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Note - Mary Lukens  
identified the handwriting  
on these documents  
as that of Fred  
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1/24/06 WHM

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

U.S. NATIONAL  
POST DEBATE II

*all over*  
If the presidential election were being held today which candidate would you vote for -- Ford, the Republican or Carter, the Democrat?

	Total	October 7 5pm - 12am	October 7 12pm - 5pm	October 7 9am - 12pm	October 6 11pm - 1am
Ford	45%	37%	45%	44%	55%
Carter	44	54	43	39	37
McCarthy (Volunteered)	1	1	0	0	2
Undecided	11	8	11	18	6
Number of Cases	(498)	(122)	(148)	(126)	(103)

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

U.S. NATIONAL  
POST DEBATE II

Who do you think did the "better job" in this debate -- Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter?

	Total	October 7 5pm - 12am	October 7 12pm - 5pm	October 7 9am - 12pm	October 6 11pm - 1am
Ford	28%	17% ✓	21% ✓	32% ✓	44%
Carter	48	62	48	44	33
Both	9	6	14	11	7
Neither	5	5	7	4	3
Don't know	10	10	11	8	13
Number of Cases	(498)	(122)	(148)	(126)	(103)

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

U.S. NATIONAL  
POST DEBATE II

Generally, do you believe that (Jimmy Carter's answers or Gerald Ford's answers) were more believable?



	Total	October 7 5pm - 12am	October 7 12pm - 5pm	October 7 9am - 12pm	October 6 11pm - 1am
Ford	39%	26%	39%	45%	53%
Carter	37	48	38	31	26
Both	11	9	10	13	11
Neither	1	1	2	-	3
Don't know	11	15	11	12	7
Number of Cases	(498)	(122)	(148)	(126)	(103)

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

U.S. NATIONAL  
POST DEBATE II

Overall, who do you think answered their questions more directly --  
(Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford)?

	Total	October 7 5pm - 12am	October 7 12pm - 5pm	October 7 9am - 12pm	October 6 11pm - 1am
Ford	41%	31%	41%	51%	44%
Carter	34	43	31	32	30
Both	13	13	16	8	14
Neither	4	3	3	5	4
Don't know	8	11	9	4	9
Number of Cases	(498)	(122)	(148)	(126)	(103)



Personally, did you most agree with (Gerald Ford's or Jimmy Carter's)  
statements during this debate?

	Total	October 7 5pm - 12am	October 7 12pm - 5pm	October 7 9am - 12pm	October 6 11pm - 1am
Ford	40%	31%	40%	48%	49%
Carter	42	53	38	37	34
Both	6	3	10	5	6
Neither	2	3	3	1	3
Don't know	9	10	9	8	9
Number of Cases	(498)	(122)	(148)	(126)	(103)

# MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Now I am going to mention some problems facing the nation today and as I mention each one I would like you to tell me who you think would do the best job of handling that problem -- (Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter)?

	<u>Ford</u>	<u>Carter</u>	<u>Both</u> <u>(VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>Neither</u> <u>(VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>Know</u>
Ending the arms race	36%	36	2	5	21
Handling our foreign affairs	48	35	2	3	12
Holding down taxes	37	41	2	5	15
Preventing war	43	33	5	4	16
Maintain a strong national defense	46	32	5	2	14
Running the federal govern- ment	38	39	3	4	15
Dealing with the Soviet Union	36	31	3	4	16
Keeping the American people and Congress in- formed about our commitments to other countries	27	52	2	4	15
Providing moral leadership in our foreign relations	36	40	4	3	16
Number of Cases	(498)				

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

If the presidential election were being held today which candidate would you vote for -- Ford, the Republican or Carter, the Democrat?

*Revised of* →

Vote Intention

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>	<u>U.S. National Sept., 1976</u>
Ford	45%	45%	41%
Carter	44	45	47
Undecided	11	10	12

Vote Intensity

Ford

Definitely	67%	64%	59%
Probably	17	18	20
Leaning	14	12	19
Don't know	2	5	2

Carter

Definitely	70%	58%	60%
Probably	15	19	21
Leaning	12	15	17
Don't know	3	7	2

Number of Cases (498) (758) (1490)...

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Now I am going to mention some problems facing the nation today and as I mention each one I would like you to tell me who you think would do the best job of handling that problem -- Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter.



	U.S. National Post Debate II	U.S. National Post Debate I	U.S. National Sept., 1976
<u>Handling Our Foreign Affairs</u>			
Ford	48%	58%	49%
Carter	35	24	28
Both (volunteered)	2	6	3
Neither (volunteered)	3	4	3
Don't know	12	9	16
<u>Holding Down Taxes</u>			
Ford	37%	48%	39%
Carter	41	34	36
Both (volunteered)	2	3	3
Neither (volunteered)	5	7	8
Don't know	15	8	15
<u>Maintain a Strong National Defense</u>			
Ford	46%	58%	51%
Carter	32	24	27
Both (volunteered)	5	8	6
Neither (volunteered)	2	2	2
Don't know	14	8	14
<u>Running the Federal Government</u>			
Ford	38%	44%	41%
Carter	39	39	37
Both (volunteered)	3	6	4
Neither (volunteered)	4	3	3
Don't know	15	9	14
Number of Cases	(498)	(758)	(1490)



We'd like you to think about qualities and characteristics that some people may associate with our two presidential candidates. Please tell me if you believe the characteristic best describes Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>	<u>U.S. National Sept., 1976</u>
<u>Decisive</u>			
Ford	41%	47%	39%
Carter	38	30	32
Both	5	9	8
Neither	5	4	6
Don't know	11	9	15
<u>Straightforward</u>			
Ford	37	43	40
Carter	44	34	36
Both	7	15	11
Neither	3	4	5
Don't know	9	4	8
<u>Strong</u>			
Ford	39	40	36
Carter	39	33	35
Both	8	17	15
Neither	4	5	4
Don't know	10	6	10
<u>Informed</u>			
Ford	48	52	50
Carter	31	19	20
Both	10	23	19
Neither	2	2	1
Don't know	8	4	10
<u>Intelligent</u>			
Ford	28	24	24
Carter	35	31	28
Both	25	39	34
Neither	2	1	2
Don't know	10	5	12
Number of Cases	(498)	(758)	(1490)



