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KISSINGER/BREZHNEV

TALKS IN MOSCOW

October 24 - 27, 1974


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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and  
Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs;  
Member CPSU Politburo  
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United  
States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General  
Secretary Brezhnev  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko; Chief, USA Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev; Second European Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department,  
Department of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European  
Affairs, Department of State  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence  
and Research, Department of State  
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security  
Council *RDC*

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, October 24, 1974  
11:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.

PLACE: Old Politburo Room, Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Visit to USSR, October 1974

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*MR 97-20, #38 NSR LHM 9/29/97*

By *ut* NARA, Date *3/11/98*



Introductory Remarks

Kissinger: (Shaking Brezhnev's hand) You're looking well.

Brezhnev: I keep getting younger. You know, when you get as old as I am, it becomes natural. I see that you have placed Ambassador Stoessel to your left (seated at table).

Kissinger: That's true.

Brezhnev: You know, we would never criticize your Ambassador. He is highly respected.

Kissinger: We're seated this way because I am to the left of Sonnenfeldt.

Brezhnev: Ah, everyone in a position of advantage.

Kissinger: I've told the Ambassador that he is the first one whom we tell everything.

Brezhnev: How does he know? We tell him everything.

Gromyko: We tell him everything until there is no more to tell him.

Kissinger: That I'm sure of.

Brezhnev: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

Kissinger: She is fine, and she very much appreciates your hospitality.

Brezhnev: The first thing that came to my mind when I got up and looked out the window this morning was that the weather is so bad. I thought: This will spoil Mrs. Kissinger's sightseeing. The second thought was a pleasant one: This time, too, Dr. Kissinger won't get to Leningrad (laughter).

Kissinger: At least I will know now that Leningrad exists. But this will make me even unhappier.

Brezhnev: Maybe on your next visit I'll take your wife around Moscow, and you'll go to Leningrad.

Kissinger: You will negotiate with my wife?

Brezhnev: I am sure she would be easier to negotiate with than you are.



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Kissinger: I saw what you told Secretary Simon about me.

Brezhnev: That was a good discussion; I liked him.

Kissinger: Yes, he's a nice man, but you told him I don't make concessions.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you are starting out our conversation by saying what isn't true! I did say what I thought of you to Secretary Simon and Mr. Kendall. . .

Kissinger: I know, it was very friendly.

Brezhnev: To both I said very positive things.

Kissinger: I appreciated it.

Brezhnev: It's no secret. I said what I did in the hope that it would be brought to the attention of your President. I am sure Secretary Simon and Mr. Kendall will bring it to his attention.

Kissinger: Your views were reported to the President, and I appreciated it very much.

Brezhnev: That makes me very pleased.

Kissinger: I was touched personally.

Brezhnev: You know, it wasn't said as a deliberate or pointed remark. The subject came up naturally.

Kissinger: I appreciated it very much, and they did report your remarks to the President.

#### General Review of Bilateral and International Issues

Brezhnev: We are today beginning our eighth meeting. May I first voice my satisfaction at this fact. Let me again say from the outset that, as in our other meetings, we have a very responsible mission -- that is, to agree on various matters relating to further improvement in the relations between our countries in all fields.

I am deeply conscious of the great trust invested in me by our Central Committee and our Government in that I have been authorized to conduct these

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complex, difficult discussions with you. Our discussions have steadfastly served to advance relations between our countries. I trust you will appreciate that it is my intention to make every effort in that direction.

Of course, negotiations are negotiations. Each side is equally free, as in the past, to set out our points of view. The important thing is the results in negotiations. In the course of our talks there can be arguments and disputes. On the whole, our talks since 1972 have played a positive role -- and continue to have such a role -- in improving our relations. I would say in brief that, on the whole, relations between our two countries have developed in the spirit of the accords negotiated in the past few years.

Since our last meeting, there have been quite a few important events both in the United States and, indeed, in the world. I would like to start out by saying a few words on this. Then we can move on to easy subjects such as warheads and missiles and other bilateral matters.

Kissinger: The General Secretary taught me much about warheads during our meetings in March.

Brezhnev: You know, I think I'll tell you something about them that you don't know this time, again. In fact, some of these things I have learned from your experts.

Kissinger: I'm glad they're telling someone.

Brezhnev: I have nothing but words of gratitude for them. Well, what I would like to say first is that from our very first meeting and until today, I believe that the U.S. side has no grounds to reproach us for any lacking in good faith to fulfill our obligations. And, this is something I relate not only to our agreements but also to our general line of policy and the official statements made both by myself and my colleagues. We have never made any statements in any way interfering in internal U.S. affairs. Even when there have been some complicated events, we have never exploited them.

Kissinger: I wish I could say that the same was true on our side.

Brezhnev: For the timebeing, I have no reproaches to make, but if you are patient we will come to all of that in good time.

I wish to stress that in all of our official statements, our public statements, I have had several opportunities to emphasize to our Party and to our Government to follow the line of seeking improvements with the United States in all fields.

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Naturally, this cannot involve such things as matters of ideology, but, in that line, we have even made references to and cited Lenin in discussing US-USSR relations. I emphasized this principle in my speeches to the German Democratic Republic, Alma Ata and Kishiniev, and in other statements I have made in the past period. I also emphasized this point in my remarks to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. Our aim is the achieving of a steadfast improvement in relations. This is something you can see in our public statements and in our press, although the press does criticize certain aspects of your policy. Of course there have been on our part certain critical remarks, not on domestic matters but on questions of international policy.

Everytime I have met with you I have understood our meetings to mean that I am meeting with the official representative of the United States Government -- whether you were in the position you held or in the position you now hold. I saw our meetings as discussions between two States.

#### Most Favored Nation Treatment

Brezhnev: And now, Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to certain matters, features to which our attention cannot fail to be attracted.

Now I do not know wherein lie the reasons for the United States' failing to live up to its obligations and agreed positions. I don't know how you will explain this, but I would like to say we have been concerned and we have been put on our guard by several factors. While we have followed the course of improved relations, the United States has taken actions not following that line.

I would like to start by mentioning the first fact, a fact on which we had agreement between the two sides. Proceeding from a reciprocal desire to improve relations between our two countries in all spheres and from the principle of equality between the two sides, we reached agreement sometime ago that the Soviet Union was to be accorded Most Favored Nation treatment. And, in return, we agreed to repay the Lend-Lease debts. Everything was agreed and crystal clear two and one-half years ago. Yet we do not see any part of that agreement fulfilled. Several days ago, I read that the United States had decided to accord MFN to several countries including China. But, regarding the Soviet Union, MFN would be accorded only as a special favor and only for 18 months. Let me say frankly that we cannot accept that "gift" (hits table with hand). We see it as a discriminatory practice that we cannot agree to. I wish to emphasize that!



Middle East

Brezhnev: That is the first question. Now, there is another fundamental issue that I also wish to mention. You will recall . . .

Kissinger: (As Sukhodrev begins translation) I've already got the interpretation, and I don't want to hear it.

Brezhnev: Sonnenfeldt, don't divert his attention. You will recall Dr. Kissinger the conversation we had at San Clemente on the Middle East -- not the details, just the gist. At that time, maybe I was tactless in being as insistent as I was -- as the guest -- but I felt I had to stress the dangers of the situation. I said that there could be no peace in the Middle East without a genuine settlement of the problem. Now, as a politician I suppose I should have been happy to receive subsequent confirmation from your side that I was right. But, that didn't make a settlement any easier.

We felt that through the United Nations framework that had been developed, we had achieved an understanding on an approach that could settle the Middle East problem with due respect for the legitimate rights of all states in the region, including the rights of Israel.

The situation took a different turn. You began your travels. You played upon countries to disunite them. I believe you have now convinced yourself that nothing will come from such attempts. Your side violated an understanding on an agreement in that region.

Grain Sales

Brezhnev: Now, turning to a third fact -- one that is virtually unprecedented -- that of our purchases of grain in the United States. We had signed contracts when your President announced that he was nullifying the contracts. This is difficult to conceive of, but even more so when both sides want improved relations. Even then we gave a positive reply. We displayed patience; we pretended it was unimportant. We proceeded from the desire not to complicate the situation for the President but to help him.

Facilitation of Business

Brezhnev: Finally, we are doing our best to assist U.S. business men in the Soviet Union. We are allowing them to make the visits they want, to meet the people they want, and we are facilitating the signing of contracts. Much has



been done. We have a trade turnover of some \$1 billion dollars. But, we have noticed of late that our business representatives, who used to be accorded cordial treatment in the United States, have not been allowed to visit open engineering plants -- plants that have nothing to do with war production. All of this cannot help but influence our thinking about the direction that U.S. policy is taking toward the Soviet Union.

Soviet Emigration/Soviet Jewry

Brezhnev: And now, a few other matters. I am not alone in observing the progress that has occurred in US-USSR relations. Our Party and our people follow these events. (Brezhnev puts on glasses and reads document). Here we have an exchange of letters between Senator Jackson and you. These letters are written in clever diplomatic terms, but the undertones are that the Soviet Union has given an undertaking concerning the departure from the USSR of Soviet citizens of Jewish origin -- a figure of 60,000! You know that the Soviet Union has not given an obligation in terms of numbers. We have said we would not erect barriers; we are not. (Brezhnev reads document, then holds it up to Secretary Kissinger across table.) I have official proof on this from our Minister of Internal Affairs. This is as of this October. Even if I were to allow all who want to to leave, I see that only 14,000 want to go. This document also says that there are 1,815 applications pending. Even if I add those figures, I still get 15,000 whereas Jackson cites 60,000. Where am I to get those applicants? I will have a copy of this given to you -- the latest official figures regarding emigration. The import of this is that Jackson has won a great victory over the White House and that he has managed to extract certain concessions from the Soviet Union.

Now, I want to return for a moment to the MFN question.

