

Issues Paper



THRESHOLD TEST BAN/PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

There are four major TTB/PNE issues you will face in Vladivostok:

1. Value of the TTB to the U.S. The Soviet leaders will undoubtedly have picked up the domestic U.S. criticism of the TTB. Thus, you will want to reassure them that the new Administration regards the TTB as a valuable step forward. You may also want to use this criticism as leverage by noting that it revolves principally around the PNE "loophole" and that it will be necessary to have a clearly verifiable PNE agreement to obtain Senate approval of the TTB. It should be made clear to the Soviets that moving ahead on TTB ratification is a priority Administration objective, but that we must have a satisfactory PNE agreement to move ahead on the Hill.

2. Focus of the TTB/PNE Negotiations. In the first round of the TTB/PNE negotiations in Moscow, the Soviets have tried to shift the focus from verification -- our main concern -- to broad cooperation on PNEs. They propose a deal in which we would give them a comprehensive PNE agreement -- providing for broad U.S.-Soviet cooperation in PNE projects world-wide -- in return for verification provisions which could include the presence of the other side's "representatives." In the absence of a broad agreement, the Soviets would agree to exchange information on the purpose, yield, place and time of each PNE event. This would be inadequate for our verification purposes.

In addition to pressing the Soviets for more concrete ideas on verification, we have proposed that contained PNEs be limited to 100 KT with exchange of geological data and provision for observers. This was based on a Soviet presentation indicating that their PNE plans did not envisage contained shots above this level. While the Soviets did not specifically reject our proposal, they reiterated their position that they are opposed in principle to any limits on PNEs and returned to the theme of PNE cooperation.

While PNE cooperation should not be categorically rejected, a show of interest in cooperative arrangements is premature at this point and would risk deflecting the



negotiations into areas extraneous to the TTB. Ultimately, we may want to explore more fully Soviet ideas on cooperation. First, we will need to make sure -- as discussed below -- that the Soviet leadership supports these ideas. We will also need to have a clearer idea on the acceptability of PNE cooperation within Washington.

At this time, we believe you should urge the Soviet leaders to instruct their PNE delegation to focus on verification aspects and set aside questions of cooperation. You should also reiterate the proposal for a 100 KT limit on contained PNEs.

3. Morokhov's Role. It is unclear how much of the Soviet position in the TTB/PNE negotiations reflects the personal parochial desires of Morokhov, the Soviet negotiator who is also the head of their PNE program. There have been a number of indications that the position is mostly Morokhov's:

-- he has described a number of proposals as "personal."

-- he quickly backed off, at least part way, when Stoessel objected to his rejection of the concept of "observers."

-- Stoessel has reported in White House channels that Arbatov, a highly influential expert on Soviet-American relations, believes there is resistance to the Soviet PNE program within the Soviet bureaucracy. Arbatov further believes the Soviet leadership would be turned off on PNEs if exposed to a balanced presentation which noted the risks to non-proliferation. Arbatov recommends that this be taken up with the Soviet leadership.

-- we had indications at the previous Summit that the Soviet leadership was not aware of what was going on in the TTB negotiations.

In light of these indications you will want to test how much leadership support Morokhov has, for example, in his pursuit of a broad PNE agreement and his stance that observers will be allowed only under such a broad agreement.

4. Comprehensive Soviet Approach and Timing Aspects. The Soviets, at least at the Morokhov level, have adopted a comprehensive approach to PNEs, the elements of which






reinforce a permissive attitude toward PNEs and avoid setting a precedent for stringent and intrusive verification. These elements include:

-- A US-Soviet cooperative arrangement on PNEs, which would provide the framework for handling world-wide PNE services under Article V of the NPT. Such services will be the subject of an IAEA conference in January and of the NPT Review Conference next May. Under the Soviet concept, a principal advantage of their package is that US and Soviet obligations under Article V are satisfied along with TTB Article III requirements. Morokhov has been critical that our delegation has taken a passive attitude toward Article V, which we agreed would be an agenda item for the talks.

-- Legitimizing the Soviet PNE program through the US-Soviet cooperative arrangement.

-- Using this legitimizing and cooperative arrangement to gain US acceptance to reinterpreting the LTBT to accommodate excavation PNEs. The Soviet position on the LTBT has been ambivalent. On the one hand, Morokhov has assured Stoessel in a private conversation that they have no intention of violating the LTBT in carrying out excavation PNEs. On the other hand, in the formal sessions the Soviet delegation has implied that the LTBT issue is behind them even though our studies show that an excavation program of any scope would inevitably vent over national borders. There is a tentative understanding that technical aspects of excavation PNEs are to be discussed in a US-Soviet meeting, which the Soviets and our AEC are pushing for November-December. (You will want to avoid firmly scheduling this meeting until we see further how the TTB/PNE negotiations progress.)

The nature of this approach creates a number of complicated linkages and interconnections for the Soviets. It virtually necessitates a solution to TTB/Article III verification, NPT/Article V services and LTBT radiation criteria problems in parallel and in a relatively short time frame -- before the NPT Review Conference next May. From the Soviet viewpoint, certain pieces of it, such as a joint approach to LTBT radiation criteria, should preferably be worked out earlier in time for the IAEA PNE Conference in January. There are also timing constraints for us, but they are less stringent. Ratification of a TTB/PNE package should not run too late



into 1975, so it will not bump up against the March 31, 1976, entry-into-force date or the Presidential election year.

You will want to avoid agreeing or catering to the comprehensive and coordinated approach Morokhov has laid out, several elements of which are disadvantageous to us. You could argue with regard to the various linkages that they are unnecessary and overly complicated; the key purpose of the PNE negotiations is to develop in a timely manner a verifiable agreement in accordance with Article III of the TTB.

Attached are a summary of the first round of TTB/PNE negotiations and a copy of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

