

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U. S.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, October 11, 1976
10:30 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted. There was small talk, including vague references to the arms decision. The press left.]

The President: Were you one of Henry's pupils?

Allon: Yes I was -- but don't blame him.

Kissinger: He and Ecevit were in the same class. It was 1956.

The President: It is good to see you again. I would like to visit the area after the present problems are over, the sooner the better.

I would like your appraisal of Lebanon and what you think is going to happen.

Allon: From the beginning, we coordinated closely with Henry.

Many of our early predictions have come true. It appears that neither side has the means to prevail. Until February the Syrians

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, Stat. Dir. 1003/13/04
BY MLM, NARA, DATE 7/12/04

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

backed the radicals, but when they wouldn't support the February compromise, the Syrians began to back the Christians who had been on the ropes. We realized this was only a tactical move on their part, so we provided Soviet arms and some of our old arms to the Christians. They fought very well.

Kissinger: You recall we were afraid if Syria beat the Palestinians and radicals they would turn on the Christians.

Allon: Once the situation changes, we are afraid the Syrians will once again back the radicals against the Christians -- after all the Ba'athists are Arab radicals. The PLO itself is in a great mess. There has been a massacre of PLO. Only the Arabs are killing the PLO. Syria wants to replace the PLO leadership to get people they can control.

Kissinger: That is not against our interest.

Allon: I am just stating the facts. They want to replace Arafat and all the others. We understand the Soviet Union may be going along with the Syrians.

Kissinger: We have a report that the Soviet Union has cut off Syrians spare parts. They are very clumsy. Syria won't forget -- you can't humiliate Arabs.

Allon: If the PLO is destroyed, the Soviets will have lost a great vehicle to intervene in the Middle East. It is hard to understand why they are doing it. Even their moves toward us are clumsy, because they are playing a more and more minor role.

In South Lebanon we have opened some border points to cooperate with the Lebanese Christians. It has made a good impact on the Arabs. We have unofficial contacts with the Shia minority also. It is very quiet in Southern Lebanon, and the PLO's attempts to return to there and to close the border points are being resisted by the local people themselves.

The President: How about the airfields?

Allon: We saw one night landing there. We are trying to get more information. The other one is farther north. We can hit with artillery the South one, but we don't want to cross the border at all.



Kissinger: They aren't using the fields very much.

Allon: Iraq is very active with the help of Egypt. I don't understand them because if the PLO is a threat to anyone, it's a threat to Egypt.

Kissinger: Egypt wants to break its isolation and the hatred between Sadat and Asad is extreme now.

Allon: There are now over 5,000 Iraqis in Lebanon, who got there through Egypt. We are watching the situation now. There is an attempt for an Arab summit but they can't agree on Sarkis or Hussein.

Our estimate, is that because of the deep disappointment of Syria and West Bankers in the PLO -- even the radical West Bankers are queuing up to visit Amman -- it is not excluded that Syria will back some Jordan/Palestinian negotiation to go around the Rabat decision.

Dinitz: They won't repudiate Rabat, but just get some negotiation going with Jordan.

Allon: In this crazy Middle East, this could happen.

I hear from Henry the Soviets are propagating the idea of a Geneva Conference, first without the PLO and then will the PLO in one of several negotiating groups. So I told Gromyko thank you, but not the PLO in any forum or arrangement. I am not going to respond officially to the Soviet Union but I called attention to a passage of my UN speech.

Kissinger: Interestingly enough, no Arab has responded. Let's see what they do.

Allon: The next couple of years will be decisive in the Middle East, so there is one crucial point I want to raise -- defensible frontiers. We would like to be able to defend ourselves by ourselves, so we need some changes in the Green Line. I will discuss this with Henry, but I wanted you to know that even moderate people in Israel will insist on the ability to defend. We know with whom we are dealing. I wrote an article in Foreign Affairs. I was trying to say that the terrain is important even in the modern age.

The President: You talk to Henry about it. I am interested in hearing what you propose.

Allon: We have differences among ourselves, but the debate is about giving less, not more.

The President: Is there anything else we should discuss?

Allon: With your permission. We are very grateful for the equipment you have agreed to give us. I hope the bureaucracy will be urged to proceed expeditiously.

I know your budget is being formulated. I would hope that you could tell your people not to reduce the budget below \$1.5 billion plus \$750 million in economic aid. If I could tell my Prime Minister you are considering favorably the idea of granting this much aid, it will be as good news as the arms decision itself.

The President: We are not really in that cycle yet -- I haven't seen either our defense budget or the aid budget. You know my record, and all I can say now is we will do the best we can. I don't want to mislead you, but I will do my best.

Allon: One other thing we have pressed for years, with the former President as well. It is a small point for you to have to deal with but it is big for us. That is additional landing rights. It would be especially helpful to get them in Miami because we have fortunately -- and amazingly -- gotten them in Mexico City. That is being inaugurated in November, and it is an interesting change in our relationship.

The President: How would you do it otherwise?

Allon: Through Montreal. It would be a logistical difficulty.

Kissinger: You would reciprocate with Beersheba.

