

Representative Anderson: We are hearing arguments that the United States would be meddling in the Turkish elections by voting on the embargo now. Some are calling for a delay of 30 days in the vote.

Speaker Albert: I have been presented with a scroll of the names of 150,000 Cypriot refugees. This is just an indication of how active the Greeks are calling on members to press their case. Of course the sad part of the story is that the Turks indeed did force the removal of these refugees.

Representative Anderson: But we can counter that argument by saying that the United States is for a settlement which will permit the refugees to return and that we want to help them recover their homes.

Senator Mansfield: My daughter returned home after hearing John Brademas speak and asked me why I voted to lift the embargo. I told her I did so because I was pro-Greek and I wanted to help the Greek Cypriots.

The President: One of the worrisome indications we have seen is the potential action of the Turkish Cypriots to declare an independent Turkish-Cypriot state. This is especially discouraging since the parties have already agreed to a bizonal federal arrangement. I would think that an independent Turkish Cypriot would be the last thing the Greeks want. They have to recognize that the Turks have 30 to 40,000 troops on the Island. Who can stop the Turks if they decided to go independent? The United States certainly won't go in to prevent that. Therefore, the only way to get the parties together to settle the refugee problem, and even more importantly, to protect our own security interests, is to lift the arms embargo.

Representative O'Neill: Mr. President, you've got to think about what happens if you should lose the vote. What would that do to the Turkish election?

The President: I think it is clear that we must take our action based on our own security interests and on the realities we face now. Another defeat of this legislation would deteriorate the situation to an absolutely irretrievable level.

The Vice President: The Turkish election is between the man who put the troops on Cyprus in the first place and the moderate



who's seeking a reasonable solution. If the Congress fails to vote to lift the embargo, they will in fact be helping the radicals in Turkey.

Representative Anderson: NATO Security General Luns spoke to several of us on the Hill last week and expressed the concern of our European allies over the situation regarding Turkey. I don't see a stronger argument than the impact on NATO of the U. S. embargo.

The President: If the Congress takes off the embargo, the negotiations can get started on a Cyprus settlement. We have made it very clear to the Turks that if the embargo is lifted, they have got to make substantial movement. What assurances does the pro-Greek lobby have that a continuing embargo will solve the problem? There are all sorts of vehicles available to Congress to reimpose the embargo if there is no progress on Cyprus. There will be many opportunities to change course if the Turks do not perform but it is absolutely critical that we act now.

The Vice President: Mr. Dean Alfange, the former President of AHEPA, has been talking to a large number of his Greek friends and supporters on the Hill. He supports the Administration's view and is saying that the only way to get the refugees back to their homes is to achieve a negotiated settlement, which can occur if the embargo is lifted.

General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I think it is important to point out that the U. S. embargo is going to be a factor in the Turkish election whatever we do. Prime Minister Demirel is under great pressure from the former Prime Minister Ecevit, the man who invaded Cyprus in the first place. Demirel can only go two ways. He can try to be as tough as Ecevit on the United States, or he can point to the fact that he got the embargo lifted.

The President: I want to assure you that we will do all that we can. Every element of the Administration will be going all out to achieve an affirmative vote. Our national security is very much involved in this issue.

Middle East

The President: Let me turn now to the Sinai Agreement. I want to point out to you that the Israelis have refused to sign the Protocol to the Agreement until Congress approves the U. S. proposal on civilian technicians in the Sinai.

General Scowcroft: That is correct, Mr. President. The Agreement cannot begin to take effect until Congress approves the U. S. proposal.

Speaker Albert: I think the Israelis should have signed immediately. They will build a lot of resentment by trying to pressure Congress in this way.

Senator Scott: We are in executive session today but one group wants public disclosure of all papers. Clifford Case tells me that while there is strong pressure to declassify all of the documents relating to the Agreement, a majority of the Committee would be satisfied with a full disclosure to the Committee members without public release.

Representative O'Neill: The House will probably act next week, but I should tell you that the International Relations Committee is not at all satisfied that it is getting all the answers on U. S. arms commitments to Israel, and they are unhappy that no aid bill has yet been sent up.

The President: I am waiting to send up the aid bill until Congress approves the Sinai Agreement. I am holding up because if the Agreement does not take effect, we will have to totally reconsider our aid to Israel in the context of the absence of an Agreement.

Representative O'Neill: (He read a list of several questions regarding the possibility of the U. S. providing the Pershing missile to Israel. Has it been committed to Israel? How many have been committed? Will it carry a nuclear warhead? Was the Defense Department informed of U. S. plans to provide the missile? etc.)

The President: Tip, let me answer all of those questions for this group. Last September, Rabin came to see me. During his visit he presented Israel's military equipment needs. There were several short-range needs we took care of. They also presented their long-range shopping list, called MATMON B. At that time, we said we could not consider that list. It was premature. After the Sinai Agreement was reached, they resubmitted their list. That list contained the Pershing missile, as did the list presented last year. In our negotiations with Israel on the recent agreement, all we said is that we would study the request for the Pershing. There is absolutely no commitment beyond that.