We'd like you to think about qualities and characteristics that some people may associate with our two presidential candidates. Please tell me if you believe the characteristic best describes Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>	<u>U.S. National Sept., 1976</u>
<u>Sincere</u>			
Ford	37%	32%	33%
Carter	37	31	30
Both	17	28	24
Neither	2	4	4
Don't know	6	6	9
<u>Competent</u>			
Ford	37	36	34
Carter	34	29	29
Both	15	25	23
Neither	2	2	3
Don't know	11	8	11
<u>Trustworthy</u>			
Ford	34	36	32
Carter	35	32	44
Both	14	22	17
Neither	5	14	7
Don't know	12	3	8
<u>Good Speaker</u>			
Ford	32	30%	24%
Carter	42	32	44
Both	11	22	17
Neither	8	14	7
Don't know	6	3	8
Number of Cases	(498)	(758)	(1490)

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Did you personally see the televised debate between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter that was televised (tonight/last night) or did you listen to it on the radio?

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>
Yes, saw it on television	68%	75%
Yes, heard it on radio	2	2
No, did not see or hear it	28	22
Don't know	2	1
Number of Cases	(498)	(758)

Did you see the entire debate or were you able to see only a portion of it?

Entire debate	53%	57%
Only a portion	46	41
Don't know	1	2
Number of Cases	(348)	(676)

Who do you think did the "better job" in this debate -- Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter?

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>
Ford	28%	33%
Carter	48	23
Both	9	26
Neither	5	4
Don't know	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>
	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(348)	(676)

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Generally, do you believe that (Jimmy Carter's answers or Gerald Ford's answers) were more believable?

Overall, who do you think answered their questions more directly -- (Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford)?

Personally, did you most agree with (Gerald Ford's or Jimmy Carter's) statements during this debate?

	<u>U.S. National Post Debate II</u>	<u>U.S. National Post Debate I</u>
<u>More Believable</u>		
Ford	39%	36%
Carter	37	27
Both	11	16
Neither	1	3
Don't know	11	17
<u>More Direct</u>		
Ford	41	41
Carter	34	22
Both	13	18
Neither	4	4
Don't know	8	15
<u>Most Agree With</u>		
Ford	40	-
Carter	42	-
Both	6	-
Neither	2	-
Don't know	9	-
Number of Cases	(348)	(676)



MARKET OPINION RESEARCH



THE PUBLIC'S RESPONSE TO  
GERALD FORD'S STATEMENTS ON  
EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE SECOND DEBATE\*

Frederick Steeper  
Market Opinion Research

\*Revised Paper Originally Prepared for the American  
Association of Public Opinion Research Annual Con-  
vention in Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania - May, 1977.



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

### Background

The formation of a public image is an asymmetrical process. While the positive side almost always is built over a long period of time involving many actions and accomplishments, the negative side can form suddenly from a single action or statement. Two famous examples of these assertions happened during New Hampshire presidential primary campaigns: the publication of George Romney's statement that he had been "brainwashed on Vietnam" and U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie's tear-shedding scene before the Manchester Union building. Each man, after making significant progress in becoming legitimate presidential candidates, fell from that achieved status overnight. (Romney was far behind Richard Nixon in New Hampshire when the "brainwashing" statement was publicized, and his candidacy probably would have ended in New Hampshire, anyway. Muskie, on the other hand, was the Democratic front runner at the time of his unfortunate incident.)

The potential for a mistake doing great damage to a candidacy is a factor which is well appreciated by candidates and their campaign strategists. It has even been fashioned into something called the "Romney Rule" by political consultants, to wit "... penalize bloopers severely, irrespective of their real importance" with a corollary-"... let it [early blooper] sit for a while then beat them to death with it in the final two weeks" (Parkinson 1977).

There are severe limits, however, on how effective a candidate can penalize an opponent's mistake because of his own suspect credibility. Voters associate mud-slinging with campaigns and can discount such attacks as "just politics." Mistakes

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

or bloopers are more likely to become a significant factor in the outcome when they are publicized in news stories by the mass media. The news media is a neutral source and therefore is more trustworthy than the candidates, and it is credited with some expertise. In short, it is a more credible source than the actual combatants in the campaign.

The power of the news media to "penalize bloopers severely" was amply demonstrated in the cases of Romney and Muskie. It was also the case with Gerald Ford's misstatement on Eastern Europe's freedom from Soviet domination during the second presidential debate on foreign policy. How this was so the reader may find surprisingly simple, but it was also absolutely essential. The data to be presented in this paper clearly indicates that the general public did not know that Ford had made an error until they were told it was an error by the news media during the following day.

Ford's publicized blunder did not cause his candidacy to collapse; the 1976 presidential election was one of our closest elections. However, the two-month trend toward Ford recorded the public polls came to a halt in the wake of the foreign policy debate. The Ford campaign was put on the defensive for several valuable campaigning days, while the media pressed Ford for a restatement of his position. In the intricate process of building and maintaining an overall positive image, the Ford campaign had suffered a serious set-back. The seriousness was compounded by the facts that the foreign policy debate was to have been a trump card for Ford and that the blunder seemed to give evidence for a perception that some Democrats had tried to foster about Ford -- that he was not smart enough to be a great President.

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH



President Ford's ill-fated remarks occurred about 25 minutes into the debate when Max Frankel of the New York Times asked President Ford if it were not true that communism, as Khrushchev had predicted, had gained the upper-hand over the West. Playing the devil's advocate, Frankel reeled off alleged examples of growing communist influence and negotiating prowess, including the Helsinki agreement by which, Frankel suggested, the United States virtually recognized the Soviet Union's right to dominate Eastern Europe. (The complete transcript of this portion of the debate can be found in the appendix.)

