

7417589

38273



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 12, 1974

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ambassador Graham Martin's Call  
on the President

Our Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam, Graham Martin, will call on the President at 11:30 am, September 13. There are attached points which we believe Ambassador Martin will raise with the President and a suggested line of response by the President.



*George S. Springsteen*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Talking points

SECRET

GDS KBH 2/10/00



SECRET

TALKING POINTS



-- Ambassador Martin believes that, if we are able to provide adequate economic and military assistance to Vietnam for the next two years, the nation can go into the 1976 electoral campaign with Vietnam so obviously an American success story that it will not be an election issue.

-- If the amounts provided are inadequate, he believes the destabilizing effects of a seriously deteriorating situation in Vietnam will have such damaging repercussions, far beyond Southeast Asia, that serious questions about American foreign policy will inevitably be a 1976 campaign issue.

-- Consequently, Ambassador Martin will briefly allude to what he believes is the vital necessity of having a clear understanding within the Executive Branch of the President's own strong support of a centralized and tightly coordinated effort to secure the maximum possible aid levels from the Congress.

-- Ambassador Martin will probably request that DOD be directed to absorb all costs now charged to Vietnam military aid by DOD administrative decision but not required by law, and that he be authorized to inform President Thieu that the President will request a supplemental appropriation at an appropriate time, should this be needed to assure the success of Vietnam's defense against aggression.

-- He will express his conviction that, under the pressures of the last two years, the Executive Branch has largely abdicated its responsibility to correct the pervasive campaign of distortion about Vietnam which has been waged so effectively by Vietnam's opponents and which has been largely responsible for the erosion of support for Vietnam aid in the Congress. He will offer some suggestions how the performance of the Executive Branch can be improved in providing to the Congress and the American people a truthful and candid picture of the current realities in Vietnam.

SECRET

GDS



SECRET

- 2 -

-- He will wish the President's authority to convey to President Thieu reassurances of the constancy of American support for Vietnam along the lines of the President's letter to President Thieu when he assumed the Presidency.

\* \* \* \* \*

-- None of the above points is controversial and we believe they will elicit affirmative responses from the President. We assume the President will wish to authorize Ambassador Martin to convey to President Thieu the reiteration of the assurances the President has already provided.



September 12, 1974

SECRET