

1a, 1b, 1c

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018352

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
 TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation  
 TITLE . . . . . Scowcroft, House, McGoff, and  
 Devilliers  
 DESCRIPTION . . . . . With attachments  
 CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/21/1976  
 VOLUME . . . . . 9 pages  
 COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400776  
 COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . National Security Adviser. Memoranda of  
 Conversations  
 BOX NUMBER . . . . . 17  
 FOLDER TITLE . . . . . January 21, 1976 - Scowcroft, Arthur  
 House, John McGoff, Les Devilliers  
 DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 06/16/2004  
 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

*MR 05-08 #3*  
*1a declassified with*  
*portions exempted*  
*1b open in full*  
*1c open in full*  
*NR 5/1107*

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Yrs

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(C)

**PARTICIPANTS:** Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Arthur House, White House Fellow, NSC Staff

John McGoff, Panex Corporation  
Les Devilliers, Deputy Secretary for Information,  
Government of South Africa

**DATE AND TIME:** Wednesday, January 21, 1976  
3:00 p. m. - 3:34 p. m.

**PLACE:** The White House  
General Scowcroft's Office

McGoff: UPITN keeps me moving. I am now a Vice President. We serve 65 countries. The South African Broadcasting Corporation is a client of ours. We have a worldwide news service. ABC News in the United States uses our foreign film -- all of ABC's foreign films are from UPITN. Through our 100 bureaus worldwide, we obtain information. We have offices in the Middle East, Moscow, Salisbury and Luanda. In Luanda our crew of British nationals has provided us with useful information in the past few days. I will give you a document (hands document to General Scowcroft). It shows that there are several hundred East Europeans at the Hotel Tivoli in Luanda, over 8,000 Cubans, one Congolese Liaison Officer and one Portuguese Communist.

I am very concerned about the course of this war. The Cubans and Soviets are testing equipment, as was done in the Spanish War. The war will shift power and will certainly frighten the Arabs if they see Soviet successes in Angola. The long-term planning for this war began in 1956 and the final military decision was taken in August, 1974. I am a loyal American, and I am concerned about American policy toward Angola. The main problem is lack of direction of the people on the Hill.

On May 31, 1974, Admiral Jack McCain and I met with Vice President Ford to talk about Africa. I will give you these documents -- one concerns the Australian election of May 18 and the other the French election of May 19. I don't know if they will be used.


~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

*with portions  
exempted*

E.O. 11652 (S.E. 1.6)

MROS-08#3 RAC Review/CIA Ltr 9/14/06  
State Review 3/11/04 DIA Ltr 6/23/06  
BY HR NARA DATE 4/30/07



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

-2-

Scowcroft: I can assure you that they will be read.

McGoff: I was very pleased at the appointment of Tom Reed as Secretary of the Air Force by President Ford. He is a good friend and we will have a reception for him next week. His company will be hardput to replace him.

Devilliers: The Prime Minister of South Africa said that I should have a full discussion with General Viljoen (General-Major Constance Viljoen) the head of operations in Angola, before I left. General Viljoen said that we cannot continue [redacted]. We cannot be effective unless our effort is "full-out".

We have agonized over this, and as you perhaps know, we have decided to pull out in eight days. I have just learned that there have been some appeals from Mobutu and Houphouet-Boigny. The Prime Minister is right now talking in our Security Council about the possibility of staying in Angola.

[redacted]  
[redacted] they need military help. Your arms boycott has been very effective -- we don't know how to use the weapons effectively. We are using World War II field guns, and they are no match for the Soviet artillery.

What effect would an open appeal from Zaire to the United States have?

Scowcroft: I honestly don't know. Marginally, it might have some effect, but Congress is insane on this issue. Even a loan is a problem. Certainly an appeal from Zaire would not hurt.


Devilliers: [redacted]  
Viljoen would do it; he has the political and military expertise. He has met with Mobutu.

Scowcroft: Let me look into it.

Devilliers: This is conventional warfare. [redacted]  
[redacted] The Cubans know the weapons. When they fire the Soviet rockets, the UNITA forces run by the hundreds. They have never used this equipment.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

EO 12958 3.3(b) (1) >25Yrs  
(C)



SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

-3-

Scowcroft: If you leave, they will have to resort to guerilla warfare. Without your help, they cannot manage conventional warfare.

Devilliers: Savimbi does not want us out.