In responding, President Ford gave his own examples and interpretations of the U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union beginning with his 1974 Vladivostok meeting with Brezhnev which Ford contended placed important caps on Soviet missile capabilities and the grain sales to the Soviet Union which he defended as benefiting American agriculture. Ford, then, turned to the Helsinki agreement and backed himself into a trap. Frankel's critique of the Helsinki agreement was not new, and one can reasonably speculate, given the extensive preparations the participants made for the 1976 debates, that Ford had prepared for Frankel's particular charge. The tactic Ford used was to cite that the Vatican had signed the Helsinki agreement and therefore, establish an inconsistency in Frankel's argument, i.e. that the Pope would approve an agreement which turned over the domination of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. One of Ford's last remark in this sequence is intriguing as he suddenly draws Carter's name into the argument suggesting the use of the Pope was a planned tactic to head-off an anticipated Carter attack on the Helsinki agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: "If we can turn to Helsinki, I am glad you raised, Mr. Frankel -- in the case of Helsinki, 35 nations signed an agreement, including the Secretary of State for the Vatican. I can't under any circumstances believe that His Holy Highness The Pope would agree by signing that agreement that 35 nations have turned over the Warsaw Pact nations the domination of Eastern Europe. It just is not true. And if Mr. Carter alleges that His Holiness, by signing that, has done it, he is totally inaccurate." Nevertheless, Ford had insinuated that Eastern Europe was not dominated by the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the Helsinki agreement said, and Frankel pressed Ford for a clarification. Ford, in trying to make a valid point, simply overstated his case. Ford's clarification proved to be the major news story the next day, and it is given in its entirety below.

THE PRESIDENT: "I don't believe Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe the Rumanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union.

Each of those countries is independent, autonomous. It has its own territorial integrity and the United States does not concede that those countries are under the domination of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, I visited Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania to make certain that the people of those countries understand that the President of the United States and the people of the United States are dedicated to their independence, their autonomy and their freedom."



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

### Methodology

The President Ford Committee commissioned Market Opinion Research to conduct a panel of viewers during the debate and a national telephone survey of registered voters after the debate. The panel consisted of fifty-two adults in Seattle, Washington.\* The national survey began immediately after the debate (11:00 p.m. E.S.T.) with 101 interviews completed by 1:00 a.m. and 397 interviews completed through the following day (October 7) ending at midnight.

The purpose of the Seattle panel was to learn what specific parts of the debate, if any, helped or hurt each candidate. Each panelist had a circular dial ranging from 0 to 100. They were instructed to turn it toward 100 if what they were hearing made them feel more favorable about President Ford or less favorable about Carter and toward 0 if what they were hearing made them feel more favorable about Jimmy Carter or less favorable toward Ford. The dials were connected to a computer which kept a running average for all the panelists and for two sub-groups: those who said they leaned toward Ford and those who said they leaned toward Carter. The running average was synchronized with a videotape of the debate for analysis afterwards.

The primary purpose of the telephone survey was to measure the post debate voting intentions and candidate perceptions of a representative sample of the national electorate. In addition to asking them who won the debate, they were also asked to rate Carter and Ford on a series of issues and personal qualities. However, the survey was not purposely designed to measure the mediating effects of the news media.

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\*The panel portion of the research was conducted by Tell-Back Inc., Spokane, Washington for Market Opinion Research.



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Evidence of some crucial interviewing variable between the debate and the following night is chiefly provided by an analysis of the voters' responses in the national survey by time of interviewing. The respondents will be divided into four time periods according to the time they were interviewed: 11:00 p.m., October 6 to 1:00 a.m., October 7, 9:00 a.m. to noon, noon to 5:00 p.m., and 5:00 p.m. to midnight, October 7. All times are Eastern Standard Time. The intervening variable is hypothesized to be the dissemination of the information that President Ford had made an incorrect statement about Eastern Europe by the news media on the day following the debate.

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

### Raw Findings by Time of Interviewing

Among 101 voters interviewed Wednesday night immediately following the debate, Ford had a 54 percent to 36 percent lead in their stated voting intentions. During the next evening the 121 voters interviewed were voting for Carter by a 54 percent to 37 percent count (Table 1). Thus, in only twenty-five hours, our raw data was showing an 18 percent majority lead for Ford turning completely around and giving a +17 percent lead for Carter for a remarkable 35 percentage point total change. In addition, there appeared to be a progressive movement to Carter although at uneven rates during the following day. The change was already apparent in the interviewing done between 9 a.m. and noon. Ford's +18 percent lead had been reduced to only +3 percent. At this point an obvious intervening event was the appearance of the morning newspapers and the telecasting of the morning news programs. The noon to 5 p.m. interviewing yielded an insignificant change from the morning although in the same direction. Ford's lead had closed to 1 percentage point. The evening interviewing, which overlapped and extended beyond the evening news programs and presumably the reading of the afternoon newspaper by people returning from work, showed the largest change from its adjacent time period. Compared to his already reduced 1 point lead in the afternoon, Ford fell -17 percent behind Carter among the voters interviewed between 5 p.m. and midnight Thursday.

[Table 1 here]

# MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Table 1. Reported Voting Intention by Time of Interview<sup>\*</sup>

	Total	TIME OF INTERVIEW			
		October 6 11pm - 1am	October 7 9am - Noon	October 7 Noon - 5pm	October 7 5pm - Midn.
Ford	45%	54%	45%	45%	37%
Carter	44	36	42	44	54
Undecided	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(498)	(101)	(125)	(151)	(121)

<sup>\*</sup>The question wording was, "If the presidential election were being held today, which candidate would you vote for -- Ford, the Republican, or Carter, the Democrat?" Results are for the entire sample, 70% of whom saw or listened to the debate.

## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH



The voters' perceptions of the debate itself showed an even greater change than was appearing in their voting intentions (Table 2). There was a huge 51 percentage point total change between late Wednesday night and Thursday night in the voters' perceptions of who had done the "better job" in the debate. Ford was the + 9% plurality choice Wednesday night, but on Thursday night a 61% to 19% majority said Jimmy Carter had done the "better job." With this perception a more even progression toward Carter is evident. There was a 22 percentage point change between Wednesday night and immediately after the dissemination of the morning news. There was a 13 percentage point change between the morning and afternoon. Finally, there was a 16 percentage point change between Thursday afternoon and Thursday night. Again, the largest spurts to the trend came immediately after the morning news period and the evening news period.

# MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Table 2. Perceived Winner of the Debate by Time of Interview\*

	Total	TIME OF INTERVIEW			
		October 6 1pm - 1am	October 7 9am - Noon	October 7 Noon - 5pm	October 7 5pm - Midn.
Ford	28%	44%	31%	22%	19%
Carter	48	35	44	48	61
Both	9	7	12	12	5
Neither	5	3	4	6	4
Don't know	10	12	8	11	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(348)	( 67)	( 92)	(103)	( 85)

\*The question wording was, "Who do you think did the 'better job' in this debate -- Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter?" The question was asked only of respondents who reported they saw or listened to the debate.



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Three specific perceptions of the debate were measured and, of the three, the one substantively closest to Ford's overstatements about Eastern Europe registered the largest reversal. Accidental to want was to happen that night, we asked, "Generally, do you think that Jimmy Carter's or Gerald Ford's answers were more believable?" On this question there was a 48 percentage point change during the 25 hours following the debate. In contrast, there was noticeable less change on which candidate the voters most "agreed with" (35 percentage points) and which candidate they thought answered their questions "more directly" (20 percentage points). Ford's statement on Eastern Europe was "direct" if nothing else and the voters appeared to be responding to that observation. Possibly reflecting the double meaning of the question, on the perception of who gave the more "direct answers," Ford gained among the morning voters over the Wednesday night voters - the only such instance of a counter movement in the four measures discussed thus far (Table 3).

[ Table 3 here ]



# MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

Table 3. Specific Perceptions of the Debate by Time of Interview

	Total	TIME OF INTERVIEW			
		October 6 11pm - 1am	October 7 9am - Noon	October 7 Noon - 5pm	October 7 5pm - Midn.
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(348)	( 67)	( 92)	(103)	( 85)
<u>Credibility*</u>					
Ford	39%	52%	42%	40%	26%
Carter	37	27	31	39	49
Both	11	11	15	9	9
Neither	1	3	--	2	1
Don't know	11	7	11	11	15
<u>Agree With</u> +					
Ford	40	48	46	40	30
Carter	42	36	40	39	53
Both	6	5	5	10	4
Neither	2	3	1	3	3
Don't know	9	8	8	10	10
<u>Directness</u> ≠					
Ford	41	42	49	42	31
Carter	34	31	33	31	40
Both	13	13	9	15	14
Neither	4	4	5	3	3
Don't know	8	8	4	9	11

\*Generally, do you think that Jimmy Carter's answers or Gerald Ford's answers were more believable?

+ Personally, did you most agree with Gerald Ford's or Jimmy Carter's statements during this debate?

≠ Overall, who do you think answered their questions more directly -- Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford?



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

### Direct Evidence of the Voters' Learning About Ford's Mistake

Fortunately, we are able to make a direct tie between these movements and Ford's misstatement on Eastern Europe. The voters were asked to volunteer what they thought were the "main things" each candidate had done "well" and had "not [done] well during the debate." On Wednesday night not a single respondent mentioned Ford's statements about Eastern Europe. But the next morning the mentions began to appear (Table 4). Twelve percent of the voters in the morning, 12 percent in the afternoon, and 20 percent after 5 p.m. cited Ford's Eastern Europe pronouncement as one of the "things" he "did not do well during the debate."

Moreover, additional voters gave such responses as, "Ford had unorganized facts" or "Ford was mixed up on his facts." There is no way of knowing now whether or not these voters had in mind Ford's misstatement on Eastern Europe. It is very tantalizing to draw that conclusion because these responses are found only in the interviewing done after 12 o'clock the next day, i.e. 3 percent of the noon to 5:00 p.m. respondents and 6 percent of the 5:00 p.m. to midnight respondents. In any event, the total absence of explicit or implicit criticisms of Ford's statement on Eastern Europe in the interviews immediately after the debate and the growing appearance of those criticisms the next day is very impressive evidence that the true status of Eastern Europe was not clear to many Americans until they learned it the next day, presumably from the news media.

[Table 4 here]



MARKET OPINION RESEARCH



Table 4. Volunteered Criticisms of Ford's Debate Performance by Time of Interview

		Time of Interview			
		October 6	October 7	October 7	October 7
		11pm - 1am	9am - Noon	Noon - 5pm	5pm - Midn.
Total Sample					
Eastern Europe/Complete domination of E. Europe/Goofed on E. Europe	9%	--%	10%	10%	13%
Indirect answers/Answers weren't good	4	4	3	5	5
Evaded the issue/Didn't address himself to the issue	4	10	5	3	--
Could have done better	4	3	3	4	7
Not a clear speaker/Delivery faded	4	7	3	5	1
Ford on defensive	4	7	3	4	1
Scared/Nervous/Worried	3	6	--	4	4
Russian issue/Statement on Russia	3	--	2	2	7
Not specific enough	3	4	1	1	5
Unorganized facts/Mixed up on facts	2	--	--	3	6
Not aggressive/Forceful/Did not push hard enough	2	1	5	1	--
Everything okay	1	1	--	1	1
Tearing down Carter/Talk about Carter	1	--	1	1	1
No warmth/Sober/Stone face	1	1	--	2	--
Unemployment issues/creating jobs	1	--	--	2	--
Explaining the economy issue	*	--	--	1	--
Was not dramatic like Reagan	*	--	--	--	1
Not constructive-cut down everything Carter said	*	--	--	1	--
Other negative Ford responses	5	6	2	8	3
None/Nothing	21	23	34	13	14
Don't know	33	33	29	37	34
Number of Cases	(348)	( 67)	( 92)	(103)	( 85)

\*The question wording was, "What are the main things you think President Ford did not do well during the debates?"



## MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

The Seattle panelists also provide direct evidence of initial non-recognition of Ford's overstatements. They did not react one way or the other during this part of the debate in which Ford made his comments about Eastern Europe. Their running average score changed frequently during the debate, ranging from 29 (pro-Carter) when Carter was criticizing U.S. arms sales to Iran, to 64 (pro-Ford) when Ford was defending his actions in the Mayaguez rescue mission. Nevertheless, there was little movement during the segment in which Ford made his statements about Eastern Europe. When Ford started the sequence by referring to the Helsinki Agreement, the group average was 45. It increased mildly to 49 when Ford opened the door for his interrogator, Mr. Frankel, by saying "His Holiness the Pope [would not sign an agreement which] turned over the Warsaw Pact nations the domination of Eastern Europe." The group average held to 48 as Frankel finished his follow-up question in astonishment at the implication of Ford's previous remarks. As Ford began his reply with "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union," the group average dropped slightly to 46, and then to 44 when Ford included the Poles. The group average held to 44 throughout the last thirty seconds of Ford's reply including the statements, "Each of those countries is independent, autonomous. It has its own territorial integrity and the United States does not concede that those countries are under domination of the Soviet Union." The Seattle panelists did not react at all. Moreover, the earlier decline from 48 to 44 is mild compared to the movements recorded during other parts of the debate as can be seen in Figure 1.



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Jimmy Carter obliquely challenged Ford's statements by a response which would have been unclear and unappreciated by that portion of the listening public which initially did not consider Ford's remarks erroneous.\* Moreover, Carter delayed his reply to Ford's references to the autonomy of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland until the second part of his seventh sentence in his total response. Carter's behavior in this regard is very important for it allowed the no reaction phenomenon to persist. Evidently for most of the Seattle panelists, if no less an authority figure than the President of the United States said Eastern Europe was free from Soviet domination, then it must be true. It was not until the following day that we find evidence of the public doubting the credibility of the President's pronouncements; that came about by the free press in our system directly taking Ford to task on the question.

[ Figure 1 here ]



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\*"... and I would like to see Mr. Ford convince the Polish-Americans and the Czech-Americans and Hungarian-Americans in this country that those countries don't live under the domination and supervision of the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain," Jimmy Carter, Transcript of the Second Presidential Debate, Office of the White House Press Secretary, October 6, 1976.

# SECOND DEBATE

PRO CARTER

PRO FORD




FIGURE 1. CONTINUOUS AVERAGE SCORE BY VIEWERS OF THE SECOND DEBATE



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### The Problem of Post Facto Data

In spite of the magnitude of the national survey changes and the direct confirmation by the volunteered remarks and by the Seattle panelists, there is a severe problem with the survey data that must be addressed before the conclusion of a media effect can be accepted. The samples falling in the four time periods were not matched national samples. Instead, interviewing necessities dictated the selection of respondents in the four time periods. Two biases in the subsamples directly resulted from the constraints on the interviewing. First, most of the interviewing Wednesday night (79 percent) was done in the West because the hour was too late to telephone in the eastern and central time zones. Second, the interviews completed Thursday morning were mostly with women (74 percent), and the interviews completed Thursday night were mostly with men (94 percent). The sex biases by time period were necessary to avoid the unacceptable alternative of overrepresenting daytime at-home males, especially retirees.

An inspection of the demographic profile of the four subsamples (Table 5) uncovers one additional bias although a moderate one. The voters interviewed Thursday night more frequently were college educated (55 percent with some college education or more) compared to the voters interviewed Wednesday (44 percent with some college education or more). The education bias is directly related to the regional bias already described.

[ Table 5 here ]





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Table 5: Profile of Time Period Subsamples\*

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Time of Interview</u>			
		<u>October 6 11pm-1am</u>	<u>October 7 9am-Noon</u>	<u>October 7 Noon-5pm</u>	<u>October 7 5pm-Midn.</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<u>Party Identification</u>					
Republican	21	24	13	28	18
Democrat	37	34	39	34	42
Independent	42	42	48	38	40
<u>Region</u>					
East	23	3	21	36	30
Midwest	27	1	33	30	37
South	31	17	46	32	25
West	18	79	--	2	8
<u>Education</u>					
Less than H.S.	16	14	14	19	16
High school	36	29	44	33	38
Some college or more	47	55	42	46	45
<u>Sex</u>					
Men	52	50	26	41	94
Women	48	50	74	59	6
<u>Race</u>					
Non-black	90	95	93	88	89
Black	7	5	5	11	7

\* There were no significant differences by age, union membership, or religion; therefore, those results are not listed.



The regional biases present the possibility that the more favorable results for Ford on Wednesday night were entirely due to interviewing a more Republican subsample from the West compared to the interviewing done on Thursday in the more Democratic South, East, and Midwest. Consequently, it is necessary to place a control for partisan loyalties on the raw data to see if the original pattern holds or vanishes. The control for the partisan loyalties of the voters in each time period must serve as a substitute test for the effects of the regional biases. It is impossible to control on region directly because there were almost no interviews done in the West the next day on which to compare to those done Wednesday night. The control for partisan loyalties also is mandatory because of the general influence of party identification on perceptual results of this kind quite apart from the regional bias in this study. To account for that portion of the change due to partisan differences in the subsamples, the expected Republican response for each subsample will be calculated and the observed deviation will be reported. (The expected Republican response is an adaptation of Converse's "normal vote" concept (1967).) If there was a media effect, then the deviations from the expected Republican response should become more unfavorable for Ford the further in time from the debate the respondents were interviewed. If the observed or raw pattern was due only to partisan biases in the subsamples, then the deviations will be the same for each time period. Theoretically, this analysis also could uncover a favorable trend to Ford which was smothered by the sampling biases.



