

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, September 2, 1976
 5:40 - 6:46 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: Nyerere has called all the chiefs and guerrilla leaders for a meeting 5-6 September -- including Neto. I have come to the conclusion I should come back here first. Nyerere thinks we are doing it for political purposes anyway. I had our Ambassador disabuse him of that.

The President: That's right.

Kissinger: Nyerere has asked that we do nothing in Rhodesia until this meeting is over. On Namibia, we are almost all set. But when all their group get together, heaven only knows what will happen. I think it is too risky for me to go on my original schedule. I would send Schaufele, and then if everything looks okay, I will only have lost four days. If Nyerere urges me to come on schedule, we at least will have that psychological advantage.

Some people will say we have failed, but it is better than taking a chance on the outcome of the meeting.

[The President and Secretary Kissinger go out for a press photo and then return.]

[There is some talk about Carter, Portillo, Echeverria and devaluation.]

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/19/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/13/04
 BY 14, NARA, DATE 7/29/04

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CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1,3)
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Kissinger: What do you think about my schedule that way? It's safer, and it would teach them we are not over-anxious.

The President: No, I think you are right. Why is Nyerere doing this?

Kissinger: That's positive. He thinks our strategy might work, but he doesn't know whether he can control the Africans.

The President: So he has to see whether or not he can deliver.

Kissinger: Exactly. And that is why he said we shouldn't do anything while his meeting is going on. I should warn you that if he can't control it, they may issue a blast that the imperialists are trying to control the blacks but they will continue the fight.

The President: Can we use the UN thing to get Neto in line?

Kissinger: I don't think we can really do it that precisely. Let's just wait and see how it works for now.

Since I may be back, B'nai B'rith will want me to speak.

You should say: "We had some difficulty on the Sinai but it worked out." If you promise them a little less than they want to hear, you will be better off. Defend the step-by-step. Compare where we were in 1973 and where we are today. Compare where Israel was in 1973 and where they are today.

On Law of the Sea. What I tried to do is change the perception that we were at fault and dragging our feet. That is why I announced the changes in our position. I think it worked. The President of the Conference is going to issue a single text at the end. We have agreement on the economic zone and scientific research, but not on deep seabeds. But Amerasinghe will put our scheme in the single text.

But for the next session, we should deal at our level, because a lot of these delegates are uninstructed. We can line up the heads of state. We can claim credit for the single text and for success on the economic zone and scientific research.

You might want to send the President a letter of congratulations at the progress at the end of the conference.



[Chitchat about Carter, Schlesinger.]

Kissinger: Did you notice the Christian Science Monitor article on SALT?

The President: Yes, I don't know where the God damn thing came from.

Kissinger: I don't know what you want to do on SALT. I am not pushing it but if you want to do something, we should have it ready by the time Gromyko gets here.

The President: I need to read back into SALT. When does Gromyko come?

Kissinger: About the 23rd. Mind you, I am not pushing it. I think it is probably better to wait.

Scowcroft: Even if we gave a proposal to Gromyko, there is almost no chance to complete negotiations before November.

Kissinger: That is right. And to get a proposal, you would have to beat up on the bureaucracy and that would surely leak. It isn't worth it, but after November you must change the system. No President has had to put up with what you have had to endure.


The President: What about that Ikle speech?

Kissinger: That's a good example.

[Describes Ikle, where he came from, what was done to ACDA after 1972, etc.]

Scowcroft: For now perhaps we should forbid Fred to make public statements without specific authority from you through me.

The President: That's a good idea. He was really irresponsible.



Send P & K to ...
Strong - Hope ... on ...

Echarrumina -

P/K 2 Sept 76

5:40 - 6:46 pm

Burns Birth 2

K Nyerere has called all the chiefs & guerrilla leaders for a mtg 5-6 Sept - incl Neto. I have come to the conclusion I should come home 1st. Nyerere thinks we are doing it for pol. purposes anyway I had an ink. discharge him of that.

P That's right

K Nyerere has asked we do nothing on Rhodesia until this mtg is over. Our intention is we are almost all set. But when all these guys get together, however only know what will happen. I think it is too risky for me to go on my orig. schedule. I would prefer Schunfle & then if everything looks ok I will only have lost 4 days. If Nyerere urges me to come on sched, we at least will have that psy advantage.

Some people will say we have failed, but it is better than taking a chance on the outcome of a mtg.

(~~T~~ P & K go out for press photo)

(Some talk about Carter, Portugal, Echarrumina & devaluation)

K What do you think about my schedule that way? It is safer and would teach them we are not overreacting

P No, I think you are right. Why is Nyerere doing this?

K That is positive. He thinks our strategy might work, but he doesn't know whether he can control - Capricious

P So he has to see whether or not he can deliver

K Exactly. And that is why he said don't do

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state & v. cas 3/13/04

BY W NARA DATE 7/29/04

what hinders & what I'll do

anything which his duty is going on.

I should warn you that if he can't control it, they may issue a blast that imperialists are trying to control a blockade but they will continue a fight.

P ~~He~~ Can we use a VN thing to get Xeto in line.

K I don't think we can really do it that precisely. Let's just wait & see how it works for now. Since I may be back, Brian Birch will wait me to speak.

"We had some diff. on Sierra but it worked out."

If you promise them a little less than they want to hear, you will be better off.

Defend step by step

"Compare where we were in 73 & today
" " I was in 73 & today

K LOS. What I would like is a change a program that we were at fault & dragging our feet. That why I announced a change in our position. I think it worked. The Pres. is going to issue a single text at a end. We have agreement on a non zone & scientific research, but not on deep seabeds. But Announcing will put our scheme in a single text. But for next session, we should deal at once

well, because a lot of these delegates are ~~interested~~
we can hire up a head of state. ~~WVVVV~~
We can claim credit for single text and for
success on loan year - submit research.
You might want to send a Pres a letter
of requests at a prog at end of a conf.
(~~Good~~ chitchat about Carter, Schlesinger)

P ~~What is this about~~

R ~~What~~ Did you notice a CSNI article
on Salt?

P Yes, I don't know where a GO thing
came from.

R I don't know what you want to do on
Salt. I am not pushing it but if
you want to do something, we should
have it ready by the time Aronko gets
here

P ~~What~~ I need to read back in & ~~that~~ Salt
when does Aronko come?

R About a 23rd. Would you, I am not
pushing it. I think it is prob better
to wait

S Even if we gave a proposal to Aronko, there
is almost no chance to complete negot
before Nov.

R That is right. and to get a proposal, you
would have to beat up on a humanity
& that would really look. It is not worth
it. But after Nov you must
change a system. So Pres has had
to put up w/ what you have
had to endure.

P What about that Isha speech?

K That is a good example

(Dean's Isha, where he came from,
what was said to H-DA after 2, etc.

S For now perhaps we should forbid FINX
to make public statements w/o specific
authority from you three men.

P That is a good idea. He was really
irresponsible.