

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Outside SystemTOP SECRET/SENSITIVEACTION

November 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

Mr. Clift 

SUBJECT:

Economic Summit -- Considerations ^{Bearing} Varying on
Canadian Participation

I am deeply dismayed by the way we are handling with the French the question of Canadian participation in the November 15-17 summit. It is my understanding that this concern is shared at the Department of State by Assistant Secretaries Hartman and Enders. I feel obliged to call this to your attention as I believe it is of prime importance that you are satisfied that the President is aware and, in turn, satisfied with the summit arrangements.

Following the receipt of President Giscard d'Estaing's message to the President of October 31 saying that, Canada could not participate, I drafted with Bob Hormats for your consideration a polite but firm reply for the President's proposed approval back to Giscard stating that Canada should participate. This proposed text was rejected in favor of a weaker text provided to you by Counselor Sonnenfeldt in which the President stated that he would come but that he was not happy -- and that the French attitude would make it difficult for him to contemplate future gatherings of this kind.

This message was sent even though the Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs had stated publicly both in Ottawa and in Tokyo that Canada should participate and that this was the position of the United States, and even though we had gained the agreement of the other summit participants on the desirability of Canada's participation.

I recommend that we continue to pursue this with President Giscard d'Estaing for the following reasons:

- because of the strong stand we have taken publicly, to give way on the question of Canadian participation weakens the standing of the President in the eyes of each and every summit participant, and this, in turn, will have a ripple effect in capitals throughout the world;

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) (B)(3)


Classified by Brent Scowcroft

Declassification Unable to Determine

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; state review

By  NARA, Date 9/25/10

9/1/03

- to give way damages our relations with Canada, undoing the President's good work thus far with Prime Minister Trudeau, and confirming to Canada that we give the Canadians lip service but that we do not attach enough importance to follow through on a matter of importance to our relations;
- the summit is a "misty" undertaking structured in terms of informal consultations with no hard and positive results to be expected. Indeed it is being challenged by some in the press as a questionable use of the President's time -- particularly considering our relative economic strength vis-a-vis the Europeans and Japanese. We understand this and we are prepared to deal with this press line. However, when it becomes fully apparent that Canada has been denied participation by France, we can expect intensified, negative press play with stronger charges that the President is not in control and is not using good judgement in going to Rambouillet.
- such charges would come at the very time when the President has just announced the reorganization of his national security/foreign policy team to demonstrate his firm control as U.S. Chief of State.

In my opinion, we should work with the Department of State to prepare another message for the President's approval to Giscard d'Estaing standing firm on the need for Canada's participation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you indicate your guidance:

- Hormats and Clift coordinate with Sonnenfeldt, Hartman and Enders on preparation of another draft _____
- Hormats and Clift prepare another draft to Giscard _____
- No further action _____

Bob Hormats concurs. **BH**