The degree to which the raw results can be explained away by sex and education biases in the four time periods will be answered by the straightforward method of breaking the results by sex and education within each time period. The observed pattern will be further tested by requiring that the deviations from the expected Republican responses show a decline for Ford among men, women, the college-educated, and the non-college educated across the four time periods.

The Effect of Party Identification on the Observed Changes

As Table 5 showed, the voters interviewed late Wednesday night were more Republican than the nation as a whole, but only moderately so. Moreover, the voters interviewed between noon and 5 o'clock Thursday were just as Republican as those interviewed Wednesday night. Instead of interviewing fewer and fewer Republicans as time went on, the partisan composition of the four time periods actually follows a zig-zag pattern. In terms of the expected Republican response for each time period, there is a 47 percent expected pro-Republican response by the respondents interviewed Wednesday night, 40 percent by those interviewed Thursday morning, 47 percent by those interviewed Thursday afternoon, and 40 percent by those interviewed Thursday evening and night.

Most of the decline in Ford's intended vote between Wednesday night and Thursday morning can be accounted for by interviewing a less Republican sample Thursday morning. However, the lack of an observed raw change between the morning and afternoon proves to be misleading. The afternoon respondents were more favorably predisposed to a Republican candidate than the morning

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respondents, but Ford's vote did not increase accordingly. By remaining the same in the two time periods, Ford's deviation from the expected Republican vote fell from +14 percent to +7 percent. This measures a real trend away from Ford between the two daytime periods. With the Thursday night respondents, Ford's vote fell another 16 percentage points, 7 percentage points of which is due to the less pro-Republican composition of the sample, but leaving 9 percentage points of the decline not accounted for by differences in party strengths. As summarized in Table 6, there is an adjusted trend against Ford across the four time periods of a -2 percent between Wednesday night and Thursday morning; -7 percent between the morning and afternoon on Thursday; and -9 percent between the afternoon and night on Thursday. The total decline in Ford's vote which cannot be accounted for by partisan sampling differences is -18 percent. These deviations measure declines in Ford's strength between each time period without an exception and at an accelerated rate.

Similarly, there is a total -25 percent decline in the proportion of voters saying Ford did the "better job" in the debate which can not be accounted for by the partisan differences between the four subsamples. In contrast to the voting intention data, very little of the -25 percent decline for Ford occurred with the Thursday night respondents; instead, 16 percentage points of the 25 percentage point drop occurred between the morning and afternoon on Thursday. Again, the deviations show continued declines for Ford between each time period without an exception.





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The differing rates of change on the two dependent variables actually fit a theoretical expectation. First, the direct measure of the stimulus object, i.e. who did the better job in the debate, underwent the largest and fastest change. Vote intention, which would be a consequence of the perceptual change lagged behind the rate of change in the antecedent measure. An intuitively appealing reason the perceptions of the debate winner slowed in their tread away from Ford is that by 5 p.m. they already had reached a theoretical minimum level, i.e. the "hard-core" Ford proportion in the electorate. By remaining at that low point, however, the unfavorable perceptions of Ford's performance continued to pull down his ballot support in the electorate.

[Table 6 here]



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Table 6. Observed Pro-Ford Responses and Expected Pro-Republican Responses by Time of Interview

	<u>Observed Response</u>	<u>Expected Pro- Republican Response</u>	<u>Deviation</u>	<u>Adjusted Trend</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
<u>FORD'S COMMITTED VOTE *</u>					
<u>Total Listener Sample</u>	52%	44%	+8		(348)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	63	47	+16		( 67)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	54	40	+14	-2	( 92)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	54	47	+7	-7	(103)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>38</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>-9</u>	( 85)
Total Decline	-25	-7	-18	-18	
<u>FORD DID BETTER JOB</u>					
<u>Total Listener Sample</u>	37%	44%	-7		(348)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	56	47	+9		( 67)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	41	40	+1	-8	( 92)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	32	47	-15	-16	(103)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>24</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>-16</u>	<u>-1</u>	( 85)
Total Decline	-32	-7	-25	-25	

\* The committed vote differs from Table 1 in that the undecided voters have been dropped from the base. Also, Ford's vote in this table and succeeding tables uses the stated intentions of the viewers and listeners of the debate rather than the total sample





The Effects of Sex and Education on the Observed Changes


The declines in the voters' preferences for Ford are still present in the data when the sex and education of the respondents are held constant. The sampling differences on these demographics do not explain away the changes. In fact, cutting the data by these demographics leads to some additional findings. While Ford's declines are present in each case, they are much larger with women than with men, and with college educated voters than with non-college educated voters.

As can be seen in Table 7, men undergo a 31 percentage point change to Carter as their vote choice, and a 28 percentage point change to Carter as doing the best job in the debate. The women switch to Carter by 40 percentage points for their vote choice, and by 65 percentage points for doing the best job in the debate. (The changes for women are based on the first three time periods. There were only 6 interviews with women in the last time period.) The results by sex are close for vote intention, but there is a big difference between men and women in the changes in their perceptions of who won the debate. Also suggesting that women, more so than men, were the focus of the media's educating role on Ford's statements about Eastern Europe is the impressive consistency in the decline of Ford across the three time periods in which there are between 34 and 68 interviews with women voters. The men, on the other hand, do not display a monotonic change.