Scowcroft: We understand. Some mercenaries would help.

McGoff: How can we help?

Scowcroft: We need help on the Hill. [REDACTED]

McGoff: I am amazed at the insanity of Tunney and Clark. I think our Congress has been penetrated. But there has been a contrary reaction to Moynihan -- who is very popular.

Devilliers: Should I hold on this? It is very urgent. Time is running out. It is too bad--this happened in an election year.

Scowcroft: I will pursue it. This is the Soviets' Vietnam -- not ours.

McGoff: Will we forsake our friends in the OAU?

Devilliers: We can handle the Cubans. The MIGS and the helicopters give us problems. We cannot explain 50 dead as a border war.

Scowcroft: What can our military do?


Devilliers: Our military could give your military a picture of what is needed in military terms. [REDACTED]  
We could better understand the material and equipment needs by consulting together. It is not a question of massive equipment, just the right equipment.

I have a second point to raise. Might this be a good time you to meet with our Prime Minister and perhaps Zaire?

Scowcroft: Not now. You did well at the OAU. Our judgment is that it would not be best to push it [REDACTED] at this time.

Devilliers: I understand. We understand that Mobutu is thinking of a military alliance between himself, Zambia, and South Africa. Mobutu's

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

-4-


being attacked could help you. The problem is basically one of leadership. The Cubans are very effective, compared to the African troops, but are not difficult compared with the South African or American forces.

Scowcroft: A few good leaders make all the difference.

Devilliers: I hope we can have an exchange of expert views.

Scowcroft: I will pursue this. We have a key vote coming up in Congress next week. We may lose it, but we will try.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~




ANGOLA SITUATION REPORT

21 January 1976

- 1. 400 Russian military experts located at the Hotel Tivoli, Luanda
  - 15 East German, Czech and Bulgarian officers, plus 1 Romanian and 1 Finnish
  - 1 Brazilian Colonel
  - 1 Portuguese Communist liaison man (Julio de Almirda)
  - 1 liaison officer from the Congo (Jean Auguie)
  - Several hundred North Koreans
  - 8000 Cubans
- 2. Conventional War
  - Weapons testing ground similar to Spain during Spanish Civil War
- 3. Victory by Russia will also shift the balance in the Middle East since that strategic fact will impress the Arabs at the appointed time and Sadat will not be able to argue it away. Soviets figure they can wait if they control the flow of oil.
- 4. Soviet Naval vastly exceeds that of NATO.
- 5. Her strategy and long term plan is in operation and is being little influenced by our State Department. The long term planning began in 1956 and the final military decision was taken in August 1974.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MR 05-0843 CIA/ltw 9/14/06  
State Review 3/11/04 DIA/ltw 6/23/06  
BY ltw NARA DATE 4/30/07



10

ANALYSIS

Two significant events on the world scene may have dire affect on not only southern Africa but also upon the United States. The Australian election on May 18 placed George Whitlam back in power as Prime Minister of that country. Whitlam continues to oppose the U. S.-British military base on the pivotal island of Diego Garcia. And the French election of May 19, although placing the pro-American d'Estaing into power, does not give him an overwhelming control of the government because of the closeness of the election.

My reflections below on these political events should cause us great concern.

John P. McGoff

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

*MR05-08 #3 CIA dtv 9/14/06*  
*State Review 3/11/04 DIA dtv 6/23/06*  
**BY 182 NARA DATE 4/30/07**



May 31, 1974

These two political events on the antipodes of the world will affect Russia's thrust into the Indian Ocean and the lifeline of Europe's oil supplies from the Persian Gulf; the whole future of East and southern Africa will figure in the drama. The spotlight will focus upon:

...a piece of barren desert on the east coast of Africa, controlled by France, known as the territory of the Afars and Issas, with its modern harbor of Djibouti;

...a minute, V-shaped strip of Indian Ocean coral, overrun by wild donkeys and giant land crabs, named after its Portuguese discoverer Diego Garcia;

...the Kerguelen Islands, barren, cold, windswept, almost forgotten, where some curious Russian scientific activities are taking place.

