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ASSESSING VOTERS' ON-GOING RESPONSES
TO A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH:
REACTIONS TO RONALD REAGAN

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In the practice of political campaigning, candidates make speeches in the hopes of enhancing, or at least maintaining, their images. The conventional wisdom asserts that the politician should provide positive associations between himself and what he will or will not do if elected and some outcomes presumably desired by the voters. At the same time he may make unfavorable assertions relating his opponent to outcomes deemed undesirable by the voters. The object, of course, is to create an unfavorable image of the opponent, or at least keep the opponent's image from becoming more favorable. This set of outcomes is essentially that predicted by congruity theory. (14) Favorable comparisons produce more favorable, or less unfavorable, evaluations, and unfavorable comparisons produce unfavorable, or less favorable, evaluations.

In the following report we will summarize how a small sample of registered voters responded to one of Ronald Reagan's televised 1976 primary campaign speeches and examine changes in images of Reagan and Gerald Ford from pre- to post-viewing conditions.

Political communication as process is perhaps best exemplified by the campaign speech. Yet, virtually all analyses of political speeches treat the communication process as a static event. While the speech spans a period of minutes, data collection usually takes place at only one or two points in time. Obviously, the major deterrents to studying the ongoing process are 1) lack of ready access to the viewer, and 2) the difficulty of obtaining the viewer's on-going responses to the event. To obtain multiple measurements, the investigator must either stop the event at a


number of points (assuming he has captured it on film or video tape) and let the respondents mark some pencil and paper form, or he must have access to continuous measurement equipment in which a button is pushed or a lever moved whenever the respondent wishes to change the evaluation. The latter procedure, button pushing, was used in this study.


In the developing mythology of the "new politics" during the 1960's and early 1970's, images were assigned prime importance and television became the way to create images. McNeil (12) typifies the argument:

Television is the Machine through which American people are now reached, persuaded, and nominally informed more extensively and homogeneously than ever before. (p. ix, emphasis in the original)

This naive view of the persuasive power of television reduces, essentially, to the argument that if a candidate can get sufficient television exposure he will be able to create a favorable image that will assure his election. It was often assumed that television deals in images and newspapers deal in issues. However, Graber (6, 7) has shown that newspapers, too, are image oriented.

The question of what constitutes an image is given little attention, although a wide variety of definitions may be found in the literature. Image is often defined as a single score in attitude change studies or as a profile change. Dyson and Scioli (4) treat issue position as part of the candidate's image. Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel (9) include personal characteristics, issues, and party within the rubric of candidate image while DeVries and Tarrance (3) exclude party from the image and maintain that image creation is a means the candidate has of freeing himself from potentially embarrassing and restrictive party ties. Evry (5) considers only the candidate's personal qualities as components of image. Whatever the totality of components, images seem necessary if voters are to make voting choices.





In keeping with what we perceive to be the more common definition of image, the personal characteristics, we will define the images of Reagan and Ford in terms of the semantic differential scales used in this study. In addition to simple location on some continuum from favorable to unfavorable, the structure of a candidate's image may be important, and the extent to which a candidate can alter the structure of his own image and that of his opponent is unknown. In a 1968 election study, Atwood, Rimerman, and Pictor (1) found that Hubert Humphrey successfully enhanced his ratings but was unable to affect the respondent's evaluations of Richard Nixon. An analysis of George McGovern's television biography found the same outcomes. Atwood, Combs, and Young (2) reported that the post-test ratings of McGovern were more favorable than pre-test ratings, but McGovern's speech had no affect on the ratings of Richard Nixon. Further, the structure of McGovern's and Nixon's images were unchanged from pre- to post-test. Based on the foregoing, we would expect that Reagan's image, in terms of scale scores, would become more favorable from pre- to post-test, but that there would be no change in structure. Further, we would expect no change in either score position or structure of Ford's image.

The literature on electoral decision-making conceptualizes image and issues as a dichotomy, however empirically, the distinction is not as clear. It has been suggested that voters may rely solely on image for their decision, but not solely on issues. Lang and Lang (10) noted that most citizens are probably not capable of making technically competent choices between candidates based on issues, but the work of Nie, Verba and Petrocik (14) confirms that, competent or not, candidate choices are based in part on issues and issue perceptions. The interaction between image and issues is inherent within political presentations as much of the rhetoric of a candidate, while ostensibly focused on issues, is designed to contribute

to his image-building. By examining voters' reactions to small segments of Reagan's speech, we can begin to isolate specific issue responses as well as responses not based on issues, in hopes of determining the causes of image change.

