

MEMORANDUM

Scowcroft file
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. R. F. Botha, Ambassador of Republic of South Africa
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - April 15, 1976
10:39 - 11:07 a.m.

PLACE: General Scowcroft's Office
The White House

Kissinger: [Described why he couldn't meet at the State Department.] I just wanted to explain where I stand. The issue is not oppression of the majority by the minority -- really. But we must deal with the realities. If we don't get the Cubans out of Africa, we will have a real race war and the Soviets will get in. So I've got to get into a position where I can get the Cubans out but protect myself domestically.

I differentiate between South Africa and Rhodesia, with Namibia in between.


I want to get Black Africa into the position of the Arabs before 1973 -- knowing that they can't get anywhere with the Soviets and have to come to us. But to do this I must be very tough on Rhodesia. I need a platform from which to resist the Soviets and Cubans.

I get the impression your government would understand that.

Botha: We are in a difficult position but I can tell you privately the Prime Minister feels let down by Smith.

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BY lab, NARA, DATE 1/1/04

Kissinger: To me South Africa is very different so long at least as I am here. Namibia, I just don't know. It is a wholly artificial entity.

Botha: We are making progress but we need time.

Kissinger: How much time?

Botha: It is hard to press it but I would guess three years for a constitution. We have no interest in keeping that territory.

Kissinger: It wouldn't bother me if you did. I have no sentimental illusion about African countries. My intention will be to focus my attacks on Rhodesia. I am not proud of it but I need a platform to work with Zambia and Zaire.

Botha: We understand. We are building platforms ourselves. We are responsible for the meetings with Smith. [Describes the bridge meeting.]

Kissinger: I am not trying to lecture you at all. But since our disgrace in Angola -- and I appreciate your role -- we have to move now more rapidly.

Botha: If I could make one point. You do what you need to with respect to Rhodesia, but can you make a sharp distinction between South Africa and Rhodesia?

Kissinger: I may have to come out for majority rule in Southern Africa.

Botha: But that lumps us with Rhodesia and Namibia.

Kissinger: You will note the distinction in my speeches. I am being pressured to see SWAPO.

Botha: You could be saddling the wrong horse. They are just one bunch and they knock each other off all the time. I think you run the danger of having all the rest against you if you approach any one group.

We have a substantial program of economic assistance in Africa. It is what really counts there. If you would do something to help in economic development, I think that will do more than anything else.

Kissinger: That we will be doing.

I would like you to keep in touch with Brent and we will meet when I return. But please hold this to your Prime Minister alone.

Botha: Of course. One thing: A Cuban invasion of Rhodesia would cause insurmountable problems for us.

Kissinger: If that should happen, I assure you we will act. But to be able to do that, we must position ourselves with respect to majority rule and dissuade Smith as well that he can't solve his problems by encouraging a Cuban invasion.

Botha: That is very reassuring to us. We agree that Smith is beyond recovery.

✓ ~~R~~ K/B other
15 Apr.

Restrict this
to this side of
street - hold
close

- (Described only for incident meeting state)
- K I just wanted to explain what I stand. The issue is not oppression of majority by minority - really. But we must deal w/c realities. I want to get a platform out of Africa we will have a real sense now + c. Since will get in. So I'd get to get with a position where I can get Cubans out but protect myself domestically.
- I diff. bet SA + Rhodesia, w/ Namibia in between.
- I want to get B back Africa in to position of Arabs - that they could get anywhere w/c sense. But to do ~~this~~ this I want to be even though on Rhodesia. I need a platform from which to resist c. I get a impression from your past comments that
- B we are in a position but I can tell you primarily P.M. has let down by Smith.
- K To me SA is very diff, as long as least as I am here. Namibia, I just don't know. It is a wholly artificial entity
- B we are making prog. but we need time.
- K How much time
- B Hard to press it but I would press 3 yrs for a constitution. We have no interest in keeping that territory
- K It would be better if you did. I have no sentimental illusion about African ~~sub~~ countries. Any coalition would be to press my attacks on Rhodesia, I just found it but I need a platform to work w/ Zambia + Zaire.
- B We understand. We are building platforms ourselves. We are also for a w/ Smith. (Describes a bridge unit)



K I am not trying to lecture you at all. But since our objective in Angola - & I agree your job - we have to work over more cohesively.

B If I could make one point. You do what you need to w/ respect to Rhodria, but can you make a sharp distinction bet SA & Rhodria

K I may have to come out for meetings with in Southern Africa

B But that bumps us w/ Rhodria & Namibia

K I am sure you will note a distinction in my efforts. I being prepared to see SWAPO

B You could be watching a very loose. They are just one bunch & they knock each other off all the time. I ~~must~~ think you run a danger of having all the rest against you if you approach any 1 group.

We have a sub. prog of econ. dev. in Guinea. It is what really counts there. If you could do something to help in econ. dev. I think that will be more than anything else.

K That we will be doing.

I would like you to keep in touch w/ Brent & we will meet when I return. But please hold this to your PM.

B Of course. One thing. Cuban invasion of Rhodria would cause insurmountable problems.

K If that should happen, I assume you will act. But to be able to do that, we must position ourselves w/ respect to majority rule & designate Smith as well that he can't solve his probs by encouraging Cuban invasion.



B That is very reassuring to us. We agree that Smith is beyond recovery.