Allon: Or Sharm el-Sheikh. That, incidentally, was very helpful for Entebbe.

The President: Congratulations on that operation. It was great. Was the television story fairly accurate?

Dinitz: It was.

Allon: If you could consider favorably the landing rights.....

The President: It hasn't come to me but I will talk to Henry about it.

Have you met the new Mexican President?

Allon: No. He was out campaigning when I was there.

The President: I was very impressed with him. I think he can do a lot to straighten out Mexico, especially economically.

Allon: We are doing fairly well in Latin America.

There is an improvement also in Africa. After Angola they got scared, and they are very disappointed in the Arab oil producers.

The President: They should. Henry has done a superb job in pulling these people together.

[General discussion of the difficulty of negotiating with Africans and the gulf between their public and private utterances.]

Kissinger: But even though they contradict themselves and don't keep their promises, they are moving toward you [Israel] and toward a settlement on Rhodesia. For example, they have gotten rid of Muzorewa but the British say he has to be there. At some point we have to say no further.

Allon: What about South Africa? That is a monumental problem.

Kissinger: It is indeed. But success in Rhodesia and Namibia will at least buy us some time to work on it.

P/Allen

11 Oct 76



Press in

(Eswell TNA incl. major references to a arms decision)

Press out

P Were you one of K's people

A Yes I was - but lost time here

K He + Eswell were in same class

P It is good to see you again. I would like to visit a area after a present job is over, a soccer club, I would like your appraisal of Lebanon & what you think going to happen

A From a log - we covered closely w/ K. Many of our early people have come over. It appears that within side has a means to proceed. (Hotel Feb + Syrians backed radicals, but when they wouldn't support. For emergency a Syrian began to back Christians, who had better on a uplo. We noticed this was only a tactical move on their part, so we provided some old arms to Christians. They forgot very well.

K You would not be afraid if Syria back Paks + radicals they could turn on Christians.

A Once a bit changes, we fear a Syria will once again be the radicals against Christians - after all the Baathists are Arab radicals. The PLO itself is in a great mess. There has been a massacre of PLO. Only a Arabs are killing PLO. Syria wants to replace PLO leadership to get people they can control.

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A I am just stating facts. They want to replace

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BY lh, NARA, DATE 7/13/04

State Review 3/13/04



f Syria + West Bankers in PLO. Even
individual W. Bankers are pushing up to
visit Amman. It would be ideal that Syria
will make some Jordan / PLO negot to
go around Rabat.

D They want negotiate Rabat, but just get
some negotiating w/ Jordan

A In this crazy M.E., this could happen.
I hear from K = Sars are propagating ideas
of Geneva, 1st w/o PLO & then PLO in one of
several negot groups. So I told Romyke Thank
you but not PLO in any form or arrange-
ment. I was going to expand ~~on~~ especially
to SC, but I called attention to a passage of
my V.M. speech.

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Let's see what they do.

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so there is crucial point about a raise - defensible
frontiers. We would like to be able to defend
ourselves by ourselves, so we will see
changes in a year or two. I will discuss
w/K, that wanted you to know some
people will insist on ability to defend
ourselves w/ whom we are dealing. I wrote
an article FA. I was trying to say that
~~the~~ ^{territory} is important even in a modern
age.

P You talk to Henry about. I'm interested in
having what you propose.

A We have diff. among ourselves but about
going less not more.



P Anything else

A W/your permission, we very grateful for
saying you have agreed to join us.
I hope a business will be agreed to
proceed expeditiously.

I know your budget is very low. I
would hope that you could tell your
people not to reduce a budget value

1.5 mil + 250 each aid. If I could

tell my PM you considering favorably a
idea of granting this much aid, it would
be a good idea as a news decision itself.

P We not really in that cycle yet - I haven't
seen either our dy budget or a civil budget.

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do my best.

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former pres as well. It a small point for you
to have to deal w/ but it big for us. That is
a little banking rights. It would be exp.
helpful to get them in Union because
we have funds - a money - getting
them in Mexico City. That being
change in law, or it is an interesting
change in relationship.

P How would you do it otherwise?



- A Then wanted. It would be logic, def.
- K You could say, w/ Belushka
- A Or Shari & Shuib. That, incidentally,
was very helpful for E. intelligence.
- P Comments on that open. It was great. Was a
TV story fairly accurate
- D It was
- A If you could consider formally - banking
rights...
- P It hasn't come to me but I will talk
to K about it.
- Have you met a new African Pres.
- A ~~Was~~ No. He was out campaigning when I was
there
- P He was very impressed w/ him. I think he
can do a lot to straighten out Africa, esp
econ.
- A We doing fairly well in Africa.
There is an improvement over in Africa. After
Angola they got scared, & they drop in
a great oil producers.
- P They should. K has done a superb job in
putting these people together -
^{best} (Discussion of def. of sovereignty w/ Africans
& public vs private enterprises).
- K But even tho they contract themselves
& don't help their friends, they are moving
toward you (I) and toward a settlement of

Rhodesia. For example, they have gotten ^{rid} ~~down~~
of Muzorewa, but I don't say he has to be
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