NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018350

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
TITLE Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft
CREATION DATE 01/15/1976
VOLUME
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400775 COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN

REDACTED

5/26/10

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 MR # 10-120; #28 acce her 3/11/04; 050 Ler 6/19/10; CIA etr 5/26/10

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By dal NARA, Dato 8/18/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, January 15, 1976 10:05 - 10:30 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

<u>Kissinger</u>: I presented Modified Option IV to Dobrynin. He read through it until he got to Backfire. Then he went up in smoke. He said they want an agreement but there is no way they can count Backfire. He said he had no instructions and maybe he would be surprised but he thought it was impossible.

He asked if there were any other possibilities. I mentioned Option I because everyone seemed to like that. He said that was impossible. I used Don's argument that it deferred the politically sensitive part until after our election. He said maybe it was acceptable if we included ALCM's for the MIRV counting rules. That would be a concession in two ways on their part: It included the principle of Backfire, lets SLCM's match off against Backfire, and gives us the counting rules without including all cruise missiles. You and Brezhnev would sign, with a codicil saying there would be an agreement on saying cruise missiles and Backfire, by January 1977. They want it done in your term.

I think it would lead to Option III. As I understand Clements, his objection to III is political in this election year. This idea would solve that.

I can't judge the political impact of the primaries on an agreement, but this would avoid this. I think you should let the Chiefs know about this and get them on board.

CLASSIFIED BY <u>Henry A. Kissinger</u> EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY <u>5 (b) 1 (3)</u> AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

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I must tell you that Brent thinks the JCS have already pocketed the MIRV verification rules and will scream "unilateral concession" if we include ALCM's in a deferral package.

<u>The President:</u> I think Option III is the place to end up and I am willing to defend it politically. This might be a good way to get there. Why isn't matching Backfire off against SLCM's a good trade militarily?

[Discussion of the Option IV and III SLCM packages]

<u>Scowcroft</u>: Do you want the NSC meeting on Monday or Saturday? Monday might be a bad day.

The President: Let's wait to see how the State of the Union is coming along.

Kissinger: My press conference went well. They were very respectful.

The President: I think we are in good shape on the issues. We certainly made the right decision on your going to Moscow, that's obvious from the press reports of your press conference. If we had cancelled, they would have screamed that we were jeopardizing SALT and the whole relationship for lousy Angola.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Mahon called me wailing about what to do on the Defense appropriation bill. Maybe you should get the leaders in.

The President: I am having them in on Tuesday on the Budget.



Kissinger: I wouldn't mix the two.

<u>The President</u>: When are you getting back? We should be able to get the leaders to hold off on the bill until then.

Kissinger: Sunday.

<u>Scowcroft</u>: But we need a strategy. Perhaps we should figure a way to go in openly for the money.

Kissinger:

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The President: Let's meet with the leaders when you get back from Moscow.

Kissinger: Okay, but we shouldn't be under any illusions that I will bring something back with me. That will take time, if it ever happens.

The President: I understand, but I think you could at least tell them of your discussion.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Okay, And I am having some books prepared of foreign press comments on Angola and how we are abdicating our great power responsibility.

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