

Issues Paper

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

Ambassador Stoessel has completed consultations with the Soviets on nuclear export controls. These talks grew out of an exchange of notes between Secretary Kissinger and Minister Gromyko in August and September. The US approach was designed with two key objectives in mind:

-- First, to define clearly the scope of nuclear supply issues that should be covered.

-- Second, to persuade the Soviets that a multi-lateral approach (such as a nuclear suppliers' conference) is the most practical and desirable basis for controlling the spread of nuclear explosives.

A summary of the US/Soviet consultations and our initial approaches to the key exporters is attached, along with background on the IAEA, Zangger Committee and related issues.

Scope of US/Soviet Talks

Our first objective was to define the scope of measures we wish to discuss with the Soviets (and eventually multilaterally) so that it would be broad enough to cover a full range of export activities, while avoiding topics such as NPT review conference strategy and PNE services, which should be kept separate.

The Soviets appear completely willing to go beyond the "trigger list" items which we and they had already agreed to through the IAEA in Vienna, broadening the discussion to include the topics addressed in the initial US note, such as enrichment and reprocessing technology (as distinct from hardware exports) and special restrictions on the supply of sensitive nuclear material or equipment to specified areas such as the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Soviets were strongly interested in going into areas we were not prepared to cover in the context of the exporters conference. These included general problems of NPT review conference strategy, NPT



adherence and shortcomings in the organization of the IAEA. Stoessel indicated we would be willing to go into these issues in other forums and the Soviets reluctantly left it on this basis.

Avoiding Bilateralism

Our second objective was to avoid strict bilateralism in handling export controls. Gromyko's note indicated the Soviets might be contemplating a bilateral approach, although it recognized the need to establish "appropriate international agreements" in the future. Stoessel took the line that only multilateral action in this field can be effective so that export controls could not be resisted or circumvented by other key suppliers.

The Soviets were at first noncommittal on the multilateral conference idea. In the end, however, Morokhov declared himself personally in favor of an exporters conference, though he said an official Soviet response would come later.

We thus appear to have gained our initial objectives with the Soviets and can now move forward on the conference plan if the French respond affirmatively.

