

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, October 17, 1975
 9:30 - 10:47 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECTS: China; Middle East; Sadat Visit

Kissinger: Cy Sulzburger would like very much to see you.

The President: Okay. Brent, will you set it up with Ron [Nessen]?

Kissinger: On Law of the Seas, I know what your political problems are, but let me leave a memo with you. Trudeau is under some pressure but has resisted. Others are just waiting to establish territorial seas. If the Soviets say it is illegal and send ships in anyway, what will you do?

The President: There really are problems.

Kissinger: But seeing that Republican leadership meeting, I can't advise you going beyond prudence.

On my China trip [October 19-23], I would propose negotiating the communique of your trip so you don't have to do it. The Shanghai one had three parts: unilateral statements, an anti-hegemony statement, and a bilateral section -- including statements on Taiwan. That language was ingenious.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 97-15 #55; NSC 68-9/15/98
By Ut NARA, Date 10/8/98

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

What can come from your visit? There can't be complete normalization, although Nixon promised we would do it by 1976. But we can strengthen the anti-hegemony statement. On Taiwan, we have two options: One is to let the PRC state its position including peaceful change, we state our desire for normalization, and we note their view and our desire to work for a solution on the principle of one China. My staff likes this -- I don't. They will reject it and then we will need a fallback. If they do, there will be pressure for full normalization because they will have approved peaceful change. The second option is to restate the Shanghai Communique but instead of saying "the US does not challenge this position," we would affirm the one-China idea. That is unilateral and can be withdrawn. It would reduce our ability to recognize an independent Taiwan, but we could do that only in the context of a massive confrontation with the PRC anyway.

The President: Which formulation is better here politically?

Kissinger: I think mine is.

Scowcroft: I think there is no question about it.

Kissinger: The first option is the unanimous position of my advisors, but I don't support it. Once you accept it, we will be under pressure to move because they have accepted peaceful change. We'll have all the liberals on us.

The President: What would the Japanese say if the Chinese tried to take over Taiwan?

Kissinger: They want us to protect Taiwan while they trade with Taiwan. The present situation where we protect Taiwan is best for everyone.

The President: What will we be doing for 4-1/2 days in China?

Kissinger: They move at a leisurely pace. They will want to hear at length from you about the world situation -- there is no substitute for that. They will expect a long session on the Soviet Union, Europe, Asia. If you get there Monday, they will give a dinner Monday night; on the following evenings there will be one cultural show, a reciprocal dinner, and then one evening free.

The President: How about Chou's health?

Kissinger: He may be on his last legs. You will meet with Mao. Soochow is nice; Hangchow is also. They will certainly want you to go to Shanghai.

The President: The first trip of Nixon was a tremendous extravaganza. There was massive television coverage. I think it would be good to do something different. What is there which is dramatic? See if you can find something different.

Kissinger: Why don't I suggest to them that you would like something Nixon didn't do? Sian is the first capital and there is excavating there.

Scowcroft: That might attract the television.

Kissinger: Asad said he would consider our demarche on Lebanon but said no one had asked him to go in.

The President: Have we approached Israel?

Kissinger: They gave us a waffling answer. I will insist on a firm answer from Dinitz today.

There is an issue on Israeli military equipment. I think we shouldn't hold up these things that were approved prior to the reappraisal.

The President: Okay.

Kissinger: Our reports are the Japanese Emperor's visit was a total success.

The President: That was my impression.

Kissinger: Morocco is threatening a massive march on Spanish Sahara. The ICJ gave an opinion which said sovereignty had been decided between Morocco and Mauritania. That basically is what Hassan wanted.

The President: What is likely to happen?

Kissinger: Spain is leaning to independence. That is what Algeria would like. I will talk to the Moroccan Ambassador today.

The President: What is Sadat doing?

Kissinger: He arrives and overnights at Williamsburg. He comes here on the 27th. Then to New York for the UN. Then Florida and Chicago.

The President: I heard Connally is doing something for Sadat. How about sending Nelson on the whole trip with him?

Kissinger: It would flatter Sadat out of his mind.

The President: Let's look into that. Rockefeller is a bit upset anyway.

