

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Sent via State
channels p.m.
1/23/75*

~~SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY~~

January 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Attached for your consideration is the draft of a message from you to President Sadat along the lines which Secretary Kissinger discussed with you this morning.

If you approve, we would dispatch the message immediately by cable. It will not, therefore, be necessary for you to sign a formal letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the dispatch of the attached message from you to President Sadat.

Approve *BS*

Disapprove _____

Attachment



~~SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (no extension) GPO 0.3

1980 Memo, OCU/AC, State Dept. Guidelines

by *HR* NARA Date *6/14/11*

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SECRET/NODIS

Dear Mr. President:

As Secretary Kissinger has reported to you through Ambassador Eilts, I had a serious talk with Foreign Minister Allon when he was here last week about the need to move decisively in the weeks immediately ahead to a new agreement on the Sinai front and about what is required from Israel to make this possible. After our talks with Mr. Allon, Secretary Kissinger consulted closely with me on the instructions he gave Ambassador Eilts prior to his return to Egypt.

From the Ambassador's talks with you and Foreign Minister Fahmy in Aswan, you therefore now have a full picture of where matters stand following our meetings with Mr. Allon as well as our views about how matters should proceed. We have now received from Ambassador Eilts a detailed report of his talks in Aswan, in which he has explained fully your reservations about the two-step procedure we have proposed.

Dr. Kissinger and I have reflected carefully together on your views and have considered the pros and cons of trying to complete everything in the course of one trip by him to the area.


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E.O. 12958 (as amended) 000003
HQS Memo, 000003, State Dept. Collection
by HR NARA Date 6/14/11



After thorough deliberation, I have concluded that for Dr. Kissinger to attempt to bring matters to a conclusion in one step would be far too risky. He must have a preliminary meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Allon and Defense Minister Peres to work further on overcoming Israeli resistance to withdrawal from the oil fields and the passes and on inducing greater Israeli flexibility with respect to the other aspects of the agreement on which the Israelis are insisting. The talks he will have with them will require a little time to have their effect in Israel. During the interim period, rather than remaining in the area, it is essential that he be here to help me coordinate the efforts that will be needed to bring about success. I would then plan on sending Dr. Kissinger back to the area about March 6 or 7 for an all-out effort to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, as you and he did together during the Aswan-Jerusalem shuttle last year.

With regard to the substance of a new agreement, we have a clear understanding of what your objectives are, and we are working in that direction. Specifically, we are urging strongly that Israel move on both the passes and the oil fields. I must underline, however, what Dr. Kissinger has said about the problem of reciprocity in any new agreement. In the end, the agreement



will need to take concrete form and, while the language and the ways in which it is recorded can be worked out to take your as well as Israel's political requirements into account, there will need to be some Egyptian contribution if our efforts are to succeed. Foreign Minister Fahmy's discussions with Ambassador Eilts have suggested a number of useful ideas in this respect, and I have no doubt that ways can be found to work these problems out. Dr. Kissinger will then need time to develop the necessary formulations, which further reinforces the desirability of an interval between his two proposed trips to the area.

Mr. President, it is our best and firm judgment that a successful conclusion can be achieved to the efforts in which we are now engaged. While obviously there can be no absolute assurance of this in advance, I would not be committing our prestige by sending Secretary Kissinger to the area if I did not believe there was a high probability of success. This judgment, however, is based on our being able to proceed as we have suggested. I must ask you to have confidence in our judgment of how the negotiations can most effectively be conducted, taking into account not only the problems I know you face and the situation in Israel, but also the pressures with which we must deal here.



I assure you that I fully appreciate the risks involved for you. There are risks for us as well in sending Dr. Kissinger on this mission. To help meet your concerns we would be prepared, if you wish, in announcing Secretary Kissinger's early February visit, to say that it is preparatory and that he anticipates returning to the area again in a few weeks for a more extended stay to continue the negotiations with the intention of doing everything possible to bring them to a successful conclusion at that time. In addition, if it would be helpful to you, during the interval between trips and while we are working on the situation here, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to leave a member of his party behind to continue the discussions in the area.


Finally, Ambassador Eilts has reported the importance you attach to an agreement that you can defend publicly and be proud of, as well as your view that, if we cannot agree, it would be better and more honorable for everyone to agree to go to Geneva immediately. We are, of course, prepared to do so, and do not shrink from reconvening the Geneva Conference, if that is really the wish of the others concerned. This would not solve the problem in present circumstances, however, although it would have the advantage for us that all participants at Geneva would



share the responsibility for the stalemate that would inevitably result. It is precisely because a stalemate would be detrimental to the real interests of all concerned, including Egypt, and because of our admiration for all you have been seeking to accomplish, that we have proposed persevering on the present course despite the complications and difficulties it holds. We value your leadership in the area and respect the objectives you seek for Egypt, for the Middle East and for world peace. For these reasons, we are prepared to continue our efforts, which are not without risk for us, to help achieve the objectives our two countries fully share.

I will look forward to your early and, I hope, favorable reaction to the ideas I have set forth in this letter.

Sincerely,



Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency
Anwar al-Sadat
President of the Arab Republic
of Egypt
Cairo

