

MEMORANDUM

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MR 01-101 #13 OSD Ltr 3/2/04 Re Ltr 11/27/01

By dal NARA Date 7/19/04

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** President Gerald R. Ford  
 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the  
 President for National Security Affairs

**DATE AND TIME:** Wednesday, November 26, 1975  
 9:20 a. m.

**PLACE:** The Oval Office  
 The White House

The President: This is the first meeting of the four of us. I hope we can overcome the problem that Henry had before. All the contacts come from Henry, not Schlesinger. I think these kinds of meetings will help that.  
Henry - -

Kissinger: I didn't know it was going to be this sort of a meeting, so I am not really prepared. I told Don I would take a DOD man along to Moscow on the SALT negotiations. I hope it won't be played as being squeezed out of me.

The President: You volunteered it.

Kissinger: And I would like a State man present when you see Peres.

The President: That was another problem. Schlesinger was continually undercutting us on Israeli equipment.

Rumsfeld: I am not particularly interested in seeing these groups. Maybe you and I should meet jointly with Peres.

Scowcroft: We used to have a Defense man in when you had defense-related meetings in State.

CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

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[General agreement on meetings with foreigners.]

Kissinger: We have a Verification Panel meeting today. I think we should show the feud between our Departments is over.

Dobrynin said we should make another try. I said that we would have to know there would be a constructive outcome. He said, "Send a letter." We did, and we got a reply in four days. We need to get a position or there is no reason to go to Moscow.

Don, you should know that the Soviets will not agree to include Backfire. If we count ALCM's as MIRV's, and SLCM's, individually, and ban cruise missiles on other than heavy bombers, you take them out of the cruise missile business. They couldn't do it without cutting out other systems.

The President: How about the reduction to 2,300?

Kissinger: That in effect would mean counting 100 Backfire.

Rumsfeld: If you go with something which limits cruise missiles and lets Backfire run free, it will not look balanced.

Kissinger: We can put as many cruise missiles as we want on bombers, trading for Poseidon which we would give to NATO.

Rumsfeld: Do you have these on paper?

Kissinger: No, I don't want it floating through the system.

[Discussion of how to manage this.]

[Discussion of SS-18's and MIRV versus single warheads.]

Brezhnev may be willing to sign a letter restricting MIRV to 1,200.

There is no sense in going to Moscow if we don't have a position. We could have an NSC Friday or just after we come back from China.

Rumsfeld: I think it is important that the key people are all on board and don't testify they were so rushed they didn't have a chance to analyze.



The President: It has never been any different since I have been here.

Rumsfeld: I also think it should be as simple as possible because it is otherwise too easy for Jackson to demagogue it.

The President: Henry has to have negotiating room. If he doesn't have some flexibility, it is not possible to negotiate.

Rumsfeld: How would you do the VP?

Kissinger: I would just outline what is and is not possible. I don't think I should advance any positions and make everyone against me.

Scowcroft: The Chiefs are tending toward signing the Vladivostok position and exempting cruise missiles and Backfire.

Kissinger: The Soviets have rejected that firmly. If we can't agree, we can't agree. I am not anxious for an agreement because it just gets me into a brutal fight with Jackson.

Rumsfeld: Not if it is a good one.

Scowcroft: Yes, Jackson will attack it no matter what.

The President: We would be severely criticized if we didn't make a serious effort -- or if we signed one which could be criticized.


Kissinger: I hear there is a new attitude in Defense toward State -- on Panama, for example.

Rumsfeld: I have been putting that out with my staff. It will take time to change both bureaucracies.

The President: Make a maximum effort in the meeting today.

Kissinger: We must look at the alternatives. Without an agreement, the gap would grow rapidly.

Scowcroft: Schlesinger repeated Sunday that we wouldn't have to spend more without a SALT treaty.



[More discussion of agreement versus no agreement.]

Kissinger: We could make our case to the public -- the consequences of agreement versus no agreement. We can kill them.

I had some conservative Senators in and asked what their objections were to SALT.

[The discussion turned to the DPQ and nuclear modernization.]

