

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
France
Amb. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, French
Ambassador to the U. S.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, September 27, 1975
10:03 - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

[Photographers were admitted. There was small talk about Sauvagnargues being in the White House but not the Oval Office. Jokes about Kissinger, etc. The press was then ushered out.]


Sauvagnargues: The Chinese speech was so long I had to speak in the afternoon.

Kissinger: It was a nasty speech about the Soviet Union and very unfriendly to the U. S.

Sauvagnargues: Yes. But it was the first time there was a reference to Korea. I spoke to Teng and he gave me the impression they were restrained about Korea.

Kissinger: They were brutal on the Soviet Union, but they were very tough for the first time since they have been in the UN, on us. On Korea, the

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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BY: [signature], NARA, DATE 6/3/04

Middle East, Angola -- which comes with especially ill grace in view of their role.

The President: We especially appreciate your helpful role in Korea. You know the Secretary's proposal and that should help in keeping stability there.

Sauvagnargues: We thought it was a useful proposal. I will be attacked by Chiao as being an ally of South Korea, but I think we must avoid a repetition of the mistakes of 1950.

The President: I understand arrangements are moving ahead for an economic summit.

Kissinger: The Brits have already told the Italians what we were going to wait on until you and Genscher could check.

The President: I spoke to Rumor earlier this week, but I was very non-committal. But I am sympathetic to their needs and I really think they should be in.

Sauvagnargues: Neither Giscard or Schmidt is enthusiastic. They are contemptuous of the Italians and they say: if you let more in, where do you draw the line? But I understand the political problems of keeping them out. We greatly appreciate the Four Power consultations we have been having. But I think it is important that we don't harm the Nine by having meetings of the Four or Five. I think, for example, the Nine have been very helpful in dealing with the Portuguese issue. The only real progress we have made in the Nine is the arrangement for periodic heads of government meetings. I mention this only because we need to keep it in perspective.

The President: Rumor made a plea for his inclusion as President of the Nine.

Sauvagnargues: That is the worst reason. They should be represented as Italy. If we get the Nine involved that way, it is a mess.

I want to mention another problem. We want representation in the Consumer-Producer Conference on the part of the Nine, and Callaghan wants no part of it. He wants individual representation.

Kissinger: There are only ten in the preparatory meeting.

Sauvagnargues: It would be destructive of the Nine to do it on this basis.

I might point out that the paper you circulated shows the spirit of Enders is not entirely dead.

Kissinger: I didn't know we had one.

Sauvagnargues: It is not worth the President's time to discuss.

I want to congratulate you on the Middle East. It was a distinct achievement. I spoke to the press about it and I am disturbed at some of the negative comments being made.

The President: I am outraged by the way the press comment.

Sauvagnargues: The American position in the Middle East is identical to our position, and I want to express our support for you.

The President: Thank you.

Sauvagnargues: There is a difference on the PLO. We go farther.

Kissinger: That is a question of timing.

Sauvagnargues: Yes. I told Asad that if the PLO wanted to assume the responsibility of a government, they had to accept the reality of Israel's existence and renounce terrorism. In Venice, the Nine reiterated their position on the PLO -- we spoke of the right of the Palestinians to a homeland.

Kissinger: It is ironical where we have come from the Balfour Declaration.

Sauvagnargues: Genscher said we had to go one step beyond 1973. Callaghan was opposed, but the Saiga made an extreme statement and put the Dutch Government under pressure so we dropped the idea to go farther.

On the whole Arafat gives the impression of being a moderate man, but I'm not sure he is in control.



Kissinger: That is the problem. There are about six groups, and the problem usually is that no leader of these movements emerges who can control the whole thing.

Sauvagnargues: What do you suppose happened between Gromyko and Allon? It was a long meeting.

Kissinger: Israel gave me an interesting readout -- only what the Soviets said. They said their position is familiar and there is no need to describe it.

The Soviet position was they wanted to participate but that the Palestinians had to participate. If the Israelis were smart and we could promise something -- like Jericho -- to the PLO, we could break them from the Soviet Union. Gromyko warned us about a Syrian-Israeli move, which must mean he thinks it is possible.

Khaddam wasn't coming to the UN, but I sent him a note. He is now coming for one day and wants to meet me for breakfast. That is interesting -- he must want to talk.

Sauvagnargues: Is a disengagement on the Golan possible?

Kissinger: Another point is that Gromyko said they wouldn't accept less than the '67 borders even if the Arabs would -- which must mean they think it is possible. Is something possible? Technically not -- the Israeli settlements are the problem.

Sauvagnargues: If they were smart, they would move them.

Kissinger: Of course.

Sauvagnargues: On Cyprus, the four had a very good discussion.

Kissinger: It was really very good.

The President: We have a crucial vote on Wednesday.

Sauvagnargues: Are you confident?

The President: It looks like 55 to 45 and that is too close. And it is only a partial lifting. But it would be a good signal.



Sauvagnargues: You would still retain an element of pressure on Turkey.

The President: That is an important point. If there is no movement in two to three months, Congress will reimpose it. So any influence you and the Nine can exert on Greece and Turkey would be very helpful.

Sauvagnargues: Yes, we have discussed in the Nine and with Greece and Turkey and with Secretary Kissinger how best to help. After the Turkish election we will start to help. I will go to Ankara shortly. And the Nine will start to apply pressure.

