

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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by dal NARA DATE 7/11/08

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, October 2, 1975  
3:00 p.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: Let me bring you up on the SFRC. On Pike, I take the position seniors will testify on policy and we can give them the numbers of dissents, but not the names.

I think we are in good shape on this issue.

The President: We have won on the classification.

Scowcroft: And Pike couldn't get a subpoena on the dissent cable.

Kissinger: I won't give it. And this dissent channel is set up specifically for this.

The President: Let's not use executive privilege unless we have to, but if we have to, we will use it.

Kissinger: On the SFRC, there are several different strands. Case is practically an Israeli agent. He has an aid amendment barring aid to the Saudis unless they admit women and Jews.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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The President: My God. And the Saudis helped us on OPEC, and have billions to invest.

Kissinger: Case is trying to force out all our commitments and assurances so he can formalize those to Israel and kill those to Egypt. He is trying to say your statement about Egyptian arms proves there are secret commitments.

The President: I guess I phrased it wrong.

Kissinger: No, that isn't it at all. He is just using it as a lever to sanctify the agreements to Israel and kill those to Egypt.

The President: If I were asked, I would say that Egypt has been cut off from Soviet arms. They need arms for self defense. If they come to us for arms, I am sympathetic.

Kissinger: That's right. My mistake was to show them the letters. Now Case is using that. Never again. I explained to the Committee that not all the commitments in the document were binding. I went through them showing how meaningless they were. Biden and Clark were happy; Case was furious.

They want to publish the documents or get a summary from us. In practice there are only two choices: We tell the Committee it is up to them, or they publish the documents against our will. If we give in we never again can negotiate. The only help is Humphrey. They also want a resolution that nothing is binding until it has been provided to the Congress.

There isn't a speech in the UN which doesn't compliment us on the Middle East.

The President: What should we do?

Kissinger: There's nothing for you to do right now.

The President: I think you should stay tough.

Kissinger: I don't think they should put it out.

The President: They are like a bunch of school kids.



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Kissinger: Let me tell you about Khaddam. It was very tough. He said he could live with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement but not the US commitments to Israel. I explained that there were more commitments after the previous one, the Syrian disengagement. The Syrians aren't prepared to negotiate.

The President: That doesn't bother me a lot.

Kissinger: I spoke to Bouteflika. We have to keep Algeria away from Syria.

We should initial the Spanish base agreement on Saturday, or we are in danger of losing it.

The President: Why not?

Kissinger: Because of the flak we'll get.

The President: That doesn't bother me. Go ahead.

Kissinger: I hate to bring this up, but I must mention Schlesinger. I think he is demented. Clements and Brown think so. Haig is outraged on what Schlesinger did to him on the Pershing. He talks to Giscard; we don't know what he says. He wants nuclear weapons out of Europe. He is sabotaging SALT. He is really devious. He told the Pentagon that I assumed his acquiescence in the SALT position and gave it to the Soviets. That's not so. I don't like it. I agreed to present it.

Brown told me cruise missiles worked on anything but a missile of a few hundred kilometers makes a sense.

The President: He should be here trying to get the Defense Budget through, instead of traveling around.

Kissinger: Your problem is executive authority. He should be supportive.

The President: I would like to fire him, frankly. But I think that would give us too many problems. If we can't fire him, we can pull the things away from him which he can use against us. Like cruise missiles.

Kissinger: He is so devious. He rarely tells you or us the real or full truth.

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The President: I have told Marsh and Don I was damned made about the defense appropriation and I wanted to fire him. I told Don I had lost confidence in him.

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from Ford, Kissinger meeting

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