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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 14, 1974

*WAK does not want to do this*

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JAN M. LODAL ~~WELMUT SONNENFELDT~~

SUBJECT: SALT Fact Sheet

I have prepared a Fact Sheet at Tab A which highlights the basic provisions of the Vladivostok agreement. The White House plans to distribute the Fact Sheet and a transcript of recent press conferences on SALT to editors of major newspapers and periodicals to contribute to a fuller public understanding of the Vladivostok agreement.

I have included in the Fact Sheet a discussion of three sensitive issues which have been frequent topics of Congressional and press inquiry:

-- Timing of negotiations on further limitations and reductions. Earlier public statements on the Vladivostok negotiations have indicated that the new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations "beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms." The agreement of course does not rule out further negotiations on reductions before 1980-1981. I have indicated that the Administration favors the earliest possible negotiations on further reductions in strategic arms.

-- Budgetary Impact. Both the President and Secretary Schlesinger have indicated that the strategic arms budget would probably not increase in constant dollars as a consequence of the Vladivostok agreement. As you know, a discussion of the budgetary impact of the 2400/1320 limits is an extremely complex subject. Therefore, I have used in the Fact Sheet the less arguable statement, which you used in your December 2 press conference, that the agreement does not make us spend any more than we had planned to spend, and that we would be spending considerably less than in an unconstrained situation.



-- Impact on US Programs. The FYDP projects a US MIRV total of 1450 by fiscal year 1983. The FYDP includes 600 MM III, 154 MX, 480 Poseidon, and 216 Trident. Consequently, I have indicated that the agreement will limit the US to approximately 10% below planned MIRV totals.

I had intended initially to recommend that the SALT Fact Sheet be distributed along with copies of your December 7 press conference and President Ford's and Secretary Schlesinger's press conferences on the Vladivostok negotiations. However, there are some inaccuracies in their press conferences which might be misleading. Therefore, I recommend that only the Fact Sheet be distributed by the White House, and that a transcript of your December 7 press conference be distributed by the State Department press office.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the distribution of the SALT Fact Sheet and your December 7 press conference.

- \_\_\_\_\_ Approve
- \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove
- \_\_\_\_\_ Other

10/10/80

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FACT SHEET ON VLADIVOSTOK

SALT NEGOTIATIONS

The December 1974 understanding reached by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok provides the framework for an agreement on strategic offensive weapons which will cover the period from October 1977 through 1985. Negotiations will resume shortly in Geneva to work out the details of the formal agreement.

Number of Strategic Delivery Vehicles

Under this new agreement both sides will be limited to 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles. The limit of 2,400 includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. It also includes other strategic delivery vehicles that might be deployed in the future, such as land-mobile ICBMs or ICBMs dropped from airplanes. The 1972 Interim Agreement limited the U. S. to a total of 1,710 ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Soviets to about 2,350 ICBMs and SLBMs. That covered only ICBMs and SLBMs; other types of strategic delivery vehicles, such as bombers or mobile ICBMs were not included.

MIRVs

Both sides will be limited to 1,320 missiles equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The Interim Agreement did not limit MIRVs.

Reductions of Strategic Forces

The agreement will require a reduction of approximately 100 strategic delivery vehicles from the current Soviet total of 2,500. It requires no immediate reduction of the current U. S. force of 2,300 ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, but will necessitate the retirement of several hundred strategic vehicles in the future as modernization programs go forward.

The agreement also commits both sides to subsequent negotiations on reductions and further arms limitations. The Vladivostok joint statement says that subsequent negotiations on reductions and further limitations must begin no later than 1980-1981, but it does not prevent negotiations from beginning even earlier. The Administration supports the earliest possible negotiations on further reductions in strategic forces.

### Throw Weight

The "throw weight," or payload, of strategic systems is not limited directly. However, the provisions of the 1972 Interim Agreement which forbid the conversion of launchers for light ICBMs into launchers for heavy ICBMs will remain in effect through 1985.

The Soviet Union currently possesses an advantage of about two-to-one in missile throw weight. When bombers are added, the throw weight or payload of the two sides is about equal.

The U. S. decided during the initial design of its ICBM force to build smaller solid fuel missiles. The Soviets decided at about the same time to rely on larger, liquid-fueled missiles. These early design decisions resulted in today's missile throw weight disparity. If for any reason the U. S. decides to increase its missile throw weight and remove this disparity, there is nothing in the SALT agreement that will prevent us from taking this step. For example, we could, if necessary, deploy a new ICBM with three times the throw weight of the existing Minuteman, with no increase in the size of Minuteman silos. However, missile throw weight is only one measure of strategic power. Consideration must also be given to other strategic measures, such as missile accuracy, number of nuclear warheads, and number of strategic bombers. In each of these areas the U. S. holds a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union.

### Number of Warheads

Except through limits on the number of missiles that can be equipped with MIRVs, the Vladivostok agreement does not restrict the total number of warheads each side may possess. The U.S. currently has a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on its missiles and bombers. Although the Soviet warhead total will increase over the next ten years, the U.S. should continue to maintain an advantage in this important index of strategic power.

### Budgetary Impact

In the absence of an agreement the U.S. would have been required to increase its strategic defense outlays significantly above programmed levels if we decided to match likely increases in Soviet forces. However, with an agreement we will avoid the increased expenditures which would result from the need to cope with unlimited growth in Soviet forces. The Vladivostok agreement itself requires no additional programs.

### Program Impact

Under the agreement there is essentially no constraint on currently planned U. S. deployments of strategic delivery vehicles. However, the agreement limits U. S. MIRV deployment to levels approximately 10 percent below programmed totals.

The agreement will limit Soviet deployments to substantially lower numbers than were anticipated according to recent intelligence estimates.