Kissinger: Okay, but don't saddle me with him. I have Schlesinger. Seriously, you could also send him on a trip to Southeast Asia -- Australia, New Zealand.

The President: Good. But let's send him with Sadat.

Kissinger: The Turks I think will come around. Demirel wants to improve US-Turkish relations. Kubisch is here with a message from Karamanlis.

P/K 17 Oct 75

K By July buyers would like very much to see you

P OK, Brent, will you set it up w/ Ron?

K On LOS, I know what your potential feels are, but let me leave a message w/ you. Truman is under some pressure but has resisted. Others are just waiting to detect territorial areas. If you say it is illegal & send ships in anyway, what will you do?

P There really are pros.

K But seeing that Republic leadership mty, I can't advise you going beyond presence.

On China - I would propose negot & communique so you don't benefit. The Chungking one had

3 parts: unilateral statements, anti hegemony statement, & bilateral section - incl statements to

on Taiwan. That language was ingenious

What can come from you - not? Can't be complete normalization, tho Nixon promised it by 76. But we can strengthen & create -

hegemony statement. On Taiwan, we have ² ~~some~~ options: (1) let PRC state its position - ^{with purpose/changes} but don't ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~desire~~ ^{desire} for normalization, we will this view & ourselves to create for solution on principle of

one China. My staff likes this - I doubt. They will reject it & then will need a fallback. If they

do there will be pressure for full normalization ^{then} they will have ^{purpose/changes} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~have~~ ^{have} ~~opportunity~~ ^{opportunity} for ~~change~~ ^{change}.

(2) Restate & Shanghai communique but instead of not saying does not challenge, but affirm the one China idea. That is unilateral & can



be all chosen. It would reduce our ability to
stay an idyllic ~~China~~ Taiwan, but we could do
it only in context of massive cooperation of
PRC.

P Which foundation is better here politically?

K I think mine is

S I think there is no question about it.

K ~~I support~~ The 1st option is a reasonable
position for my advisers, but I don't support it.
Once you accept it, we will be unable pressure
to know because they have accepted possible change.
We'll have all the interests on us.

P What would a Japs say if PRC tried to take over Taiwan?

K They won't even protect Taiwan while they trade w/ Taiwan.
The present set where we protect Taiwan is best for
everyone.

P What will we be doing for 4 1/2 days in China

K They want at least 4 days. They will want to
hear at length from you about a world set - no
substitute for that. They will expect a long session
on SD, Econ, Asia. If you get there working they
will give dinner Monday night, one cultural
show, recip dinner, one evening free.

P How about China health?

K Wang is in his last days. You will meet w/ Mrs.
Sunchow is nice, Kungchow is also. They will
certainly want you to go to Shanghai.

P The 1st trip of Nixon was a tremendous propaganda
massive TV coverage. I think it would be good



→ to eventually doing something for Sadat?

To do something big. What is there which is dramatic. Seeing you can find something big.

K Why don't I suggest you would like something Nixon didn't do. Iran is a 1st crystal & there is something there.

S That might attract a TV.

K Assad said he would cooperate and demobilize Lebanon but said no one had asked him to join.

P How did you approach I

K Tony gave us a waffling answer. I will ^{eventually} get a firm answer from Bin Laden today. There is an issue on my eyes. I think we shouldn't hold up that thing opposed prior to appraisal.

P R.

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P That my impression

K Unreconciled is threatening a massive march on Sp. Sahara. The ICJ gave an opinion which said twenty ~~countries~~ had been divided but Morocco & Mauritania. That basically what Hassan wanted.

P What likely to happen.

K Spain is leaning to ~~embrace~~. That is what Algeria would like. I will talk to Moroccan Gov. today.

P What ~~is~~ is Sadat doing?

K (Chavez's grand interview)

P I heard eventually doing something for Sadat. How about sending Nelson on a whole trip with him?

K ~~It~~ It would flatter Sadat out of his mind.



P Let's look into Court. Rockefeller is a bit upset anyway.

K OK, but let's saddle me w/ him - I have Schlesinger. Seriously, you could also send him on a trip to SEA, Australia, NZ.

P Good. But let's send him to w/ Sadat.

K ~~But~~ The Turks I think will come around.

Demirel wants to improve US-T relations.

K which is true w/ way from Kana.

