

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

MR 01-100, # 19; At. Lett 101101

By dal NARA Date 10/24/01

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Middle East Ambassadors :

Hermann F. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Richard W. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to Syria
Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
William G. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, January 7, 1976
10:23 - 10:48 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

[The Ambassadors and Sisco and Atherton joined the Kissinger-Rumsfeld meeting already in progress.]

Kissinger: I have talked with the President and Don about you and Allon. The President saw Allon's remarks on television saying he was coming to undo the mistake that was made. I will tell him our vote was serious and if they continue to talk repudiation, we will lay out the whole history. We will have an NSC meeting next week. All of us here, Mr. President, think it would be a mistake to have a brawl with Israel over a Security Council meeting. They think we can survive a veto next week with the Arabs if we have a program of action. But if we just stonewall, we will have an explosion before the end of the year. I think it is important they hear from you.

The President: We seem to be having one of our periodic crises with our friends, the Israelis. We did our damnest to work on the Security Council



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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) 1 (3)
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Scowcroft file
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BY ML NLF, DATE 6/14/04

resolution to make it acceptable and still get UNDOF extended. We worked hard and it burns the hell out of me that Israel takes this action. Condemning us as Allon did is frankly a damned lie, but I won't say that. For them to come here to apply that pressure won't work -- at least on me. We probably will have to veto; is that right?

Kissinger: Most of the draft resolutions are easily vetoable. If the Arabs are smart, though, they could give us one helluva problem by using our own language on the "legitimate interests of the Palestinians." They could be tough to explain to the Arabs, because we have used it in documents with the Soviets.

The President: It is an old legislative problem--whether to get the worst possible language so we can vote against it, or to work for a marginally acceptable one.

Kissinger: The Syrian draft is an easy one to throw up our hands at. We won't participate in any modification of the language, unless it is within reach of being acceptable. I might go up to make the explanatory statement on our vote.

Scowcroft: You may not be here then.

The President: It sounds difficult to lay out a firm scenario now.

Kissinger: We are not looking for trouble with Israel on this issue. The strain and turmoil it would cause wouldn't be worth it. I think the best idea is for us to put forward nothing. If someone does put forward a modest resolution, we can look at it.

But all the Arabs -- especially Egypt -- have asked us to avoid a veto. But I think they'll swallow it if we could show some movement.

The President: Like a unilateral movement of two -to-three kilometers on the Golan.

Kissinger: I think we can get through the year is we go through the process of convening Geneva -- with the preparatory conference and other preparatory work, we could use up the year.

Eilts: Sadat is looking for something which he can point to as progress. He really wants you to come -- he will ask for a date.

The President: [Explained the primary schedule.]

At the UN, if we have to veto it would be better if Henry could make the statement.

Kissinger: Let's see if we can make the vote come either before or after my trip.

The President: [looks at primary schedule]: It looks like April would be the best time.

We will be very firm with the Israelis. That is how we got Sinai II. I think they are trying to exploit the situation in '76.

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of being acceptable. I might go on to make a
diplomatic statement of our vote.

S you may not be here then.

P Seems diff. to lay out a firm scenario now.

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strain + tension it would cause wouldn't be
worth it. I think best idea is for us to put
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a veto. But I think they'll swallow it if we
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P like a unilateral movement of c-3 known
Golan.

K I think we can get there - year if we get them
a process of examining Geneva - w/c prep work
& other prep work we could use up a year.

EATS Sa'at is looking for something which he can
point to as proof. He really wants you to
come - he will ask for a date.

P (E explained a primary schedule.)

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