Methods

Republicans and Independents from the Carbondale, Illinois, area viewed a video tape recording of the March 31, 1976, campaign program of Ronald Reagan. None of the respondents had seen the program when it was originally broadcast on national television. Before viewing the program, the respondents completed a questionnaire asking their interest in politics, issue importance perceptions, approval ratings of Gerald Ford and Reagan, issue positions held by self as well as perceived stances of the two Republican candidates, and rated the candidates on a 15 scale semantic differential. Immediately following viewing the program, the respondents re-rated the candidates and responded to several questions about the program.

While watching the program, the respondents expressed their reactions by pushing one of five buttons connected to a response analyzer system in a classroom-type setting. The instructions were:

Please rate the content of the program you are about to see as Mr. Reagan discusses various issues. In front of you are five buttons to register your opinion. Feel free to change buttons at any time, but always be certain to have one button, and only one button, depressed at any given time. At all times, you should have one button pressed. Please change from one rating to another as often as you change your

impressions of the program. The buttons, from left to right,
as you see them, represent:


| Strongly Agree | Agree | Not Sure | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|----------|----------|----------------------|
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

The responses were recorded automatically at 25-second intervals. In the analysis of the response patterns, each respondent was treated as a variable and each recording time was considered an observation. The resulting matrix was factor analyzed (Q-analysis) to isolate the patterns of reactions. The response types isolated were examined in terms of their demographic characteristics in order to relate response patterns to more readily obtained demographic data to determine if there was consistency within types.

Standard scores (z-scores) were calculated for each response type for each 25-second interval, and the patterns were plotted against the taped program to show points at which substantial changes in respondent evaluation occurred and the differences between patterns. The criterion for a substantial change in response pattern was a z-score change of 1.0 between any two consecutive 25-second intervals. Scores in excess of +1.0 are considered strong favorable responses while scores of -1.0 or more are considered strong negative responses.

To obtain the perceived dimensions of the program, the matrix described above was transposed and time periods were considered variables and the people the observations, the more common form of a data matrix. Since the transposed matrix included more variables than observations, nine time periods, four at the beginning and five at the conclusion, were dropped from the analysis to meet the requirement that there be more observations than variables in the matrix.





The semantic differential used to assess candidate image consisted of 15 scales, 12 of which were defined in terms of a priori dimensions reported by Lemert (11). The Qualification items were intelligent-unintelligent, competent-incompetent, concerned-indifferent, and informed-uninformed. The Safety scales were honest-dishonest, safe-dangerous, just-unjust, sincere-insincere, and trustworthy-untrustworthy. The Dynamism scales were decisive-indecisive, bold-timid, and strong-weak. The undefined scales were in touch-out of touch, straight forward-evasive, and leader-follower.


All factor analyses were principal factors solutions with rotation to Varimax criteria. Squared multiple correlations were used as initial communality estimates, and the criterion for stopping factoring was a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0. The tests for difference between scale positions, pre-test and post-test and between Reagan and Ford on individual scales were t-tests for correlated samples.

To test for isomorphism of factor structures, the coefficient of congruence discussed by Harman (8) was used. A minimum coefficient of 0.90 was required before any two factors were to be considered to have essentially the same pattern of relationships.

Dimensions of the Speech

Factor Analysis of the time segments of the program reveals that viewers psychologically divide the speech into six distinct segments. These divisions were not a priori decisions of the investigators, rather they arose from the analysis as respondents reacted in consistent ways within each segment. The divisions mark the perceived themes of the program and so will be discussed as separate segments.

For each segment of the program, a mean evaluation score is assigned



to represent the average rating (based on the choice of 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree offered by the response system) given to the 25-second intervals within that program segment. (The range of evaluations within any given segment are available for inspection in Table 9 of the appendix.) The mean scores for the program dimensions range from 3.2 (slightly more favorable than a neutral response) to 3.7 (a response indicating agreement with that segment).

Dimension 5 (bread-and-butter economics) was rated significantly more favorable than the other dimensions described below, although all segments of the program received favorable evaluations. The context of the six dimensions, their time commitment within the program and mean evaluations are described below.

Dimension 1. (Mean = 3.3; approximately 4 minutes) An Appeal to patriotism and love of country. Glorifies the past development of the country (claimed to be) without government controls. Says the country can be great again if government control is ended. Includes an appeal to religious belief that the country is destined by God to be a great nation.

Dimension 2. (Mean = 3.2; approximately 10 minutes) Concerned with military power and foreign affairs. Criticizes policy in Angola, relations with China, Hanoi, Cuba, Panama, criticizes detente and a change of policy toward Israel. Says U.S. should "get tough" and increase military strength. U.S. should not accept No. 2 position in the world as advocated by Kissinger.