Kissinger: (As Sukhodrev begins translation) What burns me up is that a lot of what the General Secretary has said is true.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you must know me well now after eight meetings. I never take things out of thin air; what I have said has substantial grounds. And also, what I have said makes me think that the United States is not doing all it can to improve relations. We do see difficulties of a domestic character on the U.S. side. That is why we disregard minor issues. However, there are some issues which by their nature affect relations between states. This is an occasion when one state talks to another state.



Returning to MFN, there are some groups and individuals in the United States who pretend that we are begging for MFN as some kind of special concession that we can't get by without. Of course, we can both note the increase in trade that has been of benefit for both sides -- an increase of \$1 billion with contracts for several billion dollars signed. It is very doubtful that a U.S. business man would sign a contract that is not to his advantage. I would go on to say that we have broad, long-term economic relations with the Europeans and with Japan. With them we have dozens more contracts than with the United States. This is a factor to be taken into account. I would emphasize the interests of the United States and of U.S. businessmen in business relations with the USSR.

Returning to the Middle East, the method you have chosen can only in the final analysis confuse matters, cause them to be more complicated than they were before the October war. At one stage what you were doing seemed not too bad. But now when you analyze Arab interests, you have to conclude that there can be a new flare-up, worse than October. We believe that only through the understanding we reached earlier can we bring our influence to bear and work to bring peace. In the past, this proved true in Vietnam. The situation there is still complicated, but there is no war. I could show you official documents from the Vietnamese saying that they won't violate the Paris Accords. If we did it in Vietnam, we can do it in the Middle East.

CSCE

Brezhnev: One last matter affecting us is that of the All European Conference. If you have any reproaches regarding our position I'm sure you will make them. There are no hidden dangers in the USSR position, no one-sided advantages. The Conference must serve the interests of all the participants. But, how is the United States acting?

I don't want to criticize your President. But, in practice, we don't feel that at Geneva the United States is acting vigorously with the Soviet Union to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. I am sure that if the United States and the President wanted to act, agreement would be achieved rapidly. The United States and Soviet Union would not be showing hegemony, but would be safeguarding peace in Europe. If the United States took a stand, your friends would act. Now we have new delays, another interval. Then they will say it is too cold, then too hot. It is being dragged out. We feel the United States is far too passive. In words, the United States says it wants to act. At the conference, the United States sits in silence. France takes one position.



The FRG has its position. We think the United States should take a resolute position. The Netherlands, Turkey and others are dragging it out. But, when questions regarding our territory to the Urals are raised, then European Security is really not the subject.

Please excuse me for discussing these questions and leaving easy matters such as nuclear issues, but all that I have raised here has an important bearing on confidence between the two countries. It has not all been negative. Some of your statements we have valued. Your statement to the Congress and your statements to newsmen, those we have valued highly indeed.

Dr. Kissinger, I must ask your forgiveness for starting out with all these questions. I got carried away. I forgot to ask you to give our very best regards and respects to the President and to express my appreciation for the fact that in the first day of his Administration he sent me a message expressing his desire to continue the improvement in our relations. I sent him a reply at the time of Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to the United States. Please put these remarks at the first place in our conversation.

Kissinger: I thought the General Secretary was going to say that after these introductory remarks he would move into substance.

Brezhnev: We can do that after lunch.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, first of all . . .

Brezhnev: Really, Dr. Kissinger, there have been some major events. Every month there have been new events that we cannot disregard. And, I do not regard as ordinary, run-of-the-mill events what has happened inside the United States. Whether we want it to or not, all of this affects our relations. These problems depend on the position each side takes.

I have no need to describe the events in this country. Things are very normal. We regularly publish figures regarding our economic affairs. We are now developing final figures for the fifth Five Year Plan for 1975. We have discussed this plan and had a meeting of the Council of Ministers which I attended and addressed. In some fields there are, perhaps, certain hitches. Everyone wants to be allocated as much money as possible. Some have over-fulfilled the plan, and, of course, we don't punish them for that. At the close of the Five Year Plan, we will have a Party Congress, at the end of 1975 or in 1976 -- we haven't decided. During our Congresses we review not only foreign policy but also domestic affairs.



In short, if I were graphically to portray the basic trends -- and Ambassador Stoessel can bear me out -- the line would be an upward one. We would prefer an even steeper upward line, but the trend of the line will without question be upward. And, as we develop economically, we are broadening and expanding our economic and commercial relations with a number of nations.

On October 15, it was ten years since I was vested with the great trust of our Party and became the head of the Central Committee of the Party. I received thousands of congratulatory letters and messages, but that is not what I wish to emphasize. And, in this 10 years -- a little more than 10 years -- we have had no rise in retail prices in such staples as bread, butter, sugar, rice and other staples. Not by one Kopek has there been any rise in rent, and this is something we take pride in. I say this not in any way to contrast the situation in this country with other facts...

Kissinger: There has not been one cent of increase in my salary during the same period.

Brezhnev: That is bad! How severely they are exploiting you. Dr. Kissinger, I have to complain that in these 10 years my salary hasn't increased one Kopek. They are all exploiters.

Kissinger: Dobrynin or Gromyko?

Brezhnev: Dobrynin is a nice man.

Kissinger: Gromyko is always at his country house.

Brezhnev: We should lower Kissinger's and Gromyko's salaries.

Gromyko: Dr. Kissinger's point was misunderstood.

Secretary Kissinger's Response to Points Raised

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I appreciate the frankness of your presentation. When I arrived at the airport yesterday I said I was coming here to meet friends. In the 7 or 8 times I have been here there has developed a relationship of confidence that enables us to speak frankly.



Secondly, I had intended to congratulate the General Secretary on the October 15 anniversary.

Brezhnev: Thank you.

Kissinger: I believe the General Secretary will go down in history as someone who has done much for his people and for the peace of the world. I want to say that while we have spirited debates, we know his commitment to peace and to improved US-USSR relations.

Brezhnev: Let me interrupt to say that you need have no doubts in that regard. I still have some more life -- at least 20 years -- and throughout I will be steadfast.

Kissinger: I was going to say that when we meet on his 20th Anniversary he will have even greater accomplishments.

Brezhnev: I agree. Then we will not drink tea but cognac.

Kissinger: I have been asked by President Ford to convey his warm regards...

Brezhnev: Thank you.

Kissinger: He is firmly committed to the continuation of the policies already established. He is looking forward to meeting you in Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: I am looking forward to it also.

Kissinger: I think your Ambassador will already have given you his own judgement. But in terms of personalities, I believe a constructive personal relationship can be developed.

I am sure that by the time you visit the United States next summer, Mr. General Secretary, many of the problems you have mentioned will have been substantially overcome. At any rate, a cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the Ford Administration is that we want to make relations between the United States and Soviet Union irreversible. And, when we have difficulties and occasional disagreements, we should keep in mind that since 1972 we also have made enormous achievements.



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Now, before returning to the specifics of your points, I want to thank you for receiving me when you have another visitor from abroad. I know that this adds to the difficulties of your calendar. It is a courtesy we appreciate very much.

With regard to your remarks, Mr. General Secretary, let me group my answers in two categories -- those issues that more or less result from the American domestic situation and those issues which more or less reflect the international situation.

In the first category, I place MFN, grain, visits to factories and Senator Jackson. If you can make Senator Jackson a foreign problem for me I would be delighted (laughter). We would be glad to arrange for his emigration without reciprocity, as a unilateral concession to any country. If he comes here you can keep him on national security grounds without problem.

I do not doubt, Mr. General Secretary, that your Ambassador has given you a good description of the U.S. domestic situation. And, of course, it is also clear that the U.S. domestic situation is not what the foreign policy of the Soviet Union can be based on. It is also true that the Soviet Union has shown extraordinary restraint in commenting on the U.S. domestic situation. I should like to say a few words so that the General Secretary can understand the context of the actions taken.

First, I was, as you know, a close collaborator of President Nixon. I believe, as I have said publicly, history will treat President Nixon more kindly than have his contemporaries. It is true, for whatever reason, that the last phase of his Presidency created so many tensions that in the U.S. Congress much of this is only becoming evident today. The Congress is traditionally controlled by the personal popularity of the President. This balance wheel was removed during the last year. Therefore, it was difficult. Many things have been done by the Congress in the last months that would never have been possible in a normal Presidency.

Brezhnev: That we have noticed.

Kissinger: I say this not to change the facts but to help in understanding. When the new President came in, he was immediately caught up in an election campaign for the new Congress. But, I want to tell the General Secretary the following. I think, as you will see for yourself, my personal relationship with the new President is at least as close as that with his predecessor. You will judge that yourself. We are both determined as soon as the election is over to have a showdown with the Congress on who controls foreign policy.

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Brezhnev: That will be this fall?

Kissinger: It will really begin after the meeting in Vladivostok, really in January 1975. There is no sense in fighting with the old Congress. The old Congress comes back November 18 for two-to-three weeks. We will get the Trade Bill from the old Congress. But, the fundamental issues will be fought in January.

In your assessment of the situation, bear in mind that the President until the election had to be a transition President. But he has already started on a much tougher set of speeches yesterday. It is important to understand that starting in January we will be going back to 1972 conditions instead of the conditions you saw in 1973-74.

That is why your meeting in Vladivostok is of importance.

Now, let me speak of the domestic issues you raised -- in increasing order of importance. For example, visits to factories by Soviet personnel. I consider a universal law unaffected by ideology the stupidity of bureaucracy. While you were talking, I was raising hell with my associates, left and right, and neither I nor they had ever heard of it. It certainly does not reflect a new national policy. I would suggest Mr. General Secretary that rather than spending time here we have the following understanding. Any visit to which either the General Secretary or the Soviet Government attaches importance, if the Ambassador calls me, and unless there are reasons such as looking at the warheads of our missiles, we will, of course, approve.

Brezhnev: There can certainly be no question of us wanting to look at warheads. Any such authorization would have to come from the Politburo and the Politburo would not approve, and, as the Foreign Minister says, it is not without danger to look at warheads.