### Remaining Tasks

The negotiations in Vladivostok resulted in a framework for a SALT agreement. The Administration is hopeful that final negotiations can be completed in time to sign an agreement this summer.

The Vladivostok negotiations represent a first step toward reaching even more comprehensive limitations on strategic arms. By successfully establishing clear and equal limits on the size of the forces of the two sides, and thus contributing to an international climate of restraint and stability, we can facilitate further limitations and reductions of strategic weapons.

FACT SHEET ON VLADIVOSTOK

SALT NEGOTIATIONS

*Reached by President and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok*

The Vladivostok understanding provides the framework for an agreement which will cover the period from October 1977 through the end of 1985. It is not a complete agreement or treaty in and of itself; negotiations will resume shortly in Geneva to work out the details of the agreement.

Number of Strategic Delivery Vehicles

*Under this new agreement*

Both sides will be limited to 2400 strategic delivery vehicles. The limit of 2400 includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. It also includes other strategic delivery vehicles that might be deployed in the future, such as land-mobile ICBMs or ICBMs dropped from airplanes. The Interim Agreement covered only ICBMs and SLBMs; other types of strategic delivery vehicles, such as bombers or mobile ICBMs were not included. The Interim Agreement limited the US to a total of 1710 ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Soviets to about 2350 ICBMs and SLBMs.

MIRVs

Both sides will be limited to 1320 missiles that are equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The Interim Agreement did not limit MIRVs.

Reductions of Strategic Forces

The agreement requires a reduction of approximately 100 strategic delivery vehicles from the current Soviet total of 2500. It requires no immediate reduction of the current US force of 2300 ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, but will force us to retire several hundred strategic vehicles if the US continues with its planned deployment of Trident submarines and B-1 bombers.

The agreement also commits both sides to subsequent negotiations on reductions and further arms limitations. The Vladivostok joint statement says that subsequent negotiations on reductions and further



limitations must begin no later than 1980-1981, <sup>but it</sup> and the Vladivostok ~~statement~~ does not prevent negotiations from beginning even earlier, ~~than 1980-1981~~. The Administration supports the earliest possible negotiations on further reductions in strategic forces.

### Throw Weight

The "throw weight", ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> payload, of strategic systems is not limited directly. However, the provisions of the Interim Agreement which forbid the conversion of launchers for light ICBMs into launchers for heavy ICBMs will remain in effect through 1985.

The Soviet Union currently possesses an advantage of about two-to-one in missile throw weight. When bombers are added, the throw weight or payload of the two sides is about equal.

The US decided during the initial design of its ICBM force to build smaller solid fuel missiles. The Soviets decided at about the same time to rely on larger, liquid-fueled missiles. These early design decisions resulted in today's missile throw weight disparity. If for any reason the US decides to increase its missile throw weight and remove this disparity, there is nothing in the SALT agreement that will prevent us from taking this step. For example, we could, if necessary, deploy a new ICBM with three times the throw weight of the existing Minuteman, with no increase in the size of Minuteman silos. However, missile throw weight is only one measure of strategic power. <sup>must</sup> Proper consideration should also be given to other strategic measures, such as missile accuracy, number of nuclear warheads, and number of strategic bombers. In each of these areas the US holds a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union.

### Number of Warheads

Except through limits on the number of missiles that can be equipped with MIRVs, the Vladivostok agreement does not restrict the total number of warheads each side may possess. The US currently has a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on its missiles and bombers. Although the Soviet warhead total will increase over the next ten years, the US should continue to maintain an advantage in this important index of strategic power.



Budgetary Impact

In the absence of an agreement the US would have been required to increase its strategic defense outlays significantly above programmed levels if we decided to match likely increases in Soviet forces. However, with an agreement we will avoid these increased expenditures which would result from the fear of an unlimited arms race. The Vladivostok agreement itself requires no additional programs.

*need to cope with UNLIMITED growth in Soviet forces.*

Program Impact

Under the agreement there is essentially no constraint on <sup>currently</sup> planned US deployments of strategic delivery vehicles. However, the agreement limits US MIRV deployment to levels approximately 10 percent below programmed totals.

The agreement will probably limit Soviet deployments substantially. Our intelligence community recently estimated that in the absence of an agreement, the Soviets would have deployed considerably more strategic delivery vehicles and MIRVed missiles than they are permitted under the limits negotiated at Vladivostok.

*lower numbers than were anticipated according to recent intelligence estimates.*

Remaining Tasks

The negotiations in Vladivostok resulted only in a framework for a SALT agreement. A treaty was not signed in Vladivostok, but the Administration is hopeful that final negotiations can be completed in time to sign an agreement this summer. In the meantime difficult and complicated negotiations still lie ahead on remaining details and definitions.

The Vladivostok negotiations represent a reasonable first step toward reaching even more comprehensive limitations on strategic arms. By successfully establishing clear and equal limits on the size of the forces of the two sides, we can facilitate further limitations and reductions of strategic weapons.

*and thus contributing to an international climate of restraint and stability*



# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
12	14	12	16	12	7406137

INITIAL ACTION O

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: *John* KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER *X* \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

LOU NO FORN NODIS

C EYES ONLY EXDIS

S CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Fact Sheet*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOP	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES . . . . . (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA			<i>X</i>	RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO . . . . . (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? . . . . . (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE . . . . . (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			<i>X</i>	DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>12/16</i>		<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Discussion 12-23</i>	<i>John</i>
<i>1/9/75</i>		<i>NBCB</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>Noted by Scowcroft</i>	<i>Cliff</i>

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *✓* FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

CRT ID: *ADC* *075* SF

OPEN *ADC* HP NS

CLOSE *ADC* WH EP

PA *ADC* DY