Dimension 3. (Mean = 3.3; approximately 5 minutes) Primarily self praise on how Reagan solved the problems of the State of California. Condemns "bureaucracy" and argues that those who are a part of the Washington Establishment cannot solve the nation's problems because they are part of the problem.

Dimension 4. (Mean = 3.4; approximately 3.7 minutes) Contains miscellaneous issues including brief comments on inflation, unemployment, economic recovery, busing, gun control, and oil imports. While these issues form other dimensions, the references here appear to be passing comment in the middle of other, longer statements, and as such they appear to cluster together much as a function of not being integral to anything else.

Dimension 5. (Mean = 3.7; approximately 4.6 minutes) Bread-and-butter economics with a touch of populism. Stresses cost of living and government. Notes Congressional cost of living pay increases, and argues the government does nothing for those not in government. Among problems cited are Social Security financing and cost-benefits, unnecessary government reports, and government waste. Appeal for reduction in government operations, tax cuts for the public.

Dimension 6. (Mean = 3.4; approximately 2.5 minutes) Cites government spending and deficit budgets as the cause of inflation and unemployment. Calls for spending reductions and tax cuts.

The mean score for each 25-second interval is displayed in Table 9. These evaluations are the average of all respondents and so quite often hover around the neutral point as strong negative reactions offset the strong positive reaction to the same time interval. However, it is significant to note that the average remains on the agree side of the scale consistently throughout the program. This would indicate the overall acceptability of Reagan's discussion by the aggregate, resulting in the favorable post-viewing evaluations. Individual differences, however, provide significant insight into the program, differentiating "true" neutral responses from neutral responses which result from aggregation of polar extreme ratings.



Factor analysis of the time periods in the program resulted in separation of the speech into six segments which are relatively homogeneous in issue nature. For example, foreign affairs issues were grouped together in Dimension 2 and thus clearly differentiated from moral issues (Dimension 1, or any of the domestic issues. That factor analysis isolated six homogeneous segments of the speech suggests that distinct issues provide one criterion for evaluation of a political speech. If style or personal characteristics were the single mechanism voters used in evaluation of Reagan's presentation then segmentation of the speech either should not have occurred at all or should have occurred in a fashion not consistent with the issues at hand. Thus in examining voters' evaluations of a candidate, we would suggest issue choice and issue position contribute to the overall evaluation of a political presentation.

Response Types

The factor analysis isolated five basic response groups among the 62 respondents. There were no significant differences among types in terms of age, sex, or party preference. (Tables 2, 3, 4) This lack of typical differentiation on the basis of standard criteria is not unusual since the types are created as a function of the respondents' reactions to the speech rather than first making arbitrary classifications and then determining if there are differences among the a priori groups.

Overall, each response Type demonstrated a number of strongly favorable responses, some strongly unfavorable responses, and a substantial number of indifferent responses. In terms of the analysis, all raw scores were transformed to a weighted distribution for each Type and the weighted distributions were standardized. Thus, scores in excess of +1 standard deviation (see Figure 1) should be considered strong favorable responses while scores

of -1 standard deviation or more should be considered strong negative responses. In outlining the typical evaluations of the broadcast, three sources of information provide the capacity for interpretation of the response patterns: the individual time periods which are rated as strongly favorable or strongly unfavorable, the major response pattern changes for each type and the overall trend of responses throughout the program.

There were only four points during the program when all groups held essentially the same feelings about what was being said. The first of those consensus periods occurs at Time 1, producing a strong negative reaction from all groups. This time period refers to the opening seconds of the broadcast in which Mr. Reagan requests the attention of the audience. The unanimous negative response at this early point in the show is indicative of the general reaction of many people to any political broadcast, rather than a comment on Mr. Reagan himself. Given the option, as one is when viewing at home, many people would have probably switched the program off. But it is interesting to note that this negative reaction does not persist for any of the groups as differential reactions occur soon afterward.

The second point of consensus for the five groups is encountered at Time 10 when Mr. Reagan begins his discussion of Washington's limited economic concern with self rather than the common man. If one examines Figure 1, the neutral rating of Time 10 is revealed as a consequence of the fact that all five groups are in transition to a substantial movement in opinion. Its neutral character is more a reflection of the particular time at which the responses were collected, than a true agreement that this interval in the speech evokes a neutral response.

The final two consensus scores came at Times 41 and 42 and approached a strongly favorable level at 0.71 and 0.95 respectively. These two time periods refer to a discussion by Reagan of big government in Washington and

the fact that it constantly grows, contrary to the promises of the officials at work there. The unity of the five groups in their agreement with Mr. Reagan in his plea against big government points to the wide acceptance of an anti-Washington stance by the electorate.

