



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 18, 1974

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Planning for the President's Japan
Visit

The President's visit to Japan -- the first ever by an incumbent President -- provides us an opportunity to symbolize the great importance we attach to the US-Japan alliance, to lend additional emotional content to relations with the Japanese, exchange views on a variety of important substantive issues, and develop the close personal bonds with Japanese leaders that are important to the conduct of official business in the Japanese context.

This paper sets out broad objectives for the visit, and requests his guidance on some aspects of his schedule while in Japan. A separate NSSM study on Japan reviews substantive issues which may arise, and surfaces several policy options which we expect to forward to the President in about two weeks.

We propose the following basic objectives for the visit:

-- To assert our desire that Japan, as a major participant in the global economy, should continue to work closely with us in the resolution of global problems.

-- To affirm clearly our commitment to the US-Japan alliance as an instrument for contributing to Japan's security, promoting detente in Asia, providing a framework for managing US-Japan bilateral problems, and facilitating our cooperation on multilateral issues of common concern.

-- To provide more specific reassurances to the Japanese regarding the continuity of our policies in Asia, and our dependability as a supplier of foodstuffs, raw materials, and enriched uranium.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By WDR NARA, Date 6/4/2010

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-- To harmonize further our approaches to key multilateral issues and encourage the Japanese to assume broader responsibilities for dealing with them.

-- To acknowledge Japan's unique contributions -- both traditional and contemporary -- to world culture.

These objectives address both Japan's major concerns about us and our principal aims in relation to Japan:

-- The Japanese welcomed the President's re-affirmation of the US commitment to the alliance. Nonetheless, self-conscious about the vulnerability of their position in the world, they will look for additional reassurances and will listen closely for any qualifications to that commitment that he may express or imply. For our part we want to encourage a more mature perception among the Japanese of the mutuality of the alliance.

-- The Japanese are uneasy about the extent of their dependence on us for the supply of essential commodities, particularly foodstuffs and enriched uranium. In addition there are lingering uncertainties -- reinforced recently by our domestic trouble and Congressional assertiveness on foreign policy questions -- about our future role in Asia and our leadership in promoting cooperative international solutions to pressing global problems. For our part we want to encourage the Japanese to continue to internationalize their economy, and to handle their bilateral economic relations with us in the more responsible manner they have exhibited over the past several years.

-- The Japanese are aware of their economic prowess, and anxious to obtain the rank and status to which they feel their economic achievements entitle them. But there is still little consensus among Japanese on the nature of their future political role, and the Japanese Government remains reluctant to run political risks or assume major political responsibilities in the world. For our part we want to continue to wrap them firmly into efforts we have undertaken in concert with other advanced industrial

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democracies to enhance the solidarity among oil consuming countries, liberalize world trading rules, reform international monetary arrangements, create new approaches to food and raw materials problems, and stimulate multilateral efforts to arrest drift toward wide-spread nuclear proliferation.

Means for Achieving these Objectives

These objectives can be advanced both through the symbolism of the visit and the substantive discussions he will be holding with the Japanese leaders.

-- We do not expect to conclude any new agreements with the Japanese, since there are no pressing bilateral issues on the agenda requiring high level negotiation. On the key multilateral issues the President will be seeking to deepen Japanese understanding of our aims and strategy rather than to resolve outstanding problems.

-- The visit will provide an invaluable opportunity for the President to develop close personal relationships with Japanese leaders and to establish himself as a friend of Japan with a deep understanding of its people, its problems, its history, and its aspirations.

The visit will have enormous symbolic importance in Japan, and its value in this regard will be enhanced by the specific things the President does and says while there. We have begun to discuss specific details of the schedule with Japanese authorities. Our planning so far includes:

Substantive Meetings

-- The Japanese desire, and we agree, that the President should have two substantive meetings with Prime Minister Tanaka lasting two and one-half hours each.

-- A joint communique would be issued following the second meeting. We would intend the communique to serve as a succinct statement of the essential common purposes underlying our relationship in the late 1970's.

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Protocol

These events are considered by the Japanese to be essential elements of all state visits to Japan:

-- Arrival and departure ceremonies at Akasaka Palace.

-- Brief courtesy call by the Prime Minister at Akasaka Palace during the President's first morning in Tokyo.

-- Luncheon by Prime Minister and Mrs. Tanaka at the Prime Minister's official residence.

-- Courtesy call by the governor of Tokyo at Akasaka Palace.

-- Imperial Banquet.

-- Banquet hosted by the President and Mrs. Ford.

-- Travel to Kyoto. This will allow the President to travel beyond Tokyo and to show his appreciation for Japan's unique contribution to world history by viewing the most important source of her traditional culture.

Optional Social and Public Events

The President's participation in some or all of the events listed below will allow him to broaden this visit beyond meetings with the Japanese leadership and to leave a lasting impact on people-to-people relations through direct contact with a wide spectrum of Japanese society.

-- Luncheon by the Japan Press Club to which the foreign press would also be invited. This would entail a substantive speech followed by question and answers submitted in writing. This could be televised, thus reaching virtually the entire Japanese public.

-- Attendance at cultural or sports event. We recommend that the President attend a baseball game between the New York Mets and a Japanese all-star team. A brief appearance -- perhaps a couple of innings -- would dramatize our shared enthusiasm for a sport which is a national pastime in both countries. Alternatively,



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the President could attend a more traditional cultural event, such as a Kabuki or Bunraku performance.

-- A visit to a monument commemorating an important event in US-Japan relations. One possibility would be a visit to Shimoda, a small village at the southern tip of the Izu Peninsula where Townsend Harris established the first American diplomatic presence in Japan in 1856. A helicopter trip to Shimoda would require several hours at a minimum for the round trip. Alternatively a visit to the monument to President Grant in Ueno Park could be arranged with a minimum expenditure of time.


-- A golf game with the Prime Minister. When Prime Minister Tanaka visited on September 21 he asked if you would like to play in Tokyo and you accepted the suggestion.

-- Reception by non-governmental organizations. Hosts could be the Japan-America Society, American Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Economic Organizations or Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Brief remarks to an assemblage of these groups would allow the President directly to reach the important business segment of Japanese society.

We recommend that we be authorized to:

-- Proceed with planning for the visit according to the objectives set forth above.

-- Proceed to nail down the details of the President's schedule, subject to any specific desires or reservations the President may have regarding the optional social and public events.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary



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