[Table 7 here]

# MARKET OPINION RESEARCH

TABLE 7. Vote Intention and Perceived Winner of the Debate by Sex and Time of Interview  
(Viewers and Listeners of the Debate Only)



	Total Sample	Men					Women				
		Total Men	11PM-1AM	9AM-Noon	Noon-5PM	5PM-Midn.	Total Women	11PM-1AM	9AM-Noon	Noon-5PM	5PM-Midn.
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(348)	(180)	( 34)	( 24)	( 43)	( 80)	(168)	( 34)	( 68)	( 60)	( 6)
<u>Vote Intention</u>											
Gerald Ford	47	46	50	55	56	36	47	63	47	42	18
Jimmy Carter	44	46	39	42	35	56	41	26	42	45	65
Refused	1	1	2	4	--	1	1	--	--	3	--
Don't know	8	6	9	--	9	6	11	11	11	10	18
<u>Who Did Better Job</u>											
Gerald Ford	28	25	30	29	29	19	31	57	32	18	18
Jimmy Carter	48	52	43	54	43	60	43	26	41	52	82
Both did a good job (VOLUNTEERED)	9	9	8	9	15	6	10	6	13	9	--
Neither did a good job (VOLUNTEERED)	5	6	6	8	8	5	3	--	3	5	--
Don't know	10	8	13	--	4	11	13	11	11	17	--



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In Table 8, Ford's decline and Carter's increase in public favor can be traced for college and non-college voters by time of interview. The college voters exhibit the greater change of the two: 56 percentage points on vote intention and 59 percentage points on who did the better job in the debate. Non-college voters changed by 33 percentage points and 43 percentage points on vote intention and perceived winner of the debate, respectively. For both groups, their raw pattern is monotonic across the 25 hours for the perceived winner of the debate. On vote intention, both groups have one countermovement to the overall trend by time period.

[Table 8 here]




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TABLE 8. Vote Intention and Perceived Winner of the Debate by Education and Time of Interview  
(Viewers and Listeners of the Debate Only)

	Total Sample	High School & Voc. or Less					Some College or More				
		Total	11PM- 1AM	9AM- Noon	Noon- 5PM	5PM- Midn.	Total	11PM- 1AM	9AM- Noon	Noon- 5PM	5PM- Midn.
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	(348)	(181)	( 29)	( 53)	( 53)	( 46)	(162)	( 37)	( 39)	( 48)	( 38)
<u>Vote Intention</u>											
Gerald Ford	47	45	57	44	44	40	48	54	56	51	30
Jimmy Carter	44	46	34	50	46	50	41	33	32	36	65
Refused	1	1	3	2	2	--	1	--	--	3	2
Don't know	8	8	6	5	9	10	10	13	12	10	3
<u>Who Did Better Job</u>											
Gerald Ford	28	24	41	26	15	20	32	48	38	28	18
Jimmy Carter	46	52	37	55	50	59	44	34	29	49	63
Both did a good job (VOLUNTEERED)	9	8	6	8	14	4	11	8	18	10	8
Neither did a good job (VOLUNTEERED)	5	4	3	4	5	4	5	3	5	8	5
Don't know	10	12	13	7	17	13	7	7	10	6	7





The final step taken in the analysis was to calculate the expected Republican responses for the four demographic control groups for each time period and then calculate the deviations of the observed or raw pro-Ford responses from the expected proportions. This was done, first, to confirm that the basic finding could withstand the simultaneous control of party and demographic characteristics and, second, to possibly iron out the few countermovements existing in the raw data. Tables 9 and 10 present the results of this analysis. The basic finding withstands this test very well. Moreover, all the apparent countermovements in the raw data can be accounted for by an increase in the pro-Republican bias of the sample in the time period causing the exception. When that factor is taken into account, the demographic group's pattern returns to the monotonic decline of pro-Ford responses observed in the sample as a whole.

This analysis also uncovers two important countermovements which cannot be seen in the raw data. The new exceptions involve the non-college voters on both dependent variables between the afternoon interviewing and the evening interviewing on Thursday. On each variable Ford does less well than expected with the afternoon respondents than with the evening respondents, and, thereby, the monotonic pattern which exists everywhere else in the data breaks down among the non-college voters at one point. There is still a total drop for Ford among the non-college voters from Wednesday night to Thursday night. The noted inconsistency does not negate the basic relationship, but it does indicate a weaker impact of the news stories on the less educated voter.

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The larger total change in the raw data for college voters also exists in the adjusted results. Coupled with the perfectly consistent pattern exhibited by the college voters, the magnitude of the change for college voters surprisingly suggests that the news commentaries the next day had a much greater impact on them than on non-college voters. Among college voters Wednesday night, Ford was running +14 percent ahead of the expected proportion which would choose the Republican as doing the better job in the debate. The observed Ford proportion dropped to a +11 percent over the expected on Thursday morning; plunged to a -12 percent on Thursday afternoon; and ended at -23 percent on Thursday night. This is a total adjusted change of -37 percent in the proportion choosing Ford over Carter as the winner of the debate. In contrast, the total adjusted change for non-college voters is -14 percent. Even if the lowest point for Ford is used among the non-college voters, i.e. from noon to 5 p.m., the adjusted change from Wednesday night is still less than the total change among the college voters. The difference between college and non-college voters is even greater in their respective changes in voting preferences. Stated intention to vote for Ford drops an adjusted -32 percent among college voters, but it drops only -5 percent among non-college voters across the four time periods.

The comparison of the adjusted changes for men and women must be limited to the first three time periods because of the lack of interviews with women in the final time period. The three-period change for women in their choice of Ford as doing the best job in the debate is -37 percent compared to a lesser -15 percent drop for Ford among men. Stated intention to vote for Ford drops an adjusted -17 percent for women and a -6 percent for men across the first three time periods.