Type I

Sixteen of the 62 respondents are in Type I. These respondents can be characterized as largely Independents with a strong interest in national politics. They rated 12 time periods as strongly favorable with those portions of the program clustered around the themes of Congress providing for the people rather than self, reform in Social Security taxes, reform in Social Security taxes, reform in welfare, and reform through the efforts of the people because they maintain a belief in the greatness of Americans.

Strong negative evaluations were expressed in reference to Reagan's opening comments, his argument that inflation must be controlled as spending is the cause of all other economic woes, and three national security problems: making friends with the Communists who should be our enemies, retention of the Panama Canal, and the reference to Henry Kissinger and his analogy of the United States in a second-best position. Type I, though starting with strong negative reactions, expressed consistently strong positive evaluations of the economic aspects of the broadcast, consistently negative reactions to all references to the issue of national security, and returned to positive ratings when Reagan appealed to patriotism and love of country. This group's reactions fall into three categories of content -- economic problems, national security, and patriotism. There were nine instances in which Type I made a strong reaction to the speech and rated 12 periods strongly favorable and 16 strongly unfavorable.

Type II

Twenty of the 62 respondents are in Type II. They are largely Independents who believe in the importance of military strength and have the most unfavorable pre-test evaluations of Reagan while being positive in their pre-test evaluations of Ford. The portions of the programs with which they were in strong agreement with Reagan are inflation as the cause of economic problems, government spending, busing, and Social Security.

Strongly unfavorable reactions occurred in response to Reagan's request to the audience for their attention, his discussion of his experience as Governor of California, his criticism of Ford in the Helsinki agreement, and his own reasons for wanting to be President. Type II became substantially more unfavorable to the program when Reagan criticized Ford's experience as a congressman and member of the Washington establishment, Congressional spending as it is tied to the White House, and Reagan's establishment of practical gun control in California.

Type II, while agreeing with Reagan on several issues, disliked his attacks on Ford. They re-emphasized their negative feelings toward Reagan by unfavorable responses whenever he referred to his personal goals and accomplishments. Type II concluded the program with strong negative evaluation. Type II made 16 substantial evaluation changes and rated nine periods strongly favorable and 14 strongly unfavorable.

Type III

This group is composed of nine respondents whose major distinguishing feature is their negative pre-test evaluation of Ford in the areas of economics and foreign policy, although in general, they give Ford higher approval ratings than Reagan. This is the most active of the five groups in terms of their changes in responses of substantial magnitude throughout

the program. They made 20 substantial changes in responses. There are 10 points at which they registered a strong positive score and 13 at which they registered a strong negative score.

Favorable reactions occur in response to Reagan's concern that Congress should care for all Americans instead of just itself, self-sufficiency in energy, government by the people, and the need for American military superiority. They disagreed that the federal government should be weakened to strengthen local government. This group reacts negatively to the arguments against losing the Canal Zone, for inflation as the cause of recession and unemployment, and any reference to God and his purpose for the U.S.

There was no overall trend to the responses of this group that is readily identifiable based upon issues. They may well represent a group who responds more to the candidate's style than to his issue positions.

Type IV

There are nine respondents in Type IV. They are primarily Independents who have the least interest in national politics of all groups. They have the lowest pre-test rating of Ford of all groups, 3.0, the only group not to register a generally favorable response toward him, and the group is slightly unfavorable in its pre-test evaluation of Reagan.

Positive responses of this group were in reference to government spending in relation to deficit budgets, Social Security, government by the people, welfare, housing, busing, and Ford's participation in the Helsinki pact. Unfavorable reactions to the speech are limited, although they responded with a sharp negative reaction to criticism of energy legislation. To a substantially greater extent than all other types, this group rated the final section of the speech, Dimension 1, very unfavorably. As a result, the broadcast ends with this group on an extremely negative note. It would

appear that foreign affairs is less important to this group than domestic issues. Specific domestic issues and moral issues elicited strong responses while foreign affairs topics receive little more than neutral responses. Type IV made 11 strong changes in evaluations throughout the speech, and overall, gave strong positive responses to 14 time segments and strong negative responses to 13 segments of the speech.

Type V

The final eight respondents cluster in Type V. This is the only group with more males than females and more Republicans than Independents. As with all other groups, the initial evaluations of Reagan were slightly negative, while Ford's ratings were slightly positive. It is the only group to not rate military strength as important and was the least active group in terms of changing evaluations of the program. There were only three points at which Type V made substantial changes. Ratings of the program tended to hover near the neutral point with a sharp negative evaluation being registered when Reagan discusses his experiences as governor. The group moves slowly from an initially negative evaluation during the first half of the program to a consistently positive evaluation during the second half. This slow progression from the early position as the group to rate the speech most negatively to the conclusion as the most positive indicates the most stable pattern of change among the groups. We would hypothesize that the speech was most effective for this group and that their improved evaluations of Reagan would tend to persist longer than other groups'.

