

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Max Fisher
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, December 12, 1975
7:00-7:50 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House



Fisher: I thought you would like a read-out of my trip. They had called a special conference for world Jewish leaders. The mood of the country is hysterical. All these events like Zionism, the UN Security Council vote, the Sadat visit, put them on the defensive. I have never seen it so bad.

I spent two and a half hours with Rabin. He showed me your letter and Henry's letter. I said I could tell him there was no change in our position on the PLO. I said you wanted the six months extension and the only question is whether we could get it without giving anything. Rabin was most disturbed about the PLO invitation and its effect on the Egyptians. It further undercut them in favor of Syria.

I told him he must have confidence in you. He said he did have. I said he shouldn't stir things up and further isolate Israel. The U.S. is his only friend and he shouldn't go public with complaints.

On the settlements, he said he agreed with our assessment, but he had a public posture to uphold. Begin said the Lebanon raid was the biggest mistake they ever made. But he said an independent Palestine would be a dagger at the heart of Israel, controlled by the Soviet Union. At this conference, Begin said the settlements should be allowed to go forward on the West Bank. Rabin said he would not be compromised and put in a box on the West Bank settlements -- they would be right in the

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. memo 2/11/04
BY John, NARA, DATE 10/14/04

midst of Arab settlements. He told me that the right was deliberately stirring this up to embarrass him. He has intense political pressure on him.

The President: We don't anticipate any problems here, except getting the \$2.3 billion through the Congress.

Fisher: He said Henry had sort of given a commitment on the Security Council. I told him that was not so and Dinitz had read something which was not there. I think the key to the whole thing is the Palestinian situation.

The President: Does he have any suggestions? I saw that give Cabinet members thought Israel should talk to the Palestinians if they would recognize Israel.

Fisher: They have to face this eventually, but it is probably too much to face overnight. We can't push them into it, but I think it is the most important issue and I think it is being recognized as such more and more. Rabin is much more self-assured now.

The President: I noticed that on his last visit.

Fisher: Begin spoke very highly of you. He had a good impression of his meeting with you.

Anyway, they all felt terribly isolated and upset.

The President: I guess I can see how they might have a different perspective. But were tough on the Zionism resolution, we did our best on UNDOF, and vetoed the terrorism one. They shouldn't feel isolated.

Fisher: You know how they are -- like Henry is as a person. It is a national trait.

In the evolution of the Palestinian issue, speak frankly to Rabin on this issue, in terms of the future. I had a good visit with them and I think I quieted it down.

With respect to the American [Jewish] community, we need to do something too. There is a perception that you have written off the Jewish vote. I have a couple of ideas, but I would think it out more. In '72 the Jewish press came in to the Oval Office for an interview.



The President: I think we can work something out. Propose something.

Fisher: O. K. It can't look contrived, but we have to put things into proper perspective.



✓ P/ Max Fisher
12 Dec 75

F I that you would like a read out of my trip. They had called a spec copy of world Jewish history. The middle country is hysterical. All these events like Zionism, the UNSC vote, Sabot must put them on a defensive. I have never seen it so bad.

Depart 2 1/2 hrs w/ Rabin. He showed me yours + K's letter. I said ~~that~~ I would tell him there was no change in our position on a PLO. I said you wanted a 6 mos. extension + a soft question is ~~the~~ whether we could get it w/o giving anything. Rabin was most disturbed that a PLO invitation was a reflection of ~~the~~ E. It further undermined them in favor of Syria.

I told him he must have confidence in you - he said he did have. I said he shouldn't stir things up + further isolate ~~him~~ I. US is his only friend + he shouldn't go public w/ complaints. On a settlement, he said he agreed w/ our assessment, but he had a public posture to uphold. Begin said Lebanon raid was a biggest mistake we ever made. But to send an explicit Palestine would be a dagger at a heart of I controlled by a S.D. At this copy. Begin said a settlement should be allowed to go forward on W Bank. Rabin said he would not ^{compromise} put on a box on a W Bank settlements - ~~as~~ they would be right in midst of Arab settlements. He told me that a night was deliberately stirring this up to embarrass him. He has intense political pressure on him.

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P Does he have any say? I saw 5 cabinet
members that I should talk to Pales if they would
accept.

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much to face over-empt. We can't push them
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F Belgium spoke very nicely of you. He had a good
impression of you w/you.

Anyway they all felt terribly isolated & upset.

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perspective. But we were tough on E invasion,
did our best on UNDOF, & retold a terrorism
one. They shouldn't feel isolated.

F You know how they are - like K is a person
it's a matter of trust.

He - involvement of Pales issue, speak privately to
Rabin on this issue, in terms of future.

I had a good insight w/ them & I think I printed it
down.

w/ respect to OS committee, we need to do
something too. There is a perception you
have written off a Jewish vote. I have
a couple of ideas, but I can't think it out
here. In 72, the Jewish press came
in ~~to~~ to a crisis in the press on interview

P I think we can work something out. Please



something continued,
F of. It can't help ~~us~~, but we have to
put things into proper perspective.