Kissinger: That's true, At any rate, if there is any visit to which the Ambassador attaches importance you can be certain it will be arranged. And, if it is refused at a lower level, that refusal will not be final. I should add that our Agricultural Delegation complained that it could not see certain things during its recent visit -- it's not one-sided.

Brezhnev: I don't know about it.



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Kissinger: Let's leave it that if either side attaches importance, we will notify each other through our Ambassadors.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: I assure you there has been no change in policy.

On the subject of grain purchases, I suppose Secretary Simon has explained what happened. We were confronted with a situation where, in the judgement of our people, if the contracts had been agreed to there would have been a sharp increase in prices. This would have led the Congress to impose export controls which would have meant no grain for the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: I don't think we should spend time on this issue here. The fact is that from the press reports we know that the United States sold China 10 million tons and you sold to others. Why was it that there was no problem with regard to those countries but only with the Soviet Union? Perhaps it wasn't 10 million tons, five million, it doesn't matter. The crux of the matter is in the unprecedented nature of this action. To some countries you sell grain; with the Soviet Union you discriminate.

We have contracts, up to \$2 billion in contracts with your companies. The question in our mind is: If the President vetoes the grain deal, then, perhaps, he will veto others of these contracts. That is what is important, not the precise tonnage of wheat or corn. We ship grain to Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, one million tons here, 600 thousand there. The point is that this is unilateral discrimination.

Kissinger: In the field of grain I don't want a debate. One of the useful roles I can perform is to help us understand motivations.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you will recall we took a calm attitude; we gave a calm and quiet reply.

Kissinger: We appreciate this, and the General Secretary will know from the Ambassador that I made a public statement saying that the fault lay with the United States and not with the Soviet Union.

Let me make a concrete proposal on the subject of grain. First, I want to make clear we have no wish to discriminate against the Soviet Union. Let us set up a mechanism by which the Soviet Union tells us ahead of time how much

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it wishes to purchase over one year. We will do our best to meet the Soviet demand. In any event, we will give you a precise figure. In the face of world shortages and inflation in our country we must plan distribution, and if a sudden order comes in it has a very disturbing effect.

We are prepared to do this either on a medium-term or a year-to-year basis. We would keep the amount of your planned purchases confidential; it is for our own planning. You could continue to place orders with individual companies. (Discussion among Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin).

Kissinger: (To Sukhodrev) Would you please explain that the figure would be for our own planning and that the Soviet Union would place the orders with the companies.

Brezhnev: By and large, I have heard of that proposal before. We are giving it consideration and we haven't given you our reply. This is not because of sinister designs. We are not yet ready to give you our calculations for five years.

Kissinger: We don't need five years; one is OK. If you do it for five years we can arrange to include a margin for subsequent crop adjustment. We can do it on either basis.

Brezhnev: Well, the basic reason for no reply thus far is that we are in the process of compiling the next Five Year Plan and we haven't determined the sums we will allocate for the development of agriculture. I believe that before you leave we will be in position to give you a reply.

We received a request to inform you of the total yield this year. We weren't able to give you this figure because the harvest is only 59% complete. The harvest is not yet in in the East or the South. Perhaps in a couple of weeks we can give you those figures. Just to give you one example. This morning I signed a telegram of congratulations to the farmers of Krasnodar. They haven't finished and the Ukraine is bringing in the corn crop. That is the reason why we couldn't say what the total yield would be. With the final harvest and correct figures we can. And, we didn't want to be untruthful.

Kissinger: On agricultural purchases, if we can plan systematically -- with no sudden orders -- we are prepared to solve this in the spirit of our overall relations and not simply as a commercial transaction. If I may suggest so,



in addition to addressing this at the talks here, we should plan on spending a little time on it at Vladivostok, particularly if you can make preliminary proposals before Vladivostok. The major point for the General Secretary and his colleagues is that for us it is a question of planning. It has no political significance. On the contrary, we will give due weight to political considerations in making such decisions.

I am giving a speech in Rome which explains our global concerns with respect to food and why we think that systematic planning is necessary, even if it broaches some principles of the Soviet system. Now, should I go to MFN?

Brezhnev: Not to continue this discussion, but I just remember that the United States sold several million tons to Iran.

Kissinger: Let me tell you that an order was placed for 400,000 tons at the time of your order. We stopped that order together with yours.

Brezhnev: I was talking about general background sales to Iran and China while the Soviet order was vetoed.

Kissinger: No, no. We vetoed all foreign orders. We reduced Iran's order to 200,000 tons. You're getting 2.2 million tons.

Dobrynin: It is a small country.

Kissinger: But an ally.

#### Most Favored Nation Treatment

Kissinger: Our attitude on detente was stated in my statement to the Congress. Secondly, it is true that as part of the general Congressional difficulties, the opponents of US-USSR relations have organized very active opposition.

On MFN, it was in this room, or a similar room, that we agreed on MFN and Lend-Lease together in 1972. I had never heard of the Jackson Amendment at the time. Nor had I ever mentioned Jewish emigration. I have stated publicly on numerous occasions that we have a moral obligation on these issues quite independent of any other consideration. And, almost anything Senator Jackson does to the Soviet Union he has done to me. He doesn't only claim he has defeated the Soviet Union; he claims he has defeated me.



What happened last Friday was a trick of Jackson's. We didn't know what he would do when he stepped on the White House press podium. That doesn't make us look good, but I can assure you we won't get tricked twice.

On the substance of the matter, Soviet officials never said anything to us other than what you have said today. You have said, Mr. General Secretary, and your Foreign Minister has repeated numerous times, that no obstacles would be placed in the way of those seeking either applications or visas.

Gromyko: Except on grounds of national security.

Kissinger: Exactly correct. You have consistently refused to give a specific figure. In the letter I wrote Senator Jackson, no figure was used. My letter said what is true, that visas would be issued in relation to applications received. Jackson then said that this meant 60,000. The White House issued a statement on Monday, which I do not know whether you have seen, in which we stated specifically that the Soviet Union had never given us figures, that all the Soviet Union had done was to give us the principle for applications and visas. We said that we are not bound by the Jackson figure, that we would only take it under consideration. The Administration, under extremely difficult circumstances, attempted to fulfill a promise to the Soviet Union, and I regret the behavior of Senator Jackson. I want to assure you on behalf of the Administration that the figure of 60,000 is not our figure, nor do we consider it your figure. All you have told us is that no obstacles would be placed in the way of applications or visas, except national security.

Brezhnev: And that we are fulfilling scrupulously.

Gromyko: But, generally, the formula used by the White House in saying it takes into consideration the Jackson figure gives grounds for a one-sided interpretation of the Jackson figure.

Kissinger: No, no. Jackson said that the Congress would apply certain standards. We said that we would take that into consideration.

Gromyko: All you have said is in the statement, but it does give grounds for interpretation. I have just read it.



Kissinger: I want to make clear that as far as the Administration is concerned our understanding is that no obstacles will be placed in the way of either applications or visas, except for security, and I repeat that as far as the Administration is concerned, the only thing that governs visas is the number of applications. That has been our understanding. The Administration has no other position. If there are no other interferences, the Administration has no right to any objections.

Brezhnev: There is also reference in the letter to harassment involving the applicant and his job.

Kissinger: I was told this by your Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: There is no harassment.

Kissinger: I didn't say there is harassment.

Gromyko: I deny having said it.

Dobrynin: But there is the implication in the letter.


Kissinger: The intention of the Administration was to state those things we had been told in order to make MFN possible. There is a mistake that I made, in retrospect. I have believed and have said publicly that it was a mistake for the United States to involve itself in an internal Soviet issue.

I never briefed the press on our discussions. If I had it would have been apparent that he yielded to your point of view, not visa versa. We told him that if necessary he could refer to the letter in the Senate, but not release it at the White House. His manner is as humiliating for me as it is for you (hits table with hand). The press is saying that Kissinger has been defeated by Jackson. I'm as angry as you are. (Secretary Kissinger leaves the room for three minutes.)

Gromyko: Should we continue after lunch, at 5:30 p. m. ?

Kissinger: You're saying that you're ending this discussion in the middle of my most eloquent speech?

Brezhnev: I have just been handed a most sensational document. At last I can expose Dr. Kissinger (Sukhodrev reads following text of proposed statement on first day's talks):



Talks Between Leonid I. Brezhnev and  
Andrei A. Gromyko and Henry A. Kissinger

"On October 24 talks started in the Kremlin between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid I. Brezhnev and member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and the U. S. Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger.

The sides exchanged views on the current state and prospects for the further development of relations between the USSR and USA, notably in the light of the understandings and agreements reached in the course of the Soviet-US summit meetings.

Taking part in the talks, which proceeded in a business-like and constructive atmosphere, were: on the Soviet side - on the U. S. side - "

Kissinger: Front pages of newspapers all over the world will have to be redone.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: Can we tell our press some of the subjects that were covered?

Brezhnev: We want to make it public at 9:00 p. m.

Kissinger: We would just mention a few headings.

Gromyko: Without details.



Kissinger: Can we say that we discussed trade and agriculture and that special attention was paid to Senator Jackson?

Gromyko: If you just say trade and agriculture, you lose the political aspects of the discussion.

Kissinger: A good point. We will say that we did not discuss SALT.

Gromyko: Say that the two sides summed up the developments in their relations to date and that the talks will be continued.

Kissinger: We will say that we did not discuss SALT, but that we touched on the Middle East, CSCE and had a general review of relations.

Brezhnev: Say that the talks will continue this evening.

Kissinger: I will say a few things about CSCE and the Middle East when we meet later today. I want to tell the General Secretary that those issues that have been caused by internal problems we are determined to overcome and will overcome.

Brezhnev: Tonight we will complete those questions we have been discussing so that we can turn to the main discussion tomorrow.

Gromyko: The easiest one.

Brezhnev: To give you something to sleep on, I'll ask you two questions.

Kissinger: You won't tell me now?

Brezhnev: Not before lunch?

Kissinger: We would like to make the Valdivostok announcement on Saturday while I am here, at noon.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: So, we will work out a text -- very simple and moving.