Candidate Images

Scale Analysis

Overall, semantic differential evaluations of both Ford and Reagan are favorable and the two are rated about equally on the composite profile.

The average score for Ford in the pre-viewing situation was 3.24 on a scale of 7, a slightly favorable perception. The average score for Reagan in the pre-viewing situation was 3.29, not significantly different from Ford's evaluation. (Table 1)



After viewing the program, evaluations of Ford dropped to an average of 3.43. Reagan's evaluation however, improved to a mean of 3.03, a more favorable position. Again, the difference is not statistically significant at the .05 level, although it is significant at the .10 level.

While President Ford did maintain a favorable perception in both the pre- and post-test situations, he did suffer significant losses in the evaluation of three qualities: justness, trustworthiness and informedness. None of these losses, however, were great enough to evoke a negative evaluation, only a less positive evaluation in each case. Examination of Figure 2 reveals that perception of Ford moved towards the negative for 11 of the 12 qualities measured. The fact that the total perception of Ford could be altered in a unified way by Reagan's program indicates the lack of a solid, stable image of President Ford. If he had maintained a strong image in the eyes of the voters, such alterations in his perception in short-term responses such as that resulting from viewing of a single half-hour program could not have occurred.

The perception of Ronald Reagan from the pre-viewing situation to the post-viewing improved in all 12 of the qualities measured. Of those more favorable evaluations, 4 qualities had improved significantly, those being: decisiveness, straightforwardness, competence and strength. Figure 3 discloses the consistent movement in perception of all qualities of Reagan in a more favorable direction. Alteration of the total profile again indicates the weakness with which initial perceptions were held. Such movement is only possible with a significant increase in the voter's store of available

information upon which he bases any political perception.

Before viewing the program, Ford was generally perceived as having more favorable qualities than Reagan. (See Figure 4) President Ford was perceived as significantly more honest, safer, more just and more trustworthy. However, he was also perceived as significantly less bold, less decisive, weaker and more a follower than a leader. After watching the Reagan program, voters' perceptions of Ford were generally less favorable than those of Reagan. (See Figure 5) President Ford was able to maintain a significantly more favorable position only on his image of safety, although the difference between the two men on this quality was reduced by the program. Reagan maintained the significantly more favorable evaluation on all four important pretest qualities: boldness, decisiveness, strength and leadership. To these significant differences he added intelligence from the post-test evaluations.

The overall improvement in the perceptions of Reagan over Ford in the pre- to post-viewing situations is indicative of the power of the program to move voters who maintain relatively unstable perceptions of the two men. While only a few of the scale changes were in and of themselves significant, the overall shifts in the two profiles is a significant finding.

Image Structures

The pre-test evaluations of both Reagan and Ford produced the three a priori dimensions -- Qualification, Safety, Dynamism -- that accounted for 73.5 and 68.7 per cent of total variance, respectively. (Tables 5, 6) In the Ford analysis, Factor 1 was a Qualification dimension and contained all four of the Qualification scales, one Safety scale and one undefined scale. Factor 2 was a Safety dimension and included four of the five Safety scales and one undefined scale. Factor 3 was a Dynamism dimension containing

all three Dynamism scales and one undefined scale. Intuitively, the "fit" of the undefined scales seems satisfactory. In touch-out of touch appears in the Qualification dimension, straight forward-evasive loaded highest in the Safety dimension, and leader-follower appeared on the Dynamism dimension.



In the Reagan analysis, 11 of the 12 undefined scales formed clearly interpretable clusters. Factor 1 consisted of all five Safety scales, two Qualification scales, and two undefined scales -- sincere-insincere and in touch-out of touch. The Dynamism dimension appeared on Factor 2 and contained all three Dynamism scales and the remaining undefined scale, leader-follower. The two remaining Qualification scales formed the third factor. There are no isomorphic factors between the Ford and Reagan structures; the highest coefficient of congruence is 0.80 between Ford Factor 3 and Reagan Factor 2.

The factor analyses of post-test evaluation of Ford resulted in a two-factor solution accounting for 70.5 per cent of the total variance. Factor 1 contained all the Qualification and Dynamism scales and the two undefined scales leader-follower and in touch-out of touch. All five Safety scales clustered on Factor 2 along with the undefined scale straight forward-evasive. (Tables 7, 8)

The post-test factor structure for Reagan also contained two factors and accounted for 70.8 per cent of the total variance. Factor 1 was a combined Safety-Qualification dimension and included the undefined scales straight forward-evasive and in touch-out of touch. Factor 2 contained all three Dynamism scales and the undefined scale leader-follower.