Since the end of the 19th century, the Russians - first under the Czars - have pushed south towards the Indian Ocean, snapping up one central Asian principality after another until blocked by the British in Persia. Today the Soviets are advancing again, and for the first time in 70 years a Russian naval fleet is at large in the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Gortschkov, architect of Russia's naval resurgence, is sending in missile cruisers while Britain is left with only an archipelago of islands - the Seychelles - and the disputed base of Diego Garcia. India, once Britain's largest domain, is today allied to Russia. There are Soviet bases at Vishkapatnam and Vizianagram, and Indian-provided facilities for the Russians in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Gortschkov's fleet also enjoys naval facilities in the key area of the horn of Africa, close to the Bab el Mandeb ("the gate of tears") where the Red Sea joins the Indian Ocean, and the oil states of the Persian Gulf. These are in the former British harbor of Aden and on Socotra Island (now part of the socialist Republic of South Yemen), at the former British harbor of Zeila, and at the former Italian base of Mogadishu (now part of the Republic of Somalia).

Russia has had up to 30 warships cruising in the Indian Ocean simultaneously, and she is negotiating with the former British colony of Mauritius, now pro-Soviet, for an agreement on facilities for "fishing ships" - trawlers - whose role as intelligence gatherers is widely known. The opposition in Mauritius has, in fact, accused the predominantly Indian government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of providing military facilities for the Russians. More ominously, with the reopening of the Suez Canal scheduled for 1975, the Russian Mediterranean fleet, the ninth Eskadra, which now includes two 40,000 ton aircraft carriers, will have direct access to the Indian Ocean.



The Russians' main aim is to put pressure on the Gulf oil states. Of these, Iraq is already a Soviet satellite, and the others are weak, virtually powerless. In contrast, pro-West Iran is building up its military strength and buying missile-carrying warships. Another reason for Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is fear of U.S. nuclear submarines carrying Polaris and Poseidon missiles set for firing at targets in the USSR. The missiles, believed to be second in number only to those in the Mediterranean, account for the presence of many Soviet vessels with sensitive tracking and monitoring equipment.

The Soviet presence gains extra dimension from the waning of western influence in the Indian Ocean and with the impending doom of Mozambique and the eventual take over of Angola.

The USN says it needs the Diego Garcia base to supply its ships in Arabian and Iranian waters. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt has told the Senate that American ships need "essential elements of naval support at Diego Garcia."

The U. S. is withdrawing military personnel from the Kagnaw base in Ethiopia, replacing them with civilians, because it does not want to be drawn into a potential Ethiopian-Somalian conflict in the horn of Africa. This means that the transfer of the communication system at Kagnaw to Diego Garcia is threatened.

It is not only left-oriented, third world countries such as India, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Somalia, and Mauritius who have come out against the base at Diego and have supported verbal Soviet attacks on these "imperialist plans". Australia, under George Whitlam, is pressing Britain to cancel Diego, and it is getting fervent response among the Labor left.

It is known that the Whitlam government is receptive to a Russian request to establish a satellite and tracking station in western Australia. Such an action would make it possible for a Soviet tracking station to destroy American military communications satellites with laser beams.

We have yet to know whether the French elections have decided the fate of Djibouti. France has a strong military presence in Djibouti - a 5,000 man army, including half a brigade of the Foreign Legion, an armored and an artillery regiment with two Air Force fighter squadrons, a naval unit including the combat vessel "La Combattante", and two minesweepers. The area is run by a legislative assembly and a local government loyal to France.

If France withdraws, Djibouti - a town inhabited mostly by Somalian Issas - would be the flashpoint for a war between Ehtiopia and Somalia, both of which border the territory.



In Somali hands, Djibouti would give the Russians final control of the "gate of tears" - the Red Sea route into the Indian Ocean - and more influence over the Persian Gulf.

Had d'Estaing's election been overwhelming, there would have been no question about France reinforcing Djibouti, but that remains in doubt now.

There is speculation that the Soviets have misused a Franco-Russian weather investigation scheme on the Kerguelen Islands in the southern Indian Ocean. Some sources say Soviets have sneaked in weather tracking rockets to be fired from the islands, electronic gadgets to monitor South African and French communications in the Indian Ocean.

The closeness of the French election should also have an affect on relations with South Africa. At the present time, the French provide military supplies to South Africa in addition to other kinds of military cooperation. A cutoff of this support could place the whole of southern Africa in great jeopardy, leaving it even more susceptible to Soviet and Red Chinese penetration.

The United States should reassess its position as it relates to an arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa. They are important to our defense, our oil supplies from the Middle East, as well as for the important role they will play in the economic development of the rest of Africa.