Brezhnev: Later on, I will tell you the technical details (of the Vladivostok arrangements).



Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, on a personal basis, I believe this meeting between you and President Ford will be very important. You will have a longer meeting next summer, but it can affect events in the interim. Perhaps we can have a few words on how to do it so that it is most successful. You can count on me to do everything toward this end.

The President is going with good will. His methods are different than his predecessors, as your Ambassador will have told you.

Brezhnev: I am as before.

Kissinger: You two will get along well. Don't you agree Anatol?

Dobrynin: Yes.

Brezhnev: One question: Mr. Ford intends to bring you to Vladivostok?

Kissinger: What is the Soviet recommendation?

Brezhnev: What's yours?

Kissinger: The intention was to bring me along. Although, it is being said that if I go to Siberia I would not be able to leave.

Brezhnev: I expect that the President will go with you.

Kissinger: I have that impression. Probably Mrs. Ford and Mrs. Kissinger will go.

Brezhnev: There is one detail. From the airport we will have to fly in two helicopters for 50 minutes to the residence. The terrain is hilly. That is why the airport is not closer to the city. We guarantee absolute safety.

Kissinger: I'm not worried, but our security people will raise hell and will insist on our helicopters.

Brezhnev: You'll be welcome. I know your helicopters in the United States. If you could have seen the helicopter I used with Brandt. His face turned as white as this napkin. The only kind of helicopter they had was the kind that their police use. The whole think was vibrating.

We will work it out.



~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
NODIS

22

Kissinger: As long as it doesn't land on Chinese territory.

Brezhnev: But I don't think your Secret Service could believe I want to lose my life in a helicopter crash!

Kissinger: We will work it out.

Brezhnev: You have a lunch to go to; you're late. Mr. Gromyko is a punctual man.

Gromyko: I have to be there first to receive the guests.

Meeting ended at 2:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
NODIS





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

October 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his first session with General Secretary Brezhnev.

"I had initial three hours with Brezhnev this morning. While his tone was generally friendly and the meeting ended on upbeat note, the result of the session was taken up by Soviet grievances against recent US policies.

"Our session took place in the Kremlin conference room rather than in Brezhnev's office as in the past. Gromyko, Dobrynin and Brezhnev's Assistant Aleksandrov were the principal Soviet participants, although Brezhnev, of course, did virtually all the talking. He did not use notes and was obviously briefed in detail. The atmosphere was relaxed despite its largely critical content, with Brezhnev stressing that this was the eighth such meeting we had had. But he was less inclined than on past occasions to interrupt with jokes and anecdotes and kept the conversation on substance virtually throughout the three hour period. He was confident and more disciplined than in the past in making his presentation.

"The Soviet perception of the US is the most negative I have encountered in the last two years, based on what they regard as our failure to live up to obligations regarding MFN and on what they believed was a deliberately staged humiliation on emigration issue by Jackson's White House performance. Brezhnev also seems to question my authority to speak for US policy and, more broadly, whether we are capable of delivering on policy commitments. He thus seems to question entire credibility of the new administration. Atmospheric, which remain cordial, may therefore be misleading. ✓

"More specifically, Brezhnev cited the failure to date to grant MFN and complained bitterly about Jackson's performance in publishing emigration letters at White House. He was bitter about reference to 60,000 annual

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5  
NSC MEMO, 1140400, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *llh*, NARA, DATE *10/17/2003*



emigrants, citing alleged number of applicants as currently no more than 15-16,000. He rejected conditions for MFN, implying the Soviets might not accept it under current circumstances. His other grievances related to supposedly discriminatory cancellation of grain contracts, Soviet exclusion from Middle East diplomacy (a long-standing complaint), US foot-dragging at the European Security Conference and some minor bilateral problems. While the Soviets frequently try to place negotiating partners at moral disadvantage with complaints, there is no doubt that recent developments in the US have fed Soviet suspicions that policies of past two years are undergoing change. Soviet sensitivity to anything smacking of discrimination was also evident.

"I sought in my response to confirm your commitment to continued cooperative policies and assured Brezhnev that we will make a determined effort with the new congress to restore the momentum to previously agreed policies. I stressed the importance you attach to the Vladivostok meeting in this connection and Brezhnev warmed noticeably in response.

"At a cordial lunch for eighty people, Gromyko made a generally friendly toast.

"In a second meeting later today I expect to review Middle East and European Security. Brezhnev indicates he wants to turn to SALT Friday but we might have a preliminary talk today.

"My feeling is that Brezhnev wants my visit to have a positive public outcome in preparation for meeting with you in November which according to present plan is to be announced Saturday. But as indicated above we should not underestimate the negative effect on Soviets of recent trends in US as they see them.

"I will send you further reports promptly after our next meeting"





# PRESS

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 24, 1974

No. 436

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS  
BETWEEN  
HIS EXCELLENCY ANDREI GROMYKO  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U.S.S.R.  
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
AT A LUNCHEON  
MOSCOW  
OCTOBER 24, 1974

Foreign Minister Gromyko


Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Ladies and Gentlemen:

We express our satisfaction with the fact that the Secretary of State is once again on a visit to the Soviet Union and we have another opportunity to exchange views between the Secretary of State and our leaders on very important questions of international politics. You had your first conversation with Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Community Party. He was pleased, together with my other colleagues, with this talk, and this is what I would like to say. This conversation was a very useful one with a very important content. While there are still very important questions remaining to be discussed, I can say quite confidently that both sides are encouraged in these frank discussions and that this is in accord with the practice that has come into being between members of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Already on the basis of this discussion, I am sure that you have been able to draw the conclusion that the Soviet leadership on the whole and Leonid Brezhnev, our Secretary, is in favor of continuing the line that was initiated between our two countries. Achievements of great importance have been registered in Soviet-American relations. They are well known, and I will not go over them again. But now the main task is to continue the line jointly taken in these relations and develop and encourage these relations. The Soviet Government is still firmly in favor of continuing that line.

Leonid Brezhnev during that conversation expressed his satisfaction with the statements made by President Ford who is in favor of developing Soviet-American relations and who is in favor of continuing that line. This is fully in accord with our own line of policy.

It goes without saying that this has indeed been emphasized on both sides; that further success — and we would like to say further and big successes — require efforts, and vigorous efforts, on both sides. We are prepared to make those efforts. I believe that if both sides display the determination to continue and advance along this path, both the United States and the Soviet Union and both the American



**For further information contact:**

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people and the Soviet people can look confidently and optimistically into the future. As I said, there are still many more important questions to be discussed, questions of great importance, and it is, therefore, too early to speak or even hint at the possible outcome of these meetings. But I would like to express the hope that our meetings with you on these matters which are of immense interest for the entire world will lead to positive results.

We regret that this visit is all too brief, and once again you will not be able to see very much outside of Moscow.

As I see it, you still have certain doubts as to the existence of Leningrad. But we hope that after Mrs. Kissinger's trip to Leningrad, she will succeed in confirming to you that Leningrad does exist.

I would like to raise our glasses in a toast to the positive outcome of these meetings, to the strength of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States, of the joint interest in detente and the strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Applause]

#### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, Distinguished Guests and Friends and Mrs. Gromyko:

I have been asked as usual a very direct question by the Foreign Minister, which is to affirm the existence of Leningrad. All I can say is that we are in the preliminary stage of our negotiations. It is too early to draw a final conclusion, but we have talked in a constructive and positive manner and I think with good will on both sides we may achieve a reasonable conclusion. We cannot expect to make a unilateral concession — on so grave a question that must be on a mutual basis.

On behalf of Mrs. Kissinger and myself and my colleagues, let me thank you for the characteristically warm reception that we have received here in a country that based its views on the predominance of objective factors. Those of us who come from an earlier stage of ideological development can perhaps say a personal word: when we come to Moscow we no longer feel that we are among foreigners. We have been colleagues now through many difficult negotiations, through many complicated periods in pursuit of a common objective. We are committed to improving relations between our two countries, to strengthen detente and thereby enhance peace for all the peoples of the world.

We speak with great frankness, and there are many occasions when we do not agree. But we are always animated by the desire to narrow our differences and to achieve our common purposes.

As we look back at the past two years, there have been, of course, a few disappointments. But the main trend has been extremely positive. We have agreed on major principles, and we have achieved many specific agreements. We exchange ideas on all great problems with great frankness and generally with very positive results.

When I came to Washington, the Soviet Union was considered a permanent adversary. Today one can already say that the possibilities of war between our two countries has been reduced to negligible proportions

-3-

and the tensions which were so characteristic of earlier periods have largely been stemmed. Now our objective is to give this condition a permanent and irreversible basis. Through all the ups and downs in our relations, through a change in Administration, it has been a firm and continuing principle of American policy that the US and Soviet Union have a very special responsibility for preserving the peace in the world and for contributing to the positive aspirations of mankind. This positive peace responsibility will be fostered with great energy by our Administration. It is in this spirit that we conducted our first talks this morning with the First Secretary.

I fully agree with the evaluation of the Foreign Minister that the talks this morning were useful. It was a very good beginning. I agree with him further that with great efforts on both sides we can mark very considerable progress in the months ahead. I can pledge these efforts from the American side. We note the comments made by the Foreign Minister with respect to the Soviet side, so we realize the potentialities that are before us. This process of detente which we started and are now continuing will mark an historic change in people and a major advance towards a lasting peace. It is in this spirit that we will conduct not only these discussions but our entire relations.

It is in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister, to the expansion of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, for the friendship between Soviet and American people and to permanent peace.

[Applause]

\* \* \* \* \*





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the  
Central Committee, CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the  
United States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
the General Secretary  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Dept.,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Dept.,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)  
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, October 24, 1974  
6:00 - 9:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Old Politburo Room  
Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow

SUBJECTS:


Jackson Amendment; CSCE; Middle East;  
Nuclear War

Kissinger: I am sorry I'm so late. There is absolutely no excuse. Your  
Chief of Protocol told our people you were ready, and on one told me.