There are no isomorphic factors between the post-test structures nor between pre-test and post-test structures. Apparently, the program resulted in the viewers not only changing individual scale evaluations of

the two candidates but also changing the structure of how they viewed Ford and Reagan. It is worth noting that the post-test solution for Ford retained the separate Safety dimension while the post-test solution for Reagan retained the separate Dynamism dimension.

Conclusions

Viewers are found to segment the political speech into coherent issue groupings, suggesting the use of issues and issue positions in evaluation of a candidate. But it is not sufficient to look at the individual issues alone, for the response types demonstrated the need to analyze a pattern of responses. If broken into the six dimensions of the speech, the dynamic of Type V's pattern would be totally lost and, correspondingly, the explanation of their responses less accurate. As we begin to use the issue dimensions of the speech in tandem with the dynamic pattern of responses to the speech, our understanding of the responses improves dramatically.

Our expectations of little change in image or image structure were not met. While Reagan's speech was able to improve his own evaluations, he was also able to lower the evaluations of his opponent, a result not commonly found. It has been suggested that an initially weak perception of Ford allowed such impact of the Reagan telecast. In addition, the structure of the images of both men changed. Viewers initially used the dimensions of safety, qualification and dynamism to evaluate the two Republican candidates. These three dimensions are fairly standard and have been replicated elsewhere. Subsequent to the broadcast, respondents moved to simpler structures, consolidating two of the three pre-test dimensions. By this change in the factor structure, viewers may be indicating that one of the three pre-test dimensions is more important than the other two in evaluating the candidates. Thus safety would be the differentiating

attribute for Ford as dynamism would be for Reagan, an interpretation which is intuitively appealing.

Although this report moves toward a better understanding of the dynamics of issues and image during a political speech, it still falls short of its goal. Considerations for future analysis should examine the salience of the issues to see if they serve either as a basis for segmenting the speech or as a defining characteristic of the response types. Individuals who have similar issue saliences and positions would be expected to fall into a group which responds according to those issues as they are mentioned in the speech. However, if a typical response group did not have the same issue saliences or positions, then their responses to the speech should not be identifiable along issue lines and an understanding of image characteristics, like style might illuminate the responses.

Given a larger sample, it would also be desirable to look at image structure across the typical response groups. One might well assume that differential responses patterns should result in different image evaluations and structures. Nonetheless, we must continue to examine communication as process if we are to explicate the manner in which a voter moves from stage 1 to stage 2 in the evaluation of a candidate.

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TABLE 1
Mean Semantic Differential Ratings

| | Ford | | Reagan | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Pre | Post | Pre | Post |
| Intelligent-Unintelligent | 3.34 | 3.45 ^d | 3.23 | 2.79 ^d |
| Bold-Timid | 3.84 ^c | 3.91 ^d | 2.44 ^c | 2.45 ^d |
| Honest-Dishonest | 2.68 ^c | 2.82 | 3.44 ^c | 3.24 |
| Decisive-Indecisive | 3.92 ^c | 3.89 ^d | 2.97 ^{bc} | 2.52 ^{bd} |
| Safe-Dangerous | 2.97 ^c | 3.19 ^d | 4.23 ^c | 3.81 ^d |
| In Touch-Out of Touch | 3.37 | 3.64 | 3.68 | 3.39 |
| Just-Unjust | 2.86 ^{ac} | 3.18 ^a | 3.52 ^c | 3.37 |
| Concerned-Indifferent | 2.83 | 3.03 | 2.82 | 2.71 |
| Straight Forward-Evasive | 3.21 | 3.45 | 3.51 ^b | 3.11 ^b |
| Sincere-Insincere | 3.02 | 3.10 | 3.31 | 3.23 |
| Competent-Incompetent | 3.47 | 3.61 | 3.66 ^b | 3.21 ^b |
| Trustworthy-Untrustworthy | 2.65 ^{ac} | 3.14 ^a | 3.53 ^c | 3.26 |
| Strong-Weak | 3.60 ^c | 3.76 ^d | 2.90 ^{bc} | 2.66 ^{bd} |
| Leader-Follower | 3.57 ^c | 3.96 ^d | 2.83 ^c | 2.71 ^d |
| Informed-Uninformed | 3.10 ^a | 3.37 ^a | 3.34 | 3.27 |

* Lower scores indicate more favorable ratings, range = 1-7.

^a Difference between pre and posttest means for Ford are significant at at least the .05 level.

^b Difference between pre and posttest means for Reagan are significant at at least the .05 level.

^c Difference between pretest means for Ford and Reagan are significant at at least the .05 level.

^d Difference between posttest means for Ford and Reagan are significant at at least the .05 level.

