

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

May 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
His Excellency Charles Helou, former President
of Lebanon
The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs
Mr. Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Ms. Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter from
Department of State

DATE AND PLACE:

Tuesday, May 4, 1976, at 11:00 a.m. in
Brent Scowcroft's office, White House

Helou first thanked General Scowcroft and Mr. Sisco for taking time to see him. He then expressed his pessimism that there would be the election of a new President or a stabilization of the security situation under existing circumstances. In his opinion, interference from non-Lebanese radical elements (particularly the USSR, Iraq and Libya and the Palestinians) and Jumblatt's aspirations for power are so great that there is no possibility of the Lebanese leaders agreeing among themselves on either a lasting ceasefire or a new President. Moreover, this outside interference is so strong and the other Arab governments so divided and fearful in face of the radical/Palestinian threat that Syria cannot act decisively enough to bring about a solution nor will the efforts of "special envoys" (apparently a reference to special missions sent by the US, France and the Vatican) achieve anything lasting. Helou appealed for the United States to use its "intellectual and political power" to bring about a solution that would save Lebanon and stop the massacre and subversion.

Scowcroft replied that unfortunately the situation in the United States is no longer what it was in 1958 and there is simply no sentiment for the United States to take that kind of action. We are doing what we can through the efforts of Dean Brown to facilitate a ceasefire and a political settlement. There is not much more we can do.

Helou said that he understood the evolution of the US position and does not wish to create difficulties by asking more than we could expect to do. However, he would like to put forward, "as an uninformed layman," some ideas for consideration:

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Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Declassified on
December 31, 1982.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/18/82, STATE DEPT. CONSIDERATIONS, State Dept. 203 B/12/04
BY: JKH
MARA, DATE 7/26/04

--There can be no solution without Syrian troops but at present there are too many obstacles to their being used decisively. By providing international cover for the Syrians through adding international contingents or observers from other nations (preferably through the United Nations), the Israelis would be reassured as to the limited Syrian objectives, the Palestinians would also be reassured that the Syrians were not a threat, and the Christians of Lebanon would also be reassured that the Syrians would not stay. The weight of international opinion would also discourage those who are presently intervening to create trouble. In this way the warring factions could be separated and a solution could be found.

--A second possibility would be to establish some sort of sea and ground surveillance which would stop the supply of arms to all sides, or at least, discourage this supply. This would reduce the level of fighting and could help bring about a solution.

--Perhaps the great powers could make a joint statement demanding a ceasefire. By affirming the international will, the parties in Lebanon would be encouraged to stop fighting.

--Can the United States announce that, if necessary, it will evacuate not only American citizens but also those Lebanese who wish to leave in order to avoid a massacre of the Christians? As a humanitarian gesture, this would encourage the Christians and put their enemies on notice that the US is concerned.

Mr. Sisco replied that the situation in Lebanon is tragic, difficult and complicated. A number of the ideas raised by President Helou relate to the key question of how to maintain security. Even if a new President were to be elected this would still be a crucial problem to resolve. The US has not made any definitive judgment as to how this can be done and we will take into account the ideas proposed by President Helou. We are openminded as to how best to proceed but the next step must be the election of a new President. Our policy is based on supporting Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity and our short-term support for Syria's political actions has been in this context. With a new President we can do more than we can at present. We are not supporting any individual but we do believe that the election should be held soon.




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Helou replied that in his judgment Jumblatt would do anything to block the election of a new President and that if Raymond Edde appeared likely to win Jumblatt would shift his support to someone else in order to prevent the election. Jumblatt wants to be the head of a socialist revolutionary council ruling Lebanon. He does not want a Christian President. He reiterated his hope that General Scowcroft and Mr. Sisco would do all they could to help Lebanon.

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RH
[Signature]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT ✓

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis WHH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of
your Meeting with His Excellency
Charles Helou

Bob Oakley has prepared the attached Memorandum of Conversation of your meeting with His Excellency Charles Helou and would like to send a copy of it to Joe Sisco.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you approve the attached Memorandum of Conversation.

Approve ✓ As amended _____

2. That a copy be sent to Joe Sisco.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

WH 7/26/04



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INITIAL ACTION O

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT + _____ SECOEF _____ LOU _____ NO FORN NODIS

MYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ (C) EYES ONLY EXOIS

DAVIS _____ STATE EXES _____ S _____ CODEWORD

OTHER Davis _____ TS _____ SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Scoft Mtg w/ Charles Helou May 4, 1976 re Lebanon

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGM					
STAFF SECRETARY					
CONGRESSIONAL					
ECONOMIC					
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS					
FAR EAST/PRC					
INTELLIGENCE					
LATIN AMERICA					
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA					
NSC PLANNING					
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					
SCIENTIFIC					
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN					

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT _____

MEMO FOR PRES _____

REPLY FOR _____

APPROPRIATE ACTION _____

MEMO _____ TO _____

RECOMMENDATIONS _____

JOINT MEMO _____

REFER TO _____ FOR _____

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____

CONCURRENCE _____

DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
3/5		Scoft	X	Decision	5/11	
5-7		NSC/S	C	Scowcroft approved memo		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: cc: Sisco, J

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED _____

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/F/D _____

MAY 10 1976

IF _____

NS DY _____

WH SA FP _____

CLOSE _____ (PA)