Brezhnev: No problem.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.4  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY ll, NARA, DATE 10/17/03



Kissinger: It is a problem. I'm profoundly embarrassed.

Brezhnev: Did Gromyko give you soup for lunch?

Kissinger: About eight courses. I had enough energy to get here, believe me.

Brezhnev: I was able to get some work done.

Kissinger: I thought the meeting was being delayed, and I was getting some of my work done. There was no reason for me to delay. Your Chief of Protocol told three or four of my people, and each of them thought someone else was telling me.

Dobrynin: They're all afraid of Henry!

Brezhnev: Jackson would accuse the Soviet Union. I'm not angry.

Kissinger: You should be angry at me. But I'm not well disposed towards [this].

Brezhnev: Let's talk about logic, then. You remember we once discussed whether it was a science.

Kissinger: Yes. I don't remember what conclusion we came to.

Brezhnev: That it was a science.

Kissinger: I studied logic, symbolic logic. Military logic. I always had my doubts about. Wars are always lost by some general whose logic looked good at the beginning.

Brezhnev: Everyone loses.

[Brezhnev's alarm bell goes off in the center of the table.]

Kissinger: I need one of those. Is it to stop people when they talk too much?

Brezhnev: No, it's to start businesslike discussions.

At the end of this morning's meeting, you named four points you wanted to comment on.

Kissinger: Well, I commented on the points that dealt with the domestic situation.



JACKSON AMENDMENT

Brezhnev: Incidentally -- [he gestures to the notetakers] -- this isn't for the record; don't write it -- how is the domestic situation now? Is the fever all over?

Kissinger: Your Ambassador is a better judge of it than I am. My judgment is that the high point of the fever has now passed. After the resignation of President Nixon, it continued to rise for a few more weeks. But now the high point has been passed, and as I pointed out earlier, after the [Congressional] elections we will be in a much stronger position. Regardless of the outcome. The Democrats will gain some seats, but I think we have public support on foreign policy.

Brezhnev: That's interesting.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that the elections are for the whole House and one-third of the Senate.]

What is your forecast as to the Congressional elections?

Kissinger: One-third of the Senate and all of the House of Representatives will be elected.

Brezhnev: How many in the Senate?

Kissinger: It's 100, so 33 or 34 are up for election -- I don't know which number is up this year. And the Democrats will make considerable gains. But this doesn't prove anything for the conduct of foreign policy, because they will make their gains largely on the domestic economic situation. On the other hand, there was a recent poll in the last two weeks -- which shows on foreign policy -- in which my personal popularity was at 80% -- which is extraordinary for a non-elected official. Or an elected official.

Dobrynin: Number one in history.

Kissinger: So that enables us, when we can make an issue in foreign policy, to be extremely effective. You cannot do that in a Congressional election because each representative runs in his own district, separately. So I think you will see a much stronger assertion of executive authority as soon as the election is over.



We would welcome, . . . for example, if we came to an understanding on strategic arms, we would welcome a debate on that issue to get started in America.

Dobrynin: After the election.

Kissinger: For example, when I made my statement on Soviet-American relations, we invited Senator Jackson to reply to it, because we wanted to get a debate started. And he refused to reply, because he was afraid of a confrontation. So I say this to you privately -- we intend to provoke a confrontation at an early date on foreign policy. But not before the elections.

Brezhnev: There is one thing I really fail to understand: What are really the underlying motives behind the individuals and groups that oppose the betterment of Soviet-American relations?

Kissinger: I'll give you my analysis. There are the conservatives, who have always been anti-Soviet, who represent the Dulles position of the 1950's. There is the Jewish Community, for two reasons: One on the question of Jewish emigration, and secondly, because they accuse me -- which you may find amusing -- of conducting our Middle East policy in too close cooperation with the Soviet Union. They would like a situation in the Middle East in which the Soviet Union is on one side and the United States is on the other side, so then there is unlimited support for Israel. Thirdly, there are the intellectuals, who were anti-Nixon and who had to find a reason to be against whatever he was for. And all these people combine for different reasons. And the intellectuals also because of what they claim is happening to intellectuals in the Soviet Union. But I don't rate intellectuals all that high.

So these are the different forces that are for different reasons at work. But I think they can now be defeated, because they are not dealing with a President who has no public support. Our problem has been, with the pardon, inflation and the election, that we have not been able to get sufficiently organized to launch a counterattack. But there is no question that between now and the beginning of the year we can get our position organized.

Brezhnev: Does the President or Secretary of State have any opportunities to influence the results of the election in this one-third of the seats?

Kissinger: The President is campaigning, and he will probably reduce the defeat.



Brezhnev: I was asking just to clear my mind about the workings of the American political system.

Kissinger: I could have a big impact -- perhaps more than the President because I'm not considered a partisan political figure. But it would be extremely dangerous. If we had an issue on foreign policy, on which we could start a debate... This was my intention during the summer, to start a debate on detente. I nearly succeeded, because at that time Senator Jackson agreed to debate. I could have hurt him badly. But the debate was supposed to start during the week President Nixon resigned. And then Senator Jackson used that excuse to avoid the debate.

For me to participate in a debate, there has to be an issue. I cannot appear against a candidate. But if I can identify a candidate with an issue, and I debate on the issue, I can be very effective for a candidate -- or against.

For example, suppose we came to a SALT agreement in principle in Vladivostok. The strong probability is Senator Jackson will attack it. Then I can go around the country and defend the agreement, and thereby attacking Jackson. Or any other issue. But for me to be politically effective I have to have an issue; I can't just attack him.

[To Dobrynin:] Do you agree with my analysis?

Dobrynin: Yes. But it's not a question of the election, really, but of a public issue.

Kissinger: Yes, if I have a public issue, I'll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Can we help you in any way, by throwing in a problem or two? [Laughter]

Kissinger: The best way is if you and I are on the same side and Jackson is on the other.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: Then we'll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Excuse me for this digressing, but I think it was useful. Now let's return to the questions you enumerated this morning.



Kissinger: On the issues the General Secretary mentioned, there were two I didn't reply to -- one was the European Security Conference and the other was the Middle East.

Brezhnev: And MFN?

Dobrynin: He covered that.

Kissinger: I thought I covered MFN, but let me cover that too.

With respect to MFN, the reason we exchanged these letters was to make it possible to pass the Trade Bill before the end of the year. And we can be confident now the Trade Bill will pass before the end of December.

Brezhnev: The end of December.

Kissinger: Before the end of December, which will provide MFN as well as credits again for the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin: There are limitations there.

Kissinger: The limitations on credits were substantially eliminated. It has to be a Presidential determination...

Dobrynin: And there is a ceiling, over which the President has to go to Congress.

Kissinger: To report, not for approval.

Korniyenko: A \$300 million limitation.

Kissinger: That was eliminated.

Dobrynin: Our impression is that that remains.

Kissinger: But you don't understand. We have to notify Congress, but not for their approval.

Dobrynin: But they can raise it.

Kissinger: The point is, Congress has no mechanism for disapproving it. It's not subject to Congressional vote.



Dobrynin: But to notify Congress, each Senator can say "look at this."

Kissinger: But so what? What can he do?

Dobrynin: They can raise objections.

Kissinger: No, there are several ways Congress can give an opinion. Congress can give an opinion in an affirmative vote. Not here. Or stop something by a negative vote. Not here. Here all we do is inform them. So therefore this has no practical consequence.

Dobrynin: [To Brezhnev] Information.

Kissinger: As a practical matter...the ceiling is a different matter. There are two separate questions. We have no intention of paying attention to what we're told up to \$300 million. Beyond \$300 million, we have the right to go back for more. Normally an authorization is limited, but this gives us the right to ask for more.

Dobrynin: They will have to vote again.

Kissinger: That is right.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev.]

Our intention is, as soon as this Trade Bill is passed, to begin entertaining requests for credits, and to deal with them in the most expeditious and constructive manner. And we're prepared to ask for an extension beyond \$300 million. But we expect this to pass by the middle of December. The Bank has already passed; the Bank is tied to the Trade Bill.


Brezhnev: I've only mentioned the fact earlier: the trouble is that some countries get trade concessions without strings attached, and there are some strings attached to the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin: He is speaking about MFN.

Kissinger: I'm not sure MFN will be granted to China, as the General Secretary asked about.

Brezhnev: I mean the 18-month clause.

Kissinger: There is no question the Jackson Amendment is intended to be discriminatory against the Soviet Union.



Brezhnev: That's clear.

Kissinger: I have fought it for two years, as the General Secretary knows, and as you can read in the American press this week, it's now described as a defeat for me. I say this only so the General Secretary knows my own personal views. It is our conviction that in the present Congressional situation this is the best we can do. And of course we have every intention, and I think every expectation, of renewing it when it comes up for renewal. And I'm sure President Ford will confirm this when you meet him. Nor do we have any intention -- and I can assure of this now -- of linking the renewal of MFN to any other conditions.

Brezhnev: All right, but as I understand it, the 18-month clause does relate only to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: It relates technically to "non-market countries," which means all socialist countries.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that it's technical language and the Soviet Union is not named.]

The great anti-Communist Jackson is in favor of Most Favored Nation status for China, without conditions. Despite the well-known fact that emigration for China is absolutely free. But it is true there are no Jews in China who want to emigrate.

Brezhnev: Just the other day I heard there are about 200 million Chinese who want to emigrate to the United States.

Kissinger: [Laughs] If this were true, it would stop the emigration agitation immediately.

Gromyko: What would be the effect of 100 million Russians emigrating to the United States?

Kissinger: I tell you, if all your Jews wanted to emigrate to the United States, it would be a massive problem. It is true. I don't think Congress would let anyone immigrate.

As far as Most Favored Nation with China, I'm not aware of any discussions with China about giving them Most Favored Nation status. We haven't had any with them.



Brezhnev: Be that as it may, it is a fact -- and let's admit that in this narrow circle -- that the discriminatory attitude toward the Soviet Union does remain, and this does run counter to the understanding we have reached on basic attitudes in each country towards each other.