Kissinger: The perception in Europe would be adverse if we took them out.

We paid for ten years for McNamara. He wanted all nuclear weapons under U.S. control. He is in part responsible for deGaulle.



Don - Outgoing Ambassador \* (Ambassador Weekly edit) Talk to French on helping  
letter to Berg - DPQ Check Robin dates P/K/R unaffiliated  
- Israeli papers - ACDA notes 26 Nov 75 9:20 am

P. This 1st mtg of 4 of us. Hope we can overcome what K had. All contacts come from K, not Schles. I think these kinds of meetings will help that. Henry -

K I didn't know it was going to be <sup>this</sup> sort of mtg, so I not really prepared. I told Don I would take a OSD memo on Salt report. I hope it would be played or being squeezed out of us.

P You enriched it.

K And I would like a State man present when you see Pees

P That was another prob. Schles was continually underwriting us on I group.

R You mean when

R I not particularly interested in seeing these guys. Maybe you & I should meet jointly w/ Pees.

S Could be from def man in when you had def. critical mtgs in State.

(Get agreement on mtgs) w/ foreigners  
Chatchari

K On VP mtg today, I think we should show a fund is over.

(Outhird discussion w/ Doby)

Doby ~~acted~~ said we should make another try. I said that we would have to know ~~they~~ there would be a counterpart between. He said send a letter

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MR01-101 413 OSD etc 3/2/04, et ltr 11/27/01

BY dal NARA DATE 5/16/07



We did + got a reply in 4 days.

We need to get a position or there is no way  
reason to go to Moscow

Don't you should know that a Sars  
will not independ to agree to withdraw Backfire

I/you count Admiral as MIRVs + Slurs  
independ + ~~count~~ base error or other than

heavy launchers, you take them out of  
our business. They can't do it w/o withing  
out other systems.

P How about a reduction to 2300

K That in effect would mean counting 100  
Backfire.

R If you go w/ something which limits other  
China + like Backfire <sup>you</sup> free it will  
not look balanced.

K We can put so many arms as we want on  
launchers, making for position which we  
could give to NATO.

R Do you have these on paper.

K No, I don't want it floating there - systems -  
(Discussion of how to manage this)

(Discussion of SS-18's + MIRV no single  
warheads)

Brez may be writing to Ziya a letter  
restricting MIRV to 1200.

No sense in going to Moscow ~~but~~ if we  
don't have a position, could have NSC  
Friday or just after China.



R I think it important that the key people  
are all on board & don't testify they ~~are~~ <sup>were</sup>  
so rushed that they didn't have a  
chance to analyze go.

P It has never been my obj. since I  
have been here.

R I don't think it should be as simple as  
possible because it is otherwise too easy  
for Jackson to denigrate it.

P Henry has to have negotiating room. If he  
doesn't have some flex, it is not possible  
to negotiate.

R How would you do a VP

K I would just outline what is & is not  
possible. I don't think I should advance my  
positions & ~~expose~~ expose myself against me.

S JCS is tending toward requiring O-6 positions  
& exempting CMS & Backfire.

K The SAs have rejected that principle. If we  
can't agree, we can't agree. I am not  
anxious for agreement because it just gets me  
in a brutal fight w/ Jackson

R Not if it is a jewel one

S Yes, Jackson will attack it no matter  
what.

P We would be severely criticized if we didn't  
make a serious effort - or if we signed one  
which could be criticized.

R I hear there is a new attitude in Def.



found State Panama, for example.

R I have been putting that out w/ my staff. It will take time to change both bureaucracies

1 Make a major effort in a very timely.

K We must look at a alternative. w/o an agreement, a gap would grow rapidly.

S Schick repeated Sunday that we would not have to spend more w/o a Salt treaty.

(More discussion of agreement vs no agreement)

L We would make one case to public - consequences of agreement vs no agreement, we can bill them.

I had some conservative Senators in & asked what their objections to Salt.

DPQ  
The Underlying  
Perception in the

R We paid for 10 years for Unkhamana. He wanted all excess under US control. He is in part rep. for de Gaulle