I think you all recognize that the Israelis are very tough negotiators. They want an awful lot of hardware. We will be make a very detailed



study of the Israelis' arms request and the Pershing missile will be very carefully studied.

The Department of Defense saw the MATMON B shopping list last year, and the Pershing missiles were on that list. We also told the Defense Department that we would be studying all the items on the list.

Senator Scott: Whatever we do for Israel, we should not draw down further our active military stocks. This would endanger our own security and would lead to a public outcry.

The President: That's absolutely right, Hugh. Orders have been given in the Administration that we are not to draw down our active stocks to provide equipment to Israel. The Israelis know about this. The United States is now procuring new and sophisticated weapons from our manufacturers but Israel will not be put ahead of the United States on the production line. Israel's needs will not preempt U. S. procurement. They will get what they need from later production after our own needs have been met. The Israelis are very well protected with the weapons they now have. They will not be allowed to jeopardize our security and this has been made very clear to the Israelis.

General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I want to point out that there is some urgency on the approval of the Agreement for two particular reasons. First, the Israelis and the Egyptians hammered out with great difficulty at Geneva a withdrawal timetable. If there is any delay in approving the agreement, this timetable would have to be renegotiated and frankly it may not be possible to do so. Second, Sadat is under great pressure, as you know, from the other Arabs. Further delay by the United States would seriously undercut him because congressional questions about the value of the agreement would make it appear that the Congress agrees with his Arab detractors.

Senator Mansfield: Did you say the military aid request would be delayed?

The President: I will not send up my dollar request until the Sinai Agreement is fully set. It makes a big difference on what figures we send up on whether we have an agreement or not. As I have said, we are taking a gamble on peace, and I feel deeply that our military assistance will be a good investment. I have discussed this with the Jewish leaders and our Jewish Community friends are supportive of the agreement. It is clear to me that the Sinai Agreement is good for the United States as well as for Israel and Egypt.



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PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

John Eastland
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Carl Curtis
Frank Moss

HOUSE

Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
Jack McFall
Bob Michel
John Anderson

STAFF

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Morton
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Max Friedersdorf
Alan Greenspan
Brent Scowcroft
Dick Cheney
Frank Zarb
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis

REGRETS

Secretary Schlesinger
Senator Griffin
Rep. Rhodes
Rep. Burton
Bill Seidman
Bill Baroody



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REGRETS

Secretary Schlesinger
Senator Griffin
Rep. Rhodes
Rep. Burton
Bill Seidman
Bill Baroody



MEMORANDUM

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6787

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT

September 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: LES JANKA *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Meeting, Thursday, September 25, 1975

Attached for your review is a Memorandum of Conversation drawn from my notes of the President's meeting with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on Thursday, September 25, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the Memcon at Tab A.

 [Signature] APPROVE
 DISAPPROVE

ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Jonker KISSINGER, H REFERENCE: 6487 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ OTHER _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

S _____ S CODWORD

T/S SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Memcon of pres mtg w/ bipartisan congressional leadership on Sept 25

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			<u>X</u>	MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA			<u>X</u>	RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC			<u>X</u>	ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			<u>X</u>	
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
9/26		Scowcroft	X	Decision (r/s)	once by Clift + Jonker
9/29		NSC/S	C	Scowcroft approved memcon	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: P FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

OCT 2 1975

CRT ID: 6415 SA SF

OPEN N HP NS

CLOSE N WH EP

PA DY



CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (correction)

1. Background: The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have pressed for a European conference on security and cooperation since 1954, initially to be limited to European states. In 1970 they agreed to US and Canadian participation, as NATO members with vital interests in the area. NATO took the position that concrete progress must be made in the Berlin Four-Power negotiations before preparatory talks on such a conference could be opened, and this condition was fulfilled with the implementation of the Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin in June 1972.

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks beginning in November 1972 established enough common ground among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would produce satisfactory results. CSCE opened formally at the foreign minister level in July 1973 at which time the agenda was adopted and it was agreed that decisions would be taken by consensus. The working phase of CSCE began in Geneva in September 1973 and concluded on July 19, 1975 with the announcement that a final document would be signed by the 35 participants at a July 30-August 1 summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland.

2. The document is a political statement of intent; it is neither a treaty nor a legally binding agreement under US constitutional usage. It will, however, carry considerable moral and political weight since it is to be signed at the highest level. There are four main sections:

- Security in Europe: Ten principles of interstate relations deal with respect for sovereignty; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment of international obligations. These principles are manifestly incompatible with the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

At Western insistence the principles include a statement that borders may be changed by peaceful means. There is also provision for announcement 21 days in advance of largescale military maneuvers and for invitations to interested observers.

- Economic, scientific, technical, and environmental cooperation: commercial exchanges, industrial, scientific, and technological cooperation, and promotion of tourism.