Kissinger: I do not defend this particular arrangement, but it's the best we can do, and we're convinced we can continue it indefinitely.

Brezhnev: That doesn't mean we must accept that.

Kissinger: No. Unfortunately, the question of credits also has been tied to the question of Most Favored Nation.

Brezhnev: That is true.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer.]

I don't want to run too far ahead; that would be wrong. But if we were to look 5-7 years ahead, the general picture -- including energy, oil gas, etc. -- can change drastically.

Kissinger: I don't get the point. Could you repeat that?

Sukhodrev: If we look ahead 5-7 years, we can see the general picture -- with respect to energy, oil gas -- can change drastically.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I do understand the general situation, and your situation, Dr. Kissinger. Let's end the discussion of that and turn to whatever you want to say on the Middle East or European Security Conference.

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Kissinger: Let me turn to the European Security Conference.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: The General Secretary stated we were insufficiently cooperative.

Brezhnev: That's not right; I said "not enough activity [aktivnost']". There is cooperation; "activity" is another question.



Kissinger: One of the difficulties, quite frankly, on the European Security Conference, is that some of the issues are so absurd that it's very hard to apply political influence to them. On some issues there are only three people in the world -- in whom the Foreign Minister belongs -- who understand what they're all about. I frankly, even after a night's reflection, Mr. Foreign Minister, don't understand the difference between "each principle has equal validity" and "each principle should be equally observed." I tell you now I will accept either formulation if the other participants agree, whichever it is.

Gromyko: That is only part of the general formula being suggested. Because there is also "equally valid and interdependent," which the Germans want.

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Why do the nutty Germans want "interdependent?"

Sonnenfeldt: [To Kissinger] It's a French point.


Gromyko: Actually we understand the line pursued by proponents of that formula. When they say the principles should be interdependent -- actually it's "each principle should be equally valid and interdependent" -- they mean that if someone says, say, that a humane principle isn't being observed, for example, means that the others should not be observed.

Kissinger: But it works both ways.

Gromyko: It's like little wheels in a watch. If one stops revolving, the others do.

Kissinger: If you claim one isn't being observed, you can also say the others aren't applicable. It's much more dangerous to the Germans than to you.

Gromyko: Our point of view is different. We believe that even if somebody doesn't observe one principle, it doesn't mean an end should be put to observance of all the rest. Let's say some shouter, say in West Germany -- but let's not name any countries -- says because some principle, say a humane principle -- someone is refused an exit visa -- then all the other principles, like inviolability of frontiers, shouldn't be observed either. The objective position would be to say that all principles, from A to Z -- 10 or 11 or what have you -- should be equally strictly observed.



Kissinger: My difficulty is I don't understand half of the issues being argued about. I understand this one, but let me be perfectly frank. If you have a concrete negotiation, you can go and use influence. But when the issue is where to place one phrase, whether to put it before or after another one, it's extremely difficult to use the prestige of the United States to put pressure and be accused of betraying an ally. What's happened with the European Security Conference is that every government is using it for purely domestic purposes, proving how tough it can be because it's running no risk. In Ottawa I told them what the result would be. But it's impossible to put pressure on a stupid point.

Gromyko: Tell them more energetically.

Kissinger: I don't want to go through all this before the General Secretary. Let me give you my own prediction. I believe it must be wound up. It's impossible to keep it going on these issues. It's an affront to logic. Probably the end of March is a reasonable time it should be wound up. Thirdly, what are the issues? On the principles, it's "peaceful change" and this point about "equally observed" and "equal validity."

Gromyko: That's two separate questions.

Kissinger: That's two separate questions. These are essentially German questions. No one else is interested in them. Then there is Basket III, and there is Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-Building Measures will be settled, whatever the proposals are, because the difference between 50 and 100 kilometers, and between 20,000 and 40,000, can be compromised. So we're talking about Basket III and peaceful change.

With respect to Basket III, after the first reading, we have the approval of our allies to develop a common position. Until there is a common position, we understand your reluctance to compromise.

Regarding the two German points, Mr. Sonnenfeldt is leaving to see Schmidt before Schmidt comes here. He will express my personal view.

Gromyko: [To Sonnenfeldt] We will look at you!

Kissinger: And he may even be on time for Schmidt.



And you'll see President Ford, and he will see Schmidt in Washington. We think it has to be brought to a conclusion. And he's between you, us, and Schmidt. Maybe also Giscard, whom we'll also see on the 15th. December will be a good time to work this out.

I wonder whether the Foreign Minister's fertile mind, aided by Korniyenko, can come up with an idea on peaceful change -- even if it's only to move the word "only" around in the center. So Genscher can say he's got a victory on something. I frankly don't believe that at the level of the Foreign Offices this can be settled, so when President Ford and Schmidt and Giscard meet, it can probably be settled.

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we shouldn't now endeavor to go into every detail on this. Perhaps you and Gromyko and Korniyenko can spend some time on it before you leave.

Kissinger: [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate what I said about the end of March?

Sukhodrev: Yes. The conclusion of the Conference.

Kissinger: All I can do is repeat: The President and you will discuss it at Vladivostok, and by the end of December we can bring it to a concrete point.

Brezhnev: Since the United States is also a participant in the European Security Conference, we have a very earnest desire to write into the European Security Conference that the United States should notify us about all movements of its Navy and all movements of its troops in the United States all the way to California.

Kissinger: Dobrynin knows it anyway.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin hasn't told me about it. Because otherwise you say it doesn't concern the United States; that it's a German question, a French question. Let's all build confidence.

Kissinger: But the summer house where Dobrynin spends all his time has more electronic equipment... It goes out to the Atlantic. You want to cover California too?

Brezhnev: All the way to California.



Kissinger: I think the question of military maneuvers will be settled.

Brezhnev: You know, the unfortunate thing is, I turned out to be the author of this proposal about notification of troop movements. It sometimes happens that a man proceeds from the best of intentions and makes a mistake in not predicting what form it takes in someone else's eyes. I am admitting it very frankly. We had a discussion with the late President Pompidou at Zaslavoye, and the question didn't even exist then. I said to him, "Let's do something to strengthen confidence. After all, any army doesn't just live in barracks and go out to mess room. They conduct maneuvers; they move tanks and planes. Let's invite your representatives, and anyone's representatives, to attend these maneuvers to observe them, and that would strengthen confidence." No sooner did I say this than it was turned into an idea of opening up the whole Soviet Union, to the Urals. The question didn't exist before I mentioned it.

Aleksandrov: You let the genie out of the bottle!

Brezhnev: I let the genie out of the bottle, and now every country is coming back at me -- the Greeks, the Turks, the Dutch, Belgium.

Kissinger: Anyone who can get the Greeks and Turks to agree on anything has already accomplished something.

Brezhnev: It that is so, we have to report to you and Canada about any troop movement.

Aleksandrov: Let you and Canada report!

Kissinger: We already know what you're doing.

Brezhnev: Of course.

Kissinger: Not every company, but every substantial movement.

Brezhnev: In the last ten years, we've had no more than two major military exercises, "Dniepr" and "Dvina." One was "Dniepr," when the Kiev Military District was supposed to mount an offensive against the Belorussian Military District. Who won, I can't say, because there was no real firing. But all the general officers there watched the Air Force come in with correct precision, and other movements. So if Grechko



favors the Kiev Military District, he just announces Kiev has won. If for some reason he supports Belorussia, he announces they won. Thank God I wasn't present; I'd have said they both won.

The only extenuating factor for me is that I came out for that proposal guided by the noblest of intentions. But now others have turned it into a principle.

Kissinger: I'm aware of the differences of opinion that exist.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I raise the point by way of suggesting voluntary observers -- that is, if we want to invite them, we do, and if we don't, we don't. In short, I think we should at some point discuss it in greater detail, especially taking into account your view of reaching a solution.

One thing that troubles me is that you seem to agree with those who emphasize the great difficulty of reaching agreement on peaceful change of frontiers.

The second point is I'm sick and tired of endless delays in bringing the Conference to a close. It was once to be ended in 1972. Then it was supposed to be in 1973, then in 1974. Now we hear it's March 1975.

Kissinger: I myself think March 1975 is realistic. Don't you?

Gromyko: If that is so, it's only because there are some who artificially cling to that time limit, who try artificially to hold back on it.

Kissinger: There is no issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. If I had a major concern here, I'd insist on it. The General Secretary knows I'm not exactly bashful about stating my views. So it's a question of how between the two of us we can manage the ending of the Conference. It's now practically impossible to do it in November.

May I make a concrete proposal, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: We will make an effort in the next two months to move our allies to a conclusion. You will see Schmidt and Giscard, and you let us know what you discussed with them with respect to this Conference. We will see Schmidt and Giscard, and we'll let you know what we discussed.



So as to avoid confusion. Then early in January, you may wish to send Korniyenko, or maybe you'd send Gromyko, to America, and we could after all these discussions see where we are.

Gromyko: The important thing is that in our contacts with Schmidt and Giscard we should act from one and the same position and not in different positions.

Kissinger: I agree. But I think we should do it in parallel, but not give the impression we have an agreement.

Gromyko: The French would be overenthusiastic if they felt we were acting jointly with you.

Kissinger: They would be delighted.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree we don't need to use virtually the same words in expounding our position with Giscard and Schmidt, but we should act in parallel and in one and the same direction.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Perhaps you could have a word or two with the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: The basic thing is to talk in parallel.

Kissinger: Our basic talk with Schmidt is not when Sonnenfeldt is there, but when the President meets with Schmidt in Washington. But I'll send a message to Schmidt through Sonnenfeldt that we believe the Conference should be brought to a conclusion.

Brezhnev: When I say we should act along the same line, I mean while you are here in Moscow, you and Gromyko should agree on the main principles. Because if those basic principles are agreed on between us, Sonnenfeldt can be given more explicit instructions.

