

To Dick
Kennedy 14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Monday, December 2, 1974

10:30 a.m. (45 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger HK

I. PURPOSE

To provide an opportunity for you and Secretary Kissinger to brief the NSC members and Dr. Ikle, Director of ACDA, on your recent trips.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: It would be highly desirable for the NSC members and Dr. Ikle to hear directly from you on your discussions with the Japanese, Korean and Soviet leaders, particularly on the strategic arms limitations agreement reached with General Secretary Brezhnev. Secretary Kissinger could also brief on his trip to Peking.

B. Participants:

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
Director of Central Intelligence Colby
Chairman, JCS, General Brown
ACDA Director Ikle
Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements
Assistant to the President Rumsfeld
General Scowcroft

C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting will be announced but not the subject.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY lh DATE 8/5/05



III. TALKING POINTS

GENERAL

-- I think my trip was a significant success on all counts and I would like all agencies to reflect that in all dealings on the subject -- with the press, on the Hill, or elsewhere.

-- Let's make certain we all stay thoroughly upbeat.

JAPAN

-- Whatever differences we may have had in the past with Japan have been removed.

-- What happened to Tanaka is not important. What is important is the symbolic getting together with the Emperor. In Japan, ceremony is indistinguishable from substance, and the visit shows that our relationship has broken through any impediments of the past and has been placed on a substantially new and solid footing.

-- Our success in Japan, while perhaps somewhat difficult to articulate in precise terms, was very substantial.

-- In the vital area of security, the Japanese told us that they believed security must now be seen in a wider sense -- not just in military terms but in terms of such other requirements as energy and food.

-- In energy, the Japanese are somewhat exposed because of their heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, they are reluctant to commit themselves to our proposals until they see that we are really determined to make them work. Subject to these reservations, however, they appeared ready to look seriously at all our proposals for solving international energy problems and to play a role more nearly in line with their first-rank global economic position.

-- I spoke to the Japanese about increasing their aid to Vietnam, and they agreed to look into this.



-- They clearly count on us as an important and stable supplier of food, especially soybeans, and enriched uranium, and we shall have to make certain that we fulfill our obligations.

-- We also want to make sure that they have confidence in our ability to sustain a consistent policy.

KOREA

-- I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea. If I had not gone, the North Koreans might have underestimated our determination to support our friends as well as our commitment to stability in the area.

-- The Korean economic progress is astonishing. Seoul looks like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars and an obviously thriving economy. My welcome was amazing -- there must have been two million people lining the streets between the airport and the hotel.

-- I was very impressed by our troops in Korea. Their moral and their training are very high and I am glad I visited them so that they know we have not forgotten them.

-- President Park believes he is directly menaced by North Korean aggression and cited the recently discovered tunnel as evidence. He is going to want all the military aid that we can give him and regards the sustained level of our forces as vital, at least for the near term. He wants us to complete our program of assistance to the Modernization Plan for South Korean forces as soon as possible. I reaffirmed our support for the Plan.

-- I told President Park that we will keep our forces in Korea at present levels and that he can count on our continued military and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limitations.

-- I also pointed out that we maintain our commitments in an era of detente and that we will not take actions that affect their interests without consulting them.



VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT

-- My summit talks with General Secretary Brezhnev I think clearly mark a significant change in the international environment.

-- There is absolutely no question about the success of our efforts in Vladivostok and I want everyone to hit this issue hard and demonstrate full Administration unanimity and enthusiasm about the SALT agreement.

-- There is some negative momentum building up and it is up to us to get across to the American people the deep significance of what we were able to achieve. We have put a cap on the arms race and will be creating a situation of stability which will greatly facilitate the negotiation of future arms control agreements.

-- Let me first outline the major provisions of the SALT agreement and some of the other discussions with Brezhnev in Vladivostok. Then Henry will give us some of the negotiating details and background and outline the work we have ahead of us in the next six months if we are to nail down the agreement with the Soviets in time for Brezhnev's visit.

-- The details of the agreement are as follows: Each side will be permitted 2400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1320 missiles equipped with MIRVs. The 2400 limit applies to all strategic delivery vehicles including ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. It also includes other strategic delivery vehicles that might be deployed in the future such as land-mobile ICBMs or ICBMs dropped from airplanes. In this regard, I specifically agreed that air-launched ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers would count in the 2400 total.

-- Besides SALT, we had brief discussions on the Middle East, Cyprus, the European Security Conference, and the Trade Bill legislation.

-- No new ground was broken in our review of the Cyprus and Middle Eastern situations; but it allowed me to underscore the need for restraint and responsible conduct by all parties, including the Soviets.



-- On the European Security Conference, the Soviets are anxious to bring it to a summit-level conclusion. I pointed out that the major issues are those requiring resolution by the USSR and the Europeans, that we would continue to assist in the negotiating process, and that we had no objection to a summit when the results warranted it. I underlined that the Soviets could not expect us to pressure our allies, but that we would assist, with the possibility of concluding the conference in the spring of 1975.

-- On trade, the Soviets, of course, are distressed by the continuing lack of MFN and the linkage of trade with emigration. I reviewed the steps I am taking with the Congress on the Trade Bill.

-- Henry will now describe the recent negotiating history and go into more detail on the implications of the Vladivostok agreement.

At the end of the meeting:

-- Henry, thank you for your presentation. Your points concerning the criticisms we have been receiving are particularly well taken.

-- It is imperative that everyone in the Administration give enthusiastic support to the agreement and follow a consistent approach in public statement. I would like everyone to get out and support the agreement. Please coordinate with the NSC on the timing of your briefings, so we don't all do things on the same day. I think Henry plans a backgrounder tomorrow, don't you?

-- We want to be positive about the agreement, which represents a major achievement. The main points the critics have been making -- aggregate levels too high and no reductions, MIRV levels too high, no throw weight limits, and negotiations carried out in haste -- can be dealt with in a logical and persuasive way.

-- I have told the Congressional leadership that this agreement sets a cap on force levels, which will bring additional stability to the strategic arms competition.

-- The agreement establishes a basis of equality from which it will be easier to make subsequent reductions.



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6

-- On the relatively high level of the MIRV limits, we have to make it clear that these limits were simply the best we could negotiate. For over a year we attempted to negotiate much stricter limits, but the Soviets simply would not go along.

-- The present agreement leaves open all our options for responding to the Soviet MIRV program. If we decide it is necessary, we can increase our throw weight to the Soviet level, deploy land or air mobile ICBMs, or move part of our force to sea. We have not constrained our ability to do any of this.

-- We should emphasize the impetus this agreement will give to further negotiations. We have removed the terribly contentious issues of FBS and third-country forces. This means we can continue the talks on a strictly bilateral basis, focusing on U.S. and Soviet forces only. This will make it much easier to achieve further limits in the future.

-- Finally, the simple fact that we were able to reach agreement significantly reduces the fears both sides will have about an unrestrained arms race. Letting such fears run unchecked would have quickly led to a complete breakdown of our relationship.

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