

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, August 3, 1976
9:36 - 10:55 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: The speech played well [the Secretary's Boston speech to the Urban League the evening before].

Kissinger: The mistake I made was to take questions.

The President: I sent the speech to Hartmann, noting it was excellent.

Have we heard from the British [on Southern Africa]?

Kissinger: Yes, but it wasn't satisfactory. They want to know how much money it'll cost and don't want to call it a government. I am having breakfast Thursday with them. They are blackmailing us a bit on Namibia, but we don't need them for that. We have to be careful they don't go off on their own. We will propose a joint delegation to the blacks or else missions in close succession.

The President: Are the South Africans still on board?

Kissinger: I think so.

Scowcroft: I spoke to Botha yesterday and they are still ready to charge.

Kissinger: [to Scowcroft] Did you tell him about my speech?

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/26/89, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Div. 205 3/13/04
BY: [signature] NARA, DATE 1/28/04



Scowcroft: Yes. He had already anticipated it.

Kissinger: Have you seen the latest Gallup poll on this?

The President: No.

Kissinger: I'll send it over.

As you know, I am going to Iran tomorrow. It couldn't be a worse time. Treasury and Defense are going after the Shah. Simon is going around saying the Shah is dangerous and shouldn't have exotic weapons. And Ellsworth and Defense are viciously anti-Iran.

[Described the July 1972 Nixon memo and what really happened.]

The President: I saw in the New York Times that Schlesinger had a man over there.

Kissinger: He was playing his usual game of setting up his own channels of communication.

But it had nothing to do with the policy -- just a screw-up in the Administration.

The President: The Shah is a good friend. He didn't go along with the embargo. We aren't going to be stamped by the newspapers.

Kissinger: You can't do anything before November, but between Treasury and DOD they are on a vicious campaign.

The President: I will talk to Don because I think Iran is very important to us.

Kissinger: We are playing with fire. We have thrown away Turkey and now Iran.

There are stories now about China and Taiwan -- Ron should say it's not a large change. They are making public statements that we have heard in private. We are prepared to continue on the path of normalization. We have stated our view. Obviously there are differences remaining. And say no more.

The President: Scott's trip report said we should recognize the PRC if they promise not to use force.

Kissinger: If we could have gotten that, we would be home free. If we could just keep these do-gooders out of it, we could coast along.

Anyway, it will be rough in Iran. But if we get rid of the Shah, we will have a radical regime on our hands.

Anything you say to Kekkonen will go straight to Brezhnev. So you might say how dedicated you are to detente, you want to move on SALT and other things and after the elections you will make a major effort.

The President: Let me tell you what I decided on SALT. I asked Brent for a spread sheet showing the difference between the two options. Then I will get Don over here and ask him to explain the military differences between them.

Kissinger: I spoke to Javits this morning. He can live with any Vice President, though he would prefer a liberal. But he said you should get a foreign policy success -- like SALT. That is what John Anderson said also.

The President: That is what I think.

Kissinger: I think you can wait until after the Convention, then Gromyko can come here in September and argue with you, then we could wrap it up in October.

The President: Let me have that comparison chart and then I will talk to Don. Then we'll see where we go.

Kissinger: On Sidewinders for the Saudis: I would like to cut them to 1,000 until after the elections.

The President: Okay.

Kissinger: CBU's for Israel, We have in essence promised it. The liberals will yell but I guess we have to go ahead.

Scowcroft: The problem is they won't give us guarantees on their use.

Kissinger: On participation of the executive in CSCE Commission. I sent Monroe Leigh up there to be tough. But to our surprise, the Congressional members gave us a lot of sympathy. I think they don't want their hands tied. The real problem is Millicent Fenwick. She is a dear lady, but she is a little obtuse. I am not sure how we are going to bring her along.

P/K

3 Aug 76 ✓

P The speech played well

K The mistake I made was to take questions.

P I sent a speech to Hartmann saying it was excellent.

Have we heard from the Brits?

K Yes, but it wasn't quite. They want to know how much money & don't want to call it a gift. We don't care ~~how~~ what they call it. I bring breakfast Thurs/other. They blackmailing us a bit on America, but we don't need them (at least).

We have to be careful they don't go off on their own. We will prepare joint declaration to the blacks & missions in due discussion.

P AUC S. Openings still on board

K I think so

S I spoke to Gotta yesterday & they are still ready to change

K Did you tell him about my speech

S Yes. He had already anticipated it.

K Have you seen a latest Gallup poll on this.

P No.

* K I'll submit one.

As you know, I going to Iran tomorrow. It couldn't be a worse time. Texas & Def are going after a Shah. Siman is going around saying a Shah is dangerous & shouldn't have atomic weapons. And Ellsworth & Def are viciously anti-Jean. (Described a Nixon memo & what really happened)

P I saw in a NYT that Sebko had a man over there

K He was playing his usual game of setting up his own channels of communication.

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NSC MEMO, 1172408, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State reviewed 3/13/04

BY NARA DATE 7/24/04

^{a nice large group}
PRC Yes, they are making public statements are born to and in ~~service~~
comparison to continue an investigation. We stated our
views, the Security there are def- remaining
safe to move.

But it had nothing to do w/ a policy - just a screw
up in administration.

P The Shah is a good friend. He didn't go along w/
a embargo, we aren't going to be stampeded
by a newspaper.

R You can't do anything before Iran but let
Iran + DoD they act ~~it~~ on a serious campaign

P I will talk to Don because I think Iran is very
risky to us.

R We are playing safe. We have thrown away
Turkey & some Iran

There are stories now about China & Taiwan.
Ron should say (see top of page).

P Scott's trip report said we should deny PRC if
they promise not to use force.

R If we could have gotten that, we would be there
fast. If we could just keep these do-gooders out of
it we could coast along.

Anyway, it will be tough in Iran. But if
we get rid of Shah we will have a real
regime on our hands.

Anything you say to Khomeini will go straight
to Buz. I you might say how dedicated you
are & distrust, you want to move on Salt & other
things & after elections you will make a major
effort.

P Let me tell you what I decided on Salt. I ~~asked~~
Bunt for spread sheet (discussed). Then I will
get Don over here & ask him to explain & will
let him.

R I spoke to Janice this morning. He can live
w/ any VP, tho he would prefer a liberal. But he

said you should get a F.P. success - like Salt.

That is what John Anderson said also

* ~~John~~ That is what I think

K I think you can wait til after a convention, then George can come here in Sept + argue w/you, then we could argue it up in Oct

P Let me have that comparison chart + then I will talk to Don. Then will see where we go.

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P OK

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~~cut~~ K On participation of - spec in CSE cross. I sent Harold High up there to be tough. But to our surprise, the Com. members gave us a lot of sympathy. I think they don't want their hands tied. The real prob is Wilhelmina Fenwick. She is a dear lady, but she is a little obtuse. I not sure how we going to bring her along.