

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 18, 1976

PLACE: Secretary's Office  
Department of State

The President: Before you say a word, I read the Safire article [Tab A]. He is a no-good son-of-a-bitch. I don't believe a thing he said, so forget about it.

[Some discussion].

On a serious subject, have you read the George Brown transcript?

Kissinger: Yes, [Except for the election, he should go. It shows appalling judgment.

The President: There is another possibility. You know last night I thought he should go -- but Brown and Rumsfeld could go on the offensive.

Kissinger: It puts you on the defensive for two or three days.

The President: Look at the polls.

[Discussion].

Kissinger: You have the debate too. I would prepare differently this time. You need to come across as being in command and having a sense of direction.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
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NARA DATE 7/20/04  
BY 1/14

The President: The polls show the issues are peace, no draft, taxes and spending.

Kissinger: I would hit a little the differences between Democrats and Republicans on peace versus war.

I have never felt so passionately about an election. He is a vicious, mean little man -- the worst one ever to stand for the President.

[Discussion of Carter, his SALT proposal, etc.]

I am speaking Tuesday to the Synagogue Council in New York on morality in foreign policy. It is a good speech. In fact, Brent thinks you should give it.

Scowcroft: It is an outstanding speech.

The President: I have heard about it. I think you should give it. We are close in New York and this could be a big help.

[Discussion of the speech].

Kissinger: I think it would be helpful if we could spend some time together going over the themes of the debate. He will take on Chile again -- if he doesn't, I would. [Described the details on Allende]. I would take on the Saudi and Iranian arms. At Harvard I made a comment on arms. I said if we can't be the policeman of the world and can't sell arms, how do we defend the free world? Both the professors and the students were very tame. The faculty there doesn't like Carter.

The President: Our polls show we do well with the young people.

Kissinger: That man blights people. He casts a pall.

The President: Are there any foreign policy problems?

Kissinger: On Southern Africa, I am trying to get the Geneva Conference delayed a bit. They are urging it, to tamp down their Commons debate, but I think we should delay it past the election. On Namibia, we will have to veto tomorrow.



The President: They are pushing it?

Kissinger: Yes. I think it important that we show the Africans they can't get any more. Scranton is philosophically opposed, but that is okay.

The President: Psychologically I think it would be good to veto.

Kissinger: I met with the Business Council. I think the Southern businessmen are okay on Africa.

The President: We have no problem at all in the South on that.

Kissinger: I wouldn't hit Schlesinger any more on the defense budget. He will start contradicting you and while you are right, it's not worth it.

On China, we don't know more than is in the papers. But their diplomatic tone has really moderated.

There is no doubt they are taking on the radicals right in Shanghai.

In the long term, I am not sure the moderates are better for us, because the moderates may make a strong China, where the radicals' policies would keep it weak.

We have proposed a meeting with Vietnam on the 28th. We will say it is for normalization, but an absolute precondition is an accounting for MIAs.

The President: How about Egypt and Libya?

Kissinger: It looks like nothing will happen right away.

The President: What came out of the Riyadh meeting?

Kissinger: I think the Saudis may have laid down the law.



# Henry's Private Scorn

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—In private conversations over the past two weeks, Henry Kissinger has been expressing anguish in two ways:

First, after the first two Presidential debates, he has told friends that it is difficult for him to think of either Mr. Ford or Mr. Carter as a real President.

Second, because the President does not have an overall foreign policy philosophy, he says it is sometimes hard to get information into Mr. Ford's head in a briefing. This despairing comment is sometimes accompanied by a gesture placing stiffened fingers on his forehead as if trying to jab in information.

Mr. Kissinger will surely deny this, firing off letters to editors and calls to publishers, and will round up the usual suspects. But the reports of his behind-the-scenes undercutting of Mr. Ford come from too many different reliable sources to be ignored.

His private derogation comes with especially ill grace because Mr. Ford has been loyally and unwaveringly speaking up for his Secretary of State, and because Mr. Ford is paying in votes for two important policy errors of Mr. Kissinger.

The first political wound inflicted on Mr. Ford by Mr. Kissinger was the castigation of Israel as "intransigent" after that nation refused to hand over its security during the first Mideast shuttle early last year.

Recognizing the political damage at the time, and in a move that has never been made public, President Ford sent his friend William Scranton, then a private citizen, to talk to the Israelis about their concerns. Mr. Kissinger got the message and negotiated a deal on the second shuttle that did not endanger the Israelis.

But the Secretary never let the President make any headway with American supporters of Israel; they were especially worried by American arms sales to Arab nations. To compensate, Mr. Ford belatedly recommended that the United States supply sophisticated arms to Israel, which looked like the election time ploy it was.

Thus, many American Jewish voters—who have not forgotten Mr. Carter's pragmatic "we get the Christians" remark to a speechwriter in the primaries, and are uneasy about his sudden discovery of the Mideast—find it hard to move toward Mr. Ford.

The second wound the Secretary of State inflicted on his President is the misbegotten Helsinki agreement. Months before this legitimization of the Eastern European borders, conservatives pleaded with the President to abort the fulfillment of this Soviet

dream, or at least use it to extract enforceable concessions on human rights and troop reductions from Mr. Brezhnev.