One problem is the central government. Turkey wants a rotating President. The Greeks won't accept, but Turkey will never accept Makarios. What do you think?

Kissinger: We need Makarios for a while. It would be helpful if he would sign the agreement. The solution may be a weak government.

The President: We are getting some help from responsible members of the Democratic party, but we have a very unreal minority lobbying against lifting the embargo.

Sauvagnargues: Is the Greek Government active? They tell us no.


Kissinger: It is hard to say. The Cypriot Government is very active and most American Greeks are Cypriots. Of course Brademas and Sarbanes have their own games.

Sauvagnargues: We must make preparations for the Giscard visit. My visit now is so short. Maybe I should come next March and spend a few days. I could see some Congressmen. We should demonstrate that the U.S. and France are able to get along.

Kissinger: Since Martinique, the change has been remarkable.

Sauvagnargues: We are really very pleased with the way our relations have developed and we think it is very beneficial for the future of the West.

[The meeting concluded.]



✓ P/Sauvagnard / K / Kozarinski - Wright ^{urgent}
27 Sept 75

10:00 am

(Pass in)

Small talk about Sauvagnard being in WH but
not in Office, jokes about it, etc.

(Pass out)

S Tea Chinese speech was so long I had to get out
e afternoon

K It was a nasty speech about SC and very
unfriendly to US

S Yes, but 1st time was up to Korea. I spoke to Teng
& he gave me impression they were ^{upright} ~~upright~~
about Korea

K They were heated on SC, but very tough
for 1st time since they have in CH, on us.
On Korea, ME, Angola - which comes off as
ill grace in mind of their role.

P US say approve your helpful role in Korea.
You know - Secy proposal should help in
keeping stability there.

S We think it was a useful proposal. It will be
criticized by China as being an ally of S. Korea
but I think we must avoid a repetition
of mistakes of 1950

P I understand arrangements ~~had~~ as being
ahead for an early summit.

K Tea points have already told - I think what
what we were going to want on tel you
& perhaps could check

P I spoke to Kuznetsov earlier this week
but guess many were ~~not~~ committed

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 3/11/04

BY lra NARA DATE 6/3/04



I want to correct you on a M.E. It
was a distinct achievement. I spoke to press
about it and an editorial out saying a

P very movement being made.
S I am outraged by a very poor comment.
The Arab position on M.E. is identical to
our position, and I want to express our
support for you.

P Thank you

S There is a dig on P.H. We go further.

K Tuning


S Yes. I told Assad that if P.H. would to assume
any part they had to accept reality
of I existence + remove terrorism. In
Venice, a ^{relevant comment to} I supported the position on P.H. -
we speak of a right of a Palestinian to
a homeland

K I would like to have come from ^{Balfour} Balfour
declaration.

S Genscher said we had to go one step beyond
1973. Callaghan was opposed, but we that
~~we~~ a ^{Saiga} Saiga made an extreme statement +
had a Dutch ~~sent~~ under pressure so we
dropped a idea to go further.

On a whole Arafat gives a impression of being
a moderate man, but I'm not sure he is
in control.

K That is a fact. There are about six groups +
a part especially is no leader of that movement
nobody who can control a whole thing.



S What day or suppose happened too, Gungah & Allan. It's long with.

R I gave me interesting and out - only what C says said. They said their position position & we need to describe.

Some position was they wanted to participate with that Palestinian had to participate. ^{if there is more} If you could promise something - like Junior - D-Pho, we could break them from C.S.V.

Gungah would be about a Syrian - I mean, which must mean it is possible.

R had me want coming to UN, but I don't think a vote. He is now coming for 1 day & wants breakfast, I had to interesting - he must want to talk.

S Is a disagreement on what is possible?

R Another point is Gungah said they would not accept less than 67 votes even if Arabs would which must mean they think it possible.

Is something possible? - Technically not - I settlements are a part.

S If they ~~were~~ were present, they would cover them.

R O.P. must.

S Our biggest, a 4 trial very good also vision

R It was really very good

P We have a crucial vote on W.S.I.

S Are you confident?

P 55-45 & that too close. Good it only a partial lifting, but it would be a good sign.

S You would still retain an element of
presence in T,

P That an important part. If we move
in 2-3 months, Cong will reorganize it.
So any important years & I can get
also. Gov T would be very helpful.

S Yes, we have discussed in a few w/Gov T
& K have lost a ~~lot~~ help. After election
we will start to help. I will get a chance
thoroughly ~~to discuss~~ ~~with~~ & I will start
to apply pressure.

One prob is - central part, I want starting
Pres. Greeks want except, but I will work
except Turkies. What you think?

K We need Turkies for a while - help
if he want to give adjustment. Solution
may be work part.

S Yes. That this is really disguised partition.
(missed some)

P We are getting some help from very members
of Dem. party, but we have a very
local community lobbying against letting
changes.

S Is the Greek Gov active? They tell me
no.

H It hard to say. The Congress Govt is very
active & most US Greeks are by side. Of
course Brad & Sankar have their own goals.

S We must make preparations for Casimir
visit. My visit now is to short sample &
should come next month & spend a few days -
I could see some Com. We should ~~also~~ ^{demonstrate}
that a US & Fr ~~are~~ ^{are able to get} getting along.

K Since uncertainties & changes have been
unavoidable.

S We are really very pleased with the way
our relations have developed & think it is
very auspicious for the future of West.