TABLE 8
Factor Structure Reagan Post-Test

| Adjective pair | Factor | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|
| | 1 | 2 |
| Intelligent-unintelligent (Q)* | 0.480 | 0.529 |
| Bold-timid (D) | 0.099 | 0.584 |
| Honest-dishonest (S) | 0.801 | 0.172 |
| Decisive-indecisive (D) | 0.113 | 0.731 |
| Safe-Dangerous (S) | 0.829 | 0.127 |
| In touch-out of touch | 0.766 | 0.276 |
| Just-unjust (S) | 0.854 | 0.267 |
| Concerned-indifferent (Q) | 0.688 | 0.311 |
| Straight forward-evasive | 0.747 | 0.316 |
| Sincere-insincere (S) | 0.810 | 0.230 |
| Competent-incompetent (Q) | 0.616 | 0.508 |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy (S) | 0.844 | 0.132 |
| Strong-weak (D) | 0.318 | 0.822 |
| Leader-follower | 0.310 | 0.860 |
| Informed-uninformed (Q) | 0.798 | 0.266 |
| Eigenvalue | 8.26 | 1.63 |
| Per cent variance | 57.20 | 13.30 |

* Q = Qualification S = Safety D = Dynamism



TABLE 2
Number of Males and Females in Each Type

| | Type | | | | | Total |
|---------|------|----|-----|----|---|-------|
| | I | II | III | IV | V | |
| Males | 7 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 27 |
| Females | 9 | 11 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 35 |
| Totals | 16 | 20 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 62 |

chi square is not significant

TABLE 3
Party Preference By Response Type

| | Type | | | | | Total |
|-------------|------|----|-----|----|---|-------|
| | I | II | III | IV | V | |
| Republican | 4 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 21 |
| Independent | 10 | 13 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 37 |
| Democrat | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| All other | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| Total | 16 | 20 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 62 |

chi square for Republican and Independents is not Significant

TABLE 4
Age By Response Type

| | Type | | | | | Total |
|----------|------|----|-----|----|---|-------|
| | I | II | III | IV | V | |
| Under 25 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 27 |
| 25 Up | 9 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 35 |
| Total | 16 | 20 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 62 |

chi square is not significant



TABLE 5
Factor Structure Ford Pre-Test

| Adjective pair | Factor | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Intelligent-unintelligent (Q)* | 0.698 | 0.081 | 0.267 |
| Bold-timid (D) | 0.047 | 0.317 | 0.881 |
| Honest-dishonest (S) | 0.023 | 0.746 | 0.117 |
| Decisive-indecisive (D) | 0.380 | 0.168 | 0.628 |
| Safe-dangerous (S) | 0.304 | 0.546 | 0.227 |
| In touch-out of touch | 0.704 | 0.266 | 0.324 |
| Just-unjust (S) | 0.549 | 0.545 | 0.072 |
| Concerned-indifferent (Q) | 0.603 | 0.229 | 0.041 |
| Straight forward-evasive | 0.189 | 0.634 | 0.274 |
| Sincere-insincere (S) | 0.324 | 0.675 | 0.219 |
| Competent-incompetent (Q) | 0.598 | 0.167 | 0.496 |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy (S) | 0.237 | 0.841 | 0.174 |
| Strong-weak (D) | 0.529 | 0.209 | 0.615 |
| Leader-follower | 0.436 | 0.247 | 0.588 |
| Informed-uninformed (Q) | 0.671 | 0.308 | 0.350 |
| Eigenvalue | 6.97 | 1.38 | 1.20 |
| Per cent variance | 49.00 | 11.70 | 8.00 |

* Q=Qualification S=Safety D=Dynamism

TABLE 6
Factor Structure Reagan Pre-Test

| Adjective pair | Factor | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Intelligent-unintelligent (Q)* | 0.804 | 0.103 | 0.116 |
| Bold-timid (D) | -0.036 | 0.737 | 0.209 |
| Honest-dishonest (S) | 0.603 | 0.203 | 0.279 |
| Decisive-indecisive (D) | 0.013 | 0.589 | 0.229 |
| Safe-dangerous (S) | 0.776 | -0.009 | 0.309 |
| In touch-out of touch | 0.725 | 0.139 | 0.399 |
| Just-unjust (S) | 0.834 | 0.035 | 0.366 |
| Concerned-indifferent (Q) | 0.438 | 0.259 | 0.682 |
| Straight forward-evasive | 0.704 | 0.278 | 0.246 |
| Sincere-insincere (S) | 0.630 | 0.349 | 0.261 |
| Competent-incompetent (Q) | 0.861 | 0.169 | 0.023 |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy (S) | 0.883 | 0.109 | 0.097 |
| Strong-weak (D) | 0.346 | 0.742 | 0.145 |
| Leader-follower | 0.277 | 0.770 | -0.210 |
| Informed-uninformed (Q) | 0.499 | 0.235 | 0.699 |
| Eigenvalue | 7.52 | 1.79 | 1.05 |
| Per cent variance | 52.10 | 14.40 | 7.00 |