Kissinger: We can have a talk, but in our view the realistic time to make progress is when the President sees Schmidt.

Brezhnev: It's certainly true that more concrete results can be achieved in a summit, but at the lower level some preliminary work can be done.

Kissinger: I agree.



Brezhnev: And I certainly could not conceive of this question not being touched upon when I meet President Ford.

Kissinger: No question. We are prepared to discuss it.

Are we finished with this question?

Gromyko: In effect, you were replying to the observations made by the General Secretary this morning.

Kissinger: That's correct.

Gromyko: Because the questions we did mention regarding the European Security Conference are the issues that are now holding up the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And my point is that your basic problem is not the United States.

Can we have a two-minute break?

Brezhnev: Yes. Then we can take up the Middle East.

Kissinger: I don't insist on it!

Brezhnev: Then tomorrow morning we can start with an easy subject -- SALT. Things are simpler there.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: And Dr. Kissinger, if you'd like to have a break now . . . .

Kissinger: Good.

[There was a break from 7:45 - 8:02 p.m.]

Brezhnev: I used the time in our interval to joke with my Secretary, Galya. I'm in a better mood.

Kissinger: I wish I could speak Russian.

Brezhnev: No, that's not for you anymore. Please.



Middle East

Kissinger: Should I say something about the Middle East? Of course you have had contacts with the Middle East more recently than I, so your information is more current.

Gromyko: [Laughs] Your contacts were broader!

Brezhnev: True, I met with Fahmy recently and with Asad before that.

Very briefly, what I learned during my contacts with Asad was, his basic philosophy is that he believes the problem of the Middle East has not been concluded yet. And according to him, Israeli troops and Syrian troops have dug in and are sitting in their trenches opposite each other. He asked us for assistance in the form of certain types of arms, and spares. But I did not discuss any specific matters with him in terms of such assistance. I asked him about his opinion on the fulfillment by us of deliveries on old contracts, and he said he was quite satisfied, and that's all. And I didn't meet with him again on his way back from Korea.

Kissinger: I've never heard him express a complaint about the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: He certainly had no complaints about anything done under the old contracts. But when he was here last -- I don't remember when it was -- he said he would look into what further requirements Syria had and he would send us any additional requests.

One thing that both Asad and Fahmy said was that the United States had not only restored Israel's military might -- that is, replaced equipment that was damaged during the war -- but also considerably increased Israel's military strength, to the tune of several billion dollars. Since it's a very delicate matter, I didn't question him about the types of arms the United States is supposed to have delivered to Israel, but that is what he said anyway.

As regards Sadat, you and I both know about as much about his position, because he has on many occasions stated that the airlift by the United States to Israel was much more intense than the Soviet airlift to Egypt.

Kissinger: If he didn't say that, he would have to admit his army was defeated. It is easier to blame us than to accept the responsibility. Or to blame you.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I'm just relating in good faith the gist of what he told me; I'm not going into questions such as the motives he had for various statements or whether he's playing a double game.



Kissinger: [Laughs] No Arab would play a double game in this. [Gromyko suppresses a smile.]

Brezhnev: As I see it, Fahmy's main question which he set out to settle was my visit to Cairo. The question is not a new one. They have been raising this question for quite a few years, without linking it outwardly to the military aspect. You know, aside from the military aspect, we also have economic cooperation. Sadat raised the issue of my visit to Egypt on several occasions, in writing and verbally, saying "I've been to the Soviet Union five or seven times, so why can't Comrade Brezhnev come to Cairo?" True, I've never been to Cairo. So we discussed the question and decided I should perhaps go sometime in January.

Kissinger: I think it's a good idea.

Brezhnev: There has to be some contact.

Kissinger: I think that's right.

Brezhnev: Of course, in questions of principle nothing will change according to the place where we conduct talks, whether here where you're sitting, or there -- the question of the principle of settling the question. There was troop disengagement, and quite some time has passed since then, and we have been repeating our position all along. You have been able to see we don't change our policy from week to week.

Kissinger: From our point of view, we have no problem on your going to Egypt, and we have told this to the Egyptians.

Brezhnev: I took this decision in consultation with my comrades. I had no wish to compete with representatives of other countries who go there often, like Dr. Kissinger. We don't see it as competitive.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have both seen fluctuating events in the Middle East in the last ten years. I in any event don't believe in gratitude in foreign policy -- but especially in the Middle East. I think neither of us can gain a permanent advantage at the expense of the other, and any attempt by either of us to do so is going to be entirely futile.

Brezhnev: We have never wanted to, not even as a distant objective.

Kissinger: And we don't want to either.



Brezhnev: We have emphasized and reemphasized the need for all states in the region, including Israel, to be given guarantees of . . .

Kissinger: We noticed in the Foreign Minister's address at the UN . . .

Gromyko: I took part on behalf of the Soviet Union in working out the establishment of the State of Israel in 1947.

Kissinger: I noticed also in the speech of the Foreign Minister at the UN a reference to that. I think the Foreign Minister should visit Israel, because the demonstrators shouldn't have only me.

Brezhnev: You didn't pay attention to what I said?

Kissinger: I of course pay attention to what you said.

Brezhnev: You pay attention only to Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko: If I go to Israel, the Israelis will send me to Golgotha.

Kissinger: No, the reason is that there are groups of demonstrators there. The same groups that applauded President Nixon will be brought out to applaud the General Secretary in Cairo, and the same group that demonstrates against me in Israel will be employed against Minister Gromyko.

Brezhnev: If only we even contemplated acting against the independence of Israel, it would surely wreck our prestige in the whole world.

Kissinger: Let me make a few observations about the Middle East.

Brezhnev: If I may say two words, Henry.

Kissinger: Please.

Brezhnev: What I feel to be abnormal is this: You and we agreed on certain principles to end the conflict and establish peace in that area. We are grateful to the United States for having together with us, so to say, formalized our desire to seek a settlement in the Middle East through Security Council decisions and to seek a solution through the Geneva Conference formula. But then, gradually, this agreement began to be violated, and it is even now my view that a line is being taken to postpone the Geneva Conference and even to prevent it from taking place. But what alternative is there?



There is also a practical aspect of this question. You're familiar with the situation in the Middle East -- you have been there often enough -- and I think you will agree with me that the explosiveness of the situation is still very much in evidence. What the explosion will be, I can't say for the moment, or what consequences it will have for the general climate of peace. But a new explosion is certain to raise all the issues of war and peace, and accusations against the United States or the other side. Whether it will happen in one or two years, I can't say. But the powderkeg is still there, and I must raise this for us as great powers. In short, I'm merely repeating what we asked Comrade Gromyko to communicate both to you and President Ford when he was in Washington.

Kissinger: And this he did, with great . . .

Brezhnev: And what we have to do now is not to seek justification for our actions but find ways to solve the problems, because things are bound to move in the direction of war if no solution is found. Of course, if President Sadat or President Asad have given you their agreement to something we don't know about, that is something else.

Kissinger: President Sadat and President Asad are so busy watching each other, they don't have time to give agreements to third parties.

Brezhnev: That is a fact too. President Sadat thinks in one way and President Asad doesn't agree with him. The Palestinians too are in disagreement with certain things. But they are a people, and their problem has to be resolved.

Kissinger: I have one achievement in the Middle East, which I claim as an American achievement, not under joint auspices. Which is that King Faisal says he prays for me five times a day, and I doubt he prays for the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: I don't suppose he does, though they do of course pray a lot.

Gromyko: The question is which God to pray to, the right one or the wrong one.

Kissinger: He doesn't pray for Gromyko either.

Brezhnev: I don't know who it was, but a couple of years ago there was a high-ranking Libyan who was here negotiating with Kosygin. In the middle of his meeting he said, "Excuse me, I have to go to pray." And right in Kosygin's office he fell on his knees to pray. [Laughter]



Gromyko: By coincidence he chose the corner where there were busts of Marx and Engels!

Kissinger: Considering all the arms Libya got, this must be an effective method of negotiating with Kosygin.

Brezhnev: It must be. 15-20,000 tanks, 9-10,000 planes, and God knows how much else.

Kissinger: They will pave the Western Desert so they can keep it all there.

Have I ever told the General Secretary what Asad said to me? He told me the reason we arm Israel is because we don't want Russian arms to defeat American arms. Therefore he says we should give him American arms, so then American arms would be defeating American arms and we would have no reason to intervene.

Brezhnev: That's what you should do.

Kissinger: And I'd be impeached the next day!

Once I told him we would discuss strategic arms in Moscow. And he thought the best solution was that both of us deposit all our strategic arms in Syria, and Syria would be the trustee and would find good use for them. I accepted. But I told him your missiles were so much heavier than ours that you probably couldn't move them down there.

Brezhnev: Their territory is too small.

Kissinger: [Laughs]: That is true.

Brezhnev: And yet, Dr. Kissinger, the problem is still with us and it is a serious one. And joking apart -- though joking has a role to play in our discussions -- we should really have a serious exchange of views on what we should do to prevent a new war with unforeseen consequences.

Kissinger: I agree. I agree the situation is dangerous. And I've told the General Secretary that his analysis in San Clemente [in 1973] was more correct than ours.

Brezhnev: On my honor, I did not at that time know there was going to be a new war on that date. I had no discussion with the Arabs, either at that time or any other time, up to the beginning of the October war. I simply saw the situation developing.



Kissinger: I personally believe it, though there are many in America who do not.

Brezhnev: You certainly have my word.

Kissinger: No, I believe it. And I've had our intelligence people do an analysis of all the information we can piece together, and I believe it.

Brezhnev: Nothing. Nothing. [Nichevo]

Kissinger: We think you knew about three days before.

Brezhnev: Even less than that. We were simply notified, at such a time and in such a form that we were absolutely deprived of any possibility of doing anything about it. And added to this should be the fact that you knew for three years before that happened, that even though we helped the Arabs we did our best to moderate the Arab position. In the hope that we would find common language with the United States and act jointly. But unfortunately you didn't take that position.

