other spokesmen's credibility be preserved. However, it is important that the President, through Administration spokesmen, say things that are helpful in moving the President towards his goal.

The only way I know to do this is to develop an approach to the problem -- an overall approach which then enables Ron and all Administration spokesmen to have a broad sense of how all the various specific questions can best be answered. This requires dissemination of broad policy guidance which is carefully thought through, communicated throughout the Administration, and then repeated and repeated by Administration spokesmen.



3. There are several of options.

One, for example, in this energy effort, would be to say flat out, "we are just not going to compromise." In my judgment, that is not wise because, under the Constitution, eventually the Executive has to try to find a solution.

Another option is to admit "we are going to compromise." That is not helpful either, in that it takes the steam out of our supporters' efforts to get what is needed.

A third approach would be to not comment very much, and live with some mystery as to what may be done. That has the problem because it reduces the opportunities to use public communication to assist in moving towards the goal.

The best approach is a fourth option -- namely, to develop a general approach and state it repeatedly, answering specific questions within that overall approach, and staying with it long enough that it begins to sink into the press, the American people and through them to the Congress.

4. Specifically, in the case of the energy effort, we would get general agreement of the key people in the White House and the Administration that the goal of what we all say will be to have the press, the Congress and the public eventually see the President as making a serious, purposeful effort to achieve a goal. Thus, answers should be phrased to posture the President as urging action, not in a truculent or belligerent way, but, rather in a determined, steady manner, expressing his desire to see the country meet a problem facing the Nation.

5. For example:

- There is a danger to America in the present vulnerability of our country to foreign sources of energy, in the waste of energy and in the large dollar outflow that results from payments to foreign sources for the energy we import.



- There is a danger to the industrialized Nations of the world in their vulnerability, wastefulness and dollar outflow and our circumstances economically are interlinked.

- It is possible to do something about these problems.

- But, it takes the country to develop a national solution -- the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, and the people of the country -- working together.

- A national effort requires a national goal. In this instance, the goal is energy sufficiency by 1985. This means a circumstance where the United States is (a) no longer vulnerable to foreign sources of energy, and (b) where we have slowed the dollar outflow resulting from oil imports and thus, the danger of blackmail.

This goal can be achieved by a serious conservation program over a period of time and by the development of alternate sources of energy.

- This is not a new problem. The Congress and the country have known about the problem for years and next to nothing has been done.

- The President has developed a comprehensive program. He has put it before the Congress. It involves higher prices for energy but those added costs will be returned to the American people by a tax cut, thus, putting the dollars back into the pockets of the American people and into the economy.

- When asked if and when the President is willing to compromise, the answer is: This country needs a national energy program. Under the Constitution, the Congress must legislate such a program. For the country to have a program, the Congress must act. The President is eager to work with anyone to achieve a national program that will achieve those goals. But, is he willing to compromise in the sense of letting the Congress do nothing? No! Is he willing to see the country continue to be vulnerable? No! Etc.

6. Having an approach such as the above has the advantages of:

a) It leads to repeatedly restating the goal, the urgency and the actual situation. And to lead in a democracy requires repetition. We should not get bored with repetition. We not only do not need a fresh new answer to every question, but also it is harmful to have new answers everyday.

b) It avoids the danger of having the President seem to be without purpose or weak or, conversely, as being truculent or unyielding.

c) It avoids the danger of answering specifically a whole range of specific questions that contain inaccurate assumptions within them, or that give away ground without getting anything in exchange.

d) It enables Administration officials to say something rather than remaining silent, for fear what they say might send out the wrong signals.


7. In short, we are doing fine on the energy effort.

The Administration and the Congress were in disarray last winter. Today the Administration has a program. The work done was good work. The program is standing up to the test of outside analysis. Our people are proud that it is good work. And, they are standing with it.

The Congress is still in disarray. The Democrats are in disarray. Even when and if they develop a program, it will suffer strong criticism, even by Democrats.

The goal, and the President's purposefulness, are getting through to the people, the press and to the Congress, because of the effectiveness of the Administration's spokesmen. They are doing a good job.

The task now is to keep it up. The Administration wants to win this vote, yes, but regardless of how this vote comes out, the country will still need an energy program. And, this Administration is going to see that the country gets one.



February 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT A. GOLDWIN

I have been invited to attend an international meeting for 5 days in Berlin on the relation of cultural institutions to governments, as described in the attached telegram. On the telephone Mr. Nielsen emphasized that they were aware that I am not an expert on the details of such matters but they wanted me for my "thoughtfulness."

In my opinion this conference would be helpful to me in my work as the White House liaison with the arts endowment, the humanities endowment, the Smithsonian, and universities.

Ken Lazarus thinks the expenses must be paid by the White House (memo attached).

I would like your advice on whether I should attend.

Attachments

cc: Mr. Richard Cheney



The White House
Washington

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001 NEW YORK NY 2-24-75

PMS MR. ROBERT GOLDWIN

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON D.C.