* Q=Qualification S=Safety D=Dynamism

TABLE 7
Factor Structure Ford Post-Test

| Adjective pair | Factor | |
|--------------------------------|--------|-------|
| | 1 | 2 |
| Intelligent-unintelligent (Q)* | 0.613 | 0.397 |
| Bold-timid (D) | 0.706 | 0.293 |
| Honest-dishonest (S) | 0.125 | 0.742 |
| Decisive-indecisive (D) | 0.790 | 0.147 |
| Safe-dangerous (S) | 0.565 | 0.612 |
| In touch-out of touch | 0.708 | 0.366 |
| Just-unjust (S) | 0.546 | 0.717 |
| Concerned-indifferent (Q) | 0.625 | 0.416 |
| Straight forward-evasive | 0.303 | 0.627 |
| Sincere-insincere (S) | 0.248 | 0.859 |
| Competent-incompetent (Q) | 0.694 | 0.448 |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy (S) | 0.349 | 0.818 |
| Strong-weak (D) | 0.780 | 0.137 |
| Leader-follower | 0.803 | 0.297 |
| Informed-uninformed (Q) | 0.773 | 0.439 |
| Eigenvalue | 8.65 | 1.32 |
| Per cent variance | 59.80 | 11.00 |

* Q = Qualification S = Safety D = Dynamism

TABLE 9

Mean Scores For Time Segments By Dimension

| Time Segment | Mean Score | | Time Segment | Mean Score |
|--------------------|------------|--|--------------|------------|
| <u>Dimension 1</u> | | | | |
| 61 | 3.25 | | 66 | 3.26 |
| 62 | 3.53 | | 67 | 3.40 |
| 63 | 3.60 | | 68 | 3.34 |
| 64 | 3.37 | | 69 | 3.17 |
| 65 | 3.11 | | 21* | 3.34 |
| <u>Dimension 2</u> | | | | |
| 35 | 3.48 | | 51 | 3.26 |
| 36 | 3.60 | | 52 | 3.26 |
| 38 | 3.45 | | 53 | 3.15 |
| 44 | 3.38 | | 54 | 3.22 |
| 45 | 3.25 | | 55 | 3.22 |
| 46 | 3.17 | | 56 | 3.02 |
| 47 | 3.22 | | 57 | 3.06 |
| 48 | 3.37 | | 58 | 3.05 |
| 49 | 3.45 | | 59 | 3.28 |
| 50 | 3.32 | | 60 | 3.09 |
| <u>Dimension 3</u> | | | | |
| 17 | 3.43 | | 27 | 3.20 |
| 22 | 3.40 | | 28 | 3.37 |
| 23 | 3.15 | | 32 | 3.48 |
| 24 | 3.20 | | 33 | 3.52 |
| 25 | 3.09 | | 34 | 3.29 |
| 26 | 2.97 | | 37 | 3.82 |
| <u>Dimension 4</u> | | | | |
| 3 | 3.09 | | 20 | 3.31 |
| 4 | 3.19 | | 39 | 3.65 |
| 5 | 3.34 | | 40 | 3.88 |
| 18 | 3.57 | | 41 | 3.40 |
| 19 | 3.45 | | | |
| <u>Dimension 5</u> | | | | |
| 2 | 2.95 | | 29 | 3.66 |
| 12 | 3.80 | | 30 | 3.62 |
| 13 | 4.03 | | 31 | 3.55 |
| 14 | 3.78 | | 42 | 3.62 |
| 15 | 3.92 | | 43 | 3.86 |
| 16 | 3.89 | | | |
| <u>Dimension 6</u> | | | | |
| 6 | 3.45 | | 9 | 3.57 |
| 7 | 3.42 | | 10 | 3.31 |
| 8 | 3.43 | | 11 | 3.54 |

FIGURE 1

Patterns of Responses to Reagan's Speech for Five Response Types at 25 Second Intervals.




FIGURE 1 (cont'd)




FIGURE 1 (cont'd)




FIGURE 1 (cont'd)




FIGURE 2

Pre-Post Semantic Differential Profiles for Ford





FIGURE 3

Pre-Post Semantic Differential Profiles for Reagan



— Pre

- - - Post

FIGURE 4

Pretest Semantic Differential Profiles for Ford and Reagan





FIGURE 5

Posttest Semantic Differential Profiles for Ford and Reagan



— Ford
 --- Reagan