Kissinger: My honest belief is that until San Clemente you attempted to restrain the Arabs. After San Clemente you made no further effort to restrain them, but you did not particularly know they were going to attack. You even mildly encouraged them, but without specific knowledge they were going to attack.

Brezhnev: I deny even a mild form of encouragement. You know the events that occurred. Sadat by his own volition asked us to withdraw our military advisers. And we did it without a word. And that was a political action.

Kissinger: That we didn't know about. Mr. General Secretary, let me go back to the subject.

Brezhnev: Let us indeed discuss ways to really ensure peace in the area so there is no detriment to Arabs or Israelis.

Kissinger: We would like to solve the problem, and whatever we have done has not had any intention of hurting the Soviet Union. Supposing tomorrow the United States would succeed alone, without the Soviet Union, to restore the '67 boundaries, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, and return of the refugees. From your knowledge of the Arabs, do you believe this would give us any permanent advantage? I don't. I don't believe gratitude gives any lasting




advantage. Now we give some economic aid to Egypt; for a few years you had a monopoly on economic aid to Egypt. Does that make us permanently more influential in Egypt? I doubt it. Whenever anything goes wrong in an Arab country, they blame their benefactors. And the only people for whom they have a nostalgia are their opponents.

I say this to you, Mr. General Secretary: You have to separate the tactical issues from the strategic issue. If we look at the situation realistically, in ten years we will both be present in the Middle East. And we are prepared to respect this and we assume you are prepared to respect this. That is the strategic fact.

Let me say a word about the tactical situation. In the tactical situation, we face a problem of unusual complexity which you probably cannot understand. We face the problem that we have a minority group in America of unusual economic and political influence. And therefore the problem of a solution in the Middle East has for us domestic connotations that it cannot have for you. I speak to you in great candor, so that you understand our problem. Secondly, we have a very particular relationship to Israel. And therefore it is inevitable that we have to proceed step by step.

If I review the negotiations before the October War between your Foreign Minister and us, there are two attributes to them. Your Foreign Minister has produced plans of great complexity and great detail, and secondly, their practical effect was that it was the United States that should impose them on Israel. So you're asking . . . . The end result was that the United States was asked to plunge itself into a major domestic crisis, for what? And since there was no difference between that plan and the Arab plan, why shouldn't we deal directly with the Arabs? Since they were all asking us the same thing. So we have always had great difficulty understanding what it is that the Soviet Union was adding to the discussion. On the substance it supported every Arab position, and on the tactics we were forced to impose it unilaterally on Israel.

There are many objectives on which we agree with you. But it is a necessity of our situation that we proceed step by step. This is not a diabolical American maneuver. In fact I enjoyed foreign policy much more before I became involved in the Middle East. In fact for five years I refused to touch the Middle East. But then when necessity impelled us into it, I had to find a way to ease matters, and to avoid an unmanageable domestic situation.



I'm speaking very frankly with you; I could give you a long theoretical speech. I hope you reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel so you can have the privilege of dealing with the Israeli Cabinet at some point. I don't know why I should bear it alone.

But this is the problem. So if we can ever work out concrete measures that don't lead immediately to a comprehensive attempt to handle all the issues, we don't exclude the Soviet Union from a settlement, let alone from the Middle East. We couldn't anyway.

And since I'm certain every Arab tells everything to everybody, you know we've never said anything anti-Soviet to any Arab.

So this is the problem. We are willing to discuss a possible solution to it.

Brezhnev: [thinks] All right, well, what can I say to that? In fact I heard the gist of this explanation before.

Kissinger: From me?

Brezhnev: From our various exchanges of correspondence, from the actions taken in the Middle East, from the general state of affairs. But that isn't the crux of the matter. No one wants to exclude anyone from anywhere. And every state decides for itself whom and in what measure it wants to deal with. You maintain relations with dozens of African States and so do we, and that question doesn't arise. But here aggression has been committed, and Arab lands seized, and there has been war. And great hopes are being pinned on us, especially since we both came out before the world in favor of a joint position. We have taken the role of guarantors of a peaceful solution. Nowhere has it been said it would be done at galloping pace, and it was only by way of a statement of principle that it was said that both sides would act as guarantors of a peaceful solution.

You have been explaining, in fact, a different kind of problem, when you say that for domestic reasons you are acting on a different tactical plane. But those same domestic problems existed at the time we reached the agreement on those principles. Nothing has changed. There was a certain number of American citizens of Jewish origin, and that number continues to exist -- maybe it's increased a little, but they are still there. But now, instead of giving an explanation on the substance of the issue, you have been discussing something completely different. Instead of explaining why there cannot be joint efforts in the Geneva Conference, you talk about somebody trying to exclude somebody. But that's not the crux of the issue.



Now you say you're now giving economic assistance to Egypt. But we've never uttered a word of protest, because long before you, we have given economic assistance -- the High Dam, and plants. When the President visited Cairo, we uttered not a word of complaint; Sadat is planning a visit to the United States, and we have uttered not a word of protest. We didn't try to talk him out of going to the United States. So what the important thing here is, we should agree basically to joint and concerted action to bring peace to the area.

Kissinger: But this requires . . . .

Brezhnev: [Interrupting] But all you've been saying just now leads me to the conclusion that you think nothing further can be done.

Kissinger: This is not my conclusion. My conclusion is . . . .

Brezhnev: Although I appreciate the existence of your domestic difficulties in the area.

Kissinger: My conclusion is we should proceed step by step . . . .

Brezhnev: That's what we say -- go step by step.

Kissinger: . . . and we shouldn't be the only ones asked to exercise pressure on one party.

Gromyko: No matter how we discuss the Middle East -- and here I agree absolutely with what Comrade Brezhnev has said -- we should not bypass the paramount issues. What we've heard today is basically repetitions of your previous issues -- your observations made to us in the past -- and American Presidents have made observations to us in the same vein.

But basically there are two pivotal issues around which the Middle East issue is revolving: One is the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they occupy, and second, the problem of the Palestinians becomes more and more acute and their rights must be restored. This is something you didn't mention, and we would be interested in hearing any position you have. Our position you know well; it was set out in San Clemente and subsequently. It would be very good if you could set out the American position on these issues.



And there is a third problem -- what prospects you see for joint action on these matters. Will matters continue to develop on the same basis, that is, your separate actions, or will we act in a concerted manner? Those are the questions you have so far omitted to discuss.

Brezhnev: Maybe, judging by what time it is, we should end for today -- though not our discussion of this issue, because we may continue tomorrow. But night brings counsel. In any event, I'll discuss it tomorrow.

Kissinger: I think we should discuss it further. We are not determined on isolated action in the Middle East. We don't exclude joint concerted action in the Middle East. But we have to know for what. Maybe that's what we can discuss when we return to it.

Brezhnev: We are prepared to discuss any aspect of this subject, frankly and confidentially and honestly.

And now I suggest we recess. Dr. Kissinger, you know Mr. Bhutto is in Moscow.

Kissinger: I really feel very guilty. I know it puts an additional strain on the General Secretary.


Brezhnev: I was to have been the main negotiator on this side, but I did my best to meet your schedule. You realize I cannot refuse to see him. I therefore did my best to find a way to incorporate a conversation with him but not to interfere with ours.

Kissinger: Maybe he could join these discussions. It would certainly liven it up.

Brezhnev: Maybe he could help with a solution. Maybe he should join the strategic arms discussions. [Laughter]

### Nuclear War

Brezhnev: Let me say this in conclusion: We for our part believe the Administration and Secretary of State Kissinger and in fact the business community of the United States, and Congress by and large, and the majority of Americans, who supported the reelection of President Nixon, want to continue the improvement of US-Soviet relations in all spheres and in the interests of our peoples.



Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And I feel we understand one another equally well.

In this connection, I'd like to ask you one question: What does it mean, and how should we react to, statements emanating from various US officials, including some Government leaders, that the United States must be second to none in terms of strength and only then will peace in the world be secured? [Dobrynin corrects the translation: "Samii Silhyee" means "strongest of all."] How are we to understand such statements? If a practical import is ascribed to such statements, then tomorrow morning, while you are in your house on Lenin Hills, I could come out with a statement that only if the Soviet Union is stronger than any other state will peace be secured. Why add this element to the situation? We have not reacted to these statements. We have given our commentators no instructions on this score. Don't look for information in your briefs; it's something I thought to bring up. It's something I wanted to bring up, taking the occasion of this personal meeting.

My second question is, since tomorrow we will be taking up the question of strategic arms: do you believe or admit of the possibility of atomic war between our two nations? Or the possibility of atomic war anywhere in the world, for instance in Europe or elsewhere? Hearing my question, you would be entitled to ask me my view. On that thought, I wish you pleasant dreams.

Kissinger: Without hearing my answer?

Brezhnev: No, not today.

Kissinger: But now suspense will make you very sleepless.


Brezhnev: No, I'll sleep.

Kissinger: I'll answer tomorrow. I'll ask Sonnenfeldt.

Sonnenfeldt: Now I can't sleep!

Kissinger: I'll cable Washington for instructions.

Brezhnev: Tomorrow I think we should resume our discussions in the morning. Maybe at 11:00, as we did today.



Kissinger: Good, and I will be on time. Really, my apologies. It was inexcusable. It's the sort of mistake that, after it happens, is inexplicable.

Brezhnev: This is what happens when you involve too many people.

Kissinger: I was sitting upstairs thinking you had delayed the meeting.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I think 11:00 would be most convenient so we don't drive each other to extremes of exhaustion, taking into account the time difference.

Kissinger: [Everyone rises from the table.] At the toast today I said I'm always among friends here.

Brezhnev: I don't want to complicate things. Always clarity. So I'm acting in the framework of our previous agreements.

Kissinger: Both the President and I are committed to carrying out the policy we began.

Brezhnev: I believe that. Goodnight. My best regards to Mrs. Kissinger.

[Secretary Kissinger's party then departed for the Guest House in Lenin Hills.]





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