

## STRATEGY PAPER

### Approach

- If we win in California, then our basic Convention strategy should be geared towards November. Essentially, we should revert to a PR strategy where we get somebody like Bill Carruthers in and turn the Convention into a media event. We should avoid divisive fights on Platform issues, Vice Presidency, etc. The key strategy will be to cut a proper deal with the Reagan camp on these issues.
- If we do not win in California (and thereby if the delegate count is close -- within fifty votes) we should go to a Convention strategy. We should not put any resources into the PR side of it (forget about Carruthers) and, rather, concentrate on the nomination. What follows assumes that we do not win California and that we have a contested Convention.

### Assumptions

- I assume that the Reagan forces will be better at dealing with delegates than we are. With John Sears at the helm, I think we should assume that they will be better organized and far more effective, especially at Kansas City, in keeping their own delegates, raiding ours and persuading the neutrals. They will undoubtedly resort to extreme hard ball tactics, and there's no way we can match them.

- Our principal strengths are:
  - The Presidency itself. All the power that this implies, especially in use of the President to persuade delegates. Other benefits of the Office, such as those catalogued by Connor.
  - Our power with the RNC and Convention staff.
  - Our "advocates". People who can command press attention, such as the Vice President, etc.
  - Our weaknesses are:
    - We are not that well organized
    - We do not have the extremely tough, hardened and experienced people that Reagan has.
    - We obviously cannot resort to the kinds of tactics Reagan will be using.
    - The Presidency itself is a constraint, especially when it comes to issues.

### Planning Ideas

The following are some general thoughts in terms of how we approach developing our Convention strategy:

- We must learn to keep the strategy secret. I would definitely limit access to our information within the White House, and the PFC. It seems to me there's no reason for anyone in the PFC to be aware of



our strategy sessions, other than Rog, Stu and possibly Jim Baker.

We should have a disconnect between the overall strategy and the implementation process (e.g., the delegate operation and the logistical efforts). We should even seek to keep secret the fact that such a planning effort exists.

- In terms of controlling the delegates, it is critical that the Baker operation be given maximum attention and support. It is very important that we not work around his organization. Every contact with a delegate should be coordinated by Baker and, to the extent possible, should be implemented through his organization. It is critical that we build up his organization and his key people, in order to allow them to develop control and discipline over the delegates. It is important that delegates not be allowed to go around Baker's people (to the extent possible) in order that we have an effective discipline command system in place when we get to Kansas City. There will be a great temptation for people at the White House, Rog Morton and others at the PFC, to deal directly with delegates and encourage them to do likewise. Some of this is inevitable and indeed might be helpful, but the problem is that, to the extent this occurs on a regular basis, the credibility

of Baker and his people is decreased. We must remember that in Kansas City we're going to need to control massive numbers of people on very short notice, and the only way this can occur is through Baker and his organization.

- We need to get a key crack parliamentarian who is an expert on Robert's Rules of Order. Robert's Rules will be used by the Committees of the Convention for the first time this year. Bill Barody and Pete Wallison are trying to identify someone who fits the bill. Dick Mastrangelo at the Committee might be one candidate, but I think we need someone who is preeminent in the field.
- The following are some key logistical considerations which should be the primary focus of Stan Anderson's attention:
  - Fail-safe communications. There, of course, must be telephone/radio capabilities, but there must be a positive human backup considering of section leaders for the Convention floor, runners, team leaders within the various delegations, etc. Obviously, the Convention floor setup becomes key to the communications plan, and this needs to be cranked into our thinking early in the game. I can't help but think a creative mind could come up with a way of using the networks to help us communication-wise. There are all sorts of code systems that could be worked out, and communication



could be through key advocates who we know could get on the tube, such as the First Family, Cabinet officers, Convention strategists, etc.

- We'll need literally hundreds of volunteers. Reagan forces already have plans to subsidize young people to get them into Kansas City. We need to move on this immediately, primarily because we don't have much money. Stan Anderson has a plan, but this should receive full support.
- Our transportation system must be fail-safe. We should anticipate efforts to foil us.
- We'll need/<sup>staging</sup> areas, and I've discussed this already with Stan.
- We should have a strategy headquarters. My initial <sup>that</sup> feeling is/<sup>staging</sup>this should be in a separate location. from the campaign headquarters at the hotel. Perhaps a house or an apartment nearby. This should be a very secure area, and the reason it ought to be separate is to avoid media attention and to enhance security. It must be within approximately five minutes walking distance from the hotel to be vital.
- As a part of our communication plan, we should have a printing capability with immediate distribution to all delegations.



### Strategy Concepts

The following are some preliminary strategy concepts:

- Obviously, we need to concentrate on who is appointed to the various committees, particularly Rules, Credentials, and Resolutions. We should begin to work immediately on legally committed Reagan delegates who may be willing to support Ford on the procedural committee votes. (I am developing a separate strategy paper for the Platform Committee.)
- I think we should have a key strategy on attempting to collapse the scheduling of the Convention. I have in mind a strategy which would, at the last minute, move the Presidential nomination up as close to the opening day as possible. My basic reason for this is that I think the longer we're in Kansas City in a contested mode, the more strength Reagan is going to develop because of the reasons developed above. Furthermore, any successful effort on our part to change the order of the Convention will adversely impact Reagan's strategy plans. This will throw his people off in their timing and create confusion, which should benefit us if we're the cause of the change. In addition, this may permit us to go with the nomination prior to the Platform fight which clearly will benefit Ford. I don't see any way we can win with the Platform issues, and it may be so bad that the President will be in the position of having to repudiate the Platform prior to being



nominated. Accordingly, I think our basic strategy should be to change the order of the Convention to take up the nomination prior to the Platform. Under this idea, the only major events prior to the nomination of the President would be the convening of the Convention, credentialing and then the adoption of the Rules. (I have a separate strategy paper on this particular idea.)

- We need to begin to develop plans for the coalitions we will need to win the nomination. First, we should identify what coalitions are needed, and to this end, I suggest that we go ahead and plan a meeting to be held in New York after the California primary (so that it can be cancelled if we win California) to talk about some of the old coalitions which were successful in the '48 and '52 Conventions. I believe that the basic delegate make-up in 1976 is similar enough to the people and regional differences that existed twenty years ago to make the '52 Convention relevant to what is happening this year. Peter Wallison is willing to put together a group in New York on a quiet basis of Jack Wells, Herbert Brownell and Charlie McWhortor. I recognize that these might not be the right people, and in any case, they could create problems, but if it looks like we're going to have a major Convention fight, it might be worth meeting with them to get their ideas. One objective would be to determine which coalitions are necessary and how they can best be put together.



- We definitely should consider the possibility of a third candidate in order to force the Convention into multi-balloting.
- Obviously, other trading items include the Vice Presidency, various other Administration positions, etc. I assume that Stu Spencer and others are beginning to work to catalog these and plug them into the overall strategy.