The Secretary of State



Press Conference

July 25, 1975
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: President Ford's Trip to Europe, CSCE, Mideast, SALT

THE PRESS: There is a statement here that the White House has put out on the trip. In it, the President says the Helsinki declaration will further the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe, and he restates our commitment to the peaceful changes.

In a specific way, can you tell us how somehow this will further the aspirations of the people now locked into the Soviet sphere?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, one has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the Soviet sphere" means.

Q: Lithuania, Latvia, and part of the Soviet Union.

A: In those countries, the existing situation in Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of forces and a state of affairs that has continued for a generation. It was not created by a document and it will not, as such, be changed by a document.

Therefore, the question that has had to be answered in the entire postwar period, and has been answered in different ways at different times, is what is more helpful for a humane evolution: a policy of confrontation or a policy of easing tensions; whether peoples can realize their aspirations better under conditions in which there is political, and a threat of military, conflict, or under conditions in which the two sides are attempting to settle their disputes and ease tensions.

The judgment that has been made—and it is important to remember that it is not only that of the United States, but of all West European countries—is that a policy in which an attempt is

made to settle political conflicts will help the humane values that they espouse.

This was the basis for Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in 1969, in which he faced within his country the question of whether the objectives that he sought were best achieved by a policy of political confrontation or by a policy of easing tensions.

He gave the answer, he made the decisions as far as the Federal Republic and the German question was concerned, which in turn was at the heart of the European problem.

The agreement by the United States to attend the European Security Conference [CSCE] was in fact made conditional on progress on the German question, and particularly on the solution of the Berlin issue.

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the easing of tensions in the world and easing of tensions in Europe will help ease the lives of people and may contribute to an evolution in which the problems that produced the cold war can be dealt with more effectively.

No document is going to change the existing balance of power on the Continent and therefore there are limits to what any agreement can achieve, but this is the sense in which the President used that paragraph.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as being the consequences of yesterday's House vote on the Turkish arms embargo? Do you see any progress in—

A: I would like to answer that in the second

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



News Release

July 25, 1975
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The following is a statement by President Ford prior to his departure July 25, 1975 for the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe via Bonn, Warsaw, and Krakow, and subsequent visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.

I am glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference [CSCE] in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada—35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a *status quo* which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be de-

pended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families, and friends have been and still are profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



News Release

August 1, 1975
Helsinki, Finland

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

President Gerald R. Ford addressed the following remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Finlandia Hall, August 1, 1975:

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues: May I begin by expressing to the Governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the longstanding affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius. Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry, and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say

what all of us already know: that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization, and, therefore, all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries, and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress, not only for ourselves but for all mankind. I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to mangle for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles, are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves. Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotia-

REFERRAL

To: The Secretary of State

Date: August 27, 1975

ACTION REQUESTED

- Draft reply for:
 - President's signature.
 - Undersigned's signature.
- Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
- Direct reply.
- Furnish information copy.
- Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
- Furnish copy of reply, if any.
- For your information.
- For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.
 2 weeks!
 If more than ~~72 hours~~ delay is encountered,
 please telephone the undersigned ~~at 456-6688~~,
~~at 456-6688~~ Miss Byrne 456-6688

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

Letter: _____ Telegram: Other: _____

To: The President
 From: Jonas Talandis, 2560 Oakwood Terrace, Olympia Fields, Ill. 60461
 Date: August 7, 1975
 Subject: Writer opposes U. S. recognition of Soviet control of Baltic States.

By direction of the President:

RLE
 Roland L. Elliott
 Director of Correspondence



RLE:JRH:PAN:PB:emp

7/24 0115/75
NATIONAL LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN REPUBLICAN FEDERATION

Jonas Talandis
Chairman

2560 Oakwood Terrace
Olympia Fields, Illinois 60461

August 7, 1975

To the President of the United States
Honorable Gerald Ford
White House
Washington, D. C. 20515

7517077

Dear Mr. President:

As I have outlined in my telegram sent to you to Helsinki many people of our Lithuanian community are greatly disturbed with your participation in the Helsinki Conference and in particular the deletion of a paragraph in your speech upon departure to Europe specifically dealing with the non-recognition of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic nations.

Now a new problem has developed: meetings, demonstrations and petitions are being organized to speak strongly against you, Mr. President.


Our organization is concerned with the loss of votes in the upcoming election year. We need urgently some material from the White House for the purpose to divert the wrong assumptions and to reassure our community of your friendship toward us.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain

Very sincerely yours,

Jonas Talandis
Jonas Talandis, Chairman

JT:mf



NATIONAL LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN
REPUBLICAN FEDERATION

Jonas Talandis

Chairman

2560 Oakwood Terrace

Olympia Fields, Illinois 60461



To The President of the United States
Honorable Gerald Ford
White House
Washington, D. C. 20515