Mr. Reagan's challenge to Mr. Ford came to life when he focussed on Helsinki and the moral issue in foreign affairs. At the Republican convention, Ford supporter F. Clifton White called the Reagan trailer to say the Ford forces would swallow the foreign policy plank, including the Solzhenitsyn rebuke, if only criticism of Helsinki would be removed. It was not, and the President had to accept the Helsinki repudiation, too.

The Helsinki mistake was why Mr. Ford had to go to great lengths to assure American ethnics that the United States did not concede an "organic" relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. And just before the second debate, Mr. Ford braced himself for an expected attack on "selling out the captive nations."

Which was why he went into that debate on a hairtrigger about Eastern Europe. The verbal gaffe was the President's but the basic political blunder of Helsinki was the Secretary of State's. Henry does not realize that to this day, stung by the morality issue, he sends in briefing papers to the President with the standard Kissinger line underscored: "What is more moral than peace?"

The answer to that question is "peace with freedom." That is the answer which Mr. Kissinger, with all his brilliance, is determined not to grasp; it is the answer that Mr. Ford, with his common sense and strength of character, can grasp.

Where does this leave those of us who profoundly distrust Mr. Carter, as he adopts our positions now that they have become the majority opinion? We are faced with a choice between a man we do not trust who promises a change to the foreign policy we have been espousing, and a man we do trust who promises to cling to the man and the policy we oppose.

In this dilemma, we see Mr. Ford winning on the issue of trust but not even competing on the issue of hope. The President seems to think that if he gives us any inkling of hope for new State Department stewardship, he would be ratifying charges of error and betraying personal loyalty.

Not so. Backing away from "the perception of Helsinki" would be easy. And the Secretary of State could be induced to expunge his thoughtless derogation by honorably sacrificing his ambition with a pledge to resign on a date certain.

That would solve a very big problem for millions of us, and infuse the Ford campaign with new hope.

OCTOBER 18, 1974

P/K 18 OCT 76 ✓

P Before you say a word, I read Sapire. He is a no-good SOB. I don't believe a thing he said so forget about it.

(Same discussion)

P On a serious subject, have you read a Brown transcript.

K Yes, except for a election ~~it~~ he should go. It shows appalling judgment.

P There is another possibility - you know that might & that he should go - but Brown + Rungfeld could go on a offensive.

K Wants you on a depression for 2-3 days

P What are you doing

(Discussion)

K You have a debate too. I would prepare dig. this time. You need to come across as being in control having a sense of direction.

P The polls show peace, no draft, taxes, spending.

K I would hit a little dig but Brown & Rungfeld are peace is war.

I have never felt so passionately about an election. He is a vicious man - little man - a worst to stand for a P.

(Discussion of Carter, Salt proposal, etc)

I am speaking to you on morality in FP

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E.O. 12066, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY ll, NARA, DATE 7/30/04



Secretary - Show P. K. much.

Polks taken in E on opportunity of US in E - engage w/lt.  
→ Tens - meet w/ K (Chapelle) of  
Ferguson on Sambi and - Jamin and  
- K. P. King at Harvard  
It a good speech - in fact Burt thinks you  
should give it

S It is an outstanding speech.

P I have heard about it. I think you should  
give it. We are close in NY & this could be  
a big help.

(Discussion of speech)

K I think it would be helpful if we could spend  
some time together going over a number of debate.  
He will take on Chik again - if he doesn't, I  
would. (Described a detail in detail). I would  
take on a Sambi & Jamin case. At Harvard  
I am not an owner - if we can't see a politician  
of a world & can't sell cases, how do we spread  
a free world. Both a pop. & a student are  
very terse - they <sup>parents</sup> don't like Carter.

P Our polls show we do well w/c young people

K That means bright people. He casts a pull.

P Any F/I polls?

K On SA Africa, I trying to get conf. delayed a  
bit. They saying it to bring down their tensions  
debate, but I think we should delay post election.  
On Somalia, we will have to veto tomorrow.

P They are pushing it?

K Yes. I think it important that we show Africans  
they can't get any more. Secant is philosophically  
opposed, but that's K.

P P.S. I think it would be good to veto.

K I want w/ Business Council. I think a ~~block~~

another businessman on the office

P We have no job at all in a situation that.

K I wouldn't bet Schles any more on the budget. He will start contradicting you & while you are right, it won't work it.

On China, we don't know more than is in the papers. But their diplomatic tone has really moderated.

There no doubt they are taking on a radical right in Shanghai.

In the long term, I don't see a ~~conservative~~ <sup>moderate</sup> are better for us, because a moderate may make a strong choice, while a radical <sup>point</sup> would keep it weak.

We have proposed a party w/ UN on 28<sup>th</sup>. We will fight for unanimity but on absolute jurisdiction is accounting for MIA.

P How about E-libya?

K It looks like nothing will happen right now.

P Riyadh party?

K I think a Saudi may have laid down a law.