[Tables 9 and 10 here]





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Table 9. Observed Pro-Ford Responses and Expected Pro-Republican Responses for Men and Women by Time of Interview

	<u>Observed Response</u>	<u>Expected Pro-Republican Response</u>	<u>Deviation</u>	<u>Adjusted Trend</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
<u>FORD'S COMMITTED VOTE</u>					
<u>Total Male Listeners</u>	50%	43%	+7%		(180)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	56	39	+17		( 34)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	57	40	+17	+0	( 24)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	62	51	+11	-6	( 43)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>39</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>-13</u>	( 80)
Total Decline	-17	+2	-19	-19	
<u>Total Female Listeners</u>	54%	44%	+10%		(168)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	71	51	+20		( 34)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	52	40	+12	-8	( 68)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	49	46	+3	-9	( 60)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>(21)</u>	<u>(32)</u>	<u>(-11)</u>	<u>(-14)</u>	( 6)
Total Decline*	-22	-5	-17	-17	
<u>FORD DID BETTER JOB</u>					
<u>Total Male Listeners</u>	32%	43%	-11%		(180)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	42	39	+3		( 34)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	35	40	-5	-8	( 24)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	39	51	-12	-7	( 43)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>24</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>-17</u>	<u>-5</u>	( 80)
Total Decline	-18	+2	-20	-20	
<u>Total Female Listeners</u>	42%	44%	-2%		(168)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	68	51	+17		( 34)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	44	40	+4	-13	( 68)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	26	46	-20	-24	( 60)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>(18)</u>	<u>(32)</u>	<u>(-14)</u>	<u>(-6)</u>	( 6)
Total Decline*	-50	-19	-37	-37	

\*Total decline for women is for the first three time periods.

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Table 10. Observed Pro-Ford Responses and Expected Pro-Republican Responses for College Educated and Non-College Educated Voters by Time of Interview

	<u>Observed Response</u>	<u>Expected Pro- Republican Response</u>	<u>Deviation</u>	<u>Adjusted Trend</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
<u>FORD'S COMMITTED VOTE</u>					
<u>Total Non-College Listeners</u>	49%	41%	+8%		(181)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	63	49	+14		( 29)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	47	34	+13	-1	( 53)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	49	47	+2	-11	( 53)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>45</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>+9</u>	<u>+7</u>	( 46)
Total Decline	-18	-13	-5	-5	
<u>Total College Listeners</u>	54%	46%	+8%		(162)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	62	44	+18		( 37)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	64	47	+17	-1	( 39)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	58	48	+10	-7	( 48)
Oct. 7, 5pm	<u>32</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>-14</u>	<u>-24</u>	( 38)
Total Decline	-30	+2	-32	-32	
<u>FORD DID BETTER JOB</u>					
<u>Total Non-College Listeners</u>	31%	41%	-10%		(181)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	52	49	+3		( 29)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	33	34	-1	-4	( 53)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	23	47	-24	-23	( 53)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>25</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>-11</u>	<u>+13</u>	( 46)
Total Decline	-27	-13	-14	-14	
<u>Total College Listeners</u>	43%	46%	-3%		(162)
Oct. 6, 11pm - 1am	58	44	+14		( 37)
Oct. 7, 9am - noon	58	47	+11	-3	( 39)
Oct. 7, noon - 5pm	36	48	-12	-23	( 48)
Oct. 7, 5pm - midnight	<u>23</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>-23</u>	<u>-11</u>	( 38)
Total Decline	-35	+2	-37	-37	





Summary and Conclusions

Pro-Ford responses after the second debate declined steadily through the following day. The observed declines were not due to the known sampling biases in the data used to measure Ford's decline. The volunteered descriptions of the debate by the voters surveyed immediately after the debate included no mentions of Ford's misstatement on Eastern Europe. Not until the afternoon of the next day did such references appear, and by Thursday night they were the most frequent criticism given of Ford's performance. Similarly, the panelists monitored during the debate gave no indication of an unfavorable reaction at the time they heard Ford's Eastern European remarks. The conclusion is that the preponderance of viewers of the second debate most likely were not certain of the true status of Eastern Europe or, less likely, did not consider Ford's error important. Given the amount of publicity given to Ford's East European statements the next day by the news media and the concomitant change which took place, it is concluded that this publicity caused the change. The change probably was too rapid to be caused by interpersonal influence or by the classic two-step process. Rather, this is evidence of direct media influence.

College educated voters appeared to be a major group affected by the next-day publicity. A possible reason for this is that they are more attentive to political news and commentary than the non-college voters, and, consequently, were more likely to learn of the scope of Ford's error. Women also were disproportionately affected by the next-day publicity. This would suggest that women had fewer and/or less intense perceptions of Ford and Carter beforehand than did men, and thus, the women were less resistant to the flow of bad information about Ford the next day. (Different explanations are given for the

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same change by college educated voters and women because of the wide differences in general political interest associated with each group).

Finally, the voting intention data used in the analysis are not meant to imply that Carter surged to a lasting 17 percentage point lead on October 7. He obviously did not. It is not clear why the voting intention measure should be as sensitive as it was to the publicity following the debate. However, its change did lag behind the change registered by the measure of the voters' perceptions of the winner of the debate as would be expected. Possibly, the voting intention change reflects the extreme softness in each candidate's vote throughout the campaign. Voters were easily deflected from Ford by a surge of "bad news" about him, but then many snapped back to him based on other factors when the initial trauma of their candidate's blunder faded in their minds. However, it generally has been observed that Ford's second debate "blooper" did halt a two-month trend to him, a trend which he was never able to start again at a rate sufficient to win.





APPENDIX



The following is the transcript of the portion of the second debate dealing with Eastern Europe. This transcript was made by the office of the White House Press Secretary (San Francisco, California) for release on October 6, 1977. The numbers in brackets in the right margin represent the average ratings given by the 52 Seattle panelists at the precise moment the statement was being made by one of the debate participants. The average rating could vary from 0 to 100 with 100 representing the most favorable rating for Gerald Ford (or the most unfavorable rating for Jimmy Carter) and a 0 rating representing the most favorable rating for Jimmy Carter (or the most unfavorable rating for Gerald Ford).

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