YOU ARE INVITED TO ATTEND A SMALL, HIGH LEVEL INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON THE CURRENT PROBLEMS OF CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS TO BE HELD IN BERLIN, WEST GERMANY FROM MARCH 22-26, 1975. TWENTY TO TWENTY-FIVE LEADING PERSONS FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDING AGENCIES, PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, AND THE ARTS FROM U.K., FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE US WILL PARTICIPATE. FOR EXAMPLE: HEAD OF THE ARTS COUNCIL AND FORMER TORY MINISTER FOR THE ARTS FROM U.K.; CHAIRMAN OF NEW YORK MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL POLICY AND DAVID ROCKEFELLER, JR., FROM U.S. AND PERSONS OF COMPARABLE STATURE FROM FRANCE AND GERMANY. DISCUSSIONS WILL COVER IMPACTS OF INFLATION ON THE ARTS,

TREND TOWARD INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON GOVERNMENT SUBVENTION, AND BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS.

MEETING IS SPONSORED BY ASPEN INSTITUTE. FUNDS ARE PROVIDED BY INSTITUTE AND GERMAN AND AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS. FACILITIES ARE PROVIDED BY GRANT FROM GOVERNMENT OF WEST GERMANY.

CAN PAY YOUR ROUND TRIP TRAVEL IN ADDITION TO BERLIN COSTS IF APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY.

YOUR PARTICIPATION OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE BALANCE AND QUALITY OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT GOLDWIN
FROM: KEN LAZARUS *KL*

Referencing your inquiry, the sponsors cannot pay for either your travel or living expenses in connection with your attendance at the Berlin conference. Your participation in these meetings can only be viewed as relating to your official position, and as such, payment of all expenses must be made from official funds as the White House lacks the legal authority to accept reimbursement for such costs.



February 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

Here is your argument against wearing a helmet elevated to the lofty pedestal of academic research. How did you know?



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

TO:

DR

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY—

☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Bob Goldwin

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL —→

PHONE NO. *2222*
CODE/EXT.

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN

☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL

☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*WILL YOU WANT
MORE HELP ON THE
SPEECH FOR MARCH 17?*

ERALD R. FORD
LIBRARY
3/12

*Not yet have
enough ideas.
more redraft*

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

K

3-12

10:20

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

5010-108-01-80341-1 332-389

63-108

March 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

You may remember the reply we were going to send to the New York Times to a column by Bill Safire.

This is a revised version of it on the subject of morality in foreign policy.

Let me know if you want me to do more on the subject.

Attachment

Morality & Detent



April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: ROBERT GOLDWIN

You asked for suggestions for persons who could add scholarly depth and historical understanding to the speech-writing effort, especially in connection with the many Bicentennial speeches the President will be making for the next year and more. I attach the resumes of two men I recommend very highly. If you desire, I can furnish more names in a few more days.

Paul Theis has interviewed Kirk Emmert and told me he would have appointed him three or four months ago, but there was no slot for him. Emmert was one of my students at the University of Chicago and worked under me in one of the Percy campaigns. He stayed on with Percy as speechwriter for a while, but left because of differences of political viewpoint and because he wanted to resume his academic career. Emmert is a student of Winston Churchill's political thought, is right-minded, and is a man of sterling character.

Bill Walker has interviewed Marc Plattner, with another kind of position in mind, but to the best of my knowledge nothing has developed thus far. For the last several years Plattner has worked for Irving Kristol as managing editor of The Public Interest. Most people who have worked with Plattner consider him one of the most brilliant young men they have ever encountered. He made Phi Beta Kappa at Yale as a sophomore and graduated summa cum laude and first in the class from Yale. He did his graduate study under Allan Bloom and Walter Berns and they consider him one of the best graduate students they ever taught.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/18/75

Dr. Goldwin:

After talking with Mr. Storing the first time, he called back and said:

He had talked to Mr. Paynter and that Mr. Paynter doesn't regard himself as a Republican - hasn't been active in politics since the Civil Rights Movement and that was on an independent basis.

Mary



JOHN EDWARD PAYNTER

Born: November 1938

Education:

BA 1960 Knox College
 Galesburg, Ill.

Graduated magna cum laude
Phi Beta Kappa

1960-1963 Attended the Divinity School
 University of Chicago

MA 1968 University of Chicago
 Political Science Dept.

Ph. D 1974 University of Chicago
 Political Science Dept.

Dissertation: "The Ethics of John Adams: Prolegomenon
 to a Science of Politics"

Work on Adams being prepared for publication and in this
connection has received a Grant from the Relm Foundation.

PRESENT POSITION:

Teaching at: James Madison College
1965-1974 East Lansing, Mich.
 (it is part of Michigan State University)

Taught in
1964 at: Le Moyne College
 Memphis, Tenn.

FELLOWSHIPS:

Rockefeller Bros. Theological
Danforth Foundation Fellowship



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB GOLDWIN
FROM: DON RUMSFELD

Anything you can give me by way of speech material or reading material before I leave Wednesday night I would appreciate. I particularly want copies of those speeches that I marked up back, and then anything you've drafted or anything you think I ought to read.

